UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Danielle M. A-C.                     Case No. 22-cv-2151 (TNL)           

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Martin J. O’Malley1,                                                     
Commissioner of Social Security                                          
Administration,                                                          

          Defendant.                                                     


Edward C. Olson, Reitan Law Office, 80 South Eighth Street, Suite 900, Minneapolis, 
MN 55402 and Kylee D. Miller, Tuite Law, 1111  South Alpine Road, Suite 400, 
Rockford, IL 61101 (for Plaintiff); and                                  

Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, 
Minneapolis, MN 55415; Chris Carillo, James D. Sides, Melissa K. Curry, and Sophie 
Doroba, Social Security Administration, Office of Program Litigation, Office 4, 6401 
Security Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21235 (for Defendant).                 


                        I.  INTRODUCTION                                 
    Plaintiff Danielle M. A-C. challenges Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s 
denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social 
Security Act, 

, and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the 
same,  

.  The  parties  have  consented  to  a  final  judgment  from  the 

1 Martin O’Malley is currently serving as the Commissioner of Social Security Administration. Pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), he is automatically substituted as Defendant in this suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge in accordance with 

(c), Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 73, and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c).                                   

    Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s Supplemental Rules governing 
actions seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, this action “is presented 
for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. SS Rule 5. Rather than filing a 
brief as provided in amended Rule 5, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 
No. 21, which was the procedure prior to the recent amendment to Rule 5. Defendant filed 
a brief requesting the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed, see ECF No. 25.  

    For  the  reasons  set  forth  below,  the  Court  denies  Plaintiff’s  motion,  grants 
Defendant’s request for relief, and affirms the Commissioner’s decision.  
                   II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY                               
    In  her  applications  for  disability  insurance  benefits  and  supplemental  security 
income,  Plaintiff  asserted  that  she  has  been  disabled  since  June  23,  2013,  due  to 

fibromyalgia, social phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, general anxiety, depression, 
chronic  fatigue,  plantar  fasciitis,  extreme  pain/swelling,  extremity  numbness,  upper 
extremity pain, malaise, and hyperlipidemia. Tr. 197-209, 264, ECF No. 15. Plaintiff’s 
applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Tr. 73-104. 
    Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), Tr. 107-

108, and a hearing was held in September 2017 after which the ALJ issued an unfavorable 
decision to Plaintiff in that same month. Tr. 10-72. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 
request for review. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff then appealed to the Northern District of Illinois which 
resulted in a remand following from the Commissioner’s voluntary motion to remand. Tr. 
1014-26. The Appeals Council then vacated the ALJ’s September 2017 decision and 
remanded the case to an ALJ for resolution on several issues. Tr. 1029-32. A hearing was 

held before a new ALJ in January 2020, Tr. 933-77, and that ALJ issued an unfavorable 
decision in February 2020. Tr. 905-24.                                    
    Plaintiff then submitted to the Appeals Council written exceptions in support of her 
request for review of the ALJ’s February 2020 decision. Tr. 1129-36. The Appeals Council 
declined to assume jurisdiction. Tr. 891-94. As a result, the ALJ’s February 2020 decision 
became the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial review. See 

(g). Plaintiff now seeks review by this Court.                         
                      III.  ALJ’s DECISION                               
    The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied the insured status requirements of the Social 
Security Act through June 30, 2016 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 
the alleged onset date of June 23, 2013. Tr. 907-08. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff 

has the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia; obesity; degenerative disc disease of 
the  cervical  spine;  depressive  disorder;  posttraumatic  stress  disorder;  obsessive-
compulsive  disorder;  anxiety  disorder  with  social  phobia;  and  polysubstance  abuse 
disorder. Tr. 908. The ALJ next concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 909.     
    With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 
has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, except that Plaintiff cannot 
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally 
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks but 
not  at  a  production  rate  pace  (e.g.,  assembly  line  work);  make  simple  work-related 

decisions; and interact occasionally with supervisors, coworkers and the public. Tr. 912. 
The ALJ next determined that Plaintiff is not able to perform any past relevant work, Tr. 
922, but can perform other jobs in the national economy that exist in significant numbers. 
Tr. 923. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from June 23, 2013 
through the date of the ALJ’s February 2020 decision. Tr. 924.            

                         IV.  ANALYSIS                                   
 A. Legal Standards                                                      
    Disability benefits are available to individuals who are determined to be under a 
disability. 

(a)(1), 1381a; accord 

, 416.901. An 
individual is considered to be disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period  of  not  less  than  12  months.”  

(d)(1)(A);  accord  42  U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 

(a), 416.905(a). This standard is met 
when a severe physical or mental impairment, or impairments, renders the individual 
unable to do her previous work or “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists 

in  the  national  economy”  when  taking  into  account  her  age,  education,  and  work 
experience. 

(d)(2)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also 

(a), 416.905(a).                                        
    Disability is determined according to a five-step, sequential evaluation process. 

(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).                                  

         To determine disability, the ALJ follows the familiar five-step 
         process, considering whether: (1) the claimant was employed;    
         (2) she was severely impaired; (3) her impairment was, or was   
         comparable to, a listed impairment; (4) she could perform past  
         relevant work; and if not, (5) whether she could perform any    
         other kind of work.                                             

Halverson v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2010). In general, the burden of proving 
the existence of disability lies with the claimant. 

(a), 416.912(a). 
Once the claimant demonstrates that she cannot perform past work due to a disability, “the 
burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to prove, first that the claimant retains the 
residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists 
in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to do.” Nevland v. 
Apfel, 

 (8th Cir. 2000).                                 
    This Court reviews whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as a whole. Biestek v. Berryhill, 

 (2019). “[T]he 
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” 

 “It means—and means only—
such  relevant  evidence as  a  reasonable  mind might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a 
conclusion.” 

 (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Chismarich v. Berryhill, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018) (defining “substantial evidence as less than a preponderance but enough 
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the conclusion” (quotation 
omitted)).                                                                
    This standard requires the Court to “consider both evidence that detracts from the 
[ALJ’s] decision and evidence that supports it.” Boettcher v. Astrue, 

 

(8th Cir. 2011); see Grindley v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2021). The ALJ’s 
decision “will not [be] reverse[d] simply because some evidence supports a conclusion 
other than that reached by the ALJ.” Boettcher, 

; Perks v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2012). “The court must affirm the [ALJ’s] decision if it is supported 
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Chaney v. Colvin, 

 
(8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).  Thus, “[i]f, after reviewing the record, the court finds 

it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those 
positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.” Perks, 

.                                                         
 B. Appeal Council’s Remand Order                                        

    Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s February 2020 decision did not comply with the 
Appeals Council’s remand order. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 5-11, ECF No. 22. While the 
Eighth Circuit has not addressed this issue, courts in this district and other district courts 
in this Circuit have all concluded that the question of whether an ALJ complied with the 
Appeals Council’s instructions in a remand order is not subject to judicial review. See 
Jason M. G. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-84 (JFD), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 

13, 2024) (“Title 

(g) authorizes judicial review only to determine whether 
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s factual findings and whether the ALJ 
committed an error of law.”); Vanepps v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. C18-5-LTS, 

, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 18, 2019) (“Because 

(g) authorizes judicial 
review solely to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s 
decision and whether that decision comports with relevant legal standards, the question of 

whether the ALJ complied with the Appeals Council’s remand order is not subject to 
judicial review.”); King v. Berryhill, No. 5:16-CV-00079 (SWW/JTR), 

, 
at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 24, 2017) (concluding that an ALJ’s failure to comply with the 
Appeals Council’s remand order was “an internal agency issue that became moot when the 
Appeals  Council  later  declined  to  review  the  ALJ’s  .  .  .  decision”),  report  and 
recommendation adopted, 

 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2017); Sanders v. 

Astrue, No. 4:11-CV-1735 RWS (TIA), 

, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2013) 
(“The issue [of] whether an ALJ complied with a remand order evaporates when the 
Appeals Council adopts the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision; with that 
action, the Appeals Council implicitly acknowledges that the ALJ’s decision is compliant 
with the remand order.”), report and recommendation adopted, 

 (E.D. 

Mo. Mar. 27, 2013). The Court agrees with these persuasive and instructive decisions.  
    In  addition,  Plaintiff  already  raised  her  non-compliance  argument  before  the 
Appeals Council, see Tr. 1134-36, and the Appeals Council found no issues and no reason 
to assume jurisdiction after considering Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to follow 
the Appeals Council’s instructions in its remand order. See Tr. 891-93. Thus, assuming 

arguendo, the Appeals Council has already addressed this issue and determined that the 
ALJ “adequately evaluated the evidence of record.” Tr. 892. Therefore, the only issue up 
for judicial review pursuant to 

(g) is whether substantial evidence supports 
the Commissioner’s decision and whether that decision comports with relevant legal 
standards. See Jason M. G., 

, at *5; Vanepps, 

, at *7. 
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly modified the residual functional capacity 

determination made by the prior ALJ in its September 2017 decision also fails as the 
Appeals  Council  vacated  that  prior  decision,  see  Tr.  1029,  meaning  that  the  ALJ’s 
September 2017 decision no longer has any force or effect. See United States v. Maxwell, 

 (8th Cir. 2010).                                        
 C. Plaintiff’s Mental Residual Functional Capacity                      

    Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination relating to 
mental  limitations  associated  with  interacting  and  relating  with  others  as  well  as 
concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace, and failing to cite to the record at times. 
See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 6-8.                                           
    A claimant’s “residual functional capacity is the most [she] can still do despite [her] 
limitations.” 

(a)(1); accord 

(a)(1); see McCoy v. 

Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A claimant’s [residual functional capacity] 
represents the most [s]he can do despite the combined effects of all of h[er] credible 
limitations and must be based on all credible evidence.”); see also Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2022).“Because a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] is a 
medical question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence 

of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Perks, 

 (quotation 
omitted).                                                                 
    At the same time, the residual-functional-capacity determination “is a decision 
reserved to the agency such that it is neither delegated to medical professionals nor 
determined exclusively based on the contents of medical records.” Noerper v. Saul, 

 (8th Cir. 2020); see also 

(c), 416.946(c). “An ALJ 

determines a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] based on all the relevant evidence, 
including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an 
individual’s own description of her limitations.” Combs v. Berryhill, 

 
(8th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). As such, there is no requirement that a residual-
functional-capacity determination “be supported by a specific medical opinion.” Schmitt, 

. Nor is an ALJ “limited to considering medical evidence exclusively.” 

 

Accordingly, “[e]ven though the [residual-functional-capacity] assessment draws from 
medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the 
Commissioner.” Perks, 

; see 

(c), 416.946(c). 
Plaintiff bears the burden to establish her residual functional capacity. Mabry v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016).                                        

    The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the mental residual functional capacity to 
“perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks but not at a production rate pace (e.g., 
assembly line work); make simple work-related decisions; and interact occasionally with 
supervisors, coworkers and the public.” Tr. 912. The ALJ cited to ample evidence in 
support of Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity. See Tr. 912-14, 917-20. The ALJ 

found that there was no evidence in the record relating to treatment for reported mental 
health issues until January 2015 when she began counseling, see Tr. 917 (citing Tr. 413), 
and was subsequently diagnosed with major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress 
disorder and panic disorder, although psychiatric mental status examinations showed no 
evidence of psychosis or cognitive defects. See Tr. 917 (citing 415-16, 420, 639, 647, 669). 
Plaintiff discontinued her counseling sessions after April 2016 but began mental health 

treatment again towards the end of 2016. Tr. 917-18 (citing Tr. 700). The ALJ further 
considered Plaintiff’s reports of worsening depression and anxiety due to her discontinued 
use of her psychiatric medication because of financial constraints. See Tr. 9182 (citing Tr. 
700). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s discharge from mental health services in July 
2017 after she stopped attending sessions and reported that her mood had improved, among 
other things. Tr. 918 (citing Tr. 6773). The ALJ, however, noted that Plaintiff initiated 

treatment the following month. Tr. 918 (citing Tr. 1457). The ALJ also relied on and cited 
to additional medical evidence relating to Plaintiff’s mental impairments and limitations 
from 2018 through 2019. Tr. 918-19; see, e.g., Tr. 1639 (mental health assessment report 
from October 2018 diagnosing Plaintiff with major depressive disorder and polysubstance 
abuse  following  Plaintiff’s  admission  to  inpatient  care  due  to  increasing  depressive 

symptoms); Tr. 1650-53 (psychiatric evaluation from June 2019 finding Plaintiff to have a 
coherent thought process; good insight and judgment; average fund of knowledge; intact 
attention, concentration, memory, and associations; mood reported as “okay”; and affect 
found to be depressed, anxious, and at times tearful); Tr. 1653 (diagnosing Plaintiff with 


2 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, see Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 9, the ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff’s reports of 
inability to afford treatment. See e.g., Tr. 916 (the ALJ reasoning that “[e]ven though [Plaintiff] might not have been 
able to afford treatment during these long gaps without treatment, when she has returned to treatment, the objective 
medical findings have been disproportionate to her subjective report of symptoms”). The ALJ complied with the 
regulations. See 

(c)(2) and 416.929(c)(2).           

3 Plaintiff takes issue with this note because a clerical error shows two dates: one in 2010 and one in 2017. See Pl.’s 
Mem. in Supp. at 6-7; see also Pl.’s Reply at 3, ECF No. 28. A review of the record shows that the 2010 date was a 
clerical error, but nevertheless even if the note was from 2010 there is still substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole to support the ALJ’s determination.                                 
major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, social anxiety disorder by history 
following psychiatric evaluation in June 2019); Tr. 1659-61 (initial psychiatric evaluation 

from December 2019 describing Plaintiff’s appearance as fair; behavior as cooperative; 
speech and volume as normal; mood as neutral and slightly depressed; affect as congruent 
with mood; thought process as linear, goal directed; memory, cognition, judgment, and 
insight as intact); Tr. 1661 (finding Plaintiff’s symptoms satisfied the criteria for anxiety 
due to unspecified and major depressive disorder, moderate without psychotic symptoms); 
Tr. 1757 (clinical note from November 2019 noting improved mood with medication).  

    In addition, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s own reports and testimony4. For 
example, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s reports from June 2015 that she is able to get along 
with others, shop, attend religious gatherings, drives her children to school5, prepares meals 
for her family, reads, manages funds, and uses the internet. See Tr. 911 (citing Tr. 273-80, 
284). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her participation in support 

groups in 2016 with two or three people once a week, which she reported to be helpful. Tr. 
911, 9136; see e.g., Tr. 951-52. Plaintiff also testified that she generally gets along with 

4 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to make a credibility finding, see Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8, the ALJ however was 
not required to make such a finding. See SSR 16-3p, 

. Rather the ALJ evaluates Plaintiff’s 
statements regarding her symptoms according to 

(a), 416.929(a). The ALJ complied with the 
regulations.                                                              

5 Plaintiff disputes her driving ability. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8-9. The record, however, reflects Plaintiff’s own 
reported driving routine which includes driving her children to and from school every day as well as to sporting 
activities. Compare Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8, with Tr. 274, 276, 284, 949-50. Plaintiff also testified that on an average 
day she is able to drive between two towns which is “about 15 miles each way.” Tr. 949. 

6 Plaintiff takes issue with the lack of citations to Plaintiff’s testimony. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8. The ALJ explicitly 
referenced Plaintiff’s testimony in his decision, see Tr. 911, 913, 919, and a lack of citation in this circumstance is not 
enough to warrant remand especially where, as here, the alleged deficiencies had no bearing on the outcome of this 
case. See Robinson v. Sullivan, 

 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n arguable deficiency in opinion-writing 
technique does not require [the Court] to set aside an administrative finding when that deficiency had no bearing on 
the outcome.” (quotation omitted)).                                       
supervisors but mostly experiences anxiety in crowds the size of 10 to 15 people. See Tr. 
911, 913, 919; see e.g., Tr. 938-39, 943-44. The ALJ also considered the medical evidence 

which showed that Plaintiff had a good rapport with her providers as she was described as 
pleasant and cooperative. See Tr. 911. Plaintiff’s alleged “brain fog” was also considered. 
See Tr. 913, 919; see e.g., Tr. 941-42.                                   
    After considering the above, among other evidence in the record, the ALJ explained 
that Plaintiff’s mental status examinations generally showed “intact cognition with no 
significant deficits in intelligence, attention, concentration, or memory.” Tr. 919. The ALJ 

acknowledged  “inconsistent  reports  of  hallucinatory  experiences  and  paranoia  with 
[Plaintiff]  recently  denying  such  psychotic  symptoms.”  Tr.  919.  And  concluded  that 
Plaintiff’s “depression and anxiety, and symptoms of fibro-fog . . .  support the limitation 
to simple, routine and repetitive tasks but not at a production rate pace (e.g., assembly line 
work), and the ability to make no more than simple work-related decisions.” Tr. 919. 

Further determining that “[b]ecause of [Plaintiff’s] social anxiety and history of PTSD 
symptoms, the [ALJ] has further limited her to occasional interactions with supervisors, 
coworkers and the public.” Tr. 919. The Court concludes that the ALJ provided ample 
explanation for Plaintiff’s above mental residual functional capacity determination and 
further concludes that Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. There is no evidence that 

the ALJ failed to consider or ignored evidence in the record as Plaintiff argues, see 
generally  Pl.’s  Mem.  in  Supp.7;  Pl.’s  Reply.  Plaintiff’s  arguments  boil  down  to  a 

7 It is worth noting that Plaintiff misstates the record at times. For example, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ “specifically 
asked [Plaintiff] to limit and focus her testimony only on the time period prior to her date last insured, generating 
testimony to 2016 and earlier.” See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8. A review of the record shows that the ALJ asked Plaintiff 
disagreement in opinion writing which is not enough to warrant remand. See Senne v. Apfel, 

 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument that deficiency in the ALJ’s 

opinion writing alone warrants remand, but finding remand appropriate when the ALJ’s 
findings were not sufficient to ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by 
substantial evidence on the record); see also Benskin v. Bowen, 

 (8th Cir. 
1987) (finding harmless error where “the deficiency probably had no practical effect on the 
outcome of the case”). It follows that Plaintiff’s arguments relating to the Chenery Doctrine 
fail to hold any weight. See Pl.’s Reply at 3-5.                          

 D.  Non-Severe Carpal Tunnel Impairment                                 
    Plaintiff  also  challenges  the  ALJ’s  determination  that  Plaintiff’s  carpal  tunnel 
impairment is non-severe. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 11-13. “[A]n impairment is severe 
only if it significantly limits Plaintiff’s ability to work and lasts, or is expected to last, for 
at least 12 consecutive months.” Jessica R. H. v. O’Malley, No. 22-cv-3091 (DLM), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2024) (citing 

(d)(1)(A)). Substantial 
evidence  supports  the  ALJ’s  finding  that  Plaintiff’s  carpal  tunnel  syndrome  did  not 
significantly limit her hand function over a consecutive 12-month period and therefore is 
not severe because there is no objective evidence of Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome until 
November 2015 and symptoms resolved after Plaintiff’s second release procedure in April 

2016. See Tr. 908-09.                                                     


at the hearing “to be mindful when . . . going through testimony to separate out limitations that are current versus prior 
to the date last insured . . . to make sure that we’re clear in testimony whether any limitations that you’re referring to 
applied also prior to your date last insured.” Tr. 950.                   
    The medical evidence in the record shows impression notes from a clinical visit in 
spring of 2014 listing carpal tunnel syndrome based on Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms, 

see Tr. 908 (citing Tr. 373). No definitive evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome, however, 
was found in 2014, Tr. 908 (citing Tr. 374, 398), until November 24, 2015. Tr. 908; see 
e.g.,  Tr.  857  (examination  results  showing  mild  symmetric  bilateral  carpal  tunnel 
syndrome). The ALJ also considered the clinical examination in March 2016 which showed 
positive results, see Tr. 573, which led to Plaintiff undergoing a right carpal tunnel release 
procedure in that same month, see Tr. 568, and a left carpal tunnel release procedure in 

April 2016, see Tr. 819. A postoperative clinical note from April 26, 2016, noted Plaintiff’s 
reports of improvements and denial of any symptoms. Tr. 908 (citing Tr. 1450). And an x-
ray of Plaintiff’s hand from May 2019 showed possible mild soft tissue swelling without 
significant osseous abnormality of the left hand and no abnormality of the right hand. Tr. 
908 (citing Tr. 1364-65). Thus, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome 

did not significantly limit her hand function over a consecutive 12-month period and 
therefore substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s carpal 
tunnel syndrome is not severe.                                            
    Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s hearing testimony regarding issues 
with joint pain and swelling in her hands, but the ALJ properly concluded that “there is no 

further evidence of treatment related to carpal tunnel syndrome after that second release 
[procedure],  suggesting  that  the  procedures  were  effective  in  relieving  her  hand 
symptoms.” Tr. 908. Plaintiff’s hearing testimony concerning her subjective complaints 
are not enough to establish a disability. See 

(a), 416.929(a). “There 
must be objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source that shows you 
have a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.” 

 The Court concludes that the ALJ  properly considered 
Plaintiff’s testimony.                                                    
 E. Hypothetical Question to Vocational Expert                           
    Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to account for Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel 
syndrome and walking limitation in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert. See 
Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 10. The ALJ, however, is not required to offer a corresponding 

residual functional capacity limitation and hypothetical question for a limitation that is not 
substantially supported by the evidence in the record as a whole, as is the case here. See 
Lacroix v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2016); Flint v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-1220 
(PAM/SER), 

, at *27 (D. Minn. June 23, 2014). Because the Court has 
already concluded that no further limitations for Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome is 

supported by the record, the ALJ did not need to include any corresponding limitation in 
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity determination or in the hypothetical question to the 
vocational expert.                                                        
    And when determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ was not 
required to adopt testing results from a functional capacity evaluation conducted by a 

physical therapist in November 2019. See Tr. 1723 (finding Plaintiff’s six-minute walking 
test limited because results showed Plaintiff was only able to ambulate for two minutes out 
of  the  six  minutes  and  during  those  six  minutes  Plaintiff  ambulated  100  total  feet). 
“Because a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] is a medical question, an ALJ’s 
assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of a claimant’s ability to 
function in the workplace. However, there is no requirement that a[] [residual functional 

capacity] finding be supported by a specific medical opinion.” Schmitt, 

 
(quotation omitted). The ALJ must consider all the evidence. See Pearsall v. Massanari, 

  (8th Cir. 2001) (“It is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine a 
claimant’s [residual functional capacity] based on all relevant evidence, including medical 
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own descriptions of 
h[er] limitations.”).                                                     

    The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s November 2019 six-minute walking test results as 
well as Plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to function at a sedentary physical demand level, 
see Tr. 916 (citing Tr. 1723), and further considered follow up clinical notes from later that 
same month which noted pain with palpation of the entire neck and back, and generalized 
swelling of the hand, but no other abnormal findings other than Plaintiff’s obesity. See Tr. 

916 (citing 1755-57). The ALJ ultimately concluded that the objective evidence “does not 
provide any support for gait dysfunction, lower extremity weakness or instability.” See Tr. 
917. But after considering Plaintiff’s “consistent pain complaints” the ALJ limited Plaintiff 
to sedentary work. See Tr. 912, 917. The ALJ adequately determined that additional 
limitations beyond the limitations accounted for in Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

and subsequent hypothetical question were not warranted. See Cynthia D. v. Kijakazi, No. 
20-cv-1886 (BRT), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2022) (“For a hypothetical 
to be proper at step five, it would need to present the limitations described from a supported 
[residual functional capacity].”).                                        
    By pointing to evidence in the record to support its argument for an additional 
limitation related to walking, Plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the 

evidence. It is well established that this Court cannot reweigh the evidence as part of its 
review. See Schmitt, 

 (“Despite [the claimant’s] dissatisfaction with how 
the ALJ weighed the evidence, it is not this Court’s role to reweigh that evidence.”); Goff 
v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2005) (“If, after reviewing the record, the court 
finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those 
positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.”).  

    Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the job of ampoule sealer did not conflict with 
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity of occasional interactions. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. 
at 10. In response to a hypothetical question, the vocational expert testified that neither the 
identified job of ampoule sealer nor an automated job requiring use of more technology 
would require Plaintiff to work in concert with others at a production pace. See Tr. 969-71, 

973-75. Rather, the vocational expert stated that the ampoule sealer position would require 
someone to work “in combination with others who are doing the exact same thing as you . 
. . but it’s not going to be in terms of working in concert with others” and you do not have 
to keep up with the machine like with an assembly line. Tr. 974-75. This testimony does 
not conflict with Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity to “perform simple, routine and 

repetitive tasks but not at a production rate pace (e.g., assembly line work); make simple 
work-related decisions; and interact occasionally with supervisors, coworkers and the 
public.”  Tr.  912.  See  Newton  v.  Chater,  

  (8th  Cir.  1996)  (“A 
hypothetical  question  must  precisely  describe  a  claimant’s  impairments  so  that  the 
vocational expert may accurately assess whether jobs exist for the claimant.”); Howard v. 
Massanari, 

 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Testimony from a vocational expert based 

on a properly-phrase hypothetical constitutes substantial evidence.”).    
    In sum, substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s residual 
functional capacity determination and the corresponding hypothetical question.  
 F.  Weighing of Opinion Evidence                                        
    Plaintiff’s last argument concerns the ALJ’s weighing of opinion evidence. Plaintiff 
argues that the ALJ did not comply with the “treating physician rule” because the ALJ did 

not assign controlling weight to any medical opinion. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 13-15.  
    Plaintiff’s claims were filed prior to the March 2017 regulation change concerning 
the evaluation of medical opinions and therefore, the previous regulation for evaluating 
medical opinions applies in this matter. “A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to 
controlling weight when it is supported by medically acceptable techniques and is not 

inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record.” Julin v. Colvin, 

 
(8th Cir. 2016). “Yet[, this controlling] weight is neither inherent nor automatic and does 
not obviate the need to evaluate the record as a whole.” Cline v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation omitted). The opinions of treating physicians 
“are given  less  weight  if  they  are  inconsistent  with  the  record  as a  whole  or  if  the 

conclusions consist of vague, conclusory statements unsupported by medically acceptable 
data.” Stormo v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2004); see Cline, 

 
(permitting the opinions of treating physicians to be discounted or disregarded “where 
other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or 
where a treating physician renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of 
such  opinions”  (quotation  omitted)).  If  a  treating  physician’s  opinion  is  not  given 

controlling weight, then “the opinion is weighed based on a number of factors, including 
the  examining  relationship,  treatment  relationship,  opinion’s  supportability,  opinion’s 
consistency with the record as a whole, specialization of the provider, and any other factors 
tending to support or contradict the opinion.” Patrick M. B. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-2569 (TNL), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2020) (citing 

(c); Shontos 
v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2003)). The above factors also apply to the 

opinions of consultative examiners. See 

(c), 416.927(c) (factors 
apply in deciding weight “give[n] to any medical opinion”).               
    Not only is Plaintiff’s argument underdeveloped as she only generally argues that 
the ALJ did not comply with the “treating physician rule” but she also identifies only 
briefly Advanced Practice Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion as not being evaluated properly. 

See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 13. Under the prior regulation for evaluating medical opinions, 
however, Nurse Felgenhauer is not considered an “acceptable medical source” permitted 
to  offer  a  “medical  opinion.”  See  

(a)(7)  (defining  “Licensed 
Advanced Practice  Registered  Nurse,  or  other  licensed  advanced  practice  nurse  with 
another title, for impairments within his or her licensed scope of practice (only with respect 

to claims filed (see § 404.614) on or after March 27, 2017”) (emphasis added); accord 

(a)(7).  Thus, Plaintiff’s argument with respect to the ALJ’s evaluation of 
opinions offered by “other sources” (i.e., Nurse Felgenhauer) fails.      
    The ALJ did what was required, which is to consider all relevant evidence and 
generally explain the weight given to opinions from other sources. See SSR 06-03P, 

, at *6. “Not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every 
case. The evaluation of an opinion from a medical source who is not an ‘acceptable medical 
source’ depends on the particular facts in each case.” 

. The ALJ properly considered 
Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion which consisted of statements in the form of checked boxes, 
see  Tr.  880-89,  and  properly  afforded  such  opinion  little  weight  because  Nurse 
Felgenhauer’s assessed limitations were inconsistent with her own reported findings and 

other substantial evidence in the record. See Tr. 920. For example, the ALJ explained that 
he gave little weight to Nurse Felgenhauer’s “assessment as to [Plaintiff’s] impairment-
related absences, need for unscheduled breaks and time off-task are simply not consistent 
with any of the objective medical findings or record or [Plaintiff’s] reported activities of 
daily living.” Tr. 920. Even if Nurse Felgenhauer is an acceptable medical source, the ALJ 

still did not err in his evaluation because the ALJ gave “good reasons” for assigning less 
than controlling weight to Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion. See Chesser v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2017).                                            
    Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion is also made up of checked boxes which are typically 
given little weight. See Nolen v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2023) (finding “[t]he 

opinion’s bare, formulaic conclusion presumptively warranted little evidentiary weight 
because it was rendered on a check-box and fill-in-the-blank form” (quotation omitted)); 
Thomas v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding assessments to have “little 
evidentiary  value”  when  they  “consist  of  nothing  more  than  vague,  conclusory 
statements—checked boxes, circled answers, and brief fill-in-the-blank responses,” and 
when they “cite no medical evidence and provide little to no elaboration”). In sum, the ALJ 

appropriately weighted Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion along with the other evidence in the 
record.                                                                   
    In addition, and contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ was not required to rely 
on a particular treating physician’s opinion, see Martise v. Astrue, 

 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion 
or choose between the opinions of any of the claimant’s physicians.” (quoting Schmidt v. 

Astrue, 

 (7th Cir. 2007)), and the ALJ is not required to explicitly address 
each  factor  when  evaluating  opinion  evidence.  Roesler  v.  Colvin,  No.  12-cv-1982 
(JRT/JJK), 

, at *5, n. 5 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2013) (“[T]he regulations do 
not  strictly  require  the  ALJ  to  explicitly  discuss  each  factor  [under  

(c), 416.927(c)].”).                                              

                        V.  CONCLUSION                                   
    Because the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole, the Court affirms the ALJ’s February 2020 decision. Based upon the record, 
memoranda, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons states above, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that:                                                             

 1.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement, ECF No. 21, is DENIED.    
 2.  Defendant’s request for relief, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED.             
 3.  The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.                            
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      
Date: September 24, 2024      s/ Tony N. Leung                            
                             Tony N. Leung                               
                             United States Magistrate Judge              
                             District of Minnesota                       

                             Danielle M. A-C. v. O’Malley,               
                             Case No. 22-cv-2151 (TNL)                   

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Danielle M. A-C.                     Case No. 22-cv-2151 (TNL)           

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Martin J. O’Malley1,                                                     
Commissioner of Social Security                                          
Administration,                                                          

          Defendant.                                                     


Edward C. Olson, Reitan Law Office, 80 South Eighth Street, Suite 900, Minneapolis, 
MN 55402 and Kylee D. Miller, Tuite Law, 1111  South Alpine Road, Suite 400, 
Rockford, IL 61101 (for Plaintiff); and                                  

Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, 
Minneapolis, MN 55415; Chris Carillo, James D. Sides, Melissa K. Curry, and Sophie 
Doroba, Social Security Administration, Office of Program Litigation, Office 4, 6401 
Security Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21235 (for Defendant).                 


                        I.  INTRODUCTION                                 
    Plaintiff Danielle M. A-C. challenges Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s 
denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social 
Security Act, 

, and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the 
same,  

.  The  parties  have  consented  to  a  final  judgment  from  the 

1 Martin O’Malley is currently serving as the Commissioner of Social Security Administration. Pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), he is automatically substituted as Defendant in this suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge in accordance with 

(c), Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 73, and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c).                                   

    Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s Supplemental Rules governing 
actions seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, this action “is presented 
for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. SS Rule 5. Rather than filing a 
brief as provided in amended Rule 5, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 
No. 21, which was the procedure prior to the recent amendment to Rule 5. Defendant filed 
a brief requesting the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed, see ECF No. 25.  

    For  the  reasons  set  forth  below,  the  Court  denies  Plaintiff’s  motion,  grants 
Defendant’s request for relief, and affirms the Commissioner’s decision.  
                   II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY                               
    In  her  applications  for  disability  insurance  benefits  and  supplemental  security 
income,  Plaintiff  asserted  that  she  has  been  disabled  since  June  23,  2013,  due  to 

fibromyalgia, social phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, general anxiety, depression, 
chronic  fatigue,  plantar  fasciitis,  extreme  pain/swelling,  extremity  numbness,  upper 
extremity pain, malaise, and hyperlipidemia. Tr. 197-209, 264, ECF No. 15. Plaintiff’s 
applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Tr. 73-104. 
    Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), Tr. 107-

108, and a hearing was held in September 2017 after which the ALJ issued an unfavorable 
decision to Plaintiff in that same month. Tr. 10-72. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 
request for review. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff then appealed to the Northern District of Illinois which 
resulted in a remand following from the Commissioner’s voluntary motion to remand. Tr. 
1014-26. The Appeals Council then vacated the ALJ’s September 2017 decision and 
remanded the case to an ALJ for resolution on several issues. Tr. 1029-32. A hearing was 

held before a new ALJ in January 2020, Tr. 933-77, and that ALJ issued an unfavorable 
decision in February 2020. Tr. 905-24.                                    
    Plaintiff then submitted to the Appeals Council written exceptions in support of her 
request for review of the ALJ’s February 2020 decision. Tr. 1129-36. The Appeals Council 
declined to assume jurisdiction. Tr. 891-94. As a result, the ALJ’s February 2020 decision 
became the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial review. See 

(g). Plaintiff now seeks review by this Court.                         
                      III.  ALJ’s DECISION                               
    The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied the insured status requirements of the Social 
Security Act through June 30, 2016 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 
the alleged onset date of June 23, 2013. Tr. 907-08. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff 

has the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia; obesity; degenerative disc disease of 
the  cervical  spine;  depressive  disorder;  posttraumatic  stress  disorder;  obsessive-
compulsive  disorder;  anxiety  disorder  with  social  phobia;  and  polysubstance  abuse 
disorder. Tr. 908. The ALJ next concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 909.     
    With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 
has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, except that Plaintiff cannot 
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally 
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks but 
not  at  a  production  rate  pace  (e.g.,  assembly  line  work);  make  simple  work-related 

decisions; and interact occasionally with supervisors, coworkers and the public. Tr. 912. 
The ALJ next determined that Plaintiff is not able to perform any past relevant work, Tr. 
922, but can perform other jobs in the national economy that exist in significant numbers. 
Tr. 923. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from June 23, 2013 
through the date of the ALJ’s February 2020 decision. Tr. 924.            

                         IV.  ANALYSIS                                   
 A. Legal Standards                                                      
    Disability benefits are available to individuals who are determined to be under a 
disability. 

(a)(1), 1381a; accord 

, 416.901. An 
individual is considered to be disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period  of  not  less  than  12  months.”  

(d)(1)(A);  accord  42  U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 

(a), 416.905(a). This standard is met 
when a severe physical or mental impairment, or impairments, renders the individual 
unable to do her previous work or “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists 

in  the  national  economy”  when  taking  into  account  her  age,  education,  and  work 
experience. 

(d)(2)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also 

(a), 416.905(a).                                        
    Disability is determined according to a five-step, sequential evaluation process. 

(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).                                  

         To determine disability, the ALJ follows the familiar five-step 
         process, considering whether: (1) the claimant was employed;    
         (2) she was severely impaired; (3) her impairment was, or was   
         comparable to, a listed impairment; (4) she could perform past  
         relevant work; and if not, (5) whether she could perform any    
         other kind of work.                                             

Halverson v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2010). In general, the burden of proving 
the existence of disability lies with the claimant. 

(a), 416.912(a). 
Once the claimant demonstrates that she cannot perform past work due to a disability, “the 
burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to prove, first that the claimant retains the 
residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists 
in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to do.” Nevland v. 
Apfel, 

 (8th Cir. 2000).                                 
    This Court reviews whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as a whole. Biestek v. Berryhill, 

 (2019). “[T]he 
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” 

 “It means—and means only—
such  relevant  evidence as  a  reasonable  mind might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a 
conclusion.” 

 (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Chismarich v. Berryhill, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018) (defining “substantial evidence as less than a preponderance but enough 
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the conclusion” (quotation 
omitted)).                                                                
    This standard requires the Court to “consider both evidence that detracts from the 
[ALJ’s] decision and evidence that supports it.” Boettcher v. Astrue, 

 

(8th Cir. 2011); see Grindley v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2021). The ALJ’s 
decision “will not [be] reverse[d] simply because some evidence supports a conclusion 
other than that reached by the ALJ.” Boettcher, 

; Perks v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2012). “The court must affirm the [ALJ’s] decision if it is supported 
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Chaney v. Colvin, 

 
(8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).  Thus, “[i]f, after reviewing the record, the court finds 

it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those 
positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.” Perks, 

.                                                         
 B. Appeal Council’s Remand Order                                        

    Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s February 2020 decision did not comply with the 
Appeals Council’s remand order. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 5-11, ECF No. 22. While the 
Eighth Circuit has not addressed this issue, courts in this district and other district courts 
in this Circuit have all concluded that the question of whether an ALJ complied with the 
Appeals Council’s instructions in a remand order is not subject to judicial review. See 
Jason M. G. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-84 (JFD), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 

13, 2024) (“Title 

(g) authorizes judicial review only to determine whether 
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s factual findings and whether the ALJ 
committed an error of law.”); Vanepps v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. C18-5-LTS, 

, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 18, 2019) (“Because 

(g) authorizes judicial 
review solely to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s 
decision and whether that decision comports with relevant legal standards, the question of 

whether the ALJ complied with the Appeals Council’s remand order is not subject to 
judicial review.”); King v. Berryhill, No. 5:16-CV-00079 (SWW/JTR), 

, 
at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 24, 2017) (concluding that an ALJ’s failure to comply with the 
Appeals Council’s remand order was “an internal agency issue that became moot when the 
Appeals  Council  later  declined  to  review  the  ALJ’s  .  .  .  decision”),  report  and 
recommendation adopted, 

 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2017); Sanders v. 

Astrue, No. 4:11-CV-1735 RWS (TIA), 

, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2013) 
(“The issue [of] whether an ALJ complied with a remand order evaporates when the 
Appeals Council adopts the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision; with that 
action, the Appeals Council implicitly acknowledges that the ALJ’s decision is compliant 
with the remand order.”), report and recommendation adopted, 

 (E.D. 

Mo. Mar. 27, 2013). The Court agrees with these persuasive and instructive decisions.  
    In  addition,  Plaintiff  already  raised  her  non-compliance  argument  before  the 
Appeals Council, see Tr. 1134-36, and the Appeals Council found no issues and no reason 
to assume jurisdiction after considering Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to follow 
the Appeals Council’s instructions in its remand order. See Tr. 891-93. Thus, assuming 

arguendo, the Appeals Council has already addressed this issue and determined that the 
ALJ “adequately evaluated the evidence of record.” Tr. 892. Therefore, the only issue up 
for judicial review pursuant to 

(g) is whether substantial evidence supports 
the Commissioner’s decision and whether that decision comports with relevant legal 
standards. See Jason M. G., 

, at *5; Vanepps, 

, at *7. 
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly modified the residual functional capacity 

determination made by the prior ALJ in its September 2017 decision also fails as the 
Appeals  Council  vacated  that  prior  decision,  see  Tr.  1029,  meaning  that  the  ALJ’s 
September 2017 decision no longer has any force or effect. See United States v. Maxwell, 

 (8th Cir. 2010).                                        
 C. Plaintiff’s Mental Residual Functional Capacity                      

    Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination relating to 
mental  limitations  associated  with  interacting  and  relating  with  others  as  well  as 
concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace, and failing to cite to the record at times. 
See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 6-8.                                           
    A claimant’s “residual functional capacity is the most [she] can still do despite [her] 
limitations.” 

(a)(1); accord 

(a)(1); see McCoy v. 

Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A claimant’s [residual functional capacity] 
represents the most [s]he can do despite the combined effects of all of h[er] credible 
limitations and must be based on all credible evidence.”); see also Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2022).“Because a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] is a 
medical question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence 

of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Perks, 

 (quotation 
omitted).                                                                 
    At the same time, the residual-functional-capacity determination “is a decision 
reserved to the agency such that it is neither delegated to medical professionals nor 
determined exclusively based on the contents of medical records.” Noerper v. Saul, 

 (8th Cir. 2020); see also 

(c), 416.946(c). “An ALJ 

determines a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] based on all the relevant evidence, 
including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an 
individual’s own description of her limitations.” Combs v. Berryhill, 

 
(8th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). As such, there is no requirement that a residual-
functional-capacity determination “be supported by a specific medical opinion.” Schmitt, 

. Nor is an ALJ “limited to considering medical evidence exclusively.” 

 

Accordingly, “[e]ven though the [residual-functional-capacity] assessment draws from 
medical sources for support, it is ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the 
Commissioner.” Perks, 

; see 

(c), 416.946(c). 
Plaintiff bears the burden to establish her residual functional capacity. Mabry v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016).                                        

    The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the mental residual functional capacity to 
“perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks but not at a production rate pace (e.g., 
assembly line work); make simple work-related decisions; and interact occasionally with 
supervisors, coworkers and the public.” Tr. 912. The ALJ cited to ample evidence in 
support of Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity. See Tr. 912-14, 917-20. The ALJ 

found that there was no evidence in the record relating to treatment for reported mental 
health issues until January 2015 when she began counseling, see Tr. 917 (citing Tr. 413), 
and was subsequently diagnosed with major depressive disorder, posttraumatic stress 
disorder and panic disorder, although psychiatric mental status examinations showed no 
evidence of psychosis or cognitive defects. See Tr. 917 (citing 415-16, 420, 639, 647, 669). 
Plaintiff discontinued her counseling sessions after April 2016 but began mental health 

treatment again towards the end of 2016. Tr. 917-18 (citing Tr. 700). The ALJ further 
considered Plaintiff’s reports of worsening depression and anxiety due to her discontinued 
use of her psychiatric medication because of financial constraints. See Tr. 9182 (citing Tr. 
700). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s discharge from mental health services in July 
2017 after she stopped attending sessions and reported that her mood had improved, among 
other things. Tr. 918 (citing Tr. 6773). The ALJ, however, noted that Plaintiff initiated 

treatment the following month. Tr. 918 (citing Tr. 1457). The ALJ also relied on and cited 
to additional medical evidence relating to Plaintiff’s mental impairments and limitations 
from 2018 through 2019. Tr. 918-19; see, e.g., Tr. 1639 (mental health assessment report 
from October 2018 diagnosing Plaintiff with major depressive disorder and polysubstance 
abuse  following  Plaintiff’s  admission  to  inpatient  care  due  to  increasing  depressive 

symptoms); Tr. 1650-53 (psychiatric evaluation from June 2019 finding Plaintiff to have a 
coherent thought process; good insight and judgment; average fund of knowledge; intact 
attention, concentration, memory, and associations; mood reported as “okay”; and affect 
found to be depressed, anxious, and at times tearful); Tr. 1653 (diagnosing Plaintiff with 


2 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, see Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 9, the ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff’s reports of 
inability to afford treatment. See e.g., Tr. 916 (the ALJ reasoning that “[e]ven though [Plaintiff] might not have been 
able to afford treatment during these long gaps without treatment, when she has returned to treatment, the objective 
medical findings have been disproportionate to her subjective report of symptoms”). The ALJ complied with the 
regulations. See 

(c)(2) and 416.929(c)(2).           

3 Plaintiff takes issue with this note because a clerical error shows two dates: one in 2010 and one in 2017. See Pl.’s 
Mem. in Supp. at 6-7; see also Pl.’s Reply at 3, ECF No. 28. A review of the record shows that the 2010 date was a 
clerical error, but nevertheless even if the note was from 2010 there is still substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole to support the ALJ’s determination.                                 
major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, social anxiety disorder by history 
following psychiatric evaluation in June 2019); Tr. 1659-61 (initial psychiatric evaluation 

from December 2019 describing Plaintiff’s appearance as fair; behavior as cooperative; 
speech and volume as normal; mood as neutral and slightly depressed; affect as congruent 
with mood; thought process as linear, goal directed; memory, cognition, judgment, and 
insight as intact); Tr. 1661 (finding Plaintiff’s symptoms satisfied the criteria for anxiety 
due to unspecified and major depressive disorder, moderate without psychotic symptoms); 
Tr. 1757 (clinical note from November 2019 noting improved mood with medication).  

    In addition, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s own reports and testimony4. For 
example, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s reports from June 2015 that she is able to get along 
with others, shop, attend religious gatherings, drives her children to school5, prepares meals 
for her family, reads, manages funds, and uses the internet. See Tr. 911 (citing Tr. 273-80, 
284). The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her participation in support 

groups in 2016 with two or three people once a week, which she reported to be helpful. Tr. 
911, 9136; see e.g., Tr. 951-52. Plaintiff also testified that she generally gets along with 

4 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to make a credibility finding, see Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8, the ALJ however was 
not required to make such a finding. See SSR 16-3p, 

. Rather the ALJ evaluates Plaintiff’s 
statements regarding her symptoms according to 

(a), 416.929(a). The ALJ complied with the 
regulations.                                                              

5 Plaintiff disputes her driving ability. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8-9. The record, however, reflects Plaintiff’s own 
reported driving routine which includes driving her children to and from school every day as well as to sporting 
activities. Compare Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8, with Tr. 274, 276, 284, 949-50. Plaintiff also testified that on an average 
day she is able to drive between two towns which is “about 15 miles each way.” Tr. 949. 

6 Plaintiff takes issue with the lack of citations to Plaintiff’s testimony. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8. The ALJ explicitly 
referenced Plaintiff’s testimony in his decision, see Tr. 911, 913, 919, and a lack of citation in this circumstance is not 
enough to warrant remand especially where, as here, the alleged deficiencies had no bearing on the outcome of this 
case. See Robinson v. Sullivan, 

 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n arguable deficiency in opinion-writing 
technique does not require [the Court] to set aside an administrative finding when that deficiency had no bearing on 
the outcome.” (quotation omitted)).                                       
supervisors but mostly experiences anxiety in crowds the size of 10 to 15 people. See Tr. 
911, 913, 919; see e.g., Tr. 938-39, 943-44. The ALJ also considered the medical evidence 

which showed that Plaintiff had a good rapport with her providers as she was described as 
pleasant and cooperative. See Tr. 911. Plaintiff’s alleged “brain fog” was also considered. 
See Tr. 913, 919; see e.g., Tr. 941-42.                                   
    After considering the above, among other evidence in the record, the ALJ explained 
that Plaintiff’s mental status examinations generally showed “intact cognition with no 
significant deficits in intelligence, attention, concentration, or memory.” Tr. 919. The ALJ 

acknowledged  “inconsistent  reports  of  hallucinatory  experiences  and  paranoia  with 
[Plaintiff]  recently  denying  such  psychotic  symptoms.”  Tr.  919.  And  concluded  that 
Plaintiff’s “depression and anxiety, and symptoms of fibro-fog . . .  support the limitation 
to simple, routine and repetitive tasks but not at a production rate pace (e.g., assembly line 
work), and the ability to make no more than simple work-related decisions.” Tr. 919. 

Further determining that “[b]ecause of [Plaintiff’s] social anxiety and history of PTSD 
symptoms, the [ALJ] has further limited her to occasional interactions with supervisors, 
coworkers and the public.” Tr. 919. The Court concludes that the ALJ provided ample 
explanation for Plaintiff’s above mental residual functional capacity determination and 
further concludes that Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. There is no evidence that 

the ALJ failed to consider or ignored evidence in the record as Plaintiff argues, see 
generally  Pl.’s  Mem.  in  Supp.7;  Pl.’s  Reply.  Plaintiff’s  arguments  boil  down  to  a 

7 It is worth noting that Plaintiff misstates the record at times. For example, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ “specifically 
asked [Plaintiff] to limit and focus her testimony only on the time period prior to her date last insured, generating 
testimony to 2016 and earlier.” See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8. A review of the record shows that the ALJ asked Plaintiff 
disagreement in opinion writing which is not enough to warrant remand. See Senne v. Apfel, 

 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument that deficiency in the ALJ’s 

opinion writing alone warrants remand, but finding remand appropriate when the ALJ’s 
findings were not sufficient to ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by 
substantial evidence on the record); see also Benskin v. Bowen, 

 (8th Cir. 
1987) (finding harmless error where “the deficiency probably had no practical effect on the 
outcome of the case”). It follows that Plaintiff’s arguments relating to the Chenery Doctrine 
fail to hold any weight. See Pl.’s Reply at 3-5.                          

 D.  Non-Severe Carpal Tunnel Impairment                                 
    Plaintiff  also  challenges  the  ALJ’s  determination  that  Plaintiff’s  carpal  tunnel 
impairment is non-severe. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 11-13. “[A]n impairment is severe 
only if it significantly limits Plaintiff’s ability to work and lasts, or is expected to last, for 
at least 12 consecutive months.” Jessica R. H. v. O’Malley, No. 22-cv-3091 (DLM), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2024) (citing 

(d)(1)(A)). Substantial 
evidence  supports  the  ALJ’s  finding  that  Plaintiff’s  carpal  tunnel  syndrome  did  not 
significantly limit her hand function over a consecutive 12-month period and therefore is 
not severe because there is no objective evidence of Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome until 
November 2015 and symptoms resolved after Plaintiff’s second release procedure in April 

2016. See Tr. 908-09.                                                     


at the hearing “to be mindful when . . . going through testimony to separate out limitations that are current versus prior 
to the date last insured . . . to make sure that we’re clear in testimony whether any limitations that you’re referring to 
applied also prior to your date last insured.” Tr. 950.                   
    The medical evidence in the record shows impression notes from a clinical visit in 
spring of 2014 listing carpal tunnel syndrome based on Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms, 

see Tr. 908 (citing Tr. 373). No definitive evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome, however, 
was found in 2014, Tr. 908 (citing Tr. 374, 398), until November 24, 2015. Tr. 908; see 
e.g.,  Tr.  857  (examination  results  showing  mild  symmetric  bilateral  carpal  tunnel 
syndrome). The ALJ also considered the clinical examination in March 2016 which showed 
positive results, see Tr. 573, which led to Plaintiff undergoing a right carpal tunnel release 
procedure in that same month, see Tr. 568, and a left carpal tunnel release procedure in 

April 2016, see Tr. 819. A postoperative clinical note from April 26, 2016, noted Plaintiff’s 
reports of improvements and denial of any symptoms. Tr. 908 (citing Tr. 1450). And an x-
ray of Plaintiff’s hand from May 2019 showed possible mild soft tissue swelling without 
significant osseous abnormality of the left hand and no abnormality of the right hand. Tr. 
908 (citing Tr. 1364-65). Thus, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome 

did not significantly limit her hand function over a consecutive 12-month period and 
therefore substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s carpal 
tunnel syndrome is not severe.                                            
    Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s hearing testimony regarding issues 
with joint pain and swelling in her hands, but the ALJ properly concluded that “there is no 

further evidence of treatment related to carpal tunnel syndrome after that second release 
[procedure],  suggesting  that  the  procedures  were  effective  in  relieving  her  hand 
symptoms.” Tr. 908. Plaintiff’s hearing testimony concerning her subjective complaints 
are not enough to establish a disability. See 

(a), 416.929(a). “There 
must be objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source that shows you 
have a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged.” 

 The Court concludes that the ALJ  properly considered 
Plaintiff’s testimony.                                                    
 E. Hypothetical Question to Vocational Expert                           
    Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to account for Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel 
syndrome and walking limitation in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert. See 
Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 10. The ALJ, however, is not required to offer a corresponding 

residual functional capacity limitation and hypothetical question for a limitation that is not 
substantially supported by the evidence in the record as a whole, as is the case here. See 
Lacroix v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2016); Flint v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-1220 
(PAM/SER), 

, at *27 (D. Minn. June 23, 2014). Because the Court has 
already concluded that no further limitations for Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome is 

supported by the record, the ALJ did not need to include any corresponding limitation in 
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity determination or in the hypothetical question to the 
vocational expert.                                                        
    And when determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ was not 
required to adopt testing results from a functional capacity evaluation conducted by a 

physical therapist in November 2019. See Tr. 1723 (finding Plaintiff’s six-minute walking 
test limited because results showed Plaintiff was only able to ambulate for two minutes out 
of  the  six  minutes  and  during  those  six  minutes  Plaintiff  ambulated  100  total  feet). 
“Because a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] is a medical question, an ALJ’s 
assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of a claimant’s ability to 
function in the workplace. However, there is no requirement that a[] [residual functional 

capacity] finding be supported by a specific medical opinion.” Schmitt, 

 
(quotation omitted). The ALJ must consider all the evidence. See Pearsall v. Massanari, 

  (8th Cir. 2001) (“It is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine a 
claimant’s [residual functional capacity] based on all relevant evidence, including medical 
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant’s own descriptions of 
h[er] limitations.”).                                                     

    The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s November 2019 six-minute walking test results as 
well as Plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to function at a sedentary physical demand level, 
see Tr. 916 (citing Tr. 1723), and further considered follow up clinical notes from later that 
same month which noted pain with palpation of the entire neck and back, and generalized 
swelling of the hand, but no other abnormal findings other than Plaintiff’s obesity. See Tr. 

916 (citing 1755-57). The ALJ ultimately concluded that the objective evidence “does not 
provide any support for gait dysfunction, lower extremity weakness or instability.” See Tr. 
917. But after considering Plaintiff’s “consistent pain complaints” the ALJ limited Plaintiff 
to sedentary work. See Tr. 912, 917. The ALJ adequately determined that additional 
limitations beyond the limitations accounted for in Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

and subsequent hypothetical question were not warranted. See Cynthia D. v. Kijakazi, No. 
20-cv-1886 (BRT), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2022) (“For a hypothetical 
to be proper at step five, it would need to present the limitations described from a supported 
[residual functional capacity].”).                                        
    By pointing to evidence in the record to support its argument for an additional 
limitation related to walking, Plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the 

evidence. It is well established that this Court cannot reweigh the evidence as part of its 
review. See Schmitt, 

 (“Despite [the claimant’s] dissatisfaction with how 
the ALJ weighed the evidence, it is not this Court’s role to reweigh that evidence.”); Goff 
v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2005) (“If, after reviewing the record, the court 
finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those 
positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.”).  

    Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the job of ampoule sealer did not conflict with 
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity of occasional interactions. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. 
at 10. In response to a hypothetical question, the vocational expert testified that neither the 
identified job of ampoule sealer nor an automated job requiring use of more technology 
would require Plaintiff to work in concert with others at a production pace. See Tr. 969-71, 

973-75. Rather, the vocational expert stated that the ampoule sealer position would require 
someone to work “in combination with others who are doing the exact same thing as you . 
. . but it’s not going to be in terms of working in concert with others” and you do not have 
to keep up with the machine like with an assembly line. Tr. 974-75. This testimony does 
not conflict with Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity to “perform simple, routine and 

repetitive tasks but not at a production rate pace (e.g., assembly line work); make simple 
work-related decisions; and interact occasionally with supervisors, coworkers and the 
public.”  Tr.  912.  See  Newton  v.  Chater,  

  (8th  Cir.  1996)  (“A 
hypothetical  question  must  precisely  describe  a  claimant’s  impairments  so  that  the 
vocational expert may accurately assess whether jobs exist for the claimant.”); Howard v. 
Massanari, 

 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Testimony from a vocational expert based 

on a properly-phrase hypothetical constitutes substantial evidence.”).    
    In sum, substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s residual 
functional capacity determination and the corresponding hypothetical question.  
 F.  Weighing of Opinion Evidence                                        
    Plaintiff’s last argument concerns the ALJ’s weighing of opinion evidence. Plaintiff 
argues that the ALJ did not comply with the “treating physician rule” because the ALJ did 

not assign controlling weight to any medical opinion. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 13-15.  
    Plaintiff’s claims were filed prior to the March 2017 regulation change concerning 
the evaluation of medical opinions and therefore, the previous regulation for evaluating 
medical opinions applies in this matter. “A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to 
controlling weight when it is supported by medically acceptable techniques and is not 

inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record.” Julin v. Colvin, 

 
(8th Cir. 2016). “Yet[, this controlling] weight is neither inherent nor automatic and does 
not obviate the need to evaluate the record as a whole.” Cline v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation omitted). The opinions of treating physicians 
“are given  less  weight  if  they  are  inconsistent  with  the  record  as a  whole  or  if  the 

conclusions consist of vague, conclusory statements unsupported by medically acceptable 
data.” Stormo v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2004); see Cline, 

 
(permitting the opinions of treating physicians to be discounted or disregarded “where 
other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or 
where a treating physician renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of 
such  opinions”  (quotation  omitted)).  If  a  treating  physician’s  opinion  is  not  given 

controlling weight, then “the opinion is weighed based on a number of factors, including 
the  examining  relationship,  treatment  relationship,  opinion’s  supportability,  opinion’s 
consistency with the record as a whole, specialization of the provider, and any other factors 
tending to support or contradict the opinion.” Patrick M. B. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-2569 (TNL), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2020) (citing 

(c); Shontos 
v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2003)). The above factors also apply to the 

opinions of consultative examiners. See 

(c), 416.927(c) (factors 
apply in deciding weight “give[n] to any medical opinion”).               
    Not only is Plaintiff’s argument underdeveloped as she only generally argues that 
the ALJ did not comply with the “treating physician rule” but she also identifies only 
briefly Advanced Practice Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion as not being evaluated properly. 

See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 13. Under the prior regulation for evaluating medical opinions, 
however, Nurse Felgenhauer is not considered an “acceptable medical source” permitted 
to  offer  a  “medical  opinion.”  See  

(a)(7)  (defining  “Licensed 
Advanced Practice  Registered  Nurse,  or  other  licensed  advanced  practice  nurse  with 
another title, for impairments within his or her licensed scope of practice (only with respect 

to claims filed (see § 404.614) on or after March 27, 2017”) (emphasis added); accord 

(a)(7).  Thus, Plaintiff’s argument with respect to the ALJ’s evaluation of 
opinions offered by “other sources” (i.e., Nurse Felgenhauer) fails.      
    The ALJ did what was required, which is to consider all relevant evidence and 
generally explain the weight given to opinions from other sources. See SSR 06-03P, 

, at *6. “Not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every 
case. The evaluation of an opinion from a medical source who is not an ‘acceptable medical 
source’ depends on the particular facts in each case.” 

. The ALJ properly considered 
Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion which consisted of statements in the form of checked boxes, 
see  Tr.  880-89,  and  properly  afforded  such  opinion  little  weight  because  Nurse 
Felgenhauer’s assessed limitations were inconsistent with her own reported findings and 

other substantial evidence in the record. See Tr. 920. For example, the ALJ explained that 
he gave little weight to Nurse Felgenhauer’s “assessment as to [Plaintiff’s] impairment-
related absences, need for unscheduled breaks and time off-task are simply not consistent 
with any of the objective medical findings or record or [Plaintiff’s] reported activities of 
daily living.” Tr. 920. Even if Nurse Felgenhauer is an acceptable medical source, the ALJ 

still did not err in his evaluation because the ALJ gave “good reasons” for assigning less 
than controlling weight to Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion. See Chesser v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2017).                                            
    Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion is also made up of checked boxes which are typically 
given little weight. See Nolen v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2023) (finding “[t]he 

opinion’s bare, formulaic conclusion presumptively warranted little evidentiary weight 
because it was rendered on a check-box and fill-in-the-blank form” (quotation omitted)); 
Thomas v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding assessments to have “little 
evidentiary  value”  when  they  “consist  of  nothing  more  than  vague,  conclusory 
statements—checked boxes, circled answers, and brief fill-in-the-blank responses,” and 
when they “cite no medical evidence and provide little to no elaboration”). In sum, the ALJ 

appropriately weighted Nurse Felgenhauer’s opinion along with the other evidence in the 
record.                                                                   
    In addition, and contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ was not required to rely 
on a particular treating physician’s opinion, see Martise v. Astrue, 

 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion 
or choose between the opinions of any of the claimant’s physicians.” (quoting Schmidt v. 

Astrue, 

 (7th Cir. 2007)), and the ALJ is not required to explicitly address 
each  factor  when  evaluating  opinion  evidence.  Roesler  v.  Colvin,  No.  12-cv-1982 
(JRT/JJK), 

, at *5, n. 5 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2013) (“[T]he regulations do 
not  strictly  require  the  ALJ  to  explicitly  discuss  each  factor  [under  

(c), 416.927(c)].”).                                              

                        V.  CONCLUSION                                   
    Because the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole, the Court affirms the ALJ’s February 2020 decision. Based upon the record, 
memoranda, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons states above, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that:                                                             

 1.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement, ECF No. 21, is DENIED.    
 2.  Defendant’s request for relief, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED.             
 3.  The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.                            
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      
Date: September 24, 2024      s/ Tony N. Leung                            
                             Tony N. Leung                               
                             United States Magistrate Judge              
                             District of Minnesota                       

                             Danielle M. A-C. v. O’Malley,               
                             Case No. 22-cv-2151 (TNL)