Wagner v. U.S. Bancorp

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Wagner v. U.S. Bancorp

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Robert Wagner,                     Case No. 24-cv-1302 (SRN/DTS)         

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

U.S. Bancorp,                                                            

          Defendant.                                                     


Robert Wagner, 18111 203rd Avenue NW, Big Lake, MN 55309, Pro Se.        

Elizabeth Hayes, Polsinelli PC, 2950 N. Harwood Street, Suite 2100, Dallas, TX 75201, 
and  Richard  A.  Glassman,  Glassman  Law  Firm,  80  S.  Eighth  Street,  Suite  900, 
Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant.                                    


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 
10].1 Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the 
reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion.                        

1    The Defendant asserts that U.S. Bank National Association, a subsidiary company 
of U.S. Bancorp and holder of the underlying contract and bank accounts in question, is 
the proper named defendant in this action. (Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 3] at 1 n.1; 
Corporate Disclosure Statement [Doc. No. 2].) Mr. Wagner does not dispute this assertion, 
and the Court accordingly considers U.S. Bank National Association to be the Defendant 
for the purposes of this Order.                                           
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
    A.   Facts                                                           
    Plaintiff Robert Wagner and the Defendant, U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. 
Bank”), entered into a mortgage loan contract on November 22, 2019. (Notice of Removal 

Ex. B (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 6–7.) The mortgage loan contract provided for a mortgage on Mr. 
Wagner’s home, located at 18111 203rd Avenue Northwest, Big Lake, MN 55309. (Id. at 
6 ¶ c.)                                                                   
    On September 27, 2023, Mr. Wagner mailed a document request, titled “Notice of 
Conditional Acceptance and Offer to Perform,” along with a document titled “Affidavit of 

Facts: Verification & Validation of Debt,” to U.S. Bank. (Id. ¶ 8.) The document request 
demanded information about certain bank accounts in Mr. Wagner’s name, the authenticity 
and accuracy of his mortgage loan contract, and his related debt. (Id. ¶ 11; id. Ex. 1.) It 
demanded  this  information  pursuant  to  “Generally  Accepted  Accounting  Principles 
(GAAP),” and the accompanying Affidavit of Facts was comprised of various theories 

asserting the invalidity of the underlying mortgage loan contract due to U.S. Bank’s use of 
“consumer notes” to fund charges to the account. (See generally id.; id. Ex. 1.)  It further 
demanded proof that U.S. Bank possessed the “original note with a wet ink signature.” (Id. 
Ex. 1.) On October 13, 2023, U.S. Bank mailed back a photocopy of the contract in 
question. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 26; see id. Ex. 3.)                                 

    On November 29, 2023, Mr. Wagner mailed a second document request to U.S. 
Bank. (Id. ¶ 14.) In this request, he acknowledged his receipt of the copy of the mortgage 
loan contract. (Id. Ex. 3.) He again demanded that U.S. Bank provide him with the original 
mortgage loan contract for his inspection, along with proof that it was supported by 
adequate consideration “in accordance with GAAP.” (Id.) On December 7, 2023, U.S. 

Bank mailed Mr. Wagner copies of account statements from the two U.S. Bank accounts 
identified in his first document request. (Id. ¶ 16.) On December 10, 2023, U.S. Bank 
mailed Mr. Wagner a letter acknowledging the various correspondences. (Id. ¶ 17.) 
    B.   Procedural Posture                                              
    Mr.  Wagner  initially  filed  this  lawsuit  in  Sherburne  County  District  Court, 
Minnesota, on March 8, 2024. In the Complaint, he alleges eight causes of action: 1) Breach 

of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 2) Breach of Implied Contract 
from Acquiescence; 3) Lack of Consideration; 4) Failure to Prove Bona Fide Loss; 5) Lack 
of Bona Fide Holder Status; 6) Unfair Business Practice; 7) Estoppel; and 8) Removal, 
Release,  and  Revocation  of  Lender’s  Rights,  Titles,  and  Interest.  (Id.  ¶¶  31–79.) 
Ultimately, he asks the Court to issue a declaration that his debt under the mortgage 

contract loan is invalid and unenforceable, and to order U.S. Bank to transfer to Mr. 
Wagner the certificate of title to his home, in addition to granting restitution and damages. 
(Id. ¶¶ a–f.)                                                             
    On April 11, 2024, U.S. Bank removed the matter to this Court, and on May 2, 2024, 
it filed this motion to dismiss. It moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot. to Dismiss 
[Doc. No. 10].)                                                           
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   The Law                                                         
    When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the 
facts alleged in the complaint as true and views those allegations in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff. See Dormani v. Target Corp., 
970 F.3d 910, 914
 (8th Cir. 2020). However, 
the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations or legal conclusions 
couched as factual allegations. Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 
735 F.3d 1009, 1013
 (8th 
Cir. 2013); also Christopherson v. Bushner, 
33 F.4th 495, 499
 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Naked 
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement do not suffice, nor do threadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”). 
    To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570
 
(2007)). Although a plaintiff need not allege facts in painstaking detail, the facts alleged 

must have enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 
Atl.  Corp.,  
550 U.S. at 555
.  “This  standard  demands  more  than  an  unadorned,  the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Kulkay v. Roy, 
847 F.3d 637, 642
 (8th Cir. 
2017) (quoting Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678
). While the Court construes a pro se party’s pleadings 
liberally,  a  pro  se  complaint  must  still  allege  sufficient  facts  to  support  the  claims 

advanced. Sandknop v. Missouri Dep’t of Corrs., 
932 F.3d 739, 742
 (8th Cir. 2019).  
    The Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside of the pleadings on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, but it may consider exhibits attached to the complaint along with materials 
that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Buckley v. Hennepin County, 
9 F.4th 757, 760
 (8th Cir. 2021).                                                      

    B.   The Claims Are Frivolous as a Matter of Law                     
    At the heart of Mr. Wagner’s Complaint is an attempt to extinguish his underlying 
mortgage debt. He challenges the validity of the mortgage loan contract itself, based on 
U.S. Bank’s alleged failure to verify the validity of the debt by producing the original 
contract with a “wet ink signature.” Courts routinely dismiss this type of “show-me-the-
note” action as frivolous.2 See, e.g., Baker v. Huntington National Bank, 3:23-cv-358, 
2024 WL 361663
, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2024); Saint-Ulysse v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan 
Servs., Inc., No. 21-cv-14677, 
2023 WL 451845
, at *3 (D.N.J. July 14, 2023); Brown v. 
Exeter Finance LLC, No. 3:21-cv-169, 
2021 WL 4342336
, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 
2021 WL 4319666
 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 



2    While Mr. Wagner objects to any characterization of himself as a sovereign citizen, 
the Complaint is replete with theories and terminology common to the sovereign citizen 
movement. These include the use of mailed notices and “affidavits of fact” to attempt to 
extinguish a debt, vague references to “GAAP,” demands to provide an original “wet ink” 
copy of a note in order to prove the validity of a debt, and general references to agency 
theory. (See generally Compl.; Compl. Exs. 1–3.)  Courts around the country, including 
within this district, find claims based on such theories to lack merit. See Kiewel v. Hickok, 
No. 20-cv-1395, 
2020 WL 13748452
, at *6 (D. Minn. June 30, 2020) (observing that, 
regardless of how characterized, every court to consider arguments based on sovereign 
citizen theories has found them to be “meritless, absurd, and entirely frivolous”); In re 
Wallace, No. 24-br-315, 
2024 WL 3648551
, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 2, 2024) (“While 
Debtors deny they are ‘sovereign citizens’, their arguments are identical to those that are 
routinely made by sovereign citizens that have been repeatedly rejected by every court 
addressing them . . . Debtors argue, despite the fact they signed notes and received money 
from MWO, that MWO is falsely claiming to have loaned money to Debtors.”). 
2021); Sepehry-Fard v. MB Financial Servs., 13-cv-2784, 
2015 WL 903364
, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 2, 2015).                                                       

    The Court finds that Mr. Wagner’s claims calling into question the actual validity 
of his debt are meritless. See Patten v. Lown, No. 2:20-cv-605, 
2020 WL 8461564
, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 
2021 WL 236630
 (M.D. 
Fla. Jan. 25, 2021) (dismissing the complaint as “patently frivolous” such that “any attempt 
at amendment would be futile” when based on, among other things, GAAP theories); also 
Baker, 
2024 WL 361663
, at *2–3 (dismissing with prejudice a complaint demanding that 

a bank “show it is the holder in due course,” provide a note with a “wet signature,” and 
prove the validity of a debt pursuant to “GAAP” principles). The Court finds that these 
claims are patently frivolous, and that any amendment would be futile. See Neitzke v. 
Williams, 490 U.S 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or fact.”).                                  

    C.   The Claims Otherwise Fail under Minnesota Law                   
    To the extent that the Complaint states any causes of action which are cognizable 
under Minnesota contract law, it fails to plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.3                                                                 
    Mr. Wagner’s claim that U.S. Bank breached the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing fails, because Minnesota does not recognize such a claim based on terms or 
obligations not included in the contract at issue. “The implied covenant of good faith and 


3    Neither party disputes that Minnesota law applies in this case.      
fair dealing—which requires in every contract that one party not unjustifiably hinder the 
other party’s performance of the contract—does not extend to actions beyond the scope of 

the underlying contract.” Metro. Transportation Network, Inc. v. Collaborative Student 
Transportation of Minnesota, LLC, 
6 N.W.3d 771, 782
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2024), review 
denied (July 23, 2024). Here, Mr. Wagner has not alleged any facts suggesting that his 
performance of any obligation under that contract was in any manner hindered by U.S. 
Bank. He therefore fails to plausibly allege that U.S. Bank breached the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law.                       

    Mr. Wagner further appears to allege that U.S. Bank breached the mortgage loan 
contract by failing to provide adequate consideration. However, that theory is foreclosed 
by Minnesota law, because “the absence of consideration is fatal to the formation of a 
contract, without which no breach can exist.” 
Id.
 To the extent that he argues the alleged 
lack of adequate consideration renders the contract invalid, the Court finds that he has not 

alleged facts sufficient to support such a claim.                         
    Mr. Wagner’s additional claim, that U.S. Bank breached an implied contract created 
through his correspondence with U.S. Bank, also fails as a matter of law. Under Minnesota 
law, a complaint must allege an offer, acceptance, and consideration to sufficiently plead 
the existence of an implied contract. Carufel v. Minnesota Dep’t of Public Safety, A18-

0476, 
2018 WL 6596287
, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2018); see Commercial Assocs., 
Inc. v. Work Connection, Inc., 
712 N.W.2d 772, 782
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). He alleges 
only  that  “Defendant,  by  engaging  in  private  correspondence,  implicitly  agreed  to 
cooperate and provide relevant information.” (Compl. ¶ 39.) Accordingly, the Complaint 
fails to plausibly allege an implied contract. See Careful, 
2018 WL 6596287
, at *8. 

    Mr. Wagner alternatively asserts an estoppel claim, based on his alleged reliance 
upon  U.S.  Bank’s  implied  consent  or  acquiescence  to  his  two  document  requests. 
“Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that implies a contract in law where none 
exists in fact.” Martens v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 
616 N.W.2d 732, 746
 (Minn. 2000) 
(cleaned up). To state a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show that: (1) there 
was a clear and definite promise; (2) the promisor intended to induce reliance and such 

reliance occurred; and (3) the promise must be enforced to prevent injustice. Park Nicollet 
Clinic v. Hamann, 
808 N.W.2d 828, 834
 (Minn. 2011).                       
    In this case, there is no allegation that U.S. Bank made any clear and definite 
promise to Mr. Wagner in response to his two document requests, nor that U.S. Bank 
intended to induce Mr. Wagner’s reliance on any such promise. The only U.S. Bank 

communications at issue are letters (1) providing him with a photocopy of his underlying 
contract, (2) providing him with his account statements, and (3) acknowledging their 
various correspondences. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16, 17, 26.) Accordingly, the Complaint fails to 
state a claim for promissory estoppel under Minnesota law.                
    Finally, Mr. Wagner alleges that U.S. Bank, by failing to adequately respond to the 

two document requests, engaged in unfair business practices. Mr. Wagner does not invoke 
any statute, contract, or common law cause of action underlying this claim. In his response 
to U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Wagner explains that this claim is based on “broader 
principles of unfair business practices, which include failure to act in good faith and 
provide necessary disclosures.” (Def. Mem. in Opposition [Doc. No. 20] at 15.) To the 
extent that Mr. Wagner’s unfair business claim is rooted in some provision of law, the 

Court finds that it fails to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp., 
550 U.S. at 545
.           
    Because the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief 
can be granted, and that the claims pleaded are frivolous such that any amendment would 
be futile, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Knowles v. TD Ameritrade Holding 
Corp., 
2 F.4th 751, 758
 (8th Cir. 2021).                                  

III.  ORDER                                                               
    Based  on  the  submissions  and  the  entire  file  and  proceedings  herein,  IT  IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                      
         1.   The Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10] filed by U.S. Bank is  
              GRANTED; and                                               
         2.   The Complaint is DISMISSED with Prejudice.                 

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      



Dated: October 4, 2024               /s/ Susan Richard Nelson             
                                    SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                 
                                    United States District Judge         

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Robert Wagner,                     Case No. 24-cv-1302 (SRN/DTS)         

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

U.S. Bancorp,                                                            

          Defendant.                                                     


Robert Wagner, 18111 203rd Avenue NW, Big Lake, MN 55309, Pro Se.        

Elizabeth Hayes, Polsinelli PC, 2950 N. Harwood Street, Suite 2100, Dallas, TX 75201, 
and  Richard  A.  Glassman,  Glassman  Law  Firm,  80  S.  Eighth  Street,  Suite  900, 
Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant.                                    


SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge                        
    This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 
10].1 Based on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the 
reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion.                        

1    The Defendant asserts that U.S. Bank National Association, a subsidiary company 
of U.S. Bancorp and holder of the underlying contract and bank accounts in question, is 
the proper named defendant in this action. (Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 3] at 1 n.1; 
Corporate Disclosure Statement [Doc. No. 2].) Mr. Wagner does not dispute this assertion, 
and the Court accordingly considers U.S. Bank National Association to be the Defendant 
for the purposes of this Order.                                           
I.   BACKGROUND                                                           
    A.   Facts                                                           
    Plaintiff Robert Wagner and the Defendant, U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. 
Bank”), entered into a mortgage loan contract on November 22, 2019. (Notice of Removal 

Ex. B (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 6–7.) The mortgage loan contract provided for a mortgage on Mr. 
Wagner’s home, located at 18111 203rd Avenue Northwest, Big Lake, MN 55309. (Id. at 
6 ¶ c.)                                                                   
    On September 27, 2023, Mr. Wagner mailed a document request, titled “Notice of 
Conditional Acceptance and Offer to Perform,” along with a document titled “Affidavit of 

Facts: Verification & Validation of Debt,” to U.S. Bank. (Id. ¶ 8.) The document request 
demanded information about certain bank accounts in Mr. Wagner’s name, the authenticity 
and accuracy of his mortgage loan contract, and his related debt. (Id. ¶ 11; id. Ex. 1.) It 
demanded  this  information  pursuant  to  “Generally  Accepted  Accounting  Principles 
(GAAP),” and the accompanying Affidavit of Facts was comprised of various theories 

asserting the invalidity of the underlying mortgage loan contract due to U.S. Bank’s use of 
“consumer notes” to fund charges to the account. (See generally id.; id. Ex. 1.)  It further 
demanded proof that U.S. Bank possessed the “original note with a wet ink signature.” (Id. 
Ex. 1.) On October 13, 2023, U.S. Bank mailed back a photocopy of the contract in 
question. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 26; see id. Ex. 3.)                                 

    On November 29, 2023, Mr. Wagner mailed a second document request to U.S. 
Bank. (Id. ¶ 14.) In this request, he acknowledged his receipt of the copy of the mortgage 
loan contract. (Id. Ex. 3.) He again demanded that U.S. Bank provide him with the original 
mortgage loan contract for his inspection, along with proof that it was supported by 
adequate consideration “in accordance with GAAP.” (Id.) On December 7, 2023, U.S. 

Bank mailed Mr. Wagner copies of account statements from the two U.S. Bank accounts 
identified in his first document request. (Id. ¶ 16.) On December 10, 2023, U.S. Bank 
mailed Mr. Wagner a letter acknowledging the various correspondences. (Id. ¶ 17.) 
    B.   Procedural Posture                                              
    Mr.  Wagner  initially  filed  this  lawsuit  in  Sherburne  County  District  Court, 
Minnesota, on March 8, 2024. In the Complaint, he alleges eight causes of action: 1) Breach 

of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 2) Breach of Implied Contract 
from Acquiescence; 3) Lack of Consideration; 4) Failure to Prove Bona Fide Loss; 5) Lack 
of Bona Fide Holder Status; 6) Unfair Business Practice; 7) Estoppel; and 8) Removal, 
Release,  and  Revocation  of  Lender’s  Rights,  Titles,  and  Interest.  (Id.  ¶¶  31–79.) 
Ultimately, he asks the Court to issue a declaration that his debt under the mortgage 

contract loan is invalid and unenforceable, and to order U.S. Bank to transfer to Mr. 
Wagner the certificate of title to his home, in addition to granting restitution and damages. 
(Id. ¶¶ a–f.)                                                             
    On April 11, 2024, U.S. Bank removed the matter to this Court, and on May 2, 2024, 
it filed this motion to dismiss. It moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot. to Dismiss 
[Doc. No. 10].)                                                           
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   The Law                                                         
    When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the 
facts alleged in the complaint as true and views those allegations in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff. See Dormani v. Target Corp., 
970 F.3d 910, 914
 (8th Cir. 2020). However, 
the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations or legal conclusions 
couched as factual allegations. Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 
735 F.3d 1009, 1013
 (8th 
Cir. 2013); also Christopherson v. Bushner, 
33 F.4th 495, 499
 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Naked 
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement do not suffice, nor do threadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”). 
    To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570
 
(2007)). Although a plaintiff need not allege facts in painstaking detail, the facts alleged 

must have enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 
Atl.  Corp.,  
550 U.S. at 555
.  “This  standard  demands  more  than  an  unadorned,  the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Kulkay v. Roy, 
847 F.3d 637, 642
 (8th Cir. 
2017) (quoting Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678
). While the Court construes a pro se party’s pleadings 
liberally,  a  pro  se  complaint  must  still  allege  sufficient  facts  to  support  the  claims 

advanced. Sandknop v. Missouri Dep’t of Corrs., 
932 F.3d 739, 742
 (8th Cir. 2019).  
    The Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside of the pleadings on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, but it may consider exhibits attached to the complaint along with materials 
that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings. Buckley v. Hennepin County, 
9 F.4th 757, 760
 (8th Cir. 2021).                                                      

    B.   The Claims Are Frivolous as a Matter of Law                     
    At the heart of Mr. Wagner’s Complaint is an attempt to extinguish his underlying 
mortgage debt. He challenges the validity of the mortgage loan contract itself, based on 
U.S. Bank’s alleged failure to verify the validity of the debt by producing the original 
contract with a “wet ink signature.” Courts routinely dismiss this type of “show-me-the-
note” action as frivolous.2 See, e.g., Baker v. Huntington National Bank, 3:23-cv-358, 
2024 WL 361663
, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2024); Saint-Ulysse v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan 
Servs., Inc., No. 21-cv-14677, 
2023 WL 451845
, at *3 (D.N.J. July 14, 2023); Brown v. 
Exeter Finance LLC, No. 3:21-cv-169, 
2021 WL 4342336
, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 
2021), report and recommendation adopted, 
2021 WL 4319666
 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 



2    While Mr. Wagner objects to any characterization of himself as a sovereign citizen, 
the Complaint is replete with theories and terminology common to the sovereign citizen 
movement. These include the use of mailed notices and “affidavits of fact” to attempt to 
extinguish a debt, vague references to “GAAP,” demands to provide an original “wet ink” 
copy of a note in order to prove the validity of a debt, and general references to agency 
theory. (See generally Compl.; Compl. Exs. 1–3.)  Courts around the country, including 
within this district, find claims based on such theories to lack merit. See Kiewel v. Hickok, 
No. 20-cv-1395, 
2020 WL 13748452
, at *6 (D. Minn. June 30, 2020) (observing that, 
regardless of how characterized, every court to consider arguments based on sovereign 
citizen theories has found them to be “meritless, absurd, and entirely frivolous”); In re 
Wallace, No. 24-br-315, 
2024 WL 3648551
, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 2, 2024) (“While 
Debtors deny they are ‘sovereign citizens’, their arguments are identical to those that are 
routinely made by sovereign citizens that have been repeatedly rejected by every court 
addressing them . . . Debtors argue, despite the fact they signed notes and received money 
from MWO, that MWO is falsely claiming to have loaned money to Debtors.”). 
2021); Sepehry-Fard v. MB Financial Servs., 13-cv-2784, 
2015 WL 903364
, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 2, 2015).                                                       

    The Court finds that Mr. Wagner’s claims calling into question the actual validity 
of his debt are meritless. See Patten v. Lown, No. 2:20-cv-605, 
2020 WL 8461564
, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 
2021 WL 236630
 (M.D. 
Fla. Jan. 25, 2021) (dismissing the complaint as “patently frivolous” such that “any attempt 
at amendment would be futile” when based on, among other things, GAAP theories); also 
Baker, 
2024 WL 361663
, at *2–3 (dismissing with prejudice a complaint demanding that 

a bank “show it is the holder in due course,” provide a note with a “wet signature,” and 
prove the validity of a debt pursuant to “GAAP” principles). The Court finds that these 
claims are patently frivolous, and that any amendment would be futile. See Neitzke v. 
Williams, 490 U.S 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or fact.”).                                  

    C.   The Claims Otherwise Fail under Minnesota Law                   
    To the extent that the Complaint states any causes of action which are cognizable 
under Minnesota contract law, it fails to plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.3                                                                 
    Mr. Wagner’s claim that U.S. Bank breached the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing fails, because Minnesota does not recognize such a claim based on terms or 
obligations not included in the contract at issue. “The implied covenant of good faith and 


3    Neither party disputes that Minnesota law applies in this case.      
fair dealing—which requires in every contract that one party not unjustifiably hinder the 
other party’s performance of the contract—does not extend to actions beyond the scope of 

the underlying contract.” Metro. Transportation Network, Inc. v. Collaborative Student 
Transportation of Minnesota, LLC, 
6 N.W.3d 771, 782
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2024), review 
denied (July 23, 2024). Here, Mr. Wagner has not alleged any facts suggesting that his 
performance of any obligation under that contract was in any manner hindered by U.S. 
Bank. He therefore fails to plausibly allege that U.S. Bank breached the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law.                       

    Mr. Wagner further appears to allege that U.S. Bank breached the mortgage loan 
contract by failing to provide adequate consideration. However, that theory is foreclosed 
by Minnesota law, because “the absence of consideration is fatal to the formation of a 
contract, without which no breach can exist.” 
Id.
 To the extent that he argues the alleged 
lack of adequate consideration renders the contract invalid, the Court finds that he has not 

alleged facts sufficient to support such a claim.                         
    Mr. Wagner’s additional claim, that U.S. Bank breached an implied contract created 
through his correspondence with U.S. Bank, also fails as a matter of law. Under Minnesota 
law, a complaint must allege an offer, acceptance, and consideration to sufficiently plead 
the existence of an implied contract. Carufel v. Minnesota Dep’t of Public Safety, A18-

0476, 
2018 WL 6596287
, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2018); see Commercial Assocs., 
Inc. v. Work Connection, Inc., 
712 N.W.2d 772, 782
 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). He alleges 
only  that  “Defendant,  by  engaging  in  private  correspondence,  implicitly  agreed  to 
cooperate and provide relevant information.” (Compl. ¶ 39.) Accordingly, the Complaint 
fails to plausibly allege an implied contract. See Careful, 
2018 WL 6596287
, at *8. 

    Mr. Wagner alternatively asserts an estoppel claim, based on his alleged reliance 
upon  U.S.  Bank’s  implied  consent  or  acquiescence  to  his  two  document  requests. 
“Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that implies a contract in law where none 
exists in fact.” Martens v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 
616 N.W.2d 732, 746
 (Minn. 2000) 
(cleaned up). To state a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show that: (1) there 
was a clear and definite promise; (2) the promisor intended to induce reliance and such 

reliance occurred; and (3) the promise must be enforced to prevent injustice. Park Nicollet 
Clinic v. Hamann, 
808 N.W.2d 828, 834
 (Minn. 2011).                       
    In this case, there is no allegation that U.S. Bank made any clear and definite 
promise to Mr. Wagner in response to his two document requests, nor that U.S. Bank 
intended to induce Mr. Wagner’s reliance on any such promise. The only U.S. Bank 

communications at issue are letters (1) providing him with a photocopy of his underlying 
contract, (2) providing him with his account statements, and (3) acknowledging their 
various correspondences. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16, 17, 26.) Accordingly, the Complaint fails to 
state a claim for promissory estoppel under Minnesota law.                
    Finally, Mr. Wagner alleges that U.S. Bank, by failing to adequately respond to the 

two document requests, engaged in unfair business practices. Mr. Wagner does not invoke 
any statute, contract, or common law cause of action underlying this claim. In his response 
to U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Wagner explains that this claim is based on “broader 
principles of unfair business practices, which include failure to act in good faith and 
provide necessary disclosures.” (Def. Mem. in Opposition [Doc. No. 20] at 15.) To the 
extent that Mr. Wagner’s unfair business claim is rooted in some provision of law, the 

Court finds that it fails to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp., 
550 U.S. at 545
.           
    Because the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief 
can be granted, and that the claims pleaded are frivolous such that any amendment would 
be futile, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Knowles v. TD Ameritrade Holding 
Corp., 
2 F.4th 751, 758
 (8th Cir. 2021).                                  

III.  ORDER                                                               
    Based  on  the  submissions  and  the  entire  file  and  proceedings  herein,  IT  IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that:                                                      
         1.   The Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10] filed by U.S. Bank is  
              GRANTED; and                                               
         2.   The Complaint is DISMISSED with Prejudice.                 

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      



Dated: October 4, 2024               /s/ Susan Richard Nelson             
                                    SUSAN RICHARD NELSON                 
                                    United States District Judge         

Reference

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