Regents of the University of Minnesota v. AT&T Mobility LLC

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Regents of the University of Minnesota v. AT&T Mobility LLC

Trial Court Opinion

               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
                  DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                              
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF                                             
MINNESOTA,                                                               
                                 Civil No. 14-4666 (JRT/TNL)         

                   Plaintiff,                                        

v.                               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER            
                             DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR          
AT&T MOBILITY LLC,                  JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS            

                  Defendant,                                         

ERICSSON, INC., and NOKIA OF                                             
AMERICA CORP.,                                                           

         Intervenor-Defendants.                                      

Aamir Abdulqader Kazi, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, 1180 Peachtree Street  
Northeast, Atlanta, GA 30309; Conrad A. Gosen, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, 
60  South  Sixth  Street,  Suite  3200,  Minneapolis,  MN  55402;  Frank  E. 
Scherkenbach, Lawrence K. Kolodney, Whitney Reichel, and Daniel Haran 
Wade, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, One Marina Park Drive, Boston, MA 02210; 
John-Paul Robert Fryckman, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, 12860 El Camino    
Real,  Suite  400,  San  Diego,  CA  92130;  Katherine  D.  Prescott,  FISH  & 
RICHARDSON, PC, 500 Arguello Street, Suite 400, Redwood City, CA 94603; 
Brian J. Slovut and Carrie Ryan Gallia, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 
FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, 200 Oak Street Southeast, Suite 360, 
Minneapolis, MN 55455; William R. Woodford, AVANTECH LAW, LLP, 80    
South Eighth Street, Suite 900, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Plaintiff. 

Barbara P. Berens, Kari S. Berman, and Carrie L. Zochert, BERENS & MILLER, 
PA, 80 South Eighth Street, Suite 3720, Minneapolis, MN 55402; Benjamin 
Hershkowitz, Josh A. Krevitt, Laura Corbin, and Robert Scott Roe, GIBSON, 
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166; Neema      
Jalali, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 555 Mission Street, Suite 3000, San 
 Francisco, CA 94105; Yeepay Audrey Yang, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER     
 LLP, 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 2100, Dallas, TX 75201, for Defendant AT&T 
 Mobility LLC.                                                        


 Nearly one year after the dispositive motion deadline, Defendant AT&T Mobility, 
LLC (“AT&T”) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  After trying its hand at 
summary judgment, AT&T now sets forth another theory: Regents of the University of 
Minnesota’s (“Regents”) ’768 patent is invalid because it is directed to an abstract idea 
and lacks an inventive concept.  Because AT&T’s motion is procedurally improper and 
would fail on the merits in any event, the Court will deny AT&T’s Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings.                                                            
                       BACKGROUND                                     
 The factual background of this case has been discussed at length in the Court’s 

prior orders, so the Court will describe only the facts necessary to assess AT&T’s motion.  
See generally Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. AT&T Mobility LLC (Regents Claim Constr.), 
No. 14-4666, 
2022 WL 3142322
 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2022); Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC (Regents Summ. J.), No. 14-4666, 
2024 WL 758541
 (D. Minn. Feb. 23, 

2024).  This motion targets the’768 patent, on which Regents base Count One of their 
Amended Complaint.  (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31–36, Jan. 30, 2015, Docket No. 25.) 
 The ’768 patent “provide[s] for particular methods to be utilized within certain 
portions of” a data transmission system “which are intended to help with the speed and 

reliability of wireless communication.”  Regents Claim Constr., 
2022 WL 3142322
, at *2.  
The specification describes the problem of “fading” in wireless mobile communications, 
which is interference that may be mitigated by error control coding and diversity.  (Decl. 

Benjamin Hershkowitz (“Hershkowitz Decl.”) Supp. Mot. J. on the Pleadings ¶ 2, Ex. 1 at 
13 (“’768 Patent”), May 20, 2024, Docket No. 751.)  The patent describes techniques that 
“combine error-control [] coding and complex field linear precoding with small size 
precoders to improve diversity gain and, as a result, system performance.”  (Id.)  The 

parties focus on Claim 13, which the Court will treat as representative for the purpose of 
deciding this motion.  The claim describes:                               
      A system comprising:                                            
      a transmitter that includes:                                    
        an error-control coder that applies an error correction       
           code  to  produce  an  encoded  data  stream  of           
           information-bearing symbols;                               
        a bit interleaver to produce an interleaved data stream 15    
           in which neighboring data bits of the encoded data         
           stream  are  positioned  to  be  mapped  to  different     
           constellation  symbols  selected  from  a  constellation   
           having a finite alphabet;                                  
        a mapping unit to map the neighboring data bits of the 20     
           encoded  data  stream  to  the  different  constellation   
           symbols;  a  precoder  that  linearly  precodes  the       
           constellation  symbols  over  a  complex  field  without   
           restriction to an alphabet size of the constellation to    
           produce a joint 25 coded-precoded data stream;             
        a symbol interleaver to process the precoded data stream      
           to produce permuted blocks of precoded symbols;            
        a modulator to output a waveform from the permuted 30         
           blocks of precoded symbols; and                            
      a receiver that receives the waveform from the transmitter via  
        a wireless communication channel, and demodulates the         
        waveform to produce estimated data.                           
(Id. at 19.)                                                              
 AT&T  filed  its  Motion  for  Judgment  on  the  Pleadings  on  May  20,  2024, 
notwithstanding the dispositive motions deadline of June 1, 2023.  (13th Am. Pretrial 
Scheduling Order (“Scheduling Order”) at 13, July 3, 2024, Docket No. 777; Mot. for J. on 
the Pleadings, Docket No. 748.)  At the dispositive motion deadline, the Defendants filed 

three  separate  summary  judgment  motions,  with  extended  word  limits,  covering 
numerous theories and lines of attack.  (See Order, May 22, 2023, Docket No. 501; Defs.’ 
Mot. Summ. J., June 1, 2023, Docket No. 543; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., June 1, 2023, Docket 
No. 580; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., June 1, 2023, Docket No. 586.)  The Court denied the 

motions and set trial for December 2, 2024.  Regents Summ. J., 
2024 WL 758541
, at *18; 
(Scheduling Order at 3–4, 6, 14.)                                         
                        DISCUSSION                                    
I.   STANDARD OF REVIEW                                                   

 The Court applies Eighth Circuit law to procedural issues, while Federal Circuit 
precedent  controls  matters  of  substantive  patent  law.    See  In  re  Spalding  Sports 
Worldwide, Inc., 
203 F.3d 800, 803
 (Fed. Cir. 2000).                      
 The Court analyzes a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under the 

same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 
552 F.3d 659, 665
 (8th Cir. 2009).  Thus, the Court must 
determine whether the Complaint states a “claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
588 F.3d 585, 594
 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009)).  The Court construes the Complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Ashley 
Cnty., 
552 F.3d at 665
.  Although the Court accepts the Complaint’s factual allegations as 
true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555
 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 
478 U.S. 265, 286
  (1986)),  or  mere  “labels  and  conclusions  or  a  formulaic  recitation  of  the 
elements of a cause of action,” Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678
 (quotation omitted).  Instead, “[a] 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  
Id.
  Courts may resolve questions of patent ineligibility as a matter of law.  Ultramercial, 
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 
772 F.3d 709
, 712–13 (Fed. Cir. 2014).                 

 The Court may consider the allegations in the Complaint as well as “those materials 
that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 
774 F.3d 442, 444
 (8th Cir. 2014).  The Court may also consider matters of public record and exhibits 
attached to the pleadings, so long as those documents do not conflict with the Complaint.  

Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 
186 F.3d 1077, 1079
 (8th Cir. 1999).    
II.  ANALYSIS                                                             
 The Court will deny AT&T’s motion for two independent reasons.  First, its motion 

is untimely.  Second, Regents’ patent is eligible because it passes step one of the Mayo 
test.                                                                     
 A.   Timeliness                                                      
 AT&T argues that, in deciding whether to allow a 12(c) challenge at this late stage, 

the Court should consider only whether the motion was filed “early enough not to delay 
trial.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  But AT&T has shown neither good cause nor received the 
Court’s consent to file a dispositive motion after the deadline.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), 
16(b)(4).  And AT&T’s approach would force the Court to depart from the rule that 

“parties must take . . . not only their best shot[,] but all of their shots,” at each stage of 
litigation.  Cf. Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 
679 F.3d 1062, 1067
 (8th Cir. 
2012) (internal quotations omitted).                                      
 Consider the materials AT&T asks the Court to rely on for this motion: prior orders, 

items in the record of the case (including exhibits attached to prior motions), the patent’s 
file history and prior art references, public records, and more.  (See Def.’s Mem. Supp. 
Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 13, May 20, 2024, Docket No. 754.)  According to AT&T, all 
the materials it entered into the record in support of claim construction and summary 

judgment are now fair game for its 12(c) motion.  (See, e.g., Hershkowitz Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 
14 (claim construction expert report).)  To adopt AT&T’s view, however, would make word 
limits and filing deadlines purely academic.  Have a fringe idea that does not merit a 
mention in the 18,000 words for summary judgment?  Simply attach the necessary 
materials as exhibits to the summary judgment motion and take a stab under Rule 12(c) 

later.  Fail to exhaust every argument before the Court’s dispositive deadline?  Same 
answer—try again later.  That cannot be the purpose of Rule 12(c).        
 AT&T points to instances when courts have allowed 12(c) motions late in litigation.  
See, e.g., King v. Akima Glob. Servs., 
775 F. App’x 617
, 620 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019); Jaeger v. 

Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. 15-164, 
2016 WL 520985
, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 
2016).    Although  those  courts  exercised  their  discretion  and  considered  untimely 
motions, that does not obligate the Court to consider a 12(c) motion filed nearly a year 

after the dispositive motion deadline.  Compare 
id.,
 with Riggins v. Walter, 
279 F.3d 422
, 
427–28 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Rule 12(c) does not restrict the court’s discretion under Rule 
16(b). . . . [A] Rule 12(c) motion may be brought after the dispositive motions deadline if 
the moving party complies with the requirements of Rule 16(b) and if it will not delay 

trial.”) (emphasis in original), and Pesce v. City of Des Moines, 
433 F. Supp. 3d 1113
, 1117 
(S.D. Iowa 2020) (requiring a showing of good cause for Rule 12(c) motion filed after 
dispositive  motion  deadline).1    Because  AT&T  presents  nothing  more  than  a  bare 



 1 See also Earthworkz Enters. Inc. v. USIC Locating Servs., LLC, No. 21-603, 
2023 WL 9184146
, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2023) (good cause required for untimely 12(c) motion); 
Frontczak v. City of Detroit, No. 18-13781, 
22021 WL 1736954
, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. May 3, 2021) 
(same); Sidney v. Equifax Info. Servs, LLC, No. 20-3604, 
2021 WL 7708525
, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 
2021 WL 7708527
 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2021) (12(c) 
motion untimely when filed after deadline set by local rules and case scheduling order);  cf. Ready 
Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 
627 F.3d 402, 404
 (9th Cir. 2010) (courts have inherent power to 
assertion that its untimely dispositive motion will not delay trial, the Court will deny its 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.                                     

 B.   Merits                                                          
 While the procedural issue alone is sufficient to deny AT&T’s motion, it also fails 
on the merits.  The claims in the ’768 patent are eligible for protection because they are 
directed to solving a discrete problem in wireless mobile communications. 

      1.   Mayo Test                                                  
 Section 101 of the Patent Act governs eligibility, stating “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 

conditions and requirements of this title.”  
35 U.S.C. § 101
.  The Supreme Court has long 
recognized an implicit exception to § 101, however: “laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable.”  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 
566 U.S. 66, 70
 (2012) (cleaned up).  These exceptions are meant to avoid “tying up 

the future use of the[] building blocks of human ingenuity.”  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l, 
573 U.S. 208
, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  At the same time, 
the Supreme Court has cautioned against construing these exceptions so broadly that 
they “swallow all of patent law.”  Id. at 217.                            




control their dockets to “achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”) (internal 
quotation omitted).                                                       
 In  Mayo, the Supreme  Court  established  a two-step process for  determining 
whether a patent is eligible under § 101.  Id.  First, courts must determine “whether the 

claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts” such as abstract 
ideas.  Id.  In answering that question, courts look to the elements of each claim both 
individually  and  in  “‘an  ordered  combination’  to  determine  whether  the  additional 
elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”   Id. 

(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79).  If the claims are directed at a patent-ineligible 
concept, step two directs courts to “search for an inventive concept—i.e., an element or 
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts 

to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.”  Id. at 217–18 
(cleaned up).  The two steps are interconnected. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 
830 F.3d 1350, 1353
 (Fed. Cir. 2016).                                         
      2.   Mayo Step One                                              

 In a step one inquiry, the Court must consider claims in their entirety and in the 
context of the specification.  See Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 
790 F.3d 1343, 1346
 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Stormborn Techs., LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys., Inc., 
444 F. Supp. 3d 1119
, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2020).  Courts should not oversimplify claims by ignoring 

limitations or applying too high of a level of abstraction.  See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco 
Games Am. Inc., 
837 F.3d 1299, 1313
 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 
822 F.3d 1327, 1337
 (Fed. Cir. 2016).                                         
 If recited without additional limitations, mathematical formulas and algorithms are 
not patent eligible.  See Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 
758 F.3d 1344, 1351
 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  Nor is it enough to limit the use of an ineligible formula to a 
specific technology.  See Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175
, 191–92 (1981).  However, an 
invention is not ineligible just because it relies on a mathematical algorithm.  Digitech, 
758 F.3d at 1350
.  Claims to mathematical processes are eligible when implemented “in 

a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which 
the patent laws were designed to protect.”  Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 192
.       
 “In cases involving software innovations, [the step one] inquiry often turns on 

whether the claims focus on specific asserted improvements in computer capabilities or 
instead on a process or system that qualifies an abstract idea for which computers are 
invoked merely as a tool.”  Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Elecs., USA, Inc., 
957 F.3d 1303
, 1307–
08 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.  Conceptual patents are thus eligible 

when they apply “specific technological modifications” to “solve a problem or improve 
the functioning of a known system.”  Huawei Techs. Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 16-52, 
2017 WL 4118383
, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 
2017 WL 4117897
 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2017).                               

 AT&T alleges Claim 13 recites a series of mathematical processes that are abstract 
both individually and when combined.  Regents counter that Claim 13 involves a detailed 
system that is directed towards specific improvements in the accuracy and robustness of 
cellular transmissions.  The Court agrees with Regents.  Although Claim 13 may apply 
mathematical processes, it is directed to specific improvements in wireless technology. 

 Claim 13 improves wireless communication transmission systems by solving the 
problem of fading through specific encoding techniques.  Just as another university’s 
eligible  patent  employed  the  specific  technique  of  irregular  repetition  to  improve 
encoding, see Cal Inst. Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., 
25 F.4th 976
, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2022), Claim 13 

employs a transmitter and receiver with specific combinations of coders, interleavers, 
mapping units, precoders, and modulators, some with defined alphabet sizes (limited and 
indefinite), to gain diversity, mitigate fading effects, reduce interference, and ultimately, 

improve wireless mobile communication system performance, (’768 Patent at 13, 19.)  
Because the ’768 patent is “directed to technological improvements resolving specific 
problems in a wireless communications system . . . [Regents] claim patent-eligible subject 
matter under § 101.”  Evolved Wireless, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 
221 F. Supp. 3d 485, 494
 (D. 

Del. 2016).2                                                              
 The ’768 patent is not ineligible simply because “the claims do not recite the 
alleged improvement described in the specification of the ’768 patent.”  (Def.’s Reply 



 2 See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 13-1632, 
2017 WL 3706495
, 
at *7–8 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2017) (finding a claim employing mathematical operation to transmit 
wireless data accurately and efficiently is patent-eligible); Huawei, 
2017 WL 4118383
, at *3 
(warning  against  oversimplification  and  finding  claims  “directed  to  a  particular  technical 
problem”  in  wireless  communication  patent-eligible);  Comcast  Cable  Commc'ns,  LLC  v.  Sprint 
Commc'ns Co., LP, 
203 F. Supp. 3d 499
, 526–27 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (validating claims that apply an abstract 
idea to “provide a solution to a problem that is unique to a cellular network”). 
Supp. J. on the Pleadings at 5, July 2, 2024, Docket No. 774.)  “Claims need not articulate 
the advantages of the claimed combinations to be eligible.”  Uniloc, 
957 F.3d at 1309
.  

Reading the claim limitations as a whole, and in the context of the specification, Claim 13 
is directed to concrete improvements in wireless data transmission.  And to the extent 
AT&T alleges Claim 13’s techniques (error control coding, precoding, etc.) were known in 
the prior art, that would not be grounds to hold the ’768 patent ineligible under step one 

of the § 101 inquiry.  See Research Corp. Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
627 F.3d 859, 868
 
(Fed.  Cir.  2010)  (“[S]ection  101  eligibility  should  not  become  a  substitute  for  a 
patentability analysis related to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions 

and requirements of Title 35.”); Stormborn, 444 F. Supp. 3d at 1125.      
 Because the Court finds the ’768 patent satisfies the first step of the Mayo test, it 
need not proceed to step two.  See Uniloc, 
957 F.3d at 1309
.              
                       CONCLUSION                                     

 The Court will deny AT&T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because it is 
untimely and unmeritorious.                                               

ORDER

  Based on the foregoing, and  all the files,  records, and  proceedings herein,  IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 
748]  is  DENIED  and  Plaintiff's  Letter  Requesting the  Court Strike  Defendant’s  Motion 
[Docket No. 755] is DENIED as moot. 

DATED:  August 22, 2024                           dy W.   eedtin 
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.                         JOHN R. TUNHEIM 
                                         United States District Judge 

                                 -13- 

Trial Court Opinion

               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
                  DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                              
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF                                             
MINNESOTA,                                                               
                                 Civil No. 14-4666 (JRT/TNL)         

                   Plaintiff,                                        

v.                               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER            
                             DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR          
AT&T MOBILITY LLC,                  JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS            

                  Defendant,                                         

ERICSSON, INC., and NOKIA OF                                             
AMERICA CORP.,                                                           

         Intervenor-Defendants.                                      

Aamir Abdulqader Kazi, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, 1180 Peachtree Street  
Northeast, Atlanta, GA 30309; Conrad A. Gosen, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, 
60  South  Sixth  Street,  Suite  3200,  Minneapolis,  MN  55402;  Frank  E. 
Scherkenbach, Lawrence K. Kolodney, Whitney Reichel, and Daniel Haran 
Wade, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, One Marina Park Drive, Boston, MA 02210; 
John-Paul Robert Fryckman, FISH & RICHARDSON, PC, 12860 El Camino    
Real,  Suite  400,  San  Diego,  CA  92130;  Katherine  D.  Prescott,  FISH  & 
RICHARDSON, PC, 500 Arguello Street, Suite 400, Redwood City, CA 94603; 
Brian J. Slovut and Carrie Ryan Gallia, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL 
FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, 200 Oak Street Southeast, Suite 360, 
Minneapolis, MN 55455; William R. Woodford, AVANTECH LAW, LLP, 80    
South Eighth Street, Suite 900, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Plaintiff. 

Barbara P. Berens, Kari S. Berman, and Carrie L. Zochert, BERENS & MILLER, 
PA, 80 South Eighth Street, Suite 3720, Minneapolis, MN 55402; Benjamin 
Hershkowitz, Josh A. Krevitt, Laura Corbin, and Robert Scott Roe, GIBSON, 
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166; Neema      
Jalali, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 555 Mission Street, Suite 3000, San 
 Francisco, CA 94105; Yeepay Audrey Yang, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER     
 LLP, 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 2100, Dallas, TX 75201, for Defendant AT&T 
 Mobility LLC.                                                        


 Nearly one year after the dispositive motion deadline, Defendant AT&T Mobility, 
LLC (“AT&T”) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  After trying its hand at 
summary judgment, AT&T now sets forth another theory: Regents of the University of 
Minnesota’s (“Regents”) ’768 patent is invalid because it is directed to an abstract idea 
and lacks an inventive concept.  Because AT&T’s motion is procedurally improper and 
would fail on the merits in any event, the Court will deny AT&T’s Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings.                                                            
                       BACKGROUND                                     
 The factual background of this case has been discussed at length in the Court’s 

prior orders, so the Court will describe only the facts necessary to assess AT&T’s motion.  
See generally Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. AT&T Mobility LLC (Regents Claim Constr.), 
No. 14-4666, 
2022 WL 3142322
 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2022); Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC (Regents Summ. J.), No. 14-4666, 
2024 WL 758541
 (D. Minn. Feb. 23, 

2024).  This motion targets the’768 patent, on which Regents base Count One of their 
Amended Complaint.  (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31–36, Jan. 30, 2015, Docket No. 25.) 
 The ’768 patent “provide[s] for particular methods to be utilized within certain 
portions of” a data transmission system “which are intended to help with the speed and 

reliability of wireless communication.”  Regents Claim Constr., 
2022 WL 3142322
, at *2.  
The specification describes the problem of “fading” in wireless mobile communications, 
which is interference that may be mitigated by error control coding and diversity.  (Decl. 

Benjamin Hershkowitz (“Hershkowitz Decl.”) Supp. Mot. J. on the Pleadings ¶ 2, Ex. 1 at 
13 (“’768 Patent”), May 20, 2024, Docket No. 751.)  The patent describes techniques that 
“combine error-control [] coding and complex field linear precoding with small size 
precoders to improve diversity gain and, as a result, system performance.”  (Id.)  The 

parties focus on Claim 13, which the Court will treat as representative for the purpose of 
deciding this motion.  The claim describes:                               
      A system comprising:                                            
      a transmitter that includes:                                    
        an error-control coder that applies an error correction       
           code  to  produce  an  encoded  data  stream  of           
           information-bearing symbols;                               
        a bit interleaver to produce an interleaved data stream 15    
           in which neighboring data bits of the encoded data         
           stream  are  positioned  to  be  mapped  to  different     
           constellation  symbols  selected  from  a  constellation   
           having a finite alphabet;                                  
        a mapping unit to map the neighboring data bits of the 20     
           encoded  data  stream  to  the  different  constellation   
           symbols;  a  precoder  that  linearly  precodes  the       
           constellation  symbols  over  a  complex  field  without   
           restriction to an alphabet size of the constellation to    
           produce a joint 25 coded-precoded data stream;             
        a symbol interleaver to process the precoded data stream      
           to produce permuted blocks of precoded symbols;            
        a modulator to output a waveform from the permuted 30         
           blocks of precoded symbols; and                            
      a receiver that receives the waveform from the transmitter via  
        a wireless communication channel, and demodulates the         
        waveform to produce estimated data.                           
(Id. at 19.)                                                              
 AT&T  filed  its  Motion  for  Judgment  on  the  Pleadings  on  May  20,  2024, 
notwithstanding the dispositive motions deadline of June 1, 2023.  (13th Am. Pretrial 
Scheduling Order (“Scheduling Order”) at 13, July 3, 2024, Docket No. 777; Mot. for J. on 
the Pleadings, Docket No. 748.)  At the dispositive motion deadline, the Defendants filed 

three  separate  summary  judgment  motions,  with  extended  word  limits,  covering 
numerous theories and lines of attack.  (See Order, May 22, 2023, Docket No. 501; Defs.’ 
Mot. Summ. J., June 1, 2023, Docket No. 543; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., June 1, 2023, Docket 
No. 580; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., June 1, 2023, Docket No. 586.)  The Court denied the 

motions and set trial for December 2, 2024.  Regents Summ. J., 
2024 WL 758541
, at *18; 
(Scheduling Order at 3–4, 6, 14.)                                         
                        DISCUSSION                                    
I.   STANDARD OF REVIEW                                                   

 The Court applies Eighth Circuit law to procedural issues, while Federal Circuit 
precedent  controls  matters  of  substantive  patent  law.    See  In  re  Spalding  Sports 
Worldwide, Inc., 
203 F.3d 800, 803
 (Fed. Cir. 2000).                      
 The Court analyzes a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under the 

same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 
552 F.3d 659, 665
 (8th Cir. 2009).  Thus, the Court must 
determine whether the Complaint states a “claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
588 F.3d 585, 594
 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009)).  The Court construes the Complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Ashley 
Cnty., 
552 F.3d at 665
.  Although the Court accepts the Complaint’s factual allegations as 
true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555
 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 
478 U.S. 265, 286
  (1986)),  or  mere  “labels  and  conclusions  or  a  formulaic  recitation  of  the 
elements of a cause of action,” Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678
 (quotation omitted).  Instead, “[a] 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  
Id.
  Courts may resolve questions of patent ineligibility as a matter of law.  Ultramercial, 
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 
772 F.3d 709
, 712–13 (Fed. Cir. 2014).                 

 The Court may consider the allegations in the Complaint as well as “those materials 
that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Schriener v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 
774 F.3d 442, 444
 (8th Cir. 2014).  The Court may also consider matters of public record and exhibits 
attached to the pleadings, so long as those documents do not conflict with the Complaint.  

Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 
186 F.3d 1077, 1079
 (8th Cir. 1999).    
II.  ANALYSIS                                                             
 The Court will deny AT&T’s motion for two independent reasons.  First, its motion 

is untimely.  Second, Regents’ patent is eligible because it passes step one of the Mayo 
test.                                                                     
 A.   Timeliness                                                      
 AT&T argues that, in deciding whether to allow a 12(c) challenge at this late stage, 

the Court should consider only whether the motion was filed “early enough not to delay 
trial.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).  But AT&T has shown neither good cause nor received the 
Court’s consent to file a dispositive motion after the deadline.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), 
16(b)(4).  And AT&T’s approach would force the Court to depart from the rule that 

“parties must take . . . not only their best shot[,] but all of their shots,” at each stage of 
litigation.  Cf. Ridenour v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 
679 F.3d 1062, 1067
 (8th Cir. 
2012) (internal quotations omitted).                                      
 Consider the materials AT&T asks the Court to rely on for this motion: prior orders, 

items in the record of the case (including exhibits attached to prior motions), the patent’s 
file history and prior art references, public records, and more.  (See Def.’s Mem. Supp. 
Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 13, May 20, 2024, Docket No. 754.)  According to AT&T, all 
the materials it entered into the record in support of claim construction and summary 

judgment are now fair game for its 12(c) motion.  (See, e.g., Hershkowitz Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. 
14 (claim construction expert report).)  To adopt AT&T’s view, however, would make word 
limits and filing deadlines purely academic.  Have a fringe idea that does not merit a 
mention in the 18,000 words for summary judgment?  Simply attach the necessary 
materials as exhibits to the summary judgment motion and take a stab under Rule 12(c) 

later.  Fail to exhaust every argument before the Court’s dispositive deadline?  Same 
answer—try again later.  That cannot be the purpose of Rule 12(c).        
 AT&T points to instances when courts have allowed 12(c) motions late in litigation.  
See, e.g., King v. Akima Glob. Servs., 
775 F. App’x 617
, 620 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019); Jaeger v. 

Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. 15-164, 
2016 WL 520985
, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 
2016).    Although  those  courts  exercised  their  discretion  and  considered  untimely 
motions, that does not obligate the Court to consider a 12(c) motion filed nearly a year 

after the dispositive motion deadline.  Compare 
id.,
 with Riggins v. Walter, 
279 F.3d 422
, 
427–28 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Rule 12(c) does not restrict the court’s discretion under Rule 
16(b). . . . [A] Rule 12(c) motion may be brought after the dispositive motions deadline if 
the moving party complies with the requirements of Rule 16(b) and if it will not delay 

trial.”) (emphasis in original), and Pesce v. City of Des Moines, 
433 F. Supp. 3d 1113
, 1117 
(S.D. Iowa 2020) (requiring a showing of good cause for Rule 12(c) motion filed after 
dispositive  motion  deadline).1    Because  AT&T  presents  nothing  more  than  a  bare 



 1 See also Earthworkz Enters. Inc. v. USIC Locating Servs., LLC, No. 21-603, 
2023 WL 9184146
, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2023) (good cause required for untimely 12(c) motion); 
Frontczak v. City of Detroit, No. 18-13781, 
22021 WL 1736954
, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. May 3, 2021) 
(same); Sidney v. Equifax Info. Servs, LLC, No. 20-3604, 
2021 WL 7708525
, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 
2021 WL 7708527
 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2021) (12(c) 
motion untimely when filed after deadline set by local rules and case scheduling order);  cf. Ready 
Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 
627 F.3d 402, 404
 (9th Cir. 2010) (courts have inherent power to 
assertion that its untimely dispositive motion will not delay trial, the Court will deny its 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.                                     

 B.   Merits                                                          
 While the procedural issue alone is sufficient to deny AT&T’s motion, it also fails 
on the merits.  The claims in the ’768 patent are eligible for protection because they are 
directed to solving a discrete problem in wireless mobile communications. 

      1.   Mayo Test                                                  
 Section 101 of the Patent Act governs eligibility, stating “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 

conditions and requirements of this title.”  
35 U.S.C. § 101
.  The Supreme Court has long 
recognized an implicit exception to § 101, however: “laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable.”  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 
566 U.S. 66, 70
 (2012) (cleaned up).  These exceptions are meant to avoid “tying up 

the future use of the[] building blocks of human ingenuity.”  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l, 
573 U.S. 208
, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  At the same time, 
the Supreme Court has cautioned against construing these exceptions so broadly that 
they “swallow all of patent law.”  Id. at 217.                            




control their dockets to “achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”) (internal 
quotation omitted).                                                       
 In  Mayo, the Supreme  Court  established  a two-step process for  determining 
whether a patent is eligible under § 101.  Id.  First, courts must determine “whether the 

claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts” such as abstract 
ideas.  Id.  In answering that question, courts look to the elements of each claim both 
individually  and  in  “‘an  ordered  combination’  to  determine  whether  the  additional 
elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”   Id. 

(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–79).  If the claims are directed at a patent-ineligible 
concept, step two directs courts to “search for an inventive concept—i.e., an element or 
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts 

to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.”  Id. at 217–18 
(cleaned up).  The two steps are interconnected. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 
830 F.3d 1350, 1353
 (Fed. Cir. 2016).                                         
      2.   Mayo Step One                                              

 In a step one inquiry, the Court must consider claims in their entirety and in the 
context of the specification.  See Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 
790 F.3d 1343, 1346
 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Stormborn Techs., LLC v. Topcon Positioning Sys., Inc., 
444 F. Supp. 3d 1119
, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2020).  Courts should not oversimplify claims by ignoring 

limitations or applying too high of a level of abstraction.  See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco 
Games Am. Inc., 
837 F.3d 1299, 1313
 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 
822 F.3d 1327, 1337
 (Fed. Cir. 2016).                                         
 If recited without additional limitations, mathematical formulas and algorithms are 
not patent eligible.  See Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 
758 F.3d 1344, 1351
 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  Nor is it enough to limit the use of an ineligible formula to a 
specific technology.  See Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175
, 191–92 (1981).  However, an 
invention is not ineligible just because it relies on a mathematical algorithm.  Digitech, 
758 F.3d at 1350
.  Claims to mathematical processes are eligible when implemented “in 

a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which 
the patent laws were designed to protect.”  Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 192
.       
 “In cases involving software innovations, [the step one] inquiry often turns on 

whether the claims focus on specific asserted improvements in computer capabilities or 
instead on a process or system that qualifies an abstract idea for which computers are 
invoked merely as a tool.”  Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Elecs., USA, Inc., 
957 F.3d 1303
, 1307–
08 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.  Conceptual patents are thus eligible 

when they apply “specific technological modifications” to “solve a problem or improve 
the functioning of a known system.”  Huawei Techs. Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 16-52, 
2017 WL 4118383
, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 
2017 WL 4117897
 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2017).                               

 AT&T alleges Claim 13 recites a series of mathematical processes that are abstract 
both individually and when combined.  Regents counter that Claim 13 involves a detailed 
system that is directed towards specific improvements in the accuracy and robustness of 
cellular transmissions.  The Court agrees with Regents.  Although Claim 13 may apply 
mathematical processes, it is directed to specific improvements in wireless technology. 

 Claim 13 improves wireless communication transmission systems by solving the 
problem of fading through specific encoding techniques.  Just as another university’s 
eligible  patent  employed  the  specific  technique  of  irregular  repetition  to  improve 
encoding, see Cal Inst. Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., 
25 F.4th 976
, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2022), Claim 13 

employs a transmitter and receiver with specific combinations of coders, interleavers, 
mapping units, precoders, and modulators, some with defined alphabet sizes (limited and 
indefinite), to gain diversity, mitigate fading effects, reduce interference, and ultimately, 

improve wireless mobile communication system performance, (’768 Patent at 13, 19.)  
Because the ’768 patent is “directed to technological improvements resolving specific 
problems in a wireless communications system . . . [Regents] claim patent-eligible subject 
matter under § 101.”  Evolved Wireless, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 
221 F. Supp. 3d 485, 494
 (D. 

Del. 2016).2                                                              
 The ’768 patent is not ineligible simply because “the claims do not recite the 
alleged improvement described in the specification of the ’768 patent.”  (Def.’s Reply 



 2 See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 13-1632, 
2017 WL 3706495
, 
at *7–8 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2017) (finding a claim employing mathematical operation to transmit 
wireless data accurately and efficiently is patent-eligible); Huawei, 
2017 WL 4118383
, at *3 
(warning  against  oversimplification  and  finding  claims  “directed  to  a  particular  technical 
problem”  in  wireless  communication  patent-eligible);  Comcast  Cable  Commc'ns,  LLC  v.  Sprint 
Commc'ns Co., LP, 
203 F. Supp. 3d 499
, 526–27 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (validating claims that apply an abstract 
idea to “provide a solution to a problem that is unique to a cellular network”). 
Supp. J. on the Pleadings at 5, July 2, 2024, Docket No. 774.)  “Claims need not articulate 
the advantages of the claimed combinations to be eligible.”  Uniloc, 
957 F.3d at 1309
.  

Reading the claim limitations as a whole, and in the context of the specification, Claim 13 
is directed to concrete improvements in wireless data transmission.  And to the extent 
AT&T alleges Claim 13’s techniques (error control coding, precoding, etc.) were known in 
the prior art, that would not be grounds to hold the ’768 patent ineligible under step one 

of the § 101 inquiry.  See Research Corp. Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
627 F.3d 859, 868
 
(Fed.  Cir.  2010)  (“[S]ection  101  eligibility  should  not  become  a  substitute  for  a 
patentability analysis related to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions 

and requirements of Title 35.”); Stormborn, 444 F. Supp. 3d at 1125.      
 Because the Court finds the ’768 patent satisfies the first step of the Mayo test, it 
need not proceed to step two.  See Uniloc, 
957 F.3d at 1309
.              
                       CONCLUSION                                     

 The Court will deny AT&T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because it is 
untimely and unmeritorious.                                               

ORDER

  Based on the foregoing, and  all the files,  records, and  proceedings herein,  IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 
748]  is  DENIED  and  Plaintiff's  Letter  Requesting the  Court Strike  Defendant’s  Motion 
[Docket No. 755] is DENIED as moot. 

DATED:  August 22, 2024                           dy W.   eedtin 
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.                         JOHN R. TUNHEIM 
                                         United States District Judge 

                                 -13- 

Reference

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