Smith v. Lumio, HX, Inc.

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Smith v. Lumio, HX, Inc.

Trial Court Opinion

           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                              
             MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA                              
                FORT MYERS DIVISION                                  

SHOSHANA SMITH,                                                           

INDIVIDUALLY AND BEHALF OF                                                

ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY                                                      

SITUATED, et al.,                                                         


     Plaintiffs,                                                     
                               Case No. 2:23-CV-00849-SPC-KCD        
v.                                                                   

LUMIO HX, INC., ATLANTIC KEY                                              
ENERGY, LLC, FIFTH THIRD                                                  
BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,                                                
and DIVIDEND FINANCE,                                                     

     Defendants,                                                     
                         /                                           

ORDER

Plaintiffs are homeowners who had solar panels installed by Defendant 
Lumio  HX,  Inc.,  or  its  predecessor  Defendant  Atlantic  Key  Energy,  LLC. 
(Doc. 57.)1 According to the current complaint, Plaintiffs were “duped into 
signing expensive solar contracts under the belief that they would be saving 
money  on  their  monthly  energy  costs.  [But]  [r]ather  than  saving  money, 
[they] are left with malfunctioning equipment, hefty bills, leaky roofs, and 
property damage.” (Id. ¶ 18.)                                             
Apart from the solar companies, the complaint also names Fifth Third 
Bank  and  Dividend  Finance.  (See  Doc.  57.)  These  defendants  allegedly 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have 
been omitted in this and later citations.                                 
“aided”  the  fraudulent  scheme  by  “providing  loans  for  home  solar  energy 
systems.” (Id. ¶ 15.) The only claim against them is for “derivative liability . . 

. under the Holder Rule.” (Id. ¶ 315)                                     
Lumio  recently  filed  for  bankruptcy.  So  under  
11 U.S.C. § 362
,  the 
Court stayed the case as to Lumio. (Doc. 97.) The lender defendants now   
move to “exten[d] the current stay . . . to include proceedings in this action 

[against them] as well.” (Doc. 100 at 1-2.) No opposition was filed, and the 
time to do so passed. The Court thus treats the motion as unopposed. See  
Local Rule 3.01(c).                                                       
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in 

every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy 
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. 
Co., 
299 U.S. 248, 254
 (1936). A decision to stay is left to the discretion of the 
district court. See Clinton v. Jones, 
520 U.S. 681, 706
 (1997).           

After considering the arguments offered, the Court agrees that a stay of 
the entire case is appropriate. First, as the lender defendants point out, they 
have an indemnity agreement with Lumio. (Doc. 100 at 5.) “Faced with such 
circumstances,  federal  courts  have  extended  the  [bankruptcy]  stay’s 

protections  to  non-debtors  who  would  be  entitled  to  indemnity  from  the 
debtor in the event of a judgment against them.” Gulfmark Offshore, Inc. v. 
Bender  Shipbuilding  &  Repair  Co.,  No.  CIV.  A.  09-0249-WS-N,  
2009 WL 2413664
, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2009). This makes sense since “a judgment 
against  the  third-party  defendant  will  in  effect  be  a  judgment  or  finding 

against  the  debtor.” Nat’l Indem. Co.  of the S. v. MA  Alternative Transp. 
Servs., Inc., No. 6:19-CV-13-ORL-37LRH, 
2019 WL 1559897
, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 26, 2019).                                                           
In  any  event,  judicial  economy  independently  favors  a  stay.  On  its 

current procedural track, the case will proceed against the lender defendants 
while the claims against Lumio remain stayed. This means the Court must   
proceed through discovery (and possibly trial) and then repeat the process for 
Lumio.  Such an approach would be extraordinarily inefficient, setting the 

stage for duplicative trials on derivative claims. Redundancies of effort would 
be large and inevitable, and litigation costs for both sides would be increased 
substantially.  And  since  the  lender  defendants’  liability  is  derivative  of 
Lumio,  there  would  be  a  non-trivial  risk  of  inconsistent  judgments.  By 

contrast, there is no discernable prejudice to Plaintiffs from staying the case 
to litigate the claims together. Finally, piecemeal adjudication makes little 
sense considering there is “a pending petition” to “consolidate this case into 
[an existing multidistrict litigation.]” (Doc. 100 at 4, 9); see Ephraim v. Abbott 

Lab’ys,  Inc.,  
601 F. Supp. 3d 1274
,  1276  (S.D.  Fla.  2022)  (staying  case 
pending  decision  on  transfer  into  MDL  to  avoid  “the  possibility  of 
inconsistent rulings and duplicative litigation”).                        
 For these reasons, it is ORDERED:? 
 1.     Defendants’  Motion  to  Extend  Bankruptcy  Stay  of  Proceedings 
(Doc.  100) is GRANTED; 
 2.     This case is  stayed in its  entirety,  and all existing deadlines  are 
suspended pending further order from the Court; 
 3.     Defendants  are  directed  to  file  a  status  report  by  January  3, 
2025, and every 90 days thereafter, on the pending motion to consolidate this 

case into the MDL. 
 ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 22, 2024. 

                                              DP  icgl            
                                             fy     □            er 
                                            fe     ’          sf            
                                          ly lel.  Adel 
                                        “  Kale C. Dudek 
                                           United States Magistrate  Judge 

2 “A request for a stay of proceedings is a non-dispositive matter, subject to adjudication by 
a  federal  magistrate  judge.”  Delta  Frangible  Ammunition,  LLC  v.  Sinterfire,  Inc.,  No. 
CIV.A.  06-1477,  
2008 WL 4540394
,  at *1  n.1  (W.D.  Pa.  Oct.  7,  2008);  see also Bufkin v. 
Scottrade, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-281-FTM-29CM, 
2017 WL 7360419
, at *1  (M.D. Fla. Dec.  18, 
2017) (The Court finds that the magistrate judge had the authority to issue the Order to 
stay discovery|.]”).

Trial Court Opinion

           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                              
             MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA                              
                FORT MYERS DIVISION                                  

SHOSHANA SMITH,                                                           

INDIVIDUALLY AND BEHALF OF                                                

ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY                                                      

SITUATED, et al.,                                                         


     Plaintiffs,                                                     
                               Case No. 2:23-CV-00849-SPC-KCD        
v.                                                                   

LUMIO HX, INC., ATLANTIC KEY                                              
ENERGY, LLC, FIFTH THIRD                                                  
BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,                                                
and DIVIDEND FINANCE,                                                     

     Defendants,                                                     
                         /                                           

ORDER

Plaintiffs are homeowners who had solar panels installed by Defendant 
Lumio  HX,  Inc.,  or  its  predecessor  Defendant  Atlantic  Key  Energy,  LLC. 
(Doc. 57.)1 According to the current complaint, Plaintiffs were “duped into 
signing expensive solar contracts under the belief that they would be saving 
money  on  their  monthly  energy  costs.  [But]  [r]ather  than  saving  money, 
[they] are left with malfunctioning equipment, hefty bills, leaky roofs, and 
property damage.” (Id. ¶ 18.)                                             
Apart from the solar companies, the complaint also names Fifth Third 
Bank  and  Dividend  Finance.  (See  Doc.  57.)  These  defendants  allegedly 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have 
been omitted in this and later citations.                                 
“aided”  the  fraudulent  scheme  by  “providing  loans  for  home  solar  energy 
systems.” (Id. ¶ 15.) The only claim against them is for “derivative liability . . 

. under the Holder Rule.” (Id. ¶ 315)                                     
Lumio  recently  filed  for  bankruptcy.  So  under  
11 U.S.C. § 362
,  the 
Court stayed the case as to Lumio. (Doc. 97.) The lender defendants now   
move to “exten[d] the current stay . . . to include proceedings in this action 

[against them] as well.” (Doc. 100 at 1-2.) No opposition was filed, and the 
time to do so passed. The Court thus treats the motion as unopposed. See  
Local Rule 3.01(c).                                                       
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in 

every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy 
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. 
Co., 
299 U.S. 248, 254
 (1936). A decision to stay is left to the discretion of the 
district court. See Clinton v. Jones, 
520 U.S. 681, 706
 (1997).           

After considering the arguments offered, the Court agrees that a stay of 
the entire case is appropriate. First, as the lender defendants point out, they 
have an indemnity agreement with Lumio. (Doc. 100 at 5.) “Faced with such 
circumstances,  federal  courts  have  extended  the  [bankruptcy]  stay’s 

protections  to  non-debtors  who  would  be  entitled  to  indemnity  from  the 
debtor in the event of a judgment against them.” Gulfmark Offshore, Inc. v. 
Bender  Shipbuilding  &  Repair  Co.,  No.  CIV.  A.  09-0249-WS-N,  
2009 WL 2413664
, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2009). This makes sense since “a judgment 
against  the  third-party  defendant  will  in  effect  be  a  judgment  or  finding 

against  the  debtor.” Nat’l Indem. Co.  of the S. v. MA  Alternative Transp. 
Servs., Inc., No. 6:19-CV-13-ORL-37LRH, 
2019 WL 1559897
, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 26, 2019).                                                           
In  any  event,  judicial  economy  independently  favors  a  stay.  On  its 

current procedural track, the case will proceed against the lender defendants 
while the claims against Lumio remain stayed. This means the Court must   
proceed through discovery (and possibly trial) and then repeat the process for 
Lumio.  Such an approach would be extraordinarily inefficient, setting the 

stage for duplicative trials on derivative claims. Redundancies of effort would 
be large and inevitable, and litigation costs for both sides would be increased 
substantially.  And  since  the  lender  defendants’  liability  is  derivative  of 
Lumio,  there  would  be  a  non-trivial  risk  of  inconsistent  judgments.  By 

contrast, there is no discernable prejudice to Plaintiffs from staying the case 
to litigate the claims together. Finally, piecemeal adjudication makes little 
sense considering there is “a pending petition” to “consolidate this case into 
[an existing multidistrict litigation.]” (Doc. 100 at 4, 9); see Ephraim v. Abbott 

Lab’ys,  Inc.,  
601 F. Supp. 3d 1274
,  1276  (S.D.  Fla.  2022)  (staying  case 
pending  decision  on  transfer  into  MDL  to  avoid  “the  possibility  of 
inconsistent rulings and duplicative litigation”).                        
 For these reasons, it is ORDERED:? 
 1.     Defendants’  Motion  to  Extend  Bankruptcy  Stay  of  Proceedings 
(Doc.  100) is GRANTED; 
 2.     This case is  stayed in its  entirety,  and all existing deadlines  are 
suspended pending further order from the Court; 
 3.     Defendants  are  directed  to  file  a  status  report  by  January  3, 
2025, and every 90 days thereafter, on the pending motion to consolidate this 

case into the MDL. 
 ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 22, 2024. 

                                              DP  icgl            
                                             fy     □            er 
                                            fe     ’          sf            
                                          ly lel.  Adel 
                                        “  Kale C. Dudek 
                                           United States Magistrate  Judge 

2 “A request for a stay of proceedings is a non-dispositive matter, subject to adjudication by 
a  federal  magistrate  judge.”  Delta  Frangible  Ammunition,  LLC  v.  Sinterfire,  Inc.,  No. 
CIV.A.  06-1477,  
2008 WL 4540394
,  at *1  n.1  (W.D.  Pa.  Oct.  7,  2008);  see also Bufkin v. 
Scottrade, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-281-FTM-29CM, 
2017 WL 7360419
, at *1  (M.D. Fla. Dec.  18, 
2017) (The Court finds that the magistrate judge had the authority to issue the Order to 
stay discovery|.]”).

Reference

Status
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