Wilder v. Horihan

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Wilder v. Horihan

Trial Court Opinion

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                 DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               


Kathryn Wilder,                         Case No. 22-cv-6 (NEB/DJF)        

          Plaintiff,                                                 

v.                                       CORRECTED ORDER                  

Amy Horihan; and Nystrom and Associates                                   
Human Resources Director                                                  

          Defendants.                                                


On October 25, 2022, Plaintiff Kathryn Wilder filed a statement on the Court’s Docket 
(“Statement”) (ECF No. 25).   Ms. Wilder’s Statement makes a series of requests, including, “I am 
asking for immunity from being sued, a lawyer, and immunity from having to give my health and tax 
information.”  (Id.)  The Statement further requests, “I[f] I can[’]t be provided those…please 
dissolve the case.”  (Id.)  The Court construes Ms. Wilder’s Statement as containing certain motions 
for non-dispositive relief, including a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for a 
protective order related to discovery requests for her health and tax information.1 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to grant either request. 
1.   Appointment of Counsel                                               
The Court previously granted Ms. Wilder’s application to proceed in this case without 
prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 3).  There is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed 
counsel in civil cases, however.  Ward v. Smith, 
721 F.3d 940, 942
 (8th Cir. 2013).  Rather, the 
appointment of counsel is a matter of the Court’s discretion.  McCall v. Benson, 
114 F.3d 754, 756
 
(8th Cir. 1997); Mosby v. Mabry, 
697 F.2d 213, 214
 (8th Cir. 1982).  Factors to consider in deciding 

1 This Order does not address any motions for dispositive relief that might be construed from 
whether to appoint counsel include: “(1) the factual complexity of the issues; (2) the ability of the 
indigent person to investigate the facts; (3) the existence of conflicting testimony; (4) the ability [of 
the] indigent person to present the claims; and (5) the complexity of the legal arguments.”  Crozier v. 
Westside Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
973 F.3d 882
, 889 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing cases).   

The Court recognizes Ms. Wilder’s desire for appointment of counsel.  Nonetheless, the 
Court cannot conclude that litigating this action will be factually or legally complex, or that Ms. 
Wilder lacks the ability to investigate this action’s facts or present her arguments to the Court.  
Moreover, while conflicting testimony may emerge later on, this factor does not currently outweigh 
the others.  The Court therefore declines to appoint counsel at this time.  
2.   Protective Order                                                     
Ms. Wilder’s Statement appears to request a protective order against discovery into her 
health and tax information.  But the Statement does not restate the contents of the discovery requests 
from which she seeks protection or otherwise describe in any detail the information sought.  Without 
more, the Court cannot determine that the discovery requests from which she seeks protection are 

objectionable.                                                            
Moreover, Ms. Wilder’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is largely based on allegations that 
Defendants discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
42 USC §§ 12101
, et seq., when they accused her of having “very serious mental health issues.”  
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 8(h); see also id. 9(f), 10(4) (other allegations related to Ms. Wilder’s health).)  
Whether Defendants are liable to Ms. Wilder under the ADA will depend on whether she is a 
“qualified individual” within the meaning of the statute, who can perform the essential job functions 
with or without “reasonable accommodation.”  
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112
(a); 1211(8) and (9).  These 


the Statement.                                                            
claims put the status of Ms. Wilder’s mental health squarely at issue.    
Ms. Wilder further asserts claims for loss of wages and alleges that Defendants underpaid 
her.  (Id. 10(3).)  Tax records establishing Ms. Wilder’s income during the relevant period of time 
are potentially relevant to her damages claim.                            

Ms. Wilder now asks the Court to prevent Defendants from discovering her health or tax 
information.  (ECF No. 26.)  Parties may discover any relevant, unprivileged information that is 
admissible at trial and proportional to the needs of the case.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).  Information 
within the scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.  
Id.
  However, 
the Court may issue a protective order to prevent discovery when “justice requires to protect a party 
or  person  from  annoyance,  embarrassment,  oppression  or  undue  burden  or  expense.”   
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c).  Because Ms. Wilder’s health and tax information appears relevant to her claims, 
and there is no information in the record to suggest that Defendants’ requests are overbroad or 
otherwise disproportional to the needs of the case, or intended to embarrass or harass Ms. Wilder, the 

Court  cannot  conclude  that  any  request  for  such  information  is  improper.   Schoffstall  v. 
Henderson, 
223 F.3d 818, 822-23
 (8th Cir. 2000).  The Court therefore declines to grant blanket 
protection for all of Plaintiff’s health and tax information.             

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                      
1.   Plaintiff Kathryn Wilder’s request for appointment of counsel (ECF No. [25]) is 
DENIED; and                                                               
2.   Ms. Wilder’s request for a protective order with respect to discovery of her health 
and tax information (ECF No. [25]) is DENIED.                             


Dated:  October 26, 2022      s/ Dulce J. Foster_________________         
                         DULCE J. FOSTER                             
                         United States Magistrate Judge              

Trial Court Opinion

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                 DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               


Kathryn Wilder,                         Case No. 22-cv-6 (NEB/DJF)        

          Plaintiff,                                                 

v.                                       CORRECTED ORDER                  

Amy Horihan; and Nystrom and Associates                                   
Human Resources Director                                                  

          Defendants.                                                


On October 25, 2022, Plaintiff Kathryn Wilder filed a statement on the Court’s Docket 
(“Statement”) (ECF No. 25).   Ms. Wilder’s Statement makes a series of requests, including, “I am 
asking for immunity from being sued, a lawyer, and immunity from having to give my health and tax 
information.”  (Id.)  The Statement further requests, “I[f] I can[’]t be provided those…please 
dissolve the case.”  (Id.)  The Court construes Ms. Wilder’s Statement as containing certain motions 
for non-dispositive relief, including a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for a 
protective order related to discovery requests for her health and tax information.1 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to grant either request. 
1.   Appointment of Counsel                                               
The Court previously granted Ms. Wilder’s application to proceed in this case without 
prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 3).  There is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed 
counsel in civil cases, however.  Ward v. Smith, 
721 F.3d 940, 942
 (8th Cir. 2013).  Rather, the 
appointment of counsel is a matter of the Court’s discretion.  McCall v. Benson, 
114 F.3d 754, 756
 
(8th Cir. 1997); Mosby v. Mabry, 
697 F.2d 213, 214
 (8th Cir. 1982).  Factors to consider in deciding 

1 This Order does not address any motions for dispositive relief that might be construed from 
whether to appoint counsel include: “(1) the factual complexity of the issues; (2) the ability of the 
indigent person to investigate the facts; (3) the existence of conflicting testimony; (4) the ability [of 
the] indigent person to present the claims; and (5) the complexity of the legal arguments.”  Crozier v. 
Westside Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
973 F.3d 882
, 889 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing cases).   

The Court recognizes Ms. Wilder’s desire for appointment of counsel.  Nonetheless, the 
Court cannot conclude that litigating this action will be factually or legally complex, or that Ms. 
Wilder lacks the ability to investigate this action’s facts or present her arguments to the Court.  
Moreover, while conflicting testimony may emerge later on, this factor does not currently outweigh 
the others.  The Court therefore declines to appoint counsel at this time.  
2.   Protective Order                                                     
Ms. Wilder’s Statement appears to request a protective order against discovery into her 
health and tax information.  But the Statement does not restate the contents of the discovery requests 
from which she seeks protection or otherwise describe in any detail the information sought.  Without 
more, the Court cannot determine that the discovery requests from which she seeks protection are 

objectionable.                                                            
Moreover, Ms. Wilder’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is largely based on allegations that 
Defendants discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
42 USC §§ 12101
, et seq., when they accused her of having “very serious mental health issues.”  
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 8(h); see also id. 9(f), 10(4) (other allegations related to Ms. Wilder’s health).)  
Whether Defendants are liable to Ms. Wilder under the ADA will depend on whether she is a 
“qualified individual” within the meaning of the statute, who can perform the essential job functions 
with or without “reasonable accommodation.”  
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112
(a); 1211(8) and (9).  These 


the Statement.                                                            
claims put the status of Ms. Wilder’s mental health squarely at issue.    
Ms. Wilder further asserts claims for loss of wages and alleges that Defendants underpaid 
her.  (Id. 10(3).)  Tax records establishing Ms. Wilder’s income during the relevant period of time 
are potentially relevant to her damages claim.                            

Ms. Wilder now asks the Court to prevent Defendants from discovering her health or tax 
information.  (ECF No. 26.)  Parties may discover any relevant, unprivileged information that is 
admissible at trial and proportional to the needs of the case.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).  Information 
within the scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.  
Id.
  However, 
the Court may issue a protective order to prevent discovery when “justice requires to protect a party 
or  person  from  annoyance,  embarrassment,  oppression  or  undue  burden  or  expense.”   
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c).  Because Ms. Wilder’s health and tax information appears relevant to her claims, 
and there is no information in the record to suggest that Defendants’ requests are overbroad or 
otherwise disproportional to the needs of the case, or intended to embarrass or harass Ms. Wilder, the 

Court  cannot  conclude  that  any  request  for  such  information  is  improper.   Schoffstall  v. 
Henderson, 
223 F.3d 818, 822-23
 (8th Cir. 2000).  The Court therefore declines to grant blanket 
protection for all of Plaintiff’s health and tax information.             

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                      
1.   Plaintiff Kathryn Wilder’s request for appointment of counsel (ECF No. [25]) is 
DENIED; and                                                               
2.   Ms. Wilder’s request for a protective order with respect to discovery of her health 
and tax information (ECF No. [25]) is DENIED.                             


Dated:  October 26, 2022      s/ Dulce J. Foster_________________         
                         DULCE J. FOSTER                             
                         United States Magistrate Judge              

Reference

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