Fredin v. Halberg Criminal Defense

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Fredin v. Halberg Criminal Defense

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Brock Fredin,                            Case No. 19-cv-3068 (SRN/HB)    

                          Plaintiff,                                     

ORDER

v.                                                                       

Halberg Criminal Defense,                                                
Christina Zauhar,                                                        

                           Defendants.                                   


Brock Fredin, 1180 7th Ave., Baldwin, WI 54002, pro se.                   

Barry O’Neil, Lommen Abdo, PA, 1000 International Centre, 920 Second Avenue S., 
Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendants.                                    


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] filed by 
Defendants Halberg Criminal Defense (“Halberg”) and Christina Zauhar, and the Motion 
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 35] filed by Plaintiff Brock Fredin.  
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion, and denies Plaintiff’s 
motion.                                                                   
 I.   BACKGROUND                                                         
    On December 11, 2019, Fredin filed the Complaint [Doc. No. 1] in this action, based 
on claims arising from the legal representation provided by Ms. Zauhar to Fredin in 
underlying state court criminal and civil actions.  Ms. Zauhar is an attorney at the Halberg 
law firm.  Fredin asserts claims for legal malpractice/negligence, breach of contract, 
charging excessive legal fees, fraud, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, false 
imprisonment,  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress,  and  negligent  infliction  of 

emotional distress.  (Compl. ⁋⁋ 2, 75–121.)  In an earlier lawsuit, Fredin asserted nearly 
the same claims against the same defendants. Fredin v. Halberg Crim. Defense, No. 18-
cv-2514 (SRN/HB) (D. Minn. filed Aug. 27, 2018).1  However, in February 2018, the Court 
dismissed the earlier action without prejudice for Fredin’s failure to prosecute.   
    In lieu of filing an answer in this case, Defendants filed the instant Motion to 
Dismiss.  They argue that Fredin’s claims arise solely from the attorney-client relationship, 

and must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), due to Fredin’s failure to 
comply with 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.  (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 13] at 
5.)  Under this statute, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must serve an affidavit of 
expert review with the pleadings.  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 2(1); Noske v. Friedberg, 
713 N.W.2d 866, 871
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).  In addition, Defendants argue, Fredin’s 

claims  alleging  fraud  and  negligent  misrepresentation  also  fail  to  comply  with  the 
heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to 
Dismiss at 8–9.)                                                          
    On February 11, 2020, Fredin moved for an extension of time in which to comply 
with the expert affidavit requirement [Doc. No. 17].  On April 15, 2020, Fredin again 

moved for an extension of time in which to comply with the requirement [Doc. No. 28].  
Defendants opposed both motions [Doc. Nos. 24 & 32].  On May 1, 2020, Magistrate Judge 

1    The current pleading adds Fredin’s claims for false imprisonment and negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.                             
Bowbeer denied both motions for an extension [Doc. No. 34], and on May 12, 2020, she 
issued an order [Doc. No. 43], denying Fredin’s request for reconsideration [Doc. No. 40].  

    Fredin did not file a memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  
On May 7, 2020, he filed the instant Motion to Amend the Complaint.  He argues that 
“good cause and justice requires leave to file an amended complaint.”  (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. 
Mot. to Am. [Doc. No. 36] at 2.)  He contends that his proposed amended complaint 
survives Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) challenge because he attaches an affidavit of expert 
review.  (Id. at 4.)  Fredin asserts that he searched for an expert for some time, and “was 

only just recently able to afford an expert review.”  (Id. at 6.)  He identifies attorney Bruce 
Rivers as his expert, and provides an affidavit of expert review [Doc. No. 38] with his 
proposed amended pleading.                                                
    In opposition, Defendants urge the Court to deny Fredin’s Motion to Amend on 
grounds of futility.  (Defs.’ Opp’n [Doc. No. 44] at 3.)  Again, they assert that Fredin failed 

to comply with the expert review statute, requiring the dismissal of his claims.  (Id.)  Even 
if the Court considers the Rivers Affidavit, Defendants argue that it does not satisfy the 
requirements of 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 3(1).                         
II.   DISCUSSION                                                          
    A. Standard of Review                                                

    When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the 
facts in the pleading to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 
793 F.2d 185, 187
 (8th Cir. 
1986). The Court, however, need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten 
v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 
183 F.3d 799
, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions 
that the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged in the complaint.  Westcott v. City of Omaha, 

901 F.2d 1486, 1488
 (8th Cir. 1990).                                      
    To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint “must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.’”  Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 
849 F.3d 400, 404
 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570
 (2007)).  Facial plausibility exists when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678
 (citing Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556
).  While the 
plausibility standard is “not akin to a probability requirement,” it necessarily requires a 
complaint to present “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  
Id.
                                                                       

    To amend a pleading, other than within a narrow window of time after filing suit or 
receiving a responsive pleading, a party may only amend with the opposing party’s written 
consent or the court’s leave.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  While leave to amend shall be freely 
given when justice so requires, 
id.,
 the right to amend is not absolute.  Doe v. Cassel, 
403 F.3d 986, 990
 (8th Cir. 2005).  A court may deny a party’s request for leave to amend if 

the proposed amendment would be futile. See Reuter v. Jax Ltd., Inc., 
711 F.3d 918, 922
 
(8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (identifying futility of amendment as one of several bases 
on which to deny leave to amend). A proposed amendment is futile if the court finds “that 
the amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Cornelia I. Croswell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc., 
519 F.3d 778, 782
 (8th Cir. 2008).                                        

    Because Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s proposed amendments would be futile, 
the Court applies the same standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) to both motions.  
    B.  Affidavit of Expert Review                                       
    As noted in prior rulings of Magistrate Judge Bowbeer in this case, (see May 1, 
2020 Order at 2; May 12, 2020 Order at 1–2), when a plaintiff files a legal malpractice or 
negligence action against a licensed attorney, and intends to use expert testimony to 

establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must serve an affidavit of  expert review, drafted 
by an attorney, or, in the case of a pro se plaintiff, the plaintiff must sign the affidavit, and 
is held to the same standard as an attorney.  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 2(1).   
    The affidavit of expert review must state that                       
    (1) the facts of the case have been reviewed by the party’s attorney with an 
      expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that the 
      expert’s opinions could be admissible at trial and that, in the opinion of 
      this expert, the defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care 
      and by that action caused injury to the plaintiff;                 

    (2) the expert review required by clause (1) could not reasonably be obtained 
      before the action was commenced because of the applicable statute of 
      limitations; or                                                    

    (3) the parties have agreed to a waiver of the expert review required by clause 
      (1) or the party has applied for a waiver or modification by the court under 
      paragraph (c).                                                     
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 3(a).2  Fredin has never claimed that an approaching statute of 
limitations deadline caused him to file this action without an expert review affidavit, nor 

have the parties agreed to waive the requirement.                         
    In  a  legal  malpractice  action,  expert  testimony  is  required  to  establish  the 
professional standard of care, the breach of that standard, and causation.  LaBorde v. 
Castleman, No. A05-18-5, 
2006 WL 2053158
, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 2006) (citing 
Admiral Merchs. Motor Freight, Inc. v. O’Connor & Hannan, 
494 N.W.2d 261, 266
 (Minn. 
1992); Spannaus v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly, & Lindgren, Ltd., 
368 N.W.2d 395, 399
 (Minn. 

Ct. App. 1985); Walton v. Jones, 
286 N.W.2d 710, 715
 (Minn. 1979)).  In rare instances, 
expert testimony may not be necessary if the complained-of conduct “‘can be evaluated 
adequately by a jury in the absence of expert testimony.’”  Kurdyumova v. Robinson, No. 
A13-1734, 
2014 WL 1875847
, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 2014) (quoting Hill v. Okay 
Constr. Co., 
252 N.W.2d 107, 116
 (Minn. 1977)).                           

    Here, the Court finds that specialized knowledge from an expert is required to 
determine  the  professional  standard  of  care  applicable  to  Fredin’s  legal 
malpractice/negligence claim.  Among his allegations, Fredin asserts that his counsel 


2    The expert review statute contemplates two affidavits.  The first affidavit, which is 
the affidavit of expert review, establishes that an expert has reviewed the case and has 
concluded that the defendant breached the applicable standard of care, causing injury to 
the plaintiff.  Fontaine v. Steen, 
759 N.W.2d 672, 676
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).  The second 
affidavit, the affidavit of expert identification or expert disclosure, identifies the expert 
witnesses, and provides the substance of their opinions, and bases for their opinions.  
Id.
  
While the first affidavit must be served with the pleadings, the second must be served 
within 180 days of the commencement of discovery.  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 2(2).  The 
first affidavit is at issue here.                                         
breached the standard of care by failing to raise certain constitutional claims, failing to file 
certain  motions,  engaging in  off-the-record  proceedings  and  conversations,  failing  to 

consult  with  Plaintiff  about  a  forensic  investigator,  and  filing  motions  to  withdraw.  
(Compl. ⁋⁋ 75–79.)  A jury could not reasonably determine if Defendants’ conduct violated 
the standard of care without expert testimony, as Fredin’s claims involve a variety of 
underlying criminal and civil proceedings, many of the challenged decisions of counsel 
require an understanding of the standard of care, and the decisions of counsel implicate 
issues of professional judgment and legal strategy.  Fredin’s initially unsuccessful attempts 

to obtain an expert opinion demonstrate that he also understood expert testimony was 
necessary to prove his case.  (See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Am. at 6.)    
    The expert review statute applies not only to claims specifically pleaded as legal 
malpractice, but to any other derivative claims that “are based on the same facts as [the] 
legal malpractice claims and arise solely out of [the] attorney-client relationship.”  Afremov 

v. Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., 
922 F. Supp. 2d 800, 815
 (D. Minn. 2013); see also Pearson 
v. Oxford Prop. Advisors, LLC, No. A10-1766, 
2011 WL 1833133
, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 16, 2011) (finding no error in the dismissal of plaintiff’s alternative claims, “[b]ecause 
allowing a plaintiff to simply list multiple alternative claims without fleshing out the logic 
or merits of those claims would create a significant loophole in 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.”)   

    Plaintiff’s claims arise solely out of his attorney-client relationship with Defendants, 
and each claim is predicated upon the same set of underlying facts.  As an initial matter, 
after asserting his legal malpractice/negligence claim in Count 1, Fredin realleges and 
incorporates the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint for each of his subsequent claims.   
(See Compl. ⁋⁋ 80,  81, 83, 89, 94, 102, 108, 114.)                       

    His breach of contract claim essentially alleges that Zauhar violated the professional 
standard of care, (id. ⁋ 67), and therefore requires expert testimony.  Jerry’s Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 
711 N.W.2d 811, 817
 (Minn. 2006) (noting 
that expert testimony is generally necessary to establish the applicable standard of care and 
to  further  establish  whether  the  conduct  in  question  deviated  from  that  standard).  
Accordingly, this claim requires an affidavit of expert review under 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.  

See Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., P.L.L.P., No. A07-2462, 
2008 WL 5396832
, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008) (requiring expert testimony to support 
breach of contract claim against accountant where the claim was based on a breach arising 
out of the accountant-client relationship).                               
    Likewise, Fredin’s allegations that Zauhar engaged in unnecessary and wasteful 

billing (Compl. ⁋⁋ 69–74) also assert a breach of the standard of care, and require expert 
testimony.  Similarly, his claim of intentional and negligent misrepresentation refers to the 
“actions and representations Plaintiff described above,” (id. ⁋⁋ 75–79), and relies on the 
same allegations as his legal malpractice/negligence claim.  It is therefore subject to the 
requirements of 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.  Berman v. Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, 

LLP, No. A06-351, 
2006 WL 3734278
, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006) (affirming 
dismissal of misrepresentation claim due to plaintiff’s failure to provide expert affidavit, 
where misrepresentation claim was directly related to legal malpractice claim for which 
expert testimony was required).  The expert affidavit requirement also applies to Fredin’s 
fraud claim, in which he alleges that Defendants mishandled client funds and did not 
effectively communicate about fees.  Zirbes v. Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., No. A16-0352, 

2016 WL 5345653
, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2016) (requiring expert testimony to 
support fraud claim that was based on allegations of legal malpractice).  
    The Court likewise finds that Fredin’s false imprisonment claim, (Compl. ⁋⁋ 102–
07), alleging that Defendants’ legal representation ultimately led to Fredin’s criminal 
sentence  and  imprisonment,  is  derived  from  his  legal  malpractice/negligence  claim.  
Therefore, this claim is subject to the requirement for an affidavit of expert review.  So too 

are Fredin’s claims for the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, (id. ⁋⁋ 
108–21), which allege emotional harm resulting from Defendants’ allegedly deficient legal 
representation.  See Albert v. Binsfeld, No. C1-02-632, 
2003 WL 139529
, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 21, 2003) (finding all of plaintiff’s claims, including intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, were related to his malpractice claim, and were properly dismissed for 

his failure to comply with expert review statute).                        
    There is no dispute that Fredin failed to file an affidavit of expert review when he 
commenced this action.  Nor did he apply for a waiver or modification of the affidavit 
requirement at that time under 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 3(c), nor has he shown good 
cause for an extension under 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 4(b).  See Fontaine v. Steen, 
759 N.W.2d 672, 677
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009 ) (“to minimize [the] risk [of dismissal with 
prejudice], the statute . . . provides that the party bringing the action may apply for a waiver 
or modification of the affidavit requirements at the time the action is commenced and that 
the  district  court  may  determine  that  ‘good  cause  exists  for  not  requiring  the 
certification.’”).  Fredin fails to explain why he could not have obtained an affidavit at the 
time he filed suit.  This is particularly troubling, given that this lawsuit is Fredin’s second 

attempt to sue Defendants for legal malpractice, following the dismissal of his first lawsuit 
for failure to prosecute.  Fredin’s claim that he “was only just recently able to afford an 
expert review,” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Am. at 6), fails to explain why he did not seek 
a waiver at the time he filed suit.  Rather than explain his failure to do so, Fredin contends 
that “[o]n January 23, 2020, Plaintiff found a lawyer willing to complete the affidavit.  
Plaintiff provided a retainer check on March 23, 2020 before April deadlines and provided 

all information about the relevant case and deadlines in this case.  On or near May 6, 2020, 
Plaintiff  received  an  expert  affidavit  of  expert  review  complying  with  the  Legal 
Malpractice  Statute.”  (Id.)  But  the  “April  deadlines”  to  which  he  refers  are  not  the 
applicable deadlines for filing an affidavit of expert review or seeking a waiver.  Rather, 
as Magistrate Judge Bowbeer recently observed, “Fredin neither acted diligently nor had a 

reasonable excuse for not serving the affidavit earlier.”  (May 12, 2020 Order at 3.)   
    As to the applicable penalty for noncompliance with 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, the statute 
states that the failure to file the affidavit “within 60 days after demand for the affidavit 
results, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal of each cause of action with prejudice as to 
which  expert  testimony  is  necessary  to  establish  a  prima  facie  case.”  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
(6)(a); see also Lake Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 
715 N.W.2d 458, 470
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)  (“Minnesota courts have held that failure to 
strictly satisfy the expert disclosure requirements will result in dismissal of the claim with 
prejudice.”) (citing Broehm v. Mayo Clinic Rochester, 
690 N.W.2d 721, 726
 (Minn. 
2005)).    A motion to dismiss is a “demand” for an affidavit of expert review “because it 
provide[s] adequate notice that an affidavit of expert review [is] required.”  Kurdyumova, 

2014 WL 1875847
, at *4 (citing Brown–Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., P.L.L.P., 
732 N.W.2d 209, 215
 (Minn. 2007)).                                        
    Defendants made their demand on January 21, 2020, by filing the instant Motion to 
Dismiss.  Fredin did not file an affidavit of expert review within 60 days.  As the Court has 
found all of Fredin’s claims require an affidavit of expert review, and he failed to comply 
with 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, his claims must be dismissed with prejudice.  Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion is granted.  Because the Court rules on the basis of Fredin’s failure to 
comply  with  the  expert  review  statute,  it  declines  to  address  Defendants’  additional 
arguments that Plaintiff’s fraud and misrepresentation claims also fail to meet the pleading 
requirements of Rule 9(b).                                                
    Because any amendment would be futile, given the failure to comply with the expert 

review statute, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is denied.                    
III. ORDER                                                                
    Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that:                                                             
 1.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] is GRANTED;             

 2.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 35] is 
    DENIED; and                                                          

 3.  This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.                            

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      



Dated:  May 27, 2020               s/Susan Richard Nelson                 
                                  SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                   
                                  United States District Judge           

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Brock Fredin,                            Case No. 19-cv-3068 (SRN/HB)    

                          Plaintiff,                                     

ORDER

v.                                                                       

Halberg Criminal Defense,                                                
Christina Zauhar,                                                        

                           Defendants.                                   


Brock Fredin, 1180 7th Ave., Baldwin, WI 54002, pro se.                   

Barry O’Neil, Lommen Abdo, PA, 1000 International Centre, 920 Second Avenue S., 
Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendants.                                    


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] filed by 
Defendants Halberg Criminal Defense (“Halberg”) and Christina Zauhar, and the Motion 
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 35] filed by Plaintiff Brock Fredin.  
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion, and denies Plaintiff’s 
motion.                                                                   
 I.   BACKGROUND                                                         
    On December 11, 2019, Fredin filed the Complaint [Doc. No. 1] in this action, based 
on claims arising from the legal representation provided by Ms. Zauhar to Fredin in 
underlying state court criminal and civil actions.  Ms. Zauhar is an attorney at the Halberg 
law firm.  Fredin asserts claims for legal malpractice/negligence, breach of contract, 
charging excessive legal fees, fraud, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, false 
imprisonment,  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress,  and  negligent  infliction  of 

emotional distress.  (Compl. ⁋⁋ 2, 75–121.)  In an earlier lawsuit, Fredin asserted nearly 
the same claims against the same defendants. Fredin v. Halberg Crim. Defense, No. 18-
cv-2514 (SRN/HB) (D. Minn. filed Aug. 27, 2018).1  However, in February 2018, the Court 
dismissed the earlier action without prejudice for Fredin’s failure to prosecute.   
    In lieu of filing an answer in this case, Defendants filed the instant Motion to 
Dismiss.  They argue that Fredin’s claims arise solely from the attorney-client relationship, 

and must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), due to Fredin’s failure to 
comply with 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.  (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 13] at 
5.)  Under this statute, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must serve an affidavit of 
expert review with the pleadings.  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 2(1); Noske v. Friedberg, 
713 N.W.2d 866, 871
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).  In addition, Defendants argue, Fredin’s 

claims  alleging  fraud  and  negligent  misrepresentation  also  fail  to  comply  with  the 
heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. to 
Dismiss at 8–9.)                                                          
    On February 11, 2020, Fredin moved for an extension of time in which to comply 
with the expert affidavit requirement [Doc. No. 17].  On April 15, 2020, Fredin again 

moved for an extension of time in which to comply with the requirement [Doc. No. 28].  
Defendants opposed both motions [Doc. Nos. 24 & 32].  On May 1, 2020, Magistrate Judge 

1    The current pleading adds Fredin’s claims for false imprisonment and negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.                             
Bowbeer denied both motions for an extension [Doc. No. 34], and on May 12, 2020, she 
issued an order [Doc. No. 43], denying Fredin’s request for reconsideration [Doc. No. 40].  

    Fredin did not file a memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  
On May 7, 2020, he filed the instant Motion to Amend the Complaint.  He argues that 
“good cause and justice requires leave to file an amended complaint.”  (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. 
Mot. to Am. [Doc. No. 36] at 2.)  He contends that his proposed amended complaint 
survives Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) challenge because he attaches an affidavit of expert 
review.  (Id. at 4.)  Fredin asserts that he searched for an expert for some time, and “was 

only just recently able to afford an expert review.”  (Id. at 6.)  He identifies attorney Bruce 
Rivers as his expert, and provides an affidavit of expert review [Doc. No. 38] with his 
proposed amended pleading.                                                
    In opposition, Defendants urge the Court to deny Fredin’s Motion to Amend on 
grounds of futility.  (Defs.’ Opp’n [Doc. No. 44] at 3.)  Again, they assert that Fredin failed 

to comply with the expert review statute, requiring the dismissal of his claims.  (Id.)  Even 
if the Court considers the Rivers Affidavit, Defendants argue that it does not satisfy the 
requirements of 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 3(1).                         
II.   DISCUSSION                                                          
    A. Standard of Review                                                

    When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the 
facts in the pleading to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 
793 F.2d 185, 187
 (8th Cir. 
1986). The Court, however, need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten 
v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 
183 F.3d 799
, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions 
that the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged in the complaint.  Westcott v. City of Omaha, 

901 F.2d 1486, 1488
 (8th Cir. 1990).                                      
    To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint “must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.’”  Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 
849 F.3d 400, 404
 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570
 (2007)).  Facial plausibility exists when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678
 (citing Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556
).  While the 
plausibility standard is “not akin to a probability requirement,” it necessarily requires a 
complaint to present “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  
Id.
                                                                       

    To amend a pleading, other than within a narrow window of time after filing suit or 
receiving a responsive pleading, a party may only amend with the opposing party’s written 
consent or the court’s leave.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  While leave to amend shall be freely 
given when justice so requires, 
id.,
 the right to amend is not absolute.  Doe v. Cassel, 
403 F.3d 986, 990
 (8th Cir. 2005).  A court may deny a party’s request for leave to amend if 

the proposed amendment would be futile. See Reuter v. Jax Ltd., Inc., 
711 F.3d 918, 922
 
(8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (identifying futility of amendment as one of several bases 
on which to deny leave to amend). A proposed amendment is futile if the court finds “that 
the amended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Cornelia I. Croswell GST Trust v. Possis Med., Inc., 
519 F.3d 778, 782
 (8th Cir. 2008).                                        

    Because Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s proposed amendments would be futile, 
the Court applies the same standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) to both motions.  
    B.  Affidavit of Expert Review                                       
    As noted in prior rulings of Magistrate Judge Bowbeer in this case, (see May 1, 
2020 Order at 2; May 12, 2020 Order at 1–2), when a plaintiff files a legal malpractice or 
negligence action against a licensed attorney, and intends to use expert testimony to 

establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must serve an affidavit of  expert review, drafted 
by an attorney, or, in the case of a pro se plaintiff, the plaintiff must sign the affidavit, and 
is held to the same standard as an attorney.  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 2(1).   
    The affidavit of expert review must state that                       
    (1) the facts of the case have been reviewed by the party’s attorney with an 
      expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that the 
      expert’s opinions could be admissible at trial and that, in the opinion of 
      this expert, the defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care 
      and by that action caused injury to the plaintiff;                 

    (2) the expert review required by clause (1) could not reasonably be obtained 
      before the action was commenced because of the applicable statute of 
      limitations; or                                                    

    (3) the parties have agreed to a waiver of the expert review required by clause 
      (1) or the party has applied for a waiver or modification by the court under 
      paragraph (c).                                                     
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 3(a).2  Fredin has never claimed that an approaching statute of 
limitations deadline caused him to file this action without an expert review affidavit, nor 

have the parties agreed to waive the requirement.                         
    In  a  legal  malpractice  action,  expert  testimony  is  required  to  establish  the 
professional standard of care, the breach of that standard, and causation.  LaBorde v. 
Castleman, No. A05-18-5, 
2006 WL 2053158
, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 2006) (citing 
Admiral Merchs. Motor Freight, Inc. v. O’Connor & Hannan, 
494 N.W.2d 261, 266
 (Minn. 
1992); Spannaus v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly, & Lindgren, Ltd., 
368 N.W.2d 395, 399
 (Minn. 

Ct. App. 1985); Walton v. Jones, 
286 N.W.2d 710, 715
 (Minn. 1979)).  In rare instances, 
expert testimony may not be necessary if the complained-of conduct “‘can be evaluated 
adequately by a jury in the absence of expert testimony.’”  Kurdyumova v. Robinson, No. 
A13-1734, 
2014 WL 1875847
, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 2014) (quoting Hill v. Okay 
Constr. Co., 
252 N.W.2d 107, 116
 (Minn. 1977)).                           

    Here, the Court finds that specialized knowledge from an expert is required to 
determine  the  professional  standard  of  care  applicable  to  Fredin’s  legal 
malpractice/negligence claim.  Among his allegations, Fredin asserts that his counsel 


2    The expert review statute contemplates two affidavits.  The first affidavit, which is 
the affidavit of expert review, establishes that an expert has reviewed the case and has 
concluded that the defendant breached the applicable standard of care, causing injury to 
the plaintiff.  Fontaine v. Steen, 
759 N.W.2d 672, 676
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).  The second 
affidavit, the affidavit of expert identification or expert disclosure, identifies the expert 
witnesses, and provides the substance of their opinions, and bases for their opinions.  
Id.
  
While the first affidavit must be served with the pleadings, the second must be served 
within 180 days of the commencement of discovery.  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 2(2).  The 
first affidavit is at issue here.                                         
breached the standard of care by failing to raise certain constitutional claims, failing to file 
certain  motions,  engaging in  off-the-record  proceedings  and  conversations,  failing  to 

consult  with  Plaintiff  about  a  forensic  investigator,  and  filing  motions  to  withdraw.  
(Compl. ⁋⁋ 75–79.)  A jury could not reasonably determine if Defendants’ conduct violated 
the standard of care without expert testimony, as Fredin’s claims involve a variety of 
underlying criminal and civil proceedings, many of the challenged decisions of counsel 
require an understanding of the standard of care, and the decisions of counsel implicate 
issues of professional judgment and legal strategy.  Fredin’s initially unsuccessful attempts 

to obtain an expert opinion demonstrate that he also understood expert testimony was 
necessary to prove his case.  (See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Am. at 6.)    
    The expert review statute applies not only to claims specifically pleaded as legal 
malpractice, but to any other derivative claims that “are based on the same facts as [the] 
legal malpractice claims and arise solely out of [the] attorney-client relationship.”  Afremov 

v. Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., 
922 F. Supp. 2d 800, 815
 (D. Minn. 2013); see also Pearson 
v. Oxford Prop. Advisors, LLC, No. A10-1766, 
2011 WL 1833133
, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 16, 2011) (finding no error in the dismissal of plaintiff’s alternative claims, “[b]ecause 
allowing a plaintiff to simply list multiple alternative claims without fleshing out the logic 
or merits of those claims would create a significant loophole in 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.”)   

    Plaintiff’s claims arise solely out of his attorney-client relationship with Defendants, 
and each claim is predicated upon the same set of underlying facts.  As an initial matter, 
after asserting his legal malpractice/negligence claim in Count 1, Fredin realleges and 
incorporates the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint for each of his subsequent claims.   
(See Compl. ⁋⁋ 80,  81, 83, 89, 94, 102, 108, 114.)                       

    His breach of contract claim essentially alleges that Zauhar violated the professional 
standard of care, (id. ⁋ 67), and therefore requires expert testimony.  Jerry’s Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 
711 N.W.2d 811, 817
 (Minn. 2006) (noting 
that expert testimony is generally necessary to establish the applicable standard of care and 
to  further  establish  whether  the  conduct  in  question  deviated  from  that  standard).  
Accordingly, this claim requires an affidavit of expert review under 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.  

See Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., P.L.L.P., No. A07-2462, 
2008 WL 5396832
, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008) (requiring expert testimony to support 
breach of contract claim against accountant where the claim was based on a breach arising 
out of the accountant-client relationship).                               
    Likewise, Fredin’s allegations that Zauhar engaged in unnecessary and wasteful 

billing (Compl. ⁋⁋ 69–74) also assert a breach of the standard of care, and require expert 
testimony.  Similarly, his claim of intentional and negligent misrepresentation refers to the 
“actions and representations Plaintiff described above,” (id. ⁋⁋ 75–79), and relies on the 
same allegations as his legal malpractice/negligence claim.  It is therefore subject to the 
requirements of 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
.  Berman v. Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, 

LLP, No. A06-351, 
2006 WL 3734278
, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006) (affirming 
dismissal of misrepresentation claim due to plaintiff’s failure to provide expert affidavit, 
where misrepresentation claim was directly related to legal malpractice claim for which 
expert testimony was required).  The expert affidavit requirement also applies to Fredin’s 
fraud claim, in which he alleges that Defendants mishandled client funds and did not 
effectively communicate about fees.  Zirbes v. Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., No. A16-0352, 

2016 WL 5345653
, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2016) (requiring expert testimony to 
support fraud claim that was based on allegations of legal malpractice).  
    The Court likewise finds that Fredin’s false imprisonment claim, (Compl. ⁋⁋ 102–
07), alleging that Defendants’ legal representation ultimately led to Fredin’s criminal 
sentence  and  imprisonment,  is  derived  from  his  legal  malpractice/negligence  claim.  
Therefore, this claim is subject to the requirement for an affidavit of expert review.  So too 

are Fredin’s claims for the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, (id. ⁋⁋ 
108–21), which allege emotional harm resulting from Defendants’ allegedly deficient legal 
representation.  See Albert v. Binsfeld, No. C1-02-632, 
2003 WL 139529
, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 21, 2003) (finding all of plaintiff’s claims, including intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, were related to his malpractice claim, and were properly dismissed for 

his failure to comply with expert review statute).                        
    There is no dispute that Fredin failed to file an affidavit of expert review when he 
commenced this action.  Nor did he apply for a waiver or modification of the affidavit 
requirement at that time under 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 3(c), nor has he shown good 
cause for an extension under 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, subd. 4(b).  See Fontaine v. Steen, 
759 N.W.2d 672, 677
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009 ) (“to minimize [the] risk [of dismissal with 
prejudice], the statute . . . provides that the party bringing the action may apply for a waiver 
or modification of the affidavit requirements at the time the action is commenced and that 
the  district  court  may  determine  that  ‘good  cause  exists  for  not  requiring  the 
certification.’”).  Fredin fails to explain why he could not have obtained an affidavit at the 
time he filed suit.  This is particularly troubling, given that this lawsuit is Fredin’s second 

attempt to sue Defendants for legal malpractice, following the dismissal of his first lawsuit 
for failure to prosecute.  Fredin’s claim that he “was only just recently able to afford an 
expert review,” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to Am. at 6), fails to explain why he did not seek 
a waiver at the time he filed suit.  Rather than explain his failure to do so, Fredin contends 
that “[o]n January 23, 2020, Plaintiff found a lawyer willing to complete the affidavit.  
Plaintiff provided a retainer check on March 23, 2020 before April deadlines and provided 

all information about the relevant case and deadlines in this case.  On or near May 6, 2020, 
Plaintiff  received  an  expert  affidavit  of  expert  review  complying  with  the  Legal 
Malpractice  Statute.”  (Id.)  But  the  “April  deadlines”  to  which  he  refers  are  not  the 
applicable deadlines for filing an affidavit of expert review or seeking a waiver.  Rather, 
as Magistrate Judge Bowbeer recently observed, “Fredin neither acted diligently nor had a 

reasonable excuse for not serving the affidavit earlier.”  (May 12, 2020 Order at 3.)   
    As to the applicable penalty for noncompliance with 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, the statute 
states that the failure to file the affidavit “within 60 days after demand for the affidavit 
results, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal of each cause of action with prejudice as to 
which  expert  testimony  is  necessary  to  establish  a  prima  facie  case.”  
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
(6)(a); see also Lake Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 
715 N.W.2d 458, 470
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)  (“Minnesota courts have held that failure to 
strictly satisfy the expert disclosure requirements will result in dismissal of the claim with 
prejudice.”) (citing Broehm v. Mayo Clinic Rochester, 
690 N.W.2d 721, 726
 (Minn. 
2005)).    A motion to dismiss is a “demand” for an affidavit of expert review “because it 
provide[s] adequate notice that an affidavit of expert review [is] required.”  Kurdyumova, 

2014 WL 1875847
, at *4 (citing Brown–Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., P.L.L.P., 
732 N.W.2d 209, 215
 (Minn. 2007)).                                        
    Defendants made their demand on January 21, 2020, by filing the instant Motion to 
Dismiss.  Fredin did not file an affidavit of expert review within 60 days.  As the Court has 
found all of Fredin’s claims require an affidavit of expert review, and he failed to comply 
with 
Minn. Stat. § 544.42
, his claims must be dismissed with prejudice.  Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion is granted.  Because the Court rules on the basis of Fredin’s failure to 
comply  with  the  expert  review  statute,  it  declines  to  address  Defendants’  additional 
arguments that Plaintiff’s fraud and misrepresentation claims also fail to meet the pleading 
requirements of Rule 9(b).                                                
    Because any amendment would be futile, given the failure to comply with the expert 

review statute, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is denied.                    
III. ORDER                                                                
    Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that:                                                             
 1.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] is GRANTED;             

 2.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 35] is 
    DENIED; and                                                          

 3.  This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.                            

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      



Dated:  May 27, 2020               s/Susan Richard Nelson                 
                                  SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                   
                                  United States District Judge           

Reference

Status
Unknown