UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Vivorte, Inc.,                     Case No. 24-cv-1040 (DWF/DLM)         

               Plaintiff,                                                
                                 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S               
v.                               MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS              

Jagi Gill,                                                               

               Defendant.                                                


    This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jagi Gill’s Motion to Stay Proceedings 
(Docs.  31  (Motion),  34  (Memorandum  in  Support)).  Mr.  Gill  asserts  that  a  stay  is 
appropriate because there is a related action proceeding in Delaware state court, brought 
by Plaintiff Vivorte, Inc. (“Vivorte”) against Acumed, LLC (“Acumed”), who was Mr. 
Gill’s former employer. According to Mr. Gill, the overlap between the Delaware action 
and the instant case is so significant that a stay is appropriate under both the so-called 
Colorado River1 abstention doctrine and this Court’s inherent authority to manage its 
docket. Vivorte opposes Mr. Gill’s motion, asserting that Colorado River is inapplicable 
because, among other things, this action is a separate lawsuit against a separate defendant 
involving different states’ laws, and Mr. Gill could not have been added to the Delaware 
action for a lack of personal jurisdiction. Vivorte further asserts that the Court should not 
use its inherent authority to stay this matter because it is not likely the Delaware action will 

1 Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 

 (1976). 
resolve the issues before this Court, and because Mr. Gill has not shown he will suffer 
undue hardship if this case goes forward without a stay.                  

    The Court heard oral argument on this matter on August 9, 2024. Based on the 
parties’ pleadings and arguments, Mr. Gill’s motion for a stay of proceedings is denied. 
Colorado River permits a court to abstain from moving a federal suit forward where 
another related state-court action is pending in order to avoid conflicting state and federal 
court decisions on the same issue. But Vivorte is correct that the difference in the parties, 
claims, and applicable state laws here counsels against a stay, because resolution of the 

Delaware action against Acumed is not likely to resolve the Minnesota state-law claims 
against Mr. Gill that comprise this lawsuit. The Court likewise declines to invoke its 
inherent authority to stay this matter, as Mr. Gill has not demonstrated any undue hardship 
beyond the ordinary burdens of litigation.                                
                         BACKGROUND                                      

    This case relates to a dispute between Vivorte and Acumed. Vivorte manufactures 
biological medical devices. (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 5-6.) Acumed makes and distributes its own 
medical devices, and often sells other manufacturers’ medical devices too. (Id. ¶ 8.) Mr. 
Gill, the defendant in this case, is a former employee of Acumed. (Id. ¶ 8.)  
    In 2019, Vivorte and Acumed started negotiating a deal for Acumed to be the 

exclusive distributor of Vivorte’s products. (Id. ¶ 9.) Vivorte’s President and CEO, Mark 
Wagner, was the primary negotiator for Vivorte, and Mr. Gill served as the point person 
for  Acumed.  (Id.  ¶  10.)  The  parties  apparently—but  only  apparently—reached  a 
contractual agreement, which included certain guarantees that Acumed would purchase 
minimum amounts of Vivorte’s products. (See generally Doc. 35-4.) When questions arose 
about whether Acumed was holding up its end of the bargain, Vivorte sued in Delaware 

state court (pursuant to a choice-of-venue provision of the parties’ agreement). (Docs. 35, 
35-1, 35-3 ¶ 21, see also Vivorte, Inc. v. Acumed LLC, No. N22C-04-077 EMD CCLD 
(Del. Sup. Ct.) (“the Delaware Action”).) The Delaware Action was filed on April 11, 
2022. (Doc. 35-1 at 2.) In the Delaware Action, Vivorte brings Delaware state-law claim, 
consistent with the Delaware choice-of-law provision in the parties’ agreement. (Doc. 35-
3 ¶ 22.)                                                                  

    According to Mr. Gill, the Delaware Action has involved a significant amount of 
litigation. (Doc. 35 ¶ 2.) That litigation included deposing Mr. Gill, which was noticed to 
be taken in October of 2023. (Doc. 35-1 at 6.) According to Vivorte, it eventually came to 
believe that not only did Acumed breach its contract, but Vivorte—through Mr. Gill—had 
engaged in fraud by affixing Vivorte’s signature to a different version of the distribution 

agreement than the parties had negotiated. (Doc. 35-3 ¶¶ 119-49.) Thus, in February of 
2024, Vivorte filed an amended complaint in the Delaware Action, adding a count alleging 
fraud and fraudulent inducement based on Mr. Gill’s conduct. (Id.; see also Doc. 35-1 at 
7.)                                                                       
    A few weeks after amending the complaint to plead fraud claims against Acumed 

in the Delaware Action, Vivorte brought the instant case individually against Mr. Gill. 
(Doc. 1.) The operative one-count complaint alleges fraud and fraudulent inducement, 
tracking in many respects the fraud allegations in the Delaware Action. (Compare Doc 11 
with Doc. 35-3.) The relief sought is similar, too, although the claims against Mr. Gill in 
the instant case are made under Minnesota law, and seek relief against Mr. Gill individually 
rather than as an agent for Acumed. (Id.)                                 

    In the parties’ Joint Rule 26(f) Report, Mr. Gill forecasted that he would be seeking 
to stay this matter while the Delaware Action proceeded. (Doc. 17 at 2.) On July 31, 2024, 
Mr. Gill formally moved to stay proceedings. (Docs. 31 (Motion), 34 (Memorandum in 
Support).) He argued that a stay is appropriate based on the Colorado River abstention 
doctrine as well pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority. According to Mr. Gill, this 
matter is essentially a parallel proceeding to the Delaware Action, the Delaware Action is 

far more mature and closer to resolution, and determinations in that case might render some 
of the litigation in the instant matter unnecessary. For its part, Vivorte responded that this 
case and the Delaware action are not parallel, since they involve different parties, different 
state law, and different relief. (Doc. 38.) Mr. Gill could not have been sued as a part of the 
Delaware Action, Vivorte asserts, because Delaware courts have no personal jurisdiction 

over Mr. Gill or the claims Vivorte raised against him—this is the proper venue for Vivorte 
to seek relief against Mr. Gill. At bottom, according to Vivorte, Mr. Gill cannot pass the 
high hurdle for a litigant seeking to stay proceedings.                   
    The Court held a hearing on Mr. Gill’s motion on August 13, 2024. Both sides 
presented oral argument on the matter, and the Court took the matter under advisement 

pending this Order.                                                       
                           ANALYSIS                                      
    In some circumstances, a court may stay a case where there is another related matter 
already pending. Cottrell v. Duke, 

 (8th Cir. 2013). The power to 
stay based on parallel proceedings has been long recognized. See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. 
Co., 

 (1936); accord Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 

 (1931) (“[T]he existence of jurisdiction does not mean that it must be exercised and 
that grounds may not be shown for staying the hand of the Court.”). That power derives 
from the Court’s inherent authority to ensure judicial economy, Landis, 

, 
although the Supreme Court subsequently provided significant guidance for what factors 
ought to influence a court’s decision to abstain from moving forward with an action. These 
latter factors were most clearly identified in Colorado River Water Conservation District 

v. United States, 

 (1976), such that the analytical framework itself is 
often referred to as the Colorado River doctrine.2                        
    The Eighth Circuit has noted that often “the line dividing a stay pending resolution 
of an issue by another court and abstention under Colorado River and Moses H. Cone is 
not  clear.”  Kreditverein  Der  Bank  Austria  Creditandstalt  Fur  Niederosterreich  Und 

Bergenland v. Nejezchleba, 

 (8th Cir. 2007). That said, the powers to 
stay based on a court’s inherent authority and to abstain under Colorado River are separate, 
Roehrs v. Wahlstrom, 23-cv-1885 (SRN/DLM), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 
2024), even if there is significant overlap in the analytical framework for each. Perhaps 
most  importantly,  regardless  of  whether  a  stay  is  sought  under  the  Court’s  inherent 


2 Although Colorado River itself involved dismissal rather than a stay, the doctrine has 
been applied to certain stays as well. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 

 (1983). The key criterion is that one court is asked to abstain from 
litigating their case out of deference to another court’s related matter. 

 
authority or Colorado River, there is “a presumption in favor of denying a motion to stay” 
because of the “‘virtually unflagging  obligation of the federal courts to exercise the 

jurisdiction  given  them.’”  Wiley  v.  Portfolio  Recovery  Assocs.,  LLC,  20-cv-737 
(SRN/KMM), 

, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2020) (quoting Colorado 
River, 

).                                                  
I.   MR. GILL HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED AN ENTITLEMENT TO A STAY               
    PURSUANT TO THE COLORADO RIVER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE.                  

    Under  the  Colorado  River  doctrine,  courts  may—although  they  are  not 
automatically required to—abstain from permitting a federal suit to proceed “due to the 
presence of a concurrent state proceeding.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 

 (1976). Courts apply Colorado River to avoid state and 
federal court decisions that “reach conflicting opinions on the same issues” and create 
“unwarranted friction between state and federal courts.” Spectra Communications Grp., 
LLC v. City of Cameron, Mo., 

 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Employers 
Ins.  of  Wausau  v.  Missouri  Elec.  Works,  Inc.,  

  (8th  Cir.  1994), 
abrogated on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 

 (1995)). However, 

the mere fact that there is a pending state action concerning the same matter does not bar a 
federal court’s jurisdiction over proceedings on the same matter. Colorado River, 

. A court may stay a case under Colorado River “only ‘when [1] parallel state and 
federal actions exist and [2] exceptional circumstances warrant abstention.’” Cottrell, 737 
F.3d at 1244–45 (alterations in original) (quoting Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, 

Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2009)). To apply the Colorado River doctrine, a court 
must first determine whether the two actions are genuinely parallel. See Fru-Con, 

. If the cases are parallel, then the court looks to six additional factors to decide 

whether to stay the federal action:                                       
    (1) whether there is a res over which one court has established jurisdiction, 
    (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) whether maintaining separate 
    actions may result in piecemeal litigation, unless the relevant law would 
    require piecemeal litigation and the federal court issue is easily severed, (4) 
    which case has priority—not necessarily which case was filed first but a 
    greater emphasis on the relative progress made in the cases, (5) whether state 
    or federal law controls, especially favoring the exercise of jurisdiction where 
    federal law controls, and (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the 
    federal plaintiff’s rights.                                          

Federated Rural Elec. Ins. v. Arkansas Elec. Cooperatives, Inc., 

, 297 (8th Cir. 
1995) (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, 

 (8th 
Cir. 1994)). The risk of piecemeal litigation is often the “predominant factor” in this 
analysis. Id.; see also Mountain Pure, LLC v. Turner Holdings, LLC, 

 
(8th Cir. 2006) (Colorado River factors are to be applied pragmatically to advance the clear 
federal policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation). In considering each of these factors, 
though, the Court must be mindful that “Colorado River abstention is appropriate only in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ where the surrender of federal jurisdiction is supported by ‘the 
clearest of justifications.’” Spectra Communications Group, 

 (quoting 
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 

).                             
A.   Mr. Gill has not demonstrated this action is parallel to the Delaware Action. 
    In order to grant a stay pursuant to Colorado River, a court must first convince itself 
that the action subject to stay is a parallel proceeding to another action. Cottrell, 

. To demonstrate this, a movant must show a “substantial likelihood” that one 
proceeding will “fully dispose of” the claims presented in the other action. Fru-Con, 

. If there is any doubt that the two matters are parallel, “the district court cannot 

utilize Colorado River to refuse its jurisdiction.” Cottrell, 

. 
    There is certainly some evidence of similarity between this matter and the Delaware 
Action to support deeming the two parallel. It is true that the matters involve different 
defendants—here, Mr. Gill, and in the Delaware Action, Acumed. But there is clear overlap 
between those defendants: Acumed is being sued (at least in part) based on Mr. Gill’s 
alleged fraud against Vivorte, and those same facts comprise Vivorte’s sole-count fraud 

complaint in the instant action. (See, e.g., Doc. 34 at 4-7 (comparing factual bases for both 
actions).) Matters may still be parallel where “the parties in each action are not identical, 
[but] the facts underlying the claims in each case are the same.” See NDGS, LLC v. 
Radium2 Cap., Inc., No. 19-cv-1554 (SRN/BRT), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 
9,  2019).  And  while  the  two  actions  involve  different  state  laws—Delaware  in  the 

Delaware Action and Minnesota law here—there appears to be no analytical difference 
between those laws. Lagermeier v. Boston Sci. Corp, No. 10-cv-4087 (SRN/SER), 

, at *4 n.2 (D. Minn. July 19, 2011) (“the elements of fraud under Delaware 
law are identical to those in Minnesota”), amended on other grounds, 

 
(D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2011).                                                

    While there is no doubt this action and the Delaware Action are related, though, the 
Court agrees with Vivorte that they are not parallel. The Eighth Circuit “requires more 
precision” than simply showing similar parties are litigating similar issues in two fora. Fru-
Con, 

. The movant must demonstrate that one proceeding will “fully dispose 
of the claims presented” in the other matter. 

 And a claim cannot be fully disposed of by 
a court that has no jurisdiction to consider it. Accord Cottrell, 

 (refusing 

to find two actions parallel, despite duplicate issues in both, because one court had no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate certain claims).                               
    Mr. Gill appears to have been sued in Minnesota rather than Delaware not, as he 
suggests, due to forum shopping. (Doc. 34 at 18.) At the hearing on this matter, counsel for 
Vivorte indicated that Mr. Gill was not a part of the Delaware action because he could not 
be:  he is a Minnesota resident, none of the relevant transactions occurred in Delaware, and 

he is not a party to the contract between Acumed and Vivorte that stipulated to Delaware 
as the parties’ choice of venue and law. Absent personal jurisdiction over Mr. Gill in the 
Delaware Action, it is simply impossible that action could “fully dispose of” the claims 
against him brought in this case.                                         
B.   Even if the matters were parallel, the Colorado River factors counsel against 
    abstention.                                                          

    Because the Court has determined that Mr. Gill has failed to meet his threshold 
burden of demonstrating this action is a parallel proceeding to the Delaware Action, the 
Court need consider whether the remaining Colorado River factors would support a stay. 
Nonetheless, for purposes of completeness, the Court undertakes such an analysis. 
    The first factor—whether there is a res (that is, property) over which one court has 
jurisdiction, is inapplicable because this is an in personam action against Mr. Gill. But that 
does not, as Mr. Gill suggests, make this factor neutral: it is Mr. Gill’s obligation to 

demonstrate exceptional circumstances support a stay; absence of this factor weighs against 
that. Federated Rural Elec., 48 F.3d at 297. As for the second factor—whether this federal 
forum is inconvenient—Mr. Gill has not demonstrated any real burden. He is a citizen of 

and resides in Minnesota, where this action is pending. (Doc. 14 ¶ 2.)    
    The third Colorado River factor asks whether maintaining separate actions will 
result in piecemeal litigation. Mountain Pure, 

. Undoubtedly, there is 
overlap between the facts, claims, and analysis in this action and the Delaware Action. 
This, argues Mr. Gill, weighs in favor of a stay. The Court agrees, but does not assign this 
factor the heavy weight Mr. Gill invites. That is because some piecemeal litigation is 

unavoidable here: Mr. Gill was not, and could not be, sued in the Delaware Action. So 
while circuit precedent often analyzes this factor by reference to which action is most 
“complete,” see Federated Rural Elec., 48 F.3d at 297-98, that framework presumes one 
of the two actions is actually more fulsome. Here, that is not the case: Acumed could not 
be sued in this action due to its Delaware choice-of-venue clause, and Mr. Gill could not 

be sued in the Delaware Action because of a lack of personal jurisdiction. So while Mr. 
Gill is right that maintaining two actions could result in piecemeal litigation, the Court does 
not agree that conclusion strongly favors a stay in this case. Accord Spectra Comms., 

 (Colorado River factors are not a “mechanical checklist,” but should be 
weighed “in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand” 

(quoting Moses H. Cone, 

)).                             
    As for the fourth factor, which case has priority, the Court again agrees with Mr. 
Gill that this weighs in favor of a stay. Again, though, the Court does not assign the weight 
that Mr. Gill does to the factor. In the Delaware Action, discovery has closed and there are 
dispositive motions currently pending. But the claims that Mr. Gill asserts are parallel to 
this case—those involving his purported fraud—were only added via amendment weeks 

before this case was filed. As of now, no court has addressed the merits of those claims. 
Accord Mountain Pure, 

 (finding this factor weighed against a stay where 
neither court had addressed the merits of the parallel claims); cf. Spectra Comms., 

 (finding this factor favored stay where one court had entered partial summary 
judgment on the parallel claims). So while the maturity of the Delaware Action factors in 
support of a stay, the absence of any merits-based decision on claims at issue lessens its 

impact on the Court’s analysis.                                           
    The fifth Colorado River factor, the question of whether one state’s law controls, 
cannot be afforded any significant weight. Both the Delaware Action and this matter are 
diversity actions, both involving application of separate state laws. While there is analytical 
overlap between those laws, that does not favor a stay.                   

    Finally, and most importantly here, the Court considers whether the Delaware 
Action presents an adequate forum to protect Vivorte’s rights in this case. It does not. 
Vivorte asserts that it brought suit against Mr. Gill in Minnesota because it had to—he 
could not be sued in Delaware. This case appears to be the sole vehicle for Vivorte to seek 
relief against Mr. Gill, a factor that is extremely persuasive. Accord Gov’t Employees Ins. 

v. Simon, 

, 1149 (8th Cir. 1990) (adequacy of forum factor should be given 
weight where one forum is inadequate to protect a party’s rights). A stay delays that relief. 
And if this Court prevents Vivorte from moving forward against Mr. Gill, Vivorte has no 
other  way  to  pursue  relief  against  him.  Prudence  counsels  against  delay  in  such 
circumstances.                                                            

II.  THE  COURT  WILL  NOT  INVOKE  ITS  INHERENT  AUTHORITY  TO          
    STAY THIS MATTER.                                                    

    Separate and apart from Colorado River abstention, Mr. Gill asks the Court to stay 
this matter pending resolution of the Delaware Action based on its inherent authority. 
Courts have the authority to stay proceedings as part of their inherent power to control their 
dockets, including staying federal cases that are also proceeding in state court concerning 
the same allegations and claims. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55; see also Cottrell, 

 (citing Lunde v. Helms, 

 (8th Cir. 1990)).  
    When considering a stay based on inherent authority, courts should consider what 
promotes efficiency and wise stewardship of time for the court, counsel, and litigants. 
Landis, 

. “How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, 
which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance,” considering the 
harm to either party if the stay were ordered versus if it were not ordered. 

. 
“But considerations of fairness to the opposing party mandate a presumption in favor of 

denying a motion to stay.” Wiley, 

, at *3. And, importantly, the party 
seeking a stay under this Court’s inherent authority must demonstrate a “specific hardship 
or inequity if he or she is required to go forward.” Daywitt v. State of Minnesota, No. 14-
cv-4526 (WMW/LIB), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. May 24, 2016) (quoting Jones 
v. Clinton, 

, 1364 (8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, J., concurring)); Wiley, 

, at *3.                                                           
    As a threshold matter, it is not clear that the Court ought to consider Mr. Gill’s stay 
request under any other framework than Colorado River. In Cottrell, the Eighth Circuit 

held that the district court abused its discretion in staying a matter under its inherent 
authority  where  the  effect  of  the  stay  “amounts  to  a  complete  refusal  to  exercise 
jurisdiction.” Cottrell, 

. In such circumstances, Colorado River is the 
appropriate analytical tool, since the “effect of the district court’s order is to accomplish 
the same result contemplated by Colorado River.” Id.; see also Roehrs, 

, 
at *6 (“The authority of a district court to grant a stay under its inherent authority to manage 

its own docket is limited to temporary stays, as a permanent stay is treated as tantamount 
to a dismissal.”). There is at least a colorable argument that Mr. Gill’s proposed stay fits 
that bill, too, since he is asking that this matter be stayed “until final judgment is entered” 
in the Delaware Action because it might have a preclusive effect on this case. (Doc. 31 at 
1; accord Cottrell, 

 (finding stay of one action pending outcome 

of another should have been analyzed under Colorado River abstention doctrine rather than 
a court’s inherent authority). But since this Court’s inherent authority includes the power 
“to impose a more finite and less comprehensive stay” than what Mr. Gill requests, the 
Court will conduct an inherent-authority analysis. Cottrell, 

. 
    Here too, Mr. Gill has not met his burden to overcome the strong presumption 

against a stay. That conclusion is buttressed by a number of the same factors that support 
this Court’s Colorado River analysis: this matter and the Delaware Action are not truly 
parallel, the District of Minnesota is not an inconvenient forum to Mr. Gill, and relevant 
claims in the Delaware Action are about the same age as the ones raised in this action.  
    Additionally, while many facts and legal issues overlap between this action and the 
Delaware Action such that there could be a preclusive effect, Mr. Gill overstates matters 

in suggesting summary judgment proceedings in the Delaware Action “will dispose of the 
identical fraud and fraudulent inducement claims in both actions.” (Doc. 34 at 9 (emphasis 
added).) Indeed, based on the pleadings in this case, Vivorte’s fraud claims against Mr. 
Gill appear to be factually intensive and disputed, with the ultimate question being whether 
Mr. Gill pulled a “bait and switch” by affixing Vivorte’s signature to a different contract 
than it thought it negotiated with Acumed. It is hard to imagine that issue being decided as 

a matter of law, let alone in a manner that would demonstrate Vivorte’s claims against Mr. 
Gill could not proceed. And, if that turns out to be the case, Mr. Gill may seek relief from 
the court in this action through traditional motion practice.             
    In the meanwhile, absent a stay Mr. Gill would simply be litigating this one-count, 
single-plaintiff matter as any other defendant in a lawsuit. The Court’s Pretrial Scheduling 

Order contemplates modest discovery. (Doc. 20.) Mr. Gill is not a party to the Delaware 
Action,  and so  has  not  faced  any  of  the  perils  of  litigation  in that  matter.  There  is 
undoubtedly some burden in litigation generally, “but that is true in every case.” Ung v. 
Universal Acceptance Corp., No. 15-cv-127 (RHK/FLM), 

, at *1 (D. 
Minn. June 15, 2016). The burden of litigation here is far less than the “specific hardship 

or inequity” our cases require Mr. Gill to demonstrate for a stay.        
    Finally, although Mr. Gill suggests the stay could be of modest duration, that is not 
his request. While Mr. Gill’s memorandum suggested overlapping issues in this case and 
the  Delaware  Action  could  be  resolved  based  on  the  pending  summary-judgment 
proceedings, his motion seeks a stay until a final judgment is issued in the Delaware Action. 
(Doc. 31 at 1.) At the hearing on this matter, Mr. Gill clarified that by final judgment he 

meant after trial. The trial in the Delaware Action is not set to begin until December 2, 
2024. (Doc. 35-1 at 2.) At the hearing on this matter, counsel for Vivorte clarified that the 
Delaware Action will be a bench trial, such that the trial court will issue findings of fact 
and conclusions of law rather than receiving a jury verdict. So even assuming the December 
2, 2024 trial date remains, this Court has no confidence that a final judgment in the 
Delaware Action would swiftly follow. Such uncertainty counsels against a stay. And Mr. 

Gill has not persuasively suggested that a shorter stay than until final judgment of the 
Delaware Action would yield any benefit so significant as to overcome the presumption in 
favor of moving this case forward.                                        
                         CONCLUSION                                      
    Mr. Gill has not overcome the presumption against a stay, either under this Court’s 

inherent authority to manage its docket or under the Colorado River doctrine of abstention 
based on parallel proceeding. Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings 
above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 31) is DENIED.  


Date: September 12, 2024            s/Douglas L. Micko                   
                                   DOUGLAS L. MICKO                      
                                   United States Magistrate Judge        

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Vivorte, Inc.,                     Case No. 24-cv-1040 (DWF/DLM)         

               Plaintiff,                                                
                                 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S               
v.                               MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS              

Jagi Gill,                                                               

               Defendant.                                                


    This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jagi Gill’s Motion to Stay Proceedings 
(Docs.  31  (Motion),  34  (Memorandum  in  Support)).  Mr.  Gill  asserts  that  a  stay  is 
appropriate because there is a related action proceeding in Delaware state court, brought 
by Plaintiff Vivorte, Inc. (“Vivorte”) against Acumed, LLC (“Acumed”), who was Mr. 
Gill’s former employer. According to Mr. Gill, the overlap between the Delaware action 
and the instant case is so significant that a stay is appropriate under both the so-called 
Colorado River1 abstention doctrine and this Court’s inherent authority to manage its 
docket. Vivorte opposes Mr. Gill’s motion, asserting that Colorado River is inapplicable 
because, among other things, this action is a separate lawsuit against a separate defendant 
involving different states’ laws, and Mr. Gill could not have been added to the Delaware 
action for a lack of personal jurisdiction. Vivorte further asserts that the Court should not 
use its inherent authority to stay this matter because it is not likely the Delaware action will 

1 Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 

 (1976). 
resolve the issues before this Court, and because Mr. Gill has not shown he will suffer 
undue hardship if this case goes forward without a stay.                  

    The Court heard oral argument on this matter on August 9, 2024. Based on the 
parties’ pleadings and arguments, Mr. Gill’s motion for a stay of proceedings is denied. 
Colorado River permits a court to abstain from moving a federal suit forward where 
another related state-court action is pending in order to avoid conflicting state and federal 
court decisions on the same issue. But Vivorte is correct that the difference in the parties, 
claims, and applicable state laws here counsels against a stay, because resolution of the 

Delaware action against Acumed is not likely to resolve the Minnesota state-law claims 
against Mr. Gill that comprise this lawsuit. The Court likewise declines to invoke its 
inherent authority to stay this matter, as Mr. Gill has not demonstrated any undue hardship 
beyond the ordinary burdens of litigation.                                
                         BACKGROUND                                      

    This case relates to a dispute between Vivorte and Acumed. Vivorte manufactures 
biological medical devices. (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 5-6.) Acumed makes and distributes its own 
medical devices, and often sells other manufacturers’ medical devices too. (Id. ¶ 8.) Mr. 
Gill, the defendant in this case, is a former employee of Acumed. (Id. ¶ 8.)  
    In 2019, Vivorte and Acumed started negotiating a deal for Acumed to be the 

exclusive distributor of Vivorte’s products. (Id. ¶ 9.) Vivorte’s President and CEO, Mark 
Wagner, was the primary negotiator for Vivorte, and Mr. Gill served as the point person 
for  Acumed.  (Id.  ¶  10.)  The  parties  apparently—but  only  apparently—reached  a 
contractual agreement, which included certain guarantees that Acumed would purchase 
minimum amounts of Vivorte’s products. (See generally Doc. 35-4.) When questions arose 
about whether Acumed was holding up its end of the bargain, Vivorte sued in Delaware 

state court (pursuant to a choice-of-venue provision of the parties’ agreement). (Docs. 35, 
35-1, 35-3 ¶ 21, see also Vivorte, Inc. v. Acumed LLC, No. N22C-04-077 EMD CCLD 
(Del. Sup. Ct.) (“the Delaware Action”).) The Delaware Action was filed on April 11, 
2022. (Doc. 35-1 at 2.) In the Delaware Action, Vivorte brings Delaware state-law claim, 
consistent with the Delaware choice-of-law provision in the parties’ agreement. (Doc. 35-
3 ¶ 22.)                                                                  

    According to Mr. Gill, the Delaware Action has involved a significant amount of 
litigation. (Doc. 35 ¶ 2.) That litigation included deposing Mr. Gill, which was noticed to 
be taken in October of 2023. (Doc. 35-1 at 6.) According to Vivorte, it eventually came to 
believe that not only did Acumed breach its contract, but Vivorte—through Mr. Gill—had 
engaged in fraud by affixing Vivorte’s signature to a different version of the distribution 

agreement than the parties had negotiated. (Doc. 35-3 ¶¶ 119-49.) Thus, in February of 
2024, Vivorte filed an amended complaint in the Delaware Action, adding a count alleging 
fraud and fraudulent inducement based on Mr. Gill’s conduct. (Id.; see also Doc. 35-1 at 
7.)                                                                       
    A few weeks after amending the complaint to plead fraud claims against Acumed 

in the Delaware Action, Vivorte brought the instant case individually against Mr. Gill. 
(Doc. 1.) The operative one-count complaint alleges fraud and fraudulent inducement, 
tracking in many respects the fraud allegations in the Delaware Action. (Compare Doc 11 
with Doc. 35-3.) The relief sought is similar, too, although the claims against Mr. Gill in 
the instant case are made under Minnesota law, and seek relief against Mr. Gill individually 
rather than as an agent for Acumed. (Id.)                                 

    In the parties’ Joint Rule 26(f) Report, Mr. Gill forecasted that he would be seeking 
to stay this matter while the Delaware Action proceeded. (Doc. 17 at 2.) On July 31, 2024, 
Mr. Gill formally moved to stay proceedings. (Docs. 31 (Motion), 34 (Memorandum in 
Support).) He argued that a stay is appropriate based on the Colorado River abstention 
doctrine as well pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority. According to Mr. Gill, this 
matter is essentially a parallel proceeding to the Delaware Action, the Delaware Action is 

far more mature and closer to resolution, and determinations in that case might render some 
of the litigation in the instant matter unnecessary. For its part, Vivorte responded that this 
case and the Delaware action are not parallel, since they involve different parties, different 
state law, and different relief. (Doc. 38.) Mr. Gill could not have been sued as a part of the 
Delaware Action, Vivorte asserts, because Delaware courts have no personal jurisdiction 

over Mr. Gill or the claims Vivorte raised against him—this is the proper venue for Vivorte 
to seek relief against Mr. Gill. At bottom, according to Vivorte, Mr. Gill cannot pass the 
high hurdle for a litigant seeking to stay proceedings.                   
    The Court held a hearing on Mr. Gill’s motion on August 13, 2024. Both sides 
presented oral argument on the matter, and the Court took the matter under advisement 

pending this Order.                                                       
                           ANALYSIS                                      
    In some circumstances, a court may stay a case where there is another related matter 
already pending. Cottrell v. Duke, 

 (8th Cir. 2013). The power to 
stay based on parallel proceedings has been long recognized. See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. 
Co., 

 (1936); accord Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 

 (1931) (“[T]he existence of jurisdiction does not mean that it must be exercised and 
that grounds may not be shown for staying the hand of the Court.”). That power derives 
from the Court’s inherent authority to ensure judicial economy, Landis, 

, 
although the Supreme Court subsequently provided significant guidance for what factors 
ought to influence a court’s decision to abstain from moving forward with an action. These 
latter factors were most clearly identified in Colorado River Water Conservation District 

v. United States, 

 (1976), such that the analytical framework itself is 
often referred to as the Colorado River doctrine.2                        
    The Eighth Circuit has noted that often “the line dividing a stay pending resolution 
of an issue by another court and abstention under Colorado River and Moses H. Cone is 
not  clear.”  Kreditverein  Der  Bank  Austria  Creditandstalt  Fur  Niederosterreich  Und 

Bergenland v. Nejezchleba, 

 (8th Cir. 2007). That said, the powers to 
stay based on a court’s inherent authority and to abstain under Colorado River are separate, 
Roehrs v. Wahlstrom, 23-cv-1885 (SRN/DLM), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 
2024), even if there is significant overlap in the analytical framework for each. Perhaps 
most  importantly,  regardless  of  whether  a  stay  is  sought  under  the  Court’s  inherent 


2 Although Colorado River itself involved dismissal rather than a stay, the doctrine has 
been applied to certain stays as well. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 

 (1983). The key criterion is that one court is asked to abstain from 
litigating their case out of deference to another court’s related matter. 

 
authority or Colorado River, there is “a presumption in favor of denying a motion to stay” 
because of the “‘virtually unflagging  obligation of the federal courts to exercise the 

jurisdiction  given  them.’”  Wiley  v.  Portfolio  Recovery  Assocs.,  LLC,  20-cv-737 
(SRN/KMM), 

, at *3–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2020) (quoting Colorado 
River, 

).                                                  
I.   MR. GILL HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED AN ENTITLEMENT TO A STAY               
    PURSUANT TO THE COLORADO RIVER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE.                  

    Under  the  Colorado  River  doctrine,  courts  may—although  they  are  not 
automatically required to—abstain from permitting a federal suit to proceed “due to the 
presence of a concurrent state proceeding.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 

 (1976). Courts apply Colorado River to avoid state and 
federal court decisions that “reach conflicting opinions on the same issues” and create 
“unwarranted friction between state and federal courts.” Spectra Communications Grp., 
LLC v. City of Cameron, Mo., 

 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Employers 
Ins.  of  Wausau  v.  Missouri  Elec.  Works,  Inc.,  

  (8th  Cir.  1994), 
abrogated on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 

 (1995)). However, 

the mere fact that there is a pending state action concerning the same matter does not bar a 
federal court’s jurisdiction over proceedings on the same matter. Colorado River, 

. A court may stay a case under Colorado River “only ‘when [1] parallel state and 
federal actions exist and [2] exceptional circumstances warrant abstention.’” Cottrell, 737 
F.3d at 1244–45 (alterations in original) (quoting Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, 

Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2009)). To apply the Colorado River doctrine, a court 
must first determine whether the two actions are genuinely parallel. See Fru-Con, 

. If the cases are parallel, then the court looks to six additional factors to decide 

whether to stay the federal action:                                       
    (1) whether there is a res over which one court has established jurisdiction, 
    (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) whether maintaining separate 
    actions may result in piecemeal litigation, unless the relevant law would 
    require piecemeal litigation and the federal court issue is easily severed, (4) 
    which case has priority—not necessarily which case was filed first but a 
    greater emphasis on the relative progress made in the cases, (5) whether state 
    or federal law controls, especially favoring the exercise of jurisdiction where 
    federal law controls, and (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the 
    federal plaintiff’s rights.                                          

Federated Rural Elec. Ins. v. Arkansas Elec. Cooperatives, Inc., 

, 297 (8th Cir. 
1995) (quoting United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA, 

 (8th 
Cir. 1994)). The risk of piecemeal litigation is often the “predominant factor” in this 
analysis. Id.; see also Mountain Pure, LLC v. Turner Holdings, LLC, 

 
(8th Cir. 2006) (Colorado River factors are to be applied pragmatically to advance the clear 
federal policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation). In considering each of these factors, 
though, the Court must be mindful that “Colorado River abstention is appropriate only in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ where the surrender of federal jurisdiction is supported by ‘the 
clearest of justifications.’” Spectra Communications Group, 

 (quoting 
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 

).                             
A.   Mr. Gill has not demonstrated this action is parallel to the Delaware Action. 
    In order to grant a stay pursuant to Colorado River, a court must first convince itself 
that the action subject to stay is a parallel proceeding to another action. Cottrell, 

. To demonstrate this, a movant must show a “substantial likelihood” that one 
proceeding will “fully dispose of” the claims presented in the other action. Fru-Con, 

. If there is any doubt that the two matters are parallel, “the district court cannot 

utilize Colorado River to refuse its jurisdiction.” Cottrell, 

. 
    There is certainly some evidence of similarity between this matter and the Delaware 
Action to support deeming the two parallel. It is true that the matters involve different 
defendants—here, Mr. Gill, and in the Delaware Action, Acumed. But there is clear overlap 
between those defendants: Acumed is being sued (at least in part) based on Mr. Gill’s 
alleged fraud against Vivorte, and those same facts comprise Vivorte’s sole-count fraud 

complaint in the instant action. (See, e.g., Doc. 34 at 4-7 (comparing factual bases for both 
actions).) Matters may still be parallel where “the parties in each action are not identical, 
[but] the facts underlying the claims in each case are the same.” See NDGS, LLC v. 
Radium2 Cap., Inc., No. 19-cv-1554 (SRN/BRT), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 
9,  2019).  And  while  the  two  actions  involve  different  state  laws—Delaware  in  the 

Delaware Action and Minnesota law here—there appears to be no analytical difference 
between those laws. Lagermeier v. Boston Sci. Corp, No. 10-cv-4087 (SRN/SER), 

, at *4 n.2 (D. Minn. July 19, 2011) (“the elements of fraud under Delaware 
law are identical to those in Minnesota”), amended on other grounds, 

 
(D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2011).                                                

    While there is no doubt this action and the Delaware Action are related, though, the 
Court agrees with Vivorte that they are not parallel. The Eighth Circuit “requires more 
precision” than simply showing similar parties are litigating similar issues in two fora. Fru-
Con, 

. The movant must demonstrate that one proceeding will “fully dispose 
of the claims presented” in the other matter. 

 And a claim cannot be fully disposed of by 
a court that has no jurisdiction to consider it. Accord Cottrell, 

 (refusing 

to find two actions parallel, despite duplicate issues in both, because one court had no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate certain claims).                               
    Mr. Gill appears to have been sued in Minnesota rather than Delaware not, as he 
suggests, due to forum shopping. (Doc. 34 at 18.) At the hearing on this matter, counsel for 
Vivorte indicated that Mr. Gill was not a part of the Delaware action because he could not 
be:  he is a Minnesota resident, none of the relevant transactions occurred in Delaware, and 

he is not a party to the contract between Acumed and Vivorte that stipulated to Delaware 
as the parties’ choice of venue and law. Absent personal jurisdiction over Mr. Gill in the 
Delaware Action, it is simply impossible that action could “fully dispose of” the claims 
against him brought in this case.                                         
B.   Even if the matters were parallel, the Colorado River factors counsel against 
    abstention.                                                          

    Because the Court has determined that Mr. Gill has failed to meet his threshold 
burden of demonstrating this action is a parallel proceeding to the Delaware Action, the 
Court need consider whether the remaining Colorado River factors would support a stay. 
Nonetheless, for purposes of completeness, the Court undertakes such an analysis. 
    The first factor—whether there is a res (that is, property) over which one court has 
jurisdiction, is inapplicable because this is an in personam action against Mr. Gill. But that 
does not, as Mr. Gill suggests, make this factor neutral: it is Mr. Gill’s obligation to 

demonstrate exceptional circumstances support a stay; absence of this factor weighs against 
that. Federated Rural Elec., 48 F.3d at 297. As for the second factor—whether this federal 
forum is inconvenient—Mr. Gill has not demonstrated any real burden. He is a citizen of 

and resides in Minnesota, where this action is pending. (Doc. 14 ¶ 2.)    
    The third Colorado River factor asks whether maintaining separate actions will 
result in piecemeal litigation. Mountain Pure, 

. Undoubtedly, there is 
overlap between the facts, claims, and analysis in this action and the Delaware Action. 
This, argues Mr. Gill, weighs in favor of a stay. The Court agrees, but does not assign this 
factor the heavy weight Mr. Gill invites. That is because some piecemeal litigation is 

unavoidable here: Mr. Gill was not, and could not be, sued in the Delaware Action. So 
while circuit precedent often analyzes this factor by reference to which action is most 
“complete,” see Federated Rural Elec., 48 F.3d at 297-98, that framework presumes one 
of the two actions is actually more fulsome. Here, that is not the case: Acumed could not 
be sued in this action due to its Delaware choice-of-venue clause, and Mr. Gill could not 

be sued in the Delaware Action because of a lack of personal jurisdiction. So while Mr. 
Gill is right that maintaining two actions could result in piecemeal litigation, the Court does 
not agree that conclusion strongly favors a stay in this case. Accord Spectra Comms., 

 (Colorado River factors are not a “mechanical checklist,” but should be 
weighed “in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at hand” 

(quoting Moses H. Cone, 

)).                             
    As for the fourth factor, which case has priority, the Court again agrees with Mr. 
Gill that this weighs in favor of a stay. Again, though, the Court does not assign the weight 
that Mr. Gill does to the factor. In the Delaware Action, discovery has closed and there are 
dispositive motions currently pending. But the claims that Mr. Gill asserts are parallel to 
this case—those involving his purported fraud—were only added via amendment weeks 

before this case was filed. As of now, no court has addressed the merits of those claims. 
Accord Mountain Pure, 

 (finding this factor weighed against a stay where 
neither court had addressed the merits of the parallel claims); cf. Spectra Comms., 

 (finding this factor favored stay where one court had entered partial summary 
judgment on the parallel claims). So while the maturity of the Delaware Action factors in 
support of a stay, the absence of any merits-based decision on claims at issue lessens its 

impact on the Court’s analysis.                                           
    The fifth Colorado River factor, the question of whether one state’s law controls, 
cannot be afforded any significant weight. Both the Delaware Action and this matter are 
diversity actions, both involving application of separate state laws. While there is analytical 
overlap between those laws, that does not favor a stay.                   

    Finally, and most importantly here, the Court considers whether the Delaware 
Action presents an adequate forum to protect Vivorte’s rights in this case. It does not. 
Vivorte asserts that it brought suit against Mr. Gill in Minnesota because it had to—he 
could not be sued in Delaware. This case appears to be the sole vehicle for Vivorte to seek 
relief against Mr. Gill, a factor that is extremely persuasive. Accord Gov’t Employees Ins. 

v. Simon, 

, 1149 (8th Cir. 1990) (adequacy of forum factor should be given 
weight where one forum is inadequate to protect a party’s rights). A stay delays that relief. 
And if this Court prevents Vivorte from moving forward against Mr. Gill, Vivorte has no 
other  way  to  pursue  relief  against  him.  Prudence  counsels  against  delay  in  such 
circumstances.                                                            

II.  THE  COURT  WILL  NOT  INVOKE  ITS  INHERENT  AUTHORITY  TO          
    STAY THIS MATTER.                                                    

    Separate and apart from Colorado River abstention, Mr. Gill asks the Court to stay 
this matter pending resolution of the Delaware Action based on its inherent authority. 
Courts have the authority to stay proceedings as part of their inherent power to control their 
dockets, including staying federal cases that are also proceeding in state court concerning 
the same allegations and claims. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55; see also Cottrell, 

 (citing Lunde v. Helms, 

 (8th Cir. 1990)).  
    When considering a stay based on inherent authority, courts should consider what 
promotes efficiency and wise stewardship of time for the court, counsel, and litigants. 
Landis, 

. “How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, 
which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance,” considering the 
harm to either party if the stay were ordered versus if it were not ordered. 

. 
“But considerations of fairness to the opposing party mandate a presumption in favor of 

denying a motion to stay.” Wiley, 

, at *3. And, importantly, the party 
seeking a stay under this Court’s inherent authority must demonstrate a “specific hardship 
or inequity if he or she is required to go forward.” Daywitt v. State of Minnesota, No. 14-
cv-4526 (WMW/LIB), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. May 24, 2016) (quoting Jones 
v. Clinton, 

, 1364 (8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, J., concurring)); Wiley, 

, at *3.                                                           
    As a threshold matter, it is not clear that the Court ought to consider Mr. Gill’s stay 
request under any other framework than Colorado River. In Cottrell, the Eighth Circuit 

held that the district court abused its discretion in staying a matter under its inherent 
authority  where  the  effect  of  the  stay  “amounts  to  a  complete  refusal  to  exercise 
jurisdiction.” Cottrell, 

. In such circumstances, Colorado River is the 
appropriate analytical tool, since the “effect of the district court’s order is to accomplish 
the same result contemplated by Colorado River.” Id.; see also Roehrs, 

, 
at *6 (“The authority of a district court to grant a stay under its inherent authority to manage 

its own docket is limited to temporary stays, as a permanent stay is treated as tantamount 
to a dismissal.”). There is at least a colorable argument that Mr. Gill’s proposed stay fits 
that bill, too, since he is asking that this matter be stayed “until final judgment is entered” 
in the Delaware Action because it might have a preclusive effect on this case. (Doc. 31 at 
1; accord Cottrell, 

 (finding stay of one action pending outcome 

of another should have been analyzed under Colorado River abstention doctrine rather than 
a court’s inherent authority). But since this Court’s inherent authority includes the power 
“to impose a more finite and less comprehensive stay” than what Mr. Gill requests, the 
Court will conduct an inherent-authority analysis. Cottrell, 

. 
    Here too, Mr. Gill has not met his burden to overcome the strong presumption 

against a stay. That conclusion is buttressed by a number of the same factors that support 
this Court’s Colorado River analysis: this matter and the Delaware Action are not truly 
parallel, the District of Minnesota is not an inconvenient forum to Mr. Gill, and relevant 
claims in the Delaware Action are about the same age as the ones raised in this action.  
    Additionally, while many facts and legal issues overlap between this action and the 
Delaware Action such that there could be a preclusive effect, Mr. Gill overstates matters 

in suggesting summary judgment proceedings in the Delaware Action “will dispose of the 
identical fraud and fraudulent inducement claims in both actions.” (Doc. 34 at 9 (emphasis 
added).) Indeed, based on the pleadings in this case, Vivorte’s fraud claims against Mr. 
Gill appear to be factually intensive and disputed, with the ultimate question being whether 
Mr. Gill pulled a “bait and switch” by affixing Vivorte’s signature to a different contract 
than it thought it negotiated with Acumed. It is hard to imagine that issue being decided as 

a matter of law, let alone in a manner that would demonstrate Vivorte’s claims against Mr. 
Gill could not proceed. And, if that turns out to be the case, Mr. Gill may seek relief from 
the court in this action through traditional motion practice.             
    In the meanwhile, absent a stay Mr. Gill would simply be litigating this one-count, 
single-plaintiff matter as any other defendant in a lawsuit. The Court’s Pretrial Scheduling 

Order contemplates modest discovery. (Doc. 20.) Mr. Gill is not a party to the Delaware 
Action,  and so  has  not  faced  any  of  the  perils  of  litigation  in that  matter.  There  is 
undoubtedly some burden in litigation generally, “but that is true in every case.” Ung v. 
Universal Acceptance Corp., No. 15-cv-127 (RHK/FLM), 

, at *1 (D. 
Minn. June 15, 2016). The burden of litigation here is far less than the “specific hardship 

or inequity” our cases require Mr. Gill to demonstrate for a stay.        
    Finally, although Mr. Gill suggests the stay could be of modest duration, that is not 
his request. While Mr. Gill’s memorandum suggested overlapping issues in this case and 
the  Delaware  Action  could  be  resolved  based  on  the  pending  summary-judgment 
proceedings, his motion seeks a stay until a final judgment is issued in the Delaware Action. 
(Doc. 31 at 1.) At the hearing on this matter, Mr. Gill clarified that by final judgment he 

meant after trial. The trial in the Delaware Action is not set to begin until December 2, 
2024. (Doc. 35-1 at 2.) At the hearing on this matter, counsel for Vivorte clarified that the 
Delaware Action will be a bench trial, such that the trial court will issue findings of fact 
and conclusions of law rather than receiving a jury verdict. So even assuming the December 
2, 2024 trial date remains, this Court has no confidence that a final judgment in the 
Delaware Action would swiftly follow. Such uncertainty counsels against a stay. And Mr. 

Gill has not persuasively suggested that a shorter stay than until final judgment of the 
Delaware Action would yield any benefit so significant as to overcome the presumption in 
favor of moving this case forward.                                        
                         CONCLUSION                                      
    Mr. Gill has not overcome the presumption against a stay, either under this Court’s 

inherent authority to manage its docket or under the Colorado River doctrine of abstention 
based on parallel proceeding. Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings 
above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 31) is DENIED.  


Date: September 12, 2024            s/Douglas L. Micko                   
                                   DOUGLAS L. MICKO                      
                                   United States Magistrate Judge