International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Sun Country, Inc.

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

International Brotherhood of Teamsters,  File No. 23-cv-633 (ECT/TNL)    
Airline  Division;  and  Teamsters  Local                                
Union 970,                                                               

          Plaintiffs,                                                    
                                      OPINION AND ORDER                  
v.                                                                       

Sun Country, Inc., doing business as Sun                                 
Country  Airlines;  and  Sun  Country                                    
Airlines Holdings, Inc.,                                                 

          Defendants.                                                    

Dimitre James Petroff and Joshua D. McInerney, Wentz, McInerney, Peifer & Petroff, 
LLC,  Columbus,  OH;  and  Brendan  D.  Cummins,  Cummins  &  Cummins,  LLP, 
Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Teamsters 
Local Union 970.                                                          
Becky L. Kalas, FordHarrison LLP, Chicago, IL; Charles A. Roach, FordHarrison LLP, 
Minneapolis,  MN;  and  Sarah  P.  Wimberly,  FordHarrison  LLP,  Atlanta,  GA,  for 
Defendants Sun Country, Inc., and Sun Country Airlines Holdings, Inc.     

    In January 2023, Sun Country’s fleet service employees unionized.  Within a few 
weeks, Sun Country terminated two employees who participated in the unionization effort, 
citing unexcused absences as the justification.  Plaintiffs, the employees’ national and local 
union chapters, allege Sun Country terminated the employees in retaliation for their union 
support, thereby violating the Railway Labor Act (or “RLA”).  Sun Country seeks partial 
dismissal, arguing the Union lacks associational standing to bring claims on the employees’ 
behalf.  The motion will be granted because the Union has not alleged injury to itself and 
lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of, and seek relief for, non-party employees.   
                               I1                                        
    Plaintiffs International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Teamsters Local Union 970 
(collectively “the Union”) are a national labor organization and it’s Minneapolis-based 

chartered affiliate.  Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 4–5.  Defendants Sun Country, Inc., and Sun 
Country Airlines Holdings, Inc. (collectively, “Sun Country”) are an airline and is its parent 
corporation, both based in Minneapolis.  Id. ¶¶ 6–7.                      
    After a “duly conducted election,” the Union became “the exclusive representative 
for purposes of the RLA of the craft or class of Fleet Service Employees of Sun Country,” 
on January 5, 2023.  Id. ¶ 17.2  Little about the election is alleged in the Complaint, but the 

Union provided the National Mediation Board certification as an exhibit to its brief.  See 
ECF No. 49-1 (showing Sun Country fleet service employees voted in favor of Union 
representation).  The facts—as presented in the Complaint—revolve around two former 
employees, Sylvester Oliver and Monique Crisp, who are not parties to the case.   

    Sylvester  “Sly”  Oliver  worked  for  Sun  Country  from  October  2021  until  his 
termination on January 21, 2023.  Compl. ¶ 8.  He was a part-time ramp agent and, prior 

1    As  explained  in  Part  II,  infra,  Sun  Country’s  standing  challenge  accepts  the 
Complaint’s factual allegations as true.  This means the usual Rule 12(b)(6) standards 
apply.  In accordance with these standards, the facts are drawn from the Complaint and 
documents embraced by it.  See Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 

 (8th Cir. 2014).   

2    It doesn’t matter to this motion, but the record leaves some uncertainty regarding 
the certification date.  The Complaint alleges the Union was certified as the employees’ 
representative on January 4, 2023.  Compl. ¶ 17.  But the certification document is dated 
January 5.  See ECF No. 49-1.  And the Union elsewhere refers to January 10 as being 
“five days after the Union election victory.”  Compl. ¶ 18; see also Answer [ECF No. 19] 
¶ 17 (denying the Union was certified on January 4).  The better guess is the Union was 
certified January 5, 2023.                                                
to his termination, had not received any disciplinary or corrective action.  

 ¶¶ 13–14.  
Mr. Oliver was heavily involved in the effort to unionize Sun Country’s fleet service 
employees and was open and vocal about his union support.  

 ¶¶ 15–16.  On January 10, 

2023, five days after certification, Mr. Oliver brought the Local 970 Chapter president to 
the terminal to visit with new union members.  

 ¶¶ 18–19.  While there, Sun Country 
managers approached and directed Mr. Oliver and the Local 970 Chapter president to leave 
because they were “disrupting operations,” and because the Chapter president was “not 
authorized on the premises.”  

 ¶¶ 24–27.  Ten days later, on January 20, Mr. Oliver called 

and notified his supervisor and a human resources representative that he would be out of 
work because his wife had undergone surgery.  Id. ¶ 29.  Mr. Oliver was terminated the 
next day.  Id. ¶¶ 31–32.  Mr. Oliver was told verbally that his termination was due to 
bringing an unauthorized person to the tarmac; Mr. Oliver was later informed in writing 
that he was “also terminat[ed]” for the January 20 absence.  Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.  The Union 

claims Oliver was terminated for his union support.  Id. ¶ 36.            
    Ms. Crisp’s story follows a similar path.  She worked as a fleet service employee of 
Sun Country from February 2022 until her termination on February 2, 2023.  Id. ¶ 9.  Ms. 
Crisp was “instrumental” in organizing the union effort and was open about her union 
involvement and support.  Id. ¶¶ 38–40.  Among other activities, Ms. Crisp collected signed 

union authorization cards from fellow employees and posted pro-union videos in an 
employee group text chat where managers could see them.  Id. ¶¶ 39–40.  On January 23, 
about three weeks after the union vote, Ms. Crisp’s supervisor told her during a staff 
meeting that Sun Country would have to “‘crack down’ on discipline,” because of the 
union.  Id. ¶ 42.  Ms. Crisp “stood up to” the supervisor in the meeting.  Id.  Around 
February 1, Ms. Crisp swapped shifts with a coworker, which the Complaint alleges was 
permissible under Sun Country rules.  Id. ¶¶ 44–46.  The coworker, however, did not cover 

Ms. Crisp’s shift as agreed.  Id. ¶ 47.  When Ms. Crisp next tried to clock in for work, she 
found her timecard had been deactivated.  Id. ¶ 48.  In a letter dated February 2, 2023, Sun 
Country notified Ms. Crisp she had been terminated “due to attendance.”  Id. ¶ 51.  Sun 
Country had previously been lenient about attendance-related discipline.  Id. ¶¶ 42–43, 50–
51.  The Union claims Crisp was terminated for her union activity.  Id. ¶ 52.3   

    The Union brought this case alleging Sun Country violated the RLA.  See id.  The 
Complaint includes six counts.  In Counts One and Two, the Union alleges that Sun 
Country’s termination of Mr. Oliver interfered with employees’ rights to designate their 
choice of representative under 

, Third, and their rights to join, organize, or 
assist in organizing the labor union of their choice, in violation of § 152, Fourth.  Id. ¶¶ 53–

58.    Counts  Three  and  Four  allege  the  same  violations  stemming  from  Ms.  Crisp’s 
termination.  Id. ¶¶ 59–62.  In Counts Five and Six, the Union alleges Sun Country 
implemented stricter work rules because of union support, in violation of 

, 
Third and Fourth.  

 ¶¶ 63–66.  For relief, the Union seeks an extensive injunction 
prohibiting Sun Country from interfering with employees’ collective bargaining rights, 

reinstatement of Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s employment, a declaration that Sun Country 

3    The Complaint also includes general allegations about non-party employees John 
and Jane Does.  Compl. ¶ 10.  Ten Does were allegedly discharged for engaging in lawful 
union activity.  

  Pursuant to a stipulation with Sun Country, the Union withdrew its 
claims concerning the Does.  See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n [ECF No. 48] at 5 n.1.   
violated the RLA, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.  

 
at 17–21 ¶¶ A–O.                                                          
    Sun Country moves for partial dismissal of the Complaint, arguing the Union lacks 

standing to bring claims on behalf of non-party employees.  ECF No. 34; see Defs.’ Mem. 
in Supp. [ECF No. 35] at 8.  In its briefing, Sun Country did not identify which counts or 
claims—or which parts of the counts or claims—should be dismissed; rather, it argued the 
court should dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims brought on behalf of these . . . employees, leaving 
only the claims properly brought on behalf of Plaintiffs themselves.”  

; see also 

Defs.’ Reply Mem. [ECF No. 54] at 2 (same).  At the hearing, however, Sun Country 
clarified that it seeks dismissal of Counts One through Four only.        
                               II                                        
    Sun Country brings its motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).  See 
ECF No. 34.  Rule 12(h)(3) provides that a court must dismiss an action “if [it] determines 

at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).  “A motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3) is governed by the 
standard of Rule 12(b)(1).”  Yaakov v. Varitronics, LLC, 

 
(D. Minn. 2016) (citing Hebert v. Winona Cnty., 

 (D. Minn. 
2015)).                                                                   
    A court reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 

Rule 12(b)(1) must first determine whether the movant is making a “facial” attack or a 
“factual” attack.  Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 

 (8th Cir. 2015).  
Here, Sun Country advances a facial attack because its challenge accepts the Complaint’s 
allegations as true and relies only on materials that may appropriately be considered at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage.  See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 2 n.1; Titus v. Sullivan, 

 (8th Cir. 1993).  The Rule 12(b)(6) standards therefore govern Sun Country’s motion.  

Osborn v. United States, 

, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).   
    Under these familiar standards, a court must accept as true all factual allegations in 
the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Gorog, 

 (citation omitted).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must 
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 

 (2007) (citation omitted).  The complaint must “state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  

.  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 
(2009).  “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  

                     
    Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A—the union election certification—is a document embraced by 
the pleadings whose authenticity is not questioned and may be considered at this stage.  See 
Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 

 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining courts may 
consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to 

judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, 
and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned” in resolving a 
12(b)(6) motion) (citation omitted);  Osborn, 

 n.6  (explaining Rule 12(b)(6) 
standards govern); see also Compl. ¶ 17 (referencing certification).      
                              III                                        
                               A                                         
    Sun Country challenges the Union’s standing to assert claims for monetary relief on 

behalf of non-party employees.  Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 10–13.  The Union responds that 
unions’ authority to seek damages on behalf of their members is well established by case 
law.  Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 20–22.  The great weight of case law supports Sun Country.   
    “Federal  jurisdiction  is  limited  by  Article  III  of  the  Constitution  to  cases  or 
controversies; if a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the district court has no subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”  Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting ABF 

Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 

 (8th Cir. 2011)).  To 
establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege facts showing it has “(1) suffered an 
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) 
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

 (2016).  “Standing under Article III to bring a claim in federal court is distinct 

from the merits of a claim,” Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Podhorn, 

 (8th Cir. 
2019), and “[i]t is crucial . . . not to conflate Article III’s requirement of injury in fact with 
a plaintiff’s potential causes of action, for the concepts are not coextensive,” Braden v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2009).                 
    “Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as 

the representative of its members.”  Warth v. Seldin, 

 (1975).  To have 
standing on behalf of its members, the Union must demonstrate “(a) its members would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests [the union] seeks to 
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor 
the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”  
Higgins Elec., Inc. v. O’Fallon Fire Prot. Dist., 

 (8th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 

 (1977)); see 

 at 
1128–29 (citing United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 

 (1996) (explaining that unless “Congress intended to abrogate” the “standing 
limitation” that “an association’s action for damages running solely to its members [is] 
barred  for  want  of  the  association’s  standing  to  sue,”  the  limitation  is  “otherwise 

applicable”)).  The Supreme Court later elaborated that “the third prong of the associational 
standing test is best seen as focusing on these matters of administrative convenience and 
efficiency,  not  on  elements  of  a  case  or  controversy  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitution.”  Brown Grp., 

; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. 
v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 

, 729 n.10 (2010) (describing the associational 

standing test as having two necessary requirements); Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 

 (2020) (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (“All Article III requires is that a member 
‘would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right’ and that ‘the interests [the 
association] seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose.’” (quoting Brown 
Grp., 

)).  “Crucial to the inquiry under the third prong of the associational 

standing test is the type of relief that Plaintiffs seek.”  Minneapolis Branch of NAACP v. 
City of Minneapolis, No. 23-cv-1175 (NEB/DTS), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 29, 2024) (“NAACP”).  “While ‘“individual participation” is not normally necessary 
when an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members,’ it is typically 
‘required in an action for damages to an association’s members.’”  

 (quoting Brown Grp., 

); see also Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(“We know of no Supreme Court or federal court of appeals ruling that an association has 

standing to pursue damages claims on behalf of its members.”).            
    In Higgins, the Eighth Circuit addressed whether a union had standing to bring an 
action under § 1983 and Missouri law on behalf of its members.  813 F.3d at 1127–28.  
There, the court applied the associational standing principles described above to resolve 
the issue.  Id. at 1128 (first citing Warth, 

, and then citing Hunt, 

).  The court found it “need not decide whether the union ha[d] satisfied the first and 
second prongs of Hunt because the union [could] not satisfy the third requirement,” i.e., 
that  individual  members’  participation  was  unnecessary.    

    It  found  the  union’s 
compensatory damages claim was “peculiar to the individual member concerned, and both 
the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof.”  

 (quoting Warth, 422 

U.S. at 515–16).  The district court’s dismissal was affirmed.  Id. at 1130.   
    The same analysis applies here: the individual fleet service employees’ participation 
is necessary to the Union’s compensatory damages claims.  The type of relief sought is 
“crucial” to the inquiry, NAACP, 

, at *3, and the Union specifically 
seeks damages for and on behalf of individual members.  The Union seeks “[a]n award of 

compensatory and punitive damages to all Discriminatees in the case of Sly Oliver, 
Monique Crisp, and all affected Discriminatees and/or fleet service employees,” Compl. at 
20–21, ¶ M, as well as reinstatement of Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s employment, including 
their compensation and benefits, 

, ¶ C.  It follows that to prove those damages, Mr. 
Oliver,  Ms.  Crisp,  and  other  fleet  service  employees  must  present  “peculiar”  and 
“individualized” proof of their injuries.  Higgins, 

.  Indeed, all the facts 
recounted in the Complaint’s “Facts” section—restated nearly verbatim in the Union’s 

brief, see Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 3–12—are about Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp, see Compl. 
¶¶ 13–52, and the relief sought depends on those facts.                   
    The Union’s position on this issue is not persuasive.  In its brief, it relied on 
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 

 
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (“IFFA”), a decision resolving a union plaintiff’s motion to compel 

document production.  The court addressed the union’s standing and other procedural 
issues before reaching the merits of the motion.  IFFA, 

.  The IFFA court 
found unions could pursue monetary claims on behalf of members, explaining that “Warth 
itself notes the power of Congress to confer special standing when public policy concerns 
so dictate.”  

 at 561 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 500–01).  Warth noted that “Congress 

may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by 
prudential standing rules,” Warth, 

, but the case did not note or create any 
“special standing” for unions or RLA violations.  And IFFA has not been followed.  It has 
been cited once in a footnote in an Eastern District of Pennsylvania case involving the same 
defendant.  See Long v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 

, 1322 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 

1991).  The more recent cases from the Eighth Circuit—Higgins in particular—control.   
    The Union advanced a different argument at the hearing.  There, it relied on Brown 
Group to argue that the Warth associational standing test’s third element is practical rather 
than constitutional, meaning Article III does not bar the Union from seeking damages.  The 
Union’s understanding of this element is correct, but this doesn’t change the result here.  
The third element—that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit—requires practical consideration “of 

administrative convenience and efficiency.”  Brown Grp., 

.  Here, as a 
practical matter, Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s participation is required.  The extent of the 
injuries each sustained, the propriety of their terminations, and their pay and expected pay, 
for example, are all issues that would arise in discovery.  It would be imprudent for the 
case to proceed without them.  The Union does not meet the associational standing test’s 

third element insofar as it seeks damages, and those claims for relief will be dismissed.   
                               B                                         
    Sun Country also argues the Union lacks standing with respect to its claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief.  Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 13–29.  The Union claims it has 
statutory standing under the RLA to bring such claims.  Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 14–20.  

Associational standing principles apply, and the motion will be granted because it requires 
non-party employees’ individualized participation.                        
    “An ‘organization lacks standing to assert claims of injunctive relief on behalf of its 
members where “the fact and extent” of the injury that gives rise to the claims for injunctive 
relief  “would  require  individualized  proof,”  or  where  “the  relief  requested  [would] 

require[] the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”’”  Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. 
of Am. v. Williams, 

 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Bano, 

 (alterations 
in original).                                                             
    The fact and extent of the injuries that give rise to the Union’s injunctive-relief 
claims depend on individualized proof and require Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s individual 
participation.  The Union has claimed no damage to itself.  The facts alleged in the 

Complaint are all based on Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s terminations.  The Union never 
alleges, plausibly or otherwise, that it or other of its members were injured by Mr. Oliver 
or Ms. Crisp’s terminations or any other action taken by Sun Country.  The Union might 
have alleged that Sun Country interfered with employees’ choice of representatives in 
violation of 

, Third, or interfered with the employees’ union organization 

efforts in violation of § 152, Fourth without individualized proof from Mr. Oliver and Ms. 
Crisp.  Hypothetically, for example, the Union might allege that certain Sun Country 
managers harbored anti-union animus and sought to terminate pro-union employees.  But 
the Union does not allege that; it hangs the case exclusively on two individuals, who—
according to the Complaint—were terminated because of unexcused absences or other rule 

violations.  And it seeks injunctive relief for Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp specifically.  Compl. 
at 18 ¶ C (seeking “[d]eclaratory, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief requiring 
[Sun Country] to immediately reinstate Sylvester Oliver [and] Monique Crisp . . . to their 
former positions of employment . . . .”).  Without amending, it is difficult to understand 
how the Union could prove its case without relying on evidence regarding Mr. Oliver and 

Ms. Crisp’s terminations, including their disciplinary history and absences.   
    At the hearing, the Union again relied on Brown Group to argue that it should be 
allowed to proceed considering the prudential character of the associational standing test’s 
third element.  But a close look at Brown Group reveals substantial dissimilarities between 
the statutes at issue there and here.  There, a union sued Brown Group for violation of the 
WARN Act: Brown Group purportedly did not give the statutorily required sixty days’ 
notice of a plant closure.  Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 545–46.  The Supreme Court found the 

WARN Act provided liability “to ‘each aggrieved employee’ for backpay.”  Id. at 548.  It 
further  provided  that  “[a]  person  seeking  to  enforce  such  liability,  including  a 
representative of employees . . . aggrieved under paragraph (1) . . ., may sue either for such 
person or for other persons similarly situated, or both, [in an appropriate district court].”  
Id. at 548–49 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting 

(a)(5)).  

And Congress “defined the ‘representative’ . . . as the employees’ union.”  

.  
Taken together, Congress gave unions the right to sue on behalf of their members for 
violations  of  the  WARN  Act,  thus  overriding  the  associational  standing  test’s  third 
(prudential) element.  

.  The RLA contains no analogous provision.   
                               *                                         

    Sun Country preemptively argues that the Union should not be permitted to amend 
the Complaint to add Oliver and Crisp; it contends the applicable limitations period has 
expired and amendment would be untimely.  Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 29–33.  The Union, 
however, did not seek leave to amend, described no proposed amendments, and filed no 
proposed amended pleading as required by D. Minn. LR 15.1(b) (requiring a motion to 
amend along with “(1) a copy of the proposed amended pleading, and (2) a version of the 

proposed amended pleading that shows . . . how the proposed amended pleading differs 
from the operative pleading.”).  On this record, it is not feasible to determine the propriety 
of any proposed amendments.                                               

    Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
ORDERED THAT:                                                             

    1.   Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 34] is GRANTED.   
    2.   Counts One through Four of the Complaint [ECF No. 1] are DISMISSED 
without prejudice.                                                        

Dated:  October 15, 2024           s/ Eric C. Tostrud                     
                                  Eric C. Tostrud                        
                                  United States District Court           

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

International Brotherhood of Teamsters,  File No. 23-cv-633 (ECT/TNL)    
Airline  Division;  and  Teamsters  Local                                
Union 970,                                                               

          Plaintiffs,                                                    
                                      OPINION AND ORDER                  
v.                                                                       

Sun Country, Inc., doing business as Sun                                 
Country  Airlines;  and  Sun  Country                                    
Airlines Holdings, Inc.,                                                 

          Defendants.                                                    

Dimitre James Petroff and Joshua D. McInerney, Wentz, McInerney, Peifer & Petroff, 
LLC,  Columbus,  OH;  and  Brendan  D.  Cummins,  Cummins  &  Cummins,  LLP, 
Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Teamsters 
Local Union 970.                                                          
Becky L. Kalas, FordHarrison LLP, Chicago, IL; Charles A. Roach, FordHarrison LLP, 
Minneapolis,  MN;  and  Sarah  P.  Wimberly,  FordHarrison  LLP,  Atlanta,  GA,  for 
Defendants Sun Country, Inc., and Sun Country Airlines Holdings, Inc.     

    In January 2023, Sun Country’s fleet service employees unionized.  Within a few 
weeks, Sun Country terminated two employees who participated in the unionization effort, 
citing unexcused absences as the justification.  Plaintiffs, the employees’ national and local 
union chapters, allege Sun Country terminated the employees in retaliation for their union 
support, thereby violating the Railway Labor Act (or “RLA”).  Sun Country seeks partial 
dismissal, arguing the Union lacks associational standing to bring claims on the employees’ 
behalf.  The motion will be granted because the Union has not alleged injury to itself and 
lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of, and seek relief for, non-party employees.   
                               I1                                        
    Plaintiffs International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Teamsters Local Union 970 
(collectively “the Union”) are a national labor organization and it’s Minneapolis-based 

chartered affiliate.  Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 4–5.  Defendants Sun Country, Inc., and Sun 
Country Airlines Holdings, Inc. (collectively, “Sun Country”) are an airline and is its parent 
corporation, both based in Minneapolis.  Id. ¶¶ 6–7.                      
    After a “duly conducted election,” the Union became “the exclusive representative 
for purposes of the RLA of the craft or class of Fleet Service Employees of Sun Country,” 
on January 5, 2023.  Id. ¶ 17.2  Little about the election is alleged in the Complaint, but the 

Union provided the National Mediation Board certification as an exhibit to its brief.  See 
ECF No. 49-1 (showing Sun Country fleet service employees voted in favor of Union 
representation).  The facts—as presented in the Complaint—revolve around two former 
employees, Sylvester Oliver and Monique Crisp, who are not parties to the case.   

    Sylvester  “Sly”  Oliver  worked  for  Sun  Country  from  October  2021  until  his 
termination on January 21, 2023.  Compl. ¶ 8.  He was a part-time ramp agent and, prior 

1    As  explained  in  Part  II,  infra,  Sun  Country’s  standing  challenge  accepts  the 
Complaint’s factual allegations as true.  This means the usual Rule 12(b)(6) standards 
apply.  In accordance with these standards, the facts are drawn from the Complaint and 
documents embraced by it.  See Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 

 (8th Cir. 2014).   

2    It doesn’t matter to this motion, but the record leaves some uncertainty regarding 
the certification date.  The Complaint alleges the Union was certified as the employees’ 
representative on January 4, 2023.  Compl. ¶ 17.  But the certification document is dated 
January 5.  See ECF No. 49-1.  And the Union elsewhere refers to January 10 as being 
“five days after the Union election victory.”  Compl. ¶ 18; see also Answer [ECF No. 19] 
¶ 17 (denying the Union was certified on January 4).  The better guess is the Union was 
certified January 5, 2023.                                                
to his termination, had not received any disciplinary or corrective action.  

 ¶¶ 13–14.  
Mr. Oliver was heavily involved in the effort to unionize Sun Country’s fleet service 
employees and was open and vocal about his union support.  

 ¶¶ 15–16.  On January 10, 

2023, five days after certification, Mr. Oliver brought the Local 970 Chapter president to 
the terminal to visit with new union members.  

 ¶¶ 18–19.  While there, Sun Country 
managers approached and directed Mr. Oliver and the Local 970 Chapter president to leave 
because they were “disrupting operations,” and because the Chapter president was “not 
authorized on the premises.”  

 ¶¶ 24–27.  Ten days later, on January 20, Mr. Oliver called 

and notified his supervisor and a human resources representative that he would be out of 
work because his wife had undergone surgery.  Id. ¶ 29.  Mr. Oliver was terminated the 
next day.  Id. ¶¶ 31–32.  Mr. Oliver was told verbally that his termination was due to 
bringing an unauthorized person to the tarmac; Mr. Oliver was later informed in writing 
that he was “also terminat[ed]” for the January 20 absence.  Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.  The Union 

claims Oliver was terminated for his union support.  Id. ¶ 36.            
    Ms. Crisp’s story follows a similar path.  She worked as a fleet service employee of 
Sun Country from February 2022 until her termination on February 2, 2023.  Id. ¶ 9.  Ms. 
Crisp was “instrumental” in organizing the union effort and was open about her union 
involvement and support.  Id. ¶¶ 38–40.  Among other activities, Ms. Crisp collected signed 

union authorization cards from fellow employees and posted pro-union videos in an 
employee group text chat where managers could see them.  Id. ¶¶ 39–40.  On January 23, 
about three weeks after the union vote, Ms. Crisp’s supervisor told her during a staff 
meeting that Sun Country would have to “‘crack down’ on discipline,” because of the 
union.  Id. ¶ 42.  Ms. Crisp “stood up to” the supervisor in the meeting.  Id.  Around 
February 1, Ms. Crisp swapped shifts with a coworker, which the Complaint alleges was 
permissible under Sun Country rules.  Id. ¶¶ 44–46.  The coworker, however, did not cover 

Ms. Crisp’s shift as agreed.  Id. ¶ 47.  When Ms. Crisp next tried to clock in for work, she 
found her timecard had been deactivated.  Id. ¶ 48.  In a letter dated February 2, 2023, Sun 
Country notified Ms. Crisp she had been terminated “due to attendance.”  Id. ¶ 51.  Sun 
Country had previously been lenient about attendance-related discipline.  Id. ¶¶ 42–43, 50–
51.  The Union claims Crisp was terminated for her union activity.  Id. ¶ 52.3   

    The Union brought this case alleging Sun Country violated the RLA.  See id.  The 
Complaint includes six counts.  In Counts One and Two, the Union alleges that Sun 
Country’s termination of Mr. Oliver interfered with employees’ rights to designate their 
choice of representative under 

, Third, and their rights to join, organize, or 
assist in organizing the labor union of their choice, in violation of § 152, Fourth.  Id. ¶¶ 53–

58.    Counts  Three  and  Four  allege  the  same  violations  stemming  from  Ms.  Crisp’s 
termination.  Id. ¶¶ 59–62.  In Counts Five and Six, the Union alleges Sun Country 
implemented stricter work rules because of union support, in violation of 

, 
Third and Fourth.  

 ¶¶ 63–66.  For relief, the Union seeks an extensive injunction 
prohibiting Sun Country from interfering with employees’ collective bargaining rights, 

reinstatement of Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s employment, a declaration that Sun Country 

3    The Complaint also includes general allegations about non-party employees John 
and Jane Does.  Compl. ¶ 10.  Ten Does were allegedly discharged for engaging in lawful 
union activity.  

  Pursuant to a stipulation with Sun Country, the Union withdrew its 
claims concerning the Does.  See Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n [ECF No. 48] at 5 n.1.   
violated the RLA, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.  

 
at 17–21 ¶¶ A–O.                                                          
    Sun Country moves for partial dismissal of the Complaint, arguing the Union lacks 

standing to bring claims on behalf of non-party employees.  ECF No. 34; see Defs.’ Mem. 
in Supp. [ECF No. 35] at 8.  In its briefing, Sun Country did not identify which counts or 
claims—or which parts of the counts or claims—should be dismissed; rather, it argued the 
court should dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims brought on behalf of these . . . employees, leaving 
only the claims properly brought on behalf of Plaintiffs themselves.”  

; see also 

Defs.’ Reply Mem. [ECF No. 54] at 2 (same).  At the hearing, however, Sun Country 
clarified that it seeks dismissal of Counts One through Four only.        
                               II                                        
    Sun Country brings its motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).  See 
ECF No. 34.  Rule 12(h)(3) provides that a court must dismiss an action “if [it] determines 

at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).  “A motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3) is governed by the 
standard of Rule 12(b)(1).”  Yaakov v. Varitronics, LLC, 

 
(D. Minn. 2016) (citing Hebert v. Winona Cnty., 

 (D. Minn. 
2015)).                                                                   
    A court reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 

Rule 12(b)(1) must first determine whether the movant is making a “facial” attack or a 
“factual” attack.  Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, 

 (8th Cir. 2015).  
Here, Sun Country advances a facial attack because its challenge accepts the Complaint’s 
allegations as true and relies only on materials that may appropriately be considered at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage.  See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 2 n.1; Titus v. Sullivan, 

 (8th Cir. 1993).  The Rule 12(b)(6) standards therefore govern Sun Country’s motion.  

Osborn v. United States, 

, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).   
    Under these familiar standards, a court must accept as true all factual allegations in 
the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Gorog, 

 (citation omitted).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must 
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 

 (2007) (citation omitted).  The complaint must “state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  

.  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 
(2009).  “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  

                     
    Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A—the union election certification—is a document embraced by 
the pleadings whose authenticity is not questioned and may be considered at this stage.  See 
Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 

 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining courts may 
consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to 

judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, 
and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned” in resolving a 
12(b)(6) motion) (citation omitted);  Osborn, 

 n.6  (explaining Rule 12(b)(6) 
standards govern); see also Compl. ¶ 17 (referencing certification).      
                              III                                        
                               A                                         
    Sun Country challenges the Union’s standing to assert claims for monetary relief on 

behalf of non-party employees.  Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 10–13.  The Union responds that 
unions’ authority to seek damages on behalf of their members is well established by case 
law.  Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 20–22.  The great weight of case law supports Sun Country.   
    “Federal  jurisdiction  is  limited  by  Article  III  of  the  Constitution  to  cases  or 
controversies; if a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the district court has no subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”  Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting ABF 

Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 

 (8th Cir. 2011)).  To 
establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege facts showing it has “(1) suffered an 
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) 
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

 (2016).  “Standing under Article III to bring a claim in federal court is distinct 

from the merits of a claim,” Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Podhorn, 

 (8th Cir. 
2019), and “[i]t is crucial . . . not to conflate Article III’s requirement of injury in fact with 
a plaintiff’s potential causes of action, for the concepts are not coextensive,” Braden v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2009).                 
    “Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as 

the representative of its members.”  Warth v. Seldin, 

 (1975).  To have 
standing on behalf of its members, the Union must demonstrate “(a) its members would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests [the union] seeks to 
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor 
the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”  
Higgins Elec., Inc. v. O’Fallon Fire Prot. Dist., 

 (8th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 

 (1977)); see 

 at 
1128–29 (citing United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 

 (1996) (explaining that unless “Congress intended to abrogate” the “standing 
limitation” that “an association’s action for damages running solely to its members [is] 
barred  for  want  of  the  association’s  standing  to  sue,”  the  limitation  is  “otherwise 

applicable”)).  The Supreme Court later elaborated that “the third prong of the associational 
standing test is best seen as focusing on these matters of administrative convenience and 
efficiency,  not  on  elements  of  a  case  or  controversy  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitution.”  Brown Grp., 

; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. 
v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 

, 729 n.10 (2010) (describing the associational 

standing test as having two necessary requirements); Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 

 (2020) (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (“All Article III requires is that a member 
‘would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right’ and that ‘the interests [the 
association] seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose.’” (quoting Brown 
Grp., 

)).  “Crucial to the inquiry under the third prong of the associational 

standing test is the type of relief that Plaintiffs seek.”  Minneapolis Branch of NAACP v. 
City of Minneapolis, No. 23-cv-1175 (NEB/DTS), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. 
Mar. 29, 2024) (“NAACP”).  “While ‘“individual participation” is not normally necessary 
when an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members,’ it is typically 
‘required in an action for damages to an association’s members.’”  

 (quoting Brown Grp., 

); see also Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(“We know of no Supreme Court or federal court of appeals ruling that an association has 

standing to pursue damages claims on behalf of its members.”).            
    In Higgins, the Eighth Circuit addressed whether a union had standing to bring an 
action under § 1983 and Missouri law on behalf of its members.  813 F.3d at 1127–28.  
There, the court applied the associational standing principles described above to resolve 
the issue.  Id. at 1128 (first citing Warth, 

, and then citing Hunt, 

).  The court found it “need not decide whether the union ha[d] satisfied the first and 
second prongs of Hunt because the union [could] not satisfy the third requirement,” i.e., 
that  individual  members’  participation  was  unnecessary.    

    It  found  the  union’s 
compensatory damages claim was “peculiar to the individual member concerned, and both 
the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof.”  

 (quoting Warth, 422 

U.S. at 515–16).  The district court’s dismissal was affirmed.  Id. at 1130.   
    The same analysis applies here: the individual fleet service employees’ participation 
is necessary to the Union’s compensatory damages claims.  The type of relief sought is 
“crucial” to the inquiry, NAACP, 

, at *3, and the Union specifically 
seeks damages for and on behalf of individual members.  The Union seeks “[a]n award of 

compensatory and punitive damages to all Discriminatees in the case of Sly Oliver, 
Monique Crisp, and all affected Discriminatees and/or fleet service employees,” Compl. at 
20–21, ¶ M, as well as reinstatement of Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s employment, including 
their compensation and benefits, 

, ¶ C.  It follows that to prove those damages, Mr. 
Oliver,  Ms.  Crisp,  and  other  fleet  service  employees  must  present  “peculiar”  and 
“individualized” proof of their injuries.  Higgins, 

.  Indeed, all the facts 
recounted in the Complaint’s “Facts” section—restated nearly verbatim in the Union’s 

brief, see Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 3–12—are about Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp, see Compl. 
¶¶ 13–52, and the relief sought depends on those facts.                   
    The Union’s position on this issue is not persuasive.  In its brief, it relied on 
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 

 
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (“IFFA”), a decision resolving a union plaintiff’s motion to compel 

document production.  The court addressed the union’s standing and other procedural 
issues before reaching the merits of the motion.  IFFA, 

.  The IFFA court 
found unions could pursue monetary claims on behalf of members, explaining that “Warth 
itself notes the power of Congress to confer special standing when public policy concerns 
so dictate.”  

 at 561 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 500–01).  Warth noted that “Congress 

may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by 
prudential standing rules,” Warth, 

, but the case did not note or create any 
“special standing” for unions or RLA violations.  And IFFA has not been followed.  It has 
been cited once in a footnote in an Eastern District of Pennsylvania case involving the same 
defendant.  See Long v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 

, 1322 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 

1991).  The more recent cases from the Eighth Circuit—Higgins in particular—control.   
    The Union advanced a different argument at the hearing.  There, it relied on Brown 
Group to argue that the Warth associational standing test’s third element is practical rather 
than constitutional, meaning Article III does not bar the Union from seeking damages.  The 
Union’s understanding of this element is correct, but this doesn’t change the result here.  
The third element—that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit—requires practical consideration “of 

administrative convenience and efficiency.”  Brown Grp., 

.  Here, as a 
practical matter, Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s participation is required.  The extent of the 
injuries each sustained, the propriety of their terminations, and their pay and expected pay, 
for example, are all issues that would arise in discovery.  It would be imprudent for the 
case to proceed without them.  The Union does not meet the associational standing test’s 

third element insofar as it seeks damages, and those claims for relief will be dismissed.   
                               B                                         
    Sun Country also argues the Union lacks standing with respect to its claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief.  Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 13–29.  The Union claims it has 
statutory standing under the RLA to bring such claims.  Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n at 14–20.  

Associational standing principles apply, and the motion will be granted because it requires 
non-party employees’ individualized participation.                        
    “An ‘organization lacks standing to assert claims of injunctive relief on behalf of its 
members where “the fact and extent” of the injury that gives rise to the claims for injunctive 
relief  “would  require  individualized  proof,”  or  where  “the  relief  requested  [would] 

require[] the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”’”  Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. 
of Am. v. Williams, 

 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Bano, 

 (alterations 
in original).                                                             
    The fact and extent of the injuries that give rise to the Union’s injunctive-relief 
claims depend on individualized proof and require Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s individual 
participation.  The Union has claimed no damage to itself.  The facts alleged in the 

Complaint are all based on Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp’s terminations.  The Union never 
alleges, plausibly or otherwise, that it or other of its members were injured by Mr. Oliver 
or Ms. Crisp’s terminations or any other action taken by Sun Country.  The Union might 
have alleged that Sun Country interfered with employees’ choice of representatives in 
violation of 

, Third, or interfered with the employees’ union organization 

efforts in violation of § 152, Fourth without individualized proof from Mr. Oliver and Ms. 
Crisp.  Hypothetically, for example, the Union might allege that certain Sun Country 
managers harbored anti-union animus and sought to terminate pro-union employees.  But 
the Union does not allege that; it hangs the case exclusively on two individuals, who—
according to the Complaint—were terminated because of unexcused absences or other rule 

violations.  And it seeks injunctive relief for Mr. Oliver and Ms. Crisp specifically.  Compl. 
at 18 ¶ C (seeking “[d]eclaratory, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief requiring 
[Sun Country] to immediately reinstate Sylvester Oliver [and] Monique Crisp . . . to their 
former positions of employment . . . .”).  Without amending, it is difficult to understand 
how the Union could prove its case without relying on evidence regarding Mr. Oliver and 

Ms. Crisp’s terminations, including their disciplinary history and absences.   
    At the hearing, the Union again relied on Brown Group to argue that it should be 
allowed to proceed considering the prudential character of the associational standing test’s 
third element.  But a close look at Brown Group reveals substantial dissimilarities between 
the statutes at issue there and here.  There, a union sued Brown Group for violation of the 
WARN Act: Brown Group purportedly did not give the statutorily required sixty days’ 
notice of a plant closure.  Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 545–46.  The Supreme Court found the 

WARN Act provided liability “to ‘each aggrieved employee’ for backpay.”  Id. at 548.  It 
further  provided  that  “[a]  person  seeking  to  enforce  such  liability,  including  a 
representative of employees . . . aggrieved under paragraph (1) . . ., may sue either for such 
person or for other persons similarly situated, or both, [in an appropriate district court].”  
Id. at 548–49 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting 

(a)(5)).  

And Congress “defined the ‘representative’ . . . as the employees’ union.”  

.  
Taken together, Congress gave unions the right to sue on behalf of their members for 
violations  of  the  WARN  Act,  thus  overriding  the  associational  standing  test’s  third 
(prudential) element.  

.  The RLA contains no analogous provision.   
                               *                                         

    Sun Country preemptively argues that the Union should not be permitted to amend 
the Complaint to add Oliver and Crisp; it contends the applicable limitations period has 
expired and amendment would be untimely.  Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. at 29–33.  The Union, 
however, did not seek leave to amend, described no proposed amendments, and filed no 
proposed amended pleading as required by D. Minn. LR 15.1(b) (requiring a motion to 
amend along with “(1) a copy of the proposed amended pleading, and (2) a version of the 

proposed amended pleading that shows . . . how the proposed amended pleading differs 
from the operative pleading.”).  On this record, it is not feasible to determine the propriety 
of any proposed amendments.                                               

    Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
ORDERED THAT:                                                             

    1.   Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 34] is GRANTED.   
    2.   Counts One through Four of the Complaint [ECF No. 1] are DISMISSED 
without prejudice.                                                        

Dated:  October 15, 2024           s/ Eric C. Tostrud                     
                                  Eric C. Tostrud                        
                                  United States District Court