UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Lulu Simba Thompson, on behalf of her    No. 24-cv-3717 (KMM/TNL)        
son, M.C.,                                                               

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Lakeville Area Schools,                                                  

          Defendant.                                                     


    Plaintiff Lulu Thompson brings this case on behalf of her minor son, M.C., alleging 
that Defendant Lakeville Area Schools (“Defendant” or “the District”)1 has unlawfully 
prohibited  M.C.  from  attending  his  neighborhood  school  because  of  his  disability. 
Ms. Thompson claims that Defendant has engaged in discrimination under Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 

, violated Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 

, et seq., and violated the Minnesota Human Rights 
Act (“MHRA”), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01, et seq.2 This matter is before the Court on 
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Waiver 
of Bond. ECF 2. The Court held a hearing on the motion on October 7, 2024, at which 

1 Defendant identifies itself as “Independent School District No. 194, Lakeville,” not by the name 
provided in Plaintiff’s Complaint—“Lakeville Area Schools.” Accordingly, the Court refers to the 
Defendant as “Defendant” or “the District” throughout this Order.         
2 Ms. Thompson also asserts a claim that Defendants violated Section 13.08, subd. 3, of the 
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act by refusing to respond to a request for data. Compl. 
¶¶ 41–46. However, that claim is not relevant to the motion addressed in this Order. 
counsel for the parties appeared and presented oral argument. For the reasons that follow, 
the Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief is denied.      
                        BACKGROUND3                                      

    M.C. and His Elementary School Education                             
    Ms. Thompson’s son, M.C., is a student who is moving from elementary to middle 
school within the Defendant’s school system. At the start of his school career, M.C. 
attended John F. Kennedy Elementary School, where in 2017, he was identified as a student 
with a disability based on language delays. While at JFK, M.C. did well, received supports 

and services form the school, and established genuine friendships.        
    On April 1, 2020, while M.C. was a first-grade student, he was involved in a tragic 
car accident, sustained a severe traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), and lost his father and older 
brother. His recovery from the accident has been described as a “miracle” by medical 
professionals. Thompson Aff. ¶ 2.4 In addition to M.C.’s TBI, he has a secondary disability 

category of “Speech Language Impairment” (“SLI”). Kuhn Decl. ¶ 4 (Doc. 31). 
    Because of his TBI, M.C. experienced changes in his fine and gross motor skills, 
vision, focused attention and concentration, short-term memory, and academic skills. See 
Thompson Aff., Ex. 1, Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) (Doc. 23). M.C. also 
exhibits mild cognitive impairments, slower processing speeds, cognitive inconsistencies, 

reduced judgment and reasoning, and an increased vulnerability. Id. These changes require 

3 The parties have both agreed that live testimony was not required and submitted documents in 
support of their respective positions. This recitation of facts is based upon that record. 
4 Although the paragraphs in Ms. Thompson’s affidavit are not numbered, the court refers to them 
by number based on the order in which they appear.                        
M.C. to have structure within his environments. In the most recent re-evaluation of M.C. 
from November 23, 2020, Lakeville Area Schools found that he is eligible to receive 
special education supports and services under Minnesota’s eligibility requirements for TBI. 

    When he returned to school following his accident, Defendant required M.C. to 
move from JFK to Lakeview Elementary School (“Lakeview”) so that he could receive the 
supports and services he required through the “DCD focused” program there. Compl. ¶ 6. 
“DCD” refers to “developmental cognitive disability,” which is a state eligibility criterion 
that “does not include conditions primarily due to a sensory or physical impairment, 

traumatic brain injury, autism spectrum disorders, severe multiple impairments, cultural 
influences,  or inconsistent  educational  programming.”  Compl. ¶ 18 n.7 (citing Minn. 
Admin. R. 3525.1333, subp. 1). However, Defendant decided that M.C. needed the services 
available in a DCD classroom.                                             
    At Lakeview, the District provided M.C. with an IEP. The goals set forth in M.C.’s 

IEP include improving the following: (1) reading, writing, and functional abilities; (2) math 
skills;  (3) language  skills  (both  speech  and  language);  (4) strength,  balance,  and 
coordination for mobility; and (5) motor planning, attention, and grasp. IEP at 4–13. 
    During fifth grade, M.C. attended a regular education classroom for small portions 
of the day, like morning meeting or classroom social times; other than those periods 

“M.C.’s time with regular education peers was limited to lunch, recess, specials, and field 
trips or other special events.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 5. As indicated in M.C.’s IEP he is currently in 
a Federal Setting 3 program, which means he receives more than 60% of his educational 
services within the special education classroom. Id. He receives 230 minutes of direct 
special education services each day for his TBI in connection with core academic areas of 
math, reading, writing, etc. Id. At Lakeview, M.C. received those services “within a center-
based  special  education  classroom  focused  on  students  who  receive  services  for 

Developmental Cognitive Disabilities . . . or who have similar needs.” Id. He also receives 
direct  services  for  speech  and  language,  occupational  therapy,  physical  therapy,  and 
developmental adapted physical education. Id.                             
    M.C. adjusted well after his move to Lakeview. Valerie Miller, a Special Education 
Teacher, and Rebecca Wait, a Regular Education Teacher helped M.C. integrate into the 

Lakeview student community. M.C. finished fifth grade at Lakeview and is scheduled to 
attend middle school in the 2024–2025 school year. M.C. had a recent thoraco-lumbar spina 
fusion surgery. Thompson Aff., Attach. 8. The parties anticipate M.C. will begin middle 
school in mid-October.                                                    
    M.C’s Neighborhood Middle School and Other Options                   

    M.C.’s neighborhood school is McGuire Middle School (“McGuire”). M.C. and 
Ms. Thompson would prefer for him to attend middle school at McGuire because M.C.’s 
friends from his neighborhood and classmates from Lakeview will be there. However, in 
early November 2023, Ms. Miller informed Ms. Thompson that M.C. would not be going 
to McGuire. Instead, Defendant determined that he would be moved to Century Middle 

School  (“Century”).  Thompson  Aff.,  Attach. 2.  Ms. Thomson  immediately  informed 
Defendant of her concerns with the placement at Century. Id.              
    On November 20, 2023, Defendant held a team meeting to discuss M.C.’s middle 
school placement. Kane Decl., Ex. 1, 11/20/23 Meeting Notes (Doc. 12-1); Thompson Aff., 
Attach. 3, Notice of Team Meeting (Oct. 16, 2023). Ms. Thompson attended the meeting 
along with a private education advisor, Kristin McGeary, and personnel from the District.5 
11/20/23 Meeting Notes. Although they expected Carol Potter, the Director of Special 

Services for Lakeville Schools, to be there, they learned at the meeting that Ms. Potter was 
unavailable. Id. During the meeting, Ms. Thompson shared her goals concerning M.C.’s 
middle school placement, and the team considered M.C.’s goals, progress, and needed 
services. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.                                                     
    A second meeting was scheduled for November 28, 2023, so that Ms. Potter could 

attend, along with Amy Raffelson (Special Education Coordinator), Ms. Wait, Ms. Miller, 
Ms. Thompson, and Ms. McGeary. Id. ¶ 7. Ms. Thompson again shared her concerns with 
the team. Id. At the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Potter indicated that the decision about 
M.C.’s middle school would wait until a decision had been made regarding the City of 
Lakeville’s boundaries. Id. Ms. McGeary’s notes from the meeting indicate that it was 

unclear “where the special education classrooms might shift to if at all.” Id., Attach. A, 
11/28/23 Meeting Notes (Doc. 5-1).                                        
    Ms. Thompson wrote to the Lakeville School Board Members on February 21, 2024 
to request that they consider adding a DCD classroom to every middle school. Thompson 
Aff., Attach. 4. She expressed her view that adding a DCD classroom to every middle 




5 The other education professionals at the meeting included Ms. Miller, Ms. Wait, Elizabeth 
Heiderscheit (Speech/Language Pathologist), Chelsea Payne (Occupations Therapist), Shanyn 
Tuftee (Physical Therapist), and David Deal (DAPE). McGeary Aff. ¶ 4 (Doc. 5). 
school would help M.C. go to his home school along with his existing friends from 
Lakeview, but it would also help all special needs children having similar struggles. Id. 
    The April 16, 2024 Meeting                                           

    On April 16, 2024, District personnel held another meeting with Ms. Thompson and 
Ms. McGeary. McGeary Aff. ¶ 8. Ms. Potter led this meeting. Id. ¶ 10. Lakeville’s Middle 
School Special Education Coordinator, Karin Kuhn, again asked Ms. Thompson to share 
her goals for M.C.’s education. Id. As she had at previous meetings, Ms. Thompson 
explained that she wanted M.C. to gain “independence, social independence, and create 

stability with familiar social relationships given his fragile memory.” Id. According to 
Ms. Thompson, M.C. does not require a changing table, nor does he require a restroom that 
can accommodate both a wheelchair and a paraprofessional. Thompson Aff. ¶ 3. “One of 
M.C.’s goals is to improve his independent mobility and he is able to transition to a standing 
position and walk approximately 25–30 feet with his walker. There is no reason he cannot 

use the walker in a restroom.” Thompson Aff. ¶ 3. M.C.’s IEP documents that he needs 
some assistance when he goes to bathroom, specifically when transitioning to a seated 
position. IEP at 2.                                                       
    Ms. Potter  identified  three  middle  school  options  within  Defendant’s  school 
systems—McGuire,  Century,  and  Kenwood Trail  Middle  Schools  (“Kenwood”)—and 

Ms. McGeary’s  notes  from  the  meeting  include  a  chart  with  information  about  each 
school’s special education classrooms:                                    
        McGuire Middle School           Century Middle School         Kenwood Trail Middle Schools 
         HS-Lakeville South              HS- Lakeville North         HS- Lakeville South/Lakeville North 
     e  Resource program            «  Resource program               Resource program 
     e  Center-Based- ASD focused       e  Center-Based - DCD focused       e  Center- Based-EBD Focused 
       classrooms                  classrooms                  classrooms 
         o  4 classrooms               o  2 classrooms           *  DCD focused classroom (SOAR) 
         ©  3classrooms currently          o  Current students are           o  Current students have a 
           divided by grade               Severe/Profound               variety of disabilities: 
         ©  1 classroom for functional     «  Related Services all offered               =  TBI, OHD, SLD, 
           skills/communication-base    e  Center-Based caseload- 8:1,and 5              DCD-Mild/Moderate 
           d needs                paras                   e  Related Services all offered 
     e  Related Services all offered       e  Resource caseloads - 16:1 and 5     e  SOAR Center Based caseload- 
     «  Center Based caseload- 10:1 and      paras                     9:1 and 3 paras 
       10 paras                                        e  Resource caseloads - 18:1 and 5 
     «  Resource caseloads - 18:1 and 6                              paras 
       paras 
   Additional Information:            Additional Information:           E additional Information: 
     ®  Students in the resource setting     *  Students in the resource setting     e  Students in the resource setting 
       are generally working on           are generally working on           are generally working on 
       academics at or 1-2 years below       academics at or 1-2 years below       academics at or 1-2 years below 
       grade level                  grade level                  grade level 
     e  Center- Based ASD classrooms     e  Center-Based- DCD focused       «  Center Based SOAR students 
       focus on expected behaviors,        classrooms                  have Mild-Moderate disabilities- 
       social skills, regulation, and           ©  Majority in Wheelchairs        working on academics at their 
       communication                  o  The majority use devices       level- able to do group work/whole 
     e  Center Based classroom is in 8th          for communication          group instruction 
       grade wing/hall              ®  Focus on basic and daily living      e  Accessible bathroom is inside the 
     e  Nearest accessible bathroom is       skills- toileting, feeding, and safety      classroom 
       downstairs at the other end of the    ®  Mostly 1:1 or very small group      «  Center Based classroom is first 
       building                  «  Accessible bathrooms outside of       floor- all grades mixed 
Kane Decl., Ex. 2, 4/16/24 Meeting Notes®; see also Kuhn Decl. Ex. A. McGuire has no 
DCD specific classroom, but both Century and Kenwood do.’ 
     Ms. Potter  informed  Ms. Thompson  that  the  District  had  selected  Kenwood  as 
M.C.’s middle school location. McGeary Aff. §] 11. Potter told Ms. Thompson that District 
personnel had toured all the schools and considered moving a DCD classroom to McGuire, 
but ultimately the decision came down to issues of “space and accessibility.” [d.; 4/16/24 
Meeting  Notes  1—2.  Ms. Potter  further  explained  that McGuire  is  an  old building;  its 
classrooms and breakout spaces are not designed for students who need space; to make 

© The entire chart included in Exhibit 2 to the Kane Declaration is pasted here for reference. 
Although the bottom of the middle column appears to end abruptly, the Court has not excised any 
portion of the image from the exhibit. 
 “ASD” refers to autism spectrum disorders, Minn. Admin. R. 3525.1325, subp.  1, and “EBD” 
refers to emotional or behavioral disorders, Minn. Admin. R. 3525.1329, subp. 1.

changes to the McGuire building so that it can be accessible for those in wheelchairs would 
require major construction; McGuire lacks sufficient handicap accessible bathrooms; the 
accessible bathroom near the swimming pool that M.C. uses when he goes swimming at 

McGuire is too far away from the classrooms and would require him to spend too much 
time to get there and return to class; and other classrooms at McGuire that are on the first 
floor level are built for music and art, and they would not be appropriate for a DCD 
classroom.  4/16/24  Meeting  Notes 1–2;  McGeary  Aff.  ¶¶ 11–13.  Ms.  Potter  further 
explained that Kenwood was selected because it has a DCD classroom already, a pool, and 

peers from McGuire and Kenwood will eventually all go to the same high school—
Lakeville South High School. 4/16/24 Meeting Notes at 2; McGeary Aff. ¶¶ 15–16. The 
District explains that at the April 16th meeting, “Ms. Thompson agreed that M.C. should 
be placed in a DCD-focused classroom, but she felt strongly that M.C. should attend 
McGuire with his peers from Lakeview.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 16.                   

    The District’s Rationale for Kenwood Placement                       
    In a declaration filed in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, Ms. Kuhn elaborated on 
the  District’s  rationale  for  placing  M.C.  at  Kenwood.  Kuhn  Decl.  ¶ 7. According  to 
Ms. Kuhn, the District decided on such a placement because “the center-based program at 
Kenwood . . . is more appropriate for M.C., and District staff felt that the District would be 

better  able  to  meet  M.C.’s  individual  needs  at  Kenwood. . . .”  Id.  Ms. Kuhn  further 
explained:                                                                
         Kenwood Trail houses the SOAR Program, which is focused         
         on students with lower cognitive abilities than their grade level 
         peers. These students  typically  have  medical conditions or   
         complications that impede their learning, primarily, by causing 
         them to learn at a slower, and oftentimes significantly slower, 
         pace than their regular education peers. The SOAR Program       
         allows  students  to  learn  at  their  own  pace  and  offers  the 
         opportunity  for  repetition  and  practice  of  academic  skills. 
         Given the low student-to-staff ratio, SOAR Program staff are    
         able to individualize academic materials for students in the    
         Program. While the SOAR Program is DCD-focused, it also         
         serves students with other disabilities who have similar needs  
         and learning profiles. For example, the current SOAR Program    
         at Kenwood [T]rail includes two students (aside from M.C.)      
         who receive services for TBI and one student who receives       
         services for Other Health Disabilities (“OHD”).                 

Id.                                                                       
    According to  Ms. Kuhn, M.C.’s  education  needs are similar to  those of  other 
students in the SOAR Program. Kuhn Decl. ¶ 9. M.C. learns at a slower rate than his regular 
education peers. Id. He also benefits from repetition and practice in his lessons, and the 
District felt he would best receive those services in a SOAR Program classroom because 
of their smaller size, calm atmosphere, and fewer distractions. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. During the April 
16, 2024 meeting, “everyone agreed M.C. needs to learn in a small classroom that allows 
for repetition and practice, like the SOAR Program classroom at Kenwood. . . .” Id. ¶ 9.  
    Although the District considered placing M.C. at Century and offered it as an 
alternative placement to Kenwood, the District felt that the DCD-focused center-based 
program at Century was not a good fit because “the students in that classroom typically 
have a label of Severe-Profound, rather than Mild-Moderate, which means they have more 
significant needs than the students in the SOAR Program at Kenwood. . . .” Id. ¶ 10. The 
District concluded that M.C.’s needs would best be met at Kenwood around peers “more 
similarly situated to him.” Id. After attending Kenwood, M.C. would also “attend high 
school with at least some of his peers from Kenwood,” as the students who attend middle 
school there are split between Lakeville North High School and Lakeville South High 
School; Century only feeds into Lakeville North. Id. ¶ 11. Lakeville South “is currently 

M.C.’s  neighborhood  school  so  he  would  attend  high  school  with  his  peers  from 
Lakeview.” Id.                                                            
    The District’s staff determined that McGuire would not be a good fit for M.C.’s 
educational needs during middle school. Kuhn Decl. ¶ 12. Only one of those reasons was 
bathroom access. Id. Although McGuire is generally wheelchair accessible and has one 

accessible restroom, the accessible restroom is on the other side of the building from the 
special education classrooms, including McGuire’s center-based and resource classrooms. 
Id. Ms. Thompson let the District staff know that M.C. does not require a changing table, 
but he does need assistance transferring to the toilet and with his clothing. Id. Though this 
information alleviated some of the District’s concerns related to the bathroom, others 

remained, including the fact that the restrooms closest to the special education classrooms 
are smaller and would not accommodate both M.C. and an adult who could provide him 
assistance. Id. However, these concerns were ultimately secondary to the District, and the 
“primary concern with placing M.C. at McGuire was the inappropriate nature of McGuire’s 
center-based  classrooms,  which  District  staff  felt  would  not  be  able  to  meet  M.C.’s 

individual needs.” Id. In particular, Ms. Kuhn explains that the District was concerned that 
McGuire’s programs focus on students who receive services for ASD, and those programs 
focus  on  “behavior  regulation,  social  skills,  and  sensory  integration,  rather  than 
individualizing academics.” Id. ¶ 13. Because behavior regulation is an issue in the ASD-
focused classrooms and the “environment is often loud and not calm,” the District felt that 
placing M.C. in such a program would not serve his individualized needs. Id. “M.C. does 
not have disability-related needs for behavior regulation or sensory integration, . . . which 

means instruction in those areas would not particularly benefit M.C.” Id. 
    Further, the District considered whether M.C.’s educational needs could be met at 
McGuire  without  a  center-based  program  like  he  received  in  elementary  school  at 
Lakeview, but instead “in the resource model, [where] he would have needed a one-to-one 
paraprofessional with him in the regular education classroom and in the special education 

classroom because his current academic skills are far below his grade level peers.” Kuhn 
Decl. ¶ 14. The District did not think such a practice would fulfill its obligation to educate 
M.C.  “in  the  least  restrictive  environment  because  M.C.  would  never  be  working 
independently on his academics.” Id. “In addition, staff would have needed to modify all 
his core academics to meet him at his level, given he learns at a significantly slower rate 

than  his  regular  education  peers,  but  it  would  have  been  difficult  or  impossible  to 
individualize  general  education  academics,  which  District  staff  again  felt  was  not 
appropriate for M.C.” Id.                                                 
    After the April 16th Meeting                                         
    After the April 16th meeting, Ms. McGeary and Ms. Potter exchanged emails about 

the decision to place M.C. at Kenwood instead of McGuire. McGeary Aff. ¶ 16 & Ex. B. 
Ms. McGeary  “advocated  for  the  creation  of  a  DCD  classroom  at  McGuire  to 
accommodate M.C.,” but because of “space and staff limitations, the District declined to 
add a DCD-focused classroom at McGuire.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 16. As a result, the decision to 
have M.C. attend a middle school with an existing DCD classroom and the Kenwood 
placement remained. Ms. Potter emailed Ms. Thompson on April 24th to inform her that a 
planned tour of McGuire would not take place that day because Defendant had decided not 

to place a DCD program at McGuire. Thompson Aff., Attach. 6. Ms. Potter asserted that 
M.C.’s “special education needs are best and most appropriately met in the DCD program 
at [Kenwood].” Id.                                                        
    Ms. Thompson  shares  that  having  M.C.  attend  McGuire  is  important  for 
“maintaining  his  neighborhood  friends  and  classmates  from  Lakeview.  The  greatest 

amount of stability is essential to his emotional well-being which, in turn, is essential to 
his continued recovery and progress.” Thompson Aff. ¶ 4. M.C.’s friends and neighbors 
have weighed in with their belief that he should be permitted to attend school at McGuire. 
Popper Aff. (Doc. 6); Cartwright Aff. (Doc. 7); Allen Aff. (Doc. 8); Anderson Aff. (Doc. 9); 
Fischer Aff. (Doc. 10); Hartman Aff. (Doc. 11).                           

                          DISCUSSION                                     
 I.   Legal Standards                                                    
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a district court has the power to grant 
injunctive relief by issuing either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. 
Courts apply essentially “the same standards to a request for a preliminary injunction and 

temporary restraining order.” Roberson v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 

, 
935(W.D.  Mo.  2022).  Here,  the  Court  treats  Ms. Thompson’s  motion  as  seeking  a 
preliminary injunction because the Defendant has received notice of the motion, the matter 
is fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing. See C.S. McCrosan Const. Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t 
of Transp., 

, 857 n.10 (D. Minn. 2013) (treating a motion for TRO or 
preliminary injunction as a request for the latter because the plaintiff provided notice to all 
parties and the issues were fully briefed).                               

    A  district  court  has  “broad  discretion  in  determining  whether  a  preliminary 
injunction should be issued.” Carlson v. City of Duluth, 

 (D. 
Minn.  2013);  Lankford  v.  Shermani,  

,  503  (8th  Cir.  2006)  (same).  “A 
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the burden of establishing the 
propriety of an injunction is on the movant.” Id. (quoting Watkins, Inc. v. Lewis, 

 (8th Cir. 2003)).                                                
    When deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court considers the 
following four factors: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the 
balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other 
parties litigant; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the 

public interest.” Wilbur-Ellis Co., LLC v. Erikson, 

, 1355–56 (8th Cir. 2024) 
(quoting Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 

 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 1981))). These are commonly 
referred to as the Dataphase factors.                                     
    Courts have stated that “the probability of success factor is the most significant.” 

Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 

 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Home Instead, Inc., 

). To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the moving party 
must show “a ‘fair chance,’ not necessarily ‘greater than fifty percent,’ that it will ultimately 
prevail under applicable law.” 

 (quoting Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 

, 690 (8th Cir. 2003)). A failure to show a likelihood of success “strongly suggests 
that preliminary injunctive relief should be denied[.]” Paisley Park Enters., Inc. v. Boxill, 

 (D. Minn. 2017).                               

    Even when a plaintiff has a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, 
courts should not issue a preliminary injunction if there is no showing of irreparable harm. 
C.S. McCrossan Const., Inc., 

. “The failure of a movant to show 
irreparable harm is an ‘independently sufficient basis upon which to deny a preliminary 
injunction.’” Sessler v. Davenport, Iowa, 

 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Watkins, Inc., 

). “A party seeking relief must demonstrate that the injury is 
of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent 
irreparable harm.” Jackson v. Macalester Coll., 169 F. supp. 3d 918, 921 (D. Minn. 2016) 
(citing Packard Elevator v. Interstate Comm. Comm’n, 

, 115 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
“Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because 

its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Kato Eng’g, Inc. 
v. Hanley, 

 (D. Minn. 2018) (citing Rogers Gr., Inc. v. City of 
Fayetville, Ark., 

 (8th Cir. 2010)).                     
 II.  Analysis                                                           
    As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to 

show that there is a threat of irreparable harm to M.C. if he is required to attend middle 
school at the location selected by the District. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 
failed  to  demonstrate  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits. Accordingly,  the  Court 
concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.8    
    A. Irreparable Harm                                                  

    The Court admires Ms. Thompson’s advocacy for her son and is sympathetic to her 
desire to have him attend middle school with his friends. But neither the record nor the 
caselaw supports a finding that M.C. will suffer irreparable harm if he attends Kenwood 
rather than McGuire. First, there is no authority to support the general idea that a student 
is entitled to attend a particular school and will suffer significant harm if they cannot. 

Instead, irreparable harm is only found when the educational services themselves are 
inadequate, not when the school location is at issue.                     
    The Eighth Circuit has upheld a district court’s finding that one disabled student 
who was indisputably “making little progress” in her existing school placement had shown 
a threat of irreparable harm absent a transfer. Monahan v. State of Neb., 

 

(8th Cir. 1981). And the Monahan court affirmed the district court’s finding that another 
disabled student failed to show a threat of irreparable harm from not attending his chosen 
school where he was instead enrolled at a school that “concededly provides an adequate 
educational program.” 

                                                 
    The Eighth Circuit has also explained that where an educational institution proposed 

alternatives for disabled students that would have resulted in inadequate and inferior 

8 Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction, it is 
unnecessary for the Court to resolve the parties’ competing positions concerning whether Plaintiff 
was required to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act.                                                                      
educational  opportunities,  the  plaintiffs  had  shown  irreparable  harm.  Arc  of  Iowa  v. 
Reynolds, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Arc of Iowa II”), vacated sub. nom. by, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). The Arc of Iowa II court cited cases indicating that 

irreparable harm was established based on the “lasting impact of education’s deprivation 
on the life of a child,” 

 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 

 (1982)) (cleaned up), 
and finding irreparable harm because “even a few months in an unsound educational 
program can make a world of difference in harm to a child’s educational development,” 

 
(quoting Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 

 (3d Cir. 2017)) (cleaned up). 

    Against this backdrop, the Plaintiff fails to make the necessary showing of harm. 
Plaintiff offers two theories of irreparable harm to M.C. First, she argues that irreparable 
harm can be presumed when a defendant has violated a civil rights statute. Plaintiff relies 
on the district court’s decision in ARC of Iowa v. Reynolds, 

, 877–78 
(S.D. Iowa 2021) (“Arc of Iowa I”) in support of the idea that a violation of a civil rights 

statute by itself is adequate to establish the necessary harm. But in ARC of Iowa I, the court 
concluded that such a presumption applied because the court also found that an Iowa 
regulation violated Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 

 
Neither Arc of Iowa I, nor the other cases it cites stand for the proposition that a plaintiff’s 
mere allegation of a civil rights violation automatically supports a finding of the irreparable 

harm necessary to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. Instead, the presumption Plaintiff 
relies upon is inextricably intertwined with the issue of success on the merits of the claim 
that the defendant’s conduct violated a civil rights statute. As explained in more detail 
below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met that burden here, and as a result, the district 
court’s decision in ARC of Iowa I does not support Plaintiff’s position.  
    Second, Plaintiff argues that “M.C. faces the loss of the educational opportunity to 

be integrated with his neighborhood friends and peers at his neighborhood school.” Pl.’s 
Mem.  at  12,  13.  In  this  way,  Plaintiff  asserts  that  she  satisfies  the  irreparable-harm 
requirement in a more traditional way: she argues that M.C.’s attendance at Kenwood will 
deprive him of friendships and a lack of “continuity and stability” that are important for 
his development. Pl.’s Mem. at 12. The Court disagrees. To begin with, none of the cases 

cited by Plaintiff support the proposition that requiring a student to attend a school without 
neighborhood classmates and friends constitutes irreparable harm. Indeed, none suggests 
there is irreparable harm where the record establishes that the student’s less-preferred 
school placement will provide him with all the services and support required to allow him 
to receive an adequate education. For example, Plaintiff cites Issa v. School District of 

Lancaster, 

 (3d Cir. 2017) for the proposition that “even a few months in 
an unsound program can make a world of difference in harm to a child’s educational 
development.” Pl.’s Mem. at 13. But there is no evidence in the record that M.C.’s 
placement at Kenwood will constitute an “unsound program.” And the showing in this case 
is unlike the record before the Issa court. There, the plaintiffs presented unrebutted expert 

testimony and the testimony of former teachers showing that the programs at the school 
where the district preferred to place the students was “unsound” for their educational needs. 

  (describing  unrebutted  evidence);  

  (affirming  finding  of 
irreparable  harm  where, in the absence of injunctive  relief, the students would have 
remained at a location ill-suited to their needs).9 Nothing like that is before the Court in 
this case.                                                                
    There is no evidence before the Court showing that M.C. will receive an inadequate 

or inferior education at Kenwood. It is noteworthy that there is no opinion in the record 
from an expert witness stating that the facilities and services available at Kenwood will 
deprive M.C. of any needed services or support. Moreover, Ms. Thompson and the District 
agree on the goals for M.C.’s education as reflected in the IEP. Aside from the fact that 
M.C. will attend school away from his current friends, the parties agree that the program 

at Kenwood provides an appropriate educational setting in which to meet the IEP’s goals. 
The record reflects that at the April 16, 2024 meeting, “Ms. Thompson agreed that M.C. 
should be placed in a DCD-focused classroom, but she felt strongly that M.C. should attend 
McGuire with his peers from Lakeview.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 16. Ms. McGeary likewise noted 
that “it’s clear that there is a consensus regarding [M.C.’s] need for DCD classroom 

support.” 

 Ex. B at 4. And during elementary school at Lakeview, M.C. received special 
education services in a DCD-focused classroom. Id. ¶ 5. Indeed, at the hearing it became 



9 Other cases cited by Plaintiff, Pl.’s Mem. at 13–14, similarly involve circumstances where the 
absence of injunctive relief was shown to be likely to deprive the student of an opportunity to 
receive an effective education. E.g., Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 

 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(finding irreparable harm where the student was hearing impaired, required an ASL interpreter, 
and the school district’s failure to provide a certified interpreter would have caused him “to spend 
a silent, fruitless year in school with only the most remote hopes of being educated”); Alejandro v. 
Palm Beach State Coll., 

, 1270–71 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding absence of 
injunctive relief permitting plaintiff to bring a psychiatric support dog to classes would result in 
irreparable harm because she would be unable to attend class without the dog and “attending class 
is an important aspect of obtaining a degree”).                           
clear that Plaintiff disagrees only with the location of M.C.’s middle-school placement, not 
with the educational plan.                                                
    In Ms. Thompson’s declaration, she explains why she believes M.C. should attend 

school  at  McGuire,  and  the  notes  from  meetings  with  the  District  reflect  that 
Ms. Thompson has consistently expressed these same reasons for almost a year. She states 
that she has “tried all that I know to ensure Lakeville permits M.C. to attend McGuire for 
the purpose of maintaining his neighborhood friends and classmates from Lakeview. The 
greatest amount of stability is essential to his emotional well-being which, in turn, is 

essential to his continued recovery and progress.” Thompson Decl. ¶ 4. In addition to 
Ms. Thompson’s  declaration,  Plaintiff  also  provides  evidence  from  several  of  M.C.’s 
friends expressing their desires that M.C. be placed at McGuire. Further, M.C.’s maternal 
aunt testified via affidavit about M.C.’s development and opined that requiring M.C. to 
attend a new school “with all new students is going to result in a significant setback for 

[him].” Popper Aff. (Doc. 6). And Ms. Thompson’s long-time friend similarly states that 
having M.C. attend a middle school away from his friends and classmates will have a 
negative impact on him. Cartwright Aff. (Doc. 7).                         
    The Court appreciates the sincerity of the input from Ms. Thompson and M.C.’s 
many friends. The Court especially respects Ms. Thompson’s position about what she feels 

is best for her son. However, this evidence simply does not show a threat of imminent 
irreparable harm if M.C. attends Kenwood instead of McGuire. At most, this evidence 
reflects a genuine concern that M.C. will have difficulty adjusting to middle school. That 
is true of any student, and the Court does not doubt that M.C.’s adjustment could be more 
challenging if he does not have friends he recognizes at Kenwood. But none of this 
evidence supports a conclusion that Kenwood is an inappropriate setting, nor that M.C.’s 
attendance there will deprive him of an education. In fact, the record reflects M.C.’s ability 

to adjust to a new environment. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that when M.C. was 
required to change schools from JFK to Lakeview, with the services and supports he 
received in a DCD-focused classroom, he not only made new friends, but “continued to 
thrive” there. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7 (alleging that when M.C. moved from JFK to Lakeview he 
“lost all of his friends from school and was required to start at ground zero to develop those 

relationships,” and with the help of his teachers Miller and Wait, M.C. was integrated with 
his classmates and friends and he “continued to thrive at Lakeview and he made many 
important friendships with his classmates”); see also Pl.’s Mem. at 4 (same). The Court is 
hopeful that he will show the same admirable resilience at Kenwood.       
    Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show a threat of irreparable 

harm required to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.        
    B. Likelihood of Success                                             
    The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits.  As  noted,  Ms. Thompson  asserts  disability-discrimination  claims  against  the 
District under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the MHRA. Compl. 

¶¶ 22–40. However, the evidence before the Court does not indicate that there is a fair 
chance Plaintiff will successfully demonstrate that the District’s decision to place M.C. at 
Kenwood was the product of discrimination because of his disability. Rather, the evidence 
indicates that the District reached its decision based on its sincere judgment about the 
middle school placement that would be best suited to M.C.’s individual educational needs. 
And under existing Eighth Circuit precedent, Ms. Thompson has  not shown that the 
District’s  decision  in  this  case  was  made  in  bad  faith  or  was  the  result  of  a  gross 

misjudgment.                                                              
    Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.” 

. Similarly, Section 504 provides:         

         No  otherwise  qualified  individual  with  a  disability  in  the 
         United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, 
         be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
         or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
         receiving Federal financial assistance.                         

(a).  In  relevant  part,  the  MHRA  provides  that  “[i]t  is  an  unfair 
discriminatory practice to discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of or benefit 
from any educational institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person because … 
disability or to fail to ensure physical and program access for disabled persons.” Minn. 
Stat. § 363A.13, subd. 1. The standards applicable to claims under Title II of the ADA and 
Section 504 claims are the same. A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 

 (8th Cir. 2024) (“AJT II”); see also G.P. v. Claypool, 

, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (describing the standards as “functionally identical”). Court also 
evaluate MHRA and ADA claims under the same standards. E.g., Thompson v. Bd. of 
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 

, 580 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the Court will 
treat these claims together.                                              
    A plaintiff asserting a claim of disability discrimination under these laws must make 
the prima facie showing that the plaintiff “(1) was a qualified individual with a disability; 
(2) was denied the benefits of a program or activity of a public entity receiving federal 

funds; and (3) was discriminated against based on [his] disability.” A.J.T. v. Osseo Area 
Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, No. 21-cv-1760 (MJD/DTS), 

, at *6 
(D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2023) (“AJT I”) (quoting Est. of Barnwell v. Watson, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018)); see also Doe 1 v. Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 

, 686–
87 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (same).                                                

    “[W]hen the alleged ADA and Section 504 violations are ‘based on educational 
services for disabled children,’ a school district’s simple failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation is not enough to trigger liability.” AJT II, 

 (quoting B.M. 
ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 

 (8th Cir. 2013)). The plaintiff 
must also “prove that school officials acted with either bad faith or gross misjudgments, 

. . . which requires something more than mere non-compliance with the applicable federal 
statutes.” 

 (cleaned up). In such a case, the defendant’s “statutory non-compliance must 
deviate so substantially from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to 
demonstrate that it acted with wrongful intent.” 

 (quoting B.M., 

). 
    The parties dispute whether Plaintiff is likely to prevail on her claims that the 

District’s decision to place M.C. at Kenwood excludes him from the benefits of the 
District’s  programs,  services,  or  activities  or  otherwise  constitutes  actionable 
discrimination because of his disability. Ms. Thompson claims that the District’s decision 
to place M.C. at Kenwood instead of McGuire constitutes disability discrimination because 
it is not the product of an individualized assessment of M.C.’s needs and doesn’t establish 
a necessity that he go to school someplace other than his neighborhood school. Instead, she 
claims that the District has a policy or practice of clumping students with particular 

disabilities together into certain schools using an unlawful “center-based” approach for 
administrative convenience.                                               
    “Cluster Schools” and Nebraska Consent Decree                        
    First, Plaintiff argues that the District’s so-called “center-based” approach results in 
Lakeville schools creating “cluster sites” into which it funnels its disabled students based 

on arbitrary or generalized labels, and she contends that this practice runs afoul of the law. 
In support, she points to a consent decree recently filed in a case in the United States 
District Court for the District of Nebraska—United States of America v. Lincoln Public 
Schools, No. 4:24-cv-3141 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2024). The Consent Decree in Lincoln Public 
Schools was entered between the federal government and the school system where the 

government alleged that the schools’ policy of placing deaf or hard-of-hearing students into 
so-called “cluster schools” for middle school and high school where ASL interpreters were 
stationed. In relevant part, under the Consent Decree, the defendant in Lincoln Public 
Schools agreed to only place a student in a “cluster school” if it determined, based on an 
individualized assessment, that the student needed additional support beyond an ASL 

interpreter that could be provided only at the cluster school. A copy of the Consent Decree 
is attached as Exhibit 5 to the declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel. Kane Decl., Ex. 5. 
    For several reasons, Plaintiff’s reliance on the Lincoln Public Schools Consent 
Decree does not show that she is likely to succeed on the merits. First, the Consent Decree 
is not binding on this Court in any way. Second, the Consent Decree does not reflect a 
judgment on the merits of the government’s claims in Lincoln Public Schools. Instead, it 
reflects an agreed-upon resolution of the parties’ dispute in that case “without trial or 

further adjudication of any issues of fact or law raised in the Complaint.” Kane Decl., Ex. 5 
¶ 13. Moreover, the Consent Decree explicitly states that the defendant “does not admit” 
any of the government’s salient allegations, nor to “any wrongdoing.” 

 Ex. 5 ¶ 6. 
    Third, and most critically, the terms of the Consent Decree do not ultimately support 
the Plaintiff’s position in this case that the District should be required to provide the special 

education services and programs M.C. needs at his neighborhood school. On its face, the 
Consent Decree does not require placement at particular schools, but instead requires 
individualized assessments of the needs of each student. Here, the Plaintiff essentially 
claims that the District’s center-based approach to placement decisions for disabled middle 
school students is facially discriminatory because it ensures that students with certain forms 

of disabilities cannot attend their neighborhood schools. To remedy this, Plaintiff claims 
that the law requires the District to provide all necessary special education services to each 
disabled student at his or her neighborhood school. The upshot of this claim is that all three 
middle schools—McGuire, Century, and Kenwood—would be required to fundamentally 
change  their  programming  to  ensure  that  each  school  has  the  proper  classrooms, 

instructors, services, etc., to adequately serve any student with any type of need. But even 
the Lincoln Public Schools Consent Decree does not go so far. There, the parties agreed 
that if providing an ASL interpreter “in a neighborhood school would fundamentally alter 
the nature of an LPS service, program, or activity, or would result in undue financial and 
administrative burden, then LPS is not required to provide a qualified interpreter in a 
neighborhood school.” Kane Decl., Ex. 5 ¶ 16. Neither the Consent Decree nor any other 
authority supports the proposition that the District would be required to alter the entire 

model through which it provides special education services to its disabled students in the 
manner Plaintiff advocates.                                               
    It is true that one form of disability discrimination can involve a public entity’s 
failure to make reasonable accommodations to programs that would “ensure meaningful 
access” for disabled individuals. Arc of Iowa II, 24 F.4th at 1177–78. The accommodations 

required by the law, however, are reasonable ones. To that end, the law is clear that a 
defendant is not required to make an accommodation “if it either imposes undue financial 
or  administrative  burdens,  or  requires  a  fundamental  alteration  in  the  nature  of  the 
program.” 

 (quoting DeBord v. Bd. of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., 

, 1106 (8th Cir. 1997)).                                              

    The District, through Ms. Potter, explained that the decision about where to locate 
its DCD program was based on several factors, including “environment, accessibility, and 
staffing.” Kuhn Decl., Ex. B at 3. When Plaintiff requested that a DCD program be 
established at McGuire, the District considered the request closely, but declined to do so. 
Id., Ex. B at 2. There is no indication such decisions were made for discriminatory reasons, 

but rather because placing a DCD program at McGuire reflected a fundamental alteration 
in the nature of the District’s special education program, and one that the District found 
unworkable for a variety of reasons.                                      
    Alleged Discrimination                                               
    Finally, based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on 
the merits of her claims because there is no evidence indicating that the District’s middle 

school placement decision denies M.C. the benefits of the District’s programs or services. 
Nor is there evidence that the District discriminated against M.C. based on his disability. 
Rather, the record shows that the District based the placement decision on an individualized 
assessment of his educational needs and their reasoned judgment that Kenwood would 
meet those needs best.                                                    

    A significant hurdle for the merits of Ms. Thompson’s claims, and one that she has 
failed to clear at this stage, is the Eighth Circuit’s bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment standard. 
Although  Ms. Thompson  argues  that  this  standard  rests  on  a  shaky  foundation,  is 
inappropriate for disability discrimination cases in the educational environment, and is 
otherwise flawed, she does not dispute that the standard is still the law in this Circuit. See 

AJT II, 

 n.2 (explaining that the bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment rule 
“remains the law of our circuit”). As such, the Court is not free to disregard it, and the 
record before the Court does not suggest a fair chance that Ms. Thompson will be able to 
demonstrate that the District acted in bad faith or made a gross misjudgment. Plaintiff has 
not offered evidence indicating that the District’s decision deviated so severely from 

accepted professional standards that it was likely to have acted with wrongful intent. 

. Indeed, Plaintiff presents no evidence of what accepted professional standards are in 
making school placement decisions for a student moving from elementary to middle 
school, nor any contrary opinions from an educator or special education expert. Rather, the 
evidence reflects a reasoned and considerate assessment by the District about M.C.’s 
educational needs, and that the District drew reasonable conclusions about where those 
needs would best be served.10 As a result, even if the District’s efforts to address M.C.’s 

needs “were inadequate” for purposes of fulfilling the ADA and Section 504’s requirements 
of providing meaningful access to the District’s programs, Plaintiff has not shown that the 
District acted with the requisite intent. See 

                         
    Further, the evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff would be unlikely to succeed 
on her statutory claims even if the bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment rule did not apply. The 

Court cannot find that Plaintiff is likely to succeed in showing that the District denied M.C. 
the benefits of a program or activity by assigning him to Kenwood or made a decision to 
treat him differently because of his disability. 

(a). At Kenwood, M.C. 
will have his needs met through special education instruction, and he will be able to interact 
with peers, both within and outside the special education classroom setting. Assuming his 

education at Kenwood proceeds according to the plan reflected in his most recent IEP, he 
will join his peers outside the special education classrooms for some purposes (e.g., 
morning meeting, recess, field trips, etc.), but his goals and needs in the academic and 
functional areas addressed by his IEP will be met primarily in the special education 
classroom. Nothing before the Court indicates that by placing M.C. at Kenwood, the 



10 In her reply brief and at oral argument, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Kuhn’s testimony in her 
declaration is not credible and that the Court should view it with heavy skepticism at most, or 
disregard it entirely as a fabrication. Given the record before the Court, it declines Plaintiff’s 
invitation  to  assume  Ms. Kuhn’s  declaration  is  intentionally  misleading  or  otherwise  lacks 
credibility.                                                              
District will deny him the benefit of its programs. Nor does the evidence indicate that the 
District is failing to administer its programs “in the most integrated setting appropriate to” 
M.C.’s needs. 

(d).                                      

    Although Plaintiff argues to the contrary, Ms. Kuhn’s declaration demonstrates that 
the District’s decision in this case was not based solely on a disability label assigned to 
M.C., but on an individualized assessment of M.C.’s needs. It shows that the District chose 
Kenwood because it reasonably believed it was the best setting of the three middle school 
options to meet M.C.’s needs.11                                           

    The District did not feel that placing M.C. at McGuire would be suitable because 
the ASD-focused program at McGuire would be detrimental to his educational goals. In an 
ASD classroom at McGuire, M.C. would be attending courses alongside students who 
predominantly perform at the same level or slightly below the level of their regular 
education peers, and educating M.C. in that environment would require a one-to-one 

paraprofessional, depriving him of the opportunity to work independently on academics. 
In addition, the District had concerns that the ASD-focused classroom would be ill-suited 
to M.C.’s need because he does not require behavior regulation or sensory integration as 
many of the students who receive special education services at McGuire. The District also 



11 The record does not support Plaintiff’s argument that the District chose Kenwood over McGuire 
solely because of concerns over restroom accessibility. Ms. Kuhn makes clear that District staff 
did initially have accessibility concerns about placing M.C. at McGuire due to his use of a 
wheelchair.  However,  after  Ms. Thompson  clarified  during  a  meeting  with  M.C.’s  special 
education team what M.C. needs in the bathroom setting, this became an even less significant 
concern in  the District’s evaluation.  Ultimately, the record shows that the availability of a 
wheelchair accessible bathroom at McGuire was not the primary reason for the placement decision. 
found that the learning environment in McGuire’s ASD classrooms could be challenging 
for M.C. because he needs a calm and quiet environment to do his work, and the ASD 
classrooms can be loud and would likely be distracting for M.C.           

    The District considered the special education programming available at Kenwood 
and how it aligns with M.C.’s needs. That programming is well suited to students, like 
M.C., who learn at slower rates than their peers, and it has a low student-to-staff ratio, 
which ensures that special education staff can work individually with students where 
appropriate. M.C.’s needs are similar to those of other students who are in the type of 

programming available at Kenwood, including M.C.’s need to learn in a small classroom 
conducive to repetition and practice. In addition, the District considered that a Kenwood 
placement would allow M.C. to move into high school alongside the students with whom 
he attended elementary school at Lakeview.                                
    Given  the  unrebutted  evidence  that  the  District  made  these  individualized 

determinations so that M.C. would receive an adequate and appropriate education and 
Plaintiff’s concession that the District’s programming for M.C. at Kenwood would not 
deprive him of an education, the only alleged benefit the District allegedly denied to M.C. 
is that he cannot attend his neighborhood school while peers without disabilities have that 
opportunity. However, Plaintiff cites no case to support the proposition that under the ADA 

or Section 504, a school district engages in unlawful disability discrimination by assigning 
a disabled student to a school that is not his or her neighborhood school. Nor does Plaintiff 
site a single case in which a court has found a discriminatory practice where, as here, the 
record shows that the school district reached that conclusion after thoroughly considering 
which school would better serve the student’s needs.                      
    For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show 

that she is likely to succeed on the merits.                              
 III.  Conclusion and Order                                              
    Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown neither a threat of irreparable harm 
nor that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims, and in the interest of providing 
the parties with a timely decision, the Court declines to discuss the remaining Dataphase 

factors—the public interest and balance of harms.                         
    For  the  reasons  stated  in  this  Order,  the  Plaintiff’s  motion  for  a  preliminary 
injunction is DENIED.                                                     

Date: October 8, 2024           s/Katherine Menendez                     
                                Katherine Menendez                       
                                United States District Judge             

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Lulu Simba Thompson, on behalf of her    No. 24-cv-3717 (KMM/TNL)        
son, M.C.,                                                               

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Lakeville Area Schools,                                                  

          Defendant.                                                     


    Plaintiff Lulu Thompson brings this case on behalf of her minor son, M.C., alleging 
that Defendant Lakeville Area Schools (“Defendant” or “the District”)1 has unlawfully 
prohibited  M.C.  from  attending  his  neighborhood  school  because  of  his  disability. 
Ms. Thompson claims that Defendant has engaged in discrimination under Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 

, violated Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 

, et seq., and violated the Minnesota Human Rights 
Act (“MHRA”), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01, et seq.2 This matter is before the Court on 
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Waiver 
of Bond. ECF 2. The Court held a hearing on the motion on October 7, 2024, at which 

1 Defendant identifies itself as “Independent School District No. 194, Lakeville,” not by the name 
provided in Plaintiff’s Complaint—“Lakeville Area Schools.” Accordingly, the Court refers to the 
Defendant as “Defendant” or “the District” throughout this Order.         
2 Ms. Thompson also asserts a claim that Defendants violated Section 13.08, subd. 3, of the 
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act by refusing to respond to a request for data. Compl. 
¶¶ 41–46. However, that claim is not relevant to the motion addressed in this Order. 
counsel for the parties appeared and presented oral argument. For the reasons that follow, 
the Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief is denied.      
                        BACKGROUND3                                      

    M.C. and His Elementary School Education                             
    Ms. Thompson’s son, M.C., is a student who is moving from elementary to middle 
school within the Defendant’s school system. At the start of his school career, M.C. 
attended John F. Kennedy Elementary School, where in 2017, he was identified as a student 
with a disability based on language delays. While at JFK, M.C. did well, received supports 

and services form the school, and established genuine friendships.        
    On April 1, 2020, while M.C. was a first-grade student, he was involved in a tragic 
car accident, sustained a severe traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), and lost his father and older 
brother. His recovery from the accident has been described as a “miracle” by medical 
professionals. Thompson Aff. ¶ 2.4 In addition to M.C.’s TBI, he has a secondary disability 

category of “Speech Language Impairment” (“SLI”). Kuhn Decl. ¶ 4 (Doc. 31). 
    Because of his TBI, M.C. experienced changes in his fine and gross motor skills, 
vision, focused attention and concentration, short-term memory, and academic skills. See 
Thompson Aff., Ex. 1, Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) (Doc. 23). M.C. also 
exhibits mild cognitive impairments, slower processing speeds, cognitive inconsistencies, 

reduced judgment and reasoning, and an increased vulnerability. Id. These changes require 

3 The parties have both agreed that live testimony was not required and submitted documents in 
support of their respective positions. This recitation of facts is based upon that record. 
4 Although the paragraphs in Ms. Thompson’s affidavit are not numbered, the court refers to them 
by number based on the order in which they appear.                        
M.C. to have structure within his environments. In the most recent re-evaluation of M.C. 
from November 23, 2020, Lakeville Area Schools found that he is eligible to receive 
special education supports and services under Minnesota’s eligibility requirements for TBI. 

    When he returned to school following his accident, Defendant required M.C. to 
move from JFK to Lakeview Elementary School (“Lakeview”) so that he could receive the 
supports and services he required through the “DCD focused” program there. Compl. ¶ 6. 
“DCD” refers to “developmental cognitive disability,” which is a state eligibility criterion 
that “does not include conditions primarily due to a sensory or physical impairment, 

traumatic brain injury, autism spectrum disorders, severe multiple impairments, cultural 
influences,  or inconsistent  educational  programming.”  Compl. ¶ 18 n.7 (citing Minn. 
Admin. R. 3525.1333, subp. 1). However, Defendant decided that M.C. needed the services 
available in a DCD classroom.                                             
    At Lakeview, the District provided M.C. with an IEP. The goals set forth in M.C.’s 

IEP include improving the following: (1) reading, writing, and functional abilities; (2) math 
skills;  (3) language  skills  (both  speech  and  language);  (4) strength,  balance,  and 
coordination for mobility; and (5) motor planning, attention, and grasp. IEP at 4–13. 
    During fifth grade, M.C. attended a regular education classroom for small portions 
of the day, like morning meeting or classroom social times; other than those periods 

“M.C.’s time with regular education peers was limited to lunch, recess, specials, and field 
trips or other special events.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 5. As indicated in M.C.’s IEP he is currently in 
a Federal Setting 3 program, which means he receives more than 60% of his educational 
services within the special education classroom. Id. He receives 230 minutes of direct 
special education services each day for his TBI in connection with core academic areas of 
math, reading, writing, etc. Id. At Lakeview, M.C. received those services “within a center-
based  special  education  classroom  focused  on  students  who  receive  services  for 

Developmental Cognitive Disabilities . . . or who have similar needs.” Id. He also receives 
direct  services  for  speech  and  language,  occupational  therapy,  physical  therapy,  and 
developmental adapted physical education. Id.                             
    M.C. adjusted well after his move to Lakeview. Valerie Miller, a Special Education 
Teacher, and Rebecca Wait, a Regular Education Teacher helped M.C. integrate into the 

Lakeview student community. M.C. finished fifth grade at Lakeview and is scheduled to 
attend middle school in the 2024–2025 school year. M.C. had a recent thoraco-lumbar spina 
fusion surgery. Thompson Aff., Attach. 8. The parties anticipate M.C. will begin middle 
school in mid-October.                                                    
    M.C’s Neighborhood Middle School and Other Options                   

    M.C.’s neighborhood school is McGuire Middle School (“McGuire”). M.C. and 
Ms. Thompson would prefer for him to attend middle school at McGuire because M.C.’s 
friends from his neighborhood and classmates from Lakeview will be there. However, in 
early November 2023, Ms. Miller informed Ms. Thompson that M.C. would not be going 
to McGuire. Instead, Defendant determined that he would be moved to Century Middle 

School  (“Century”).  Thompson  Aff.,  Attach. 2.  Ms. Thomson  immediately  informed 
Defendant of her concerns with the placement at Century. Id.              
    On November 20, 2023, Defendant held a team meeting to discuss M.C.’s middle 
school placement. Kane Decl., Ex. 1, 11/20/23 Meeting Notes (Doc. 12-1); Thompson Aff., 
Attach. 3, Notice of Team Meeting (Oct. 16, 2023). Ms. Thompson attended the meeting 
along with a private education advisor, Kristin McGeary, and personnel from the District.5 
11/20/23 Meeting Notes. Although they expected Carol Potter, the Director of Special 

Services for Lakeville Schools, to be there, they learned at the meeting that Ms. Potter was 
unavailable. Id. During the meeting, Ms. Thompson shared her goals concerning M.C.’s 
middle school placement, and the team considered M.C.’s goals, progress, and needed 
services. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.                                                     
    A second meeting was scheduled for November 28, 2023, so that Ms. Potter could 

attend, along with Amy Raffelson (Special Education Coordinator), Ms. Wait, Ms. Miller, 
Ms. Thompson, and Ms. McGeary. Id. ¶ 7. Ms. Thompson again shared her concerns with 
the team. Id. At the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Potter indicated that the decision about 
M.C.’s middle school would wait until a decision had been made regarding the City of 
Lakeville’s boundaries. Id. Ms. McGeary’s notes from the meeting indicate that it was 

unclear “where the special education classrooms might shift to if at all.” Id., Attach. A, 
11/28/23 Meeting Notes (Doc. 5-1).                                        
    Ms. Thompson wrote to the Lakeville School Board Members on February 21, 2024 
to request that they consider adding a DCD classroom to every middle school. Thompson 
Aff., Attach. 4. She expressed her view that adding a DCD classroom to every middle 




5 The other education professionals at the meeting included Ms. Miller, Ms. Wait, Elizabeth 
Heiderscheit (Speech/Language Pathologist), Chelsea Payne (Occupations Therapist), Shanyn 
Tuftee (Physical Therapist), and David Deal (DAPE). McGeary Aff. ¶ 4 (Doc. 5). 
school would help M.C. go to his home school along with his existing friends from 
Lakeview, but it would also help all special needs children having similar struggles. Id. 
    The April 16, 2024 Meeting                                           

    On April 16, 2024, District personnel held another meeting with Ms. Thompson and 
Ms. McGeary. McGeary Aff. ¶ 8. Ms. Potter led this meeting. Id. ¶ 10. Lakeville’s Middle 
School Special Education Coordinator, Karin Kuhn, again asked Ms. Thompson to share 
her goals for M.C.’s education. Id. As she had at previous meetings, Ms. Thompson 
explained that she wanted M.C. to gain “independence, social independence, and create 

stability with familiar social relationships given his fragile memory.” Id. According to 
Ms. Thompson, M.C. does not require a changing table, nor does he require a restroom that 
can accommodate both a wheelchair and a paraprofessional. Thompson Aff. ¶ 3. “One of 
M.C.’s goals is to improve his independent mobility and he is able to transition to a standing 
position and walk approximately 25–30 feet with his walker. There is no reason he cannot 

use the walker in a restroom.” Thompson Aff. ¶ 3. M.C.’s IEP documents that he needs 
some assistance when he goes to bathroom, specifically when transitioning to a seated 
position. IEP at 2.                                                       
    Ms. Potter  identified  three  middle  school  options  within  Defendant’s  school 
systems—McGuire,  Century,  and  Kenwood Trail  Middle  Schools  (“Kenwood”)—and 

Ms. McGeary’s  notes  from  the  meeting  include  a  chart  with  information  about  each 
school’s special education classrooms:                                    
        McGuire Middle School           Century Middle School         Kenwood Trail Middle Schools 
         HS-Lakeville South              HS- Lakeville North         HS- Lakeville South/Lakeville North 
     e  Resource program            «  Resource program               Resource program 
     e  Center-Based- ASD focused       e  Center-Based - DCD focused       e  Center- Based-EBD Focused 
       classrooms                  classrooms                  classrooms 
         o  4 classrooms               o  2 classrooms           *  DCD focused classroom (SOAR) 
         ©  3classrooms currently          o  Current students are           o  Current students have a 
           divided by grade               Severe/Profound               variety of disabilities: 
         ©  1 classroom for functional     «  Related Services all offered               =  TBI, OHD, SLD, 
           skills/communication-base    e  Center-Based caseload- 8:1,and 5              DCD-Mild/Moderate 
           d needs                paras                   e  Related Services all offered 
     e  Related Services all offered       e  Resource caseloads - 16:1 and 5     e  SOAR Center Based caseload- 
     «  Center Based caseload- 10:1 and      paras                     9:1 and 3 paras 
       10 paras                                        e  Resource caseloads - 18:1 and 5 
     «  Resource caseloads - 18:1 and 6                              paras 
       paras 
   Additional Information:            Additional Information:           E additional Information: 
     ®  Students in the resource setting     *  Students in the resource setting     e  Students in the resource setting 
       are generally working on           are generally working on           are generally working on 
       academics at or 1-2 years below       academics at or 1-2 years below       academics at or 1-2 years below 
       grade level                  grade level                  grade level 
     e  Center- Based ASD classrooms     e  Center-Based- DCD focused       «  Center Based SOAR students 
       focus on expected behaviors,        classrooms                  have Mild-Moderate disabilities- 
       social skills, regulation, and           ©  Majority in Wheelchairs        working on academics at their 
       communication                  o  The majority use devices       level- able to do group work/whole 
     e  Center Based classroom is in 8th          for communication          group instruction 
       grade wing/hall              ®  Focus on basic and daily living      e  Accessible bathroom is inside the 
     e  Nearest accessible bathroom is       skills- toileting, feeding, and safety      classroom 
       downstairs at the other end of the    ®  Mostly 1:1 or very small group      «  Center Based classroom is first 
       building                  «  Accessible bathrooms outside of       floor- all grades mixed 
Kane Decl., Ex. 2, 4/16/24 Meeting Notes®; see also Kuhn Decl. Ex. A. McGuire has no 
DCD specific classroom, but both Century and Kenwood do.’ 
     Ms. Potter  informed  Ms. Thompson  that  the  District  had  selected  Kenwood  as 
M.C.’s middle school location. McGeary Aff. §] 11. Potter told Ms. Thompson that District 
personnel had toured all the schools and considered moving a DCD classroom to McGuire, 
but ultimately the decision came down to issues of “space and accessibility.” [d.; 4/16/24 
Meeting  Notes  1—2.  Ms. Potter  further  explained  that McGuire  is  an  old building;  its 
classrooms and breakout spaces are not designed for students who need space; to make 

© The entire chart included in Exhibit 2 to the Kane Declaration is pasted here for reference. 
Although the bottom of the middle column appears to end abruptly, the Court has not excised any 
portion of the image from the exhibit. 
 “ASD” refers to autism spectrum disorders, Minn. Admin. R. 3525.1325, subp.  1, and “EBD” 
refers to emotional or behavioral disorders, Minn. Admin. R. 3525.1329, subp. 1.

changes to the McGuire building so that it can be accessible for those in wheelchairs would 
require major construction; McGuire lacks sufficient handicap accessible bathrooms; the 
accessible bathroom near the swimming pool that M.C. uses when he goes swimming at 

McGuire is too far away from the classrooms and would require him to spend too much 
time to get there and return to class; and other classrooms at McGuire that are on the first 
floor level are built for music and art, and they would not be appropriate for a DCD 
classroom.  4/16/24  Meeting  Notes 1–2;  McGeary  Aff.  ¶¶ 11–13.  Ms.  Potter  further 
explained that Kenwood was selected because it has a DCD classroom already, a pool, and 

peers from McGuire and Kenwood will eventually all go to the same high school—
Lakeville South High School. 4/16/24 Meeting Notes at 2; McGeary Aff. ¶¶ 15–16. The 
District explains that at the April 16th meeting, “Ms. Thompson agreed that M.C. should 
be placed in a DCD-focused classroom, but she felt strongly that M.C. should attend 
McGuire with his peers from Lakeview.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 16.                   

    The District’s Rationale for Kenwood Placement                       
    In a declaration filed in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, Ms. Kuhn elaborated on 
the  District’s  rationale  for  placing  M.C.  at  Kenwood.  Kuhn  Decl.  ¶ 7. According  to 
Ms. Kuhn, the District decided on such a placement because “the center-based program at 
Kenwood . . . is more appropriate for M.C., and District staff felt that the District would be 

better  able  to  meet  M.C.’s  individual  needs  at  Kenwood. . . .”  Id.  Ms. Kuhn  further 
explained:                                                                
         Kenwood Trail houses the SOAR Program, which is focused         
         on students with lower cognitive abilities than their grade level 
         peers. These students  typically  have  medical conditions or   
         complications that impede their learning, primarily, by causing 
         them to learn at a slower, and oftentimes significantly slower, 
         pace than their regular education peers. The SOAR Program       
         allows  students  to  learn  at  their  own  pace  and  offers  the 
         opportunity  for  repetition  and  practice  of  academic  skills. 
         Given the low student-to-staff ratio, SOAR Program staff are    
         able to individualize academic materials for students in the    
         Program. While the SOAR Program is DCD-focused, it also         
         serves students with other disabilities who have similar needs  
         and learning profiles. For example, the current SOAR Program    
         at Kenwood [T]rail includes two students (aside from M.C.)      
         who receive services for TBI and one student who receives       
         services for Other Health Disabilities (“OHD”).                 

Id.                                                                       
    According to  Ms. Kuhn, M.C.’s  education  needs are similar to  those of  other 
students in the SOAR Program. Kuhn Decl. ¶ 9. M.C. learns at a slower rate than his regular 
education peers. Id. He also benefits from repetition and practice in his lessons, and the 
District felt he would best receive those services in a SOAR Program classroom because 
of their smaller size, calm atmosphere, and fewer distractions. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. During the April 
16, 2024 meeting, “everyone agreed M.C. needs to learn in a small classroom that allows 
for repetition and practice, like the SOAR Program classroom at Kenwood. . . .” Id. ¶ 9.  
    Although the District considered placing M.C. at Century and offered it as an 
alternative placement to Kenwood, the District felt that the DCD-focused center-based 
program at Century was not a good fit because “the students in that classroom typically 
have a label of Severe-Profound, rather than Mild-Moderate, which means they have more 
significant needs than the students in the SOAR Program at Kenwood. . . .” Id. ¶ 10. The 
District concluded that M.C.’s needs would best be met at Kenwood around peers “more 
similarly situated to him.” Id. After attending Kenwood, M.C. would also “attend high 
school with at least some of his peers from Kenwood,” as the students who attend middle 
school there are split between Lakeville North High School and Lakeville South High 
School; Century only feeds into Lakeville North. Id. ¶ 11. Lakeville South “is currently 

M.C.’s  neighborhood  school  so  he  would  attend  high  school  with  his  peers  from 
Lakeview.” Id.                                                            
    The District’s staff determined that McGuire would not be a good fit for M.C.’s 
educational needs during middle school. Kuhn Decl. ¶ 12. Only one of those reasons was 
bathroom access. Id. Although McGuire is generally wheelchair accessible and has one 

accessible restroom, the accessible restroom is on the other side of the building from the 
special education classrooms, including McGuire’s center-based and resource classrooms. 
Id. Ms. Thompson let the District staff know that M.C. does not require a changing table, 
but he does need assistance transferring to the toilet and with his clothing. Id. Though this 
information alleviated some of the District’s concerns related to the bathroom, others 

remained, including the fact that the restrooms closest to the special education classrooms 
are smaller and would not accommodate both M.C. and an adult who could provide him 
assistance. Id. However, these concerns were ultimately secondary to the District, and the 
“primary concern with placing M.C. at McGuire was the inappropriate nature of McGuire’s 
center-based  classrooms,  which  District  staff  felt  would  not  be  able  to  meet  M.C.’s 

individual needs.” Id. In particular, Ms. Kuhn explains that the District was concerned that 
McGuire’s programs focus on students who receive services for ASD, and those programs 
focus  on  “behavior  regulation,  social  skills,  and  sensory  integration,  rather  than 
individualizing academics.” Id. ¶ 13. Because behavior regulation is an issue in the ASD-
focused classrooms and the “environment is often loud and not calm,” the District felt that 
placing M.C. in such a program would not serve his individualized needs. Id. “M.C. does 
not have disability-related needs for behavior regulation or sensory integration, . . . which 

means instruction in those areas would not particularly benefit M.C.” Id. 
    Further, the District considered whether M.C.’s educational needs could be met at 
McGuire  without  a  center-based  program  like  he  received  in  elementary  school  at 
Lakeview, but instead “in the resource model, [where] he would have needed a one-to-one 
paraprofessional with him in the regular education classroom and in the special education 

classroom because his current academic skills are far below his grade level peers.” Kuhn 
Decl. ¶ 14. The District did not think such a practice would fulfill its obligation to educate 
M.C.  “in  the  least  restrictive  environment  because  M.C.  would  never  be  working 
independently on his academics.” Id. “In addition, staff would have needed to modify all 
his core academics to meet him at his level, given he learns at a significantly slower rate 

than  his  regular  education  peers,  but  it  would  have  been  difficult  or  impossible  to 
individualize  general  education  academics,  which  District  staff  again  felt  was  not 
appropriate for M.C.” Id.                                                 
    After the April 16th Meeting                                         
    After the April 16th meeting, Ms. McGeary and Ms. Potter exchanged emails about 

the decision to place M.C. at Kenwood instead of McGuire. McGeary Aff. ¶ 16 & Ex. B. 
Ms. McGeary  “advocated  for  the  creation  of  a  DCD  classroom  at  McGuire  to 
accommodate M.C.,” but because of “space and staff limitations, the District declined to 
add a DCD-focused classroom at McGuire.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 16. As a result, the decision to 
have M.C. attend a middle school with an existing DCD classroom and the Kenwood 
placement remained. Ms. Potter emailed Ms. Thompson on April 24th to inform her that a 
planned tour of McGuire would not take place that day because Defendant had decided not 

to place a DCD program at McGuire. Thompson Aff., Attach. 6. Ms. Potter asserted that 
M.C.’s “special education needs are best and most appropriately met in the DCD program 
at [Kenwood].” Id.                                                        
    Ms. Thompson  shares  that  having  M.C.  attend  McGuire  is  important  for 
“maintaining  his  neighborhood  friends  and  classmates  from  Lakeview.  The  greatest 

amount of stability is essential to his emotional well-being which, in turn, is essential to 
his continued recovery and progress.” Thompson Aff. ¶ 4. M.C.’s friends and neighbors 
have weighed in with their belief that he should be permitted to attend school at McGuire. 
Popper Aff. (Doc. 6); Cartwright Aff. (Doc. 7); Allen Aff. (Doc. 8); Anderson Aff. (Doc. 9); 
Fischer Aff. (Doc. 10); Hartman Aff. (Doc. 11).                           

                          DISCUSSION                                     
 I.   Legal Standards                                                    
    Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a district court has the power to grant 
injunctive relief by issuing either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. 
Courts apply essentially “the same standards to a request for a preliminary injunction and 

temporary restraining order.” Roberson v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 

, 
935(W.D.  Mo.  2022).  Here,  the  Court  treats  Ms. Thompson’s  motion  as  seeking  a 
preliminary injunction because the Defendant has received notice of the motion, the matter 
is fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing. See C.S. McCrosan Const. Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t 
of Transp., 

, 857 n.10 (D. Minn. 2013) (treating a motion for TRO or 
preliminary injunction as a request for the latter because the plaintiff provided notice to all 
parties and the issues were fully briefed).                               

    A  district  court  has  “broad  discretion  in  determining  whether  a  preliminary 
injunction should be issued.” Carlson v. City of Duluth, 

 (D. 
Minn.  2013);  Lankford  v.  Shermani,  

,  503  (8th  Cir.  2006)  (same).  “A 
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the burden of establishing the 
propriety of an injunction is on the movant.” Id. (quoting Watkins, Inc. v. Lewis, 

 (8th Cir. 2003)).                                                
    When deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court considers the 
following four factors: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the 
balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other 
parties litigant; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the 

public interest.” Wilbur-Ellis Co., LLC v. Erikson, 

, 1355–56 (8th Cir. 2024) 
(quoting Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 

 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 1981))). These are commonly 
referred to as the Dataphase factors.                                     
    Courts have stated that “the probability of success factor is the most significant.” 

Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 

 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Home Instead, Inc., 

). To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the moving party 
must show “a ‘fair chance,’ not necessarily ‘greater than fifty percent,’ that it will ultimately 
prevail under applicable law.” 

 (quoting Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 

, 690 (8th Cir. 2003)). A failure to show a likelihood of success “strongly suggests 
that preliminary injunctive relief should be denied[.]” Paisley Park Enters., Inc. v. Boxill, 

 (D. Minn. 2017).                               

    Even when a plaintiff has a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, 
courts should not issue a preliminary injunction if there is no showing of irreparable harm. 
C.S. McCrossan Const., Inc., 

. “The failure of a movant to show 
irreparable harm is an ‘independently sufficient basis upon which to deny a preliminary 
injunction.’” Sessler v. Davenport, Iowa, 

 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Watkins, Inc., 

). “A party seeking relief must demonstrate that the injury is 
of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent 
irreparable harm.” Jackson v. Macalester Coll., 169 F. supp. 3d 918, 921 (D. Minn. 2016) 
(citing Packard Elevator v. Interstate Comm. Comm’n, 

, 115 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
“Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because 

its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Kato Eng’g, Inc. 
v. Hanley, 

 (D. Minn. 2018) (citing Rogers Gr., Inc. v. City of 
Fayetville, Ark., 

 (8th Cir. 2010)).                     
 II.  Analysis                                                           
    As explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to 

show that there is a threat of irreparable harm to M.C. if he is required to attend middle 
school at the location selected by the District. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 
failed  to  demonstrate  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits. Accordingly,  the  Court 
concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.8    
    A. Irreparable Harm                                                  

    The Court admires Ms. Thompson’s advocacy for her son and is sympathetic to her 
desire to have him attend middle school with his friends. But neither the record nor the 
caselaw supports a finding that M.C. will suffer irreparable harm if he attends Kenwood 
rather than McGuire. First, there is no authority to support the general idea that a student 
is entitled to attend a particular school and will suffer significant harm if they cannot. 

Instead, irreparable harm is only found when the educational services themselves are 
inadequate, not when the school location is at issue.                     
    The Eighth Circuit has upheld a district court’s finding that one disabled student 
who was indisputably “making little progress” in her existing school placement had shown 
a threat of irreparable harm absent a transfer. Monahan v. State of Neb., 

 

(8th Cir. 1981). And the Monahan court affirmed the district court’s finding that another 
disabled student failed to show a threat of irreparable harm from not attending his chosen 
school where he was instead enrolled at a school that “concededly provides an adequate 
educational program.” 

                                                 
    The Eighth Circuit has also explained that where an educational institution proposed 

alternatives for disabled students that would have resulted in inadequate and inferior 

8 Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction, it is 
unnecessary for the Court to resolve the parties’ competing positions concerning whether Plaintiff 
was required to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act.                                                                      
educational  opportunities,  the  plaintiffs  had  shown  irreparable  harm.  Arc  of  Iowa  v. 
Reynolds, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Arc of Iowa II”), vacated sub. nom. by, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). The Arc of Iowa II court cited cases indicating that 

irreparable harm was established based on the “lasting impact of education’s deprivation 
on the life of a child,” 

 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 

 (1982)) (cleaned up), 
and finding irreparable harm because “even a few months in an unsound educational 
program can make a world of difference in harm to a child’s educational development,” 

 
(quoting Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 

 (3d Cir. 2017)) (cleaned up). 

    Against this backdrop, the Plaintiff fails to make the necessary showing of harm. 
Plaintiff offers two theories of irreparable harm to M.C. First, she argues that irreparable 
harm can be presumed when a defendant has violated a civil rights statute. Plaintiff relies 
on the district court’s decision in ARC of Iowa v. Reynolds, 

, 877–78 
(S.D. Iowa 2021) (“Arc of Iowa I”) in support of the idea that a violation of a civil rights 

statute by itself is adequate to establish the necessary harm. But in ARC of Iowa I, the court 
concluded that such a presumption applied because the court also found that an Iowa 
regulation violated Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 

 
Neither Arc of Iowa I, nor the other cases it cites stand for the proposition that a plaintiff’s 
mere allegation of a civil rights violation automatically supports a finding of the irreparable 

harm necessary to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. Instead, the presumption Plaintiff 
relies upon is inextricably intertwined with the issue of success on the merits of the claim 
that the defendant’s conduct violated a civil rights statute. As explained in more detail 
below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met that burden here, and as a result, the district 
court’s decision in ARC of Iowa I does not support Plaintiff’s position.  
    Second, Plaintiff argues that “M.C. faces the loss of the educational opportunity to 

be integrated with his neighborhood friends and peers at his neighborhood school.” Pl.’s 
Mem.  at  12,  13.  In  this  way,  Plaintiff  asserts  that  she  satisfies  the  irreparable-harm 
requirement in a more traditional way: she argues that M.C.’s attendance at Kenwood will 
deprive him of friendships and a lack of “continuity and stability” that are important for 
his development. Pl.’s Mem. at 12. The Court disagrees. To begin with, none of the cases 

cited by Plaintiff support the proposition that requiring a student to attend a school without 
neighborhood classmates and friends constitutes irreparable harm. Indeed, none suggests 
there is irreparable harm where the record establishes that the student’s less-preferred 
school placement will provide him with all the services and support required to allow him 
to receive an adequate education. For example, Plaintiff cites Issa v. School District of 

Lancaster, 

 (3d Cir. 2017) for the proposition that “even a few months in 
an unsound program can make a world of difference in harm to a child’s educational 
development.” Pl.’s Mem. at 13. But there is no evidence in the record that M.C.’s 
placement at Kenwood will constitute an “unsound program.” And the showing in this case 
is unlike the record before the Issa court. There, the plaintiffs presented unrebutted expert 

testimony and the testimony of former teachers showing that the programs at the school 
where the district preferred to place the students was “unsound” for their educational needs. 

  (describing  unrebutted  evidence);  

  (affirming  finding  of 
irreparable  harm  where, in the absence of injunctive  relief, the students would have 
remained at a location ill-suited to their needs).9 Nothing like that is before the Court in 
this case.                                                                
    There is no evidence before the Court showing that M.C. will receive an inadequate 

or inferior education at Kenwood. It is noteworthy that there is no opinion in the record 
from an expert witness stating that the facilities and services available at Kenwood will 
deprive M.C. of any needed services or support. Moreover, Ms. Thompson and the District 
agree on the goals for M.C.’s education as reflected in the IEP. Aside from the fact that 
M.C. will attend school away from his current friends, the parties agree that the program 

at Kenwood provides an appropriate educational setting in which to meet the IEP’s goals. 
The record reflects that at the April 16, 2024 meeting, “Ms. Thompson agreed that M.C. 
should be placed in a DCD-focused classroom, but she felt strongly that M.C. should attend 
McGuire with his peers from Lakeview.” Kuhn Decl. ¶ 16. Ms. McGeary likewise noted 
that “it’s clear that there is a consensus regarding [M.C.’s] need for DCD classroom 

support.” 

 Ex. B at 4. And during elementary school at Lakeview, M.C. received special 
education services in a DCD-focused classroom. Id. ¶ 5. Indeed, at the hearing it became 



9 Other cases cited by Plaintiff, Pl.’s Mem. at 13–14, similarly involve circumstances where the 
absence of injunctive relief was shown to be likely to deprive the student of an opportunity to 
receive an effective education. E.g., Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 

 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(finding irreparable harm where the student was hearing impaired, required an ASL interpreter, 
and the school district’s failure to provide a certified interpreter would have caused him “to spend 
a silent, fruitless year in school with only the most remote hopes of being educated”); Alejandro v. 
Palm Beach State Coll., 

, 1270–71 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding absence of 
injunctive relief permitting plaintiff to bring a psychiatric support dog to classes would result in 
irreparable harm because she would be unable to attend class without the dog and “attending class 
is an important aspect of obtaining a degree”).                           
clear that Plaintiff disagrees only with the location of M.C.’s middle-school placement, not 
with the educational plan.                                                
    In Ms. Thompson’s declaration, she explains why she believes M.C. should attend 

school  at  McGuire,  and  the  notes  from  meetings  with  the  District  reflect  that 
Ms. Thompson has consistently expressed these same reasons for almost a year. She states 
that she has “tried all that I know to ensure Lakeville permits M.C. to attend McGuire for 
the purpose of maintaining his neighborhood friends and classmates from Lakeview. The 
greatest amount of stability is essential to his emotional well-being which, in turn, is 

essential to his continued recovery and progress.” Thompson Decl. ¶ 4. In addition to 
Ms. Thompson’s  declaration,  Plaintiff  also  provides  evidence  from  several  of  M.C.’s 
friends expressing their desires that M.C. be placed at McGuire. Further, M.C.’s maternal 
aunt testified via affidavit about M.C.’s development and opined that requiring M.C. to 
attend a new school “with all new students is going to result in a significant setback for 

[him].” Popper Aff. (Doc. 6). And Ms. Thompson’s long-time friend similarly states that 
having M.C. attend a middle school away from his friends and classmates will have a 
negative impact on him. Cartwright Aff. (Doc. 7).                         
    The Court appreciates the sincerity of the input from Ms. Thompson and M.C.’s 
many friends. The Court especially respects Ms. Thompson’s position about what she feels 

is best for her son. However, this evidence simply does not show a threat of imminent 
irreparable harm if M.C. attends Kenwood instead of McGuire. At most, this evidence 
reflects a genuine concern that M.C. will have difficulty adjusting to middle school. That 
is true of any student, and the Court does not doubt that M.C.’s adjustment could be more 
challenging if he does not have friends he recognizes at Kenwood. But none of this 
evidence supports a conclusion that Kenwood is an inappropriate setting, nor that M.C.’s 
attendance there will deprive him of an education. In fact, the record reflects M.C.’s ability 

to adjust to a new environment. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that when M.C. was 
required to change schools from JFK to Lakeview, with the services and supports he 
received in a DCD-focused classroom, he not only made new friends, but “continued to 
thrive” there. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7 (alleging that when M.C. moved from JFK to Lakeview he 
“lost all of his friends from school and was required to start at ground zero to develop those 

relationships,” and with the help of his teachers Miller and Wait, M.C. was integrated with 
his classmates and friends and he “continued to thrive at Lakeview and he made many 
important friendships with his classmates”); see also Pl.’s Mem. at 4 (same). The Court is 
hopeful that he will show the same admirable resilience at Kenwood.       
    Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show a threat of irreparable 

harm required to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.        
    B. Likelihood of Success                                             
    The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits.  As  noted,  Ms. Thompson  asserts  disability-discrimination  claims  against  the 
District under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the MHRA. Compl. 

¶¶ 22–40. However, the evidence before the Court does not indicate that there is a fair 
chance Plaintiff will successfully demonstrate that the District’s decision to place M.C. at 
Kenwood was the product of discrimination because of his disability. Rather, the evidence 
indicates that the District reached its decision based on its sincere judgment about the 
middle school placement that would be best suited to M.C.’s individual educational needs. 
And under existing Eighth Circuit precedent, Ms. Thompson has  not shown that the 
District’s  decision  in  this  case  was  made  in  bad  faith  or  was  the  result  of  a  gross 

misjudgment.                                                              
    Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 
such entity.” 

. Similarly, Section 504 provides:         

         No  otherwise  qualified  individual  with  a  disability  in  the 
         United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, 
         be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
         or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
         receiving Federal financial assistance.                         

(a).  In  relevant  part,  the  MHRA  provides  that  “[i]t  is  an  unfair 
discriminatory practice to discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of or benefit 
from any educational institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person because … 
disability or to fail to ensure physical and program access for disabled persons.” Minn. 
Stat. § 363A.13, subd. 1. The standards applicable to claims under Title II of the ADA and 
Section 504 claims are the same. A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 

 (8th Cir. 2024) (“AJT II”); see also G.P. v. Claypool, 

, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (describing the standards as “functionally identical”). Court also 
evaluate MHRA and ADA claims under the same standards. E.g., Thompson v. Bd. of 
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 

, 580 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the Court will 
treat these claims together.                                              
    A plaintiff asserting a claim of disability discrimination under these laws must make 
the prima facie showing that the plaintiff “(1) was a qualified individual with a disability; 
(2) was denied the benefits of a program or activity of a public entity receiving federal 

funds; and (3) was discriminated against based on [his] disability.” A.J.T. v. Osseo Area 
Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, No. 21-cv-1760 (MJD/DTS), 

, at *6 
(D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2023) (“AJT I”) (quoting Est. of Barnwell v. Watson, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018)); see also Doe 1 v. Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 

, 686–
87 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (same).                                                

    “[W]hen the alleged ADA and Section 504 violations are ‘based on educational 
services for disabled children,’ a school district’s simple failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation is not enough to trigger liability.” AJT II, 

 (quoting B.M. 
ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 

 (8th Cir. 2013)). The plaintiff 
must also “prove that school officials acted with either bad faith or gross misjudgments, 

. . . which requires something more than mere non-compliance with the applicable federal 
statutes.” 

 (cleaned up). In such a case, the defendant’s “statutory non-compliance must 
deviate so substantially from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to 
demonstrate that it acted with wrongful intent.” 

 (quoting B.M., 

). 
    The parties dispute whether Plaintiff is likely to prevail on her claims that the 

District’s decision to place M.C. at Kenwood excludes him from the benefits of the 
District’s  programs,  services,  or  activities  or  otherwise  constitutes  actionable 
discrimination because of his disability. Ms. Thompson claims that the District’s decision 
to place M.C. at Kenwood instead of McGuire constitutes disability discrimination because 
it is not the product of an individualized assessment of M.C.’s needs and doesn’t establish 
a necessity that he go to school someplace other than his neighborhood school. Instead, she 
claims that the District has a policy or practice of clumping students with particular 

disabilities together into certain schools using an unlawful “center-based” approach for 
administrative convenience.                                               
    “Cluster Schools” and Nebraska Consent Decree                        
    First, Plaintiff argues that the District’s so-called “center-based” approach results in 
Lakeville schools creating “cluster sites” into which it funnels its disabled students based 

on arbitrary or generalized labels, and she contends that this practice runs afoul of the law. 
In support, she points to a consent decree recently filed in a case in the United States 
District Court for the District of Nebraska—United States of America v. Lincoln Public 
Schools, No. 4:24-cv-3141 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2024). The Consent Decree in Lincoln Public 
Schools was entered between the federal government and the school system where the 

government alleged that the schools’ policy of placing deaf or hard-of-hearing students into 
so-called “cluster schools” for middle school and high school where ASL interpreters were 
stationed. In relevant part, under the Consent Decree, the defendant in Lincoln Public 
Schools agreed to only place a student in a “cluster school” if it determined, based on an 
individualized assessment, that the student needed additional support beyond an ASL 

interpreter that could be provided only at the cluster school. A copy of the Consent Decree 
is attached as Exhibit 5 to the declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel. Kane Decl., Ex. 5. 
    For several reasons, Plaintiff’s reliance on the Lincoln Public Schools Consent 
Decree does not show that she is likely to succeed on the merits. First, the Consent Decree 
is not binding on this Court in any way. Second, the Consent Decree does not reflect a 
judgment on the merits of the government’s claims in Lincoln Public Schools. Instead, it 
reflects an agreed-upon resolution of the parties’ dispute in that case “without trial or 

further adjudication of any issues of fact or law raised in the Complaint.” Kane Decl., Ex. 5 
¶ 13. Moreover, the Consent Decree explicitly states that the defendant “does not admit” 
any of the government’s salient allegations, nor to “any wrongdoing.” 

 Ex. 5 ¶ 6. 
    Third, and most critically, the terms of the Consent Decree do not ultimately support 
the Plaintiff’s position in this case that the District should be required to provide the special 

education services and programs M.C. needs at his neighborhood school. On its face, the 
Consent Decree does not require placement at particular schools, but instead requires 
individualized assessments of the needs of each student. Here, the Plaintiff essentially 
claims that the District’s center-based approach to placement decisions for disabled middle 
school students is facially discriminatory because it ensures that students with certain forms 

of disabilities cannot attend their neighborhood schools. To remedy this, Plaintiff claims 
that the law requires the District to provide all necessary special education services to each 
disabled student at his or her neighborhood school. The upshot of this claim is that all three 
middle schools—McGuire, Century, and Kenwood—would be required to fundamentally 
change  their  programming  to  ensure  that  each  school  has  the  proper  classrooms, 

instructors, services, etc., to adequately serve any student with any type of need. But even 
the Lincoln Public Schools Consent Decree does not go so far. There, the parties agreed 
that if providing an ASL interpreter “in a neighborhood school would fundamentally alter 
the nature of an LPS service, program, or activity, or would result in undue financial and 
administrative burden, then LPS is not required to provide a qualified interpreter in a 
neighborhood school.” Kane Decl., Ex. 5 ¶ 16. Neither the Consent Decree nor any other 
authority supports the proposition that the District would be required to alter the entire 

model through which it provides special education services to its disabled students in the 
manner Plaintiff advocates.                                               
    It is true that one form of disability discrimination can involve a public entity’s 
failure to make reasonable accommodations to programs that would “ensure meaningful 
access” for disabled individuals. Arc of Iowa II, 24 F.4th at 1177–78. The accommodations 

required by the law, however, are reasonable ones. To that end, the law is clear that a 
defendant is not required to make an accommodation “if it either imposes undue financial 
or  administrative  burdens,  or  requires  a  fundamental  alteration  in  the  nature  of  the 
program.” 

 (quoting DeBord v. Bd. of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., 

, 1106 (8th Cir. 1997)).                                              

    The District, through Ms. Potter, explained that the decision about where to locate 
its DCD program was based on several factors, including “environment, accessibility, and 
staffing.” Kuhn Decl., Ex. B at 3. When Plaintiff requested that a DCD program be 
established at McGuire, the District considered the request closely, but declined to do so. 
Id., Ex. B at 2. There is no indication such decisions were made for discriminatory reasons, 

but rather because placing a DCD program at McGuire reflected a fundamental alteration 
in the nature of the District’s special education program, and one that the District found 
unworkable for a variety of reasons.                                      
    Alleged Discrimination                                               
    Finally, based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on 
the merits of her claims because there is no evidence indicating that the District’s middle 

school placement decision denies M.C. the benefits of the District’s programs or services. 
Nor is there evidence that the District discriminated against M.C. based on his disability. 
Rather, the record shows that the District based the placement decision on an individualized 
assessment of his educational needs and their reasoned judgment that Kenwood would 
meet those needs best.                                                    

    A significant hurdle for the merits of Ms. Thompson’s claims, and one that she has 
failed to clear at this stage, is the Eighth Circuit’s bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment standard. 
Although  Ms. Thompson  argues  that  this  standard  rests  on  a  shaky  foundation,  is 
inappropriate for disability discrimination cases in the educational environment, and is 
otherwise flawed, she does not dispute that the standard is still the law in this Circuit. See 

AJT II, 

 n.2 (explaining that the bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment rule 
“remains the law of our circuit”). As such, the Court is not free to disregard it, and the 
record before the Court does not suggest a fair chance that Ms. Thompson will be able to 
demonstrate that the District acted in bad faith or made a gross misjudgment. Plaintiff has 
not offered evidence indicating that the District’s decision deviated so severely from 

accepted professional standards that it was likely to have acted with wrongful intent. 

. Indeed, Plaintiff presents no evidence of what accepted professional standards are in 
making school placement decisions for a student moving from elementary to middle 
school, nor any contrary opinions from an educator or special education expert. Rather, the 
evidence reflects a reasoned and considerate assessment by the District about M.C.’s 
educational needs, and that the District drew reasonable conclusions about where those 
needs would best be served.10 As a result, even if the District’s efforts to address M.C.’s 

needs “were inadequate” for purposes of fulfilling the ADA and Section 504’s requirements 
of providing meaningful access to the District’s programs, Plaintiff has not shown that the 
District acted with the requisite intent. See 

                         
    Further, the evidence in the record shows that Plaintiff would be unlikely to succeed 
on her statutory claims even if the bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment rule did not apply. The 

Court cannot find that Plaintiff is likely to succeed in showing that the District denied M.C. 
the benefits of a program or activity by assigning him to Kenwood or made a decision to 
treat him differently because of his disability. 

(a). At Kenwood, M.C. 
will have his needs met through special education instruction, and he will be able to interact 
with peers, both within and outside the special education classroom setting. Assuming his 

education at Kenwood proceeds according to the plan reflected in his most recent IEP, he 
will join his peers outside the special education classrooms for some purposes (e.g., 
morning meeting, recess, field trips, etc.), but his goals and needs in the academic and 
functional areas addressed by his IEP will be met primarily in the special education 
classroom. Nothing before the Court indicates that by placing M.C. at Kenwood, the 



10 In her reply brief and at oral argument, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Kuhn’s testimony in her 
declaration is not credible and that the Court should view it with heavy skepticism at most, or 
disregard it entirely as a fabrication. Given the record before the Court, it declines Plaintiff’s 
invitation  to  assume  Ms. Kuhn’s  declaration  is  intentionally  misleading  or  otherwise  lacks 
credibility.                                                              
District will deny him the benefit of its programs. Nor does the evidence indicate that the 
District is failing to administer its programs “in the most integrated setting appropriate to” 
M.C.’s needs. 

(d).                                      

    Although Plaintiff argues to the contrary, Ms. Kuhn’s declaration demonstrates that 
the District’s decision in this case was not based solely on a disability label assigned to 
M.C., but on an individualized assessment of M.C.’s needs. It shows that the District chose 
Kenwood because it reasonably believed it was the best setting of the three middle school 
options to meet M.C.’s needs.11                                           

    The District did not feel that placing M.C. at McGuire would be suitable because 
the ASD-focused program at McGuire would be detrimental to his educational goals. In an 
ASD classroom at McGuire, M.C. would be attending courses alongside students who 
predominantly perform at the same level or slightly below the level of their regular 
education peers, and educating M.C. in that environment would require a one-to-one 

paraprofessional, depriving him of the opportunity to work independently on academics. 
In addition, the District had concerns that the ASD-focused classroom would be ill-suited 
to M.C.’s need because he does not require behavior regulation or sensory integration as 
many of the students who receive special education services at McGuire. The District also 



11 The record does not support Plaintiff’s argument that the District chose Kenwood over McGuire 
solely because of concerns over restroom accessibility. Ms. Kuhn makes clear that District staff 
did initially have accessibility concerns about placing M.C. at McGuire due to his use of a 
wheelchair.  However,  after  Ms. Thompson  clarified  during  a  meeting  with  M.C.’s  special 
education team what M.C. needs in the bathroom setting, this became an even less significant 
concern in  the District’s evaluation.  Ultimately, the record shows that the availability of a 
wheelchair accessible bathroom at McGuire was not the primary reason for the placement decision. 
found that the learning environment in McGuire’s ASD classrooms could be challenging 
for M.C. because he needs a calm and quiet environment to do his work, and the ASD 
classrooms can be loud and would likely be distracting for M.C.           

    The District considered the special education programming available at Kenwood 
and how it aligns with M.C.’s needs. That programming is well suited to students, like 
M.C., who learn at slower rates than their peers, and it has a low student-to-staff ratio, 
which ensures that special education staff can work individually with students where 
appropriate. M.C.’s needs are similar to those of other students who are in the type of 

programming available at Kenwood, including M.C.’s need to learn in a small classroom 
conducive to repetition and practice. In addition, the District considered that a Kenwood 
placement would allow M.C. to move into high school alongside the students with whom 
he attended elementary school at Lakeview.                                
    Given  the  unrebutted  evidence  that  the  District  made  these  individualized 

determinations so that M.C. would receive an adequate and appropriate education and 
Plaintiff’s concession that the District’s programming for M.C. at Kenwood would not 
deprive him of an education, the only alleged benefit the District allegedly denied to M.C. 
is that he cannot attend his neighborhood school while peers without disabilities have that 
opportunity. However, Plaintiff cites no case to support the proposition that under the ADA 

or Section 504, a school district engages in unlawful disability discrimination by assigning 
a disabled student to a school that is not his or her neighborhood school. Nor does Plaintiff 
site a single case in which a court has found a discriminatory practice where, as here, the 
record shows that the school district reached that conclusion after thoroughly considering 
which school would better serve the student’s needs.                      
    For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show 

that she is likely to succeed on the merits.                              
 III.  Conclusion and Order                                              
    Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown neither a threat of irreparable harm 
nor that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims, and in the interest of providing 
the parties with a timely decision, the Court declines to discuss the remaining Dataphase 

factors—the public interest and balance of harms.                         
    For  the  reasons  stated  in  this  Order,  the  Plaintiff’s  motion  for  a  preliminary 
injunction is DENIED.                                                     

Date: October 8, 2024           s/Katherine Menendez                     
                                Katherine Menendez                       
                                United States District Judge