Quinlan v. Washington County

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota September 25, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Carsten James Quinlan et al., Case No. 24-cv-2782 (PAM/ECW)

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

Washington County et al.,

Defendants.

This case is before the Court on Defendants City of Woodbury and Kim
Richardson’s (collectively, “the City Defendants”) Motions for More Definite Statement
and/or to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8) and the City Defendants’ Motion
Re: Sealing (Dkt. 6). For the reasons discussed below, the City Defendants’ Motions for
More Definite Statement and/or to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are granted and
their Motion Re: Sealing is denied as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
This case was initiated on March 13, 2024, when Plaintiff Carsten Quinlan filed a
Complaint in Minnesota’s Tenth Judicial District, Washington County, alleging various
claims against the State of Minnesota and police and child protection investigators
(including Defendant Kim Richardson) related to child abuse allegations and subsequent
criminal proceedings against Quinlan. (Dkt. 2 at 1 (Complaint).) The Complaint is 47
pages with 230 paragraphs, not including subparagraphs, and, with the attached exhibits,
contains 369 pages of text. (See id.) The Complaint includes the following confidential
information: the full legal names of Quinlan’s minor children; confidential medical

information related to Quinlan’s minor children including medical procedures received,
medications prescribed and administered, and medical financial records; and an October
17, 2022 Custody Evaluation Report, which is confidential pursuant to a stipulated
Family Court order. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 135-99; 246-304.) On March 25, 2024, the state
court entered an order stating:

1. The Court Administrator shall temporarily designate the minor children’s
names, medical records and custody evaluation described herein as
confidential and not accessible to the public.

2. If restricting access to only those portions of the Summons and Complaint
is impracticable, the Court Administrator shall temporarily make the
entire Summons Complaint [sic] not accessible to the public.

3. Plaintiff shall have 20 days from the date of this order to file legal
authority and argument as to why: a) the case caption should not be
modified to only identify the minor children by their initials, and b) the
medical records and Custody Evaluation should not be subject to a
protective or confidentiality order.

(Dkt. 1-1 at 3.) It does not appear that Quinlan filed any supplemental legal authority and
argument regarding the confidentiality issues in response to that order. See 82-CV-24-
1149 Wash. Cnty Dist. Ct. docket.1
The Complaint also includes personal attacks on Richardson, including statements
such as: “KR thinks far too highly of her own detective ability, mistaking her mediocrity
for genius, and only confirming her own bias instead of doing a real investigation” (Dkt.

1 The records for the underlying Washington County case can be located by
searching by case number at https://publicaccess.courts.state.mn.us/CaseSearch.
2 ¶ 93); “KR acts arrogantly” (id. ¶ 98); and “KR is a fundamentally dishonest person”
(id. ¶ 131), as well as alleging KR claims to be “infallible and clairvoyant” (id. ¶ 99).

Quinlan filed an Amended Complaint in state court on June 18, 2024, which added
new claims and numerous new defendants, including the City of Woodbury. (Dkt. 2-1
¶¶ 360-440 (Amended Complaint).) The Amended Complaint also named his minor
children as Plaintiffs. (Id. at 1.) The Amended Complaint is 49 pages, incorporates the
claims in the Complaint, and simply picks up where the Complaint left off at paragraph
231. (Id.; see id. ¶ 231 (“All Claims #1-#230 from the original complaint filed March 13,

2024 are incorporated herein.”).) Thus, Quinlan apparently intends the Complaint,
exhibits, and Amended Complaint to be one large complaint, totalling 417 pages and 457
paragraphs, not including subparagraphs (hereinafter “Full Amended Complaint”).
(Dkts. 2 & 2-1.) The Amended Complaint names the jurors from Quinlan’s underlying
criminal trial and includes personal and identifying information about them, including

their occupations, number and ages of any children, and experiences with abuse. (Dkt. 2-
1 ¶¶ 251-52.)
On June 28, 2024, the state court issued an order which stated:
The document titled “Amended Complaint” has been deleted from the court
file and is being returned to you because, as discussed at the June 18, 2024
motion hearing, pages 5-7 improperly identify by name jurors stated to be
involved in your criminal matter. You may file a revised Amended
Complaint redacting or otherwise protecting from public disclosure
identifying information regarding these persons in accordance with all Court
Rules.

(Dkt. 1-2.) A review of the state court docket shows that Quinlan has not filed a revised
Amended Complaint. See 82-CV-24-1149 Wash. Cnty. Dist. Ct. docket.
The City Defendants assert that Quinlan’s service of the Complaint and Amended
Complaint on them was as follows:

On June 20, 2024, the City of Woodbury was served with the Amended
Complaint, which has subsequently been “deleted” from the State court file,
Initial Complaint and related exhibits. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff served the
Amended Complaint (pleading only) on Detective Richardson. On July 2,
2024, Plaintiff served the Initial Complaint with exhibits on Detective
Richardson. Neither the Initial, nor the Amended Complaint served on
Detective Richardson addressed the defects identified in the Court’s March
25, 2024 or June 28, 2024 Orders. Further, given that the Court “deleted” the
Amended Complaint from the Court’s docket and that Plaintiff served the
Initial Complaint a week after serving the Amended Complaint on
Richardson, it is unclear what pleading is the operative pleading in this case.

(Dkt. 10 at 5.)
The City Defendants removed the case to this Court on July 18, 2024 based on the
pleaded § 1983 claims in the Amended Complaint, which gave this Court original
jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331

. (Dkt. 1 at 3.)
On July 19, 2024, the City Defendants filed the Motions for More Definite
Statement and/or to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint now before the Court.
After prompting from the Court via a Briefing Order (Dkt. 14), Quinlan filed a
response and memorandum on August 13, 2024 on CM/ECF. (Dkts. 16-17.) In the
filing, Quinlan agreed to “compromise” with the City Defendants’ request for a more
definite statement, acknowledging confusing procedural errors and other errors that he
would like to fix. (Dkt. 16 at 3.) Quinlan also presents nine “proposed conditions” for
rewriting the complaint. (Id. at 3-8.) The conditions are:
Condition 1: The new complaint will only include claims pertaining to events
occurring on or prior to April 12, 2024.
Condition 2: The plaintiffs are permitted to file a supplemental pleading
within 60 days after juvenile case 82-JV-24-220 is resolved. This
supplemental pleading will include all claims pertaining to events occurring
after April 12, 2024.

Condition 3: The new complaint will name the following defendants: Kim
Richardson, Hailey Dornfeld, Keshini Ratnayake, Tom Wedes, City of
Woodbury, Washington County, and John/Jane Doe(s).

Condition 4: The new complaint will not include any exhibits. Any exhibits
referenced by the new complaint will be filed separately. Further, any exhibit
that contains confidential information will either be redacted or filed as a
sealed document.

Condition 5: The new complaint will not use the children’s full names, only
their initials. Further, no personal information about the jurors from 82-CR-
23-361 will be in the complaint. The complaint will also be organized such
that it is very clear which claims apply to which defendants. The complaint
will have a more professional tone.

Condition 6: This new complaint will not incorporate or reference any
portion of either the initial complaint, nor the amended complaint, which can
be discarded.

Condition 7: The complaint will not exceed 420 numbered paragraphs, nor
exceed 90 pages, nor exceed 22,000 words.

Condition 8: Defendants will accept service of the new complaint
electronically, through electronic filing with the court and through email to
their legal representatives.

Condition 9: The new complaint will be filed within 14 days of the court
granting the defendant’s motion for a more definite statement along with
these conditions listed here.

(Id. (cleaned up).)
The City Defendants sought leave to file a reply (Dkt. 18), which the Court
granted (Dkt. 19), and they subsequently filed a reply on August 22, 2024. Their
Motions are now ripe for resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs a motion for a

more definite statement, states:
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the
party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before
filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and
the details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order
is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the
court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate
order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). When determining whether a more definite statement is required
under Rule 12(e), “the only question is whether it is possible to frame a response to the
pleading.” Ransom v. VFS, Inc.,

918 F. Supp. 2d 888, 901

 (D. Minn. 2013) (quoting 
Lyon Fin. Sers., Inc. v. MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 06-4562,

2007 WL 2893612

, at *9 
(D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2007), citing Century ‘21’ Shows v. Owens,

400 F.2d 603, 607

 (8th 
Cir. 1968)).                                                              
   As part of this determination, the Court necessarily considers Rule 8(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs pleading claims for relief, and requires 
that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain only need contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2).  Rule 8(d)(1) further states that the pleading must be concise and direct: “Each 
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).   
   In addition, Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to 
“strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, 
or scandalous matter.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).  “A matter is immaterial or impertinent 
when not relevant to the resolution of the issue at hand.”  McLafferty v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 

Indiana, No. CIV. 14-564 DSD/SER,

2014 WL 2009086

, at *3 (D. Minn. May 16, 2014) 
(quoting Kay v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc., No. 2:09cv4065,

2009 WL 1664624

, at *1 (W.D. 
Mo. June 15, 2009)).  “Material is scandalous if it generally refers to any allegation that 
unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual or states anything in 
repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court.”

Id.

     
   Rule 12(f) continues that “[t]he court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion 

made by a party. . . .”

Id.

  A district court enjoys “liberal discretion” under this rule.  
Stanbury Law Firm, P.A. v. I.R.S.,

221 F.3d 1059, 1063

 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted).  A motion to strike should be granted “if the result is to make a trial less 
complicated or otherwise streamline the ultimate resolution of the action.”  Daigle v. 
Ford Motor Co.,

713 F. Supp. 2d 822, 830

(D. Minn. 2010).

Given these legal standards, the Court addresses Defendants’ Motion.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview
The City Defendants seek a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(e) and ask the Court to require Plaintiffs to comply with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8’s pleading requirements that the complaint “contain a short and plain
statement of the claim.” (Dkt. 8 at 1 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).) The City
Defendants also seek, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), to strike the Full
Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, confidential information from the Full
Amended Complaint, including but not limited to:

a. Plaintiff’s minor children’s full names from the caption, pleading(s), and
all exhibits;
b. Plaintiff’s minor children’s medical history, including medical procedures
performed and medications prescribed/administered (see, e.g., Exhibit J);
c. Custody Evaluation, Exhibit F, as it was previously deemed confidential
by both this Court and a Dane County, WI court;
d. Jurors’ identifies, medical information, arrest history, and family history
of abuse from the Amended Complaint; and
e. Factual allegations that are irrelevant and harassing.

(Id. at 1-2.) Finally, the City Defendants seek an order from the Court directing Plaintiffs
to file a Second Amended Complaint that complies with the Federal Rules, Local Rules,
and this Court’s orders within 14 days of the Court’s order, and if Plaintiffs fail to do so,
recommend that the case be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 2.)
It appears, through Quinlan’s response, that he agrees to many of the City
Defendants’ requests. (Dkt. 16 at 3-8.) However, the Court addresses the Rules and
individual Motions below to provide clarity and direction to the parties. Even though he
is pro se, Quinlan, just like any other party, must comply with all Federal and Local
Rules, and with this Court’s orders. See, e.g., Soliman v. Johanns,

412 F.3d 920, 922

 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (“Even pro se litigants must comply with court rules and directives.”); Bennett 
v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up, Inc.,

295 F.3d 805, 808

 (8th Cir. 2002) (pro se status does not 
entitle litigant to disregard Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or court’s local rules); Burgs 
v. Sissel,

745 F.2d 526, 528

 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[P]ro se litigants are not excused from 
failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.”).                 
B.   Discussion                                                           
   The City Defendants argue that the Full Amended Complaint is so vague and 

ambiguous that they cannot reasonably prepare a response, requiring a more definite 
statement pursuant to Rule 12(e).  (Dkt. 10 at 11-13.)  This includes the City Defendants’ 
argument that the Amended Complaint effectively supplemented the Complaint rather 
than amending it, creating inconsistent and duplicative claims for relief.  (Id. at 12.)  For 
example, the City Defendants assert that both the Complaint and Amended Complaint 
contain negligence claims against individually named Defendants, but it is unclear 

whether the Amended Complaint modifies, supplements, or replaces the original 
negligence claims.  (Id. at 8, 12.)  The City Defendants also assert that, given that the 
state court “deleted” the Amended Complaint from the docket before the case was 
removed to this Court and that Quinlan served the Complaint after that occurred, it is 
unclear which version is the operative pleading in this action.  (Id. at 12.)   

   It is evident based on the Court’s review of the Full Amended Complaint that it is 
not possible for the City Defendants to frame a response to the Complaint, Amended 
Complaint, or Full Amended Complaint.  See Ransom,

918 F. Supp. 2d at 901

.  There are 
inconsistent and duplicative claims between the Complaint and Amended Complaint—
including but not limited to a negligence claim against Richardson in the Complaint (Dkt. 

2 ¶¶ 190-99) and another against her in the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 2-1 ¶¶ 360-67), 
both relating to an investigation of Quinlan for alleged child abuse—such that it is 
unclear what claims the Amended Complaint modifies.  This is exacerbated by the 
confusion around the state court’s “deletion” of the Amended Complaint coupled with the 
order and manner of Quinlan’s service on the City Defendants.  Simply put, the pleadings 
are so vague and ambiguous that the City Defendants cannot reasonably prepare a 

response.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).                                     
   Moreover, the City Defendants are unable to reasonably prepare a response to the 
pleadings because the Full Amended Complaint does not satisfy Rule 8’s notice pleading 
requirements.  Indeed, at 417 pages and 457 paragraphs (not including subparagraphs), 
the Full Amended Complaint fails Rule 8’s “short and plain” requirement.  “The words 
‘short and plain’ are themselves short and plain, and they mean what they say: A 

complaint must be concise, and it must be clear.  Rule 8 was not promulgated to provide 
helpful advice; it has the force of law, and it must be followed.”  Gurman v. Metro 
Housing & Redevelopment Authority,

842 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1152

 (D. Minn. 2011). 
   Further, while the pleading standard articulated by Rule 8 “does not require 
detailed factual allegations, but it [does demand] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  A “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ 
or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Id.

 (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555

 (2007)).  With respect to any §1983 claim, 
a plaintiff must plead facts showing each named defendant’s personal involvement in the 

alleged constitutional wrongdoing.  See White v. Jackson,

865 F.3d 1064, 1081

 (8th Cir. 
2017); Beck v. LaFleur,

257 F.3d 764, 766

(8th Cir. 2001) (upholding summary dismissal
of civil rights claims because plaintiff's complaint “failed to allege sufficient personal
involvement by any of [the] defendants to support such a claim”). Despite being 417
pages and 457 paragraphs (not including subparagraphs) long, the Full Amended
Complaint fails to provide clear non-conclusory factual allegations against each named

defendant to this action. (See, e.g., Dkt. 2-1 ¶ 397 (“For The State of Minnesota,
Washington County, The City of Woodbury, Kim Richardson, Hailey Dornfeld, Matthew
Stephenson, and possibly John/Jane Doe(s), the tort of Malicious Prosecution is charged.
These Defendants treated CJQ with unwarranted malice. Defendants’ actions contributed
to either instigating prosecution or continuing prosecution of CJQ. Defendants were
unjustified in either instigating or continuing prosecution of CJQ.”), ¶ 408 (listing

numerous defendants and focusing on underlying criminal trial), ¶ 410 (listing numerous
defendants and focusing on underlying juvenile trial), ¶¶ 434-40 (alleging constitutional
rights violations and Section 1983 claims).)
Additionally, many of the causes of action are needlessly duplicative. For
example, the Complaint contains a Witness Tampering Claim and a Gross Negligence

Claim alleging that various defendants were grossly negligent by tampering with a
witness (see Dkt. 2 ¶¶ 100-19, 210-214), while the Amended Complaint contains
additional Witness Tampering and Gross Negligence Claims (where those Claims refer
back to the Witness Tampering and Gross Negligence Claims in the Complaint) (Dkt. 2-1
¶¶ 412-28). There is little, if any, difference between these Claims, and there was no

good reason for to have pleaded them in the different ways in two different pleadings.
“[C]omplaints like the one in this case unfairly burden defendants and courts. The
plaintiff who files a kitchen-sink complaint shifts onto the defendant[s] and the court the
burden of identifying the plaintiff’s genuine claims and determining which of those
claims might have legal support.” Gurman,

842 F. Supp. 2d at 1153

 (dealing with a 60 
page and almost 250 paragraph complaint); see also Brown v. Ludeman, No. 11-CV-2859 

(JRT/ECW),

2023 WL 4399079

, at *6 (D. Minn. July 7, 2023) (rejecting an 84-page, 
274-paragraph complaint), R. & R. adopted,

2023 WL 5703194

 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2023);  
Favors v. Johnson, No. 19-CV-0032 (PJS/TNL),

2019 WL 1230367

 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 
2019) (striking a 118-page complaint with hundreds of paragraphs);2 Naca v. Macalester 
Coll., No. 16-CV-3263 (PJS/BRT),

2016 WL 5842771

, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2016) 
(rejecting an 81-page, and 250-paragraph complaint).  “This is emphatically not the job 

of either a defendant or the Court.”  Gurman,

842 F. Supp. 2d at 1153

.  The Court further 
notes that “kitchen-sink complaints also harm the very plaintiffs who bring them.”

Id. at 1154

.  In many cases, “[A] genuine dispute that supports a viable legal claim—or even a 
few viable legal claims—underlies a plaintiff’s complaint.  But this genuine dispute 
becomes almost impossible to discern when it is wreathed in a halo of frivolous and near-

frivolous legal claims.  The bad obscures the good.”

Id.

                 
   While it is unclear—based in part on the confusing procedural posture of this 
case—exactly how many claims Plaintiffs are alleging and against whom, it is apparent to 


2    Quinlan argues that Favors is different from his case because there the plaintiff 
pleaded only “four claims against three defendants,” id. at *1, while here his case is 
“significantly more complex, involving a conspiracy to violate [his] civil rights, 
numerous investigative errors, comparisons to other investigations, critical flaws in the 
forensic interview process, and extensive damages resulting from the defendants’ 
actions.”  (Dkt. 17 at 3.)  However, the plaintiff in Favors also argued that his case was 
“very complex” and that it “involve[d] a multitude of violations of state and federal 
rights, privileges and immunities”—an argument rejected by the Favors court.

2019 WL 1230367

, at *2.                                                           
the Court that their claims do not require a lengthy pleading.  This is due in part to the 
Full Amended Complaint containing voluminous factual allegations and assertions that 

are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ causes of action.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 2-1 ¶¶ 248-359 (summary of 
Quinlan’s criminal trial including names and other confidential information about the 
individual jurors and detailed summaries of every witness including Quinlan’s 
editorializing).)                                                         
   Quinlan argues that his need to “comply” with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
18(a), which governs the joinder of claims, and the principle of res judicata, whereby the 

disposition of an earlier claim bars against the litigation of a subsequent claim, balance 
Rule 8’s requirements for a short and concise pleading.  (Dkt. 17 at 1-2.)  However, Rule 
18 does not grant Plaintiffs leeway to violate Rule 8.  See Fletcher v. Inmate Bank,

752 F. App’x 683

, 684-85 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Rule 18(a) allows joinder of multiple claims, but 
the opportunity to include multiple claims did not eliminate the obligation to comply with 

Rule 8.”).  Nor does complying with Rule 8 prevent a plaintiff from asserting all 
nonfrivolous claims arising from the same case of action so as to prevent barring of 
potential future claims by res judicata.  Pro. Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. KPMG LLP,

345 F.3d 1030

, 1032 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Under res judicata, a judgment on the merits in an earlier 
lawsuit bars a second suit involving the same parties based on the same cause of 

action.”).  It is not the number of claims here that is the issue, but rather whether they are 
unnecessarily verbose, frivolous, duplicative, or otherwise make it impossible for the City 
Defendants to properly respond to under Rule 8’s notice requirement.  The Court is 
certain that Plaintiffs could comply with Rule 8’s short and concise pleading 
requirements and assert as many nonfrivolous claims as they have against the City 
Defendants while also complying with Rule 18 and guarding against any claims being 

barred in the future by res judicata.                                     
   Because Plaintiffs’ Full Amended Complaint is neither short and concise, nor are 
the allegations simple, concise, and direct, the Court finds that it fails to satisfy Rule 8’s 
notice pleading standard.                                                 
   Finally, the City Defendants argue that the Full Amended Complaint should be 
stricken for irrelevance and invasion of privacy pursuant to Rule 12(f).  (Dkt. 10 at 13-

19.)  Specifically, they argue that the Full Amended Complaint should be stricken in its 
entirety because it invades the privacy of Quinlan’s minor children by using their full 
names rather than initials in the case caption and in exhibits, including their medical 
information and a custody evaluation; it invades the privacy of jurors from his criminal 
trial by naming the jurors and including other personal and identifying information about 

them; and it contains irrelevant, redundant, and scandalous information through his 
lengthy descriptions of his criminal trial and his ad hominem attacks of Defendant 
Richardson.  (Dkt. 10 at 13-19.)  Quinlan appears to concede that the Full Amended 
Complaint should be stricken by acknowledging that he will “fix” any confidentiality 
issues going forward, promising the second amended complaint “will have a more 

professional tone,” and stating the Full Amended Complaint may be “discarded.”  (Dkt. 
16 at 3, 6, 7.)  Notwithstanding these concessions, Quinlan is advised that the Court will 
not tolerate any further disregard by Quinlan of his minor children’s privacy, nor will it 
tolerate written submissions from Quinlan containing personal attacks.    
   Likewise, the inclusion of the jurors’ names and personal information in the 
pleadings is immaterial and impertinent.  See McLafferty,

2014 WL 2009086

, at *3.  It 

also invades the jurors’ privacy rights.  See generally United States v. Thao,

586 F. Supp. 3d 924

, 925 (D. Minn. 2022) (“[T]he District of Minnesota’s jury plan provides that 
‘[n]ames and personal information concerning prospective, sitting, and previously seated 
petit and grand jurors must not be disclosed to attorneys, parties, the public, or the media 
. . . .’  D. Minn. Jury Plan § 21(e).  And federal law allows the Court to ‘keep [jurors’] 
names confidential in any case where the interests of justice so require.’

28 U.S.C. § 1863

(b)(7).”).  While these jurors sat in a state court matter, these principles guide 
whether their names and other information should be included in a pleading in federal 
court.  In the Court’s view, based on the Full Amended Complaint, their names are not 
necessary for notice pleading purposes and their inclusion in a pleading is immaterial and 
impertinent.                                                              

   Finally, the attacks on Richardson (and others) are scandalous because they 
“unnecessarily reflect[] on [her] moral character” and do so in a way that “detracts from 
the dignity of the court.”  McLafferty,

2014 WL 2009086

, at *3.  Such commentary and 
editorialization violates the Rules and will not be tolerated in future pleadings. 
   For all of the reasons stated above, the Court finds that granting the motion to 

strike will make the “trial less complicated” and will “otherwise streamline the ultimate 
resolution of the action.”  Daigle,

713 F. Supp. 2d at 830

(citation omitted). The Court
therefore grants the motion to strike insofar as the Complaint and Amended Complaint
will be stricken from the record. The Court will give Plaintiffs the opportunity to submit
one single second amended complaint that clearly and concisely sets forth their claims
for relief and the factual basis for those claims. Consistent with this Order, the second

amended complaint must not violate the privacy of Quinlan’s minor children or the jurors
in his criminal case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 requires that minors must only
be referred to by their initials in pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3). Quinlan’s inclusion
of his minor children’s names in the case caption and elsewhere throughout his filings
clearly violates this Rule and his minor children’s privacy. Quinlan must not violate Rule
5.2 in any future filing. Moreover, Quinlan must not include medical information or

references to the custody determination of the minor children in any future filing unless it
is actually relevant to the claims asserted. Any filing that refers to the custody
determination of Quinlan’s minor children must be filed under seal with a redacted
version filed publicly. Quinlan must not attach the minor children’s medical documents
or the custody evaluation to the second amended complaint. Further, the second

amended complaint also must not contain scandalous assertions of the type discussed
above with respect to Richardson, including personal attacks on any defendant or similar
editorializing or commentary. Such assertions are not necessary for purposes of notice
pleading and do not contribute to the merit of any of Plaintiffs’ claims.
To ensure that the second amended complaint complies with Rule 8, the Court also

grants the motion for more definite statement. The second amended complaint must
comply with Rule 8. To aid Plaintiffs in that regard, the Court provides the following
requirements to Plaintiffs.3 The second amended complaint must be a standalone
document that does not refer back to or rely on the Complaint or Second Amended

Complaints. The facts must be presented chronologically in the second amended
complaint. Plaintiffs must focus on the facts that describe in concise manner why they
are entitled to relief as the result of alleged actions of Defendants. Further, the second
amended complaint must make clear which specific plaintiffs and which specific
defendants are the subject of which specific allegations. Blanket references to
“plaintiffs” or “defendants” are unacceptable unless the references genuinely apply to

every plaintiff and every defendant. The second amended complaint must not contain
duplicative, redundant, or repetitive material. Finally, the second amended complaint
must be no more than 10,000 words. See, e.g., Gurman,

842 F. Supp. 2d at 1154

 (“the 
second amended complaint must not exceed 10,000 words”); Naca,

2016 WL 5842771

,
at *1 (“To proceed with this action, Naca must file an amended complaint of no more

than 10,000 words. . . .”).
To be clear, the list of requirements in the preceding paragraph is not exhaustive.
As stated above, Quinlan and the other potential plaintiffs are required to comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rules for the District of Minnesota, and the
Court’s Orders. Accordingly, the second amended complaint must comply with all

3 Plaintiffs proposed certain “conditions” in their opposition. (Dkt. 17 at 4.) It is
unclear what Plaintiffs mean by “conditions,” as the Court’s decision as to these Motions
is based on the applicable law and no party may impose “conditions” on the Court. The
Court understands Plaintiffs’ proposed “conditions” to be requests that the Court rule in a
certain way, and the Court has addressed those requests in this Order.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8, Rule 5.2, and Rule 104 (form of
pleadings); and all Local Rules, including specifically, District of Minnesota Local Rule
15.15 (no incorporation of prior pleadings); and all Orders issued by any judge presiding

4 Rule 10 provides:

(a) Caption; Names of Parties. Every pleading must have a caption with the
court's name, a title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation. The title
of the complaint must name all the parties; the title of other pleadings,
after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally to other
parties.

(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses
in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set
of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in
an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded
on a separate transaction or occurrence--and each defense other than a
denial--must be stated in a separate count or defense.

(c) Adoption by Reference; Exhibits. A statement in a pleading may be
adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other
pleading or motion. A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10.

5 Local Rule 15.1 states:

(a) Amended Pleadings. Unless the court orders otherwise, any amended
pleading must be complete in itself and must not incorporate by reference
any prior pleading.

(b) Motions to Amend. Any motion to amend a pleading must be
accompanied by:

(1) a copy of the proposed amended pleading, and

(2) a version of the proposed amended pleading that shows — through
redlining, underlining, strikeouts, or other similarly effective
typographic methods — how the proposed amended pleading differs
over this case. Quinlan is directed to the resources for pro se parties available on the
District of Minnesota website at the “Representing Yourself” tab

(https://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/representing-yourself), which contains links to the
Federal and Local Rules, the Pro Se Civil Guidebook and Information Sheets
(https://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/pro-se-civil-guidebook-and-information-sheets), and
other resources he may find useful.
The second amended complaint must be filed on or before October 25, 2024. If it
is not filed by that date, or if it does not comply with this Order and the Federal and Local

Rules, the Court may recommend dismissal without prejudice of this action pursuant to
Rule 8 and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court notes that the City Defendants have agreed to accept service
electronically of the second amended complaint via CM/ECF. (Dkt. 23 at 5.) They must
respond to the second amended complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure as appropriate—whether it be an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a renewed
motion for a more definitive statement/motion to strike. As to Defendants other than the
City of Woodbury and Kim Richardson, there is no evidence in the record indicating that
those Defendants have been properly served with any pleading so as to warrant any
response from them to the second amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.

from the operative pleading. If the court grants the motion, the moving
party must file and serve the amended pleading.

D. Minn. LR 15.1.
In sum, for all these reasons, the Court grants the City Defendants’ Motions for
More Definite Statement and/or Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Dkt.

8). Given that the Court is striking the Complaint (Dkt. 2) and the Amended Complaint
(Dkt. 2-1) from the record, denies the City Defendants’ Motion Re: Sealing as moot. The
under seal status of Docket Entries 2, 2-1, and 2-2 will remain unchanged.
IV. ORDER
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants City of Woodbury and Kim Richardson’s Motions for More

Definite Statement and/or to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8) are
GRANTED.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to STRIKE the Complaint (Dkt. 2) and
Amended Complaint (Dkt. 2-1) from the record.
3. Plaintiffs may submit one single second amended complaint that clearly

and concisely sets forth Plaintiffs’ claims for relief and the factual basis for those claims
on or before October 25, 2024. The second amended complaint must comply with all
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8, Rule 10, and Rule 5.2, all Local
Rules, including Local Rule 15.1, and all requirements imposed by this Order. The
second amended complaint must be no more than 10,000 words. If the second amended

complaint does not comply with the October 25, 2024 deadline and these requirements,
the Court may recommend dismissal without prejudice of this action pursuant to Rule 8
and Rule 41.
4. Defendants City of Woodbury and Kim Richardson shall respond to the
second amended complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. Defendants City of Woodbury and Kim Richardson’s Motion Re: Sealing
(Dkt. 6) is DENIED as moot. Docket Entries 2, 2-1, and 2-2 will remain UNDER
SEAL.

Dated: September 25, 2024 s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT
United States Magistrate Judge

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Carsten James Quinlan et al., Case No. 24-cv-2782 (PAM/ECW)

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

Washington County et al.,

Defendants.

1. The Court Administrator shall temporarily designate the minor children’s
names, medical records and custody evaluation described herein as
confidential and not accessible to the public.

28 U.S.C. § 1331

Condition 3: The new complaint will name the following defendants: Kim
Richardson, Hailey Dornfeld, Keshini Ratnayake, Tom Wedes, City of
Woodbury, Washington County, and John/Jane Doe(s).

Condition 6: This new complaint will not incorporate or reference any
portion of either the initial complaint, nor the amended complaint, which can
be discarded.

Condition 7: The complaint will not exceed 420 numbered paragraphs, nor
exceed 90 pages, nor exceed 22,000 words.

Condition 8: Defendants will accept service of the new complaint
electronically, through electronic filing with the court and through email to
their legal representatives.

Condition 9: The new complaint will be filed within 14 days of the court
granting the defendant’s motion for a more definite statement along with
these conditions listed here.

918 F. Supp. 2d 888, 901

 (D. Minn. 2013) (quoting 
Lyon Fin. Sers., Inc. v. MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 06-4562,

2007 WL 2893612

, at *9 
(D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2007), citing Century ‘21’ Shows v. Owens,

400 F.2d 603, 607

 (8th 
Cir. 1968)).                                                              
   As part of this determination, the Court necessarily considers Rule 8(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs pleading claims for relief, and requires 
that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain only need contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2).  Rule 8(d)(1) further states that the pleading must be concise and direct: “Each 
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).   
   In addition, Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to 
“strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, 
or scandalous matter.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).  “A matter is immaterial or impertinent 
when not relevant to the resolution of the issue at hand.”  McLafferty v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 

Indiana, No. CIV. 14-564 DSD/SER,

2014 WL 2009086

, at *3 (D. Minn. May 16, 2014) 
(quoting Kay v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc., No. 2:09cv4065,

2009 WL 1664624

, at *1 (W.D. 
Mo. June 15, 2009)).  “Material is scandalous if it generally refers to any allegation that 
unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual or states anything in 
repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court.”

Id.

     
   Rule 12(f) continues that “[t]he court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion 

made by a party. . . .”

Id.

  A district court enjoys “liberal discretion” under this rule.  
Stanbury Law Firm, P.A. v. I.R.S.,

221 F.3d 1059, 1063

 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted).  A motion to strike should be granted “if the result is to make a trial less 
complicated or otherwise streamline the ultimate resolution of the action.”  Daigle v. 
Ford Motor Co.,

713 F. Supp. 2d 822, 830

(D. Minn. 2010).

412 F.3d 920, 922

 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (“Even pro se litigants must comply with court rules and directives.”); Bennett 
v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up, Inc.,

295 F.3d 805, 808

 (8th Cir. 2002) (pro se status does not 
entitle litigant to disregard Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or court’s local rules); Burgs 
v. Sissel,

745 F.2d 526, 528

 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[P]ro se litigants are not excused from 
failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.”).                 
B.   Discussion                                                           
   The City Defendants argue that the Full Amended Complaint is so vague and 

ambiguous that they cannot reasonably prepare a response, requiring a more definite 
statement pursuant to Rule 12(e).  (Dkt. 10 at 11-13.)  This includes the City Defendants’ 
argument that the Amended Complaint effectively supplemented the Complaint rather 
than amending it, creating inconsistent and duplicative claims for relief.  (Id. at 12.)  For 
example, the City Defendants assert that both the Complaint and Amended Complaint 
contain negligence claims against individually named Defendants, but it is unclear 

whether the Amended Complaint modifies, supplements, or replaces the original 
negligence claims.  (Id. at 8, 12.)  The City Defendants also assert that, given that the 
state court “deleted” the Amended Complaint from the docket before the case was 
removed to this Court and that Quinlan served the Complaint after that occurred, it is 
unclear which version is the operative pleading in this action.  (Id. at 12.)   

   It is evident based on the Court’s review of the Full Amended Complaint that it is 
not possible for the City Defendants to frame a response to the Complaint, Amended 
Complaint, or Full Amended Complaint.  See Ransom,

918 F. Supp. 2d at 901

.  There are 
inconsistent and duplicative claims between the Complaint and Amended Complaint—
including but not limited to a negligence claim against Richardson in the Complaint (Dkt. 

2 ¶¶ 190-99) and another against her in the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 2-1 ¶¶ 360-67), 
both relating to an investigation of Quinlan for alleged child abuse—such that it is 
unclear what claims the Amended Complaint modifies.  This is exacerbated by the 
confusion around the state court’s “deletion” of the Amended Complaint coupled with the 
order and manner of Quinlan’s service on the City Defendants.  Simply put, the pleadings 
are so vague and ambiguous that the City Defendants cannot reasonably prepare a 

response.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).                                     
   Moreover, the City Defendants are unable to reasonably prepare a response to the 
pleadings because the Full Amended Complaint does not satisfy Rule 8’s notice pleading 
requirements.  Indeed, at 417 pages and 457 paragraphs (not including subparagraphs), 
the Full Amended Complaint fails Rule 8’s “short and plain” requirement.  “The words 
‘short and plain’ are themselves short and plain, and they mean what they say: A 

complaint must be concise, and it must be clear.  Rule 8 was not promulgated to provide 
helpful advice; it has the force of law, and it must be followed.”  Gurman v. Metro 
Housing & Redevelopment Authority,

842 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1152

 (D. Minn. 2011). 
   Further, while the pleading standard articulated by Rule 8 “does not require 
detailed factual allegations, but it [does demand] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  A “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ 
or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Id.

 (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555

 (2007)).  With respect to any §1983 claim, 
a plaintiff must plead facts showing each named defendant’s personal involvement in the 

alleged constitutional wrongdoing.  See White v. Jackson,

865 F.3d 1064, 1081

 (8th Cir. 
2017); Beck v. LaFleur,

257 F.3d 764, 766

842 F. Supp. 2d at 1153

 (dealing with a 60 
page and almost 250 paragraph complaint); see also Brown v. Ludeman, No. 11-CV-2859 

(JRT/ECW),

2023 WL 4399079

, at *6 (D. Minn. July 7, 2023) (rejecting an 84-page, 
274-paragraph complaint), R. & R. adopted,

2023 WL 5703194

 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2023);  
Favors v. Johnson, No. 19-CV-0032 (PJS/TNL),

2019 WL 1230367

 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 
2019) (striking a 118-page complaint with hundreds of paragraphs);2 Naca v. Macalester 
Coll., No. 16-CV-3263 (PJS/BRT),

2016 WL 5842771

, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2016) 
(rejecting an 81-page, and 250-paragraph complaint).  “This is emphatically not the job 

of either a defendant or the Court.”  Gurman,

842 F. Supp. 2d at 1153

.  The Court further 
notes that “kitchen-sink complaints also harm the very plaintiffs who bring them.”

Id. at 1154

.  In many cases, “[A] genuine dispute that supports a viable legal claim—or even a 
few viable legal claims—underlies a plaintiff’s complaint.  But this genuine dispute 
becomes almost impossible to discern when it is wreathed in a halo of frivolous and near-

frivolous legal claims.  The bad obscures the good.”

Id.

                 
   While it is unclear—based in part on the confusing procedural posture of this 
case—exactly how many claims Plaintiffs are alleging and against whom, it is apparent to 


2    Quinlan argues that Favors is different from his case because there the plaintiff 
pleaded only “four claims against three defendants,” id. at *1, while here his case is 
“significantly more complex, involving a conspiracy to violate [his] civil rights, 
numerous investigative errors, comparisons to other investigations, critical flaws in the 
forensic interview process, and extensive damages resulting from the defendants’ 
actions.”  (Dkt. 17 at 3.)  However, the plaintiff in Favors also argued that his case was 
“very complex” and that it “involve[d] a multitude of violations of state and federal 
rights, privileges and immunities”—an argument rejected by the Favors court.

2019 WL 1230367

, at *2.                                                           
the Court that their claims do not require a lengthy pleading.  This is due in part to the 
Full Amended Complaint containing voluminous factual allegations and assertions that 

are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ causes of action.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 2-1 ¶¶ 248-359 (summary of 
Quinlan’s criminal trial including names and other confidential information about the 
individual jurors and detailed summaries of every witness including Quinlan’s 
editorializing).)                                                         
   Quinlan argues that his need to “comply” with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
18(a), which governs the joinder of claims, and the principle of res judicata, whereby the 

disposition of an earlier claim bars against the litigation of a subsequent claim, balance 
Rule 8’s requirements for a short and concise pleading.  (Dkt. 17 at 1-2.)  However, Rule 
18 does not grant Plaintiffs leeway to violate Rule 8.  See Fletcher v. Inmate Bank,

752 F. App’x 683

, 684-85 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Rule 18(a) allows joinder of multiple claims, but 
the opportunity to include multiple claims did not eliminate the obligation to comply with 

Rule 8.”).  Nor does complying with Rule 8 prevent a plaintiff from asserting all 
nonfrivolous claims arising from the same case of action so as to prevent barring of 
potential future claims by res judicata.  Pro. Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. KPMG LLP,

345 F.3d 1030

, 1032 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Under res judicata, a judgment on the merits in an earlier 
lawsuit bars a second suit involving the same parties based on the same cause of 

action.”).  It is not the number of claims here that is the issue, but rather whether they are 
unnecessarily verbose, frivolous, duplicative, or otherwise make it impossible for the City 
Defendants to properly respond to under Rule 8’s notice requirement.  The Court is 
certain that Plaintiffs could comply with Rule 8’s short and concise pleading 
requirements and assert as many nonfrivolous claims as they have against the City 
Defendants while also complying with Rule 18 and guarding against any claims being 

barred in the future by res judicata.                                     
   Because Plaintiffs’ Full Amended Complaint is neither short and concise, nor are 
the allegations simple, concise, and direct, the Court finds that it fails to satisfy Rule 8’s 
notice pleading standard.                                                 
   Finally, the City Defendants argue that the Full Amended Complaint should be 
stricken for irrelevance and invasion of privacy pursuant to Rule 12(f).  (Dkt. 10 at 13-

19.)  Specifically, they argue that the Full Amended Complaint should be stricken in its 
entirety because it invades the privacy of Quinlan’s minor children by using their full 
names rather than initials in the case caption and in exhibits, including their medical 
information and a custody evaluation; it invades the privacy of jurors from his criminal 
trial by naming the jurors and including other personal and identifying information about 

them; and it contains irrelevant, redundant, and scandalous information through his 
lengthy descriptions of his criminal trial and his ad hominem attacks of Defendant 
Richardson.  (Dkt. 10 at 13-19.)  Quinlan appears to concede that the Full Amended 
Complaint should be stricken by acknowledging that he will “fix” any confidentiality 
issues going forward, promising the second amended complaint “will have a more 

professional tone,” and stating the Full Amended Complaint may be “discarded.”  (Dkt. 
16 at 3, 6, 7.)  Notwithstanding these concessions, Quinlan is advised that the Court will 
not tolerate any further disregard by Quinlan of his minor children’s privacy, nor will it 
tolerate written submissions from Quinlan containing personal attacks.    
   Likewise, the inclusion of the jurors’ names and personal information in the 
pleadings is immaterial and impertinent.  See McLafferty,

2014 WL 2009086

, at *3.  It 

also invades the jurors’ privacy rights.  See generally United States v. Thao,

586 F. Supp. 3d 924

, 925 (D. Minn. 2022) (“[T]he District of Minnesota’s jury plan provides that 
‘[n]ames and personal information concerning prospective, sitting, and previously seated 
petit and grand jurors must not be disclosed to attorneys, parties, the public, or the media 
. . . .’  D. Minn. Jury Plan § 21(e).  And federal law allows the Court to ‘keep [jurors’] 
names confidential in any case where the interests of justice so require.’

28 U.S.C. § 1863

(b)(7).”).  While these jurors sat in a state court matter, these principles guide 
whether their names and other information should be included in a pleading in federal 
court.  In the Court’s view, based on the Full Amended Complaint, their names are not 
necessary for notice pleading purposes and their inclusion in a pleading is immaterial and 
impertinent.                                                              

   Finally, the attacks on Richardson (and others) are scandalous because they 
“unnecessarily reflect[] on [her] moral character” and do so in a way that “detracts from 
the dignity of the court.”  McLafferty,

2014 WL 2009086

, at *3.  Such commentary and 
editorialization violates the Rules and will not be tolerated in future pleadings. 
   For all of the reasons stated above, the Court finds that granting the motion to 

strike will make the “trial less complicated” and will “otherwise streamline the ultimate 
resolution of the action.”  Daigle,

713 F. Supp. 2d at 830

842 F. Supp. 2d at 1154

 (“the 
second amended complaint must not exceed 10,000 words”); Naca,

2016 WL 5842771

,
at *1 (“To proceed with this action, Naca must file an amended complaint of no more

4 Rule 10 provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10.

5 Local Rule 15.1 states:

(a) Amended Pleadings. Unless the court orders otherwise, any amended
pleading must be complete in itself and must not incorporate by reference
any prior pleading.

(b) Motions to Amend. Any motion to amend a pleading must be
accompanied by:

(1) a copy of the proposed amended pleading, and

from the operative pleading. If the court grants the motion, the moving
party must file and serve the amended pleading.

D. Minn. LR 15.1.
In sum, for all these reasons, the Court grants the City Defendants’ Motions for
More Definite Statement and/or Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Dkt.

5. Defendants City of Woodbury and Kim Richardson’s Motion Re: Sealing
(Dkt. 6) is DENIED as moot. Docket Entries 2, 2-1, and 2-2 will remain UNDER
SEAL.

Dated: September 25, 2024 s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT
United States Magistrate Judge

Reference

Status: Unknown