Johnson v. Stahl

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota October 15, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Paul Edward Johnson, File No. 24-cv-1065 (ECT/DJF)

Plaintiff,

v.
OPINION AND ORDER
Kevin Stahl, Chief of Police for the City
of Braham; Tyler Johnson, Officer Braham
PD; and Kevin Lease, Officer Braham PD,
sued in their official and individual
capacities,

Defendants.
________________________________________________________________________
Paul Edward Johnson, Pro Se.

Ashley M. Ramstad and Jason M. Hiveley, Iverson Ruevers, Bloomington, MN, for
Defendants Kevin Stahl, Tyler Johnson, and Kevin Lease.

Pro se Plaintiff Paul Edward Johnson alleges that three officers with the Braham,
Minnesota Police Department violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by engaging in an unlawful search and seizure and by exposing him to a lethal substance.
Defendants move to dismiss Mr. Johnson’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion will be granted because the Complaint does not
reasonably apprise Defendants of the factual grounds underlying Mr. Johnson’s claims.
Mr. Johnson will be given a chance to amend the Complaint to address this deficiency.
The Complaint’s factual allegations are sparse. See Compl. [ECF No. 1]. The
Complaint alleges Defendants entered “unlawfully” into the Braham, Minnesota residence
of Donna Van Asch on March 25, 2023. Id. at 4. It alleges Mr. Johnson was in the home,
and that Defendants “searched” the home and Mr. Johnson. Id. Defendants had no warrant.
Id. Ms. Van Asch did not consent to Defendants’ search of the home, and Mr. Johnson did

not consent to Defendants’ search of him. Id. The Complaint alleges that one Defendant,
Officer Tyler Johnson, had “lethal substances on his gloves” and “transferred” a substance
or substances to Mr. Johnson by touching him. Id. at 4–5. Mr. Johnson was “not breaking
any laws” when the search occurred. Id. at 7. Mr. Johnson was “unlawfully arrested and
detained for 2 days until being released from jail without any charges.” Id. at 4. The

Complaint notes that these events were recorded on Defendants’ body-worn cameras. Id.
at 4–6, 9, 12.
Through

42 U.S.C. § 1983

, Mr. Johnson claims Defendants “put [his] life in danger 
and . . . violated [his] 4th Amendment, 5th, [sic] Amendment and 14th Amendment 
constitutional civil rights to be free from unlawful search [and] seizure and arrest and to be 

safe in [his] person.”

Id. at 7

.  The Complaint names Defendants in their “individual and 
official capacities.”

Id.

 at 2–3; see

id. at 9

.  For relief, Mr. Johnson seeks damages in the 
amount of $2 million from each Defendant.

Id.

 at 13–14.  To justify these damages 
requests, Mr. Johnson alleges he “was subject to jail for two days, and other PTSD stress 
as a result.”

Id. at 11

.                                                 

The legal standards governing Defendants’ motion are familiar.  In reviewing a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept a 
complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 
the plaintiff’s favor.  Gorog v. Best Buy Co.,

760 F.3d 787, 792

 (8th Cir. 2014).  Although 
the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555

 (2007).  The 
complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Id. at 570

.  “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009).  “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Id.

  These rules 
are derived from the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 8(a).  See Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555

; Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 680, 684

.  Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(2).  “Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not 
excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.”  Burgs v. Sissel,

745 F.2d 526, 528

  (8th  Cir.  1984);  Sorenson  v.  Minn.  Dep't  of  Corr.,  No.  12-cv-1336 

(ADM/AJB),

2012 WL 3143927

, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2012).  A pro se complaint must 
contain sufficient facts to support the claims it advances.  Stone v. Harry,

364 F.3d 912, 914

(8th Cir. 2004).
The Complaint does not meet these standards. Begin with the alleged constitutional
violations stemming from the searches of Ms. Van Asch’s residence and Mr. Johnson. The

only facts alleged to support these allegations are that the searches were warrantless and
without consent and that Mr. Johnson was engaged in no criminal activity when the
searches occurred. See Compl. at 4, 7. A search, whether it be of a residence or a person,
is not unconstitutional merely because it was warrantless, without consent, or of a person
who is not known to be committing a crime. The Complaint’s allegations regarding Mr.
Johnson’s subsequent arrest and detention suffer from the same problem. An arrest and
detention do not violate the Constitution merely because a person denies engaging in

criminal activity or because it was later determined the person would not be charged. The
allegation that officers contaminated Mr. Johnson with a “lethal substance” poses a
somewhat different problem. Without knowing more, it is not possible to understand the
claim. The Complaint does not identify the substance, allege why the substance might be
lethal, or allege that Mr. Johnson suffered any injury because of the contamination. The

absence of this information causes this aspect of the Complaint to appear fanciful.
Regardless, the Complaint does not give any Defendant fair notice of why he is liable under
this contamination theory. The bottom line is that, even accepting these allegations as true,
they do not plausibly show that Defendants violated the Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth
Amendment.

To be fair, the Complaint’s allegations might show a constitutional violation. A
warrant’s absence might contribute to showing that a search violated the Fourth
Amendment. The absence of criminal activity on Mr. Johnson’s part might say something
about the absence of probable cause and, in turn, contribute to showing a Fourth
Amendment Violation. And with more information, perhaps the contamination theory

might plausibly show an unjustified or gratuitous use of force. The problem is that a
complaint that merely raises the possibility of illegal activity flunks Rule 8(a)(2). Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679

(“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))).
Defendants take a different approach in their motion. They submit videos recorded

by the officers’ body-worn cameras and argue that the videos disprove any constitutional
violation. This approach is understandable, but it seems at least inconsistent with generally
applicable pleading rules for me to follow Defendants’ approach in this context. The
pleading burden lies with Mr. Johnson. Unless Mr. Johnson alleges facts plausibly
showing misconduct, a wholesale review of the video evidence for constitutional violations

would require guesswork as to what constitutional claims Mr. Johnson might assert and the
factual basis for those constitutional claims. That, in turn, would risk deciding purely
hypothetical questions—that is, constitutional issues Mr. Johnson never intended to raise.
It would effectively turn a federal district court into a police-review board or comparable
administrative oversight body. Put differently, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires testing the

plausibility of a plaintiff’s case theory, not what a defendant or court might guess a
plaintiff’s case theory to be. Without more from Mr. Johnson, following Defendants’
approach would require the latter.1

1 Mr. Johnson refers to the body-worn camera footage and several other exhibits in
opposing Defendant’s motion. See ECF Nos. 6, 7, 30, 37–38, 40, 42, 45, 49. It would be
inappropriate to consider these materials. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of
a pleading—here, the Complaint’s allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. A
plaintiff opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has two options. He may amend the complaint
as of right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Or he may defend the pleading as written. A party
cannot, however, defend a complaint by relying on a brief, affidavit, or other documents
that describe additional or different allegations that are not in the complaint. See Al-
Saadoon v. Barr,

973 F.3d 794, 805

 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a complaint 
may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” (alteration in 
There is a question whether the Complaint should be dismissed with or without 
prejudice.  Courts ultimately have discretion to decide between a with-prejudice and 
without-prejudice dismissal.  Paisley Park Enters. v. Boxill,

361 F. Supp. 3d 869

, 880 n.7 

(D. Minn. 2019).  A dismissal with prejudice is typically appropriate when a plaintiff has 
shown “persistent pleading failures” despite one or more opportunities to amend, Milliman 
v. Cnty. of Stearns, No. 13-cv-136 (DWF/LIB),

2013 WL 5426049

, at *16 (D. Minn. Sept. 
26, 2013); see Reinholdson v. Minnesota, 01-cv-1650 (RHK/JMM),

2002 WL 32658480

, 
at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2002) (adopting report and recommendation), or when the record 

makes clear that any amendment would be futile, Paisley Park,

361 F. Supp. 3d at 880

 n.7.  
On the other hand, when a plaintiff’s claim “might conceivably be repleaded with success,” 
dismissal without prejudice may be justified.  Washington v. Craane, No. 18-cv-1464 
(DWF/TNL),

2019 WL 2147062

,  at  *5  (D.  Minn.  Apr.  18,  2019), report  and 
recommendation adopted,

2019 WL 2142499

 (D. Minn. May 16, 2019).  Here, for reasons 

discussed above, the Complaint falls in the latter category.  Mr. Johnson might be able to 
allege a plausible claim; he just hasn’t done that in the Complaint.      





original) (quotation omitted)); see also In re Agape Litig.,

773 F. Supp. 2d 298, 316

 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“It is well-settled that a plaintiff cannot amend the complaint through 
briefs and affidavits, and ‘such facts are thus irrelevant for purposes of determining 
whether [the Plaintiff’s] [c]omplaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.’” 
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
ORDERED THAT:                                                             

1.   Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 19] is GRANTED.          
2.   Plaintiff Paul Edward Johnson’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT  
PREJUDICE.                                                                
3.   On or before Friday, November 15, 2024, Plaintiff Paul Edward Johnson may 
file an amended complaint.  If no amended complaint is filed by that deadline, judgment 

will be entered dismissing this action with prejudice.                    

Dated:  October 15, 2024           s/ Eric C. Tostrud                     
                              Eric C. Tostrud                        
                              United States District Court