UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


James Lieffring,                   Case No. 19-cv-02812 (SRN/TNL)        

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Prairieland Solid Waste Facility, County                                 
of Martin, and County of Faribault,                                      

          Defendants.                                                    


Areti Georgopoulos, Harmony Law Firm PLLC, 310 Fourth Avenue South, Suite 5010, 
Minneapolis, MN 55415; and Heather M. Gilbert, Gilbert Law PLLC, 4856 Banning 
Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55110, for Plaintiff.                               

Ryan  P.  Myers  and  Timothy  P.  Jung,  Lind  Jensen  Sullivan  &  Peterson,  PA,  901 
Marquette Avenue South, Suite 1300, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant. 


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 27] 
filed by Defendants. Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, 
and for the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion.                   
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
    In April 1989, Martin County and Faribault County (collectively, “the Counties”) 
entered into a Joint Powers Agreement pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 471.59. (See Decl. 
of Ryan P. Myers (“Myers Decl.”) [Doc. No. 30], Ex. 5 (“JPA”).) The Agreement created 
the Prairieland Solid Waste Board (“Prairieland”), an entity tasked with meeting the solid 
waste  disposal  needs  of  the  Counties  and  their  residents.  Under  the  Joint  Powers 
Agreement and Prairieland’s bylaws, Prairieland is governed by a Board of Directors, a 
ten-member  body  composed  of  each  County’s  set  of  five  commissioners,  and  the 

Prairieland Director, an individual appointed by the Board and tasked with overseeing 
Prairieland’s daily operations. (See id. § II.A; Myers Decl., Ex. 7 (“Prairieland Bylaws”), 
art. IV; Decl. of Areti Georgopoulos (“Georgopoulos Decl.”) [Doc. No. 36], Ex. 4 (“Rabbe 
Dep.”), at 18-21.)                                                        
    The  Agreement  required  the  Counties  to  pay  the  “[c]ompensation  and  other 
expenses” of the Prairieland Board.1 (JPA § II.A.) In addition, the Agreement required the 

Counties to jointly fund the development of Prairieland’s facilities, and split Prairieland’s 
operating costs and revenue between them. (Id. § I.C.) However, Prairieland’s current 
Director, Billeye Rabbe, testified that Prairieland’s operating budget is fully funded by 
tipping fees paid by commercial garbage haulers and individuals who dump refuse at 
Prairieland’s facilities. (Rabbe Dep. at 64-66.) The Prairieland Board is empowered to hire, 

fire, and pay employees.2 (JPA § II.B; Prairieland Bylaws art. IV, sec. III.) Strikingly, the 

    1 The record is unclear regarding whether the commissioners actually received 
separate compensation for their work on the Prairieland Board. Although the Joint Powers 
Agreement required the Board’s compensation to be paid by the Counties, Prairieland’s 
bylaws provide that the Board “shall not be entitled to compensation of [sic] services 
performed except that they may be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance 
of their duties.” (Prairieland Bylaws art. V, sec. III.) Nevertheless, at its Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition, Martin County testified that its commissioners are entitled to a $75 per diem 
reimbursement, paid by Prairieland, for work on the Prairieland Board. (See Georgopoulos 
Decl., Ex. 2 (“Martin Cty. Dep.”), at 61-65.)                             
    2 Notably, the record indicates that, prior to 1991, Prairieland employees were paid 
by and received health insurance benefits through Martin County. (See Decl. of Kathryn 
Grunig (“Grunig Decl.”) [Doc. No. 40].)                                   
Joint Powers Agreement also grants the Prairieland Board authority to “assign tasks . . . to 
any staff member or members of any County,” and provides that “[c]ompensation and 

payment  of  expenses  of  such  staff  member  or  members  shall  continue  to  be  the 
responsibility of the County which regularly employs the staff member or members, unless 
otherwise determined by the [Prairieland Board].” (JPA § II.B.)           
    Although the Counties’ commissioners typically manage Prairieland business at a 
meeting of the Prairieland Board, the record indicates that, on at least one occasion, the 
Prairieland Board’s members conducted Prairieland business at the Counties’ separate 

commissioner meetings. (See Rabbe Dep. at 155-56 (testifying that, when the Prairieland 
Board was unable to meet in May 2018, Rabbe sought authorization to pay Prairieland’s 
bills at the Counties’ respective commissioner meetings); Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 24.) 
Prairieland maintains its own personnel policy manuals, has its own federal employer 
identification number, and holds its own bank accounts. (See Rabbe Dep. at 40-41, 104; 

Myers Decl., Ex. 13.) There is no provision in either the Joint Powers Agreement or 
Prairieland’s bylaws requiring Prairieland to indemnify the Counties for its actions.  
    In 2005, the Counties amended the Joint Powers Agreement to authorize Prairieland 
to serve as the Solid Waste Coordinator for each County. (See Myers Decl., Ex. 8.) Each 
County’s  Solid  Waste  Coordinator  administers  the  county’s  solid  waste  collection 

programs, which are funded by a tax assessed on county residents. (See Rabbe Dep. at 16-
20, 64-66.) In 2013, Billeye Rabbe was appointed as both Prairieland’s Director and to the 
Solid Waste Coordinator position for each county. (Id. at 16-20.) Rabbe performs many of 
her duties as Solid Waste Coordinator from her office at Prairieland. (Id.) In her capacity 
as  Prairieland  Director,  Rabbe  reports  to  both  Counties’  commissioners  together  at 
Prairieland  Board  meetings;  in  her  capacity  as  Solid  Waste  Coordinator,  she  reports 
separately to each County’s commissioners.3 (Id. at 54.) When she was appointed to these 

positions, at the Prairieland Board’s request, Rabbe created a salary proposal. (Id. at 29; 
Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 23.) Under the proposal, which was accepted by the Board, 
Prairieland was to be responsible for 50% of Rabbe’s salary, and the Counties were to be 
collectively responsible for 50% of her salary. (Rabbe Dep. at 29; Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 
23.) In practice, Prairieland pays Rabbe’s full salary, and the Counties then reimburse 

Prairieland for their share of the salary. (Rabbe Dep. at 29.)            
    In 2016, Prairieland and Martin County entered into a Joint Powers Agreement, 
under  which  Martin  County  agreed  to  administer  Prairieland’s  employee  benefits  in 
exchange for a $9,111.43 administrative fee. (Rabbe Dep. at 66-68; Martin Cty. Dep. at 
108-09; Myers Decl., Ex. 9 (“Prairieland-Martin Cty. JPA”).) The record suggests that, 

prior  to  the  2016  Agreement, Martin  County  had  provided  health  insurance benefits 
directly to Prairieland employees, without charging an administrative fee. (See Grunig 
Decl.;  Martin  Cty.  Dep.  at  108-11.)  The  2016  Agreement  expressly  provided  that 
“Prairieland employees are not considered County employees for any purpose despite 
participating in any of [sic] health insurance or ancillary benefits being provided pursuant 

to this Agreement.” (Prairieland-Martin Cty. JPA ¶ 5.)                    


    3 The record is unclear whether Rabbe has ever discussed Solid Waste Coordinator 
issues at meetings of the Prairieland Board.                              
    Plaintiff James Lieffring joined Prairieland as a full-time Production Worker in 
2001. (Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 1 (“Lieffring Dep.”), at 13.) Prairieland’s Production 

Workers are tasked with, in essence, operating equipment, cleaning, and working on the 
facility’s tipping floor. (See Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 4 (“Langvardt Dep.”), at 13; id., Ex. 
25;  Lieffring  Dep.  at  20.)  Beginning  in  April  2017,  Prairieland  implemented  a  rule 
prohibiting employees from taking beverages onto the tipping floor. (Rabbe Dep. at 107-
08; Myers Decl., Ex. 15.) Despite this rule, Lieffring took coffee onto the tipping floor on 
several occasions, leading to a verbal warning in June 2017 and a written warning in 

October 2017. (See Myers Decl., Ex. 15.)                                  
    In  November  2017,  Lieffring  experienced  a  mesenteric  artery  blockage 
necessitating emergency medical care and a lengthy hospitalization. (See Lieffring Dep. at 
29-30.) The following month, Lieffring discussed his medical condition with Rabbe and 
Kathryn Grunig, Prairieland’s Office Manager, and was told that the only leave available 

to him was accrued vacation or sick leave. (Decl. of James Lieffring [Doc. No. 41], at ¶¶ 3-
5.) Lieffring therefore used accrued sick leave benefits during his absence from work. 
(Lieffring Dep. at 33.) When Lieffring was released from the hospital in December 2017, 
his doctor imposed a ten-pound lifting restriction for six weeks. (Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 
28.) Although Lieffring sought to return to work, Rabbe refused to permit him to return, 

noting that his position as a Production Worker required him to be able to lift at least 35 
pounds. (Lieffring Dep. at 31-33; Rabbe Dep. at 90-92.) Lieffring consulted with his 
doctor, who increased the lifting restriction to 36 pounds, and Lieffring returned to work 
on January 2, 2018. (Lieffring Dep. at 33; Rabbe Dep. at 91-92.) Lieffring testified that he 
returned “on a lighter duty,” and did not lift more than 36 pounds, climb, or do “anything 
real strenuous.” (Lieffring Dep. at 35-36.)                               

    On January 30, 2018, while checking on trash compactors outside the building, 
Lieffring slipped and fell on a patch of ice, injuring his left shoulder. (Id. at 36-37.) He 
reported his injury to Kirk Langvardt, the Plant Supervisor, and completed an accident 
report with Langvardt the next day. (Id.; Myers Decl., Ex. 19.) Lieffring sought medical 
treatment, and Prairieland filed a First Report of Injury with its workers’ compensation 
insurer. (Lieffring Dep. at 40-42; Myers Decl., Exs. 21-22.) On February 5, Lieffring 

received an additional evaluation of his shoulder, and his doctor imposed a 26 to 40-pound 
lifting restriction. (Myers Decl., Ex. 23.) Because Lieffring could lift more than 35 pounds, 
Prairieland permitted him to continue working. (Rabbe Dep. at 104-05.)    
    On February 19, Rabbe met with Lieffring and Langvardt to discuss her observation 
that Lieffring continued to bring coffee onto the tipping floor, as well as “leav[e] early, 

watch[] other employees work and not perform[] his job.” (Id. at 115.) Rabbe discussed 
her concerns with Langvardt, who she testified worked with Lieffring more closely than 
she did. (Id. at 115-16.) Langvardt did not share Rabbe’s concerns regarding Lieffring’s 
behavior, and testified that he “didn’t know that she was upset about his work performance 
or his coffee drinking or anything else. It just kind of blind-sided me.” (Id. at 115-19; 

Langvardt Dep. at 51-53.) Following this meeting, Rabbe suspended Lieffring for two 
weeks. (Myers Decl., Ex. 24.) Sometime prior to Lieffring’s suspension, Rabbe discussed 
terminating Lieffring with the Prairieland Board. (Rabbe Dep. at 157.) At that meeting, 
Rabbe discussed her concerns with Lieffring’s performance and asked the Board for “some 
direction  on if this was  grounds  for termination.”  (/d.  at  157-58.)  The Board voted to 
terminate Lieffring, but advised Rabbe to first seek guidance from counsel. (/d. at 158-60.) 
Rabbe disclosed to the Board that Lieffring had experienced a work-related injury. (/d. at 
160.) 
     Lieffring was diagnosed with a complete rotator cuff injury, which appeared to be 
irreparable. (Georgopoulos Decl., Exs. 37-38.) On February 19, as a result of a February 14 
MRI scan, Lieffring’s doctor recommended “that he be off work at this time. It is unknown 
how long he will be off work.” (Myers Decl., Ex. 25.) Lieffring began receiving temporary 
total disability benefits through Prairieland’s workers’ compensation insurer on February 
19,  (See  Georgopoulos  Decl.,  Ex.  42.)  On February 28,  Lieffring’s  doctor revised his 
restrictions, permitting him to return to work with the following restrictions, effective for 
ten weeks: 

Functional Abilities: Ina    Y :      hour shift a person may 
Restrictions (No restrictions unless marked)                          C1 No Rotating Shifts 
Number of Hours Permitted to Work per Day   £__Number of Days perWeek  <~_  CL Other (Specify) 
Esaployes Cans ioted          Not at All oa Rare 5%) Ogeasoinal  Epeent       Other Restrictions: 
Sit                   Oo     oO    0     er       (No driving work vehicles 
  Stand Walk               QO    o     0     x          No working alone 
Twist/Turn               Oo     0     0     ee          direct patient care 
Bend/Stoop               Oo    Oo     a    Oo        CD No operating power equipment 
Squat/Kneel/Crawl -   kwe elng    o    EY    O     oO        (No working at heights or where abrupt incapacity could 
Climb (Ladder/Stairs)          a   oOo     Oo     Oo         be hazardous 
Reach Above Shoulders    ALOR &    Oo     Oo     Oo        CO Keep the wound site clean and dry 
Reach At or Below Shoulders LOR O    cr    oO     0        C No assaultive/physical control situations 
{Repetitive Grasp/Pinch    FLOR O     oO    (    Oo        (1 No temperature extremes (Less than 52F or greater than 80 
Work With Hand/Arm     @.oRoO     a    oO     oO        Cl Environmental (Specify)  = 
Fine Manipulation       O1orR oO    oO     oO     0       (© No work in patient's environment 
Vibratory Tasks        O.:DroO     0    -O     0       D No latex products 
Keyboarding         OL.ORQ    Oo     oD     o       O    Other 
Lift/Carry           BLORO   @&£_ibsO__ tsX__ Ibs 
PushyPull           OLORO   O__ibsO__  bbsO__ tts 
Other Instructlons/Limitations       ; 
     fr  caunot   (efor  aay  Come  bod y

(Id., Ex. 35.) The revised restrictions noted that Lieffring “cannot lift [left] arm away from 
body,” and could only lift or carry five pounds with his left arm. (Id.) However, those 

restrictions extended only to his left arm. (Id.) Both Lieffring and Langvardt testified that 
Lieffring could perform the essential functions of his job even with these restrictions.4 
(Lieffring Dep. at 86-89; Langvardt Dep. at 50-61.) Indeed, Langvardt testified that he had 
“always tried finding light duty work for guys that need it, that were hurt and needed to get 
back to work.” (Langvardt Dep. at 51.) As one example, Langvardt testified that he had 
permitted an employee to sweep and sharpen drill bits for two weeks as the employee 

recovered from kidney surgery. (Id. at 54.)                               
    Nonetheless, once Lieffring’s suspension expired, Rabbe refused to permit Lieffring 
to return to work “until he’s 100 percent.” (Id. at 60.) At her deposition, Rabbe admitted 
that she never discussed Lieffring’s February 28 lifting restrictions, or Prairieland’s ability 
to accommodate them, with Lieffring. (Rabbe Dep. at 176.) Instead, Prairieland permitted 

Lieffring  to  use  accrued  sick  and  vacation  benefits  to  supplement  his  workers’ 
compensation benefits. (Myers Decl., Ex. 28.) When Lieffring exhausted his accrued leave, 
Prairieland terminated his employment. (See id., Ex. 30.) Prairieland’s separation letter, 
dated May 11, 2018, stated in full:                                       
    On May 8, 2018 you exhausted your sick and vacation balances. Attempts to 
    reach you have not been successful. Since you are not on paid status, have 

    4 Langvardt’s testimony is at odds with Rabbe’s, who testified that both she and 
Langvardt “were on the same page” that Lieffring was “not . . . able to perform production 
work duties.” (Rabbe Dep. at 139.) However, Langvardt testified that when he discussed 
Lieffring’s February 28 restrictions with Rabbe, he did not agree with her assessment that 
the restrictions prevented Lieffring from returning to work. (Langvardt Dep. at 63.) 
    not applied for a leave of absence and have not contacted me with regard to 
    your status, you are considered to have been absent without leave at this time. 
    Accordingly, you are separated from employment at Prairieland Solid Waste 
    Management  effective  today  May  11,  2018.  Your  insurance  will  be 
    continued until the end of May. You will receive a separate communication 
    regarding continuation of health insurance.                          
(Id.) Lieffring testified that he did not discuss his ability to return to work with anyone 
from Prairieland in the weeks leading to his termination; however, he visited the workplace 
regularly to sign his paystubs, and Rabbe did not attempt to speak with him about his 
restrictions or what would happen when he exhausted his accrued leave, either. (See 
Lieffring Dep. at 67, 80; Rabbe Dep. at 168-69, 176 (testifying that Rabbe did not make 
any attempt to contact Lieffring, and that the attempts referenced in the separation letter 
referred to the workers’ compensation insurer’s attempts to reach Lieffring).) 
    On  May  1,  2018,  prior  to  Lieffring’s  termination,  Prairieland’s  workers’ 
compensation insurer issued a Notice of Intention to Discontinue Workers’ Compensation 
Benefits (“NOID”). (Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 41.) The NOID stated that “[t]he employer 
and the insurer are in receipt of additional information which indicate [sic] the employee 
did not sustain a work injury as claimed by him on 1/30/2018.” (Id.) The NOID specifically 

referenced  photos  taken  by  Rabbe  shortly  after  Lieffring’s  fall:  “The  employer  took 
pictures of the area of employee’s fall and saw foot prints only in the snow but no imprint 
of the employee’s fall. No snow mound was visible from which the employee claims he 
fell.” (Id.) However, the photos submitted by Rabbe to the insurer were only a subset of 
the photos taken after Lieffring’s fall, and none of them depicted the area between the trash 

compactors where Lieffring fell. (See Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 31, at 44-47; id., Ex. 32, at 
2.)  Lieffring  contested  the  denial  of  workers’  compensation  benefits,  and  ultimately 
prevailed in the workers’ compensation system. (See Myers Decl., Ex. 35.) 

    Lieffring brought suit against Prairieland and the Counties under the Family and 
Medical  Leave  Act  (“FMLA”),  the  Americans  with  Disabilities  Act  (“ADA”),  the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), and Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
(“WCA”). Lieffring alleges that Prairieland and the Counties failed to offer him FMLA 
leave. In addition, Lieffring asserts disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure-to-
accommodate claims against Prairieland under the ADA and the MHRA. And Lieffring 

alleges that Prairieland obstructed his workers’ compensation claim and retaliated against 
him for seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Defendants now move for summary 
judgment on all claims.                                                   
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Standard of Review                                              
    Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if it may affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” TCF 
Nat’l Bank v. Mkt. Intelligence, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2016). And a factual 
dispute is “genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

 

(1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence 
and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

 
(1986).                                                                   

    Although the moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine 
issue of fact, the party opposing summary judgment may not “rest on mere allegations or 
denials but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a 
genuine issue for trial.” Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur, 

 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

 
(1986). Moreover, summary judgment is properly entered “against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 

.                                                              
    B.   Analysis                                                        
    Defendants seek summary judgment on three grounds. First, Defendants argue that 

Prairieland is a separate entity from the Counties, and that Prairieland therefore does not 
have a sufficient number of employees to trigger the requirements of the FMLA, the ADA, 
or the MHRA. Second, with respect to Lieffring’s ADA and MHRA claims, Defendants 
contend that Lieffring’s lifting restrictions rendered him unable to perform the essential 
functions of his job. And finally, Defendants assert that Lieffring has not raised a genuine 

factual dispute regarding the causal connection between his workers’ compensation claim 
and his suspension, Prairieland’s refusal to permit him to return to work, or his termination. 
The Court will analyze each argument in turn.                             
         1.   Coverage Under the FMLA, the ADA, and the MHRA             
    The FMLA generally applies to all public agency employers, regardless of the 
number of persons employed by the agency. See 

(4)(A)(iii); 

(a). However, only “eligible employees” may obtain the statute’s benefits. The 
statute  provides  that,  among  other  requirements,  an  eligible  employee  is  one  whose 
employer has 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite. See 

(2); 

(d) (“[E]mployees of public agencies must meet all of the requirements 
of  eligibility,  including  the  requirement  that  the  employer  (e.g.,  State)  employ  50 

employees at the worksite or within 75 miles.”). Thus, Lieffring can prevail on his FMLA 
claim only if Prairieland meets the 50-employee threshold. Similarly, the ADA and the 
MHRA  apply  only  if  Prairieland  employed  15  or  more  employees.  See  

(5)(A) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more 

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .”); Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, 
subd. 6 (“[I]t is an unfair employment practice for an employer with a number of part-time 
or full-time employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the 
current  or  preceding  calendar  year . . . equal  to  or  greater  than  15 . . . not  to  make 
reasonable accommodation to the known disability of a qualified disabled person . . . .”). 

    It is undisputed that Prairieland employed fewer than 15 persons during the relevant 
time period, and that the FMLA, the ADA, and the MHRA apply if and only if Prairieland’s 
employees may be counted together with one or both Counties’ employees. Lieffring 
contends that Defendants’ employees may be counted together under the “joint employer” 
and “integrated employer” doctrines.5 In their initial memorandum in support of their 
motion,  Defendants  argued  that,  applying  these  doctrines,  Lieffring  has  not  raised  a 

genuine factual dispute supporting the conclusion that Prairieland and the Counties are 
joint or integrated employers. In their reply memorandum, Defendants raised the additional 
argument that the joint and integrated employer doctrines do not apply under the FMLA 
where the employer is a public agency.6                                   
    The Court finds that the joint and integrated employer doctrines are available to a 
plaintiff employed by a public agency. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary rest on an 

overly restrictive reading of the Department of Labor’s regulations implementing the 
FMLA. Those regulations provide that:                                     
    Normally the legal entity which employs the employee is the employer under 
    FMLA. Applying this principle, a corporation is a single employer rather 
    than its separate establishments or divisions.                       
         (1)  Where  one  corporation  has  an  ownership  interest  in  another 
         corporation,  it  is  a  separate  employer  unless  it  meets  the  joint 
         employment test discussed in § 825.106, or the integrated employer 
         test contained in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.             

    5  Lieffring  also  contends  that  the  Joint  Powers  Agreement  did  not  establish 
Prairieland as a separate legal entity from the Counties, relying largely on language in the 
Agreement that refers to Prairieland as a “project.” But the Agreement also refers to 
Prairieland as an “organization,” and the record demonstrates that Prairieland has operated 
as a legal entity—by, for example, hiring its own employees, obtaining its own federal 
employer identification number, and holding its own bank accounts. (See JPA §§ I.B, II.B; 
Rabbe Dep. at 40-41, 104.) The question, therefore, is not whether Prairieland is a separate 
legal entity, but whether the applicable statutes permit counting Prairieland’s employees 
together with those of the Counties.                                      
    6 Defendants do not appear to argue that the joint and integrated employer tests are 
inapplicable to public agencies under the ADA and the MHRA.               
         (2) Separate entities will be deemed to be parts of a single employer 
         for purposes of FMLA if they meet the integrated employer test. 
         Where this test is met, the employees of all entities making up the 
         integrated  employer  will  be  counted  in  determining  employer 
         coverage and employee eligibility. . . .                        

(c) (emphasis added). Section 825.106, in turn, specifically addresses 
the “joint employer” test:                                                
    Where two or more businesses exercise some control over the work or  
    working conditions of the employee, the businesses may be joint employers 
    under FMLA . . . .                                                   

 § 825.106(a) (emphasis added).                                        
    Defendants  argue  that  these  regulations  suggest  that  the  joint  and  integrated 
employer tests apply only to “corporations” and “businesses,” not to public agencies. 
Defendants’ argument finds some support in the case law. The regulations contain a section 
dedicated to the FMLA’s application in the public agency context. Prior to 2008, that 
section stated that:                                                      
    A State or a political subdivision of a State constitutes a single public agency 
    and, therefore, a single employer for purposes of determining employee 
    eligibility. For example, a State is a single employer; a county is a single 
    employer; a city or town is a single employer. Where there is any question 
    about whether a public entity is a public agency, as distinguished from a part 
    of  another  public  agency,  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census’  “Census  of 
    Governments” will be determinative, except for new entities formed since 
    the most recent publication of the “Census.”                         
Id. § 825.108(c)(1) (effective prior to 2008) (emphasis added). In Rollins v. Wilson County 
Government, the Sixth Circuit interpreted this regulation as establishing a two-part test 
applicable where a plaintiff seeks to aggregate the number of employees employed by 
public agencies. 

 (6th Cir. 1998). Based on the regulation’s “[w]here there is 
any question” language, the court held that courts must first determine whether state law 
definitively resolves the question of whether two public agencies are separate. 

. 

If state law does not provide a definitive answer, the court reasoned that, under the 
regulation’s language, the Census of Governments is “determinative.” 

 In light of 
Rollins’ reasoning, some district courts subsequently concluded that the two-part Rollins 
test, and not the joint or integrated employer doctrines, applies to FMLA claims against 
public agencies. See, e.g., Colter v. Bowling Green-Warren Cty. Reg’l Airport Bd., No. 
1:17-CV-00118-JHM, 

 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017); Miller v. Cty. of 

Rockingham, No. 5:06-CV-00053, 

, at *7 (W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2007) 
(“The Counties persuasively argue that neither [the joint nor integrated employer] test 
should be applied in this case, given the fact that there is a separate regulation pertaining 
to public agencies.”).                                                    
    But the reasoning of the Rollins court, as well as the Colter and Miller courts, rested 

on the regulation’s treatment of the Census as “determinative.” In 2008, the Department of 
Labor amended the regulation to recognize that “[w]hether two agencies of the same State 
or local government constitute the same public agency can only be determined on a case-
by-case  basis.”  

(c)(1).  Rather  than  treating  the  Census  as 
“determinative,” the regulation now treats the Census as but “[o]ne factor that would 

support a conclusion that two agencies are separate.” 

 In a January 2020 opinion letter, 
the Department of Labor explained that the regulation was revised to make the Census “just 
one factor,” consistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act, and to “allow[] employment-
related  factors  to  play  a  greater  role.”  Wage  &  Hour  Div.,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  Labor, 
FMLA2020-1-A, Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act, 

, at *2 n.2 
(Jan. 7, 2020) [hereinafter “2020 Opinion Letter”]. Such factors include: “(1) whether the 

two agencies have separate payroll systems; (2) whether they have different retirement 
systems; (3) whether they have separate budgets and funding authorities; (4) whether each 
has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; (5) whether they have separate hiring 
and other employment practices; (6) whether one employer controls the appointment of 
officers of the other agency; and (7) how state law treats the relationship between the two 
agencies.” 

                                                            

    The Court reads the public agency test described in the current regulation and the 
2020 Opinion Letter as a statement of additional factors that courts should consider in 
determining whether  two public agencies are “integrated employers.” Nothing in the 
regulations  suggests  that  the  integrated  employer  factors  outlined  in  

(c)(2) are inapplicable to public agencies. Indeed, both before and after the 

Department of Labor’s 2008 revisions, courts have applied the integrated employer test in 
public agency cases. See Braden v. Cty. of Washington, 

 (W.D. 
Pa. 2010) (applying both the Rollins test and the integrated employer test, and declining to 
determine whether the Rollins test is the only test applicable in the public agency context); 
Nielson v. Port of Gold Beach, No. CV 05-3095-PA, 

, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 

16, 2007) (same). Both the public agency test and the integrated employer doctrine serve 
to resolve whether two legal entities ought to be considered the same entity for purposes 
of the FMLA’s coverage requirements. See 

 (“Separate entities will be 
deemed to be parts of a single employer for purposes of FMLA if they meet the integrated 
employer test.”); 

 § 825.108(c)(1) (“Whether two agencies of the same State or local 
government constitute the same public agency can only be determined on a case-by-case 

basis.”). The regulations’ public agency provision, in essence, identifies additional factors 
that speak to whether two public agencies are one integrated employer.    
    In addition, the Court is not persuaded that the joint employer test is categorically 
inapplicable  where  the  employer  is  a  public  agency.  Defendants  emphasize  that  the 
regulations phrase the test in terms of “corporations” and “businesses,” as opposed to 
“entities”—as  used  in  the  integrated  employer  provision.  See  id.  §§ 825.104(c)(1), 

825.106. But courts, both before and after the Department of Labor’s 2008 revisions, have 
applied the joint employer test to public agencies in the FMLA context. See Porter v. New 
Age Servs. Corp., No. 10 C 1784, 

, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2011), aff’d, 

 (7th Cir. 2012) (analyzing a joint employer theory under the FMLA in 
the public agency context); Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consol. Commc’ns Ctr., No. 

04-1169, 

, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2006), aff’d, 

 (7th Cir. 
2008)  (analyzing  whether  a  private  employer,  city,  and  county  jointly  employed  the 
plaintiff under the FMLA). Defendants do not persuasively explain why private employers 
can be regarded as joint employers of an employee, while public employers cannot. 
    Accordingly, the Court finds that the joint and integrated employer doctrines are 

available to Lieffring. Under the joint employer doctrine, courts evaluate the economic 
realities of the relationship between the employee and the alleged joint employer, and 
generally consider whether the alleged joint employer “(1) had the power to hire and fire 
the employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of 
employment;  (3)  determined  the  rate  and  method  of  payment;  and  (4)  maintained 
employment records.” Catani v. Chiodi, No. CIV.00-1559 (DWF/RLE), 

, 

at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2001) (citing Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 

 (9th Cir. 1983)). Under the integrated employer doctrine, courts 
generally  consider  (1) the  interrelation  between  the  entities’  operations, (2)  common 
management, (3) centralized control of the entities’ labor relations, and (4) common 
ownership. See Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Loc. Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. 
of Mobile, Inc., 

 (1965); 

(c)(2). Both tests are fact-

intensive, and look to the totality of the circumstances.                 
    In the public agency context, the Department of Labor’s FMLA regulations add 
several additional factors to the integrated employer test. Such factors include: “(1) whether 
the two agencies have separate payroll systems; (2) whether they have different retirement 
systems; (3) whether they have separate budgets and funding authorities; (4) whether each 

has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; (5) whether they have separate hiring 
and other employment practices; (6) whether one employer controls the appointment of 
officers of the other agency; and (7) how state law treats the relationship between the two 
agencies,” as well as treatment of the agency by the Census of Governments. 2020 Opinion 
Letter at *2; see 

(c)(1).                              

    Applying those tests, the Court finds that Lieffring has raised a genuine factual 
dispute precluding summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. It is true that Prairieland has, 
in  many  ways,  operated  as  its  own  entity,  independent  of  the  Counties.  Prairieland 
maintains its own bank accounts, hires, fires, and pays its own employees, maintains its 
own personnel policy manuals, has its own federal employer identification number, and 
financially supports its operations through tipping fees. (JPA § II.B; Prairieland Bylaws 

art. IV, sec. III; Rabbe Dep. at 40-41, 64-66, 104; Myers Decl., Ex. 13.) Moreover, the 
Joint Powers Agreement does not require Prairieland to indemnify the Counties for its 
conduct. And Prairieland is identified as a separate public agency in the Census. (See Myers 
Decl., Ex. 38.)                                                           
    But Prairieland is also closely tied to the Counties, in several important respects. 
First, the Prairieland Board is composed exclusively of the Counties’ commissioners. 

Although the Prairieland Director is hired by the Board to manage day-to-day operations, 
the Director is not a member of the Board, as might support a greater degree of separation 
between the entities. (See JPA § II.A; Prairieland Bylaws art. IV; Rabbe Dep. at 18-21.) In 
addition, even though the record suggests that Prairieland’s budget is fully supported by 
tipping fees paid to Prairieland—and not taxes collected by the Counties—the Joint Powers 

Agreement obligates the Counties to pay for the development of Prairieland’s facilities and 
split  Prairieland’s  operating  costs  and  revenue.  (JPA  § I.C;  Rabbe  Dep.  at  64-66.) 
Strikingly, the Agreement also empowers the Prairieland Board to “assign tasks . . . to any 
staff member or members” of the Counties, the compensation and expenses of that staff 
member to be borne by the County. (JPA § II.B.) Although the record does not reflect an 

example of the Board exercising this power, the power to co-opt County employees 
strongly supports a joint or integrated employer relationship.            
    Moreover, the Board’s compensation—had the Board not disclaimed compensation 
in Prairieland’s bylaws—would be paid by the Counties, not Prairieland. (Id. § II.A; see 
Prairieland Bylaws art. V, sec. III.) Yet, in fact, Martin County’s commissioners do receive 
a $75 per diem reimbursement for their work on Prairieland’s Board. (Martin Cty. Dep. at 

61-65.)  Although  the  Joint  Powers  Agreement  would  suggest  that  the  Counties  are 
obligated to make that payment, Martin County testified that Prairieland pays the per diem. 
(Id.)  Relatedly,  Director  Rabbe serves  in  the  nominally  separate  roles  of  Prairieland 
Director and Solid Waste Coordinator for the Counties. But Prairieland pays Rabbe’s entire 
salary,  including  the  portion  of  her  salary  attributable  to  her  work  as  Solid  Waste 
Coordinator; the Counties then “reimburse” Prairieland for half of Rabbe’s salary. (Rabbe 

Dep.  at  29;  Georgopoulos  Decl.,  Ex.  23.)  In  addition,  prior  to  1991,  Prairieland’s 
employees were paid by and received health insurance benefits through Martin County. 
(See Grunig Decl.) While Prairieland subsequently took on its own payroll obligations, it 
continued to offer employment benefits through Martin County, and did not formalize 
Martin County’s role as a paid plan administrator until 2016. (See Rabbe Dep. at 66-68; 

Martin Cty. Dep. at 108-11; Prairieland-Martin Cty. JPA.) Finally, the record reflects at 
least one occasion where the Counties’ commissioners acted on Prairieland business in 
their separate commission meetings, rather than at a meeting of the full Prairieland Board. 
(See Rabbe Dep. at 155-56; Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 24.)                   
    In short, although Prairieland and the Counties are largely separate on paper, the 

record  contains  ample  facts  suggesting  that  their  management  and  operations  are 
sufficiently enmeshed to support the conclusion that they are joint or integrated employers 
under the FMLA, the ADA, and the MHRA. Accordingly, the Court finds that a triable 
issue of fact exists, and denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis. 
         2.   Lieffring’s Ability to Perform the Essential Functions of His Job 
    The Court next considers Defendants’ argument that Lieffring’s February 28, 2018 
lifting restrictions prevented him from performing the essential functions of his job. A 

plaintiff may prevail on disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure-to-accommodate 
claims, under both the ADA and the MHRA, only if the plaintiff is able to perform the 
essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation. See Duty v. 
Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 

 (8th Cir. 2002) (“An ADA claimant must 
make a prima facie showing that he (1) has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 

(2) is able to  perform the essential  functions of the job,  with or without reasonable 
accommodation,  and  (3)  suffered  an  adverse  employment  action  as  a  result  of  the 
disability.” (citation omitted)); Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 

  (8th  Cir.  2018)  (affirming  grant  of  summary  judgment  for  employer  on 
employee’s  ADA  failure-to-accommodate  and  retaliation  claims  where  the  employee 

failed to show that he could perform the essential functions of his job); Collins v. Abbott 
Lab’ys, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming grant of summary judgment for 
employer on employee’s MHRA claims where employee failed to make “a facial showing 
that reasonable accommodation is possible and that the accommodation will allow [him] 
to perform the essential functions of the job” (quotation omitted)). Defendants contend that 

Lieffring’s February 28 work restrictions, which provided that he could not lift more than 
five pounds with his left arm, rendered him unable to perform the essential functions of his 
work.7                                                                    

    The Court finds that Lieffring has raised a genuine factual dispute regarding whether 
he could perform his duties despite his lifting restrictions. It is undisputed that the ability 
to lift thirty-five pounds is an essential requirement for Prairieland Production Workers. 
(See Lieffring Dep. at 31-32; Myers Decl., Ex. 12.) It is also undisputed that, as of February 
28, 2018, Lieffring was restricted to lifting only five pounds. (See Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 
35.) However, that restriction applied solely to Lieffring’s left arm. (Id.) Defendants have 

not addressed that fact, and the record does not indicate that Lieffring could not meet the 
position’s  lifting  requirements  using  his  right  arm.  Indeed,  both  Lieffring  and  his 
immediate supervisor testified that Lieffring could have returned to work despite the 
February 28 restrictions. (Lieffring Dep. at 86-89; Langvardt Dep. at 50-61.) Director 
Rabbe admitted that she made no effort to discuss Lieffring’s restrictions with him or to 

accommodate those restrictions, and instead insisted—without any explanation apparent 
on this record—that he could not return to work “until he’s 100 percent.” (Rabbe Dep. at 
176; Langvardt Dep. at 60.) In light of that testimony, the Court finds that a genuine factual 
dispute exists regarding Lieffring’s ability to perform the essential functions of his job.  



    7  Although  the  February  28  restrictions  included  many  other  terms,  including 
restrictions  on Lieffring’s ability  to squat,  bend, climb, and reach with his left arm, 
Defendants focus solely on Lieffring’s five-pound lifting restriction. (See Georgopoulos 
Decl., Ex. 35.) Because Defendants have not argued that the other restrictions touch on 
essential functions of Lieffring’s job, the Court focuses its analysis on the lifting restriction. 
    Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Lieffring’s ADA and MHRA claims.                                          

         3.   WCA Obstruction and Retaliation Claims                     
    Finally, the Court considers Defendants’ challenge to Lieffring’s WCA claims. 
Lieffring asserts both an obstruction and a retaliation claim under the WCA. See 

, subd. 1 (“Any person discharging or threatening to discharge an employee 
for seeking workers’ compensation benefits or in any manner intentionally obstructing an 
employee  seeking  workers’  compensation  benefits  is  liable  in  a  civil  action  for 

damages . . . .”). Specifically, Lieffring alleges that Defendants obstructed his efforts to 
obtain workers’ compensation benefits by sending misleading photographs of the accident 
site to the workers’ compensation insurer, and that Defendants took adverse actions against 
him in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim. Defendants’ motion does not 
address Lieffring’s obstruction claim.                                    

    With respect to Lieffring’s retaliation claim, Defendants argue that Lieffring has not 
shown a causal connection between the alleged adverse actions and his protected activity. 
“A workers’ compensation retaliation claim is generally analyzed under the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting test.” Tomlinson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 

 (D. Minn. 2013) (citing Randall v. N. Milk Prods., Inc., 

 (Minn. 

Ct.  App.  1994)).  Under  Minnesota  law,  “[a]  prima  facie  case  of  retaliatory 
discharge . . . consists of: (1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse 
employment action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” 
Kunferman v. Ford Motor Co., 

 (8th Cir. 1997). Defendants do not 
contest the first two elements of Lieffring’s prima facie case, and instead focus their motion 
exclusively on the causation element. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 29], 

at 39.)                                                                   
    Lieffring argues that a triable issue exists on causation because Director Rabbe met 
with the Prairieland Board to discuss terminating him shortly after his accident and the 
filing of his workers’ compensation claim; and after the Board voted to terminate him, 
Rabbe suspended him for two weeks, prevented him from returning to work until his 
accrued  sick  and  vacation  leave  was  exhausted,  and  then  terminated  him  upon  the 

exhaustion of his leave benefits. To be sure, “[t]iming alone cannot establish retaliatory 
intent.” Kunferman, 

 (citation omitted). Rather, in order to overcome a 
motion for summary judgment, “[a]n employee must establish the employer’s knowledge 
of protected activity.” 

 (citation omitted). But it is undisputed that Rabbe informed the 
Prairieland Board of Lieffring’s workplace injury, and the Board then voted to terminate 

Lieffring. (Rabbe Dep. at 160.) Although Defendants argue that Lieffring was ultimately 
terminated because he exhausted his accrued leave and failed to return to work, Lieffring 
has presented evidence that he was willing and able to return, and Prairieland’s refusal to 
permit him to return was the product of unlawful discrimination and retaliation.8 See supra 


    8  Notably,  Director  Rabbe’s  concerns  with  Lieffring’s  performance—which 
allegedly led her to seek guidance from the Prairieland Board regarding his termination—
were not even mentioned in the separation letter sent to Lieffring. See Rabbe Dep. at 157-
60; Myers Decl., Ex. 30; cf. Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 

 (8th Cir. 
2012)  (noting  that, under  the  McDonnel-Douglas  framework,  substantial  shifts  in an 
employer’s proffered non-discriminatory explanation for its actions may suggest that the 
explanation is pretextual).                                               
Section II.B.2. On this record, a reasonable jury could find a sufficient causal nexus 
between the alleged adverse actions and Lieffring’s protected activity, supporting a prima 

facie case of workers’ compensation retaliation.                          
    Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Lieffring’s WCA claims.                                                   
III.  CONCLUSION                                                          
    Based  on  the  submissions  and  the  entire  file  and  proceedings  herein,  IT  IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 27] is 

DENIED.                                                                   
IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                         


Dated: June 30, 2021                 s/Susan Richard Nelson               
                                    SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                 
                                    United States District Judge         

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


James Lieffring,                   Case No. 19-cv-02812 (SRN/TNL)        

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Prairieland Solid Waste Facility, County                                 
of Martin, and County of Faribault,                                      

          Defendants.                                                    


Areti Georgopoulos, Harmony Law Firm PLLC, 310 Fourth Avenue South, Suite 5010, 
Minneapolis, MN 55415; and Heather M. Gilbert, Gilbert Law PLLC, 4856 Banning 
Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55110, for Plaintiff.                               

Ryan  P.  Myers  and  Timothy  P.  Jung,  Lind  Jensen  Sullivan  &  Peterson,  PA,  901 
Marquette Avenue South, Suite 1300, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant. 


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 27] 
filed by Defendants. Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, 
and for the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion.                   
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
    In April 1989, Martin County and Faribault County (collectively, “the Counties”) 
entered into a Joint Powers Agreement pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 471.59. (See Decl. 
of Ryan P. Myers (“Myers Decl.”) [Doc. No. 30], Ex. 5 (“JPA”).) The Agreement created 
the Prairieland Solid Waste Board (“Prairieland”), an entity tasked with meeting the solid 
waste  disposal  needs  of  the  Counties  and  their  residents.  Under  the  Joint  Powers 
Agreement and Prairieland’s bylaws, Prairieland is governed by a Board of Directors, a 
ten-member  body  composed  of  each  County’s  set  of  five  commissioners,  and  the 

Prairieland Director, an individual appointed by the Board and tasked with overseeing 
Prairieland’s daily operations. (See id. § II.A; Myers Decl., Ex. 7 (“Prairieland Bylaws”), 
art. IV; Decl. of Areti Georgopoulos (“Georgopoulos Decl.”) [Doc. No. 36], Ex. 4 (“Rabbe 
Dep.”), at 18-21.)                                                        
    The  Agreement  required  the  Counties  to  pay  the  “[c]ompensation  and  other 
expenses” of the Prairieland Board.1 (JPA § II.A.) In addition, the Agreement required the 

Counties to jointly fund the development of Prairieland’s facilities, and split Prairieland’s 
operating costs and revenue between them. (Id. § I.C.) However, Prairieland’s current 
Director, Billeye Rabbe, testified that Prairieland’s operating budget is fully funded by 
tipping fees paid by commercial garbage haulers and individuals who dump refuse at 
Prairieland’s facilities. (Rabbe Dep. at 64-66.) The Prairieland Board is empowered to hire, 

fire, and pay employees.2 (JPA § II.B; Prairieland Bylaws art. IV, sec. III.) Strikingly, the 

    1 The record is unclear regarding whether the commissioners actually received 
separate compensation for their work on the Prairieland Board. Although the Joint Powers 
Agreement required the Board’s compensation to be paid by the Counties, Prairieland’s 
bylaws provide that the Board “shall not be entitled to compensation of [sic] services 
performed except that they may be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance 
of their duties.” (Prairieland Bylaws art. V, sec. III.) Nevertheless, at its Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition, Martin County testified that its commissioners are entitled to a $75 per diem 
reimbursement, paid by Prairieland, for work on the Prairieland Board. (See Georgopoulos 
Decl., Ex. 2 (“Martin Cty. Dep.”), at 61-65.)                             
    2 Notably, the record indicates that, prior to 1991, Prairieland employees were paid 
by and received health insurance benefits through Martin County. (See Decl. of Kathryn 
Grunig (“Grunig Decl.”) [Doc. No. 40].)                                   
Joint Powers Agreement also grants the Prairieland Board authority to “assign tasks . . . to 
any staff member or members of any County,” and provides that “[c]ompensation and 

payment  of  expenses  of  such  staff  member  or  members  shall  continue  to  be  the 
responsibility of the County which regularly employs the staff member or members, unless 
otherwise determined by the [Prairieland Board].” (JPA § II.B.)           
    Although the Counties’ commissioners typically manage Prairieland business at a 
meeting of the Prairieland Board, the record indicates that, on at least one occasion, the 
Prairieland Board’s members conducted Prairieland business at the Counties’ separate 

commissioner meetings. (See Rabbe Dep. at 155-56 (testifying that, when the Prairieland 
Board was unable to meet in May 2018, Rabbe sought authorization to pay Prairieland’s 
bills at the Counties’ respective commissioner meetings); Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 24.) 
Prairieland maintains its own personnel policy manuals, has its own federal employer 
identification number, and holds its own bank accounts. (See Rabbe Dep. at 40-41, 104; 

Myers Decl., Ex. 13.) There is no provision in either the Joint Powers Agreement or 
Prairieland’s bylaws requiring Prairieland to indemnify the Counties for its actions.  
    In 2005, the Counties amended the Joint Powers Agreement to authorize Prairieland 
to serve as the Solid Waste Coordinator for each County. (See Myers Decl., Ex. 8.) Each 
County’s  Solid  Waste  Coordinator  administers  the  county’s  solid  waste  collection 

programs, which are funded by a tax assessed on county residents. (See Rabbe Dep. at 16-
20, 64-66.) In 2013, Billeye Rabbe was appointed as both Prairieland’s Director and to the 
Solid Waste Coordinator position for each county. (Id. at 16-20.) Rabbe performs many of 
her duties as Solid Waste Coordinator from her office at Prairieland. (Id.) In her capacity 
as  Prairieland  Director,  Rabbe  reports  to  both  Counties’  commissioners  together  at 
Prairieland  Board  meetings;  in  her  capacity  as  Solid  Waste  Coordinator,  she  reports 
separately to each County’s commissioners.3 (Id. at 54.) When she was appointed to these 

positions, at the Prairieland Board’s request, Rabbe created a salary proposal. (Id. at 29; 
Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 23.) Under the proposal, which was accepted by the Board, 
Prairieland was to be responsible for 50% of Rabbe’s salary, and the Counties were to be 
collectively responsible for 50% of her salary. (Rabbe Dep. at 29; Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 
23.) In practice, Prairieland pays Rabbe’s full salary, and the Counties then reimburse 

Prairieland for their share of the salary. (Rabbe Dep. at 29.)            
    In 2016, Prairieland and Martin County entered into a Joint Powers Agreement, 
under  which  Martin  County  agreed  to  administer  Prairieland’s  employee  benefits  in 
exchange for a $9,111.43 administrative fee. (Rabbe Dep. at 66-68; Martin Cty. Dep. at 
108-09; Myers Decl., Ex. 9 (“Prairieland-Martin Cty. JPA”).) The record suggests that, 

prior  to  the  2016  Agreement, Martin  County  had  provided  health  insurance benefits 
directly to Prairieland employees, without charging an administrative fee. (See Grunig 
Decl.;  Martin  Cty.  Dep.  at  108-11.)  The  2016  Agreement  expressly  provided  that 
“Prairieland employees are not considered County employees for any purpose despite 
participating in any of [sic] health insurance or ancillary benefits being provided pursuant 

to this Agreement.” (Prairieland-Martin Cty. JPA ¶ 5.)                    


    3 The record is unclear whether Rabbe has ever discussed Solid Waste Coordinator 
issues at meetings of the Prairieland Board.                              
    Plaintiff James Lieffring joined Prairieland as a full-time Production Worker in 
2001. (Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 1 (“Lieffring Dep.”), at 13.) Prairieland’s Production 

Workers are tasked with, in essence, operating equipment, cleaning, and working on the 
facility’s tipping floor. (See Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 4 (“Langvardt Dep.”), at 13; id., Ex. 
25;  Lieffring  Dep.  at  20.)  Beginning  in  April  2017,  Prairieland  implemented  a  rule 
prohibiting employees from taking beverages onto the tipping floor. (Rabbe Dep. at 107-
08; Myers Decl., Ex. 15.) Despite this rule, Lieffring took coffee onto the tipping floor on 
several occasions, leading to a verbal warning in June 2017 and a written warning in 

October 2017. (See Myers Decl., Ex. 15.)                                  
    In  November  2017,  Lieffring  experienced  a  mesenteric  artery  blockage 
necessitating emergency medical care and a lengthy hospitalization. (See Lieffring Dep. at 
29-30.) The following month, Lieffring discussed his medical condition with Rabbe and 
Kathryn Grunig, Prairieland’s Office Manager, and was told that the only leave available 

to him was accrued vacation or sick leave. (Decl. of James Lieffring [Doc. No. 41], at ¶¶ 3-
5.) Lieffring therefore used accrued sick leave benefits during his absence from work. 
(Lieffring Dep. at 33.) When Lieffring was released from the hospital in December 2017, 
his doctor imposed a ten-pound lifting restriction for six weeks. (Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 
28.) Although Lieffring sought to return to work, Rabbe refused to permit him to return, 

noting that his position as a Production Worker required him to be able to lift at least 35 
pounds. (Lieffring Dep. at 31-33; Rabbe Dep. at 90-92.) Lieffring consulted with his 
doctor, who increased the lifting restriction to 36 pounds, and Lieffring returned to work 
on January 2, 2018. (Lieffring Dep. at 33; Rabbe Dep. at 91-92.) Lieffring testified that he 
returned “on a lighter duty,” and did not lift more than 36 pounds, climb, or do “anything 
real strenuous.” (Lieffring Dep. at 35-36.)                               

    On January 30, 2018, while checking on trash compactors outside the building, 
Lieffring slipped and fell on a patch of ice, injuring his left shoulder. (Id. at 36-37.) He 
reported his injury to Kirk Langvardt, the Plant Supervisor, and completed an accident 
report with Langvardt the next day. (Id.; Myers Decl., Ex. 19.) Lieffring sought medical 
treatment, and Prairieland filed a First Report of Injury with its workers’ compensation 
insurer. (Lieffring Dep. at 40-42; Myers Decl., Exs. 21-22.) On February 5, Lieffring 

received an additional evaluation of his shoulder, and his doctor imposed a 26 to 40-pound 
lifting restriction. (Myers Decl., Ex. 23.) Because Lieffring could lift more than 35 pounds, 
Prairieland permitted him to continue working. (Rabbe Dep. at 104-05.)    
    On February 19, Rabbe met with Lieffring and Langvardt to discuss her observation 
that Lieffring continued to bring coffee onto the tipping floor, as well as “leav[e] early, 

watch[] other employees work and not perform[] his job.” (Id. at 115.) Rabbe discussed 
her concerns with Langvardt, who she testified worked with Lieffring more closely than 
she did. (Id. at 115-16.) Langvardt did not share Rabbe’s concerns regarding Lieffring’s 
behavior, and testified that he “didn’t know that she was upset about his work performance 
or his coffee drinking or anything else. It just kind of blind-sided me.” (Id. at 115-19; 

Langvardt Dep. at 51-53.) Following this meeting, Rabbe suspended Lieffring for two 
weeks. (Myers Decl., Ex. 24.) Sometime prior to Lieffring’s suspension, Rabbe discussed 
terminating Lieffring with the Prairieland Board. (Rabbe Dep. at 157.) At that meeting, 
Rabbe discussed her concerns with Lieffring’s performance and asked the Board for “some 
direction  on if this was  grounds  for termination.”  (/d.  at  157-58.)  The Board voted to 
terminate Lieffring, but advised Rabbe to first seek guidance from counsel. (/d. at 158-60.) 
Rabbe disclosed to the Board that Lieffring had experienced a work-related injury. (/d. at 
160.) 
     Lieffring was diagnosed with a complete rotator cuff injury, which appeared to be 
irreparable. (Georgopoulos Decl., Exs. 37-38.) On February 19, as a result of a February 14 
MRI scan, Lieffring’s doctor recommended “that he be off work at this time. It is unknown 
how long he will be off work.” (Myers Decl., Ex. 25.) Lieffring began receiving temporary 
total disability benefits through Prairieland’s workers’ compensation insurer on February 
19,  (See  Georgopoulos  Decl.,  Ex.  42.)  On February 28,  Lieffring’s  doctor revised his 
restrictions, permitting him to return to work with the following restrictions, effective for 
ten weeks: 

Functional Abilities: Ina    Y :      hour shift a person may 
Restrictions (No restrictions unless marked)                          C1 No Rotating Shifts 
Number of Hours Permitted to Work per Day   £__Number of Days perWeek  <~_  CL Other (Specify) 
Esaployes Cans ioted          Not at All oa Rare 5%) Ogeasoinal  Epeent       Other Restrictions: 
Sit                   Oo     oO    0     er       (No driving work vehicles 
  Stand Walk               QO    o     0     x          No working alone 
Twist/Turn               Oo     0     0     ee          direct patient care 
Bend/Stoop               Oo    Oo     a    Oo        CD No operating power equipment 
Squat/Kneel/Crawl -   kwe elng    o    EY    O     oO        (No working at heights or where abrupt incapacity could 
Climb (Ladder/Stairs)          a   oOo     Oo     Oo         be hazardous 
Reach Above Shoulders    ALOR &    Oo     Oo     Oo        CO Keep the wound site clean and dry 
Reach At or Below Shoulders LOR O    cr    oO     0        C No assaultive/physical control situations 
{Repetitive Grasp/Pinch    FLOR O     oO    (    Oo        (1 No temperature extremes (Less than 52F or greater than 80 
Work With Hand/Arm     @.oRoO     a    oO     oO        Cl Environmental (Specify)  = 
Fine Manipulation       O1orR oO    oO     oO     0       (© No work in patient's environment 
Vibratory Tasks        O.:DroO     0    -O     0       D No latex products 
Keyboarding         OL.ORQ    Oo     oD     o       O    Other 
Lift/Carry           BLORO   @&£_ibsO__ tsX__ Ibs 
PushyPull           OLORO   O__ibsO__  bbsO__ tts 
Other Instructlons/Limitations       ; 
     fr  caunot   (efor  aay  Come  bod y

(Id., Ex. 35.) The revised restrictions noted that Lieffring “cannot lift [left] arm away from 
body,” and could only lift or carry five pounds with his left arm. (Id.) However, those 

restrictions extended only to his left arm. (Id.) Both Lieffring and Langvardt testified that 
Lieffring could perform the essential functions of his job even with these restrictions.4 
(Lieffring Dep. at 86-89; Langvardt Dep. at 50-61.) Indeed, Langvardt testified that he had 
“always tried finding light duty work for guys that need it, that were hurt and needed to get 
back to work.” (Langvardt Dep. at 51.) As one example, Langvardt testified that he had 
permitted an employee to sweep and sharpen drill bits for two weeks as the employee 

recovered from kidney surgery. (Id. at 54.)                               
    Nonetheless, once Lieffring’s suspension expired, Rabbe refused to permit Lieffring 
to return to work “until he’s 100 percent.” (Id. at 60.) At her deposition, Rabbe admitted 
that she never discussed Lieffring’s February 28 lifting restrictions, or Prairieland’s ability 
to accommodate them, with Lieffring. (Rabbe Dep. at 176.) Instead, Prairieland permitted 

Lieffring  to  use  accrued  sick  and  vacation  benefits  to  supplement  his  workers’ 
compensation benefits. (Myers Decl., Ex. 28.) When Lieffring exhausted his accrued leave, 
Prairieland terminated his employment. (See id., Ex. 30.) Prairieland’s separation letter, 
dated May 11, 2018, stated in full:                                       
    On May 8, 2018 you exhausted your sick and vacation balances. Attempts to 
    reach you have not been successful. Since you are not on paid status, have 

    4 Langvardt’s testimony is at odds with Rabbe’s, who testified that both she and 
Langvardt “were on the same page” that Lieffring was “not . . . able to perform production 
work duties.” (Rabbe Dep. at 139.) However, Langvardt testified that when he discussed 
Lieffring’s February 28 restrictions with Rabbe, he did not agree with her assessment that 
the restrictions prevented Lieffring from returning to work. (Langvardt Dep. at 63.) 
    not applied for a leave of absence and have not contacted me with regard to 
    your status, you are considered to have been absent without leave at this time. 
    Accordingly, you are separated from employment at Prairieland Solid Waste 
    Management  effective  today  May  11,  2018.  Your  insurance  will  be 
    continued until the end of May. You will receive a separate communication 
    regarding continuation of health insurance.                          
(Id.) Lieffring testified that he did not discuss his ability to return to work with anyone 
from Prairieland in the weeks leading to his termination; however, he visited the workplace 
regularly to sign his paystubs, and Rabbe did not attempt to speak with him about his 
restrictions or what would happen when he exhausted his accrued leave, either. (See 
Lieffring Dep. at 67, 80; Rabbe Dep. at 168-69, 176 (testifying that Rabbe did not make 
any attempt to contact Lieffring, and that the attempts referenced in the separation letter 
referred to the workers’ compensation insurer’s attempts to reach Lieffring).) 
    On  May  1,  2018,  prior  to  Lieffring’s  termination,  Prairieland’s  workers’ 
compensation insurer issued a Notice of Intention to Discontinue Workers’ Compensation 
Benefits (“NOID”). (Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 41.) The NOID stated that “[t]he employer 
and the insurer are in receipt of additional information which indicate [sic] the employee 
did not sustain a work injury as claimed by him on 1/30/2018.” (Id.) The NOID specifically 

referenced  photos  taken  by  Rabbe  shortly  after  Lieffring’s  fall:  “The  employer  took 
pictures of the area of employee’s fall and saw foot prints only in the snow but no imprint 
of the employee’s fall. No snow mound was visible from which the employee claims he 
fell.” (Id.) However, the photos submitted by Rabbe to the insurer were only a subset of 
the photos taken after Lieffring’s fall, and none of them depicted the area between the trash 

compactors where Lieffring fell. (See Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 31, at 44-47; id., Ex. 32, at 
2.)  Lieffring  contested  the  denial  of  workers’  compensation  benefits,  and  ultimately 
prevailed in the workers’ compensation system. (See Myers Decl., Ex. 35.) 

    Lieffring brought suit against Prairieland and the Counties under the Family and 
Medical  Leave  Act  (“FMLA”),  the  Americans  with  Disabilities  Act  (“ADA”),  the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), and Minnesota’s Workers’ Compensation Act 
(“WCA”). Lieffring alleges that Prairieland and the Counties failed to offer him FMLA 
leave. In addition, Lieffring asserts disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure-to-
accommodate claims against Prairieland under the ADA and the MHRA. And Lieffring 

alleges that Prairieland obstructed his workers’ compensation claim and retaliated against 
him for seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Defendants now move for summary 
judgment on all claims.                                                   
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Standard of Review                                              
    Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if it may affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” TCF 
Nat’l Bank v. Mkt. Intelligence, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2016). And a factual 
dispute is “genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

 

(1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence 
and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

 
(1986).                                                                   

    Although the moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine 
issue of fact, the party opposing summary judgment may not “rest on mere allegations or 
denials but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a 
genuine issue for trial.” Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur, 

 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

 
(1986). Moreover, summary judgment is properly entered “against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 

.                                                              
    B.   Analysis                                                        
    Defendants seek summary judgment on three grounds. First, Defendants argue that 

Prairieland is a separate entity from the Counties, and that Prairieland therefore does not 
have a sufficient number of employees to trigger the requirements of the FMLA, the ADA, 
or the MHRA. Second, with respect to Lieffring’s ADA and MHRA claims, Defendants 
contend that Lieffring’s lifting restrictions rendered him unable to perform the essential 
functions of his job. And finally, Defendants assert that Lieffring has not raised a genuine 

factual dispute regarding the causal connection between his workers’ compensation claim 
and his suspension, Prairieland’s refusal to permit him to return to work, or his termination. 
The Court will analyze each argument in turn.                             
         1.   Coverage Under the FMLA, the ADA, and the MHRA             
    The FMLA generally applies to all public agency employers, regardless of the 
number of persons employed by the agency. See 

(4)(A)(iii); 

(a). However, only “eligible employees” may obtain the statute’s benefits. The 
statute  provides  that,  among  other  requirements,  an  eligible  employee  is  one  whose 
employer has 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite. See 

(2); 

(d) (“[E]mployees of public agencies must meet all of the requirements 
of  eligibility,  including  the  requirement  that  the  employer  (e.g.,  State)  employ  50 

employees at the worksite or within 75 miles.”). Thus, Lieffring can prevail on his FMLA 
claim only if Prairieland meets the 50-employee threshold. Similarly, the ADA and the 
MHRA  apply  only  if  Prairieland  employed  15  or  more  employees.  See  

(5)(A) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more 

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .”); Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, 
subd. 6 (“[I]t is an unfair employment practice for an employer with a number of part-time 
or full-time employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the 
current  or  preceding  calendar  year . . . equal  to  or  greater  than  15 . . . not  to  make 
reasonable accommodation to the known disability of a qualified disabled person . . . .”). 

    It is undisputed that Prairieland employed fewer than 15 persons during the relevant 
time period, and that the FMLA, the ADA, and the MHRA apply if and only if Prairieland’s 
employees may be counted together with one or both Counties’ employees. Lieffring 
contends that Defendants’ employees may be counted together under the “joint employer” 
and “integrated employer” doctrines.5 In their initial memorandum in support of their 
motion,  Defendants  argued  that,  applying  these  doctrines,  Lieffring  has  not  raised  a 

genuine factual dispute supporting the conclusion that Prairieland and the Counties are 
joint or integrated employers. In their reply memorandum, Defendants raised the additional 
argument that the joint and integrated employer doctrines do not apply under the FMLA 
where the employer is a public agency.6                                   
    The Court finds that the joint and integrated employer doctrines are available to a 
plaintiff employed by a public agency. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary rest on an 

overly restrictive reading of the Department of Labor’s regulations implementing the 
FMLA. Those regulations provide that:                                     
    Normally the legal entity which employs the employee is the employer under 
    FMLA. Applying this principle, a corporation is a single employer rather 
    than its separate establishments or divisions.                       
         (1)  Where  one  corporation  has  an  ownership  interest  in  another 
         corporation,  it  is  a  separate  employer  unless  it  meets  the  joint 
         employment test discussed in § 825.106, or the integrated employer 
         test contained in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.             

    5  Lieffring  also  contends  that  the  Joint  Powers  Agreement  did  not  establish 
Prairieland as a separate legal entity from the Counties, relying largely on language in the 
Agreement that refers to Prairieland as a “project.” But the Agreement also refers to 
Prairieland as an “organization,” and the record demonstrates that Prairieland has operated 
as a legal entity—by, for example, hiring its own employees, obtaining its own federal 
employer identification number, and holding its own bank accounts. (See JPA §§ I.B, II.B; 
Rabbe Dep. at 40-41, 104.) The question, therefore, is not whether Prairieland is a separate 
legal entity, but whether the applicable statutes permit counting Prairieland’s employees 
together with those of the Counties.                                      
    6 Defendants do not appear to argue that the joint and integrated employer tests are 
inapplicable to public agencies under the ADA and the MHRA.               
         (2) Separate entities will be deemed to be parts of a single employer 
         for purposes of FMLA if they meet the integrated employer test. 
         Where this test is met, the employees of all entities making up the 
         integrated  employer  will  be  counted  in  determining  employer 
         coverage and employee eligibility. . . .                        

(c) (emphasis added). Section 825.106, in turn, specifically addresses 
the “joint employer” test:                                                
    Where two or more businesses exercise some control over the work or  
    working conditions of the employee, the businesses may be joint employers 
    under FMLA . . . .                                                   

 § 825.106(a) (emphasis added).                                        
    Defendants  argue  that  these  regulations  suggest  that  the  joint  and  integrated 
employer tests apply only to “corporations” and “businesses,” not to public agencies. 
Defendants’ argument finds some support in the case law. The regulations contain a section 
dedicated to the FMLA’s application in the public agency context. Prior to 2008, that 
section stated that:                                                      
    A State or a political subdivision of a State constitutes a single public agency 
    and, therefore, a single employer for purposes of determining employee 
    eligibility. For example, a State is a single employer; a county is a single 
    employer; a city or town is a single employer. Where there is any question 
    about whether a public entity is a public agency, as distinguished from a part 
    of  another  public  agency,  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census’  “Census  of 
    Governments” will be determinative, except for new entities formed since 
    the most recent publication of the “Census.”                         
Id. § 825.108(c)(1) (effective prior to 2008) (emphasis added). In Rollins v. Wilson County 
Government, the Sixth Circuit interpreted this regulation as establishing a two-part test 
applicable where a plaintiff seeks to aggregate the number of employees employed by 
public agencies. 

 (6th Cir. 1998). Based on the regulation’s “[w]here there is 
any question” language, the court held that courts must first determine whether state law 
definitively resolves the question of whether two public agencies are separate. 

. 

If state law does not provide a definitive answer, the court reasoned that, under the 
regulation’s language, the Census of Governments is “determinative.” 

 In light of 
Rollins’ reasoning, some district courts subsequently concluded that the two-part Rollins 
test, and not the joint or integrated employer doctrines, applies to FMLA claims against 
public agencies. See, e.g., Colter v. Bowling Green-Warren Cty. Reg’l Airport Bd., No. 
1:17-CV-00118-JHM, 

 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017); Miller v. Cty. of 

Rockingham, No. 5:06-CV-00053, 

, at *7 (W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2007) 
(“The Counties persuasively argue that neither [the joint nor integrated employer] test 
should be applied in this case, given the fact that there is a separate regulation pertaining 
to public agencies.”).                                                    
    But the reasoning of the Rollins court, as well as the Colter and Miller courts, rested 

on the regulation’s treatment of the Census as “determinative.” In 2008, the Department of 
Labor amended the regulation to recognize that “[w]hether two agencies of the same State 
or local government constitute the same public agency can only be determined on a case-
by-case  basis.”  

(c)(1).  Rather  than  treating  the  Census  as 
“determinative,” the regulation now treats the Census as but “[o]ne factor that would 

support a conclusion that two agencies are separate.” 

 In a January 2020 opinion letter, 
the Department of Labor explained that the regulation was revised to make the Census “just 
one factor,” consistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act, and to “allow[] employment-
related  factors  to  play  a  greater  role.”  Wage  &  Hour  Div.,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  Labor, 
FMLA2020-1-A, Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act, 

, at *2 n.2 
(Jan. 7, 2020) [hereinafter “2020 Opinion Letter”]. Such factors include: “(1) whether the 

two agencies have separate payroll systems; (2) whether they have different retirement 
systems; (3) whether they have separate budgets and funding authorities; (4) whether each 
has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; (5) whether they have separate hiring 
and other employment practices; (6) whether one employer controls the appointment of 
officers of the other agency; and (7) how state law treats the relationship between the two 
agencies.” 

                                                            

    The Court reads the public agency test described in the current regulation and the 
2020 Opinion Letter as a statement of additional factors that courts should consider in 
determining whether  two public agencies are “integrated employers.” Nothing in the 
regulations  suggests  that  the  integrated  employer  factors  outlined  in  

(c)(2) are inapplicable to public agencies. Indeed, both before and after the 

Department of Labor’s 2008 revisions, courts have applied the integrated employer test in 
public agency cases. See Braden v. Cty. of Washington, 

 (W.D. 
Pa. 2010) (applying both the Rollins test and the integrated employer test, and declining to 
determine whether the Rollins test is the only test applicable in the public agency context); 
Nielson v. Port of Gold Beach, No. CV 05-3095-PA, 

, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 

16, 2007) (same). Both the public agency test and the integrated employer doctrine serve 
to resolve whether two legal entities ought to be considered the same entity for purposes 
of the FMLA’s coverage requirements. See 

 (“Separate entities will be 
deemed to be parts of a single employer for purposes of FMLA if they meet the integrated 
employer test.”); 

 § 825.108(c)(1) (“Whether two agencies of the same State or local 
government constitute the same public agency can only be determined on a case-by-case 

basis.”). The regulations’ public agency provision, in essence, identifies additional factors 
that speak to whether two public agencies are one integrated employer.    
    In addition, the Court is not persuaded that the joint employer test is categorically 
inapplicable  where  the  employer  is  a  public  agency.  Defendants  emphasize  that  the 
regulations phrase the test in terms of “corporations” and “businesses,” as opposed to 
“entities”—as  used  in  the  integrated  employer  provision.  See  id.  §§ 825.104(c)(1), 

825.106. But courts, both before and after the Department of Labor’s 2008 revisions, have 
applied the joint employer test to public agencies in the FMLA context. See Porter v. New 
Age Servs. Corp., No. 10 C 1784, 

, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2011), aff’d, 

 (7th Cir. 2012) (analyzing a joint employer theory under the FMLA in 
the public agency context); Moldenhauer v. Tazewell-Pekin Consol. Commc’ns Ctr., No. 

04-1169, 

, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2006), aff’d, 

 (7th Cir. 
2008)  (analyzing  whether  a  private  employer,  city,  and  county  jointly  employed  the 
plaintiff under the FMLA). Defendants do not persuasively explain why private employers 
can be regarded as joint employers of an employee, while public employers cannot. 
    Accordingly, the Court finds that the joint and integrated employer doctrines are 

available to Lieffring. Under the joint employer doctrine, courts evaluate the economic 
realities of the relationship between the employee and the alleged joint employer, and 
generally consider whether the alleged joint employer “(1) had the power to hire and fire 
the employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of 
employment;  (3)  determined  the  rate  and  method  of  payment;  and  (4)  maintained 
employment records.” Catani v. Chiodi, No. CIV.00-1559 (DWF/RLE), 

, 

at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2001) (citing Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 

 (9th Cir. 1983)). Under the integrated employer doctrine, courts 
generally  consider  (1) the  interrelation  between  the  entities’  operations, (2)  common 
management, (3) centralized control of the entities’ labor relations, and (4) common 
ownership. See Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Loc. Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. 
of Mobile, Inc., 

 (1965); 

(c)(2). Both tests are fact-

intensive, and look to the totality of the circumstances.                 
    In the public agency context, the Department of Labor’s FMLA regulations add 
several additional factors to the integrated employer test. Such factors include: “(1) whether 
the two agencies have separate payroll systems; (2) whether they have different retirement 
systems; (3) whether they have separate budgets and funding authorities; (4) whether each 

has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; (5) whether they have separate hiring 
and other employment practices; (6) whether one employer controls the appointment of 
officers of the other agency; and (7) how state law treats the relationship between the two 
agencies,” as well as treatment of the agency by the Census of Governments. 2020 Opinion 
Letter at *2; see 

(c)(1).                              

    Applying those tests, the Court finds that Lieffring has raised a genuine factual 
dispute precluding summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. It is true that Prairieland has, 
in  many  ways,  operated  as  its  own  entity,  independent  of  the  Counties.  Prairieland 
maintains its own bank accounts, hires, fires, and pays its own employees, maintains its 
own personnel policy manuals, has its own federal employer identification number, and 
financially supports its operations through tipping fees. (JPA § II.B; Prairieland Bylaws 

art. IV, sec. III; Rabbe Dep. at 40-41, 64-66, 104; Myers Decl., Ex. 13.) Moreover, the 
Joint Powers Agreement does not require Prairieland to indemnify the Counties for its 
conduct. And Prairieland is identified as a separate public agency in the Census. (See Myers 
Decl., Ex. 38.)                                                           
    But Prairieland is also closely tied to the Counties, in several important respects. 
First, the Prairieland Board is composed exclusively of the Counties’ commissioners. 

Although the Prairieland Director is hired by the Board to manage day-to-day operations, 
the Director is not a member of the Board, as might support a greater degree of separation 
between the entities. (See JPA § II.A; Prairieland Bylaws art. IV; Rabbe Dep. at 18-21.) In 
addition, even though the record suggests that Prairieland’s budget is fully supported by 
tipping fees paid to Prairieland—and not taxes collected by the Counties—the Joint Powers 

Agreement obligates the Counties to pay for the development of Prairieland’s facilities and 
split  Prairieland’s  operating  costs  and  revenue.  (JPA  § I.C;  Rabbe  Dep.  at  64-66.) 
Strikingly, the Agreement also empowers the Prairieland Board to “assign tasks . . . to any 
staff member or members” of the Counties, the compensation and expenses of that staff 
member to be borne by the County. (JPA § II.B.) Although the record does not reflect an 

example of the Board exercising this power, the power to co-opt County employees 
strongly supports a joint or integrated employer relationship.            
    Moreover, the Board’s compensation—had the Board not disclaimed compensation 
in Prairieland’s bylaws—would be paid by the Counties, not Prairieland. (Id. § II.A; see 
Prairieland Bylaws art. V, sec. III.) Yet, in fact, Martin County’s commissioners do receive 
a $75 per diem reimbursement for their work on Prairieland’s Board. (Martin Cty. Dep. at 

61-65.)  Although  the  Joint  Powers  Agreement  would  suggest  that  the  Counties  are 
obligated to make that payment, Martin County testified that Prairieland pays the per diem. 
(Id.)  Relatedly,  Director  Rabbe serves  in  the  nominally  separate  roles  of  Prairieland 
Director and Solid Waste Coordinator for the Counties. But Prairieland pays Rabbe’s entire 
salary,  including  the  portion  of  her  salary  attributable  to  her  work  as  Solid  Waste 
Coordinator; the Counties then “reimburse” Prairieland for half of Rabbe’s salary. (Rabbe 

Dep.  at  29;  Georgopoulos  Decl.,  Ex.  23.)  In  addition,  prior  to  1991,  Prairieland’s 
employees were paid by and received health insurance benefits through Martin County. 
(See Grunig Decl.) While Prairieland subsequently took on its own payroll obligations, it 
continued to offer employment benefits through Martin County, and did not formalize 
Martin County’s role as a paid plan administrator until 2016. (See Rabbe Dep. at 66-68; 

Martin Cty. Dep. at 108-11; Prairieland-Martin Cty. JPA.) Finally, the record reflects at 
least one occasion where the Counties’ commissioners acted on Prairieland business in 
their separate commission meetings, rather than at a meeting of the full Prairieland Board. 
(See Rabbe Dep. at 155-56; Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 24.)                   
    In short, although Prairieland and the Counties are largely separate on paper, the 

record  contains  ample  facts  suggesting  that  their  management  and  operations  are 
sufficiently enmeshed to support the conclusion that they are joint or integrated employers 
under the FMLA, the ADA, and the MHRA. Accordingly, the Court finds that a triable 
issue of fact exists, and denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis. 
         2.   Lieffring’s Ability to Perform the Essential Functions of His Job 
    The Court next considers Defendants’ argument that Lieffring’s February 28, 2018 
lifting restrictions prevented him from performing the essential functions of his job. A 

plaintiff may prevail on disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure-to-accommodate 
claims, under both the ADA and the MHRA, only if the plaintiff is able to perform the 
essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation. See Duty v. 
Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 

 (8th Cir. 2002) (“An ADA claimant must 
make a prima facie showing that he (1) has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, 

(2) is able to  perform the essential  functions of the job,  with or without reasonable 
accommodation,  and  (3)  suffered  an  adverse  employment  action  as  a  result  of  the 
disability.” (citation omitted)); Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 

  (8th  Cir.  2018)  (affirming  grant  of  summary  judgment  for  employer  on 
employee’s  ADA  failure-to-accommodate  and  retaliation  claims  where  the  employee 

failed to show that he could perform the essential functions of his job); Collins v. Abbott 
Lab’ys, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming grant of summary judgment for 
employer on employee’s MHRA claims where employee failed to make “a facial showing 
that reasonable accommodation is possible and that the accommodation will allow [him] 
to perform the essential functions of the job” (quotation omitted)). Defendants contend that 

Lieffring’s February 28 work restrictions, which provided that he could not lift more than 
five pounds with his left arm, rendered him unable to perform the essential functions of his 
work.7                                                                    

    The Court finds that Lieffring has raised a genuine factual dispute regarding whether 
he could perform his duties despite his lifting restrictions. It is undisputed that the ability 
to lift thirty-five pounds is an essential requirement for Prairieland Production Workers. 
(See Lieffring Dep. at 31-32; Myers Decl., Ex. 12.) It is also undisputed that, as of February 
28, 2018, Lieffring was restricted to lifting only five pounds. (See Georgopoulos Decl., Ex. 
35.) However, that restriction applied solely to Lieffring’s left arm. (Id.) Defendants have 

not addressed that fact, and the record does not indicate that Lieffring could not meet the 
position’s  lifting  requirements  using  his  right  arm.  Indeed,  both  Lieffring  and  his 
immediate supervisor testified that Lieffring could have returned to work despite the 
February 28 restrictions. (Lieffring Dep. at 86-89; Langvardt Dep. at 50-61.) Director 
Rabbe admitted that she made no effort to discuss Lieffring’s restrictions with him or to 

accommodate those restrictions, and instead insisted—without any explanation apparent 
on this record—that he could not return to work “until he’s 100 percent.” (Rabbe Dep. at 
176; Langvardt Dep. at 60.) In light of that testimony, the Court finds that a genuine factual 
dispute exists regarding Lieffring’s ability to perform the essential functions of his job.  



    7  Although  the  February  28  restrictions  included  many  other  terms,  including 
restrictions  on Lieffring’s ability  to squat,  bend, climb, and reach with his left arm, 
Defendants focus solely on Lieffring’s five-pound lifting restriction. (See Georgopoulos 
Decl., Ex. 35.) Because Defendants have not argued that the other restrictions touch on 
essential functions of Lieffring’s job, the Court focuses its analysis on the lifting restriction. 
    Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Lieffring’s ADA and MHRA claims.                                          

         3.   WCA Obstruction and Retaliation Claims                     
    Finally, the Court considers Defendants’ challenge to Lieffring’s WCA claims. 
Lieffring asserts both an obstruction and a retaliation claim under the WCA. See 

, subd. 1 (“Any person discharging or threatening to discharge an employee 
for seeking workers’ compensation benefits or in any manner intentionally obstructing an 
employee  seeking  workers’  compensation  benefits  is  liable  in  a  civil  action  for 

damages . . . .”). Specifically, Lieffring alleges that Defendants obstructed his efforts to 
obtain workers’ compensation benefits by sending misleading photographs of the accident 
site to the workers’ compensation insurer, and that Defendants took adverse actions against 
him in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim. Defendants’ motion does not 
address Lieffring’s obstruction claim.                                    

    With respect to Lieffring’s retaliation claim, Defendants argue that Lieffring has not 
shown a causal connection between the alleged adverse actions and his protected activity. 
“A workers’ compensation retaliation claim is generally analyzed under the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting test.” Tomlinson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 

 (D. Minn. 2013) (citing Randall v. N. Milk Prods., Inc., 

 (Minn. 

Ct.  App.  1994)).  Under  Minnesota  law,  “[a]  prima  facie  case  of  retaliatory 
discharge . . . consists of: (1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse 
employment action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” 
Kunferman v. Ford Motor Co., 

 (8th Cir. 1997). Defendants do not 
contest the first two elements of Lieffring’s prima facie case, and instead focus their motion 
exclusively on the causation element. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 29], 

at 39.)                                                                   
    Lieffring argues that a triable issue exists on causation because Director Rabbe met 
with the Prairieland Board to discuss terminating him shortly after his accident and the 
filing of his workers’ compensation claim; and after the Board voted to terminate him, 
Rabbe suspended him for two weeks, prevented him from returning to work until his 
accrued  sick  and  vacation  leave  was  exhausted,  and  then  terminated  him  upon  the 

exhaustion of his leave benefits. To be sure, “[t]iming alone cannot establish retaliatory 
intent.” Kunferman, 

 (citation omitted). Rather, in order to overcome a 
motion for summary judgment, “[a]n employee must establish the employer’s knowledge 
of protected activity.” 

 (citation omitted). But it is undisputed that Rabbe informed the 
Prairieland Board of Lieffring’s workplace injury, and the Board then voted to terminate 

Lieffring. (Rabbe Dep. at 160.) Although Defendants argue that Lieffring was ultimately 
terminated because he exhausted his accrued leave and failed to return to work, Lieffring 
has presented evidence that he was willing and able to return, and Prairieland’s refusal to 
permit him to return was the product of unlawful discrimination and retaliation.8 See supra 


    8  Notably,  Director  Rabbe’s  concerns  with  Lieffring’s  performance—which 
allegedly led her to seek guidance from the Prairieland Board regarding his termination—
were not even mentioned in the separation letter sent to Lieffring. See Rabbe Dep. at 157-
60; Myers Decl., Ex. 30; cf. Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 

 (8th Cir. 
2012)  (noting  that, under  the  McDonnel-Douglas  framework,  substantial  shifts  in an 
employer’s proffered non-discriminatory explanation for its actions may suggest that the 
explanation is pretextual).                                               
Section II.B.2. On this record, a reasonable jury could find a sufficient causal nexus 
between the alleged adverse actions and Lieffring’s protected activity, supporting a prima 

facie case of workers’ compensation retaliation.                          
    Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Lieffring’s WCA claims.                                                   
III.  CONCLUSION                                                          
    Based  on  the  submissions  and  the  entire  file  and  proceedings  herein,  IT  IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 27] is 

DENIED.                                                                   
IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                         


Dated: June 30, 2021                 s/Susan Richard Nelson               
                                    SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                 
                                    United States District Judge