Reynolds v. Clark

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota September 5, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Antoinette Reynolds,

Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Officer Matthew Clark, individually Civil No. 23-331 ADM/DLM
And in his official capacity, and
Metropolitan Airports Commission,

Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Kenneth U. Udoibok, Esq., Kenneth Ubong Udoibok, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of
Plaintiff.

Ashley Marie Ramstad, Esq., and Susan M. Tindal, Esq., Iverson Reuvers Condon,
Bloomington, MN, on behalf of Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________

I. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 2024, the undersigned United States District Judge heard oral argument on
Defendants Officer Matthew Clark (“Officer Clark”) and Metropolitan Airports Commission’s
(“MAC”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 33]. For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises from Plaintiff Antoinette Reynolds’ (“Reynolds”) claim that Officer
Clark used excessive force against her when he grabbed her arm and twisted it behind her back
when responding to a call of an assault in progress in the baggage claim area at Minneapolis-St.
Paul International Airport (“MSP”).
The incident occurred on February 15, 2021. Reynolds and her husband arrived at MSP
after a trip to San Diego and walked to the baggage claim area to retrieve their luggage.
Ramstad Decl. Ex. 1 [Docket No. 38] (“Reynolds Dep.”) at 132:23-133:10. As they approached
the baggage claim area, Reynolds observed a woman, later identified as Alison Louise Baker
(“Baker”), “making lots of ruckus” by yelling and screaming at other travelers in the area. Id. at
134:6-16; Ramstad Decl. Ex. 3 [Docket No. 36, Attach. 2] (“Citizen Video”). Reynolds ignored
Baker and walked to baggage carousel 7. Reynolds Dep. at 134:11-19.

As Reynolds waited for her bags at the carousel, Baker approached her and yelled at her
to take off her mask. Id. at 135:14-19; Ramstad Decl. Ex. 6 [Docket No. 36, Attach. 5]
(“Surveillance Video III”) at 4:01-4:10. Baker also shouted racially charged remarks at
Reynolds, who is Black, calling her a “slave bitch” and saying Reynolds was “a slave just like
your ancestors.” Reynolds Decl. at 135:19-23. Reynolds told Baker to go away, and Baker
responded, “F you, you slave.” Id. at 135:23-136:2. Baker then walked away from Reynolds
and began confronting and yelling at other travelers. Id. at 136:5-10; Surveillance Video III at
4:10.
After Reynolds and her husband had collected their luggage, Baker approached them and

again began to engage with them. Reynolds Dep. at 137:8-23; Citizen Video at 1:13-115;
Ramstad Decl. Ex. 5 [Docket No. 36, Attach. 4] (“Surveillance Video II”) at 6:52. Baker
shouted at Reynolds’ husband, calling him “stupid,” and yelled at Reynolds to take off her mask.
Reynolds Dep. at 138:1-7. Reynolds then stepped toward Baker, pointed her finger in Baker’s
face, and told her she needed to back up. Id. at 138:22-139:18; Surveillance Video II at 6:54-59.
A group of individuals were gathered around Reynolds and Baker during the interaction.
Reynolds Dep. at 139:23-140:10; Surveillance Video II at 6:54-58; Citizen Video 1:23-25.
Minutes earlier, Baker’s erratic behavior had prompted a bystander to call 911. Ramstad
Decl. Ex. 8 [Docket No. 36, Attach. 7] (“911 Audio Recording”). The bystander told dispatch
that officers were needed at carousel 7 as soon as possible because a woman was “fighting with
everybody.” Id. at 00:45-47. Dispatch radioed to MSP Airport Police Department officers that
there was an “assault in progress” at carousel 7, and that “a female . . . was fighting with
everyone.” Ramstad Decl. Ex. 7 [Docket No. 36, Attach. 6] (“Police Reports”) at 3, 5-6;
Ramstad Decl. Ex. 2 [Docket No. 36, Attach. 1] (“Clark Dep.”) at 24:23-25:7. No description of

the suspect was given by dispatch other than the suspect was a female and was fighting with
others. See generally Police Reports; Clark Dep. at 59:8-10.
Officer Clark was on the third floor of the airport when he received the radio call from
dispatch. Clark Dep. at 28:3-6. Due to the urgency of the call, he ran to the first floor where
carousel 7 was located. Id. at 28:11-14. As Officer Clark was running on the first floor toward
carousel 7, he could see a group of people yelling and causing a disturbance. Id. at 29:4-8; 55:5-
12. Officer Clark testified in his deposition that before he reached the group causing the
commotion, he passed a man observing the group from a distance and asked the man who was
fighting. Id. at 29:4-16, 55:9-25, 131:2-5. The man replied that it was the female with the white

hoodie. Clark Dep. at 29:4-8, 55:23-56:2, 131:4-6 .
When Officer Clark approached the group, he observed that Reynolds was wearing a
white hoodie and that she appeared agitated and was advancing towards another female with a
gray coat (Baker). Clark Dep. at 57:23-25, 131:8-16; Surveillance Video II at 6:54-59.
Reynolds had her hand up and was pointing at the woman in the gray coat. Clark Dep. at
131:14-16. Other people in the group appeared to be holding Reynolds back and pushing her
away from the woman. Clark Dep. at 62:7-10, 131:19-22; Surveillance Video II at 6:54-59.
Based on these observations and the information relayed from dispatch, Officer Clark believed
that Reynolds was the potential suspect. Clark Dep. at 58:22-25.
Officer Clark was concerned that if he did not remove Reynolds from the situation
immediately, someone might get hurt. Id. at 63:16-18, 64:15-16. Without announcing his
presence or issuing a warning, Officer Clark attempted to perform an escort hold on Reynolds by
taking hold of her arm with both hands and pulling and twisting it. Id. at 31:14-22, 131:23-25;
Reynolds Dep. at 140:13-17, 141:17-142:3; Citizen Video at 1:25-29; Surveillance Video I at

7:01. Reynolds attempted to pull away, and Officer Clark continued to pull on her arm.
Surveillance Video I at 7:02-10; Citizen Video at 1:28-32.
Officer Clark then heard an individual shout that Reynolds was not the person who had
been fighting. Clark Dep. at 132:4-9; Citizen Video at 1:33-37. Upon hearing this, Officer Clark
released his hold on Reynolds. Clark Dep. at 132:6-9; Citizen Video at 1:33-38; Surveillance
video I at 7:06-09. As he did so, Reynolds turned and punched Officer Clark in the chest. Clark
Dep. at 132:9-11; Surveillance Video I at 7:09-11. The entire interaction between Officer Clark
and Reynolds lasted approximately ten seconds. Id. at 7:01-11. Officer Clark then approached
Baker and placed her under arrest. Id. at 7:13-20.

Since the incident, Reynolds has experienced pain in her right shoulder and decreased
feeling in the fingers of her right hand. Reynolds Dep. at 90:8-91:7. She visited her primary
care clinic the day after the incident and was instructed to use heat, ice, and ibuprofen. Udoibok
Decl. Ex. 1 [Docket No. 42, Attach. 1] (“Medical Report”) at 2.1 In September 2021, Reynolds
began consulting with a sports medicine physician due to continued shoulder pain and weakness
in her right hand. Id. at 3. The physician determined that Reynolds suffered trauma to her
shoulder that is expected to resolve over time and is not anticipated to result in permanent
disability. Id. at 4-5.

1 Page citations to the Medical Report are to the page numbers in the CM/ECF banner at the top
of the page.
On February 9, 2023, Reynolds filed this lawsuit against Officer Clark, in his individual
and official capacities, and against MAC. Reynolds asserts three claims against Officer Clark: a
claim under

28 U.S.C. § 1983

 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count 
I); a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II) and a state law 
claim for assault and battery (Count IV).  See Compl. [Docket No. 1].  The Complaint also 

asserts a state law claim against MAC for negligent hiring, training, and supervision (Count III).       
Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that qualified and 
official immunity bar Reynolds’ claims against Officer Clark.  In her Response to Defendant’s 
summary judgment motion, Reynolds states that she has voluntarily withdrawn her claim against 
MAC.  See Resp. [Docket No. 41] at 19 n. 2.  At oral argument, Reynolds’ counsel stated that 
Reynolds is no longer suing Officer Clark in his official capacity, and that the only remaining 
claims in this lawsuit are the § 1983 and tort claims against Officer Clark in his individual 
capacity.                                                                 
                     III.  DISCUSSION                                

A.  Standard of Review                                                    
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment shall issue “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587

 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 252

 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323

 (1986).  On a motion for summary 
judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
draws all justifiable inferences in its favor.  Ludwig v. Anderson,

54 F.3d 465, 470

 (8th Cir. 
1995).  The nonmoving party may not “rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate 
on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.”  Krenik v. 
Cnty. of Le Sueur,

47 F.3d 953, 957

 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted).   
B.  Section 1983 Claim (Count I)                                          
Officer Clark argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity against Reynolds’ § 1983 
claim for excessive force.  Qualified immunity shields government officials from § 1983 lawsuits 

and liability “unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory 
right of which a reasonable person would have known.”  LaCross v. City of Duluth,

713 F.3d 1155, 1157

 (8th Cir. 2013).  “In a § 1983 action, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity 
unless: (1) the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly 
established.”  Ching as Tr. for Jordan v. City of Minneapolis,

73 F.4th 617, 620

 (8th Cir. 2023).   
1.  Violation of a Constitutional Right                              
Reynolds argues that Officer Clark violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  She contends that Officer Clark lacked particularized 
suspicion to stop and detain her, and that the force he used against her was unreasonable.   

     a.  Stop and Detention                                          
“[B]efore a police officer can use physical force, the arrest or investigatory stop itself 
must be justified.”  Smith v. Appledorn, No. CIV. 11-2966 JNE/SER,

2013 WL 451320

, at *3 
(D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2013) (citing Andrews v. Fuoss,

417 F.3d 813

, 817–18 (8th Cir. 2005)).  The 
Supreme Court has long held that “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for 
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 
criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”  United States v. 
Sokolow,

490 U.S. 1

 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21

 (1968)).  “In making 
reasonable-suspicion determinations, reviewing courts ‘must look at the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and 
objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”  United States v. Martinez-Cortes,

566 F.3d 767, 769

 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002)).
Here, the totality of the circumstances show that Officer Clark had a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting Reynolds of legal wrongdoing. Officer Clark had been dispatched

to the baggage claim area with a report of an assault in progress. Dispatch relayed that a female
was fighting with everyone at carousel 7, but did not provide a description of the suspect. As he
approached carousel 7, Officer Clark observed a group of people that appeared to be arguing
with each other, and was told by a bystander that the person who was fighting was the female in
the white hoodie. Reynolds’ head was covered with a white hoodie. Officer Clark also
personally observed that Reynolds appeared agitated and was advancing toward Baker with her
arm outstretched, while others in the group were pulling and pushing Reynolds away from
Baker. The totality of these facts known to Officer Clark at the time of the seizure provided an
objective basis at that time for believing that criminal activity may be afoot. As such, Officer

Clark was justified in briefly detaining Reynolds to remove her from the potentially hostile
situation and quell the disturbance.
Reynolds argues that the evidence, when viewed most favorably to her, does not support
an inference that a bystander told Officer Clark that the person fighting was wearing a white
hoodie. Reynolds contends that Officer Clark’s deposition testimony about his interaction with a
bystander is contradicted by video evidence, because the surveillance footage does not show
Officer Clark slowing down or stopping to talk to anyone as he ran toward the group that was
arguing in the baggage area. However, the surveillance footage (which does not include audio)
shows that as Officer Clark ran toward the group, he passed by a man who appears to be pointing
out an individual in the group. See Surveillance Video II at 6:52-56. The video thus does not
contradict but rather lends some support for Officer Clark’s testimony. Additionally, Officer
Clark’s contemporaneous police report states that he asked a bystander to tell him who was
fighting, and the bystander told him it was the female with the white hoodie. Police Report at 3.
Even if a genuine dispute of fact exists as to whether Officer Clark communicated with a

bystander about who was fighting, that particular disputed fact is not material. Assuming that
Officer Clark had not been told about the white hoodie, the facts known to him at the time he
arrived on the scene were: there was an assault in progress at carousel 7; the suspect was female
and was fighting with everyone; Reynolds was in a group of people that appeared to be arguing;
Reynolds appeared agitated and was moving towards Baker with her arm outstretched; Reynolds
was pointing in Baker’s face; and individuals near Reynolds appeared to be pulling her back and
pushing her away from Baker. These facts provided a particularized and objective basis for
believing that Reynolds was engaged in legal wrongdoing. Accordingly, Officer Clark’s brief
detention of Reynolds did not amount to a constitutional violation.

Unfortunately, Officer Clark was mistaken in briefly concluding that Reynolds was the
woman referenced in the dispatch report, but his reasonable error does not render his conduct
unlawful. If an officer has a particularized and objective basis conducting an investigatory stop,
as Officer Clark did here, then briefly detaining individual does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Gilliam,

520 F.3d 844, 847

 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding seizure 
was lawful where the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable justification to briefly 
detain the plaintiff until it was clear that he was not the person named in the arrest warrant).  
Officer Clark’s mistake is not unconstitutional conduct.                  
     b.  Reasonableness of Force Used                                
Reynolds also argues that Officer Clark violated the Fourth Amendment by using an 
excessive amount of force to detain her.  Courts apply an objective “reasonableness” standard in 
analyzing whether an officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765, 774

 (2014) (citing Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386

 (1989)).  

“[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use 
some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”  Graham,

490 U.S. at 396

.  A 
police officer’s use of force must be viewed in context, and “must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Id.

  “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's 
chambers violates the Fourth Amendment.”

Id.

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
When applying the test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, a court must 
pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the 
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others, and whether [she] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight.”

Id.

  “[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one:  the 
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”

Id. at 397

.                                                                      
Here, Officer Clark was responding to a report of an assault, which is a potentially 
violent crime, and was told that a woman was fighting with everyone.  When Officer Clark 
arrived on the scene, he observed Reynolds stepping toward Baker and pointing in her face while 
other individuals were pushing or pulling Reynolds away from Baker.  These facts and 
circumstances would lead a reasonable officer on the scene to conclude that he was intervening 
in a hostile situation and that Reynolds posed an immediate threat to the safety of others or 
herself.  When Officer Clark grabbed Reynolds’ arm to remove her from the situation, she 
immediately pulled away, which would cause a reasonable officer to believe that she was 
resisting or attempting to evade arrest.  Almost immediately after hearing others yell that he had 

the wrong person, Officer Clark let go of Reynolds’ arm.  Approximately 10 seconds elapsed 
from the time Officer Clark took hood of Reynolds’ arm until the time he let go.  Based on these 
facts and circumstances known to Officer Clark when he arrived on the scene, his use of force 
was objectively reasonable.                                               
Resisting this conclusion, Reynolds argues that the amount of force used was 
unreasonable because there was no indication that she posed a threat to anyone or that she was 
acting aggressively.  Resp. at 11.  Reynolds contends that, “if anything, Ms. Baker presented 
evidence of public safety risks by the manner [in which] she confronted passengers.”

Id.

  
However, Baker’s earlier confrontations with other passengers occurred before Officer Clark 

arrived on the scene.  As such, he did not witness Bakers’ verbally abusive and unacceptable 
treatment of others, including Reynolds.  At the time that Officer Clark arrived, the facts and 
circumstances confronting him were that a woman was fighting at carousel 7, that Reynolds 
appeared agitated and was stepping toward Baker with her arm outstretched, and that others were 
trying to push or pull Reynolds away.  It was reasonable for Officer Clark to conclude albeit 
falsely from these facts and circumstances that Reynolds was the aggressor in the situation.  
Officer Clark’s concern that Reynolds was agitated enough to potentially harm someone was not 
unfounded; the moment he let go of Reynolds’ arm after pulling her away from the disturbance, 
she turned and punched him in the chest.  See Surveillance Video I at 7:09-11.   
Reynolds also argues the level of force used was excessive because the force caused 
damage to her arm and shoulder.  Although the degree of injury is relevant to showing the 
amount and type of force used, “[t]he degree of injury should not be dispositive, because the 
nature of the force applied cannot be correlated perfectly with the type of injury inflicted.”  
Chambers v. Pennycook,

641 F.3d 898, 906

 (8th Cir. 2011).  This is because “[s]ome plaintiffs 

will be thicker-skinned than others, and the same application of force will have different effects 
on different people.”

Id.

  As such, the focus is on “whether the force applied is reasonable from 
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the force is used.”

Id.

 (emphasis 
in original).  For the reasons already discussed, the force briefly applied by Officer Clark to 
Reynolds was reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances known to him at the time the 
force was used.                                                           
Because Officer Clark did not violate a constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified 
immunity on the § 1983 claim for excessive force.                         
2.  Clearly Established Right                                        

Even if Reynolds could show that Officer Clark’s conduct violated a constitutional right, 
she cannot show that the right in question was clearly established.  “For a constitutional right to 
be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”  Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 739

 (2002) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Stated differently, “existing law must have placed the 
constitutionality of the officer’s conduct beyond debate.”  District of Columbia v. Wesby,

138 S. Ct. 577, 589

 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).                            
The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed courts to define clearly established law with 
specificity, rather than “at a high level of generality.”  Kisela v. Hughes,

584 U.S. 100, 104

 
(2018).  Specificity is particularly important when the Fourth Amendment is at issue.

Id.

  “Use 
of excessive force is an area of the law ‘in which the result depends very much on the facts of 
each case,’ and thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent 
‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.”

Id.

 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7, 13

 
(2015)).                                                                  

Reynolds has provided no existing Eighth Circuit precedent that squarely governs the 
specific facts at issue in this case.  Instead, she relies on cases involving greater uses of force 
such as using pepper spray and mace on non-violent suspects who were not resisting arrest and 
posed no threat to others’ safety.  See Resp. at 14.  For example, in Tatum v. Robinson, the 
Eighth Circuit held that an officer’s use of pepper spray on a shoplifter who was not resisting 
arrest and did not pose a threat of harm to others was an unreasonable use of force.

858 F.3d 544, 551

 (8th Cir. 2017.  In Johnson v. Carroll, an officer was found to have used excessive force 
when he threw to the ground and maced a non-violent individual who was suspected of a 
misdemeanor, was not fleeing or resisting arrest, and posed no threat to anyone’s safety.

658 F.3d 819, 828

 (8th Cir. 2011).  Neither one of these cases would put a reasonable officer on 
notice that the conduct here---pulling and twisting the arm of an individual suspected of being 
involved in an assault in order to remove that individual from a confrontation where she 
appeared to be the aggressor---was unconstitutional.                      
Because Officer Clark’s conduct did not violate a clearly established right of which a 
reasonable officer would have known, he is entitled to qualified immunity on Reynolds’ § 1983 
claim.                                                                    
C.  State Law Claims                                                      
Officer Clark argues that he is entitled to official immunity on Reynolds’ state law tort 
claims because his actions were discretionary and he did not act with malice.  “[U]nder 
Minnesota law, a public official is entitled to official immunity from state law claims when that 
official is charged by law with duties that require the exercise of judgment or discretion.”  

Johnson v. Morris,

453 N.W.2d 31, 41

 (Minn. 1990).  Discretionary duties require the use of 
“professional judgment to choose between a variety of options under uncertain circumstances 
and without the benefit of time for reflection.”  Welters v. Minnesota Dep’t of Corr.,

968 N.W.2d 569

, 586 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021).                                           
A public official’s discretionary conduct is not immune from liability if the official “is 
guilty of a wilful or malicious wrong.”  Rico v. State,

472 N.W.2d 100, 107

 (Minn. 1991).  
“Malice is ‘the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse, or, 
otherwise stated, the willful violation of a known right.’”  Samuelson v. City of New Ulm,

455 F.3d 871, 878

 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co.,

205 N.W. 630, 631

 (Minn. 1925)).  The “willful or malicious wrong” exception to official immunity “anticipates 
liability only when an official intentionally commits an act that he or she has reason to believe is 
prohibited.”  Johnson v. Cnty. of Dakota,

510 N.W.2d 237

, 240–41 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Rico,

472 N.W.2d at 107

).                                        
Here, Officer Clark’s actions when responding to the dispatch call of an assault in 
progress constituted discretionary conduct.  See Kelly v. City of Minneapolis,

598 N.W.2d 657, 665

(Minn. 1999) (“[T]he conduct of police officers in responding to a dispatch or making an
arrest involves precisely the type of discretionary decisions, often split-second and on meager
information, that [the Minnesota Supreme Court] intended to protect from judicial second-
guessing through the doctrine of official immunity.”).
Additionally, Officer Clark did not act with malice. As discussed above, his conduct was
legally justified and he did not violate a known right. Officer Clark is thus entitled to official
immunity on Reynolds’ state law tort claims.

Because the claims against Officer Clark are barred by qualified and official immunity
and the claim against MAC has been voluntarily withdrawn, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that:
1. Defendants Officer Matthew Clark and Metropolitan Airports Commission’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 33] is GRANTED; and

2. The Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

BY THE COURT:

s/Ann D. Montgomery
Dated: September 5, 2024 ANN D. MONTGOMERY
U.S. DISTRICT COURT