Polaris Experience, LLC v. 3 Wheel Rentals Tampa LLC

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota July 10, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Polaris Experience, LLC, Civ. No. 23-2843 (PAM/DTS)
d/b/a Polaris Adventures,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

3 Wheel Rentals Tampa LLC,
3 Wheel Rentals LLC, Michael Bobo,
and Reginald Bobo,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Polaris Experience, LLC’s (“Polaris”)
Motion to Dismiss Defendants 3 Wheel Rentals Tampa LLC, 3 Wheel Rentals LLC, and
Michael Bobo’s Counterclaim. (Docket No. 64.) For the following reasons, the Court
grants the Motion and dismisses the Counterclaim.
BACKGROUND
The full factual background has been set forth previously and need not be repeated
here. (See Docket Nos. 28, 61.) In brief, Defendants Michael Bobo and Reginald Bobo
are the members, owners, and operators of the Defendant companies. (Compl. (Docket
No. 1) ¶¶ 3-6.) In 2019 and 2020, Defendants 3 Wheel Rentals LLC and 3 Wheel Rentals
Tampa LLC entered into agreements—called Premium Program Services Agreements—
with Polaris to become part of the “Polaris Adventures Program,” allowing the companies
to rent Polaris Slingshots, three-wheel, open-air vehicles, to their customers. (Id. ¶¶ 10-
11.)
After Defendants missed payments, failed to return Slingshots, and continued to use
Polaris’s trademarks, Polaris brought this lawsuit for breach of contract, conversion,

trademark infringement, and unjust enrichment. On September 22, 2022, the Court granted
a preliminary injunction on the trademark claim because there was significant evidence
that the companies kept renting Polaris’s vehicles and using Polaris’s trademarks. (Docket
No. 28.)
Defendants then moved to dismiss many of the claims, arguing that an arbitration
provision in the Guaranties for the Defendant companies’ Premium Program Services

Agreements with Polaris meant that the Court should compel arbitration, and that the
Complaint failed to state a claim against the individual Defendants. (Docket No. 49.) The
Court denied that motion in March 2024, finding that Defendants had waived any right to
arbitrate by not moving to compel arbitration at the earliest possible time, and that the
Complaint sufficiently stated claims on which relief could be granted. (Docket No. 61.)

Defendants thereafter answered the Complaint and brought four counterclaims.
(Countercl. (Docket No. 62).) According to the Counterclaim allegations, after Polaris
renewed its one-year agreement with 3 Wheel Rentals Tampa in 2021, 3 Wheel Rentals
Tampa “was entitled to replenishment from POLARIS of late-model vehicles,” and Polaris
“failed to provide the late-model replacements as agreed.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Both 3 Wheel

Rental entities then “missed several installment payments,” but in June 2022, “made lump
payments to POLARIS totaling more than $100,000.00.” (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Despite this
payment, Polaris “failed to provide program support and assistance as required under the
agreements.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendants assert that the failure to “replenish” the Slingshots
and the failure to “consistently provide programmatic support” violated the parties’
contracts, breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulently induced

Defendants into entering the agreements, and unjustly enriched Polaris.
Polaris seeks the dismissal of all counterclaims. At this stage, the Court assumes
the factual allegations in the counterclaims are true and views them in the light most
favorable to Defendants. See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc.,

688 F.3d 928

, 933 
n.4 (8th Cir. 2012).                                                      

DISCUSSION                                                                
Although the Rules require only a “short and plain statement” of the claim, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a cause of action.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009).  To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a 
[counterclaim] must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id.

 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

 (2007)).  A plausibly pled claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

A. Breach of Contract
Defendants contend that Polaris breached the parties’ agreement by not giving

Defendants new Polaris vehicles and by not “provid[ing] programmatic support” as the
agreements ostensibly required. (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n (Docket No. 68) at 2-5.) Polaris
points out that Defendants do not cite any contractual provision that they contend Polaris
breached. Indeed, the parties’ written agreements neither mention the purported duty to
“replenish” Polaris vehicles, nor contain the words “programmatic support.”

1. Programmatic Support
In their opposition memorandum, Defendants assert that the “programmatic
support” contractual requirement is found in section 2 of the Premium Program Services
Agreement, and, among other duties, requires Polaris to: (1) provide web- and mobile-
based software to manage reservations, inventory, scheduling, and payments, software to
manage check-in, check-out, and fleet management, and software to manage the

maintenance of the Slingshots; (2) provide access to online portals for marketing,
documentation, and branded goods; (3) provide risk management tools, including safety
videos and training; (4) outfit each Slingshot with a Vehicle Outfitting Kit (including GPS
trackers and rescue beacons); and (5) provide access to online training modules for repair,
maintenance, and service of the Slingshots. (Countercl. Ex. A at 1-7.)

Defendants further argue in the opposition memorandum that Polaris did not
“consistently” provide the reservation and payment platform and support for that platform,
the customer and fleet management system, marketing, and risk management. (Defs.’
Mem. in Opp’n at 4.) The problem is that the breach-of-contract counterclaim does not
mention any of those facts, and thus Polaris cannot know how it allegedly violated the

parties’ agreement or what provision of the agreement Polaris apparently violated. See
Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678

 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).  And as Polaris argues, Defendants cannot 
amend  their  pleadings  in  a  legal  memorandum.    Martin  v.  ReliaStar  Life  Ins.  Co.,

710 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887

 (D. Minn. 2010) (Davis, C.J.) (“[A]llegations made in subsequent 
legal memoranda cannot correct inadequacies within a complaint.” (quotation omitted)).  

Thus, this aspect of the breach-of-contract counterclaim is dismissed without prejudice to 
replead the alleged breach more specifically.                             
2.   Replenishment                                                   
Defendants  contend  that  the  duty  to  “replenish”  the  Slingshots  is  found  in 
agreements that are not attached to either the Complaint or to the Counterclaim, but rather 
are attached as an exhibit to Defendants’ response brief.  (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 2-3;

id.

Ex. A.) These agreements, each labeled “Polaris Adventures Program Agreement,” consist
of a list of vehicles, program fees for each vehicle, and a date payment is due for that
vehicle.
The counterclaim alleges only that 3 Wheel Rental Tampa was due vehicle
“replenishment” that it did not receive, not that the other 3 Wheel Rental entity did not

receive vehicle replenishment it was due. (Countercl. ¶¶ 11-12.) However, the Program
Agreement pertaining to 3 Wheel Rental Tampa provides that “[f]ulfillment of this order
is subject to vehicle availability and is subject to cancellation in whole or in part.” (Defs.’
Mem. in Opp’n Ex. A at 12.) In addition, the copy appended to the response brief is not
signed by Polaris, but only by Reginald Bobo. (Id.)

Defendants argue that these Program Agreements represent the parties’ “entire
understanding” under the main agreement’s integration clause. (E.g., Compl. Ex. A
(Docket No. 2) at 13, § 16.) Putting aside that neither the overarching Premium Program
Services Agreements nor the Program Agreements explicitly reference each other, the
integration clause does not help Defendants. The only relevant Program Agreement for
this argument is the agreement with 3 Wheel Rental Tampa. Even if this Program

Agreement is part of the parties’ contract, it does not require Polaris to do anything. Polaris
can cancel the Program Agreement with 3 Wheel Rental Tampa, either in whole or in part,
at any time. This aspect of the breach-of-contract claim is dismissed with prejudice.
3. Michael Bobo
Finally, Polaris argues that Michael Bobo lacks standing to bring any breach-of-
contract claim, because she was not a party to the contracts. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. (Docket

No. 65) at 6.) Michael Bobo only signed personal guaranties, and because the breach
claims do not arise out of any indebtedness, she is not a party to any alleged breach.
While Defendants contend that Michael Bobo can litigate disputes arising from
either the Guaranties or the Agreements, the Guaranty provides the opposite: she can
enforce any claim arising out of the Guaranty or any duty or right that relates to the

Guaranty. (Compl. Ex. B (Docket No. 2) at 13.) The Guaranty does not confer any
contractual rights or duties to her aside from guaranteeing payment. She is not a party to
the contract and, as such, cannot bring a claim for its breach. See German All. Ins. Co. v.
Home Water Supply Co.,

226 U.S. 220, 234

 (1912) (“[A] third person cannot sue for the 
breach of a contract to which he is a stranger unless he is in privity with the parties and is 

therein given a direct interest.”).                                       
B.   Good Faith and Fair Dealing                                          
“Under Minnesota law, every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith 
and  fair  dealing  requiring  that  one  party  not  ‘unjustifiably  hinder’  the  other  party’s 
performance  of  the  contract.”    In  re  Hennepin  Cnty.  1986  Recycling  Bond  Litig.,

540 N.W.2d 494, 502

 (Minn. 1995) (quoting Zobel & Dahl Constr. v. Crotty,

356 N.W.2d 42, 45

 (Minn. 1984)).  To establish a breach of this covenant, a party must establish that its 
opponent acted dishonestly, maliciously, or otherwise in subjective bad faith.  BP Prods. 
N. Am., Inc. v. Twin Cities Stores, Inc.,

534 F. Supp. 2d 959, 968

 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(Schiltz, J.).  As with the breach claim, Defendants have not sufficiently alleged any breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The alleged breaches are the same as the 
contract claim:  failure to replenish vehicles and failure to provide programmatic support.  

(Countercl.  ¶¶ 22-25.)    Because  these  allegations  fail  to  plausibly  plead  that  Polaris 
hindered Defendants’ performance, this counterclaim is dismissed.         
C.   Fraudulent Inducement                                                
Defendants’  fraudulent-inducement  counterclaim  alleges  that  Polaris  “assured 
[them] that the subject vehicles . . . would be replenished on an annual basis with current-

model vehicles,” that Polaris “had no intention of replenishing the vehicles” when it made 
that promise, and that Defendants “relied on” Polaris’s assurances when entering into the 
agreements.  (Id. ¶¶ 28-30.)                                              
Any claim alleging fraud must be pled with particularity.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  
Rule 9(b) thus requires pleading, at minimum, the “time, place and contents of false 

representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation.”  Parnes 
v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,

122 F.3d 539, 549

 (8th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).  Put another 
way, a claim for fraud must allege “the who, what, when, where, and how: the first 
paragraph of any newspaper story.”

Id.

 at 549-50 (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,

901 F.2d 624, 627

 (7th Cir. 1990)).  Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to claims 
for fraudulent inducement.  Johnson v. Bobcat Co.,

175 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1145

 (D. Minn. 

2016) (Tunheim, C.J.).                                                    
Defendants have not pled their fraudulent-inducement counterclaim with anything 
approaching particularity.  Defendants’ sole allegation is that some discovery is required 
to allow them to plead with the requisite particularity.  (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 5.)  But 
the case on which they rely, Kinetic Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,

672 F. Supp. 2d 933, 945

 
(D. Minn. 2009) (Rosenbaum, J.), is not on point.  The Kinetic decision noted that pleading 

with particularity is not possible without some discovery when the party claiming fraud “is 
not a party to a communication.”

Id.

 (quotation omitted).  Defendants allege that Polaris 
made promises made to them, not to someone else.  Therefore, Defendants were a party to 
the allegedly fraudulent communications.  Discovery is not required for Defendants to 
plead what they allegedly heard and when they heard it.                   

Defendants fail to plausibly plead anything that would allow a plausible inference 
that  Polaris  wronged  them.    The  fraudulent-inducement  claim  is  dismissed  without 
prejudice.                                                                
D.   Unjust enrichment                                                    
Unjust enrichment occurs when one party “conferred a benefit on [the other],” and 

the  other  party  “appreciated  and  knowingly  accepted  the  benefit  .  .  .  ‘under  such 
circumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without paying for it.’”  
Qwest Commc’ns Co., LLC v. Free Conferencing,

990 F. Supp. 2d 953, 981

 (D. Minn. 
2014) (Davis, C.J.) (quoting E-Shops Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n,

795 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879

 (D. Minn. 2011) (Doty, J.).  Unjust enrichment requires Defendants to show more than 
that Polaris merely “benefit[ed] from the efforts or obligations of others,” but that Polaris 

“was  unjustly  enriched  in  the  sense  that  the  term  ‘unjustly’ could  mean  illegally  or 
unlawfully.”  Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,

742 N.W.2d 186, 195-96

 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of St. Paul v. Ramier,

311 N.W.2d 502, 504

 (Minn. 
1981)).                                                                   
Defendants  assert  that  “Polaris  entered  into  several  oral  agreements  with 
[Defendants] which conferred financial benefits on POLARIS,”  and that Polaris was 

“aware of the benefit it received and reasonably should have expected to have been required 
to supply [Defendants] with current-model vehicles an [sic] ongoing programmatic support 
as agreed.”  (Countercl. ¶ 33-34.)  Further, Defendants allege that Polaris “accepted and 
retained the financial benefit without performing as agreed.”  (Id. ¶ 35.) 
Defendants are required to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678

.  As with the breach claim, the unjust-enrichment claim does not plausibly 
plead anything.  Defendants fail to specify any financial benefit that was unjustly conferred 
on Polaris.  Indeed, Defendants admit that they did not make all the payments to which 
they were bound under the agreements.  (Countercl. ¶ 13.)  If the financial benefit conferred 

on Polaris is the partial payments, Defendants fail to articulate why it is unjust for Polaris 
to  keep  those  partial  payments.    Further,  Defendants  do  not  include  any  specific 
information about these alleged oral agreements, such as who were the parties to those 
alleged agreements or what was promised.  Defendants’ unjust-enrichment counterclaim is 
dismissed without prejudice.                                              

CONCLUSION                                                                
Accordingly,  IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                             
1.   Polaris’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims (Docket No. 64) is 
     GRANTED; and                                                    
2.   Defendants’ Counterclaim is DISMISSED without prejudice.        

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      

Dated:                                                                    
                         Paul A. Magnuson                            
                         United States District Court Judge

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Polaris Experience, LLC, Civ. No. 23-2843 (PAM/DTS)
d/b/a Polaris Adventures,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

3 Wheel Rentals Tampa LLC,
3 Wheel Rentals LLC, Michael Bobo,
and Reginald Bobo,

Defendants.

688 F.3d 928

, 933 
n.4 (8th Cir. 2012).                                                      

DISCUSSION                                                                
Although the Rules require only a “short and plain statement” of the claim, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a cause of action.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009).  To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a 
[counterclaim] must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id.

 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

 (2007)).  A plausibly pled claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

A. Breach of Contract
Defendants contend that Polaris breached the parties’ agreement by not giving

parties’ agreement or what provision of the agreement Polaris apparently violated. See
Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678

 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).  And as Polaris argues, Defendants cannot 
amend  their  pleadings  in  a  legal  memorandum.    Martin  v.  ReliaStar  Life  Ins.  Co.,

710 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887

 (D. Minn. 2010) (Davis, C.J.) (“[A]llegations made in subsequent 
legal memoranda cannot correct inadequacies within a complaint.” (quotation omitted)).  

Thus, this aspect of the breach-of-contract counterclaim is dismissed without prejudice to 
replead the alleged breach more specifically.                             
2.   Replenishment                                                   
Defendants  contend  that  the  duty  to  “replenish”  the  Slingshots  is  found  in 
agreements that are not attached to either the Complaint or to the Counterclaim, but rather 
are attached as an exhibit to Defendants’ response brief.  (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 2-3;

id.

226 U.S. 220, 234

 (1912) (“[A] third person cannot sue for the 
breach of a contract to which he is a stranger unless he is in privity with the parties and is 

therein given a direct interest.”).                                       
B.   Good Faith and Fair Dealing                                          
“Under Minnesota law, every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith 
and  fair  dealing  requiring  that  one  party  not  ‘unjustifiably  hinder’  the  other  party’s 
performance  of  the  contract.”    In  re  Hennepin  Cnty.  1986  Recycling  Bond  Litig.,

540 N.W.2d 494, 502

 (Minn. 1995) (quoting Zobel & Dahl Constr. v. Crotty,

356 N.W.2d 42, 45

 (Minn. 1984)).  To establish a breach of this covenant, a party must establish that its 
opponent acted dishonestly, maliciously, or otherwise in subjective bad faith.  BP Prods. 
N. Am., Inc. v. Twin Cities Stores, Inc.,

534 F. Supp. 2d 959, 968

 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(Schiltz, J.).  As with the breach claim, Defendants have not sufficiently alleged any breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The alleged breaches are the same as the 
contract claim:  failure to replenish vehicles and failure to provide programmatic support.  

(Countercl.  ¶¶ 22-25.)    Because  these  allegations  fail  to  plausibly  plead  that  Polaris 
hindered Defendants’ performance, this counterclaim is dismissed.         
C.   Fraudulent Inducement                                                
Defendants’  fraudulent-inducement  counterclaim  alleges  that  Polaris  “assured 
[them] that the subject vehicles . . . would be replenished on an annual basis with current-

model vehicles,” that Polaris “had no intention of replenishing the vehicles” when it made 
that promise, and that Defendants “relied on” Polaris’s assurances when entering into the 
agreements.  (Id. ¶¶ 28-30.)                                              
Any claim alleging fraud must be pled with particularity.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  
Rule 9(b) thus requires pleading, at minimum, the “time, place and contents of false 

representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation.”  Parnes 
v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,

122 F.3d 539, 549

 (8th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).  Put another 
way, a claim for fraud must allege “the who, what, when, where, and how: the first 
paragraph of any newspaper story.”

Id.

 at 549-50 (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,

901 F.2d 624, 627

 (7th Cir. 1990)).  Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to claims 
for fraudulent inducement.  Johnson v. Bobcat Co.,

175 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1145

 (D. Minn. 

2016) (Tunheim, C.J.).                                                    
Defendants have not pled their fraudulent-inducement counterclaim with anything 
approaching particularity.  Defendants’ sole allegation is that some discovery is required 
to allow them to plead with the requisite particularity.  (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 5.)  But 
the case on which they rely, Kinetic Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,

672 F. Supp. 2d 933, 945

 
(D. Minn. 2009) (Rosenbaum, J.), is not on point.  The Kinetic decision noted that pleading 

with particularity is not possible without some discovery when the party claiming fraud “is 
not a party to a communication.”

Id.

 (quotation omitted).  Defendants allege that Polaris 
made promises made to them, not to someone else.  Therefore, Defendants were a party to 
the allegedly fraudulent communications.  Discovery is not required for Defendants to 
plead what they allegedly heard and when they heard it.                   

Defendants fail to plausibly plead anything that would allow a plausible inference 
that  Polaris  wronged  them.    The  fraudulent-inducement  claim  is  dismissed  without 
prejudice.                                                                
D.   Unjust enrichment                                                    
Unjust enrichment occurs when one party “conferred a benefit on [the other],” and 

the  other  party  “appreciated  and  knowingly  accepted  the  benefit  .  .  .  ‘under  such 
circumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without paying for it.’”  
Qwest Commc’ns Co., LLC v. Free Conferencing,

990 F. Supp. 2d 953, 981

 (D. Minn. 
2014) (Davis, C.J.) (quoting E-Shops Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n,

795 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879

 (D. Minn. 2011) (Doty, J.).  Unjust enrichment requires Defendants to show more than 
that Polaris merely “benefit[ed] from the efforts or obligations of others,” but that Polaris 

“was  unjustly  enriched  in  the  sense  that  the  term  ‘unjustly’ could  mean  illegally  or 
unlawfully.”  Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,

742 N.W.2d 186, 195-96

 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of St. Paul v. Ramier,

311 N.W.2d 502, 504

 (Minn. 
1981)).                                                                   
Defendants  assert  that  “Polaris  entered  into  several  oral  agreements  with 
[Defendants] which conferred financial benefits on POLARIS,”  and that Polaris was 

“aware of the benefit it received and reasonably should have expected to have been required 
to supply [Defendants] with current-model vehicles an [sic] ongoing programmatic support 
as agreed.”  (Countercl. ¶ 33-34.)  Further, Defendants allege that Polaris “accepted and 
retained the financial benefit without performing as agreed.”  (Id. ¶ 35.) 
Defendants are required to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678

.  As with the breach claim, the unjust-enrichment claim does not plausibly 
plead anything.  Defendants fail to specify any financial benefit that was unjustly conferred 
on Polaris.  Indeed, Defendants admit that they did not make all the payments to which 
they were bound under the agreements.  (Countercl. ¶ 13.)  If the financial benefit conferred 

on Polaris is the partial payments, Defendants fail to articulate why it is unjust for Polaris 
to  keep  those  partial  payments.    Further,  Defendants  do  not  include  any  specific 
information about these alleged oral agreements, such as who were the parties to those 
alleged agreements or what was promised.  Defendants’ unjust-enrichment counterclaim is 
dismissed without prejudice.                                              

CONCLUSION                                                                
Accordingly,  IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                             
1.   Polaris’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims (Docket No. 64) is 
     GRANTED; and                                                    
2.   Defendants’ Counterclaim is DISMISSED without prejudice.        

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      

Dated:                                                                    
                         Paul A. Magnuson                            
                         United States District Court Judge

Reference

Status: Unknown