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Hanley v. LeJeune

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Hanley v. LeJeune

Trial Court Opinion

            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Shane Eric Hanley,                    File No. 23-CV-00063 (JMB/TNL)      

     Petitioner,                                                     

v.

ORDER

Warden LeJeune, Warden of FCI Sandstone,                                  

     Respondent.                                                     



Shane Eric Hanley, Sandstone, MN, self represented.                       
Kristen Elise Rau and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, 
for Respondent Warden LeJeune.                                            


This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (R&R) of 
United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung, dated April 24, 2024 (Doc. No. 41) on 
Petitioner Shane Eric Hanley’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241
.  
Hanley objected to the R&R (Objection) (Doc. Nos. 44, 45, 55) and Respondent Warden 
LeJeune responded.  (Doc. No. 54.)  For the reasons explained below, the Court will 
overrule the Objection and adopt the R&R.                                 
                     BACKGROUND                                      
The complete background for this matter is set forth in the R&R and is incorporated 
here by reference.  Because the R&R provides a detailed history, the Court only briefly 
summarizes it here.                                                       
In 2013, Hanley was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty 
to possession of images of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252
(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) and
18 U.S.C. § 2256
.  (Doc. No. 13-2 at 2; Doc. No. 13-
3 at 1.)  He is currently serving his prison sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution 
in Sandstone, Minnesota (FCI-Sandstone).  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 4.)              
As part of his sentence, Hanley was also ordered to pay $17,769 in restitution to the 
victims of his crime.  (Doc. No. 13-3 at 6; Doc. No. 13 ¶ 5.)  He was ordered to pay the 
restitution as follows:                                                   

     [I]n  minimum  quarterly  installments  of  $25.00  based  on   
     [Inmate Financial Responsibility Program] IFRP participation,   
     or  minimum  monthly  installments  of  $20.00  based  on       
     UNICOR earnings, during the period of incarceration, . . . .    
(Doc. No. 13-3 at 6.)  The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is required to help inmates 
with “legitimate financial obligations,” such as restitution, to develop financial plans to 
meet those obligations; for this reason, the BOP encourages inmate participation in the 
Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP).1
28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10
, 545.11(a)(1)–
(a)(5).  The BOP develops such financial plans with inmates during the inmates’ “program 
reviews,”  which  are  to  occur  “at  least  once  every  180  calendar  days.”
28 C.F.R. § 524.11
(a)(2).  The BOP uses a specific calculation when developing these financial plans.  
See
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(b); BOP Program Statement 5380.08 [hereinafter, “P.S. 5380.08”].  


1 Participation in the IFRP program is “not mandatory.”  Cervantes v. Cruz, No. 07-CV-
04738 (DWF/JJK),
2009 WL 76685
, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2009).  Non-participation, 
however, causes the inmate to be placed on “refuse” status and, as a result, they will be 
denied certain program and housing privileges.  Id.;
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(d). 
IFRP payments can be made from an inmate’s “institution resources,” such as performance 
pay, or from community resources.  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 9; Doc. No. 13-1 at 7.)  According to 

BOP Program Statement 5380.08, “[a]ny money remaining after th[at] computation may 
be considered for IFRP payments, regardless of whether the money is in the inmate’s trust 
fund or phone credit account.”  P.S. 5380.08.                             
In January 2020, Hanley agreed to participate in the IFRP program.  (Doc. No. 13-
6.)  He entered into an IFRP contract by which he paid $25.00 per quarter toward his 
restitution obligation.  (Id.)  Then, in early 2022, the BOP initiated an audit of inmate 

accounts—specifically, the BOP wished to determine if inmates had large amounts of 
money in their accounts but were paying minimum amounts through IFRP and therefore 
needed to have their IFRP payment obligations adjusted.  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 13.)  Inmates at 
FCI-Sandstone received notice that, if it was determined that they had more ability to pay 
than their IFRP contract required, they “will be subject to an adjustment to their [I]FRP 

contract.”  (Doc. No. 13-4; see also Doc. No. 13 ¶ 14.)  Hanley’s account was flagged 
during this audit and he was asked to execute a new IFRP contract.  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 18.)  
Hanley signed a new IFRP contract in February 2022; under its terms, he would pay $36.20 
per month toward restitution, which was an increase from his previous obligation of $25.00 
per quarter.  (Doc. No. 13-7.)                                            
Hanley paid $36.20 for each month of March, April, and May 2022.  (Doc. No. 13-
8 at 5–6.)  Then, in May 2022, Hanley signed a new IFRP contract that reverted his payment 
obligation back to $25.00 per quarter.2  (Doc. No. 13-9.)                 

In January 2023, Hanley filed his Petition.  (Doc. No. 1.)  In it, he asserts that, by 
adjusting his IFRP payments outside of his normal 180-day program-review period, the 
BOP violated both his procedural and substantive due process rights and the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA).  Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R, in which he 
determined that the BOP’s actions did not violate Hanley’s due-process rights and, further, 

that Hanley’s petition did not present a live case or controversy and was therefore moot 
because the BOP has re-set Hanley’s IFRP payment amount at $25.00 per quarter pursuant 
to his May 2022 IFRP contract.  (See Doc. No. 41.)                        
                      DISCUSSION                                     
Hanley has objected to several aspects of the R&R.  (Doc. Nos. 44, 45, 55.)  The 

Court conducts a de novo review of any portion of an R&R to which a petitioner makes 
specific objections.
28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b).  
The Court gives the filings and objections of self-represented litigants liberal construction.  
Stone v. Harry,
364 F.3d 912, 914
 (8th Cir. 2004).                        




2 Hanley does not assert that the IFRP calculations—under either the February 2022 or 
May 2022 IFRP contracts—are incorrect.  (See Doc. No. 44 ¶ 22 (“[O]nce again, this 
Complaint is not about the calculation of [the] IFRP.”).)                 
A.   Procedural and Substantive Due Process                          
Hanley first objects on grounds that the Magistrate Judge had relied on inapposite 

case  law  and  a  flawed  understanding  of  the  nature  of  his  due  process  claim  when 
determining that Hanley had not identified a violation of his procedural or substantive due 
process rights.  (Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 5–9; Doc. No. 55 ¶¶  3–5.)  Hanley clarifies in his Objection 
that the BOP’s conduct that allegedly violated his due process rights was: “fraudulently 
induc[ing] [him] to sign a new and fraudulent IFRP contract under threat of sanction and 
under severe duress.”  (Doc. No. 44 ¶ 6.)  However, as explained below, on de novo review, 

this Court determines that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion—that there was no procedural 
or substantive due-process violation—is correct.                          
The manner by which the BOP asked Hanley to sign a new IFRP contract in 
February 2022 does not give rise to a procedural due-process violation in light of the 
property interest involved and the procedural safeguards built into the applicable prison 

rules and regulations.  See Bonner v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
196 F. App’x 447, 448
 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (“[A] violation of prison regulations in itself does not give rise to a constitutional 
violation.”); Phillip v. Norris,
320 F.3d 844
, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no federal 
constitutional liberty interest in having state officers follow state law or prison officials 
follow prison regulations.”); Mahers v. Halford,
76 F.3d 951
, 954–55 (8th Cir. 1996) 

(providing that when inmate’s money is applied toward a restitution debt, they “are not 
absolutely deprived of the benefit of their money”);
28 C.F.R. §§ 542
.10–.18 (setting forth 
administrative remedy program that permits challenge of IFRP payment plan).  Further, 
contrary to Hanley’s argument, the applicable regulations do not prohibit review of IFRP 
contracts more frequently than every 180 days.  See
28 C.F.R. §§ 524.11
(a)(2) (providing 
that program reviews are to occur “at least once every 180 calendar days” (emphasis 

added));
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(c) (providing that “[p]articipation and/or progress in the 
Inmate Financial Responsibility Program will be reviewed each time staff assesses an 
inmate’s demonstrated level of responsible behavior”).                    
The Magistrate Judge also correctly concluded that there is no substantive due 
process violation because Hanley had agreed to participate in the voluntary IFRP program 
and because the BOP calculated Hanley’s IFRP obligation in keeping with
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
 and Program Statement 5380.08.  Weiler v. Purkett,
137 F.3d 1047, 1051
 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (providing that substantive due-process violation arises when action is “so 
outrageous that it shocks the conscience or otherwise offends judicial notions of fairness 
or is offensive to human dignity”).3                                      





3 In his Objection, Hanley argues that his participation in the IFRP program is not, in fact, 
voluntary because his underlying financial obligation is pursuant to a Court order and 
because non-participation would place him in an unprivileged “refuse” status.  (See Doc. 
No. 44 ¶¶ 8–9.)  The Court agrees with the analysis of the Magistrate Judge and other 
judges in this Circuit, concluding that such consequences are not constitutional violations.  
Hill v. Fikes, No. 20-CV-1365 (SRN/LIB),
2021 WL 606709
, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 
2021)  (“[A]ny  adverse  consequences  that  may  occur  to  Petitioner  as  a  result  of  his 
withdrawal from the IFRP program do not trigger a constitutional claim.”); Gaines v. 
Castillo, No. 11-3113-CV-S-RED-H,
2011 WL 5546865
, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2011) 
(“[P]articipation in the [IFRP] program is voluntary to the extent that the penalties incurred 
for not participating do not rise to constitutional proportions[.]”)      
B.   APA                                                             
Hanley next objects to the R&R on grounds that the Magistrate Judge did not 
address or dispose of his APA claim.4  (Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 10–19; Doc. No. 55 ¶¶ 6–13.)  

Hanley argues that the BOP’s failure to follow its own rules and procedures by asking him 
to sign the February 2022 IFRP contract requires this Court to invalidate those actions 
under U.S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260
 (1954).  (See Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 10–
11.)                                                                      
Accardi stands for the proposition that “agencies may not violate their own rules 

and regulations to the prejudice of others.”  Damus v. Nielsen,
313 F. Supp. 3d 317
, 335–
36  (D.D.C.  2018)  (citations  omitted);  see  also  Spener  v.  Rios,  No.  18-CV-2639 
(MJD/TNL),
2019 WL 9313598
,  at  *5  (D.  Minn.  Apr.  23,  2019),  report  and 
recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 2373333
 (D. Minn. June 5, 2019) (“The requirement 
that an agency be barred from taking action inconsistent with its internal regulations when 

doing so would affect individuals rights has been referred to by some courts as the Accardi 
doctrine.”).  That said, the first question when analyzing any Accardi claim is whether any 
rights given to the claimant under statute or regulation have been violated. 
In his Objection, Hanley clarifies the contours of his Accardi claim as follows: 
     North  Central  Regional  Director  Andre  Matavousian,  FCI    
     Sandstone Warden LeJeune, CMC Fogt, Unit Managers . . . did     
     not adhere to Policy/Regulation
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(a)(2) and    


4 The Court notes that the Magistrate Judge did address his APA claim, determining that 
the claim had no merit and was moot.  (See Doc. No. 41 at 14–17.)         
     P.S. P5322.13 in regards to holding Program Reviews outside     
     of the 180 day window.                                          
(Doc. No. 44 ¶ 11; see also
id. ¶ 12
.)  However, as discussed supra, the BOP’s decision to 
review Hanley’s IFRP payment obligations at a time less than 180 days since his previous 
program review does not violate
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(a)(2) (stating that IFRP progress will 
be evaluated during progress reviews), or Program Statement 5322.13 (which provides that 

“Program Reviews occur at least once every 180 calendar days”).  In other words, the BOP 
can hold program reviews, that include IFRP progress reviews, less than 180 calendar days 
from a previous program review.  This is what happened in Hanley’s case.  Thus, Hanley’s 
Accardi claim fails because he has not identified a violation of a statutory or regulatory 
right.                                                                    

Hanley also contends that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244
, __ U.S. __ (2024), affects the 
analysis of his APA claim.  Specifically, Hanley contends that Loper “overturned Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837
 [1984],” and, as a 
result, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation is “based on vacated law.”  (See Doc. No. 

45.)  This is not the case.  The Loper decision does not affect statutes that “expressly 
delegate to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statute term” and to “fill 
up the details of a statutory scheme.”  144 S. Ct. at 2263, __ U.S. at __ (quotations omitted).  
Here,  the  statutory  schemes  at  issue  unambiguously  authorize  the  BOP,  through  the 
Attorney General, to exercise its discretion to “fill up the[ir] details.”  See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3612
, 4001.  Therefore, the Loper decision is inapplicable.            
C.   Mootness                                                        
Hanley also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his due process and 

APA claims, which are rooted in his being asked to sign the February 2022 IFRP contract, 
were mooted by his execution of the May 2022 IFRP contract.  (Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 21–23.)  
Hanley asserts in his Objection that his Petition still presents a “live” controversy because 
he still does not have access to the $108.60 that he paid under the February 2022 IFRP 
contract.  (Id. ¶ 21.)  This argument is unpersuasive.  Hanley does not dispute the accuracy 
of the BOP’s calculation of his IFRP obligation under the February 2022 contract.  (See,
id. ¶ 22
.)  He also does not dispute the fact of his restitution obligation or the BOP’s 
authority to facilitate his payment of it.  (See generally Doc. No. 44.)  Therefore, because 
the February 2022 IFRP contract was authorized by statute (as discussed supra), and 
because it was accurately calculated, Hanley has not demonstrated entitlement to any 
money paid pursuant to it.  Further, the challenged contract is no longer in effect and the 

Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge: there is no “live” controversy.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                   
1.  The Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. Nos. 44, 45, 55) to the 
  R&R.                                                               
2.  The Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. No. 41) and dismisses Petitioner’s petition 
  without prejudice.                                                 

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 

Dated:  October 28, 2024           /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan                   
                              Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan                 
                              United States District Court

Trial Court Opinion

            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Shane Eric Hanley,                    File No. 23-CV-00063 (JMB/TNL)      

     Petitioner,                                                     

v.

ORDER

Warden LeJeune, Warden of FCI Sandstone,                                  

     Respondent.                                                     



Shane Eric Hanley, Sandstone, MN, self represented.                       
Kristen Elise Rau and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, 
for Respondent Warden LeJeune.                                            


This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (R&R) of 
United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung, dated April 24, 2024 (Doc. No. 41) on 
Petitioner Shane Eric Hanley’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241
.  
Hanley objected to the R&R (Objection) (Doc. Nos. 44, 45, 55) and Respondent Warden 
LeJeune responded.  (Doc. No. 54.)  For the reasons explained below, the Court will 
overrule the Objection and adopt the R&R.                                 
                     BACKGROUND                                      
The complete background for this matter is set forth in the R&R and is incorporated 
here by reference.  Because the R&R provides a detailed history, the Court only briefly 
summarizes it here.                                                       
In 2013, Hanley was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty 
to possession of images of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252
(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) and
18 U.S.C. § 2256
.  (Doc. No. 13-2 at 2; Doc. No. 13-
3 at 1.)  He is currently serving his prison sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution 
in Sandstone, Minnesota (FCI-Sandstone).  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 4.)              
As part of his sentence, Hanley was also ordered to pay $17,769 in restitution to the 
victims of his crime.  (Doc. No. 13-3 at 6; Doc. No. 13 ¶ 5.)  He was ordered to pay the 
restitution as follows:                                                   

     [I]n  minimum  quarterly  installments  of  $25.00  based  on   
     [Inmate Financial Responsibility Program] IFRP participation,   
     or  minimum  monthly  installments  of  $20.00  based  on       
     UNICOR earnings, during the period of incarceration, . . . .    
(Doc. No. 13-3 at 6.)  The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is required to help inmates 
with “legitimate financial obligations,” such as restitution, to develop financial plans to 
meet those obligations; for this reason, the BOP encourages inmate participation in the 
Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP).1
28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10
, 545.11(a)(1)–
(a)(5).  The BOP develops such financial plans with inmates during the inmates’ “program 
reviews,”  which  are  to  occur  “at  least  once  every  180  calendar  days.”
28 C.F.R. § 524.11
(a)(2).  The BOP uses a specific calculation when developing these financial plans.  
See
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(b); BOP Program Statement 5380.08 [hereinafter, “P.S. 5380.08”].  


1 Participation in the IFRP program is “not mandatory.”  Cervantes v. Cruz, No. 07-CV-
04738 (DWF/JJK),
2009 WL 76685
, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2009).  Non-participation, 
however, causes the inmate to be placed on “refuse” status and, as a result, they will be 
denied certain program and housing privileges.  Id.;
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(d). 
IFRP payments can be made from an inmate’s “institution resources,” such as performance 
pay, or from community resources.  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 9; Doc. No. 13-1 at 7.)  According to 

BOP Program Statement 5380.08, “[a]ny money remaining after th[at] computation may 
be considered for IFRP payments, regardless of whether the money is in the inmate’s trust 
fund or phone credit account.”  P.S. 5380.08.                             
In January 2020, Hanley agreed to participate in the IFRP program.  (Doc. No. 13-
6.)  He entered into an IFRP contract by which he paid $25.00 per quarter toward his 
restitution obligation.  (Id.)  Then, in early 2022, the BOP initiated an audit of inmate 

accounts—specifically, the BOP wished to determine if inmates had large amounts of 
money in their accounts but were paying minimum amounts through IFRP and therefore 
needed to have their IFRP payment obligations adjusted.  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 13.)  Inmates at 
FCI-Sandstone received notice that, if it was determined that they had more ability to pay 
than their IFRP contract required, they “will be subject to an adjustment to their [I]FRP 

contract.”  (Doc. No. 13-4; see also Doc. No. 13 ¶ 14.)  Hanley’s account was flagged 
during this audit and he was asked to execute a new IFRP contract.  (Doc. No. 13 ¶ 18.)  
Hanley signed a new IFRP contract in February 2022; under its terms, he would pay $36.20 
per month toward restitution, which was an increase from his previous obligation of $25.00 
per quarter.  (Doc. No. 13-7.)                                            
Hanley paid $36.20 for each month of March, April, and May 2022.  (Doc. No. 13-
8 at 5–6.)  Then, in May 2022, Hanley signed a new IFRP contract that reverted his payment 
obligation back to $25.00 per quarter.2  (Doc. No. 13-9.)                 

In January 2023, Hanley filed his Petition.  (Doc. No. 1.)  In it, he asserts that, by 
adjusting his IFRP payments outside of his normal 180-day program-review period, the 
BOP violated both his procedural and substantive due process rights and the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA).  Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R, in which he 
determined that the BOP’s actions did not violate Hanley’s due-process rights and, further, 

that Hanley’s petition did not present a live case or controversy and was therefore moot 
because the BOP has re-set Hanley’s IFRP payment amount at $25.00 per quarter pursuant 
to his May 2022 IFRP contract.  (See Doc. No. 41.)                        
                      DISCUSSION                                     
Hanley has objected to several aspects of the R&R.  (Doc. Nos. 44, 45, 55.)  The 

Court conducts a de novo review of any portion of an R&R to which a petitioner makes 
specific objections.
28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b).  
The Court gives the filings and objections of self-represented litigants liberal construction.  
Stone v. Harry,
364 F.3d 912, 914
 (8th Cir. 2004).                        




2 Hanley does not assert that the IFRP calculations—under either the February 2022 or 
May 2022 IFRP contracts—are incorrect.  (See Doc. No. 44 ¶ 22 (“[O]nce again, this 
Complaint is not about the calculation of [the] IFRP.”).)                 
A.   Procedural and Substantive Due Process                          
Hanley first objects on grounds that the Magistrate Judge had relied on inapposite 

case  law  and  a  flawed  understanding  of  the  nature  of  his  due  process  claim  when 
determining that Hanley had not identified a violation of his procedural or substantive due 
process rights.  (Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 5–9; Doc. No. 55 ¶¶  3–5.)  Hanley clarifies in his Objection 
that the BOP’s conduct that allegedly violated his due process rights was: “fraudulently 
induc[ing] [him] to sign a new and fraudulent IFRP contract under threat of sanction and 
under severe duress.”  (Doc. No. 44 ¶ 6.)  However, as explained below, on de novo review, 

this Court determines that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion—that there was no procedural 
or substantive due-process violation—is correct.                          
The manner by which the BOP asked Hanley to sign a new IFRP contract in 
February 2022 does not give rise to a procedural due-process violation in light of the 
property interest involved and the procedural safeguards built into the applicable prison 

rules and regulations.  See Bonner v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
196 F. App’x 447, 448
 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (“[A] violation of prison regulations in itself does not give rise to a constitutional 
violation.”); Phillip v. Norris,
320 F.3d 844
, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no federal 
constitutional liberty interest in having state officers follow state law or prison officials 
follow prison regulations.”); Mahers v. Halford,
76 F.3d 951
, 954–55 (8th Cir. 1996) 

(providing that when inmate’s money is applied toward a restitution debt, they “are not 
absolutely deprived of the benefit of their money”);
28 C.F.R. §§ 542
.10–.18 (setting forth 
administrative remedy program that permits challenge of IFRP payment plan).  Further, 
contrary to Hanley’s argument, the applicable regulations do not prohibit review of IFRP 
contracts more frequently than every 180 days.  See
28 C.F.R. §§ 524.11
(a)(2) (providing 
that program reviews are to occur “at least once every 180 calendar days” (emphasis 

added));
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(c) (providing that “[p]articipation and/or progress in the 
Inmate Financial Responsibility Program will be reviewed each time staff assesses an 
inmate’s demonstrated level of responsible behavior”).                    
The Magistrate Judge also correctly concluded that there is no substantive due 
process violation because Hanley had agreed to participate in the voluntary IFRP program 
and because the BOP calculated Hanley’s IFRP obligation in keeping with
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
 and Program Statement 5380.08.  Weiler v. Purkett,
137 F.3d 1047, 1051
 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (providing that substantive due-process violation arises when action is “so 
outrageous that it shocks the conscience or otherwise offends judicial notions of fairness 
or is offensive to human dignity”).3                                      





3 In his Objection, Hanley argues that his participation in the IFRP program is not, in fact, 
voluntary because his underlying financial obligation is pursuant to a Court order and 
because non-participation would place him in an unprivileged “refuse” status.  (See Doc. 
No. 44 ¶¶ 8–9.)  The Court agrees with the analysis of the Magistrate Judge and other 
judges in this Circuit, concluding that such consequences are not constitutional violations.  
Hill v. Fikes, No. 20-CV-1365 (SRN/LIB),
2021 WL 606709
, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 
2021)  (“[A]ny  adverse  consequences  that  may  occur  to  Petitioner  as  a  result  of  his 
withdrawal from the IFRP program do not trigger a constitutional claim.”); Gaines v. 
Castillo, No. 11-3113-CV-S-RED-H,
2011 WL 5546865
, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2011) 
(“[P]articipation in the [IFRP] program is voluntary to the extent that the penalties incurred 
for not participating do not rise to constitutional proportions[.]”)      
B.   APA                                                             
Hanley next objects to the R&R on grounds that the Magistrate Judge did not 
address or dispose of his APA claim.4  (Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 10–19; Doc. No. 55 ¶¶ 6–13.)  

Hanley argues that the BOP’s failure to follow its own rules and procedures by asking him 
to sign the February 2022 IFRP contract requires this Court to invalidate those actions 
under U.S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260
 (1954).  (See Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 10–
11.)                                                                      
Accardi stands for the proposition that “agencies may not violate their own rules 

and regulations to the prejudice of others.”  Damus v. Nielsen,
313 F. Supp. 3d 317
, 335–
36  (D.D.C.  2018)  (citations  omitted);  see  also  Spener  v.  Rios,  No.  18-CV-2639 
(MJD/TNL),
2019 WL 9313598
,  at  *5  (D.  Minn.  Apr.  23,  2019),  report  and 
recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 2373333
 (D. Minn. June 5, 2019) (“The requirement 
that an agency be barred from taking action inconsistent with its internal regulations when 

doing so would affect individuals rights has been referred to by some courts as the Accardi 
doctrine.”).  That said, the first question when analyzing any Accardi claim is whether any 
rights given to the claimant under statute or regulation have been violated. 
In his Objection, Hanley clarifies the contours of his Accardi claim as follows: 
     North  Central  Regional  Director  Andre  Matavousian,  FCI    
     Sandstone Warden LeJeune, CMC Fogt, Unit Managers . . . did     
     not adhere to Policy/Regulation
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(a)(2) and    


4 The Court notes that the Magistrate Judge did address his APA claim, determining that 
the claim had no merit and was moot.  (See Doc. No. 41 at 14–17.)         
     P.S. P5322.13 in regards to holding Program Reviews outside     
     of the 180 day window.                                          
(Doc. No. 44 ¶ 11; see also
id. ¶ 12
.)  However, as discussed supra, the BOP’s decision to 
review Hanley’s IFRP payment obligations at a time less than 180 days since his previous 
program review does not violate
28 C.F.R. § 545.11
(a)(2) (stating that IFRP progress will 
be evaluated during progress reviews), or Program Statement 5322.13 (which provides that 

“Program Reviews occur at least once every 180 calendar days”).  In other words, the BOP 
can hold program reviews, that include IFRP progress reviews, less than 180 calendar days 
from a previous program review.  This is what happened in Hanley’s case.  Thus, Hanley’s 
Accardi claim fails because he has not identified a violation of a statutory or regulatory 
right.                                                                    

Hanley also contends that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244
, __ U.S. __ (2024), affects the 
analysis of his APA claim.  Specifically, Hanley contends that Loper “overturned Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837
 [1984],” and, as a 
result, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation is “based on vacated law.”  (See Doc. No. 

45.)  This is not the case.  The Loper decision does not affect statutes that “expressly 
delegate to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statute term” and to “fill 
up the details of a statutory scheme.”  144 S. Ct. at 2263, __ U.S. at __ (quotations omitted).  
Here,  the  statutory  schemes  at  issue  unambiguously  authorize  the  BOP,  through  the 
Attorney General, to exercise its discretion to “fill up the[ir] details.”  See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3612
, 4001.  Therefore, the Loper decision is inapplicable.            
C.   Mootness                                                        
Hanley also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his due process and 

APA claims, which are rooted in his being asked to sign the February 2022 IFRP contract, 
were mooted by his execution of the May 2022 IFRP contract.  (Doc. No. 44 ¶¶ 21–23.)  
Hanley asserts in his Objection that his Petition still presents a “live” controversy because 
he still does not have access to the $108.60 that he paid under the February 2022 IFRP 
contract.  (Id. ¶ 21.)  This argument is unpersuasive.  Hanley does not dispute the accuracy 
of the BOP’s calculation of his IFRP obligation under the February 2022 contract.  (See,
id. ¶ 22
.)  He also does not dispute the fact of his restitution obligation or the BOP’s 
authority to facilitate his payment of it.  (See generally Doc. No. 44.)  Therefore, because 
the February 2022 IFRP contract was authorized by statute (as discussed supra), and 
because it was accurately calculated, Hanley has not demonstrated entitlement to any 
money paid pursuant to it.  Further, the challenged contract is no longer in effect and the 

Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge: there is no “live” controversy.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                   
1.  The Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. Nos. 44, 45, 55) to the 
  R&R.                                                               
2.  The Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. No. 41) and dismisses Petitioner’s petition 
  without prejudice.                                                 

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 

Dated:  October 28, 2024           /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan                   
                              Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan                 
                              United States District Court

Reference

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