VanHauer v. Minneapolis Police Department

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota July 25, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Andrew Cole VanHauer, File No. 23-cv-1208 (ECT/LIB)

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

Minneapolis Police Department; City of
Minneapolis; State of Minnesota; and
Hennepin Healthcare,

Defendants.
________________________________________________________________________
Andrew Cole VanHauer, pro se.
Mark Enslin and Chase Webber, Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN,
for Defendants Minneapolis Police Department and City of Minneapolis.

Matthew Mason, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, St. Paul, MN, for Defendant State
of Minnesota.

Matthew S. Frantzen, Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Defendant Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.
________________________________________________________________________
On April 30, 2017, Minneapolis Police Department officers were dispatched to
Plaintiff Andrew Cole VanHauer’s home. Without his consent, officers took Mr.
VanHauer to a hospital operated by Hennepin Healthcare Systems, Inc., where he was
placed on a 72-hour mental health hold. Representing himself, Mr. VanHauer brings
several claims through

42 U.S.C. § 1983

  alleging  that  Defendants  violated  his 
constitutional rights.  He also sues under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”),

42 U.S.C. § 12101

et seq.
Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
12(c). The motions will be granted. Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims against Defendant
State of Minnesota will be dismissed based on Eleventh Amended immunity. His § 1983

claims against the municipal Defendants—the City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Police
Department, and Hennepin Healthcare—will be dismissed for failing to plausibly allege
Monell liability. And the operative Second Amended Complaint lacks enough factual
content to plausibly state an ADA claim against any Defendant. To the extent
Mr. VanHauer brings any state-law claims, those claims will be dismissed for lack of

supplemental jurisdiction.
I1
The Minneapolis Police Department responds to a report that Mr. VanHauer is
suicidal. On April 30, 2017, the Minneapolis Police Department (“MPD”) “received a
false report” that Mr. VanHauer was suicidal. 2d. Am. Compl. [ECF No. 8] at 6 ¶ 1. MPD

1 The facts will be drawn from the Second Amended Complaint and taken as true.
But why requires clarification. Mr. VanHauer filed a Complaint, ECF No. 1, an Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 7, and a Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 8. A party may only
amend its pleading “once as a matter of course.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other
cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Mr. VanHauer did not file a motion to amend
or obtain written consent. See generally Docket. Nonetheless, Defendants generally draw
facts and identify claims from the Second Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 59 at 2–3
(citing ECF No. 8); ECF No. 40 at 11 (same); ECF No. 34 at 1 n.1. Nor has any Defendant
objected to Mr. VanHauer’s Second Amended Complaint. Given the absence of any
objection or motion to strike for the past eleven months, and the substantial similarities
between the First and Second Amended Complaints, the Second Amended Complaint will
be treated as the operative complaint. And facts will be drawn only from the Second
Amended Complaint. Although Defendants request consideration of several matters
outside the pleadings, see ECF No. 41; ECF No. 48, none need be considered to grant their
motions.
officers subsequently “contacted [Mr. VanHauer] at his home at approximately 12:25 a.m.”
Id. The officers entered his home without a warrant and “refused to inform [Mr. VanHauer]
of the reason they were entering.” Id. at 6 ¶ 3. “MPD handcuffed [Mr. VanHauer] and

dragged [him] outside out of his home, seated him on concrete for a period of
approximately 30 minutes and questioned [him] without legal representation.” Id. at 6 ¶ 6.
MPD officers threatened Mr. VanHauer with sedation if he did not cooperate and “then
ordered Hennepin Healthcare emergency medical technician staff to inject [him] with
unknown sedatives.” Id. at 6 ¶¶ 11–12.

Mr. VanHauer is hurt by a tight blood pressure cuff. Mr. VanHauer was then taken
by ambulance to a hospital operated by Hennepin Healthcare. See 2d. Am. Compl. at 6
¶¶ 12–13. During the ambulance ride, Mr. VanHauer “reported preexisting injuries to both
upper extremities.” Id. at 7 ¶ 18. Nonetheless, Mr. VanHauer “was subjected to an
automated blood pressure monitor placed on the left arm, with multiple preexisting injuries,

and which then ran continuously for an extended period of time.” Id. at 7 ¶ 19. This
“caus[ed] both immediate and chronic pain.” Id. at 7 ¶ 20. Hennepin Healthcare staff
refused to remove the blood pressure cuff. Id.2
Mr. VanHauer is hospitalized and placed on a 72-hour mental health hold. When
Mr. VanHauer arrived at Hennepin Healthcare, he was placed on a 72-hour hold “based

simply on the fact that [he] was ‘agitated.’” 2d. Am. Compl. at 7 ¶ 25. “Hospital staff

2 It can be inferred that a blood pressure cuff was placed on Mr. VanHauer in the
ambulance and a second blood pressure cuff was placed during his hospital stay. 2d. Am.
Compl. at 7 ¶ 18 (“[B]lood pressure monitor was placed on the left leg.”); ¶ 19 (“[A]n
automated blood pressure monitor [was] placed on the left arm.”).
falsely claimed suicidal ideation and intention” despite Mr. VanHauer “deny[ing] all
suicidal ideology.” Id. at 7 ¶ 26. This 72-hour hold was based in part on information
provided by the MPD. Id. at 6–7 ¶ 15 (“MPD presented Hennepin Healthcare with previous

mental health diagnosis and symptoms that were obtained by the MPD officers by coercion
and duress.”).
Mr. VanHauer is mistreated by hospital staff during the 72-hour hold. While held
at the hospital, Mr. VanHauer “was repeatedly sedated as punishment for screaming in pain
and asking for food, water, and access to restroom facilities.” 2d. Am. Compl. at 7 ¶ 23.

He was also “administered sedatives and/or psychotropic substances” against his will. Id.
at 7 ¶ 24. The last instance of sedation “result[ed] in sexual assault.” Id. at 7–8 ¶ 27
(“[Mr. VanHauer] found what appeared to be semen and blood in [his] stool.”). “Before
and after being placed on a mental health hold, [Mr. VanHauer] was continuously
restrained in a painful position for an extended period of time.” Id. And he was “provided

inadequate clothing, . . . denied requests for additional clothing, and restrained in solitary
confinement for an extended period of time in substandard temperatures.” Id. At one point,
hospital staff “forcibly stripped” Mr. VanHauer with no privacy curtain or door,
“expos[ing] [him] to people in the hallway.” Id.
Mr. VanHauer attempts to report his mistreatment. After he was released from the

hospital, Mr. VanHauer attempted to file complaints against the MPD and Hennepin
Healthcare. 2d. Am. Compl. at 8 ¶¶ 28–31. The MPD “repeatedly refused to take [his]
complaints.” Id. at 8 ¶ 28. “Hennepin Healthcare similarly refused to accept or properly
investigate sexual assault allegations.” Id. at 8 ¶ 29. Mr. VanHauer also requested records
from the City of Minneapolis and Hennepin Healthcare. Id. at 8 ¶¶ 28–29. The City of
Minneapolis “repeatedly refused to release documents and data . . . for a period of up to 18
months after the incident.” Id. at 8 ¶ 28. Hennepin Healthcare “refused to release medical

records repeatedly over a prolonged and extended period of time.” Id. at 8 ¶ 29.
The claims. On August 24, 2023, Mr. VanHauer filed the operative Second
Amended Complaint. Mr. VanHauer brings several § 1983 claims alleging that Defendants
violated his First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 2d.
Am. Compl. at 4–5. He also alleges that Defendants violated the ADA. Id. at 5. Mr.

VanHauer requests several forms of injunctive relief, e.g., id. at 9 (requesting “[c]hanges
in state, city, hospital, and police department laws, ordinances, policies, and procedures
that allow or encourage discrimination, prevent investigation of complaints, and deprive
individuals of civil rights”), financial compensation, and punitive damages, id.

II
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is assessed under the same
standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc.,

552 F.3d 659, 665

 (8th 
Cir. 2009).  In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), 

a court must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Gorog v. Best Buy Co.,

760 F.3d 787, 792

 
(8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, 
they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555

 (2007) (citation omitted).  The complaint must “state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Id. at 570

.  “A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009).                                                     
Mr. VanHauer’s pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction.  Erickson v. 
Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94

 (2007).  Pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held 
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Id. at 94

.  “[I]f the 
essence of an allegation is discernible,” the district court should “construe the complaint in 

a  way  that  permits  the  layperson’s  claim  to  be  considered  within  the  proper  legal 
framework.”  Solomon v. Petray,

795 F.3d 777, 787

 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  
However, even under this liberal standard, a pro se complaint must contain specific facts 
in support of the claims it advances.  See Martin v. Sargent,

780 F.2d 1334, 1337

 (8th Cir. 
1985).                                                                    

                          III                                        
                           A                                         
The State of Minnesota moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims based on 
Eleventh  Amendment  immunity.    Absent  waiver  of  immunity  by  a  state  or  a  valid 
congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state 

“for any kind of relief.”  Monroe v. Ark. State Univ.,

495 F.3d 591, 594

 (8th Cir. 2007).  
“[I]t  is  widely  recognized  that  ‘Minnesota  has  not  waived  its  Eleventh  Amendment 
immunity from suit in federal court for federal constitutional claims.’”  Capers v. Ramsey 
Cnty. Pub. Def., No. 13-cv-1041 (PJS/JJG),

2014 WL 1048517

, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 
2014) (quoting Eaton v. Minn. Att’y Gen.’s Off., No. 10-cv-1804 (JRT/FLN),

2011 WL 1195777

, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2011)); see Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ.,

226 F.3d 964, 969

  (8th  Cir.  2000).    And  “Congress  has  not  abrogated  Eleventh  Amendment 

immunity for § 1983 claims.”  Capers,

2014 WL 1048517

, at *5 (citing Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332, 342, 345

 (1979)).  Accordingly, Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims against the 
State of Minnesota will be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The State of Minnesota moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s ADA claims for failure 
to state a claim, not based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.  ECF No. 34 at 5 n.5.  

Because the Eighth Circuit has described sovereign immunity as a threshold jurisdictional 
matter, Lors v. Dean,

746 F.3d 857, 861

 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Harmon Indus., Inc. v. 
Browner,

191 F.3d 894, 903

 (8th Cir. 1999)), that jurisdictional question would ordinarily 
need to be resolved before reaching the merits, see, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l 
Shipping Corp.,

549 U.S. 422, 431

 (2007) (“[J]urisdictional questions ordinarily must 

precede  merits  determinations  in  dispositional  order.”).    The  merits-based  and 
jurisdictional inquiries collapse here, but why this is so requires some explanation.  As best 
can be determined, Mr. VanHauer brings a claim under Title II of the ADA.3  Minnesota 


3    Title I of the ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”

42 U.S.C. § 12112

.  Title I plainly 
doesn’t apply because no employment relationship is described in the Second Amended 
Complaint.    “Title  III  of  the  ADA  proscribes  discrimination  in  places  of  public 
accommodation against persons with disabilities.”  Durand v. Fairview Health Servs.,

902 F.3d 836, 841

 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Steger v. Franco, Inc.,

228 F.3d 889

, 892 (8th Cir. 
2000)).    Title  III  of  the  ADA  only  applies  to  private  entities  providing  public 
has not waived immunity for such claims.  See

Minn. Stat. § 1.05

, subdiv. 4 (waiving 
immunity only for ADA claims brought by employees, former employees, or prospective 
employees).  And “[t]here is no question that, in enacting the ADA and authorizing its 

attendant regulations, Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity.”  Klingler 
v. Dir., Dep’t of Revenue,

455 F.3d 888

, 893 (8th Cir. 2006).  To determine when 
Congress’s  abrogation  of  Title  II  is  valid,  the  Supreme  Court  laid  out  a  three-part 
framework.  United States v. Georgia,

546 U.S. 151, 159

 (2006).  The first part of that 
framework is determining “which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II.”

Id.

  If a plaintiff fails to state a claim, there is no need to proceed any further.  See Lors,

746 F.3d at 864

 (describing the Georgia framework); Roblero-Barrios v. Ludeman, No. 
07-cv-4101 (MJD/FLN),

2008 WL 4838726

, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov. 5, 2008) (“Because 
Plaintiff has not established a violation of Title II of the ADA, the Court need not address 
the remaining factors in determining whether Congress had the power under § 5 of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate sovereign immunity under the circumstances of this 
case.”).                                                                  
Therefore, the question becomes whether Mr. VanHauer has plausibly stated a claim 
under Title II of the ADA.  See, e.g., Hall v. Minn. Bd. of Physical Therapy, No. 23-cv-
0665 (WMW/LIB),

2023 WL 8934307

, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2023) (starting with this 

question).  Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 

accommodations, “not to public entities.”  DeBord v. Bd. of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant 
Sch. Dist.,

126 F.3d 1102

, 1106 (8th Cir. 1997).  All that’s reasonably left is a Title II claim. 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by 
any such entity.”

42 U.S.C. §12132

.  To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff 
must plausibly allege: “(1) they are qualified individuals with a disability; (2) they were 

denied the benefits of a public entity’s service or program, or otherwise discriminated 
against; and (3) the denial or discrimination was based on their disability.”  Loye v. Cnty. 
of Dakota,

647 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087

 (D. Minn. 2009) (citing Randolph v. Rodgers,

170 F.3d 850, 858

 (8th Cir. 1999)).                                           
The Second Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual content to satisfy these 

elements.  Mr. VanHauer does not allege he was disabled at the time of his seizure, 
transport, or hospitalization.  That alone is a sufficient basis to dismiss his ADA claim.  See 
Bearbower v. Olmsted Med. Ctr.,

668 F. Supp. 3d 831

, 841 (D. Minn. 2023) (“Plaintiffs 
cannot satisfy the first element because they have failed to allege any facts to plausibly 
show they are disabled within the meaning of the ADA.”).  Mr. VanHauer does allege that 

he was denied basic necessities while in the hospital, documents related to the incident, 
and medical records.  2d. Am. Compl. at 7–8 ¶¶ 27–29.  But even assuming these are 
benefits of a service, program, or activity within the scope of Title II, Mr. VanHauer does 
not plausibly allege a link between the denial of such benefits and a disability.  Nor does 
he plausibly allege some other form of discrimination based on a disability.  “Simply 

invoking the ADA by reference with no more information or support is insufficient to plead 
a cognizable claim.”  Prager v. Allina Health, No. 21-cv-1351 (DWF/ECW),

2021 WL 4895277

, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2021) (similarly dismissing an ADA claim where a 
plaintiff failed to “specify how he is disabled or allege any specific violation of the ADA”).4 
                           B                                         

The City of Minneapolis moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims for failure 
to allege liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658

 (1978).  
Monell’s basic rule is “that civil rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 must show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom.”  Los 
Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries,

562 U.S. 29

, 30–31 (2010).  In other words, a municipality 

cannot be held liable under § 1983 because it employed a tortfeasor, but it may be “sued 
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief . . . [only if] the action 
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, 
regulation,  or  decision  officially  adopted  and  promulgated  by  that  body’s  officers.”  
Monell,

436 U.S. at 690

.  Municipalities also “may be sued for constitutional deprivations 

visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received 
formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”

Id.

 at 690–91.  
Thus, the “first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is . . . whether 
there  is  a  direct  causal  link  between  a  municipal  policy  or  custom  and  the  alleged 
constitutional deprivation.”  City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385

 (1989). 




4    To the extent Mr. VanHauer brings ADA claims against Hennepin Healthcare and 
the  City  of  Minneapolis,  those  claims  will  be  dismissed  for  the  same  reasons  that 
Mr. VanHauer fails to state an ADA claim against the State of Minnesota.   
In addition to liability for unconstitutional policies and customs, a municipality may 
be liable for failing to properly train its public servants.  Inadequate training “may serve as 
the  basis  for  §  1983  liability  only  where  the  failure  to  train  amounts  to  deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”  Canton, 
489  U.S  at  388.    A  municipality  “may  be  deemed  deliberately  indifferent  if  the 
policymakers choose to retain” a training program when they “are on actual or constructive 
notice that a particular omission in [that] training program causes city employees to violate 
citizens’ constitutional rights.”  Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 61

 (2011). 

Mr. VanHauer does not plausibly allege that a constitutional deprivation was caused 
by a City of Minneapolis policy or custom.  The allegations on custom and policy are sparse 
and conclusory.  See 2d. Am. Compl. at 7 ¶ 22 (“[The] City of Minneapolis maintain[s] 
laws, policies, and ordinances that encourage law enforcement to violate the civil rights of 
those with federally protected mental health conditions including laws protecting first 

responders from liability.”).  The closest he gets is alleging that “[t]he MPD complaint 
system  is/was  grossly  inadequate,  frequently  malfunctioned  whether  by  design  or 
negligence, leaving complaints uninvestigated and unaddressed as a matter of policy.”

Id.

 
at 8 ¶ 31.  But no factual allegations plausibly and directly connect the alleged inadequacies 
of the MPD complaint system with a specific constitutional deprivation.  Nor is it obvious 

what right an inadequate complaint system would violate and how.  Combined with the 
absence of facts describing the MPD complaint system’s inadequacies, this is not enough 
to state a Monell claim.                                                  
To the extent Mr. VanHauer is attempting to bring an inadequate-training claim, the 
same result follows.  Only one allegation in the Second Amended Complaint relates to 
inadequate training.  See 2d. Am. Compl. at 6 ¶ 14 (“MPD officers are not trained in 

medical or psychological assessment, diagnosis, crisis intervention, or treatment[.]”).  But 
“[l]ack of particularized training that might have prevented [the unlawful conduct] does 
not establish a constitutional violation.”  Mendoza v. United States Immigr. & Customs 
Enf’t,

849 F.3d 408, 420

 (8th Cir. 2017).  Nor does Mr. VanHauer plausibly allege facts to 
support deliberate indifference.  He does not allege, for example, a pattern of similar 

(alleged) Fourth Amendment violations by police officers provided the City of Minneapolis 
with  constructive  notice.    Connick,

563 U.S. at 62

  (2011)  (“A  pattern  of  similar 
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate 
deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”).  Courts have dismissed failure-
to-train claims with a stronger factual basis than Mr. VanHauer alleges here.  See, e.g., 

Broadus v. Johnson, No. 16-cv-1211 (WMW/SER),

2017 WL 11707857

, at *5–7 (D. 
Minn. Apr. 27, 2017).5                                                    



5    Mr. VanHauer names the MPD as a separate Defendant.  But the MPD is not a 
suable entity separate from the City of Minneapolis.  El-Alamin v. Radke,

369 F. App’x 770, at *1

 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) is not a suable 
entity.”); Polta v. City of St. Paul Police Dept., No. 06-cv-1014 (PAM/AJB)

2006 WL 1174210

, at *2 (D. Minn. May 1, 2006) (“A municipal police department is simply not a 
‘suable entity;’ it is merely a part of some larger municipal government, and has no separate 
legal existence by itself.”).  Even if the MPD was suable as a separate legal entity, 
Mr. VanHauer’s claims against the MPD would be dismissed for the same reason his 
claims against the City of Minneapolis will be dismissed.                 
                           C                                         
Hennepin Healthcare moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims on familiar 
grounds—failure to plausibly allege Monell liability.  As a preliminary matter, Hennepin 

Healthcare may be sued under § 1983 as a public corporation that operates as a subsidiary 
of Hennepin County.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Hennepin Cnty.,

9 F.4th 757, 761

 (8th Cir. 2021) 
(adjudicating  §  1983  claims  against  Hennepin  paramedics);  Minn.  Stat.  §  383B.901 
(creating “a corporation which shall be public in nature, operating as a subsidiary of the 
county of Hennepin”).  Because Hennepin Healthcare is a municipal entity, to prevail on 

his  §  1983  claims  Mr.  VanHauer  must  plausibly  allege  Monell  liability.    See,  e.g., 
Perryman v. City of Bloomington, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 23-cv-1984 (DWF/DTS),

2023 WL 8374283

, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2023).  The same standards for Monell liability 
discussed in Part III.B apply here.                                       
The Second Amended Complaint fails to identify any specific Hennepin Healthcare 

policy or custom, let alone link such a policy or custom to a specific constitutional 
deprivation.    Rather,  Mr.  VanHauer’s  Hennepin-Healthcare  focused  allegations  are 
incident specific.  2d. Am. Compl. at 7 ¶ 16 (“Hennepin Healthcare was informed. . .”); 
¶ 17 (“Hennepin healthcare did knowingly use false statements. . .”); ¶ 20 (“Hennepin 
Healthcare refused to remove blood pressure cuff. . .”); ¶ 21 (“Hennepin healthcare used 

[his] agitation. . .”).  He does not describe, for example, Hennepin Healthcare’s policies or 
customs regarding 72-hour mental health holds.  Mr. VanHauer’s allegations of “an 
isolated incident of alleged [municipal-employee] misconduct . . . cannot, as a matter of 
law, establish a municipal policy or custom creating liability under § 1983.”  Ulrich v. Pope 
Cnty.,

715 F.3d 1054, 1062

 (8th Cir. 2013); Triemert v. Washington Cnty., No. 13-cv-1312 
(PJS/JSM),

2013 WL 6729260

, at *12 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) (“Because there are no 
factual allegations describing any specific policy, custom or practice that was established 

by any particular defendant, [plaintiff] has failed to plead an actionable Monell claim.”).  
Nor does he allege facts from which an inference regarding the existence of a particular 
policy,  custom,  or  practice  could  be  drawn.    See  D.B.  v.  Hargett,  No.  13-cv-2781 
(MJD/LIB),

2014 WL 1371200

, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Apr. 8, 2014).              
The same follows to the extent Mr. VanHauer attempts to bring a failure-to-train 

claim under Canton.  The Second Amended Complaint does not include allegations 
regarding Hennepin Healthcare’s training.  Absent such allegations, no link is established 
between inadequate training and a constitutional violation.  And Mr. VanHauer does not 
allege a pattern of misconduct that would put Hennepin Healthcare on notice to satisfy the 
deliberate-indifference standard.  See Ulrich,

715 F.3d at 1061

 (affirming dismissal of 

failure-to-train claim where a complaint lacked similar factual content).6 
                           D                                         
In response to the pending motions to dismiss, Mr. VanHauer requested permission 
to amend his complaint to meet the criteria for a § 1983 action.  ECF Nos. 72–74.  He did 
not file a copy of the proposed amended pleading in compliance with D. Minn. LR 15.1(b).  

Nor did he explain what factual content his amended complaint would include.  See ECF 

6    Mr. VanHauer might be bringing a HIPAA claim.  See 2d. Am. Compl. at 8 (alleging 
that “relationships were irreparably damaged by [Hennepin Healthcare] violating patient 
privacy and HIPPA [sic] laws.”).  If so, that claim would be dismissed because “HIPAA 
does not create a private right of action.”  Dodd v. Jones,

623 F.3d 563, 569

 (8th Cir. 2010). 
Nos. 72–74.  “[A] party is not entitled to amend a complaint without making a showing 
that such an amendment would be able to save an otherwise meritless claim.”  Plymouth 
Cnty. v. Merscorp, Inc.,

774 F.3d 1155, 1160

 (8th Cir. 2014).  Given that Mr. VanHauer 

has already amended his complaint twice, see ECF Nos. 7, 8, and lacking a showing of 
how an amendment would save his claims, the request to amend will be denied and the 
action will be dismissed.                                                 
                           E                                         
The Second Amended Complaint could reasonably be construed to contain some 

state-law claims.  For example, Hennepin Healthcare argues that “[t]he gravamen of 
Mr. VanHauer’s claims sound in medical malpractice.”  ECF No. 40 at 1.  And his 
allegations regarding the municipal Defendants’ failure to provide data could be construed 
as a claim under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act.  To the extent state-law 
claims remain, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 

claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367

(c)(3).  “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims 
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 
jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point 
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”  Barstad v. 

Murray Cnty.,

420 F.3d 880, 888

 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

484 U.S. 343

, 350 n.7 (1988)).  And the Eighth Circuit has instructed district courts not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when, as here, all federal claims 
are dismissed well before trial.  See Hervey v. Cnty. of Koochiching,

527 F.3d 711

, 726–
27 (8th Cir. 2008).  There is no reason to deviate from this general rule here, where the 
case remains in its earliest stages and Mr. VanHauer’s state-law claims are ill-defined.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
ORDERED THAT:                                                             
1.   Defendant  State  of  Minnesota’s  Motion  to  Dismiss  [ECF  No.  31]  is 
GRANTED.                                                                  
2.   Defendant  Hennepin  Healthcare  System,  Inc.’s  Motion  to  Dismiss 

[ECF No. 38] is GRANTED.                                                  
3.   Defendants  City  of  Minneapolis  and  Minneapolis  Police  Department’s 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 57] is GRANTED.             
4.   Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED as follows:                     
     a.   Plaintiff Andrew Cole VanHauer’s § 1983 claims against Defendant 

State of Minnesota are DISMISSED without prejudice.                  
     b.   Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
     c.   Plaintiff’s state-law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 
5.   The Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 8] is DISMISSED.          
       LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                          


Dated:  July 25, 2024              s/ Eric C. Tostrud                     
                              Eric C. Tostrud                        
                              United States District Court

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Andrew Cole VanHauer, File No. 23-cv-1208 (ECT/LIB)

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

Minneapolis Police Department; City of
Minneapolis; State of Minnesota; and
Hennepin Healthcare,

Matthew Mason, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, St. Paul, MN, for Defendant State
of Minnesota.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

  alleging  that  Defendants  violated  his 
constitutional rights.  He also sues under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”),

42 U.S.C. § 12101

simply on the fact that [he] was ‘agitated.’” 2d. Am. Compl. at 7 ¶ 25. “Hospital staff

II
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is assessed under the same
standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc.,

552 F.3d 659, 665

 (8th 
Cir. 2009).  In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), 

a court must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Gorog v. Best Buy Co.,

760 F.3d 787, 792

 
(8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, 
they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555

 (2007) (citation omitted).  The complaint must “state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Id. at 570

.  “A claim has facial plausibility 
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009).                                                     
Mr. VanHauer’s pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction.  Erickson v. 
Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94

 (2007).  Pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held 
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Id. at 94

.  “[I]f the 
essence of an allegation is discernible,” the district court should “construe the complaint in 

a  way  that  permits  the  layperson’s  claim  to  be  considered  within  the  proper  legal 
framework.”  Solomon v. Petray,

795 F.3d 777, 787

 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  
However, even under this liberal standard, a pro se complaint must contain specific facts 
in support of the claims it advances.  See Martin v. Sargent,

780 F.2d 1334, 1337

 (8th Cir. 
1985).                                                                    

                          III                                        
                           A                                         
The State of Minnesota moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims based on 
Eleventh  Amendment  immunity.    Absent  waiver  of  immunity  by  a  state  or  a  valid 
congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state 

“for any kind of relief.”  Monroe v. Ark. State Univ.,

495 F.3d 591, 594

 (8th Cir. 2007).  
“[I]t  is  widely  recognized  that  ‘Minnesota  has  not  waived  its  Eleventh  Amendment 
immunity from suit in federal court for federal constitutional claims.’”  Capers v. Ramsey 
Cnty. Pub. Def., No. 13-cv-1041 (PJS/JJG),

2014 WL 1048517

, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 18, 
2014) (quoting Eaton v. Minn. Att’y Gen.’s Off., No. 10-cv-1804 (JRT/FLN),

2011 WL 1195777

, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2011)); see Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ.,

226 F.3d 964, 969

  (8th  Cir.  2000).    And  “Congress  has  not  abrogated  Eleventh  Amendment 

immunity for § 1983 claims.”  Capers,

2014 WL 1048517

, at *5 (citing Quern v. Jordan,

440 U.S. 332, 342, 345

 (1979)).  Accordingly, Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims against the 
State of Minnesota will be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The State of Minnesota moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s ADA claims for failure 
to state a claim, not based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.  ECF No. 34 at 5 n.5.  

Because the Eighth Circuit has described sovereign immunity as a threshold jurisdictional 
matter, Lors v. Dean,

746 F.3d 857, 861

 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Harmon Indus., Inc. v. 
Browner,

191 F.3d 894, 903

 (8th Cir. 1999)), that jurisdictional question would ordinarily 
need to be resolved before reaching the merits, see, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l 
Shipping Corp.,

549 U.S. 422, 431

 (2007) (“[J]urisdictional questions ordinarily must 

precede  merits  determinations  in  dispositional  order.”).    The  merits-based  and 
jurisdictional inquiries collapse here, but why this is so requires some explanation.  As best 
can be determined, Mr. VanHauer brings a claim under Title II of the ADA.3  Minnesota 


3    Title I of the ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”

42 U.S.C. § 12112

.  Title I plainly 
doesn’t apply because no employment relationship is described in the Second Amended 
Complaint.    “Title  III  of  the  ADA  proscribes  discrimination  in  places  of  public 
accommodation against persons with disabilities.”  Durand v. Fairview Health Servs.,

902 F.3d 836, 841

 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Steger v. Franco, Inc.,

228 F.3d 889

, 892 (8th Cir. 
2000)).    Title  III  of  the  ADA  only  applies  to  private  entities  providing  public 
has not waived immunity for such claims.  See

Minn. Stat. § 1.05

, subdiv. 4 (waiving 
immunity only for ADA claims brought by employees, former employees, or prospective 
employees).  And “[t]here is no question that, in enacting the ADA and authorizing its 

attendant regulations, Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity.”  Klingler 
v. Dir., Dep’t of Revenue,

455 F.3d 888

, 893 (8th Cir. 2006).  To determine when 
Congress’s  abrogation  of  Title  II  is  valid,  the  Supreme  Court  laid  out  a  three-part 
framework.  United States v. Georgia,

546 U.S. 151, 159

 (2006).  The first part of that 
framework is determining “which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II.”

Id.

  If a plaintiff fails to state a claim, there is no need to proceed any further.  See Lors,

746 F.3d at 864

 (describing the Georgia framework); Roblero-Barrios v. Ludeman, No. 
07-cv-4101 (MJD/FLN),

2008 WL 4838726

, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov. 5, 2008) (“Because 
Plaintiff has not established a violation of Title II of the ADA, the Court need not address 
the remaining factors in determining whether Congress had the power under § 5 of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate sovereign immunity under the circumstances of this 
case.”).                                                                  
Therefore, the question becomes whether Mr. VanHauer has plausibly stated a claim 
under Title II of the ADA.  See, e.g., Hall v. Minn. Bd. of Physical Therapy, No. 23-cv-
0665 (WMW/LIB),

2023 WL 8934307

, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2023) (starting with this 

question).  Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 

accommodations, “not to public entities.”  DeBord v. Bd. of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant 
Sch. Dist.,

126 F.3d 1102

, 1106 (8th Cir. 1997).  All that’s reasonably left is a Title II claim. 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by 
any such entity.”

42 U.S.C. §12132

.  To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff 
must plausibly allege: “(1) they are qualified individuals with a disability; (2) they were 

denied the benefits of a public entity’s service or program, or otherwise discriminated 
against; and (3) the denial or discrimination was based on their disability.”  Loye v. Cnty. 
of Dakota,

647 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087

 (D. Minn. 2009) (citing Randolph v. Rodgers,

170 F.3d 850, 858

 (8th Cir. 1999)).                                           
The Second Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual content to satisfy these 

elements.  Mr. VanHauer does not allege he was disabled at the time of his seizure, 
transport, or hospitalization.  That alone is a sufficient basis to dismiss his ADA claim.  See 
Bearbower v. Olmsted Med. Ctr.,

668 F. Supp. 3d 831

, 841 (D. Minn. 2023) (“Plaintiffs 
cannot satisfy the first element because they have failed to allege any facts to plausibly 
show they are disabled within the meaning of the ADA.”).  Mr. VanHauer does allege that 

he was denied basic necessities while in the hospital, documents related to the incident, 
and medical records.  2d. Am. Compl. at 7–8 ¶¶ 27–29.  But even assuming these are 
benefits of a service, program, or activity within the scope of Title II, Mr. VanHauer does 
not plausibly allege a link between the denial of such benefits and a disability.  Nor does 
he plausibly allege some other form of discrimination based on a disability.  “Simply 

invoking the ADA by reference with no more information or support is insufficient to plead 
a cognizable claim.”  Prager v. Allina Health, No. 21-cv-1351 (DWF/ECW),

2021 WL 4895277

, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2021) (similarly dismissing an ADA claim where a 
plaintiff failed to “specify how he is disabled or allege any specific violation of the ADA”).4 
                           B                                         

The City of Minneapolis moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims for failure 
to allege liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658

 (1978).  
Monell’s basic rule is “that civil rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 must show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom.”  Los 
Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries,

562 U.S. 29

, 30–31 (2010).  In other words, a municipality 

cannot be held liable under § 1983 because it employed a tortfeasor, but it may be “sued 
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief . . . [only if] the action 
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, 
regulation,  or  decision  officially  adopted  and  promulgated  by  that  body’s  officers.”  
Monell,

436 U.S. at 690

.  Municipalities also “may be sued for constitutional deprivations 

visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received 
formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”

Id.

 at 690–91.  
Thus, the “first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under § 1983 is . . . whether 
there  is  a  direct  causal  link  between  a  municipal  policy  or  custom  and  the  alleged 
constitutional deprivation.”  City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385

 (1989). 




4    To the extent Mr. VanHauer brings ADA claims against Hennepin Healthcare and 
the  City  of  Minneapolis,  those  claims  will  be  dismissed  for  the  same  reasons  that 
Mr. VanHauer fails to state an ADA claim against the State of Minnesota.   
In addition to liability for unconstitutional policies and customs, a municipality may 
be liable for failing to properly train its public servants.  Inadequate training “may serve as 
the  basis  for  §  1983  liability  only  where  the  failure  to  train  amounts  to  deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”  Canton, 
489  U.S  at  388.    A  municipality  “may  be  deemed  deliberately  indifferent  if  the 
policymakers choose to retain” a training program when they “are on actual or constructive 
notice that a particular omission in [that] training program causes city employees to violate 
citizens’ constitutional rights.”  Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 61

 (2011). 

Mr. VanHauer does not plausibly allege that a constitutional deprivation was caused 
by a City of Minneapolis policy or custom.  The allegations on custom and policy are sparse 
and conclusory.  See 2d. Am. Compl. at 7 ¶ 22 (“[The] City of Minneapolis maintain[s] 
laws, policies, and ordinances that encourage law enforcement to violate the civil rights of 
those with federally protected mental health conditions including laws protecting first 

responders from liability.”).  The closest he gets is alleging that “[t]he MPD complaint 
system  is/was  grossly  inadequate,  frequently  malfunctioned  whether  by  design  or 
negligence, leaving complaints uninvestigated and unaddressed as a matter of policy.”

Id.

 
at 8 ¶ 31.  But no factual allegations plausibly and directly connect the alleged inadequacies 
of the MPD complaint system with a specific constitutional deprivation.  Nor is it obvious 

what right an inadequate complaint system would violate and how.  Combined with the 
absence of facts describing the MPD complaint system’s inadequacies, this is not enough 
to state a Monell claim.                                                  
To the extent Mr. VanHauer is attempting to bring an inadequate-training claim, the 
same result follows.  Only one allegation in the Second Amended Complaint relates to 
inadequate training.  See 2d. Am. Compl. at 6 ¶ 14 (“MPD officers are not trained in 

medical or psychological assessment, diagnosis, crisis intervention, or treatment[.]”).  But 
“[l]ack of particularized training that might have prevented [the unlawful conduct] does 
not establish a constitutional violation.”  Mendoza v. United States Immigr. & Customs 
Enf’t,

849 F.3d 408, 420

 (8th Cir. 2017).  Nor does Mr. VanHauer plausibly allege facts to 
support deliberate indifference.  He does not allege, for example, a pattern of similar 

(alleged) Fourth Amendment violations by police officers provided the City of Minneapolis 
with  constructive  notice.    Connick,

563 U.S. at 62

  (2011)  (“A  pattern  of  similar 
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate 
deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”).  Courts have dismissed failure-
to-train claims with a stronger factual basis than Mr. VanHauer alleges here.  See, e.g., 

Broadus v. Johnson, No. 16-cv-1211 (WMW/SER),

2017 WL 11707857

, at *5–7 (D. 
Minn. Apr. 27, 2017).5                                                    



5    Mr. VanHauer names the MPD as a separate Defendant.  But the MPD is not a 
suable entity separate from the City of Minneapolis.  El-Alamin v. Radke,

369 F. App’x 770, at *1

 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) is not a suable 
entity.”); Polta v. City of St. Paul Police Dept., No. 06-cv-1014 (PAM/AJB)

2006 WL 1174210

, at *2 (D. Minn. May 1, 2006) (“A municipal police department is simply not a 
‘suable entity;’ it is merely a part of some larger municipal government, and has no separate 
legal existence by itself.”).  Even if the MPD was suable as a separate legal entity, 
Mr. VanHauer’s claims against the MPD would be dismissed for the same reason his 
claims against the City of Minneapolis will be dismissed.                 
                           C                                         
Hennepin Healthcare moves to dismiss Mr. VanHauer’s § 1983 claims on familiar 
grounds—failure to plausibly allege Monell liability.  As a preliminary matter, Hennepin 

Healthcare may be sued under § 1983 as a public corporation that operates as a subsidiary 
of Hennepin County.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Hennepin Cnty.,

9 F.4th 757, 761

 (8th Cir. 2021) 
(adjudicating  §  1983  claims  against  Hennepin  paramedics);  Minn.  Stat.  §  383B.901 
(creating “a corporation which shall be public in nature, operating as a subsidiary of the 
county of Hennepin”).  Because Hennepin Healthcare is a municipal entity, to prevail on 

his  §  1983  claims  Mr.  VanHauer  must  plausibly  allege  Monell  liability.    See,  e.g., 
Perryman v. City of Bloomington, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 23-cv-1984 (DWF/DTS),

2023 WL 8374283

, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2023).  The same standards for Monell liability 
discussed in Part III.B apply here.                                       
The Second Amended Complaint fails to identify any specific Hennepin Healthcare 

policy or custom, let alone link such a policy or custom to a specific constitutional 
deprivation.    Rather,  Mr.  VanHauer’s  Hennepin-Healthcare  focused  allegations  are 
incident specific.  2d. Am. Compl. at 7 ¶ 16 (“Hennepin Healthcare was informed. . .”); 
¶ 17 (“Hennepin healthcare did knowingly use false statements. . .”); ¶ 20 (“Hennepin 
Healthcare refused to remove blood pressure cuff. . .”); ¶ 21 (“Hennepin healthcare used 

[his] agitation. . .”).  He does not describe, for example, Hennepin Healthcare’s policies or 
customs regarding 72-hour mental health holds.  Mr. VanHauer’s allegations of “an 
isolated incident of alleged [municipal-employee] misconduct . . . cannot, as a matter of 
law, establish a municipal policy or custom creating liability under § 1983.”  Ulrich v. Pope 
Cnty.,

715 F.3d 1054, 1062

 (8th Cir. 2013); Triemert v. Washington Cnty., No. 13-cv-1312 
(PJS/JSM),

2013 WL 6729260

, at *12 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2013) (“Because there are no 
factual allegations describing any specific policy, custom or practice that was established 

by any particular defendant, [plaintiff] has failed to plead an actionable Monell claim.”).  
Nor does he allege facts from which an inference regarding the existence of a particular 
policy,  custom,  or  practice  could  be  drawn.    See  D.B.  v.  Hargett,  No.  13-cv-2781 
(MJD/LIB),

2014 WL 1371200

, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Apr. 8, 2014).              
The same follows to the extent Mr. VanHauer attempts to bring a failure-to-train 

claim under Canton.  The Second Amended Complaint does not include allegations 
regarding Hennepin Healthcare’s training.  Absent such allegations, no link is established 
between inadequate training and a constitutional violation.  And Mr. VanHauer does not 
allege a pattern of misconduct that would put Hennepin Healthcare on notice to satisfy the 
deliberate-indifference standard.  See Ulrich,

715 F.3d at 1061

 (affirming dismissal of 

failure-to-train claim where a complaint lacked similar factual content).6 
                           D                                         
In response to the pending motions to dismiss, Mr. VanHauer requested permission 
to amend his complaint to meet the criteria for a § 1983 action.  ECF Nos. 72–74.  He did 
not file a copy of the proposed amended pleading in compliance with D. Minn. LR 15.1(b).  

Nor did he explain what factual content his amended complaint would include.  See ECF 

6    Mr. VanHauer might be bringing a HIPAA claim.  See 2d. Am. Compl. at 8 (alleging 
that “relationships were irreparably damaged by [Hennepin Healthcare] violating patient 
privacy and HIPPA [sic] laws.”).  If so, that claim would be dismissed because “HIPAA 
does not create a private right of action.”  Dodd v. Jones,

623 F.3d 563, 569

 (8th Cir. 2010). 
Nos. 72–74.  “[A] party is not entitled to amend a complaint without making a showing 
that such an amendment would be able to save an otherwise meritless claim.”  Plymouth 
Cnty. v. Merscorp, Inc.,

774 F.3d 1155, 1160

 (8th Cir. 2014).  Given that Mr. VanHauer 

has already amended his complaint twice, see ECF Nos. 7, 8, and lacking a showing of 
how an amendment would save his claims, the request to amend will be denied and the 
action will be dismissed.                                                 
                           E                                         
The Second Amended Complaint could reasonably be construed to contain some 

state-law claims.  For example, Hennepin Healthcare argues that “[t]he gravamen of 
Mr. VanHauer’s claims sound in medical malpractice.”  ECF No. 40 at 1.  And his 
allegations regarding the municipal Defendants’ failure to provide data could be construed 
as a claim under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act.  To the extent state-law 
claims remain, a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 

claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367

(c)(3).  “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims 
are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent 
jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point 
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”  Barstad v. 

Murray Cnty.,

420 F.3d 880, 888

 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

484 U.S. 343

, 350 n.7 (1988)).  And the Eighth Circuit has instructed district courts not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when, as here, all federal claims 
are dismissed well before trial.  See Hervey v. Cnty. of Koochiching,

527 F.3d 711

, 726–
27 (8th Cir. 2008).  There is no reason to deviate from this general rule here, where the 
case remains in its earliest stages and Mr. VanHauer’s state-law claims are ill-defined.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
ORDERED THAT:                                                             
1.   Defendant  State  of  Minnesota’s  Motion  to  Dismiss  [ECF  No.  31]  is 
GRANTED.                                                                  
2.   Defendant  Hennepin  Healthcare  System,  Inc.’s  Motion  to  Dismiss 

[ECF No. 38] is GRANTED.                                                  
3.   Defendants  City  of  Minneapolis  and  Minneapolis  Police  Department’s 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 57] is GRANTED.             
4.   Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED as follows:                     
     a.   Plaintiff Andrew Cole VanHauer’s § 1983 claims against Defendant 

State of Minnesota are DISMISSED without prejudice.                  
     b.   Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
     c.   Plaintiff’s state-law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. 
5.   The Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 8] is DISMISSED.          
       LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                          


Dated:  July 25, 2024              s/ Eric C. Tostrud                     
                              Eric C. Tostrud                        
                              United States District Court

Reference

Status: Unknown