Jackson v. Minnesota Department of Human Services

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota July 31, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Deidre Sherell Jackson, Case No. 0:20-cv-749 (KMM/TNL)

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Minnesota Department of Human
Services,

Defendant.

Deidre Jackson has worked for the Minnesota Department of Human Services
(hereafter, “DHS” or “the agency”) for nearly 20 years. In 2019, Ms. Jackson, already in a
supervisory role at DHS, applied for a new and more senior director position at the agency.
Ms. Jackson, who is black, was a finalist but was ultimately passed over for the promotion.
Instead, DHS promoted another internal candidate, who is white.
On March 18, 2020, Ms. Jackson filed a complaint in this Court alleging
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because of her color and
race in the agency’s failure to promote her, in the terms and conditions of her employment,
and as retaliation against her. See, e.g., ECF 1 at 3–4. On October 4, 2022, the Court granted
summary judgment in favor of DHS on all but Ms. Jackson’s failure–to–promote claim.
See generally ECF 153. Starting on October 23, 2023, a three–day bench trial was held on
Ms. Jackson’s surviving claim, in which the Court heard testimony from a number of
witnesses for both parties. See ECF 201–203. The Court, having heard and considered the
evidence and arguments of counsel, now makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Findings of Fact set forth herein are undisputed or have been proven by
a preponderance of the evidence.
2. To the extent the Court's Conclusions of Law may include what may be
considered Findings of Fact, they are incorporated herein by reference

I. The Parties
3. DHS is an agency of the State of Minnesota. ECF 197 (Stip. Trial Facts) ¶ 1.
4. Ms. Jackson is an employee of DHS. Id. ¶ 2.
5. Ms. Jackson is a black woman who identifies as African American. See, e.g.,
Trial Transcript1 82:13–14, 83:15–16.
II. Ms. Jackson’s Employment at DHS

6. Ms. Jackson began working for DHS on April 4, 2005, as a Health Care
Claims Specialist in the Claims Division. Stip. Facts ¶ 1.
7. Ms. Jackson moved into the Behavioral Health Division as a Policy
Specialist in 2012. Trial Tr. 13:23–14:10.
8. On April 27, 2016, Ms. Jackson was promoted to the position of Mental

Health Program Administrative Supervisor, a position she still holds. Stip. Trial Facts ¶ 2.

1 The full trial transcript is docketed as three volumes ECF Nos. 205–207. Pagination is
continuous from volume to volume. Citations herein are to page and line numbers within
the full transcript, without regard to volume number.
9. Ms. Jackson’s employment history at DHS reflects increased responsibility
and recognition over time, and she has received praise and positive feedback from her

colleagues and supervisors.
10. For example, Dominique Jones, Jackson’s former supervisor, testified that
Jackson was considered a resource to the Behavioral Health Division on questions of
Medicaid policy and payments. Trial Tr. 174:14–175:10.
11. Performance reviews from 2016 through 2018 indicate that she performed
well and never received a rating score indicating that she had failed to meet standards for

her position. Exs. P-02, P-04, P-06.
12. And in 2017, Ms. Jackson received an achievement award that included a
cash prize and recognition for her “strong contributions” to DHS. Ex. P-03.
13. But Ms. Jackson’s employment history at DHS also includes disciplinary
incidents, tension, and disputes between her and the agency.

14. For example, in April 2019, Ms. Jackson received a “Letter of
Expectations” identifying professional communication expectations and directing her to
complete coaching. Ex. P-14.
15. A Letter of Expectations is not formal discipline at DHS. Trial Tr. 412:6–
10. Instead, it is a prospective step, putting an employee on notice that discipline may be

administered in the future if needed improvement does not occur. Id. 412:12–16.
16. Ms. Jackson maintains that she has always communicated professionally in
the workplace and was aware of the policies requiring her to engage respectfully at DHS.
Id. 75:21–76:2, 103:5–104:9.
17. Ms. Jackson objected to the Letter of Expectation’s coaching requirement,
describing it as an effort to make her “be more acceptable for white people” and to “talk

white.” Id. 78:7–79:12, 106:5–7, 108:18–22; Ex. P-19. The Letter of Expectations was
later amended to require training instead. Trial Tr. 78:7–79:12; Ex. P-19.
18. In May 2019, Ms. Jackson was informed she had been named the subject
of an investigation. Ex. P-18. In August 2019, Ms. Jackson was informed that the
investigation was complete and its findings were inconclusive. Id.

19. Ms. Jackson was suspended for one day with pay on December 27, 2019.
Trial Ex. P-78; Trial Tr. 68:1–11. The suspension stemmed from a complaint concerning
Ms. Jackson’s interaction with one of her subordinates on August 30, 2019, and was
investigated by an outside law firm. Tr. Exs. P-42, P-71; Trial Tr. 81:18–24, 110:23–112:7,
117:17–118:15. The investigation concluded that Jackson “raised her voice” when

speaking with the subordinate, which was overheard by others, and “used an adverse
tone.” Ex. P-68 at 54.
20. Ms. Jackson’s suspension was later rescinded and removed from her
personnel file in October 2020 after Ms. Jackson successfully grieved the discipline. Ex.
P-71, P-83; Trial Tr. 81:18–82:8.

21. The most substantial dispute between Ms. Jackson and her employer
involved her use of a state–issued cell phone and the charges incurred in that use.
22. DHS issued Ms. Jackson a cell phone for work as a supervisor at the agency.
Trial Tr. 50:24–51:1.
23. The state of Minnesota has a policy concerning the “Appropriate Use of
Electronic Communication and Technology,” which applies to the use of state cell phones.

Ex. P-08; Trial Tr. at 424:17–24. The policy permits the “[l]imited and reasonable
incidental use” of state electronic devices, which is defined as “minimal duration in length
and frequency.” Ex. P-08 at 1. Managers and supervisors are “responsible for ensuring that
employees appropriately use all electronic tools through training, when necessary.” Id. at
5. The policy applies to intentional violations, providing that an employee who
“intentionally fails to comply” shall be subject to discipline. Id.; Trial Tr. 404:9–405:15,

436:8–16.
24. This policy applied to Ms. Jackson’s use of the cell phone. Trial Ex. P-8;
Trial Tr. 424:3–25.
25. At times, Ms. Jackson would use the hotspot on her work phone to connect
her work computer to the internet. Trial Tr. 51:7–10.

26. Ms. Jackson was not formally trained on using her work phone or the
hotspot on the work phone, but she had a general understanding of how to use her DHS–
issued cell phone hotspot. Id. 51:2–3, 53:8–9, 53:20–54:3, 96:25–97:9.
27. Over the course of August and October 2018, records indicate that Ms.
Jackson incurred data overages totaling $7,786.88 on her DHS–issued cell phone. Trial

Ex. P-9 at 2; Trial Ex. P-11; Trial Tr. 98:5–99:7.
28. After being informed about the overages, Ms. Jackson stated that she forgot
to turn off her DHS–issued cell phone hotspot, including overnight, but denied that she
intentionally violated state policy that applied to her use of the cell phone. Trial Ex. P-9;
Trial Tr. 51:7–16, 96:15–22. Ms. Jackson voluntarily turned in the cell phone, without
being asked to do so. Trial Tr. 58:17–19.

29. Based on the data overages, DHS initiated an investigation to determine
whether Ms. Jackson violated the Use of State Property policy. Trial Ex. P-9; Trial Tr.
425:15–426:10.
30. The investigation was conducted by Jan Brenk, an investigator with DHS.
Trial Ex. P-9; Trial Tr. 426:13–18. Investigators make fact findings but do not determine
whether the facts establish a policy violation. Trial Tr. 427:1–7.

31. The completed investigation was sent to Sean Tolefree, DHS’s Deputy
Director of Human Resources in 2019. Id. 405:2–15, 422:4–9. Mr. Tolefree reviewed the
investigative findings with DHS’s Work Incident Review Committee to determine whether
a policy violation had occurred and, if so, what discipline to recommend. Id. 420:14–21,

422:10–16, 427:8–10.
32. The investigation confirmed that Ms. Jackson had incurred data overages
totaling $7,786.88 on her DHS–issued cell phone. Trial Ex. P-9; Trial Transcript 426:2–
10, 427:8–14.
33. Mr. Tolefree was concerned by the amount of the data overages, which were

the highest he had ever seen. Id. 441:8–22. He was also concerned about investigative
findings suggesting Ms. Jackson had allowed someone else to use her DHS–issued cell
phone hotspot, potentially posing risks to the security of private DHS data. Id. 430:22–
431:13.
34. After reviewing the investigation report, Mr. Tolefree recommended
suspending Ms. Jackson. Trial Ex. P-9; Trial Tr. 427:18–429:6. However, Assistant DHS
Commissioner Claire Wilson chose to issue Ms. Jackson a written reprimand instead of a

suspension. Trial Tr. 428:13–429:2, 501:15–20.
35. Ms. Jackson was issued a written reprimand on February 15, 2019, for
violating state policy by incurring the data overages. Trial Ex. D-2; Trial Tr. 427:18–
429:15. Mr. Tolefree was involved in drafting the reprimand. Trial Tr. 429:4–6.
36. In addition to the written reprimand, DHS revoked Ms. Jackson’s telework
privileges. Trial Ex. D-2; Trial Tr. 96:5–12. Ms. Jackson has not been reissued a DHS cell

phone since the written reprimand. Trial Tr. 96:5–9.
37. Ms. Jackson understood that the February 2019 written reprimand would be
added to her DHS personnel file. Id. 120:20–22, 429:16–18.
38. By letter dated February 26, 2019, Behavioral Health Director Maisha Giles
requested that Ms. Jackson repay the $7,786.88 in data overages to the state of Minnesota.

Trial Ex. P-11; Trial Tr. 92:8–24, 98:7–14, 321:23–324:1. The letter included a Consent
to Payroll Collection form. Trial Ex. P-11; Trial Tr. 101:3–11.
39. Jackson’s union instructed her not to consent to the payroll deductions. Trial
Tr. 55:24–56:13.

40. Ms. Giles thereafter asked Ms. Jackson to sign the Consent to Payroll
Collection form, but Ms. Jackson refused. Trial Tr. 100:21–24, 101:6–14.
41. On January 9, 2020, Mr. Tolefree again requested that Ms. Jackson consent
to repay the data overages via deductions from her future earnings via an official DHS
letter. Trial Ex. P- 79; Trial Tr. 430:7–21, 442:1–9. Mr. Tolefree copied the Office of the
Legislative Auditor on this letter because it allegedly involved misuse of public funds.
Trial Tr. 431:25–432:5.

42. Ms. Jackson has not repaid any of the $7,786.88 in data overages and
testified that she has no intention of doing so. Id. 101:15–23.
43. Other DHS employees have had data overages on their state cell phones and
Mr. Tolefree cannot recall whether they were subject to discipline for those overages. Id.
441:8–13, 441:20–22.

III. The Moving Home Minnesota Director Position
44. On August 15, 2019, DHS posted a job opening for the Moving Home
Minnesota (“MHM”) Director position. Stip. Facts ¶ 4. The minimum qualifications for the
position included supervisory or other leadership experience and four years of professional
experience in grant management or policy experiences for public programming. Ex. P-36
at 10–11. The “preferred” qualifications for the position included a master’s degree in

public policy or a human–services related field, experience working with federal–state
human services programs, and understanding of service delivery systems and funding
streams for older adults and/or people living with disabilities. Id.
45. Anab Gulaid was the hiring manager for the MHM Director position. Trial
Tr. 119:15–17; 228:8–25. Ms. Gulaid was hired in February 2019 as a Deputy Assistant

Commissioner over the Community Supports Administration, which included Behavioral
Health. Id. 119:18–19, 223:1–7, 224:1–13. Ms. Gulaid was in an “appointed” position at
DHS and, therefore, did not have the same union representation as employees like Ms.
Jackson. See id. 66:8–16, 328:8–330:5.
46. Ms. Gulaid lacked experienced making new hires or promotions at DHS and
worked with Talent Acquisition Specialist, Zong Thao, on recruitment for the MHM

position. Ex. P-20; Ex. P-87 at ⁋⁋ 1–2; Trial Tr. 229:7–11, 230:23–231:2, 385:12–20,
387:16–18.
47. Ms. Gulaid encouraged Ms. Jackson to apply for the MHM position. Trial Tr.
35:18–36:5, 41:8–10, 316:11–19. On August 19, 2019, Ms. Jackson applied on August 19,
2019. Stip. Facts ¶ 5.
48. On September 17, 2019, Ms. Thao referred 23 candidates who met the

minimum qualifications for the MHM position, including Ms. Jackson, to Ms. Gulaid.
Trial Ex. P-32; Trial Tr. 239:3–10, 387:8–18.
49. Ms. Gulaid reviewed resumes for each of the 23 candidates and sorted them
into the following categories, reflecting whether they should receive an interview: “Yes,”
“Maybe,” and “No.” Exs. P-34 at 1, P-35 at 1; Trial Tr. 243:19–23. Ms. Gulaid redacted

the candidates’ names and asked several others at DHS to review the candidates’ resumes.
Trial Tr. 243:2–244:4. Every resume reviewer responded “yes” when asked if Ms. Jackson
should be offered an interview for the position. Ex. P-38 at 3. Ms. Jackson was the only
one of the 23 candidates to receive unanimous support to be interviewed. Id.
50. On September 25, 2019, Ms. Gulaid notified Daniel Pollock, then the

Assistant Commissioner for the Older Adults Administration, that she planned only to
interview five candidates. Ex. P-35 at 1; Trial Tr. 244:9–13, 465:10–12.
51. In an email, Ms. Gulaid identified her “top five” candidates to Mr. Pollock
“based on their comprehensive skills.” Trial Tr. 245:3–8; Ex. P-35 at 1–2. Ms. Jackson was
among the “top five,” and Ms. Gulaid highlighted Ms. Jackson’s experience with “CMS
rules” and “Medicaid benefit[s].” Ex. P-35 at 2; Trial Tr. 245:14–23, 246:19–21. Mr.

Pollock agreed Ms. Jackson should be interviewed. Exs. P-35 at p. 1, P-86 ⁋ 1; Trial Tr.
467:22–25.
52. In the same email exchange, Ms. Gulaid and Ms. Pollock agreed that Amy
Petersen, who was later selected for the MHM position, should not be offered an interview,
determining that at least five other candidates, including Ms. Jackson, were more qualified.
Ex. P-35 at 2; Trial Tr. 248:22–24, 279:25–280:2, 468:1–5.

53. Ms. Gulaid invited five applicants for a first interview, including Ms.
Jackson. Ex. P-36; Trial Tr. 45:19–46:12. Following Jackson’s interview, Gulaid believed
Jackson was qualified for the MHM Director role and the hiring committee agreed to move
her candidacy forward. Trial Tr. 253:24–254:16.
54. In mid-October 2019, Ms. Gulaid invited Ms. Jackson and two candidates

from the initial interview round to second interviews. Exs. P-39, P-40; Tr. Tran 46:3–6,
253:24–254:9, 316:24–317:2, 468:16–25. In the second interviews, Ms. Gulaid evaluated
a candidate’s leadership potential, whereas the first interview evaluated competency. Trial
Tr. 325:17–19.
55. Ms. Gulaid informed Ms. Jackson that her second interview went well. Id.

47:11–17, 255:24–256:1.
56. After completing the second interviews, Ms. Jackson was Ms. Gulaid’s “top
candidate.” Ex. P-41 at p. 2; Trial Tr. 274:3–14, 388:5–12. Ms. Gulaid concluded that Ms.
Jackson had the requisite skills relating to Medicaid policy and rules and services for
people with disabilities and older adults. Trial Tr. 251:5–12.

57. Ms. Gulaid decided to proceed with checking the references and personnel
files for Ms. Jackson and one other candidate, Heidi Hamilton. Id. 257:13–16, 271:17–24,
272:14–17. But Ms. Jackson was Ms. Gulaid’s top candidate, and Ms. Gulaid was “rooting
for” her to obtain the MHM Director job. Id. 274:3–6, 287:5–10.
58. It was Ms. Gulaid’s job to check candidate references and HR’s job to check
personnel files for the internal candidates. Id. 266:16–18, 271:23–272:2.

59. Ms. Gulaid notified Ms. Jackson she was one of the finalists for the role and
Ms. Jackson provided Ms. Gulaid with three references on October 22, 2019. Id. 47:18–
48:10, 119:25–120:2; Ex. P-44. All of Ms. Jackson’s references provided positive support
for Ms. Jackson’s candidacy. Trial Tr. 269:11–12, 510:12–511:8.
60. After checking Ms. Hamilton’s references, Gulaid decided not to advance

Ms. Hamilton because she was hesitant about whether Ms. Hamilton would be able to move
the program forward. Id. 270:16–271:11. By contrast, Ms. Gulaid testified Jackson “had a
vision” and “an idea about how to … move forward [and] to grow the program.” Id. 274:3–
14.
61. Ms. Gulaid asked Ms. Thao to review Ms. Jackson’s DHS personnel file,

which is standard practice for internal DHS job candidates. Id. 272:7–17, 387:19– 389:14,
416:11–417:22. Ms. Thao was trained on how to conduct personnel file reviews, and she
followed normal practices and policies and procedures in reviewing Ms. Jackson’s
DHS personnel file. Id. 401:9–402:3, 417: 18–22.
62. At the time she reviewed Ms. Jackson’s personnel file, Ms. Thao had never
met Ms. Jackson and did not know her race. Trial Tr. 289:19–24, 400:14–21.

63. In reviewing Ms. Jackson’s personnel file, Ms. Thao discovered Ms.
Jackson’s discipline related to communication issues and the cell phone bill dispute. Trial
Tr. 390:2–13, 391:8–20.
64. Ms. Thao informed Ms. Gulaid that there were some “red flags” in Ms.
Jackson’s personnel file and she shared her findings with Ms. Gulaid. Id. 271:17–273:25,
299:19–300:7, 394:19–25.

65. Ms. Gulaid was previously unaware of Ms. Jackson’s disciplinary history.
Id. 320:15–17.
66. The existence of disciplinary issues in Ms. Jackson’s file was a “big deal”
to Ms. Gulaid, who was new to DHS and still learning to grasp the complexity of
disciplinary conflicts between management and staff at the agency. Id. 329:7–330:5.

67. In particular, Ms. Gulaid was concerned that others at DHS in positions of
authority over her would be unsupportive of a decision to promote Ms. Jackson to the
MHM position because of the disciplinary issues flagged by Ms. Thao. Trial Tr. 276:3–8,
276:10–11. She sought assurances from leadership about Ms. Jackson’s record, but she
did not receive any response that would guide or make her feel more confident about her

choice. Id. 276:15–16.
68. Ms. Gulaid decided not to offer Ms. Jackson the MHM position. Trial Ex.
P-67; Trial Tr. 274:15– 18, 306:16–23. In doing so, Ms. Gulaid was the sole
decisionmaker. Trial Tr. 275:24–276:18.
69. On November 13, 2019, Ms. Gulaid told Ms. Jackson that she was not
selected for the position because of her discipline for the data overages. Trial Ex. P-58;

Trial Tr. 49:19–25, 50:6–17, 121:1–15, 295:3–296:9. Ms. Gulaid told Ms. Jackson that she
did not want to deal with collecting repayment of the overages from Ms. Jackson. Id.
122:14–19.
70. After conducting a background check on Ms. Hamilton, Ms. Gulaid
decided not to offer the MHM Director position to her, either. Id. 270:5–18, 322:9–11.
71. While Ms. Hamilton was qualified for the job and there were no concerns

with her background check, Ms. Gulaid did not feel she possessed the vision necessary to
move the MHM program forward. Id. 270:11–271:16.
72. Ms. Gulaid then looked to other candidates who had previously applied
and met the position’s minimum qualifications but were not initially interviewed. Id.
280:3–16.

73. Ms. Gulaid selected several new candidates to interview for the MHM
Director position, including Ms. Petersen. Id. 279:18–281:6. Ms. Petersen was one of
several applicants who were not initially interviewed but who remained viable candidates
based on Ms. Gulaid’s review of their resumés. Id. 280:21–281:8.
74. Ms. Petersen had prior experience working both with MHM program

participants and in health administration supervisory roles, including at DHS. Trial Ex.
P-28; Trial Tr. 286:20–287:4, 337:15–339:24, 372:13–375:8. Ms. Petersen holds a
master’s degree in public administration. Trial Tr. 335:10–25.
75. Ms. Gulaid and Ms. Petersen had not met before Ms. Petersen’s interview.
Id. 286:13–15, 375:9–13.
76. Ms. Gulaid conducted a round of follow-up interviews, as she had done

with the initial group of candidates. Id. 324:1–12. Ms. Petersen was among those who
received a second-round interview. Id. 281:2–15, 323:2–9.
77. Mr. Pollock participated in Ms. Petersen’s second-round interview. Id.
469:15–17.
78. At the conclusion of these interviews, Ms. Gulaid determined that
Ms. Petersen was a finalist for the MHM Director position and conducted a background

and reference check on her. Exs. P-53, P-57; Trial Tr. 288:2–12.
79. Ms. Petersen’s vision for the future of the MHM program impressed Ms.
Gulaid. Trial Tr. 324:13–325:14.
80. Ms. Gulaid asked Ms. Thao to review Ms. Petersen’s DHS personnel file.
Trial Ex. 53; Trial Tr. 288:6–12, 396:1–10.

81. At the time of her review of Ms. Petersen’s DHS personnel file, Ms. Thao
did not know Ms. Petersen and was unaware of Ms. Petersen’s race. Trial Tr. 401:1–6.
82. Ms. Thao followed the same process in reviewing Ms. Petersen’s DHS
personnel file that she did in reviewing Ms. Jackson’s DHS personnel file. Id. 396:6– 15,
401:20–22, 402:1–3.

83. Ms. Thao reviewed Ms. Petersen’s DHS personnel file but did not find
anything of concern. Trial Ex. P-59; Trial Tr. 288:6–25, 290:14–291:4, 396:16–397:1.
84. Ms. Thao subsequently informed Ms. Gulaid on November 13, 2019, that
she had not found anything concerning in Ms. Petersen’s DHS personnel file. Trial Ex. P-
59; Trial Tr. 288:6–25, 290:14–291:4, 396:16–22.
85. Unbeknownst to Ms. Thao, Ms. Petersen had received a written reprimand

three months earlier—on August 1, 2019—for violating DHS’s Respectful Workplace
Policy. Trial Ex. P-17; Trial Tr. 354:14–18, 397:18–23, 399:4–11. Ms. Thao testified that
she did not find any indication of the reprimand when reviewing Ms. Petersen’s file and
that she was not otherwise aware of any discipline against Ms. Petersen at the time she
reviewed Ms. Petersen's DHS personnel file. Trial Tr. 396:11–397:23.

86. Ms. Petersen has no other disciplinary history at DHS. Id. 375:14–19.
87. Ms. Petersen had been placed on a lengthy leave of absence prior to being
reprimanded, during which time she was the subject of an employment investigation that
culminated in the written reprimand. Id. 351:4–17, 358:3–4, 411:8–9, 448:15–23.

88. Records relating to employment investigations are not kept in DHS
personnel files, and therefore, Ms. Thao found no indication of the leave or the
investigation while reviewing Ms. Petersen’s file. Id. 388:23–389:7, 390:15–18, 393:2–9,
397:24–398:2, 413:14–17.
89. Ms. Petersen recalls mentioning during her second-round interview that

she had been disciplined. Trial Tr. 370:10–371:5, 376:13–25, 377:14–19.
90. Ms. Gulaid and Mr. Pollock, who participated in Ms. Petersen’s second-
round interview, testified that they did not recall Ms. Petersen disclosing that she had been
disciplined. Id. 289:1–4, 326:10–16, 469:18–470:7.
91. Ms. Gulaid testified that had no knowledge of Ms. Petersen’s investigatory
leave or discipline prior to hiring Ms. Petersen for the MHM Director position. Id. 286:9–
15, 326:10–20, 332:6–22.

92. Had Ms. Gulaid known of Ms. Petersen’s discipline, she testified that
would not have offered Ms. Petersen the MHM Director position. Id. 327:19–21, 332:20–
22.
93. Had Ms. Gulaid known of Ms. Petersen’s discipline and not offered Ms.
Petersen the MHM Director position, she is uncertain whether she would have revisited

Ms. Jackson’s candidacy or moved on to a new candidate entirely. Id. 330:14–331:12.
94. Ms. Gulaid offered the MHM Director position to Ms. Petersen, and
Ms. Petersen accepted on November 15, 2019. Trial Ex. P-60.
95. Ms. Jackson met with Ms. Gulaid to discuss why she was not selected for
the MHM Director job. Trial Tr. 63:14–64:14, 303:5–13.
96. During this meeting, Ms. Gulaid informed Ms. Jackson that Ms. Petersen

had been hired for the position. Id. Ms. Jackson asked Ms. Gulaid whether she knew that
Ms. Petersen had been on an investigatory leave of absence. Id. Ms. Gulaid said she did
not and seemed surprised by this information. Id.
97. Ms. Petersen began working as the MHM Director on December 4, 2019.
Stip. Facts ¶ 10.

98. On January 3, 2020, Ms. Jackson met with Ms. Gulaid, Mr. Tolefree, and
Connie Jones, who was then DHS’s Human Resources Director. Trial Ex. P-77; Trial Tr.
61:1–4, 67:16–21, 124:7–10, 125:1–126:4, 305:13–306:21, 432:22–434:20. The purpose
of this meeting was to further discuss why Ms. Jackson was not selected for the MHM
Director position. Trial Tr. 67:16–21, 124:7–10, 125:1–126:4, 305:13–306:21, 432:22–
434:20. During this meeting, Ms. Gulaid again indicated that her decision not to hire Ms.

Jackson was based on Ms. Jackson’s discipline for the data overages. Id. Mr. Tolefree’s
handwritten notes of this meeting state that Ms. Jackson’s discipline was a “big deal” for
Ms. Gulaid. Trial Ex. P-77; Trial Tr. 433:23–434:17.
IV. Work Culture at DHS
99. During the trial, Ms. Jackson testified extensively about her perceptions of
the bias and disparate treatment she has experienced while employed at DHS. Other

employee witnesses who worked in the Behavioral Health Division with Mr. Jackson
testified to similar perceptions and experiences.
100. Dominique Jones, a black woman who has worked at DHS for seven years
and who previously supervised Ms. Jackson, testified that she has experienced differential
treatment based on her race. Trial Tr. 144:1–4, 169:8-15, 173:1–15. Ms. Jones testified

that she would participate in Behavioral Health Division meetings and be ignored,
skipped over, and have her contributions to the discussion dismissed by white employees,
whereas suggestions from her white colleagues would be welcomed and validated. Id.
161:10–20, 162:21–163:2, 163:24–164:11, 169:18–170:9, 171:6–9.
101. Ms. Jones also testified that she has observed DHS grant employees’

requests to transfer and not be supervised by people of color but deny similar requests
when the supervisor is white. Id. 164:20–165:24.
102. Ms. Jones further testified that she has had concerns about whether a
candidate’s race was a factor in how a DHS hiring panel perceived a candidate. Id.

165:25–167:6.
103. Ms. Jones also disagrees with concerns about Ms. Jackson’s
communication style. Id. 169:8–9, 177:19–178:5, 179:4–10. When Ms. Jones supervised
Ms. Jackson, Ms. Jones was often added to email chains and asked about Ms. Jackson’s
communications, but after reading the communications, Ms. Jones believed that Ms.
Jackson was being respectful. Id. 180:24–181:6.

104. Similarly, in Ms. Jackson’s 2017 Annual Performance Review, her then–
manager, Carole LaBine, acknowledged that Jackson “has had to deal with racism and
unreasonable expectations (due to racism) from team members, others in the agency and
partners, in her daily work.” Ex. P-04 at 351; Trial Tr. 22:23–23:10. Ms. LaBine further
wrote that Jackson “can focus on the end goal in order to work through these times with

grace and integrity. Deidre is very vocal and I appreciate she is willing to push and question
the system.” Ex. P-04 at 351.
105. Jeffrey Hunsberger, who identifies as African American and who recently
retired after 26 years at DHS, testified that during his tenure in the Behavioral Health
Division, he observed white employees being treated more favorably than black

employees in a workplace environment where “two standards existed.” Trial Tr. 479:16–
19, 482:14, 485:11–486:15, 490:8–10; id. 482:20–22, 482:16-18, 492:2–12.
106. Mr. Hunsberger testified that he experienced hostile treatment from a white
supervisor who spoke to him in a condescending way, trying to “establish intellectual

superiority,” which Hunsberger believed was related to his race. Id. 487:5-20.
107. Patina Thomas, a black supervisor in the Behavioral Health Division with
Ms. Jackson, who has worked at DHS for nine years, described the culture in the Division
as “toxic.” Id. 495:14-21, 496:11, 502:12-13.
108. Ms. Thomas has observed that DHS employees experience differential
treatment based on their race. Id. 498:3-499:9.

109. She further testified that she has observed this disparate treatment as a
hiring manager during DHS’ hiring processes, particularly with respect to salary offers,
and she described incidents in which she had to push for DHS to approve salary offers for
black candidates at levels consistent with previously hired white candidates. Id. 502:19–
505:7.

110. Ms. Thomas also testified about her belief that less-qualified white
candidates were more likely to receive promotions at DHS. Id. 505:8-506:8.
111. Finally, Ms. Gulaid testified that she secured a monetary settlement of a
claim of race-based discrimination she made against DHS related to the elimination of
her position in 2020 and her own unsuccessful attempt to secure a different position

within the agency. Id. 309:2–313:5.
FINDINGS OF LAW
I. Legal Standard
112. Ms. Jackson’s claim arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which
makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
113. Such a violation of Title VII occurs when a plaintiff “demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e–2(m).
114. Ms. Jackson claims she was denied promotion to the MHM Director

position because she is black. Her failure–to–promote claim is the sole claim that survived
summary judgment. See ECF 153 at 1.
115. “A plaintiff may prove unlawful racial discrimination through either direct
or circumstantial evidence.” Lucke v. Solsvig,

912 F.3d 1084, 1087

 (8th Cir. 2019).  
    116.  Where,  as  here,  a  plaintiff  seeks  to  support  her  discrimination  claim 

through circumstantial evidence, “she must proceed under the framework laid out in 
McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green.”

Id.

 (citing McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792

 (1973)).                                                     
    117.  To establish a prima facie failure–to–promote case, a plaintiff must show 
that “(1) she is in a protected class; (2) she was qualified for an open position; (3) she was 

denied that position; and (4) the [employer] filled the position with a person not in the 
same protected class.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester,

643 F.3d 1031, 1046

 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Dixon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist.,

578 F.3d 862

, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2009).  
    118.  Thereafter, under McDonnell Douglas, the burden shifts to the defendant, 
who “must show a ‘legitimate, non–discriminatory reason’ for the challenged conduct.” 
Lucke,

912 F.3d at 1084

 (quoting Young v. Builders Steel Co.,

754 F.3d 573

, 577–78 (8th 

Cir. 2014)).                                                              
    119.  If the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden returns once again to 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reason is pretextual “and that discrimination was 
the real reason” for the employer’s conduct. Id. at 1088 (quotation omitted). 
    120.  A  plaintiff  may  show  pretext  by  establishing  that  an  “employer's 
explanation is unworthy of credence because it has no basis in fact.” Torgerson,

643 F.3d at 1047

 (cleaned up).                                                     
    121.  Or a plaintiff may show pretext “by persuading the court that a prohibited 
reason more likely motivated the employer.”

Id.

(cleaned up).
122. “Either route amounts to showing that a prohibited reason, rather than the
employer's stated reason, actually motivated the employer's action.” Id.

123. In its summary judgment order, the Court concluded that Ms. Jackson had
established a prima facie case and shifted the burden to DHS to articulate a legitimate,
non–discriminatory reason for failing to promote her. See ECF 153 at 7–8.
124. The evidence at trial further supports that conclusion. First, it remains
undisputed that Ms. Jackson is a member of a protected class, specifically that she is a

black woman and African American. Second, testimony establishes that she was qualified
for the promotion she sought. Ms. Jackson was advanced unanimously to the interview
round for the MHM position and was Ms. Gulaid’s top pick for the role. No testimony or
evidence suggests that any person had objective concerns about Ms. Jackson’s
qualifications for the position. Third, it remains undisputed that Ms. Jackson was not
promoted. Fourth, it remains undisputed that Ms. Petersen, who was promoted instead, is

a white woman.
125. Also in its summary judgment order, the Court concluded that DHS had
met its subsequent obligation to articulate a legitimate, non–discriminatory reason for
failing to promote Ms. Jackson. See id. at 8.
126. The evidence at trial also supports this conclusion. The trial testimony of
several witnesses, and in particular of Ms. Gulaid, is consistent with DHS’s long–

proffered non–discriminatory basis that Ms. Jackson was not promoted because of the
issues flagged in her personnel file, especially the cellphone bill dispute.
127. Finally, this Court found in its summary judgment order that Ms. Jackson
had presented questions of triable fact as to whether DHS’s legitimate, non–

discriminatory reason for failing to promote her was a mere pretext for racial
discrimination against her and the desire to hire a white candidate in her place. See id. at
9.
II. Failure to Prove Pretext

128. Based on the evidence at trial, Ms. Jackson has failed to prove pretext.
129. First, Ms. Jackson has failed to prove pretext because she has failed to
establish that DHS’s explanation “is unworthy of credence because it has no basis in fact.”
Torgerson,

643 F.3d at 1047

(cleaned up). Indeed, evidence at trial suggests a strong

factual basis to back up DHS’s non-discriminatory explanation.
130. The evidence shows that Ms. Gulaid was the sole decisionmaker in
deciding not to promote Ms. Jackson.

131. Evidence also overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that, in her
capacity as the decisionmaker, Ms. Gulaid declined to offer Ms. Jackson the promotion
because she was informed by Ms. Thao that Ms. Jackson’s file had revealed “red flags,”
and in particular, that Ms. Jackson was in an ongoing dispute with DHS over a cell phone
bill that exceeded $7,000.

132. To be sure, there is nothing straightforward about Ms. Jackson’s dispute
with her employer over the cellphone bill. Ms. Jackson’s testimony raised legitimate
questions about her culpability for the data overages that led to this dispute with her
employer. And Ms. Gulaid’s testimony reveals that she was frustrated and confused by

her own lack of guidance about what significance to place on Ms. Jackson’s discipline
over the bill when considering her candidacy. Simply put, it seems possible that the cell
phone bill may have determined the outcome of Ms. Jackson’s promotion decision in a
way that was, in the general sense, unfair to Ms. Jackson. But the cell phone bill is not on
trial in this case. Absent evidence that the existence of the cellphone bill dispute was itself

grounded in racial discrimination against Ms. Jackson, the fact that there may be
reasonable disagreement over whether Ms. Jackson ought to be blamed and/or held
responsible for the data overage is not relevant to the outcome of her Title VII claim.
133. Setting aside the bureaucratic complexity of its merits, there is also no

evidence to suggest that the cell phone dispute was used as pretext for racial
discrimination.
134. There is no evidence that anyone influenced or controlled Ms. Thao when

she flagged the cell phone dispute to Ms. Gulaid and no evidence that Ms. Gulaid was
influenced or controlled by anyone else in how to interpret the dispute’s significance to
Ms. Jackson’s candidacy.
135. Instead, the evidence at trial supports the conclusion that neither Ms. Thao

nor Ms. Gulaid had any preexisting knowledge about the dispute, that Ms. Thao came to
know about the dispute through her routine review of Ms. Jackson’s personnel file, and
that upon learning about the dispute from Ms. Thao, Ms. Gulaid accepted the information
at face value—meaning she accepted as true that Ms. Jackson was involved in a dispute
with the agency over thousands of dollars in cell phone bills—without outside influence.

136. Finally, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that Ms. Gulaid
independently seized on the cell phone dispute as a pretext for her own discriminatory
desire not to promote Ms. Jackson or that Ms. Thao flagged the dispute to Ms. Gulaid out
of her own discriminatory desire to harm Ms. Jackson’s candidacy.

137. The most likely conclusion then is that knowledge of the cell phone bill,
coupled with the other items flagged in Ms. Jackson’s file, led Ms. Gulaid to grow nervous
about offering Ms. Jackson the promotion. Indeed, Ms. Gulaid, who was relatively new
to DHS and a political appointee, explicitly testified about these concerns. She credibly
testified that she sought assurances from DHS leadership that the items in Ms. Jackson’s

file were “not a big deal” and that “someone will back me up if I take that step [of
promoting Ms. Jackson despite of them].” Trial Tr. 276:3–8; see also

id.

 276:10–11 
(“[W]hat I was looking for was like support.”). And when she did not receive any response 

from leadership, one way or the other, she took the cautious approach and decided to not 
promote Ms. Jackson.

Id.

 276:15–16 (credibly testifying that she concluded that, “I can't 
move forward without someone else signing off and saying it's not a big deal”).  
    138.  Having failed to demonstrate that DHS’s proffered non-discriminatory 
reason for not promoting her was factually baseless, the evidence at trial has also failed 

to “persuad[e] the court that a prohibited reason more likely motivated” DHS. Torgerson,

643 F.3d at 1047

 (cleaned up).                                            
    139.  One basis by which this Court could be persuaded that race, rather than her 
personnel file, was the more likely reason that Ms. Jackson did not receive the MHM 

position is that Ms. Petersen, a white woman who had her own disciplinary record at DHS, 
was promoted instead. See King v. Hardesty,

517 F.3d 1049, 1063

 (8th Cir. 2008), 
abrogated  on  other  grounds  by  Torgerson,

643 F.3d 1031

  (“Instances  of  disparate 
treatment can support a claim of pretext.”). Indeed, this apparent disparate treatment 
strongly informed the Court’s decision to allow Ms. Jackson’s failure–to–promote claim 

to proceed to trial. See ECF 153 at 12–14.                                
    140.  But the evidence at trial concerning Ms. Petersen’s selection does not 
support the conclusion that the likely basis for DHS’s failure to promote Ms. Jackson was 
its desire to hire a white woman instead.                                 

    141.  Most crucially, the trial evidence reveals that Ms. Jackson’s rejection and 
Ms. Petersen’s selection were fairly attenuated. Initially, Ms. Jackson was Ms. Gulaid’s 
clear favorite for the promotion, a fact that Ms. Gulaid shared with Ms. Jackson and 

others. This fact alone weighs strongly against the notion that a Ms. Gulaid had the 
discriminatory intent to deny her the promotion because of her race. See Barnes v. Bd. Of 
Trustees of Univ. of Ill.,

946 F.3d 384, 390

(7th Cir. 2020) (finding no pretext where
decisionmaker actively encouraged members of plaintiff’s protected class to apply for
position). And there is no evidence that Ms. Gulaid had any candidate in mind, let alone
Ms. Petersen or another white person, when she reversed course on Ms. Jackson’s

candidacy. Indeed, before going back to the drawing board in terms of candidates, Ms.
Gulaid initially declined to offer the MHM director position to Ms. Jackson’s original co–
finalist, who is white.
142. Further, even if Ms. Petersen had been hired immediately after Ms. Jackson

was removed from consideration, the Court would not find that it was persuaded that the
more likely basis for DHS’s failure to promote Ms. Jackson was due to racial
discrimination.
143. First, Ms. Thao credibly testified that she was unaware of Ms. Jackson’s

and Ms. Petersen’s races when she reviewed their respective DHS personnel files.
144. Second, Ms. Gulaid credibly testified that she did not know of Ms.
Petersen’s disciplinary record when she hired Ms. Petersen for the position and testified
credibly that she would not have hired Ms. Petersen had she known about it.
145. While it is true that Ms. Petersen credibly testified that she disclosed her
suspension during her second-round interview with Ms. Gulaid and Mr. Pollock, both Ms.
Gulaid and Mr. Pollock credibly testified that they had no recollection of that disclosure.

146. Ms. Jackson is understandably frustrated that Ms. Gulaid ultimately
became aware of disciplinary issues in her personnel file but not in Ms. Petersen’s.
However, the evidence nevertheless supports the conclusion that this was a genuine
oversight. Ultimately, “[t]he fact that [Ms. Gulaid’s] decision may have been uninformed
is not evidence that it was motivated by racial animus.” Gold Star Taxi & Transp. Serv. v.
Mall of Am. Co.,

987 F. Supp. 741, 751

 (D. Minn. 1997).                   

    147.  A final basis by which the Court might be persuaded that race was the more 
likely basis for DHS’s failure to promote Ms. Jackson lies in the testimony of herself and 
others about their experiences of racial prejudice at DHS. This testimony is often referred 
to as “me too” evidence and can inform a conclusion of pretext in racial discrimination 

cases. See Callahan v. Runyun,

75 F.3d 1293, 1298

 (8th Cir. 1996) (evidence of other, 
unrelated instances of discrimination may “assist in the development of a reasonable 
inference of discrimination within the context of each case's respective facts”) (quoting 
Bradford v. Norfolk S. Corp.,

54 F.3d 1412

, 1419 (8th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. Hennepin 
Tech. Ctr.,

900 F.2d 153

, 156 (8th Cir. 1990) ( “[B]ackground evidence [of discrimination]

may be critical for the jury’s assessment of whether a given employer was more likely
than not to have acted from an unlawful motive.”).
148. Indeed, the “me too” testimony in this case was broadly credible and paints
a picture of DHS during the time in question as an environment in which black employees
routinely feel marginalized relative to their white colleagues. However, this testimony
simply does not sufficiently support the theory that racial discrimination led to the specific

failure to promote Ms. Jackson at issue in this case.
149. Here, Ms. Jones, Mr. Hunsberger, Ms. Thomas, and Ms. Jackson each
testified credibly to instances in which they felt that white colleagues had treated them or
other black colleagues with disrespect or prejudice, or in which small disciplinary matters
had been unfairly escalated against them, or in which white colleagues had gotten away

with behavior that black colleagues would not have. Ms. Jones and Ms. Thomas also
provided testimony that they believe race has played a part in hiring and/or salary
decisions at DHS.
150. But notably, none of these witnesses testified to specific instances of

alleged racial discrimination in hiring or promoting at DHS, other than Ms. Jackson’s
testimony concerning herself. Instead, what these witnesses provided was credible
subjective experiences and perceptions. But the anecdotal value of this evidence to the
outcome of Ms. Jackson’s Title VII case is diminished by the fact that three of the four
witness who testified to experiences of racism at DHS—Ms. Jackson, Ms. Jones, Ms.

Thomas—were nevertheless promoted into supervisory roles at the agency. Moreover, this
trial also featured testimony from Ms. Gulaid, a black woman in a supervisory role at
DHS, and testimony about Ms. Giles, another black woman in a supervisory role.
151. Ultimately, though the very troubling evidence in this case shows that

numerous black employees experienced racial prejudice and biased attitudes at their
workplace, that evidence does not overcome the specific, non-discriminatory reasons that
Ms. Jackson was not promoted.

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that judgment be entered for Defendant Minnesota Department of Human 
Services and against Plaintiff Deidre Sherell Jackson.                    


    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 

Date: July 31, 2024                 s/ Katherine M. Menendez             
                                   Katherine M. Menendez                 
                                   United States District Judge

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Deidre Sherell Jackson, Case No. 0:20-cv-749 (KMM/TNL)

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Minnesota Department of Human
Services,

Defendant.

Health Program Administrative Supervisor, a position she still holds. Stip. Trial Facts ¶ 2.

912 F.3d 1084, 1087

 (8th Cir. 2019).  
    116.  Where,  as  here,  a  plaintiff  seeks  to  support  her  discrimination  claim 

through circumstantial evidence, “she must proceed under the framework laid out in 
McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green.”

Id.

 (citing McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792

 (1973)).                                                     
    117.  To establish a prima facie failure–to–promote case, a plaintiff must show 
that “(1) she is in a protected class; (2) she was qualified for an open position; (3) she was 

denied that position; and (4) the [employer] filled the position with a person not in the 
same protected class.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester,

643 F.3d 1031, 1046

 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Dixon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist.,

578 F.3d 862

, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2009).  
    118.  Thereafter, under McDonnell Douglas, the burden shifts to the defendant, 
who “must show a ‘legitimate, non–discriminatory reason’ for the challenged conduct.” 
Lucke,

912 F.3d at 1084

 (quoting Young v. Builders Steel Co.,

754 F.3d 573

, 577–78 (8th 

Cir. 2014)).                                                              
    119.  If the defendant articulates such a reason, the burden returns once again to 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reason is pretextual “and that discrimination was 
the real reason” for the employer’s conduct. Id. at 1088 (quotation omitted). 
    120.  A  plaintiff  may  show  pretext  by  establishing  that  an  “employer's 
explanation is unworthy of credence because it has no basis in fact.” Torgerson,

643 F.3d at 1047

 (cleaned up).                                                     
    121.  Or a plaintiff may show pretext “by persuading the court that a prohibited 
reason more likely motivated the employer.”

Id.

(cleaned up).
122. “Either route amounts to showing that a prohibited reason, rather than the
employer's stated reason, actually motivated the employer's action.” Id.

643 F.3d at 1047

(cleaned up). Indeed, evidence at trial suggests a strong

factual basis to back up DHS’s non-discriminatory explanation.
130. The evidence shows that Ms. Gulaid was the sole decisionmaker in
deciding not to promote Ms. Jackson.

evidence to suggest that the cell phone dispute was used as pretext for racial
discrimination.
134. There is no evidence that anyone influenced or controlled Ms. Thao when

file were “not a big deal” and that “someone will back me up if I take that step [of
promoting Ms. Jackson despite of them].” Trial Tr. 276:3–8; see also

id.

 276:10–11 
(“[W]hat I was looking for was like support.”). And when she did not receive any response 

from leadership, one way or the other, she took the cautious approach and decided to not 
promote Ms. Jackson.

Id.

 276:15–16 (credibly testifying that she concluded that, “I can't 
move forward without someone else signing off and saying it's not a big deal”).  
    138.  Having failed to demonstrate that DHS’s proffered non-discriminatory 
reason for not promoting her was factually baseless, the evidence at trial has also failed 

to “persuad[e] the court that a prohibited reason more likely motivated” DHS. Torgerson,

643 F.3d at 1047

 (cleaned up).                                            
    139.  One basis by which this Court could be persuaded that race, rather than her 
personnel file, was the more likely reason that Ms. Jackson did not receive the MHM 

position is that Ms. Petersen, a white woman who had her own disciplinary record at DHS, 
was promoted instead. See King v. Hardesty,

517 F.3d 1049, 1063

 (8th Cir. 2008), 
abrogated  on  other  grounds  by  Torgerson,

643 F.3d 1031

  (“Instances  of  disparate 
treatment can support a claim of pretext.”). Indeed, this apparent disparate treatment 
strongly informed the Court’s decision to allow Ms. Jackson’s failure–to–promote claim 

to proceed to trial. See ECF 153 at 12–14.                                
    140.  But the evidence at trial concerning Ms. Petersen’s selection does not 
support the conclusion that the likely basis for DHS’s failure to promote Ms. Jackson was 
its desire to hire a white woman instead.                                 

    141.  Most crucially, the trial evidence reveals that Ms. Jackson’s rejection and 
Ms. Petersen’s selection were fairly attenuated. Initially, Ms. Jackson was Ms. Gulaid’s 
clear favorite for the promotion, a fact that Ms. Gulaid shared with Ms. Jackson and 

others. This fact alone weighs strongly against the notion that a Ms. Gulaid had the 
discriminatory intent to deny her the promotion because of her race. See Barnes v. Bd. Of 
Trustees of Univ. of Ill.,

946 F.3d 384, 390

987 F. Supp. 741, 751

 (D. Minn. 1997).                   

    147.  A final basis by which the Court might be persuaded that race was the more 
likely basis for DHS’s failure to promote Ms. Jackson lies in the testimony of herself and 
others about their experiences of racial prejudice at DHS. This testimony is often referred 
to as “me too” evidence and can inform a conclusion of pretext in racial discrimination 

cases. See Callahan v. Runyun,

75 F.3d 1293, 1298

 (8th Cir. 1996) (evidence of other, 
unrelated instances of discrimination may “assist in the development of a reasonable 
inference of discrimination within the context of each case's respective facts”) (quoting 
Bradford v. Norfolk S. Corp.,

54 F.3d 1412

, 1419 (8th Cir. 1995); Hawkins v. Hennepin 
Tech. Ctr.,

900 F.2d 153

, 156 (8th Cir. 1990) ( “[B]ackground evidence [of discrimination]

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that judgment be entered for Defendant Minnesota Department of Human 
Services and against Plaintiff Deidre Sherell Jackson.                    


    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 

Date: July 31, 2024                 s/ Katherine M. Menendez             
                                   Katherine M. Menendez                 
                                   United States District Judge

Reference

Status: Unknown