Kelley v. Westford Special Situations Master Fund, L.P.

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Kelley v. Westford Special Situations Master Fund, L.P.

Trial Court Opinion

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Douglas A. Kelley,                  File No. 19-cv-1073 (ECT/KMM)         
in his capacity as the Trustee of the                                     
PCI Liquidating Trust,                                                    

      Plaintiff,                                                     
v.                                                                        

Westford Special Situations Master Fund,                                  
L.P.; Westford Global Asset Management,                                   
Ltd.; Westford Special Situations Fund,                                   
Ltd.; Westford Special Situations Fund,                                   
L.P.; Westford Asset Management, LLC;                                     
Epsilon Global Master Fund, L.P.; Epsilon                                 
Global Active Value Fund, Ltd.; Epsilon                                   
Global Active Value Fund I-B Ltd; Epsilon                                 
Global Active Value Fund, L.P.; Epsilon  OPINION AND ORDER                
Global Master Fund II, L.P., a/k/a Epsilon                                
Global Master Fund II, L.P., Sub. 1; Epsilon                              
Global Active Value Fund II-B Ltd.;                                       
Epsilon Global Active Value Fund II-G                                     
Ltd.; Epsilon Global Active Value Fund II,                                
L.P.; Epsilon Global Active Value Fund II-                                
B, L.P.; Epsilon Global Active Value Fund                                 
II-G, L.P.; Epsilon Global Asset                                          
Management, Ltd.; Epsilon Investment                                      
Management, LLC; Epsilon Structured                                       
Strategies Master Fund, L.P., f/k/a Epsilon                               
Global Master Fund III Structured                                         
Strategies, L.P.; Epsilon Global Active                                   
Value Fund III Ltd.; Stafford Towne, Ltd.;                                
and Steve Goran Stevanovich,                                              
      Defendants.                                                    
D. Farrington Yates, Igor Margulyan, and Adam Levine, Kobre & Kim LLP, New York, 
NY; J. David Jackson and Lucas J. Olson, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for 
Plaintiff Douglas A. Kelley.                                              

Sarah Riedl Clark and W. Gregory Lockwood, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, 
Chicago, IL/Portland, OR, for Defendants Westford Special Situations Master Fund, L.P., 
et al.                                                                    


Plaintiff  Douglas  A.  Kelley,  trustee  of  the  Petters  Company,  Inc.  (“PCI”) 
Liquidating Trust, brought this adversary case originally in the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Minnesota seeking to avoid and recover money transfers made to Defendants 
by PL Ltd., Inc. and Petters Company, Inc., entities controlled by convicted Ponzi-schemer 
Thomas J. Petters.  For present purposes, Defendants fall into three categories: (1) four 
master funds that invested over $2 billion in the Petters Ponzi scheme and earned over $300 
million in profits as a result (the “Master Funds”);1 (2) the Master Funds’ management 
companies (the “Management Companies”);2 and (3) the lead principal of the Management 
                                                                     
1    The Master Funds are Epsilon Global Master Fund, L.P.; Epsilon Global Master 
Fund II, L.P.; Westford Special Situations Master Fund, L.P.; and Epsilon Structured 
Strategies Master Fund, L.P., f/k/a Epsilon Global Master Fund III Structured Strategies, 
L.P.  Defendants also include eleven “feeder funds,” but these feeder funds are not 
implicated  directly  by  the  Parties’  motions.    (In  a  master-feeder  structure,  investors 
purchase interests in a feeder fund, and the feeder fund in turn invests its assets in the 
master fund.  See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Conrad, 
354 F. Supp. 3d 1330
, 1338–39 
(N.D. Ga. 2019).)                                                         

2    The  Management  Companies  are  Westford  Global  Asset  Management,  Ltd.; 
Westford Asset Management, LLC; Epsilon Global Asset Management, Ltd; and Epsilon 
Investment Management, LLC.                                               
Companies at the time of the Master Funds’ investments in the Petters Ponzi scheme, Steve 
Goran Stevanovich.                                                        
Kelley on the one side, and the Management Companies and Stevanovich on the 

other, have filed competing motions for summary judgment.  Kelley has moved for partial 
summary judgment on his actual and constructive fraud claims against the Master Funds.  
Kelley’s summary-judgment motion relies on Kelley v. Kanios, 
383 F. Supp. 3d 852
 (D. 
Minn. 2019), a decision that entered summary judgment in favor of Kelley on equivalent 
claims under like circumstances.  The judgment entered in Kanios was appealed to the 

Eighth Circuit, and oral argument occurred on February 11, 2020.  Because the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Kanios (whichever way it comes out) is certain to be significant here, 
it makes sound practical sense to delay deciding Kelley’s motion until the Eighth Circuit 
decides  Kanios.    The  Management  Companies  and  Stevanovich  also  seek  summary 
judgment, arguing essentially that Kelley cannot show that they received property, either 

directly or as subsequent transferees, from any Petters-affiliated entity.  This motion will 
be  denied  because  Kelley  has  introduced  materials—an  expert  report  and  associated 
documents—from which a juror reasonably may infer that the Management Companies 
and Stevanovich are subsequent transferees of property that originated with the Debtor.   
                           I                                         
Petters owned numerous businesses, including Petters Group Worldwide LLC, Sun 

Country  Airlines,  Polaroid  Corporation,  Fingerhut,  and  PCI;  through  PCI,  Petters 
perpetrated a multi-billion-dollar Ponzi scheme.  United States v. Petters, 
663 F.3d 375, 379
 (8th Cir. 2011).  Petters “induced investments in fake consumer electronics financing 
transactions and paid ‘returns’ to investors using the investors’ own money or other 
subsequent investors’ money.”  Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 67–68 [ECF No. 7-10]; see also 
Petters, 
663 F.3d at 379
.                                                 

From 2001 to 2007, the Master Funds invested nearly $2.5 billion with Petters 
through approximately 346 loans, each evidenced by a promissory note.  Clark Decl., Ex. 
B (“Murray Report”) ¶ 40 [ECF No. 46-2]; see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73–79.  In all but 
one circumstance in which PCI was the borrower, the loans were made to PL Ltd., a 
special-purpose entity established by Petters to receive loan proceeds from the Master 

Funds.  Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–72, 100–13.  PL Ltd. transferred loan proceeds to 
“vendors” controlled by Petters’ associates, and the vendors “pretended to sell receivables 
or inventory to PCI,” creating fraudulent paperwork showing non-existent transactions.  
Id.
 
¶¶ 80–97.  Petters and his associates would then create fraudulent purchase orders and 
invoices showing fictitious profits from the “resale” of that inventory to “big-box” retailers 

like Costco and Sam’s Club.  Id. ¶¶ 87, 96.  When a note matured, PCI would transfer 
funds, typically funds received from other investors in an amount greater than the original 
principal and interest specified in the promissory note, back to the PL Ltd. account, from 
which Stevanovich could withdraw the principal and interest owed to the Master Funds.  
Id. ¶¶ 85–86, 88.  Unlike many other Petters investors, the Master Funds ultimately were 

repaid all outstanding principal balances, interest, and origination fees before the Petters 
scheme collapsed.  Murray Report ¶ 49; see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–4, 70–73.  These 
payments totaled nearly $2.8 billion, including $318,187,782 in profits to the Master 
Funds.  Murray Report ¶¶ 49–50; see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–4, 73.  (Kelley refers to 
these as “false profits.”  Pl. Mem. in Opp’n at 5 [ECF No. 57].)          
During the period the Master Funds invested in the Petters entities, the Master Funds 

“received cash from various sources, including returns from hundreds of investments 
unrelated to [] Petters, proceeds from the sales of those investments, and payments from 
PL Ltd., Inc.”  Stevanovich Decl. ¶ 5 [ECF No. 47].  The Master “Funds also received cash 
from new investors” during this period.  Id.  All funds from all sources were deposited in 
a single account for each Master Fund.  Id. ¶ 7.  The Master Funds “applied money received 

from all sources, including PL Ltd., Inc. and hundreds of other investments, to invest in 
other holdings, pay expenses, or credit redeeming investors.”  Id. ¶ 8.  The Master Funds 
also applied these funds to pay “management fees” (paid quarterly) and “performance fees” 
(paid annually and when a redemption was issued to an investor) to the Management 
Companies.  Id. ¶ 9; Murray Report ¶¶ 141–43.  The Management Companies received 

fees from the Master Funds and from other “master funds unrelated to this action and which 
never lent money to [] Petters or his entities.”  Stevanovich Decl. ¶ 10.  “[T]he Management 
Companies also received consulting fees and miscellaneous fees from specialty funds and 
consulting projects unrelated to [] Petters or his companies.”  Id. ¶ 11.  “The Management 
Companies deposited all fees received from all sources in a single account for each 

Management Company.”  Id. ¶ 12.  “In turn, the Management Companies applied the fees 
received to pay office rent for multiple locations, employee payroll, compensation for [] 
Stevanovich,  and  general  business  expenses.”    Id.  ¶  13.    Neither  the  Management 
Companies nor Stevanovich personally loaned funds or invested in Petters or his entities.  
Id. ¶¶ 4, 14.                                                             
In October 2008—following the collapse of the Petters Ponzi scheme—PCI and PL 

Ltd., along with other PCI affiliates, filed voluntary petitions for relief in bankruptcy court 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  See Compl. ¶¶ 40–42 [ECF No. 1-1].  In 
February 2009, the bankruptcy court appointed Kelley trustee of the PCI Liquidating Trust 
for all debtors.  Def. Summ. J. Mot. ¶ 1 [ECF No. 43].  In October 2010, Kelley commenced 
this adversary case in bankruptcy court pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rule of 

Bankruptcy  Procedure  7001,  and  the  Minnesota  Uniform  Fraudulent  Transfer  Act 
(“MUFTA”),3  seeking  to  avoid  and  recover  transfers  made  by  PCI  and  PL  Ltd.  to 
Defendants, “including the payments of both principal and false profits in excess of their 
investments.”  Second Am. Compl. ¶ 6–7; see Compl.  The Parties then engaged in 
discovery and motion practice for several years.                          

On  June  26,  2017,  Kelley  filed  his  second  amended  complaint,  which  is  the 
operative complaint in this case.4  After discovery closed, the Management Companies and 
                                                                     
3    MUFTA was renamed the Minnesota Uniform Voidable Transactions Act in 2015, 
see 
Minn. Stat. § 513.51
, but the Parties agree that amendments made at that time are not 
material to their motions, and they use the acronym MUFTA to conform with earlier 
pleadings and case law, see Pl. Mem. in Supp. at 2 n.2 [ECF No. 50].      

4    Kelley asserts eleven claims in the second amended complaint:  (I) Fraudulently 
Incurred Obligations – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. § 548
(a)(1)(A); (II) Fraudulently Incurred 
Obligations – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(1) and 
513.47; (III) Actual Fraudulent Transfers – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 548
(a)(1)(A), 
550(a), 551 (Regarding Two-Year Transfers); (IV) Constructive Fraudulent Transfers – 
Constructive  Fraud,  
11 U.S.C. §§ 548
(a)(1)(B),  550(a),  551  (Regarding  Two-Year 
Transfers); (V) Actual Fraudulent Transfers – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 
Stevanovich moved in the Bankruptcy Court for summary judgment on all claims against 
them.  ECF No. 7-40.  They argued, in part, that the fraudulent transfer claims against them 
failed because Kelley had not, as a matter of law, traced transfers from PCI and PL Ltd. to 

them.  
Id. at 7
.  In a March 13, 2019 order, Bankruptcy Judge Kathleen H. Sanberg denied 
the motion as to counts I through VIII of the second amended complaint, reasoning that the 
motion  raised  a  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  as  to  the  tracing  methodologies  and 
conclusions of Kelley’s expert, Marti P. Murray.  Summ. J. Order ¶ 2 [ECF No. 8-4]; see 
Summ. J. Tr. at 18–25 [ECF No. 17-1].  Judge Sanberg granted the motion as to count XI.  

Summ. J. Order ¶ 4.  Judge Sanberg also ordered Kelley, the Management Companies, and 
Stevanovich to file a stipulation effecting their agreement to the voluntary dismissal of 
counts IX and X.  
Id. ¶ 3
.  No stipulation to that effect has been filed, however.  See Def. 
Mem. in Supp. at 9 n.9 [ECF No. 45].  This case subsequently was transferred to this Court.  



                                                                     
550(a), 551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(1) and 513.47 (For avoidance and recovery, as initial 
transferees of the PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. Transfers, and as subsequent transferees 
of the PCI SPE Transfers); (VI) Constructive Fraudulent Transfers – Constructive Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 550(a), 551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(2)(i) and 513.47 (For 
avoidance and recovery, as initial transferees of the PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. 
Transfers, and as subsequent transferees of the PCI SPE Transfers); (VII) Fraudulent 
Transfers – Constructive Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 550(a), 551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(2)(ii) and 513.47 (For avoidance and recovery, as initial transferees of the 
PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. Transfers, and as subsequent transferees of the PCI SPE 
Transfers); (VIII) Fraudulent Transfers – Constructive Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(b), 550(a), 
551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.45
(a) and 513.47 (For avoidance and recovery, as initial transferees 
of the PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. Transfers, and as subsequent transferees of the PCI 
SPE Transfers); (IX) Lien Avoidance – 
11 U.S.C. § 506
(d); (X) Turnover and Accounting 
– 
11 U.S.C. § 542
; and (XI) Unjust Enrichment/Equitable Disgorgement.     
ECF No. 1.  The Management Companies and Stevanovich have moved for summary 
judgment on all remaining claims.  Def. Summ. J. Mot.                     
                           II                                        

The Parties dispute whether the Bankruptcy Court’s order on the Management 
Companies and Stevanovich’s previous summary-judgment motion bars consideration of 
this motion because the Bankruptcy Court’s order is law of the case.  Pl. Mem. in Opp’n at 
15–16 [ECF No. 57]; Def. Reply Mem. at 8–9 [ECF No. 61].  It is not.  The law of the case 
doctrine provides that “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should 

continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”  Morris v. Am. 
Nat’l Can Corp., 
988 F.2d 50, 52
 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Arizona v. California, 
460 U.S. 605, 618
 (1983)).  The doctrine applies to final decisions by a district court that have not 
been appealed, but it does not apply to interlocutory orders, “for they can always be 
reconsidered and modified by a district court prior to entry of a final judgment.”  First 

Union Nat’l Bank v. Pictet Overseas Tr. Corp., 
477 F.3d 616, 620
 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
United States v. Hively, 
437 F.3d 752, 766
 (8th Cir. 2006)).  A district court’s denial of 
summary judgment as to some claims in a case “renders the entire order interlocutory” 
because it necessarily indicates that there are claims left to be resolved.  Acton v. City of 
Columbia, 
436 F.3d 969
, 973 (8th Cir. 2006).  The Eighth Circuit has expressly rejected 

the argument that “the law of the case doctrine precludes a second summary judgment 
motion unless it can be shown that the second or renewed motion is based upon substantial 
discovery of facts not before the court at the time of the original motion.”  Mosley v. City 
of Northwoods, 
415 F.3d 908
, 911 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating the law of the case doctrine 
“does not deprive the district court of the ability to reconsider earlier rulings to avoid 
reversal” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  Therefore, the law of the case 
doctrine does not bar consideration of the Management Companies and Stevanovich’s 

present summary-judgment motion.                                          
Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute over a fact is “material” only if its resolution “might affect 
the outcome of the suit” under the governing substantive law.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248
 (1986).  A dispute over a fact is “genuine” only if “the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  
Id.
  “The 
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 
in his favor.”  
Id. at 255
.5                                              

                                                                     
5    Kelley argues that, “[i]rrespective of whether the Moving Defendants meet their 
summary judgment burden, this Court may still deny summary judgment in its discretion 
if it believes that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.”  Mem. in Opp’n at 
14, n.7.  As support for this argument, Kelley cites McLain v. Meier, in which our Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals some 41 years ago observed:                      

     [A] district court in passing on a Rule 56 motion performs what 
     amounts  to  what  may  be  called  a  negative  discretionary  
     function.  The court has no discretion to grant a motion for    
     summary judgment, but even if the court is convinced that the   
     moving party is entitled to such a judgment the exercise of     
     sound judicial discretion may dictate that the motion should be 
     denied, and the case fully developed.                           

612 F.2d 349, 356
 (8th Cir. 1979).  This description of the law seems difficult to square 
with the current version of Rule 56.  It says that a district court “shall grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis 
The  law  allows  bankruptcy  trustees  to  recover  the  value  of  avoided  property 
transfers, not merely from initial transferees, but from subsequent transferees also.  Under 
the Bankruptcy Code, the avoidance of transfers (pursuant to specified Code provisions at 

issue in this case) would allow the Trustee to recover “the property transferred, or, if the 
court so orders, the value of such property, from (1) the initial transferee of such transfer 
or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or (2) any immediate or mediate 
transferee of such initial transferee.”  
11 U.S.C. § 550
(a).  Similarly, under Minnesota law, 
“the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred . . . or the amount 

necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less” against “(i) the first transferee 
of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or (ii) an immediate or 
mediate transferee of the first transferee, other than[] (A) a good-faith transferee that took 
for value[] or (B) an immediate or mediate good-faith transferee of a person described in 
subitem (A).”  
Minn. Stat. § 513.48
(b)(1).  Here, because there appears to be no fact dispute 

that the Management Companies and Stevanovich did not themselves invest in, or receive 
payments from, PCI or PL Ltd., Kelley must establish that they were subsequent transferees 
of amounts that the Master Funds received from PCI or PL Ltd.  And Kelley seeks to do 
precisely that.  He alleges that the Management Companies received at least $60,667,405 

                                                                     
added).  It also seems irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s 1986 summary-judgment 
trilogy that made clear, among other things, that “[s]ummary judgment procedure is 
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of 
the  Federal  Rules  as  a  whole,  which  are  designed  ‘to  secure  the  just,  speedy  and 
inexpensive determination of every action.’”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 327
 
(1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574
 (1986); 
Anderson, 
477 U.S. 242
.                                                   
in management fees and performance fees based on amounts the Master Funds received 
from  PCI  or  PL  Ltd.  and  that  amounts  Stevanovich received  from  the  Management 
Companies also were based on these amounts.  Pl. Mem. in Opp’n at 10–13; see Murray 

Report ¶¶ 138–83.                                                         
The Management Companies and Stevanovich seek summary judgment on all 
remaining claims against them on the ground that Kelley cannot, as a matter of law, meet 
his burden to show the transfer of funds from PCI and PL Ltd. to them.  Def. Summ. J. 
Mot. ¶ 2; Def. Mem. in Supp. at 1–3.  To summarize, the Management Companies and 

Stevanovich argue that Kelley cannot meet his tracing burden because of the extensive 
commingling of receipts by the Master Funds and the Management Companies.  See Def. 
Mot. ¶ 3; Def. Mem. in Supp. at 15–22.  They note that the Master Funds “received 
investment returns from numerous investment positions (only one of which was PL Ltd., 
Inc.),  proceeds  from  sales  of  investment  positions,  and  infusions  of  cash  from  new 

subscribing investors, which they deposited in a single account” for each Master Fund.  
Def. Mem. in Supp. at 19.  The Master Funds then “reinvested the proceeds in other 
positions and redeemed investor interests before paying management and performance 
fees.”  
Id.
  The management and performance fees were paid “on the basis of all assets 
under management as of a particular date or the yearly increase in the global net asset 

value,” and the Management Companies deposited those fees in the same account as they 
received fees from other sources and used money from those accounts to pay expenses 
beyond the distributions to Stevanovich.  Id. at 20; Stevanovich Decl. ¶ 12–13.  Therefore, 
the Management Companies and Stevanovich argue, “[t]he nature of both the receipt of 
funds from multiple investments and the method of calculating the management and 
performance fees prevents the Trustee from establishing that any money . . . originated 
solely with PL Ltd.”  Def. Mem. in Supp. at 20.                           

The law does not place such a difficult burden on trustees.  The commingling of 
legitimate funds with funds transferred from a debtor does not defeat tracing.  In re Dreier 
LLP, No. 08-15051 (SMB), 
2014 WL 47774
, at *15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2014); In re 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 08-01789 (BRL), 
2012 WL 892514
, at *2 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012) (rejecting the “untenable assumption that once the [f]ictitious 

[p]rofits were comingled with legitimate funds” none of the funds could be traced).  A 
trustee’s burden “is not so onerous as to require dollar-for-dollar accounting of the exact 
funds at issue.”  Madoff, 
2012 WL 892514
, at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Dreier, 
2014 WL 47774
, at *15 (denying Management Companies’ motion 
for summary judgment, reasoning evidence that the debtor contributed to the managed 

funds’ profits, which triggered the funds’ obligation to pay fees to the Management 
Companies, supported a reasonable inference that those fees were actually paid absent 
evidence to the contrary); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 
408 F.3d 689, 708
 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“[P]roper tracing does not require dollar-for-dollar accounting.”).  Factual 
allegations that “show the relevant pathways through which the funds were transferred” 

are sufficient.  Madoff, 
2012 WL 892514
, at *3.                           
Relying on Weil v. United States, the Management Companies and Stevanovich 
argue that, in lieu of dollar-for-dollar tracing, Kelley must show that management and 
performance  fees  received  by  the  Management  Companies  and  money  received  by 
Stevanovich “originated solely” with PCI and PL Ltd. to defeat summary judgment.  Def. 
Mem. in Supp. at 17–21.  Weil did not establish that rule.  True, in distinguishing its facts 
from those in International Administrative, Weil observed that the transfers in International 

Administrative were shown to have “originated solely” from the debtor while the Weil 
trustee had not made a similar showing.  Weil v. United States, No. 1:09-bk-26982-VK, 
2016 WL 1239519
,  at  *17,  27  (Bankr.  C.D.  Cal.  Mar.  29,  2016),  report  and 
recommendation adopted sub nom., In re Tag Entm’t Corp, 
2016 WL 5947304
 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 5, 2016).  But Weil nowhere adopts or applies a rule that transfers must be shown to 

have “originated solely” with the debtor to be recoverable.  Instead, Weil applied the rule 
that “attenuated links between the debtor and the ultimate transferee” are insufficient to 
establish a transfer of assets.  Weil, 
2016 WL 1239519
, at *17, 27; see Kremen v. Cohen, 
No. 5-11-CV-05411-LHK, 
2012 WL 2919332
, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2012).  Weil also 
involved a materially different procedural posture and facts.  In Weil, the trustee sought to 

show in a bench trial that the United States received a transfer from the debtor corporation 
(TAG Entertainment Corp.), when it received a restitution payment from an individual 
(Austin) who had been convicted of mail fraud and filing a false tax return.  Weil, 
2016 WL 1239519
, at *2.  Austin incorporated TAG Entertainment and was involved in its 
management  at  various  times,  but  Austin’s  convictions  arose  from  his  activities  in 

connection with another business organization.  
Id. at *7
.  To meet her tracing burden, the 
trustee “pointed to several real estate transactions, the last of which was the sale of [real 
property] for the purpose of meeting Mr. Austin’s restitution obligation.”  
Id. at *2
.  The 
trustee tried to show that TAG Entertainment “was the originating source of funding for 
these real estate transactions.”  
Id.
  Following trial, the court found that the trustee had not 
established a sufficient connection between Austin and his acquisition of the real estate he 
sold to pay his restitution obligation and payments from TAG Entertainment.  
Id.
 at **22–

27.  The trustee, the court explained, had identified irregularities, but failed to present 
evidence of a pathway of funds or sufficient circumstantial evidence to connect payments 
from the debtor to Austin’s purchase of the real property he eventually sold to pay his 
restitution obligation.  
Id.
  Here, in contrast to Weil, there is a summary-judgment motion 
(not a trial), and the asserted pathway of funds is more direct.          

Kelley  has  introduced  materials—Murray’s  expert  report  and  its  associated 
documents—from which a juror reasonably may infer that the Management Companies 
and Stevanovich are subsequent transferees of property that originated with the Debtor.  
Two of Murray’s opinions and accompanying analysis are particularly relevant to this 
motion.    In  her  fourth  opinion,  Murray  concluded  that  the  Management  Companies 

received at least $60,667,405 in management fees and performance fees based on the 
$318,187,782 in profits received by the Master Funds from their Petters investments.  
Murray Report ¶¶ 138–62.  (For convenience, profits from the Master Funds’ Petters 
investments will be referred to from here on as “Petters profits.”)  To reach this conclusion, 
Murray first determined the amount of overall profits received yearly by each Master Fund 

during the Petters Ponzi scheme and the amount in management and performance fees paid 
to the Management Companies during that time.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 138–43.  Murray then calculated 
the minimum amount of management fees attributable to Petters profits by identifying 
Petters profits by Master Fund by quarter and then determining what management fees 
were charged on those Petters profits by quarter based on each fund’s management fee rate.  
Id.
  ¶¶ 144–58, App’x K.  Murray then calculated the amount of performance fees 
attributable to Petters profits by subtracting the management fees charged during each year 

from Petters profits earned during that year and multiplying the result by the performance 
fee rate.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 159–61, App’x K.  In her fifth opinion, Murray concluded that Stevanovich 
received  cash  payments  from  the  Management  Companies  “well  in  excess”  of  the 
$60,667,405 in fees received by the Management Companies attributable to Petters profits.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 163–83.  To reach this conclusion, Murray first determined the amount in fees 

attributable to Petters profits paid to each of the Management Companies, two of which 
are domestic entities and two of which are offshore entities.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 163–78.  Murray then 
observed  that  the  two  domestic  Management  Companies  are  owned  entirely  by 
Stevanovich through “Ally Kat,” an entity Stevanovich established in 2001, and that 
Stevanovich received “virtually the same amount in distributions [from Ally Kat] in the 

years 2004 to 2007 as the fees credited to the domestic Stevanovich Entities relating to 
[Petters] Profits in all the years in which there were [Petters] Profits.”  
Id.
 ¶¶ 164–65.  
Murray  further  observed  that  the  net  income  from  the  two  offshore  Management 
Companies was “virtually the same as gross income, meaning [they] did not have material 
expenses” and that the fees received by those companies relating to Petters profits “would 

have directly benefitted Stevanovich without material deductions.”  
Id. ¶ 168
.  Murray 
determined that Epsilon Global Asset Management’s account showed teller withdrawals 
totaling $49,812,709 during the relevant time period and that Stevanovich had “sole 
signatory authority” for the account, making it “reasonable to conclude that Stevanovich 
received these funds.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 170–73.  Similar documentation was not available for Westford 
Global  Asset  Management’s  account,  “including  documentation  relating  to  signatory 
authority on the account,” but Murray determined there were teller withdrawals from that 

account  during  the  relevant  timeframe  totaling  $51,480,519  and  posited  that  it  was 
reasonable to conclude that Stevanovich also had sole signatory authority over the account 
and received those funds.  
Id.
 ¶ 174–78.                                  
The Management Companies and Stevanovich argue that Murray’s investigation, 
analysis, and opinions cannot be relied on to identify genuine issues of material fact 

because Murray “utterly fails to identify any accepted methodology for the critical portion 
of  her  opinion  at  which  she  purportedly  connects  PL  Ltd.,  Inc’s  payments  to  the 
Management Companies (and, ultimately, Mr. Stevanovich).”  Mem. in Supp. at 23.  
Whether Murray’s methodology is “accepted” is more properly considered under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 and the rubric of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579
  (1993).    The  Management  Companies  and  Stevanovich  did  not  challenge 
Murray’s opinions on this basis.  Stevanovich argues that, if Kelley were able to trace funds 
from PCI and PL Ltd. to him, the distributions he received were compensation for his 
management services and are not subject to claw back under 
11 U.S.C. § 550
(a)(2).  Def. 
Mem. in Supp. at 29–31.  For this position, Stevanovich cites authorities establishing that 

a corporate officer’s receipt of salary from a debtor or transferee corporation is alone 
insufficient to render the officer a transferee.  See In re Geltzer, 
502 B.R. 760
, 772–73 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 
386 F. Supp.2d 209, 227
 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  Here, there is a fact dispute about whether the distributions 
Stevanovich  received  from  the  Management  Companies  were  a  salary  in  light  of 
Stevanovich’s deposition testimony that he is not an employee of his entities and that his 
distributions were comprised of the funds that remained after the Management Companies 

paid their expenses.  See Yates Decl, Ex. J at 27:7–29:9; 34:10–12; 51:12–18 [ECF No. 
58-1 at 228–30, 234].                                                     

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
ORDERED   THAT Defendants  Westford  Global  Asset  Management,  Ltd.,  Westford 

Asset Management, LLC, Epsilon Global Asset Management, Ltd., Epsilon Investment 
Management, LLC, and Steve Goran Stevanovich’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF 
No. 43] is DENIED.                                                        

Dated:  June 10, 2020         s/ Eric C. Tostrud                          
                         Eric C. Tostrud                             
                         United States District Court                

Trial Court Opinion

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Douglas A. Kelley,                  File No. 19-cv-1073 (ECT/KMM)         
in his capacity as the Trustee of the                                     
PCI Liquidating Trust,                                                    

      Plaintiff,                                                     
v.                                                                        

Westford Special Situations Master Fund,                                  
L.P.; Westford Global Asset Management,                                   
Ltd.; Westford Special Situations Fund,                                   
Ltd.; Westford Special Situations Fund,                                   
L.P.; Westford Asset Management, LLC;                                     
Epsilon Global Master Fund, L.P.; Epsilon                                 
Global Active Value Fund, Ltd.; Epsilon                                   
Global Active Value Fund I-B Ltd; Epsilon                                 
Global Active Value Fund, L.P.; Epsilon  OPINION AND ORDER                
Global Master Fund II, L.P., a/k/a Epsilon                                
Global Master Fund II, L.P., Sub. 1; Epsilon                              
Global Active Value Fund II-B Ltd.;                                       
Epsilon Global Active Value Fund II-G                                     
Ltd.; Epsilon Global Active Value Fund II,                                
L.P.; Epsilon Global Active Value Fund II-                                
B, L.P.; Epsilon Global Active Value Fund                                 
II-G, L.P.; Epsilon Global Asset                                          
Management, Ltd.; Epsilon Investment                                      
Management, LLC; Epsilon Structured                                       
Strategies Master Fund, L.P., f/k/a Epsilon                               
Global Master Fund III Structured                                         
Strategies, L.P.; Epsilon Global Active                                   
Value Fund III Ltd.; Stafford Towne, Ltd.;                                
and Steve Goran Stevanovich,                                              
      Defendants.                                                    
D. Farrington Yates, Igor Margulyan, and Adam Levine, Kobre & Kim LLP, New York, 
NY; J. David Jackson and Lucas J. Olson, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for 
Plaintiff Douglas A. Kelley.                                              

Sarah Riedl Clark and W. Gregory Lockwood, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, 
Chicago, IL/Portland, OR, for Defendants Westford Special Situations Master Fund, L.P., 
et al.                                                                    


Plaintiff  Douglas  A.  Kelley,  trustee  of  the  Petters  Company,  Inc.  (“PCI”) 
Liquidating Trust, brought this adversary case originally in the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Minnesota seeking to avoid and recover money transfers made to Defendants 
by PL Ltd., Inc. and Petters Company, Inc., entities controlled by convicted Ponzi-schemer 
Thomas J. Petters.  For present purposes, Defendants fall into three categories: (1) four 
master funds that invested over $2 billion in the Petters Ponzi scheme and earned over $300 
million in profits as a result (the “Master Funds”);1 (2) the Master Funds’ management 
companies (the “Management Companies”);2 and (3) the lead principal of the Management 
                                                                     
1    The Master Funds are Epsilon Global Master Fund, L.P.; Epsilon Global Master 
Fund II, L.P.; Westford Special Situations Master Fund, L.P.; and Epsilon Structured 
Strategies Master Fund, L.P., f/k/a Epsilon Global Master Fund III Structured Strategies, 
L.P.  Defendants also include eleven “feeder funds,” but these feeder funds are not 
implicated  directly  by  the  Parties’  motions.    (In  a  master-feeder  structure,  investors 
purchase interests in a feeder fund, and the feeder fund in turn invests its assets in the 
master fund.  See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Conrad, 
354 F. Supp. 3d 1330
, 1338–39 
(N.D. Ga. 2019).)                                                         

2    The  Management  Companies  are  Westford  Global  Asset  Management,  Ltd.; 
Westford Asset Management, LLC; Epsilon Global Asset Management, Ltd; and Epsilon 
Investment Management, LLC.                                               
Companies at the time of the Master Funds’ investments in the Petters Ponzi scheme, Steve 
Goran Stevanovich.                                                        
Kelley on the one side, and the Management Companies and Stevanovich on the 

other, have filed competing motions for summary judgment.  Kelley has moved for partial 
summary judgment on his actual and constructive fraud claims against the Master Funds.  
Kelley’s summary-judgment motion relies on Kelley v. Kanios, 
383 F. Supp. 3d 852
 (D. 
Minn. 2019), a decision that entered summary judgment in favor of Kelley on equivalent 
claims under like circumstances.  The judgment entered in Kanios was appealed to the 

Eighth Circuit, and oral argument occurred on February 11, 2020.  Because the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Kanios (whichever way it comes out) is certain to be significant here, 
it makes sound practical sense to delay deciding Kelley’s motion until the Eighth Circuit 
decides  Kanios.    The  Management  Companies  and  Stevanovich  also  seek  summary 
judgment, arguing essentially that Kelley cannot show that they received property, either 

directly or as subsequent transferees, from any Petters-affiliated entity.  This motion will 
be  denied  because  Kelley  has  introduced  materials—an  expert  report  and  associated 
documents—from which a juror reasonably may infer that the Management Companies 
and Stevanovich are subsequent transferees of property that originated with the Debtor.   
                           I                                         
Petters owned numerous businesses, including Petters Group Worldwide LLC, Sun 

Country  Airlines,  Polaroid  Corporation,  Fingerhut,  and  PCI;  through  PCI,  Petters 
perpetrated a multi-billion-dollar Ponzi scheme.  United States v. Petters, 
663 F.3d 375, 379
 (8th Cir. 2011).  Petters “induced investments in fake consumer electronics financing 
transactions and paid ‘returns’ to investors using the investors’ own money or other 
subsequent investors’ money.”  Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 67–68 [ECF No. 7-10]; see also 
Petters, 
663 F.3d at 379
.                                                 

From 2001 to 2007, the Master Funds invested nearly $2.5 billion with Petters 
through approximately 346 loans, each evidenced by a promissory note.  Clark Decl., Ex. 
B (“Murray Report”) ¶ 40 [ECF No. 46-2]; see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73–79.  In all but 
one circumstance in which PCI was the borrower, the loans were made to PL Ltd., a 
special-purpose entity established by Petters to receive loan proceeds from the Master 

Funds.  Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–72, 100–13.  PL Ltd. transferred loan proceeds to 
“vendors” controlled by Petters’ associates, and the vendors “pretended to sell receivables 
or inventory to PCI,” creating fraudulent paperwork showing non-existent transactions.  
Id.
 
¶¶ 80–97.  Petters and his associates would then create fraudulent purchase orders and 
invoices showing fictitious profits from the “resale” of that inventory to “big-box” retailers 

like Costco and Sam’s Club.  Id. ¶¶ 87, 96.  When a note matured, PCI would transfer 
funds, typically funds received from other investors in an amount greater than the original 
principal and interest specified in the promissory note, back to the PL Ltd. account, from 
which Stevanovich could withdraw the principal and interest owed to the Master Funds.  
Id. ¶¶ 85–86, 88.  Unlike many other Petters investors, the Master Funds ultimately were 

repaid all outstanding principal balances, interest, and origination fees before the Petters 
scheme collapsed.  Murray Report ¶ 49; see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–4, 70–73.  These 
payments totaled nearly $2.8 billion, including $318,187,782 in profits to the Master 
Funds.  Murray Report ¶¶ 49–50; see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–4, 73.  (Kelley refers to 
these as “false profits.”  Pl. Mem. in Opp’n at 5 [ECF No. 57].)          
During the period the Master Funds invested in the Petters entities, the Master Funds 

“received cash from various sources, including returns from hundreds of investments 
unrelated to [] Petters, proceeds from the sales of those investments, and payments from 
PL Ltd., Inc.”  Stevanovich Decl. ¶ 5 [ECF No. 47].  The Master “Funds also received cash 
from new investors” during this period.  Id.  All funds from all sources were deposited in 
a single account for each Master Fund.  Id. ¶ 7.  The Master Funds “applied money received 

from all sources, including PL Ltd., Inc. and hundreds of other investments, to invest in 
other holdings, pay expenses, or credit redeeming investors.”  Id. ¶ 8.  The Master Funds 
also applied these funds to pay “management fees” (paid quarterly) and “performance fees” 
(paid annually and when a redemption was issued to an investor) to the Management 
Companies.  Id. ¶ 9; Murray Report ¶¶ 141–43.  The Management Companies received 

fees from the Master Funds and from other “master funds unrelated to this action and which 
never lent money to [] Petters or his entities.”  Stevanovich Decl. ¶ 10.  “[T]he Management 
Companies also received consulting fees and miscellaneous fees from specialty funds and 
consulting projects unrelated to [] Petters or his companies.”  Id. ¶ 11.  “The Management 
Companies deposited all fees received from all sources in a single account for each 

Management Company.”  Id. ¶ 12.  “In turn, the Management Companies applied the fees 
received to pay office rent for multiple locations, employee payroll, compensation for [] 
Stevanovich,  and  general  business  expenses.”    Id.  ¶  13.    Neither  the  Management 
Companies nor Stevanovich personally loaned funds or invested in Petters or his entities.  
Id. ¶¶ 4, 14.                                                             
In October 2008—following the collapse of the Petters Ponzi scheme—PCI and PL 

Ltd., along with other PCI affiliates, filed voluntary petitions for relief in bankruptcy court 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  See Compl. ¶¶ 40–42 [ECF No. 1-1].  In 
February 2009, the bankruptcy court appointed Kelley trustee of the PCI Liquidating Trust 
for all debtors.  Def. Summ. J. Mot. ¶ 1 [ECF No. 43].  In October 2010, Kelley commenced 
this adversary case in bankruptcy court pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rule of 

Bankruptcy  Procedure  7001,  and  the  Minnesota  Uniform  Fraudulent  Transfer  Act 
(“MUFTA”),3  seeking  to  avoid  and  recover  transfers  made  by  PCI  and  PL  Ltd.  to 
Defendants, “including the payments of both principal and false profits in excess of their 
investments.”  Second Am. Compl. ¶ 6–7; see Compl.  The Parties then engaged in 
discovery and motion practice for several years.                          

On  June  26,  2017,  Kelley  filed  his  second  amended  complaint,  which  is  the 
operative complaint in this case.4  After discovery closed, the Management Companies and 
                                                                     
3    MUFTA was renamed the Minnesota Uniform Voidable Transactions Act in 2015, 
see 
Minn. Stat. § 513.51
, but the Parties agree that amendments made at that time are not 
material to their motions, and they use the acronym MUFTA to conform with earlier 
pleadings and case law, see Pl. Mem. in Supp. at 2 n.2 [ECF No. 50].      

4    Kelley asserts eleven claims in the second amended complaint:  (I) Fraudulently 
Incurred Obligations – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. § 548
(a)(1)(A); (II) Fraudulently Incurred 
Obligations – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(1) and 
513.47; (III) Actual Fraudulent Transfers – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 548
(a)(1)(A), 
550(a), 551 (Regarding Two-Year Transfers); (IV) Constructive Fraudulent Transfers – 
Constructive  Fraud,  
11 U.S.C. §§ 548
(a)(1)(B),  550(a),  551  (Regarding  Two-Year 
Transfers); (V) Actual Fraudulent Transfers – Actual Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 
Stevanovich moved in the Bankruptcy Court for summary judgment on all claims against 
them.  ECF No. 7-40.  They argued, in part, that the fraudulent transfer claims against them 
failed because Kelley had not, as a matter of law, traced transfers from PCI and PL Ltd. to 

them.  
Id. at 7
.  In a March 13, 2019 order, Bankruptcy Judge Kathleen H. Sanberg denied 
the motion as to counts I through VIII of the second amended complaint, reasoning that the 
motion  raised  a  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  as  to  the  tracing  methodologies  and 
conclusions of Kelley’s expert, Marti P. Murray.  Summ. J. Order ¶ 2 [ECF No. 8-4]; see 
Summ. J. Tr. at 18–25 [ECF No. 17-1].  Judge Sanberg granted the motion as to count XI.  

Summ. J. Order ¶ 4.  Judge Sanberg also ordered Kelley, the Management Companies, and 
Stevanovich to file a stipulation effecting their agreement to the voluntary dismissal of 
counts IX and X.  
Id. ¶ 3
.  No stipulation to that effect has been filed, however.  See Def. 
Mem. in Supp. at 9 n.9 [ECF No. 45].  This case subsequently was transferred to this Court.  



                                                                     
550(a), 551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(1) and 513.47 (For avoidance and recovery, as initial 
transferees of the PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. Transfers, and as subsequent transferees 
of the PCI SPE Transfers); (VI) Constructive Fraudulent Transfers – Constructive Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 550(a), 551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(2)(i) and 513.47 (For 
avoidance and recovery, as initial transferees of the PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. 
Transfers, and as subsequent transferees of the PCI SPE Transfers); (VII) Fraudulent 
Transfers – Constructive Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(a) and (b), 550(a), 551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.44
(a)(2)(ii) and 513.47 (For avoidance and recovery, as initial transferees of the 
PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. Transfers, and as subsequent transferees of the PCI SPE 
Transfers); (VIII) Fraudulent Transfers – Constructive Fraud, 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544
(b), 550(a), 
551, 
Minn. Stat. §§ 513.45
(a) and 513.47 (For avoidance and recovery, as initial transferees 
of the PCI Direct Transfers and PL Ltd. Transfers, and as subsequent transferees of the PCI 
SPE Transfers); (IX) Lien Avoidance – 
11 U.S.C. § 506
(d); (X) Turnover and Accounting 
– 
11 U.S.C. § 542
; and (XI) Unjust Enrichment/Equitable Disgorgement.     
ECF No. 1.  The Management Companies and Stevanovich have moved for summary 
judgment on all remaining claims.  Def. Summ. J. Mot.                     
                           II                                        

The Parties dispute whether the Bankruptcy Court’s order on the Management 
Companies and Stevanovich’s previous summary-judgment motion bars consideration of 
this motion because the Bankruptcy Court’s order is law of the case.  Pl. Mem. in Opp’n at 
15–16 [ECF No. 57]; Def. Reply Mem. at 8–9 [ECF No. 61].  It is not.  The law of the case 
doctrine provides that “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should 

continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”  Morris v. Am. 
Nat’l Can Corp., 
988 F.2d 50, 52
 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Arizona v. California, 
460 U.S. 605, 618
 (1983)).  The doctrine applies to final decisions by a district court that have not 
been appealed, but it does not apply to interlocutory orders, “for they can always be 
reconsidered and modified by a district court prior to entry of a final judgment.”  First 

Union Nat’l Bank v. Pictet Overseas Tr. Corp., 
477 F.3d 616, 620
 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
United States v. Hively, 
437 F.3d 752, 766
 (8th Cir. 2006)).  A district court’s denial of 
summary judgment as to some claims in a case “renders the entire order interlocutory” 
because it necessarily indicates that there are claims left to be resolved.  Acton v. City of 
Columbia, 
436 F.3d 969
, 973 (8th Cir. 2006).  The Eighth Circuit has expressly rejected 

the argument that “the law of the case doctrine precludes a second summary judgment 
motion unless it can be shown that the second or renewed motion is based upon substantial 
discovery of facts not before the court at the time of the original motion.”  Mosley v. City 
of Northwoods, 
415 F.3d 908
, 911 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating the law of the case doctrine 
“does not deprive the district court of the ability to reconsider earlier rulings to avoid 
reversal” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  Therefore, the law of the case 
doctrine does not bar consideration of the Management Companies and Stevanovich’s 

present summary-judgment motion.                                          
Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute over a fact is “material” only if its resolution “might affect 
the outcome of the suit” under the governing substantive law.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248
 (1986).  A dispute over a fact is “genuine” only if “the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  
Id.
  “The 
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 
in his favor.”  
Id. at 255
.5                                              

                                                                     
5    Kelley argues that, “[i]rrespective of whether the Moving Defendants meet their 
summary judgment burden, this Court may still deny summary judgment in its discretion 
if it believes that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.”  Mem. in Opp’n at 
14, n.7.  As support for this argument, Kelley cites McLain v. Meier, in which our Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals some 41 years ago observed:                      

     [A] district court in passing on a Rule 56 motion performs what 
     amounts  to  what  may  be  called  a  negative  discretionary  
     function.  The court has no discretion to grant a motion for    
     summary judgment, but even if the court is convinced that the   
     moving party is entitled to such a judgment the exercise of     
     sound judicial discretion may dictate that the motion should be 
     denied, and the case fully developed.                           

612 F.2d 349, 356
 (8th Cir. 1979).  This description of the law seems difficult to square 
with the current version of Rule 56.  It says that a district court “shall grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis 
The  law  allows  bankruptcy  trustees  to  recover  the  value  of  avoided  property 
transfers, not merely from initial transferees, but from subsequent transferees also.  Under 
the Bankruptcy Code, the avoidance of transfers (pursuant to specified Code provisions at 

issue in this case) would allow the Trustee to recover “the property transferred, or, if the 
court so orders, the value of such property, from (1) the initial transferee of such transfer 
or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or (2) any immediate or mediate 
transferee of such initial transferee.”  
11 U.S.C. § 550
(a).  Similarly, under Minnesota law, 
“the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred . . . or the amount 

necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is less” against “(i) the first transferee 
of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or (ii) an immediate or 
mediate transferee of the first transferee, other than[] (A) a good-faith transferee that took 
for value[] or (B) an immediate or mediate good-faith transferee of a person described in 
subitem (A).”  
Minn. Stat. § 513.48
(b)(1).  Here, because there appears to be no fact dispute 

that the Management Companies and Stevanovich did not themselves invest in, or receive 
payments from, PCI or PL Ltd., Kelley must establish that they were subsequent transferees 
of amounts that the Master Funds received from PCI or PL Ltd.  And Kelley seeks to do 
precisely that.  He alleges that the Management Companies received at least $60,667,405 

                                                                     
added).  It also seems irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s 1986 summary-judgment 
trilogy that made clear, among other things, that “[s]ummary judgment procedure is 
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of 
the  Federal  Rules  as  a  whole,  which  are  designed  ‘to  secure  the  just,  speedy  and 
inexpensive determination of every action.’”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 327
 
(1986); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574
 (1986); 
Anderson, 
477 U.S. 242
.                                                   
in management fees and performance fees based on amounts the Master Funds received 
from  PCI  or  PL  Ltd.  and  that  amounts  Stevanovich received  from  the  Management 
Companies also were based on these amounts.  Pl. Mem. in Opp’n at 10–13; see Murray 

Report ¶¶ 138–83.                                                         
The Management Companies and Stevanovich seek summary judgment on all 
remaining claims against them on the ground that Kelley cannot, as a matter of law, meet 
his burden to show the transfer of funds from PCI and PL Ltd. to them.  Def. Summ. J. 
Mot. ¶ 2; Def. Mem. in Supp. at 1–3.  To summarize, the Management Companies and 

Stevanovich argue that Kelley cannot meet his tracing burden because of the extensive 
commingling of receipts by the Master Funds and the Management Companies.  See Def. 
Mot. ¶ 3; Def. Mem. in Supp. at 15–22.  They note that the Master Funds “received 
investment returns from numerous investment positions (only one of which was PL Ltd., 
Inc.),  proceeds  from  sales  of  investment  positions,  and  infusions  of  cash  from  new 

subscribing investors, which they deposited in a single account” for each Master Fund.  
Def. Mem. in Supp. at 19.  The Master Funds then “reinvested the proceeds in other 
positions and redeemed investor interests before paying management and performance 
fees.”  
Id.
  The management and performance fees were paid “on the basis of all assets 
under management as of a particular date or the yearly increase in the global net asset 

value,” and the Management Companies deposited those fees in the same account as they 
received fees from other sources and used money from those accounts to pay expenses 
beyond the distributions to Stevanovich.  Id. at 20; Stevanovich Decl. ¶ 12–13.  Therefore, 
the Management Companies and Stevanovich argue, “[t]he nature of both the receipt of 
funds from multiple investments and the method of calculating the management and 
performance fees prevents the Trustee from establishing that any money . . . originated 
solely with PL Ltd.”  Def. Mem. in Supp. at 20.                           

The law does not place such a difficult burden on trustees.  The commingling of 
legitimate funds with funds transferred from a debtor does not defeat tracing.  In re Dreier 
LLP, No. 08-15051 (SMB), 
2014 WL 47774
, at *15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2014); In re 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 08-01789 (BRL), 
2012 WL 892514
, at *2 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012) (rejecting the “untenable assumption that once the [f]ictitious 

[p]rofits were comingled with legitimate funds” none of the funds could be traced).  A 
trustee’s burden “is not so onerous as to require dollar-for-dollar accounting of the exact 
funds at issue.”  Madoff, 
2012 WL 892514
, at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Dreier, 
2014 WL 47774
, at *15 (denying Management Companies’ motion 
for summary judgment, reasoning evidence that the debtor contributed to the managed 

funds’ profits, which triggered the funds’ obligation to pay fees to the Management 
Companies, supported a reasonable inference that those fees were actually paid absent 
evidence to the contrary); see also In re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 
408 F.3d 689, 708
 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“[P]roper tracing does not require dollar-for-dollar accounting.”).  Factual 
allegations that “show the relevant pathways through which the funds were transferred” 

are sufficient.  Madoff, 
2012 WL 892514
, at *3.                           
Relying on Weil v. United States, the Management Companies and Stevanovich 
argue that, in lieu of dollar-for-dollar tracing, Kelley must show that management and 
performance  fees  received  by  the  Management  Companies  and  money  received  by 
Stevanovich “originated solely” with PCI and PL Ltd. to defeat summary judgment.  Def. 
Mem. in Supp. at 17–21.  Weil did not establish that rule.  True, in distinguishing its facts 
from those in International Administrative, Weil observed that the transfers in International 

Administrative were shown to have “originated solely” from the debtor while the Weil 
trustee had not made a similar showing.  Weil v. United States, No. 1:09-bk-26982-VK, 
2016 WL 1239519
,  at  *17,  27  (Bankr.  C.D.  Cal.  Mar.  29,  2016),  report  and 
recommendation adopted sub nom., In re Tag Entm’t Corp, 
2016 WL 5947304
 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 5, 2016).  But Weil nowhere adopts or applies a rule that transfers must be shown to 

have “originated solely” with the debtor to be recoverable.  Instead, Weil applied the rule 
that “attenuated links between the debtor and the ultimate transferee” are insufficient to 
establish a transfer of assets.  Weil, 
2016 WL 1239519
, at *17, 27; see Kremen v. Cohen, 
No. 5-11-CV-05411-LHK, 
2012 WL 2919332
, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2012).  Weil also 
involved a materially different procedural posture and facts.  In Weil, the trustee sought to 

show in a bench trial that the United States received a transfer from the debtor corporation 
(TAG Entertainment Corp.), when it received a restitution payment from an individual 
(Austin) who had been convicted of mail fraud and filing a false tax return.  Weil, 
2016 WL 1239519
, at *2.  Austin incorporated TAG Entertainment and was involved in its 
management  at  various  times,  but  Austin’s  convictions  arose  from  his  activities  in 

connection with another business organization.  
Id. at *7
.  To meet her tracing burden, the 
trustee “pointed to several real estate transactions, the last of which was the sale of [real 
property] for the purpose of meeting Mr. Austin’s restitution obligation.”  
Id. at *2
.  The 
trustee tried to show that TAG Entertainment “was the originating source of funding for 
these real estate transactions.”  
Id.
  Following trial, the court found that the trustee had not 
established a sufficient connection between Austin and his acquisition of the real estate he 
sold to pay his restitution obligation and payments from TAG Entertainment.  
Id.
 at **22–

27.  The trustee, the court explained, had identified irregularities, but failed to present 
evidence of a pathway of funds or sufficient circumstantial evidence to connect payments 
from the debtor to Austin’s purchase of the real property he eventually sold to pay his 
restitution obligation.  
Id.
  Here, in contrast to Weil, there is a summary-judgment motion 
(not a trial), and the asserted pathway of funds is more direct.          

Kelley  has  introduced  materials—Murray’s  expert  report  and  its  associated 
documents—from which a juror reasonably may infer that the Management Companies 
and Stevanovich are subsequent transferees of property that originated with the Debtor.  
Two of Murray’s opinions and accompanying analysis are particularly relevant to this 
motion.    In  her  fourth  opinion,  Murray  concluded  that  the  Management  Companies 

received at least $60,667,405 in management fees and performance fees based on the 
$318,187,782 in profits received by the Master Funds from their Petters investments.  
Murray Report ¶¶ 138–62.  (For convenience, profits from the Master Funds’ Petters 
investments will be referred to from here on as “Petters profits.”)  To reach this conclusion, 
Murray first determined the amount of overall profits received yearly by each Master Fund 

during the Petters Ponzi scheme and the amount in management and performance fees paid 
to the Management Companies during that time.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 138–43.  Murray then calculated 
the minimum amount of management fees attributable to Petters profits by identifying 
Petters profits by Master Fund by quarter and then determining what management fees 
were charged on those Petters profits by quarter based on each fund’s management fee rate.  
Id.
  ¶¶ 144–58, App’x K.  Murray then calculated the amount of performance fees 
attributable to Petters profits by subtracting the management fees charged during each year 

from Petters profits earned during that year and multiplying the result by the performance 
fee rate.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 159–61, App’x K.  In her fifth opinion, Murray concluded that Stevanovich 
received  cash  payments  from  the  Management  Companies  “well  in  excess”  of  the 
$60,667,405 in fees received by the Management Companies attributable to Petters profits.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 163–83.  To reach this conclusion, Murray first determined the amount in fees 

attributable to Petters profits paid to each of the Management Companies, two of which 
are domestic entities and two of which are offshore entities.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 163–78.  Murray then 
observed  that  the  two  domestic  Management  Companies  are  owned  entirely  by 
Stevanovich through “Ally Kat,” an entity Stevanovich established in 2001, and that 
Stevanovich received “virtually the same amount in distributions [from Ally Kat] in the 

years 2004 to 2007 as the fees credited to the domestic Stevanovich Entities relating to 
[Petters] Profits in all the years in which there were [Petters] Profits.”  
Id.
 ¶¶ 164–65.  
Murray  further  observed  that  the  net  income  from  the  two  offshore  Management 
Companies was “virtually the same as gross income, meaning [they] did not have material 
expenses” and that the fees received by those companies relating to Petters profits “would 

have directly benefitted Stevanovich without material deductions.”  
Id. ¶ 168
.  Murray 
determined that Epsilon Global Asset Management’s account showed teller withdrawals 
totaling $49,812,709 during the relevant time period and that Stevanovich had “sole 
signatory authority” for the account, making it “reasonable to conclude that Stevanovich 
received these funds.  
Id.
 ¶¶ 170–73.  Similar documentation was not available for Westford 
Global  Asset  Management’s  account,  “including  documentation  relating  to  signatory 
authority on the account,” but Murray determined there were teller withdrawals from that 

account  during  the  relevant  timeframe  totaling  $51,480,519  and  posited  that  it  was 
reasonable to conclude that Stevanovich also had sole signatory authority over the account 
and received those funds.  
Id.
 ¶ 174–78.                                  
The Management Companies and Stevanovich argue that Murray’s investigation, 
analysis, and opinions cannot be relied on to identify genuine issues of material fact 

because Murray “utterly fails to identify any accepted methodology for the critical portion 
of  her  opinion  at  which  she  purportedly  connects  PL  Ltd.,  Inc’s  payments  to  the 
Management Companies (and, ultimately, Mr. Stevanovich).”  Mem. in Supp. at 23.  
Whether Murray’s methodology is “accepted” is more properly considered under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 and the rubric of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579
  (1993).    The  Management  Companies  and  Stevanovich  did  not  challenge 
Murray’s opinions on this basis.  Stevanovich argues that, if Kelley were able to trace funds 
from PCI and PL Ltd. to him, the distributions he received were compensation for his 
management services and are not subject to claw back under 
11 U.S.C. § 550
(a)(2).  Def. 
Mem. in Supp. at 29–31.  For this position, Stevanovich cites authorities establishing that 

a corporate officer’s receipt of salary from a debtor or transferee corporation is alone 
insufficient to render the officer a transferee.  See In re Geltzer, 
502 B.R. 760
, 772–73 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 
386 F. Supp.2d 209, 227
 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  Here, there is a fact dispute about whether the distributions 
Stevanovich  received  from  the  Management  Companies  were  a  salary  in  light  of 
Stevanovich’s deposition testimony that he is not an employee of his entities and that his 
distributions were comprised of the funds that remained after the Management Companies 

paid their expenses.  See Yates Decl, Ex. J at 27:7–29:9; 34:10–12; 51:12–18 [ECF No. 
58-1 at 228–30, 234].                                                     

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
ORDERED   THAT Defendants  Westford  Global  Asset  Management,  Ltd.,  Westford 

Asset Management, LLC, Epsilon Global Asset Management, Ltd., Epsilon Investment 
Management, LLC, and Steve Goran Stevanovich’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF 
No. 43] is DENIED.                                                        

Dated:  June 10, 2020         s/ Eric C. Tostrud                          
                         Eric C. Tostrud                             
                         United States District Court                

Reference

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