Harris v. Vang

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Harris v. Vang

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Joshua Harris,                  Case No. 24-cv-1791 (JMB/DJF)           



                Plaintiff,                                              

v.                                                                      

ORDER

Metro Transit Police Dept et al.,                                       

              Defendants.                                               


   Plaintiff Joshua Harris initiated this civil action alleging that Defendants violated his 
constitutional rights during the stop and search of his person.  (ECF No.  1.)  Because Mr. Harris 
is a prisoner, the Court previously calculated his initial partial filing fee pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(b) and warned him of potential legal and factual deficiencies with his original Complaint.  
(See ECF No. 5.)  Mr. Harris paid the initial partial filing fee of $6.50 (ECF No. 7) and filed an 
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6), but his Amended Complaint did not adequately address the 
Court’s warnings.  On June 25, 2024, the Court filed a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 8) 
recommending that this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A(a).  This matter is now before the Court because Mr. Harris submitted a putative second 
amended complaint (ECF No. 13) during the period for objections to the Court’s Report and 
Recommendation.                                                           
I.   The Putative Second Amended Complaint                                
   There are several problems with Mr. Harris’s putative second amended complaint.  First, 
it is procedurally improper.  Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to 
amend its pleading once as a matter of course.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).  Here, however, Mr. 
Harris has already submitted an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6).  Mr. Harris, therefore, may file 
a second amended complaint only with the Court’s permission.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(2).  
Mr. Harris did not seek or obtain the Court’s permission before filing his putative second amended 
complaint.  Recognizing that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, the Court views Mr. 
Harris’s filing as a Motion to Amend his pleading, and the putative second amended complaint as 

the substance of his proposed amendments.                                 
   Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a court should “freely give leave [to amend a 
complaint] when justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  But “there is no absolute right to 
amend.”  Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cty., 
88 F.3d 647
, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1996).  Denial of leave 
to amend may be justified by “undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of 
the amendment or unfair prejudice to the opposing party.”  Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 
823 F.2d 214, 216
 (8th Cir. 1987).  “Denial of a motion for leave to amend on the basis of futility means the 
district court has reached the legal conclusion that the [proposed amendment] could not withstand 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Zutz v. Nelson, 
601 F.3d 842, 850
 (8th Cir. 2010).  The decision whether to amend is entrusted to the sound 

discretion of the trial court.  See, e.g., Niagara of Wisc. Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. Union Mgmt. 
Pension Fund, 
800 F.2d 742
, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).                          
   Mr. Harris requests that his putative second amended complaint “be read with the other 
complaint.”  (ECF No. 13 at 3.)  Generally, however, “an amended complaint supercedes [sic] an 
original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect.”  Schlafly v. Eagle 
Forum, 
970 F.3d 924, 933
 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Acuity v. Rex, LLC, 
929 F.3d 995, 999
 (8th Cir. 
2019)).  Pursuant to this District’s Local Rules, moreover, unless the Court orders otherwise, “any 
amended pleading must be complete in itself and must not incorporate by reference any prior 
pleading.”  Local Rule 15.1(a).  This means that the Court must consider the putative second 
amended complaint as a standalone document, without regard to any previous filings.  But to 
accept the putative second amended complaint without regard for the allegations asserted in Mr. 
Harris’s Complaint and Amended Complaint plainly would contravene his intent in filing it. 
   Second, the putative second amended complaint is deficient on its face.  Pursuant to Rule 

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper 
must be signed by … a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).  Mr. 
Harris did not sign his putative second amended complaint.  (ECF No. 13).  In light of these 
deficiencies, Mr. Harris’s motion to amend his pleading (ECF No. 13) by filing the putative second 
amended complaint, is denied as futile.                                   
   The Court nevertheless will afford Mr. Harris a final opportunity to correct his pleading 
deficiencies.  To do so, Mr. Harris must: (1) file a motion to amend the complaint; and (2) file, as 
an exhibit to his motion, a proposed Second Amended Complaint consistent with this Order.  This 
means that, at a minimum, to survive review, the proposed Second Amended Complaint must be 
signed, and it must incorporate all the allegations Mr. Harris seeks to plead in a single, standalone 

document without reference to of his previously-filed pleadings or other filings. 
I.   Mr. Harris’s IFP Application                                         
   Mr. Harris also requests to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  (ECF No. 3.)  As previously 
explained, because Mr. Harris is a prisoner, his IFP application is subject to the requirements of 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(b).  Section 1915(g) establishes the “Three Strikes Rule”, which provides that: 
        in no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action … under this section 
        [i.e., proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)] if the prisoner has, on 3 or 
        more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 
        brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 
        dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 
        state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner 
        is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.            
   For his part, Mr. Harris has accumulated more than three such “strikes” under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g):                                                                  
     •  Strike One: In Harris v. Ramsey County Courts, Case No. 23-cv-0197 (JRT/JFD) 
        (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2023), Mr. Harris alleged, among other things, that his court-

        appointed attorney was providing ineffective assistance of counsel.  That action 
        was dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  See 
        Harris, No. 23-cv-0197 (JRT/JFD) (ECF Nos. 8, 9).               
     •  Strike Two: In Harris v. Ramsey’s Courts, Case No. 23-cv-342 (NEB/LIB) (D. 
        Minn. Feb. 10, 2023), Mr. Harris challenged his bail, alleged detention center 
        officials retaliated against him by placing him in the “hole” when he complained 
        about his bail, and claimed officials ordered him to walk around naked at the 
        facility.  See id. (ECF No. 6).  That action was also dismissed without prejudice as 
        frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because his claims were duplicative of 

        a separate civil action—Harris v. A.D.C., Case No. 23-cv-0170 (ECT/TNL) (D. 
        Minn.).  See Harris, No. 23-cv-342 (NEB/LIB) (ECF Nos. 6, 7).   
     •  Strike Three: In Harris v. Schutz, Case No. 23-cv-377 (ECT/LIB) (D. Minn. Feb. 
        15, 2023), Mr. Harris argued, among other things, that in December 2022, the 
        defendants stopped and searched his person in violation of his constitutional rights.  
        See id. (ECF No. 3).  That action was dismissed without prejudice for failure to 
        state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).  
        See Harris, No. 23-cv-377 (ECT/LIB) (ECF Nos. 3, 4).            
     •  Strike Four: In Harris v. Goldfine, Case No. 23-cv-0426 (ECT/LIB) (D. Minn. Feb. 

        21, 2023), Mr. Harris alleged that the defendant, his court appointed criminal 
        defense attorney, provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel.  See id. (ECF 
        No. 1).  That action was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim 
        under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).  See Harris, Case No. 23-cv-0426 (ECT/LIB) (ECF 
        Nos. 4, 5).1                                                    

   In light of these previous dismissals, to commence this action Mr. Harris must pay the full 
filing fee of $405.00 (less the $6.50 he has already paid) unless he can establish that “he is under 
imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g); see also Charron v. Allen, 
37 F.4th 483, 486
 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Section 1915(g) does not prohibit prisoners from pursuing legal 
claims … It only limits their ability to proceed in forma pauperis.”) (quoting Lyon v. Krol, 
127 F.3d 763
, 765 (8th Cir. 1997)).  For the “imminent danger” exception to apply, “the requisite 
imminent danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint or appeal is filed, 
not when the alleged wrongdoing occurred.”  Martin v. Shelton, 
319 F.3d 1048
, 1050 (8th Cir. 
2003).  Furthermore, “[a]bsent specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or of a 
pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury,” “general” 

or “conclusory assertions” are insufficient to invoke this exception to the Three Strikes Rule.  Id.  
(citing Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 
239 F.3d 307
, 315 n.1 (3d. Cir. 2001) (en banc)).  In this case, 
none of Mr. Harris’s filings assert any specific facts suggesting he is in “imminent danger of 
serious physical injury.”  Mr. Harris thus cannot invoke the “imminent danger” exception and the 
Three Strikes Rule applies.  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g).  Mr. Harris’s IFP Application (ECF No. 3) is 
therefore denied.                                                         

   1 Mr. Harris has initiated two more federal lawsuits in this District as a prisoner.  See Harris 
v. A.D.C., Case No. 23-cv-0170 (ECT/TNL) (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2023); Harris v. Ramsey County 
Court, Case No. 23-cv-207 (JWB/ECW) (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2023).  Those actions were also 
dismissed on preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).  Harris, 23-cv-0170 (ECF No. 
19); Harris, 23-cv-207 (ECF No. 17).  But because those cases were dismissed, in part, for lack of 
jurisdiction, the Court does not count them as “strikes” for the purposes of 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g). 
                         CONCLUSION                                     
   If Mr. Harris decides to continue pursuing this action, he must bring a motion to file a 
second amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order and pay the full 
$405 filing fee (less the $6.50 already paid, or $398.50) by August 20, 2024.  If Mr. Harris fails 

to submit full payment by that date, the Court will recommend dismissing the action without 
prejudice for failure to prosecute.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).  In addition, Mr. Harris shall have 
until August 20, 2024 to bring a motion to file a second amended complaint that is: (1) signed; 
and (2) a standalone document that fully incorporates all the allegations he seeks to plead.  If he 
meets that deadline promptly, the motion to amend is granted, and this case has not otherwise been 
dismissed by that date, the Court will withdraw its June 25, 2024 Report and Recommendation 
(ECF No. 8) recommending this case be dismissed based on its review of Mr. Harris’s prior 
pleadings.  The Court may, however, file another report and recommendation for dismissal if 
warranted.  As a reminder to Mr. Harris, should he pay the full filing fee and bring a motion to file 
a second amended complaint, if the motion to amend is granted his new pleading still will be 

subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to determine, for example, whether it states a 
cause of action on which relief can be granted.2                          

ORDER

   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                      



   2 As previously explained (ECF No. 8), the factual predicate of Mr. Harris’s federal claims 
also gave rise to state criminal charges against him.  Thus, even if Mr. Harris complies with the 
requirements of this Order and pleads a plausible claim for relief, so long as the state criminal 
proceedings remain pending, this action likely would be stayed pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37
 (1971).                                                           
   1.   The  Clerk  of  Court  is  directed  to  docket  Plaintiff  Joshua  Harris’s  purported 
amended complaint (ECF No. 13) as a Motion to Amend the Amended Complaint.   
   2.   Plaintiff Joshua Harris’s Motion to Amend the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13) 
is DENIED as futile.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).                       

   3.   Plaintiff Joshua Harris’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is 
DENIED.                                                                   
   4.   Mr. Harris may file a motion to file a second amended complaint addressing the 
deficiencies identified in this Order on or before August 20, 2024, failing which the Court’s Report 
and Recommendation for dismissal of this action (ECF No. 8) will not be withdrawn. 
   5.   Mr. Harris must pay the remainder of the full filing fee for this action ($405-$6.50) 
or $398.50 by August 20, 2024, failing which this Court will recommend that this action be 
dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.                     
IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                         

Dated: July 30, 2024            s/ Dulce J. Foster                      
                                DULCE J. FOSTER                         
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Joshua Harris,                  Case No. 24-cv-1791 (JMB/DJF)           



                Plaintiff,                                              

v.                                                                      

ORDER

Metro Transit Police Dept et al.,                                       

              Defendants.                                               


   Plaintiff Joshua Harris initiated this civil action alleging that Defendants violated his 
constitutional rights during the stop and search of his person.  (ECF No.  1.)  Because Mr. Harris 
is a prisoner, the Court previously calculated his initial partial filing fee pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(b) and warned him of potential legal and factual deficiencies with his original Complaint.  
(See ECF No. 5.)  Mr. Harris paid the initial partial filing fee of $6.50 (ECF No. 7) and filed an 
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6), but his Amended Complaint did not adequately address the 
Court’s warnings.  On June 25, 2024, the Court filed a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 8) 
recommending that this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A(a).  This matter is now before the Court because Mr. Harris submitted a putative second 
amended complaint (ECF No. 13) during the period for objections to the Court’s Report and 
Recommendation.                                                           
I.   The Putative Second Amended Complaint                                
   There are several problems with Mr. Harris’s putative second amended complaint.  First, 
it is procedurally improper.  Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to 
amend its pleading once as a matter of course.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).  Here, however, Mr. 
Harris has already submitted an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6).  Mr. Harris, therefore, may file 
a second amended complaint only with the Court’s permission.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(2).  
Mr. Harris did not seek or obtain the Court’s permission before filing his putative second amended 
complaint.  Recognizing that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, the Court views Mr. 
Harris’s filing as a Motion to Amend his pleading, and the putative second amended complaint as 

the substance of his proposed amendments.                                 
   Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a court should “freely give leave [to amend a 
complaint] when justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  But “there is no absolute right to 
amend.”  Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cty., 
88 F.3d 647
, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1996).  Denial of leave 
to amend may be justified by “undue delay, bad faith on the part of the moving party, futility of 
the amendment or unfair prejudice to the opposing party.”  Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 
823 F.2d 214, 216
 (8th Cir. 1987).  “Denial of a motion for leave to amend on the basis of futility means the 
district court has reached the legal conclusion that the [proposed amendment] could not withstand 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Zutz v. Nelson, 
601 F.3d 842, 850
 (8th Cir. 2010).  The decision whether to amend is entrusted to the sound 

discretion of the trial court.  See, e.g., Niagara of Wisc. Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. Union Mgmt. 
Pension Fund, 
800 F.2d 742
, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).                          
   Mr. Harris requests that his putative second amended complaint “be read with the other 
complaint.”  (ECF No. 13 at 3.)  Generally, however, “an amended complaint supercedes [sic] an 
original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect.”  Schlafly v. Eagle 
Forum, 
970 F.3d 924, 933
 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Acuity v. Rex, LLC, 
929 F.3d 995, 999
 (8th Cir. 
2019)).  Pursuant to this District’s Local Rules, moreover, unless the Court orders otherwise, “any 
amended pleading must be complete in itself and must not incorporate by reference any prior 
pleading.”  Local Rule 15.1(a).  This means that the Court must consider the putative second 
amended complaint as a standalone document, without regard to any previous filings.  But to 
accept the putative second amended complaint without regard for the allegations asserted in Mr. 
Harris’s Complaint and Amended Complaint plainly would contravene his intent in filing it. 
   Second, the putative second amended complaint is deficient on its face.  Pursuant to Rule 

11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper 
must be signed by … a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).  Mr. 
Harris did not sign his putative second amended complaint.  (ECF No. 13).  In light of these 
deficiencies, Mr. Harris’s motion to amend his pleading (ECF No. 13) by filing the putative second 
amended complaint, is denied as futile.                                   
   The Court nevertheless will afford Mr. Harris a final opportunity to correct his pleading 
deficiencies.  To do so, Mr. Harris must: (1) file a motion to amend the complaint; and (2) file, as 
an exhibit to his motion, a proposed Second Amended Complaint consistent with this Order.  This 
means that, at a minimum, to survive review, the proposed Second Amended Complaint must be 
signed, and it must incorporate all the allegations Mr. Harris seeks to plead in a single, standalone 

document without reference to of his previously-filed pleadings or other filings. 
I.   Mr. Harris’s IFP Application                                         
   Mr. Harris also requests to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  (ECF No. 3.)  As previously 
explained, because Mr. Harris is a prisoner, his IFP application is subject to the requirements of 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(b).  Section 1915(g) establishes the “Three Strikes Rule”, which provides that: 
        in no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action … under this section 
        [i.e., proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)] if the prisoner has, on 3 or 
        more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 
        brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 
        dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 
        state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner 
        is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.            
   For his part, Mr. Harris has accumulated more than three such “strikes” under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g):                                                                  
     •  Strike One: In Harris v. Ramsey County Courts, Case No. 23-cv-0197 (JRT/JFD) 
        (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2023), Mr. Harris alleged, among other things, that his court-

        appointed attorney was providing ineffective assistance of counsel.  That action 
        was dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  See 
        Harris, No. 23-cv-0197 (JRT/JFD) (ECF Nos. 8, 9).               
     •  Strike Two: In Harris v. Ramsey’s Courts, Case No. 23-cv-342 (NEB/LIB) (D. 
        Minn. Feb. 10, 2023), Mr. Harris challenged his bail, alleged detention center 
        officials retaliated against him by placing him in the “hole” when he complained 
        about his bail, and claimed officials ordered him to walk around naked at the 
        facility.  See id. (ECF No. 6).  That action was also dismissed without prejudice as 
        frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because his claims were duplicative of 

        a separate civil action—Harris v. A.D.C., Case No. 23-cv-0170 (ECT/TNL) (D. 
        Minn.).  See Harris, No. 23-cv-342 (NEB/LIB) (ECF Nos. 6, 7).   
     •  Strike Three: In Harris v. Schutz, Case No. 23-cv-377 (ECT/LIB) (D. Minn. Feb. 
        15, 2023), Mr. Harris argued, among other things, that in December 2022, the 
        defendants stopped and searched his person in violation of his constitutional rights.  
        See id. (ECF No. 3).  That action was dismissed without prejudice for failure to 
        state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).  
        See Harris, No. 23-cv-377 (ECT/LIB) (ECF Nos. 3, 4).            
     •  Strike Four: In Harris v. Goldfine, Case No. 23-cv-0426 (ECT/LIB) (D. Minn. Feb. 

        21, 2023), Mr. Harris alleged that the defendant, his court appointed criminal 
        defense attorney, provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel.  See id. (ECF 
        No. 1).  That action was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim 
        under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).  See Harris, Case No. 23-cv-0426 (ECT/LIB) (ECF 
        Nos. 4, 5).1                                                    

   In light of these previous dismissals, to commence this action Mr. Harris must pay the full 
filing fee of $405.00 (less the $6.50 he has already paid) unless he can establish that “he is under 
imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g); see also Charron v. Allen, 
37 F.4th 483, 486
 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Section 1915(g) does not prohibit prisoners from pursuing legal 
claims … It only limits their ability to proceed in forma pauperis.”) (quoting Lyon v. Krol, 
127 F.3d 763
, 765 (8th Cir. 1997)).  For the “imminent danger” exception to apply, “the requisite 
imminent danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint or appeal is filed, 
not when the alleged wrongdoing occurred.”  Martin v. Shelton, 
319 F.3d 1048
, 1050 (8th Cir. 
2003).  Furthermore, “[a]bsent specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or of a 
pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury,” “general” 

or “conclusory assertions” are insufficient to invoke this exception to the Three Strikes Rule.  Id.  
(citing Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 
239 F.3d 307
, 315 n.1 (3d. Cir. 2001) (en banc)).  In this case, 
none of Mr. Harris’s filings assert any specific facts suggesting he is in “imminent danger of 
serious physical injury.”  Mr. Harris thus cannot invoke the “imminent danger” exception and the 
Three Strikes Rule applies.  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g).  Mr. Harris’s IFP Application (ECF No. 3) is 
therefore denied.                                                         

   1 Mr. Harris has initiated two more federal lawsuits in this District as a prisoner.  See Harris 
v. A.D.C., Case No. 23-cv-0170 (ECT/TNL) (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2023); Harris v. Ramsey County 
Court, Case No. 23-cv-207 (JWB/ECW) (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2023).  Those actions were also 
dismissed on preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).  Harris, 23-cv-0170 (ECF No. 
19); Harris, 23-cv-207 (ECF No. 17).  But because those cases were dismissed, in part, for lack of 
jurisdiction, the Court does not count them as “strikes” for the purposes of 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(g). 
                         CONCLUSION                                     
   If Mr. Harris decides to continue pursuing this action, he must bring a motion to file a 
second amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order and pay the full 
$405 filing fee (less the $6.50 already paid, or $398.50) by August 20, 2024.  If Mr. Harris fails 

to submit full payment by that date, the Court will recommend dismissing the action without 
prejudice for failure to prosecute.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).  In addition, Mr. Harris shall have 
until August 20, 2024 to bring a motion to file a second amended complaint that is: (1) signed; 
and (2) a standalone document that fully incorporates all the allegations he seeks to plead.  If he 
meets that deadline promptly, the motion to amend is granted, and this case has not otherwise been 
dismissed by that date, the Court will withdraw its June 25, 2024 Report and Recommendation 
(ECF No. 8) recommending this case be dismissed based on its review of Mr. Harris’s prior 
pleadings.  The Court may, however, file another report and recommendation for dismissal if 
warranted.  As a reminder to Mr. Harris, should he pay the full filing fee and bring a motion to file 
a second amended complaint, if the motion to amend is granted his new pleading still will be 

subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to determine, for example, whether it states a 
cause of action on which relief can be granted.2                          

ORDER

   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                      



   2 As previously explained (ECF No. 8), the factual predicate of Mr. Harris’s federal claims 
also gave rise to state criminal charges against him.  Thus, even if Mr. Harris complies with the 
requirements of this Order and pleads a plausible claim for relief, so long as the state criminal 
proceedings remain pending, this action likely would be stayed pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37
 (1971).                                                           
   1.   The  Clerk  of  Court  is  directed  to  docket  Plaintiff  Joshua  Harris’s  purported 
amended complaint (ECF No. 13) as a Motion to Amend the Amended Complaint.   
   2.   Plaintiff Joshua Harris’s Motion to Amend the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13) 
is DENIED as futile.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).                       

   3.   Plaintiff Joshua Harris’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is 
DENIED.                                                                   
   4.   Mr. Harris may file a motion to file a second amended complaint addressing the 
deficiencies identified in this Order on or before August 20, 2024, failing which the Court’s Report 
and Recommendation for dismissal of this action (ECF No. 8) will not be withdrawn. 
   5.   Mr. Harris must pay the remainder of the full filing fee for this action ($405-$6.50) 
or $398.50 by August 20, 2024, failing which this Court will recommend that this action be 
dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.                     
IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                         

Dated: July 30, 2024            s/ Dulce J. Foster                      
                                DULCE J. FOSTER                         
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

Reference

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