UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Tony N. Taylor,                            Civ. No. 20-2266 (PAM/DTS)     

     Plaintiff,                                                      

v.                                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER               

Inflection Risk Solutions, LLC,                                           

     Defendant.                                                      


This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s partial Motion to Dismiss or to 
Strike.  For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.                 
BACKGROUND                                                                
In 2014, Plaintiff Tony Taylor brought his licensed firearm into Minneapolis City 
Hall, a building that also contains courtrooms.  (Am. Compl. (Docket No. 15) ¶ 22.)  He 
and his wife, Sarah Taylor, were subsequently convicted of bringing a weapon into a 
courthouse in violation of 

, subd. 1g(a)(1), which is a felony.  (Id. 
¶¶ 22-23.)  Both received a sentence of probation with a stayed prison term, and both 
successfully completed their probationary sentences.  (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.)  Under Minnesota 
law, such convictions are deemed misdemeanors, 

, and according to 
Taylor, online public court records list the convictions as misdemeanors.  (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.)   
Defendant Inflection Risk Solutions, LLC conducts criminal background checks for 
its clients, including Airbnb.  In July 2020, Taylor applied to rent an apartment through 
Airbnb.  (Id. ¶ 30.)  Inflection conducted a background check, and after receiving that 
report, Airbnb rejected Taylor’s application and permanently barred him from ever renting 
through Airbnb.  (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.)  Taylor received a copy of the background check report, 
which listed his criminal conviction as a felony.  (Id. ¶ 35.)  The report also stated that the 

“offense class” of the conviction was “violence.”  (Id. ¶ 36.)  Taylor disputed the report 
and Inflection corrected it, but according to Taylor, he remains permanently barred from 
using Airbnb.  (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.)                                            
Taylor’s wife also asked Inflection for a criminal background report, which listed 
the same erroneous information: that her offense was a felony and that the offense class 
was “violence.”  (Id. ¶ 47.)  Mrs. Taylor disputed her report and Inflection corrected it.  (Id. 

¶ 49.)  Thereafter, Mrs. Taylor sought to rent an apartment through Airbnb and was 
approved for that rental.  (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.)                                
The Amended Complaint raises two causes of action.  Count I alleges that Inflection 
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1682e(b), by either willfully 
or negligently reporting as felonies crimes that Minnesota law deems to be misdemeanors.  

Count II asserts the same statutory violation, alleging that Inflection willfully or negligently 
mis-reported non-violent offenses as violent offenses.                    
Taylor seeks to represent two classes: a so-called “deemed misdemeanor” class and 
an  “inaccurate  offense  characterization”  class.    (Am.  Compl.  ¶  64.)    The  “deemed 
misdemeanor” class consists of individuals with Minnesota felony convictions that were 

ultimately deemed misdemeanors under 

, and on whom Infection 
published an inaccurate background-check report indicating that the offense was a felony.  
The “inaccurate offense characterization” class comprises individuals on whom Inflection 
performed a background check that listed a Minnesota criminal offense described as 
involving violence, but whose conviction was not a crime of violence under 

, subd. 5.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 64.)  Both classes are limited to two years before this 

case’s commencement.  (Id.)                                               
Inflection’s Motion seeks the dismissal of Count II of the Amended Complaint, or 
in the alternative to dismiss the request for statutory or punitive damages in Count II, and 
to strike the class allegations in their entirety.                        
DISCUSSION                                                                
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need only “contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  A claim bears facial 
plausibility when it allows the Court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 

.  When evaluating a motion 

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept plausible factual allegations as true.  
Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

 (8th Cir. 2012).       
The  FCRA  mandates  that  credit-reporting  agencies  such  as  Inflection  “follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning 
the individual about whom the report relates.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).  A reasonable-

procedures claim requires a plaintiff to plead and ultimately prove that the defendant failed 
to follow such reasonable procedures, included inaccurate information in the plaintiff’s 
credit report, and the plaintiff suffered an injury because of that inaccurate information.  
Gohman v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 

 (D. Minn. 2005) (Doty, 
J.).  The parties agree, however, that a claim asserting a willful violation of the statute does 
not require proof of any injury, because the FCRA provides for statutory damages for 

willful violations of its provisions.                                     
A.   Count II                                                             
1.   Crime of Violence                                               
Inflection first argues that Count II fails to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted, because Inflection’s categorization of Taylor’s conviction as a violent one is not 
inaccurate.  Taylor in turn contends that Minnesota law defines crime of violence and that 

his conviction is not included in that definition.  The crime-of-violence definition to which 
he  points,  

,  defines  a  crime  of  violence  for  Minnesota’s  gun-
possession statutes, 

.  It is true that the definition’s laundry 
list of sections of the Minnesota criminal code does not include the section under which 
Taylor was convicted, 

.  But as Inflection notes, Taylor was convicted 

of possessing a “dangerous weapon” in a courthouse, 

, subd. 1g, and 
Minnesota law defines a “dangerous weapon” as one “capable of producing death or great 
bodily harm.”  

.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “violent crime” in 
part as the “threatened use, or substantial risk of use of physical force.”  (Def.’s Supp. 
Mem. (Docket No. 20) at 12.)  Thus, Inflection asserts that Taylor’s crime fits the general 

definition of crime of violence and it was not inaccurate for Inflection to include that 
notation in its background-check report.                                  
Taylor’s response is that the “offense class” category is one of Inflection’s own 
making.  To put it differently, although Inflection represents that its reports are merely a 
copy of public records, there is no “offense class” in Minnesota’s criminal records, so 
Inflection must have created that category itself.  As such, Taylor argues, Inflection had a 

duty to ensure that it accurately represented the so-called “offense class.”  And here, there 
is no indication in any public record that Taylor’s crime was a violent one, except for the 
statute’s use of the term “dangerous weapon” in the definition of the crime itself.  Taylor 
claims that, having endeavored to classify the crimes it is reporting, the FCRA required 
Inflection to make certain that its classifications were accurate.        
On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must take the allegations in the Amended 

Complaint as true and construe those allegations in favor of Taylor.  It is plausible that, as 
Taylor  alleges,  Inflection  did  not  use  reasonable  procedures  when  determining  what 
offenses fit the “offense class” of “violence.”  Taylor is entitled to discovery as to how 
Inflection  makes  this  offense-categorization  judgment  and  whether  Inflection  acted 
reasonably  to  ensure,  as  the  FCRA  requires,  “maximum  possible  accuracy”  in  that 

categorization judgment and the subsequent reporting of the categorization decision to its 
clients.                                                                  
2.   Willfulness                                                     
In the alternative, Inflection asks for dismissal of the statutory and punitive damages 
associated with Count II.  Inflection contends that any alleged inaccuracy in categorizing 

Taylor’s conviction as one involving violence could not have been willful, for the reasons 
discussed above with regard to the statutory and general definition of crimes of violence.   
The FCRA imposes different penalties for violations of the statute depending on the 
violator’s conduct.  Willful failure to comply subjects the violator to penalties including 
actual damages of not less than $100, and punitive damages, in addition to costs and 
attorney’s fees, and, as noted, a willful violation does not require a showing of actual injury.  

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).  Willfulness “cover[s] not only knowing violations of a standard, 
but reckless ones as well.”  Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 

 (2007).  And 
recklessness, in turn, “entail[s] ‘an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or 
so obvious that it should be known.’”  

 at 68 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 

 (1994)).  An erroneous reading of a statute may be  willful  only if “objectively 
unreasonable.”  Id. at 69.                                                

“To determine whether a reading is objectively unreasonable, the Safeco Court 
identified three sources of potential guidance for an alleged willful violator: (1) the federal 
courts of appeals; (2) the FTC; and (3) the statutory text.”  Just v. Target Corp., 

 (D. Minn. 2016) (Frank, J.).  Inflection contends that the use of the 
term “dangerous weapon” in Taylor’s statute of conviction should end the matter; because 

the statute uses this term, it was thus reasonable as a matter of law for Inflection to 
categorize Taylor’s conviction as a violent one.  Taylor asserts that Inflection should have 
also consulted other statutes, namely Minnesota’s definition of “crime of violence,” which 
does not include Taylor’s crime.                                          
At this stage, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that Inflection’s decision 

to categorize Taylor’s conviction as a violent one was objectively reasonable as a matter 
of law.  Taylor has not had the benefit of any discovery regarding how Inflection decides 
which crimes are categorized in which way.  This is not a situation in which Inflection is 
merely reporting the public record, but rather Inflection is interpreting the public record.  
Taylor is allowed to discover whether that interpretation of his crime was objectively 
reasonable.                                                               

B.   Class Allegations                                                    
Finally, Inflection contends that Taylor’s attempt to represent a class is improper.  
Essentially, Inflection seeks to litigate class certification at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  
All but one of the cases Inflection cites for the propriety of such an early ruling on class 
certification issues are from outside this Circuit, although as Inflection notes, the Eighth 
Circuit has affirmed a district court’s dismissal of class claims under Rule 12(b)(6).  

McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 

 (8th Cir. 2012).  But no court 
in this Circuit has cited this case for the proposition that considering class-certification 
issues is always appropriate, or even often appropriate, at this early stage of the litigation.    
While the Court has doubts about whether either of the claims Taylor raises is 
amenable to class treatment, it is premature to make that judgment at this early stage of the 

litigation.                                                               
CONCLUSION                                                                
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss or to Strike 
(Docket No. 18) is DENIED.                                                

Dated: February 16, 2021                                                  
                         s/ Paul A. Magnuson                         
                         Paul A. Magnuson                            
                         United States District Court Judge          

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Tony N. Taylor,                            Civ. No. 20-2266 (PAM/DTS)     

     Plaintiff,                                                      

v.                                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER               

Inflection Risk Solutions, LLC,                                           

     Defendant.                                                      


This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s partial Motion to Dismiss or to 
Strike.  For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.                 
BACKGROUND                                                                
In 2014, Plaintiff Tony Taylor brought his licensed firearm into Minneapolis City 
Hall, a building that also contains courtrooms.  (Am. Compl. (Docket No. 15) ¶ 22.)  He 
and his wife, Sarah Taylor, were subsequently convicted of bringing a weapon into a 
courthouse in violation of 

, subd. 1g(a)(1), which is a felony.  (Id. 
¶¶ 22-23.)  Both received a sentence of probation with a stayed prison term, and both 
successfully completed their probationary sentences.  (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.)  Under Minnesota 
law, such convictions are deemed misdemeanors, 

, and according to 
Taylor, online public court records list the convictions as misdemeanors.  (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.)   
Defendant Inflection Risk Solutions, LLC conducts criminal background checks for 
its clients, including Airbnb.  In July 2020, Taylor applied to rent an apartment through 
Airbnb.  (Id. ¶ 30.)  Inflection conducted a background check, and after receiving that 
report, Airbnb rejected Taylor’s application and permanently barred him from ever renting 
through Airbnb.  (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.)  Taylor received a copy of the background check report, 
which listed his criminal conviction as a felony.  (Id. ¶ 35.)  The report also stated that the 

“offense class” of the conviction was “violence.”  (Id. ¶ 36.)  Taylor disputed the report 
and Inflection corrected it, but according to Taylor, he remains permanently barred from 
using Airbnb.  (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.)                                            
Taylor’s wife also asked Inflection for a criminal background report, which listed 
the same erroneous information: that her offense was a felony and that the offense class 
was “violence.”  (Id. ¶ 47.)  Mrs. Taylor disputed her report and Inflection corrected it.  (Id. 

¶ 49.)  Thereafter, Mrs. Taylor sought to rent an apartment through Airbnb and was 
approved for that rental.  (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.)                                
The Amended Complaint raises two causes of action.  Count I alleges that Inflection 
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1682e(b), by either willfully 
or negligently reporting as felonies crimes that Minnesota law deems to be misdemeanors.  

Count II asserts the same statutory violation, alleging that Inflection willfully or negligently 
mis-reported non-violent offenses as violent offenses.                    
Taylor seeks to represent two classes: a so-called “deemed misdemeanor” class and 
an  “inaccurate  offense  characterization”  class.    (Am.  Compl.  ¶  64.)    The  “deemed 
misdemeanor” class consists of individuals with Minnesota felony convictions that were 

ultimately deemed misdemeanors under 

, and on whom Infection 
published an inaccurate background-check report indicating that the offense was a felony.  
The “inaccurate offense characterization” class comprises individuals on whom Inflection 
performed a background check that listed a Minnesota criminal offense described as 
involving violence, but whose conviction was not a crime of violence under 

, subd. 5.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 64.)  Both classes are limited to two years before this 

case’s commencement.  (Id.)                                               
Inflection’s Motion seeks the dismissal of Count II of the Amended Complaint, or 
in the alternative to dismiss the request for statutory or punitive damages in Count II, and 
to strike the class allegations in their entirety.                        
DISCUSSION                                                                
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need only “contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  A claim bears facial 
plausibility when it allows the Court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 

.  When evaluating a motion 

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept plausible factual allegations as true.  
Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

 (8th Cir. 2012).       
The  FCRA  mandates  that  credit-reporting  agencies  such  as  Inflection  “follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning 
the individual about whom the report relates.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).  A reasonable-

procedures claim requires a plaintiff to plead and ultimately prove that the defendant failed 
to follow such reasonable procedures, included inaccurate information in the plaintiff’s 
credit report, and the plaintiff suffered an injury because of that inaccurate information.  
Gohman v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 

 (D. Minn. 2005) (Doty, 
J.).  The parties agree, however, that a claim asserting a willful violation of the statute does 
not require proof of any injury, because the FCRA provides for statutory damages for 

willful violations of its provisions.                                     
A.   Count II                                                             
1.   Crime of Violence                                               
Inflection first argues that Count II fails to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted, because Inflection’s categorization of Taylor’s conviction as a violent one is not 
inaccurate.  Taylor in turn contends that Minnesota law defines crime of violence and that 

his conviction is not included in that definition.  The crime-of-violence definition to which 
he  points,  

,  defines  a  crime  of  violence  for  Minnesota’s  gun-
possession statutes, 

.  It is true that the definition’s laundry 
list of sections of the Minnesota criminal code does not include the section under which 
Taylor was convicted, 

.  But as Inflection notes, Taylor was convicted 

of possessing a “dangerous weapon” in a courthouse, 

, subd. 1g, and 
Minnesota law defines a “dangerous weapon” as one “capable of producing death or great 
bodily harm.”  

.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “violent crime” in 
part as the “threatened use, or substantial risk of use of physical force.”  (Def.’s Supp. 
Mem. (Docket No. 20) at 12.)  Thus, Inflection asserts that Taylor’s crime fits the general 

definition of crime of violence and it was not inaccurate for Inflection to include that 
notation in its background-check report.                                  
Taylor’s response is that the “offense class” category is one of Inflection’s own 
making.  To put it differently, although Inflection represents that its reports are merely a 
copy of public records, there is no “offense class” in Minnesota’s criminal records, so 
Inflection must have created that category itself.  As such, Taylor argues, Inflection had a 

duty to ensure that it accurately represented the so-called “offense class.”  And here, there 
is no indication in any public record that Taylor’s crime was a violent one, except for the 
statute’s use of the term “dangerous weapon” in the definition of the crime itself.  Taylor 
claims that, having endeavored to classify the crimes it is reporting, the FCRA required 
Inflection to make certain that its classifications were accurate.        
On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must take the allegations in the Amended 

Complaint as true and construe those allegations in favor of Taylor.  It is plausible that, as 
Taylor  alleges,  Inflection  did  not  use  reasonable  procedures  when  determining  what 
offenses fit the “offense class” of “violence.”  Taylor is entitled to discovery as to how 
Inflection  makes  this  offense-categorization  judgment  and  whether  Inflection  acted 
reasonably  to  ensure,  as  the  FCRA  requires,  “maximum  possible  accuracy”  in  that 

categorization judgment and the subsequent reporting of the categorization decision to its 
clients.                                                                  
2.   Willfulness                                                     
In the alternative, Inflection asks for dismissal of the statutory and punitive damages 
associated with Count II.  Inflection contends that any alleged inaccuracy in categorizing 

Taylor’s conviction as one involving violence could not have been willful, for the reasons 
discussed above with regard to the statutory and general definition of crimes of violence.   
The FCRA imposes different penalties for violations of the statute depending on the 
violator’s conduct.  Willful failure to comply subjects the violator to penalties including 
actual damages of not less than $100, and punitive damages, in addition to costs and 
attorney’s fees, and, as noted, a willful violation does not require a showing of actual injury.  

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).  Willfulness “cover[s] not only knowing violations of a standard, 
but reckless ones as well.”  Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 

 (2007).  And 
recklessness, in turn, “entail[s] ‘an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or 
so obvious that it should be known.’”  

 at 68 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 

 (1994)).  An erroneous reading of a statute may be  willful  only if “objectively 
unreasonable.”  Id. at 69.                                                

“To determine whether a reading is objectively unreasonable, the Safeco Court 
identified three sources of potential guidance for an alleged willful violator: (1) the federal 
courts of appeals; (2) the FTC; and (3) the statutory text.”  Just v. Target Corp., 

 (D. Minn. 2016) (Frank, J.).  Inflection contends that the use of the 
term “dangerous weapon” in Taylor’s statute of conviction should end the matter; because 

the statute uses this term, it was thus reasonable as a matter of law for Inflection to 
categorize Taylor’s conviction as a violent one.  Taylor asserts that Inflection should have 
also consulted other statutes, namely Minnesota’s definition of “crime of violence,” which 
does not include Taylor’s crime.                                          
At this stage, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that Inflection’s decision 

to categorize Taylor’s conviction as a violent one was objectively reasonable as a matter 
of law.  Taylor has not had the benefit of any discovery regarding how Inflection decides 
which crimes are categorized in which way.  This is not a situation in which Inflection is 
merely reporting the public record, but rather Inflection is interpreting the public record.  
Taylor is allowed to discover whether that interpretation of his crime was objectively 
reasonable.                                                               

B.   Class Allegations                                                    
Finally, Inflection contends that Taylor’s attempt to represent a class is improper.  
Essentially, Inflection seeks to litigate class certification at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  
All but one of the cases Inflection cites for the propriety of such an early ruling on class 
certification issues are from outside this Circuit, although as Inflection notes, the Eighth 
Circuit has affirmed a district court’s dismissal of class claims under Rule 12(b)(6).  

McCrary v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 

 (8th Cir. 2012).  But no court 
in this Circuit has cited this case for the proposition that considering class-certification 
issues is always appropriate, or even often appropriate, at this early stage of the litigation.    
While the Court has doubts about whether either of the claims Taylor raises is 
amenable to class treatment, it is premature to make that judgment at this early stage of the 

litigation.                                                               
CONCLUSION                                                                
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss or to Strike 
(Docket No. 18) is DENIED.                                                

Dated: February 16, 2021                                                  
                         s/ Paul A. Magnuson                         
                         Paul A. Magnuson                            
                         United States District Court Judge