White v. Stenseth
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota
White v. Stenseth
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
William Demont White, Jr., Civ. No. 24-261 (PAM/JFD)
Petitioner,
v.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Lisa Stenseth, Warden Rush City
Correctional Facility, Minnesota,
Respondent.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty dated August 30, 2024. (Docket No. 17.)
The R&R recommends dismissal of this matter without prejudice because the Petition is
untimely.
The full background is set forth in the R&R and the Court need not revisit it here.
In brief, Petitioner William Demont White, Jr., challenges his state-court conviction for
second-degree intentional murder, first-degree assault, and arson. Relevant here, Petitioner
contends that the state violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83(1963), by failing to divulge that a witness who testified against him, Vance Laster, was on parole during the time of Petitioner’s offense and trial. The R&R concluded that Petitioner’s Brady claim is untimely under28 U.S.C. § 2244
(d)(1)(A), and that Petitioner’s
other claims are likewise time-barred.
Petitioner objects to the R&R. (Pet.’s Objs. (Docket No. 18).) Defendant Lisa
Stenseth did not respond to the objections, and the time to do so has passed. According to
statute, the Court must conduct a de novo review of any portion of the R&R to which
specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); D. Minn.
L.R. 72.2(b). After conducting the required review and for the following reasons, the Court
adopts the R&R.
White’s first objection to the R&R is that the limitations period of his Brady claim
should “run from . . . the date on which the factual predication of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), rather than from the date on which his conviction became final in
state court, under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Specifically, White contends that the one-year
limitations period in which to file his petition should begin to run when the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County provided the Certified Disposition evincing that Laster was
on parole during Petitioner’s crime and trial. (Pet.’s Objs. at 1–3.)
But “[t]he jury heard about Laster’s criminal convictions and his favorable plea deal
in this case. His parole status would have added little weight to the information already
available to impeach Laster’s credibility.” (R&R at 5 (quoting White v. State, No. A22-
1848, 2023 WL 5695630, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2023)).) Indeed, as Magistrate
Judge Docherty noted, the prosecution disclosed Laster’s criminal history, including that
Laster had been sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment in March 2016, to Petitioner’s
counsel before his trial in February 2018. (R&R at 11 (quoting State v. White, No. 05-CR-
18-617, (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 2022)).) Therefore, as the state court concluded, because
Petitioner’s trial took place within 36 months of Laster’s state-court conviction, his parole
status was readily ascertainable even without the Certified Disposition. (Id.) As the R&R
correctly determined, § 2244(d)(1)(A) governs the timeliness of Petitioner’s Brady claim,
and, as with Petitioner’s other claims, it is time-barred.
White next contends that “equitable tolling is appropriate due to limitations placed
on him during the Covid-19 pandemic.” (Pet.’s Objs. at 4.) But White provides no reason
why the pandemic’s strictures were particularly prohibitive for him or explanation of any
hindrance that prevented him from obtaining the Certified Disposition for more than two
years after the pandemic’s inception. This objection is without merit.
Lastly, White objects to the conclusion that no certificate of appealability should
issue. (Id. at 5–6.) The R&R correctly determined that the Petition is untimely under the
relevant limitations period. Because reasonable minds could not differ as to this
conclusion, the R&R likewise correctly determined that no certificate of appealability
should issue. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 n.3 (2009) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)).
After conducting the required reviews, the Court ADOPTS the R&R.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The R&R (Docket No. 17) is ADOPTED;
2. Defendant Lisa Stenseth’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12) is
GRANTED;
3. The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice; and
4. No certificate of appealability shall issue.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: October 10, 2024 s/Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
William Demont White, Jr., Civ. No. 24-261 (PAM/JFD)
Petitioner,
v.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Lisa Stenseth, Warden Rush City
Correctional Facility, Minnesota,
Respondent.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty dated August 30, 2024. (Docket No. 17.)
The R&R recommends dismissal of this matter without prejudice because the Petition is
untimely.
The full background is set forth in the R&R and the Court need not revisit it here.
In brief, Petitioner William Demont White, Jr., challenges his state-court conviction for
second-degree intentional murder, first-degree assault, and arson. Relevant here, Petitioner
contends that the state violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83(1963), by failing to divulge that a witness who testified against him, Vance Laster, was on parole during the time of Petitioner’s offense and trial. The R&R concluded that Petitioner’s Brady claim is untimely under28 U.S.C. § 2244
(d)(1)(A), and that Petitioner’s
other claims are likewise time-barred.
Petitioner objects to the R&R. (Pet.’s Objs. (Docket No. 18).) Defendant Lisa
Stenseth did not respond to the objections, and the time to do so has passed. According to
statute, the Court must conduct a de novo review of any portion of the R&R to which
specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); D. Minn.
L.R. 72.2(b). After conducting the required review and for the following reasons, the Court
adopts the R&R.
White’s first objection to the R&R is that the limitations period of his Brady claim
should “run from . . . the date on which the factual predication of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), rather than from the date on which his conviction became final in
state court, under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Specifically, White contends that the one-year
limitations period in which to file his petition should begin to run when the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County provided the Certified Disposition evincing that Laster was
on parole during Petitioner’s crime and trial. (Pet.’s Objs. at 1–3.)
But “[t]he jury heard about Laster’s criminal convictions and his favorable plea deal
in this case. His parole status would have added little weight to the information already
available to impeach Laster’s credibility.” (R&R at 5 (quoting White v. State, No. A22-
1848, 2023 WL 5695630, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2023)).) Indeed, as Magistrate
Judge Docherty noted, the prosecution disclosed Laster’s criminal history, including that
Laster had been sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment in March 2016, to Petitioner’s
counsel before his trial in February 2018. (R&R at 11 (quoting State v. White, No. 05-CR-
18-617, (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 2022)).) Therefore, as the state court concluded, because
Petitioner’s trial took place within 36 months of Laster’s state-court conviction, his parole
status was readily ascertainable even without the Certified Disposition. (Id.) As the R&R
correctly determined, § 2244(d)(1)(A) governs the timeliness of Petitioner’s Brady claim,
and, as with Petitioner’s other claims, it is time-barred.
White next contends that “equitable tolling is appropriate due to limitations placed
on him during the Covid-19 pandemic.” (Pet.’s Objs. at 4.) But White provides no reason
why the pandemic’s strictures were particularly prohibitive for him or explanation of any
hindrance that prevented him from obtaining the Certified Disposition for more than two
years after the pandemic’s inception. This objection is without merit.
Lastly, White objects to the conclusion that no certificate of appealability should
issue. (Id. at 5–6.) The R&R correctly determined that the Petition is untimely under the
relevant limitations period. Because reasonable minds could not differ as to this
conclusion, the R&R likewise correctly determined that no certificate of appealability
should issue. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 n.3 (2009) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)).
After conducting the required reviews, the Court ADOPTS the R&R.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The R&R (Docket No. 17) is ADOPTED;
2. Defendant Lisa Stenseth’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12) is
GRANTED;
3. The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice; and
4. No certificate of appealability shall issue.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: October 10, 2024 s/Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge Reference
- Status
- Unknown