UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                              
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                              
-------------------------------------------------------x                  
PRISCILLA JIBOWU, Individually and on                                     
Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated,                           

            Plaintiff,           MEMORANDUM & ORDER                  
                                  17-CV-3875 (PKC) (MMH)             
     - against -                                                     

TARGET CORPORATION and TARGET                                             
CORPORATION OF MINNESOTA,                                                 

            Defendants.                                              
-------------------------------------------------------x                  
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:                             
Plaintiff Priscilla Jibowu (“Plaintiff Jibowu” or “Jibowu”), individually and on behalf of 
all other persons similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought this collective action under 
the Fair  Labor Standards Act  (“FLSA”) against  Defendants  Target  Corporation and Target 
Corporation of Minnesota (collectively “Defendants”) alleging overtime violations pursuant to the 
FLSA, New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), and Illinois 
Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”).  Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to transfer 
venue to the District of Minnesota due to developments in a related case before that court, 
Babbitt v. Target Corp., No. 20-CV-0490 (DWF) (ECW) (D. Minn.).  For the reasons stated below, 
Plaintiffs’ motion is granted.                                            
                     BACKGROUND1                                     
I.   Factual and Procedural History                                       
Defendant Target Corporation (“Target”) is a national retailer that operates approximately 
1,800 stores nationwide, with stores in each of the 50 states.  (Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129, 

1 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case and only recounts 
those facts that are relevant to the instant motion.  The Court has previously provided a detailed 
at 2.)  Each Target store has two salaried managerial positions: the senior-most Store Team Leader 
(“STL”), and some number of Executive Team Leaders (“ETLs”).  (Id.)  Target classifies ETLs as 
exempt executives/administrators for purposes of the FLSA and state labor laws.  (Id.)  Plaintiff 
Jibowu, who worked as an ETL for Target in their Chicago and Brooklyn stores, (see id. at 4), 
commenced the instant action on June 28, 2017, alleging that Target improperly classified Plaintiff 

Jibowu as an exempt executive under the FLSA, NYLL, IMWL, and IWPCA, (see Compl., 
Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 1–3, 33).  On September 6, 2019, Target moved for summary judgment on these claims, 
arguing that there was no genuine dispute that Plaintiff Jibowu’s ETL roles fell within the bona 
fide executive exemption to overtime pay and that she was properly compensated for the hours she 
worked above 40 per week.  (Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129, at 6.)  On September 30, 2020, 
the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and granted Plaintiff Jibowu and the 
seven other opt-in Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification as a collective action under the 
FLSA, defining the collective as the following:                           
[C]urrent and former Food ETLs, Sales Floor ETLs, Softlines ETLs, Hardlines 
ETLs, Guest Experience ETLs, Replenishment ETLs, and Logistics ETLs in stores 
that do not have Replenishment ETLs, employed by Defendants at the Target store 
locations within California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
and Texas, at which Plaintiff Jibowu or the opt-in Plaintiffs worked, at any time 
from June 28, 2014 to the present.                                   

(Id. at 62.)  By March 2022, the case was well into second-stage discovery, and the class was 
comprised of Plaintiff Jibowu and 34 opt-in Plaintiffs.  (See generally Def. Second Suppl. 
Disclosures, Dkt. 191-2.)  A few months later, in June 2022, Defendants filed a consent motion to 
stay the case.  (Dkt. 181.)  In its motion, Defendants informed the Court that “an action [was] 

description of the procedural history and claims in this case in its Memorandum & Order denying 
Defendants’ summary judgment motion.  (Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129); see also Jibowu v. 
Target Corp., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).                         
currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, [No. 20-CV-0490], in 
which plaintiff asserts the same FLSA claim against Target.”  (Id. at ECF 1.2)  Defendants further 
stated that “the parties agree that the Babbitt conditionally-certified collective will likely overlap 
significantly with the collective conditionally certified in Jibowu, which consists of 35 current and 
former Target ETLs who worked at covered stores in California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, 

Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas, at any time from June 28, 2014 to the present, and who filed 
consent forms to participate in the Jibowu lawsuit.”  (Id. at ECF 2.)  At the same time, Defendants 
noted that “the extent of the overlap in the conditionally certified collectives and discoverable 
material cannot be determined until after the disposition of the Rule 72 Motion in Target’s favor 
or the close of the notice and opt-in period in Babbitt (as applicable).”  (Id.)  On June 2, 2022, the 
Court granted the parties’ motion to stay the case, (see 6/2/2022 Dkt. Order), after which the case 
remained stayed for over two years pending developments in Babbitt.       
Following several joint status reports from the parties, on July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs requested 
that the Court lift the stay and allow the parties to engage in motion practice on the issue of whether 

the case should be transferred to the District of Minnesota.  (Joint Status Report, Dkt. 188.)  The 
Court granted Plaintiffs’ request.  (7/11/2024 Dkt. Order.)  Plaintiffs subsequently filed their 
motion to change venue on August 5, 2024.  (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Transfer Venue, Dkt. 189-1 
(“Pls.’ Mem.”), at 13.)  Defendants filed their opposition on September 11, 2024.  (Defs.’ Opp’n, 
Dkt. 190 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), at 26.)  Plaintiffs filed their reply, and this motion was fully briefed, 
on September 25, 2024.  (Pls.’ Reply, Dkt. 191 (“Pls.’ Reply”), at 10.)   



2 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing 
system and not the document’s internal pagination.                        
II.  The Babbitt Case                                                     
Babbitt is a 2020 collective action brought against Defendant Target in the District Court 
of Minnesota by named plaintiffs Tammy Babbitt and William Carter.3  See Babbitt, No. 20-CV-
0490, Dkt. 1.  Plaintiffs in Babbitt worked as ETLs in Target stores and alleged that Target 
misclassified them as exempt employees under federal and state overtime laws and failed to pay 

them overtime, in violation of the FLSA.  

  On March 28, 2022, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth 
Cowan Wright issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) in Babbitt that recommended 
granting conditional certification of a nationwide collective of ETLs.  (Decl. of Sara B. Tomezsko 
Opp’n Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. 190-25 (“Tomezsko Decl.”), ¶ 2.)  On August 24, 2022, District Judge 
Donovan  W.  Frank  adopted  the  R&R  over  Target’s  objections.    (Id.)    The  Babbitt  court 
conditionally certified the following collective:                         
All current and former Executive Team Leader[s] (ETLs) however variously titled, 
excluding the ETL Human Resources position, the ETL Asset Protection position, 
the ETL Remodel position, and the Logistics ETL position in stores that have 
Replenishment ETLs, who worked for [Target] in the United States at any time on 
or after July 20, 2018.                                              

(Id. ¶ 3.)  In March 2023, a third-party administrator started sending out notices of the conditional 
certification order to the Babbitt collective, with the last opt-in deadline set at December 9, 2023.  
(Id. ¶¶ 5–6.)  The scheduling order adopted in January 2024 stated that “[a]ll non-dispositive 
motions and supporting documents, including those that relate to sample fact discovery, shall be 
filed and served” by June 14, 2024, after which the second discovery phase would commence.  See 
Babbitt, No. 20-CV-0490, Dkt. 363, at 4.                                  

3 The District of Minnesota action was originally brought by Andrew Davis, who later 
withdrew, with Babbitt and Carter substituting in his place.  See Babbitt, No. 20-CV-0490, Dkt. 
46.                                                                       
Though Babbitt was originally brought by different lawyers, Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case 
started representing the Babbitt plaintiffs in late 2020.  (See Pls.’ Reply at 7–8 n.5 (“Babbitt was 
filed entirely independently of this case by other lawyers and the counsel in the two cases only 
later agreed to work together.”)); see also Babbitt, No. 20-CV-0490, Dkts. 29, 31 (Orders granting 
Mots. for Admis. Pro Hac Vice for Att’ys Predovan, Timmel, Rudich, Lesser, and Gershbaum).  

Following the grant of conditional certification in Babbitt, two individuals who joined the Jibowu 
case as opt-in Plaintiffs—Bertram Pryce and Kyla Cushman—also opted into Babbitt.  (Pls.’ Mem. 
at 1–2.)                                                                  
                    LEGAL STANDARD                                   
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to 
any district or division to which all parties have consented.”  

(a).  “Under this 
statute, transfer is appropriate where (1) the plaintiff could have originally brought the case in the 
transferee forum, and (2) the balance of convenience and justice favors transfer.”  Buccafusco v. 
Resorts Casino Hotel Atl. City, No. 20-CV-5687 (PKC) (LB), 

, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 

Jan. 6, 2021) (citing N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 

 (2d 
Cir. 2010)).  Once it is established that a plaintiff could have originally brought the action in the 
transferee court,4 courts typically determine whether the case should be transferred by weighing 
the following nine factors:                                               
(1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus 
of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of 
unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease 
of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s 

4 Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff Jibowu could have originally brought the case in 
the District of Minnesota since Defendant Target is headquartered there.  (See Pls.’ Mem. at 4–5; 
Defs.’ Opp’n at 7.)                                                       
familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded the plaintiff[’]s choice 
of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interest of justice, based on the totality of 
the circumstances.                                                   

Rimler v. Ripple Junction Design Co., No. 19-CV-5953 (PKC) (CLP), 

, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting S & L Birchwood, LLC v. LFC Cap., 
Inc., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)).  The party requesting the transfer bears the 
burden of making a “strong case for transfer.”  N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 

 
(quoting Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 
1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Lastly, “[c]ourts have discretion when balancing these 
factors and no one factor is decisive.”  Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. v. Obbink, No. 21-CV-3113 (RPK) 
(MMH), 

, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2023) (quoting Erickson v. MGM Grand, 
Inc., No. 13-CV-0564 (NRB), 

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2014)).  
                      DISCUSSION                                     
I.   The Existence of Changed Circumstances                               
As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to show a change in 
circumstances warranting transfer, and “that fact, in and of itself, counsels in favor of denying the 
request to transfer the case.”  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2–3.)  While they acknowledge that the existence 
of a related case in a different court could warrant transfer in some circumstances, Defendants 
maintain that, in this instance, “there is nothing that recently occurred in Babbitt that would 
constitute a change of circumstances to justify transfer at this time,” and that “ [t]he mere existence 
of Babbitt is plainly insufficient to constitute a change in circumstances.”  (Id. at 4.)  Defendants 
further accuse Plaintiffs of “[f]orum shopping” and having “filer’s remorse,” given that the Babbitt 
plaintiffs  achieved  a  more  favorable  outcome  than  the  Jibowu  plaintiffs  on  conditional 
certification.  (Id. at 6–7.)  They assert that Plaintiffs should have met and conferred with 
Defendants and notified them of their intention to potentially transfer the case back when the 
parties initially requested the stay of the proceedings.  (Id. at 5–6.)   
As Plaintiffs note, “[t]he Second Circuit has not ruled on, and courts in this Circuit disagree 
on, whether a plaintiff seeking to transfer venue must demonstrate a change in circumstances since 
filing the suit.”  Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 

 at *3; (Pls.’ Reply at 7 n.5; see also 

Defs.’ Opp’n at 3 n.1 (acknowledging that a few courts within the Second Circuit have excused a 
movant-plaintiff from demonstrating changed circumstances).)  For some courts, absent such a 
showing, a “motion to transfer venue is not ordinarily granted at the request of the party who chose 
the forum in the first place.”  Megna v. Biocomp Lab’ys Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (requiring plaintiff to show change in circumstances in motion to transfer venue); see also, 
e.g., Bakken Res., Inc. v. Edington, No. 15-CV-8686 (ALC), 

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 29, 2019) (denying motion for transfer for failure to show, inter alia, sufficiently changed 
circumstances).  For other courts, “even though a bona fide change in circumstances may be a sure 
sign that transfer of venue would be in the interests of justice, it does not augment or displace that 

essential inquiry.”  Nat’l Experiential, LLC v. Nike, Inc., No. 12-CV-3197 (ENV) (SIL), 

, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2021); see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale Univ., 
No. 02-CV-1205 (PCD), 

, at *2–3 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2006) (finding that, where 
transfer is “in the interest of justice,” an action may be transferred even if plaintiff cannot show a 
change in circumstances); Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 

 at *4 (finding “that the 
interests of justice inquiry adequately subsumes consideration of any change in circumstances”); 
Lihuan Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., No. 13-CV-0218 (PKC), 

, 
at  *3  (S.D.N.Y.  Jan.  13,  2014)  (noting  that  a  showing  of  changed  circumstances  is  not 
“mandatory,” as the court has “broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under 
[28 U.S.C.] Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-
case basis”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).            
The Court agrees with those courts that have found no need for a showing of changed 
circumstances where the transfer is in the interest of justice.  But even if such a requirement did 
exist, there is no doubt that such a showing would be satisfied in this case.  In their reply brief, 

Plaintiffs contend that their motion to transfer was submitted at an appropriate point in this case 
because “Babbit . . . has [now] reached the exact same posture as this case was when it was 
stayed.”  (Pls.’ Reply at 3; id. at 7 (“[I]t was precisely when both cases reached the same procedural 
point as to second-stage discovery that Plaintiffs, in June, informed Target that they believed the 
cases should be brought together.”).)  Moreover, Plaintiffs note that “[w]hen this case was stayed, 
Babbitt had just been conditionally certified and involved a few individuals.  Now, it has become 
a 3,500 person collective in which the parties are engaged in the same second-stage discovery 
issues as this case with overlapping work regions, districts, [and] stores.”  (Id. at 7 n.5.)  These are 
certainly “new” developments that have taken place since the filing of this suit in 2017.  See Fisher, 

204 F. Supp. 3d at 623 (“Courts assessing this threshold question in plaintiffs’ motions to transfer 
have required plaintiffs to identify a new development that ‘warrants transferring the action to the 
transferee forum.’ . . . This change must have taken place since the filing of the suit.” (quoting 
Ferrostaal, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))).  Moreover, 
these are not examples of circumstances that existed at the time Plaintiffs chose this forum, nor 
are they developments that are only tangentially related to this case.  See Universal Marine Med. 
Supply, Inc. v. Lovecchio, No. 98-CV-3495 (ILG), 

, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 
1999) (“Examples of changes in circumstances warranting transfer include . . . the pendency of a 
related action filed by a plaintiff in the transferee district.”)  Thus, even if Plaintiffs did have a 
burden to demonstrate a change in circumstances—which this Court believes they do not—that 
standard has been satisfied here.                                         
II.  Balancing Factor Analysis                                            
Defendants only dispute six of the nine factors that courts typically weigh to determine 
whether the balance of convenience and justice favors transfer.5  The Court considers each of these 

six factors in turn.                                                      
1.  The Convenience of Witnesses                                     
Plaintiffs contend that in FLSA collective action cases such as this, where witnesses are 
“geographically disparate,” convenience of witnesses is found “either at the corporate defendant’s 
headquarters, or in no single venue because the relevant witnesses are most likely to be found 
disbursed [sic] and where the opt-ins worked.”  (Pls.’ Mem. at 6.)  Defendants, in opposition, state 
that “the presence of a significant number of plaintiffs and their witnesses in New York weighs 
against transfer,” and that “Plaintiffs offer no specific facts as to the identity of key witnesses and 
the nature of their anticipated testimony.  That itself is a reason to reject the transfer request.”  
(Defs.’ Opp’n at 9.)                                                      
“Courts typically regard the convenience of witnesses as the most important factor in 

considering a § 1404(a) motion to transfer.”  Herbert Ltd. P’ship v. Elec. Arts Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  “In assessing whether to transfer this action, the Court notes the 
convenience of witnesses located outside of either this District or the [District of Minnesota] 
should be afforded little, if any, weight.”  Rindfleisch v. Gentiva Health Sys., Inc., 

, 252 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see, e.g., Elec. Workers Pension Fund, Loc. 103 v. Nuvelo, Inc., 

5 Defendants agree with Plaintiffs that the following factors are neutral: (1) the location of 
documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2) the relative means of the parties, and 
(3) the weight accorded to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum.  (See Defs.’ Opp’n at 17–19.) 
Nos.  07-CV-975  (HB),  07-CV-1229  (HB),  07-CV-1777  (HB),  07-CV-1953  (HB),  

, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007) (“Typically . . . district courts have given little, if 
any, weight to the convenience of witnesses who reside in neither the transferor nor transferee 
forum.”).  Moreover, courts “must do more than merely compare the number of witnesses who 
reside in the current forum to the number located in the proposed transferee forum, but should 

instead assess the materiality, nature and quality of the testimony that the witnesses are likely to 
provide.”  Capitol Recs., LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Here, Plaintiffs have identified several corporate witnesses who could offer material 
testimony as to the duties and titles of Target ETLs—a central issue in the case.6  (Pls.’ Reply at 8–
9 n.6.)  Plaintiffs claim that these individuals were responsible for ensuring that ETLs are properly 
classified under the FLSA, as well as for determining store policy, store operations, and ETL 
training materials.  (Id.)  Where a corporation’s practices and policies constitute the heart of a 
claim, courts have favored transfer to the district where the corporate headquarters are located.  
See Farrior v. George Weston Bakeries Distrib., Inc., No. 08-CV-2705 (JFB) (WDW), 

, at *4–6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2009) (where FLSA collective action raised questions 
about  defendant  company’s  compensation  policies  and  practices,  transfer  to  district  where 
defendant’s headquarters were located was warranted because, inter alia, substantial aspects of 
those policies were developed by individuals at corporate headquarters); Earley v. BJ’s Wholesale 


6  They  include  the  potential  testimony  of:  (1)  Michael  Brewer,  Director-Employee 
Relations, regarding Target’s compliance with state and federal wage-and-hour laws and annual 
ETL self-audits; (2) Tonya Lizakowski, former Director-Employee Relations, regarding Target’s 
compliance with state and federal wage-and-hour laws; (3) Melissa Doll, Lead Business Partner, 
HR Planning & Delivery, regarding Target’s compliance with state and federal wage-and-hour 
laws; (4) Laura Poling (f/k/a Hernandez), Lead Compensation Consultant, regarding Target’s 
payment and calculation of ETL bonuses; and (5) Patti Koch, Senior Director Compensation, 
regarding Target’s compensation of ETLs.  (Pls.’ Reply at 9 n.6.)         
Club, Inc., No. 06-CV-3529 (WHP), 

, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (transfer 
of FLSA action to district where defendant’s headquarters were located was appropriate where key 
issue in case was nature and implementation of company-wide overtime policies); Rindfleisch, 752 
F. Supp. 2d at 256–57 (finding that the more critical and extensive testimony was likely to be 
provided by parties and witnesses residing in the transferee district, where the corporation was 

headquartered and its executives who set  company-wide policies were based).  This factor 
therefore weighs in favor of transfer.                                    
2.  The Convenience of the Parties                                   
Courts  generally  find  that  this  factor  favors  transfer  “when  transfer  would  increase 
convenience to the moving party without generally increasing inconvenience to the non-movant.”  
Dickerson v. Novartis Corp., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Fairbanks Co., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).  “Ordinarily, [this] factor becomes 
neutral when transfer would merely shift the inconvenience from the non-movant to the movant.”  
Penrose v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 22-CV-2184 (JPC), 

, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 
2023).  While it is true that eight of the Plaintiffs in this case live in New York and none live in 

Minnesota, Plaintiffs themselves assert that “[i]t seems almost superfluous to point out that it is 
Plaintiffs who are making this motion and hence are willing to bear any inconvenience.”  (Pls.’ 
Reply at 8–9 (emphasis in original).)  Because litigating in Minnesota would not shift any burden 
onto Defendants7, and would not be inconvenient for Plaintiffs, the Court finds that this factor 
weighs in favor of transfer.                                              



7 For example, as Plaintiffs note, regardless of where the case is litigated, Defendants will 
have to depose Plaintiffs in New York.  (See Pls.’ Reply at 9 n.7.)       
3.  The Locus of Operative Facts                                     
Although “in a nationwide FLSA action . . . it is often difficult to fix a single locus of 
operative facts, . . . courts have concluded that operative facts may be found at the locations where 
employees worked, notwithstanding allegations that a uniform corporate policy caused the FLSA 
violations.”  Scalia v. KDE Equine, LLC, No. 19-CV-3389 (KAM) (SJB), 

, at *6 

(E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2020) (quoting Flood v. Carlson Rests Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015)); see also Bukhari v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, No. 12-CV-4290 (PAE), 

, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (“[T]he locus of operative facts is the location of the alleged 
violations . . . not the corporate headquarters.”).  Here, there is no dispute that no Plaintiff worked 
in Minnesota and that eight Plaintiffs worked at stores in New York.  (Pls.’ Reply at 8.)  This factor 
therefore weighs against transfer.                                        
4.  The Availability of Process to Compel Attendance of Unwilling Witnesses 
Though, as noted previously, Plaintiffs have identified material corporate witnesses, they 
have not provided detailed information regarding any third-party witnesses, e.g., where they 
currently live and whether they are still employed by Defendants.  (Pls.’ Mem. at 9; Pls.’ Reply 
at 9 n.6.)  Plaintiffs, however, note that since “Plaintiffs might wish to call unwilling corporate 

witnesses from Target’s headquarters, the District of Minnesota would be favored.”  (Pls.’ Mem. 
at 9.)  But, as even Defendants acknowledge, “to the extent that Defendants’ witnesses are current 
employees, Defendants presumably can compel their testimony without a subpoena.”  (Defs.’ 
Opp’n at 16–17 (quoting Flood v. Carlson Restaurants Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (cleaned up)).)                                                     
Defendants argue that “if any third-party witnesses are unwilling to testify, they are far 
more likely to be former Target employees who worked with plaintiffs at stores outside of 
Minnesota.  Transferring the case to Minnesota—more than 100 miles from the stores at issue—
would jeopardize a court’s ability to compel their testimony.”  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 17.)  Plaintiffs 
respond that in a collective action such as this, most unwilling third-party witnesses are likely to 
be geographically scattered, rendering the reach of 100-mile radius for witness subpoenas the same 
for either court.  (Pls.’ Reply at 10.)  Plaintiffs also question Target’s ability to summon its former 
employees to testify on a voluntary basis if the case remains in this District, stating that “there is 

no guarantee that [Target] will be able to do so, for example, for the witnesses involved in the 
classification decision twenty or more years ago.”  (Id.)  The Court finds that there is no 
demonstrated or predictable difference in the availability of process between the two districts and 
has no reason to believe that litigating the case in this District would be more or less burdensome 
than in the District of Minnesota with respect to issuing subpoenas.  The Court thus concludes that 
this factor is neutral.                                                   
5.  The Forum’s Familiarity with Governing Law                       
“‘Familiarity with the governing law is generally given little weight in federal courts.’ . . .  
This is particularly true when the governing law is a federal statute like the FLSA, which is equally 
familiar to all federal courts.”  Flood, 

 (quoting AEC One Stop Grp., Inc. v. 

CD Listening Bar, Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  When it comes to the state 
law claims present in this action, it is certainly the case that this Court, as a federal district court 
located in New York, has the most familiarity in applying the NYLL.  In the past, courts have 
weighed this factor against transfer.  See, e.g., Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. v. Tala Bros. Corp., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[W]here there are state law claims, the forum’s familiarity 
with governing law supports retention of the action”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  But the NYLL is not the only state law violation alleged in this case—Plaintiff Jibowu 
also alleges violations of Illinois state law, namely the IMWL and the IWPCA.  Thus, to the extent 
that state law claims from other states may arise in this case, “‘federal courts are deemed capable 
of applying the law of other states’” and “the ‘governing law’ factor is to be accorded little weight 
on a motion to transfer venue.”  Neil Bros. Ltd. v. World Wide Lines, Inc., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Norcom Dev., Inc., No. 97-CV-6308 (DC), 

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1998)) (cleaned up).  The Court thus considers this 
factor neutral.                                                           

6.  Trial Efficiency and the Interest of Justice, Based on the Totality of Circumstances 
When it comes to trial efficiency, “[t]here is a strong policy favoring the litigation of related 
claims in the same tribunal in order that pretrial discovery can be conducted more efficiently, 
duplicitous litigation can be avoided, thereby saving time and expense for both parties and 
witnesses, and inconsistent results can be avoided.”  Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Ass’n of Flight 
Attendants, CWA, 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 

, 619 (2d Cir. 1968)).  Indeed, “courts consistently recognize that the existence of a 
related action in the transferee district is a strong factor to be weighed with regard to judicial 
economy.”    Brown  v.  New  York,  

,  325–26  (E.D.N.Y.  2013)  (quoting 
Williams v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-5342 (RWS), 

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 

2006)) (cleaned up).                                                      
Here, Defendants emphasize that the “mere existence of related litigation,” however, is not 
enough; what matters instead is “the degree of overlap between the [related] actions.”  (Defs.’ 
Opp’n at 20.)  Though Jibowu and Babbitt allege the same FLSA misclassification claims against 
Target, Defendants point to the various ways the conditional collectives in the two cases do not 
overlap.  For example, broadly speaking, the Babbitt collective includes all “current and former 
[ETLs] . . . who worked for Defendants in the United States at any times on or after July 20, 2018,” 
(Tomezsko Decl., Dkt. 190-25, ¶ 3), while the Jibowu collective includes only “current and former 
[ETLs] . . . employed . . . at the Target store locations within California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas . . . at any time from June 28, 2014 to the present,” (see 
Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129, at 62).  Defendants rely on Scalia—a case where the Court 
ultimately denied transfer when two related actions had different liability periods and only five 
overlapping plaintiffs—to argue that the same should happen in this case.  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 20); 

.                                                          

Defendants’ reliance on Scalia is unavailing.  In Scalia, the related case (pending in the 
Western District of Kentucky) was “already at an advanced stage” and concerned “different groups 
of employees who were allegedly underpaid at different times.”  

, at *7.  Here, 
though there currently is limited overlap between the time periods of the two collectives,8 both 
cases are procedurally at the same point and concern employees who have essentially the same 
role within Target stores.  A small amount of overlap between the liability periods of the two cases 
is not sufficient to outweigh the larger efficiencies that may be gained from having both cases 
before the same court.  As Plaintiffs note, there are several other considerations supporting transfer 
of this case for the purposes of trial efficiency:                        

Going forward the cases will proceed down the exact same path[.] [T]here will be 
extensive discovery of Target corporation itself, particularly and critically, as to 
Target’s corporate-wide policies and practices and its corporate state of mind, 
including whether it acted willfully or with a reckless disregard for the FLSA . . . or 

8 The time period for the Jibowu collective extends from June 28, 2014 to June 28, 2019, 
which was “the present” for purposes of the Court’s summary judgment decision.  (Summ. J. Mem. 
& Order, Dkt. 129, at 56 (“However, the Court grants conditional certification of those ETLs in 
the proposed collective who were employed in the particular Target stores . . . even temporarily, 
from June 28, 2014, to June 28, 2019.”).)  In contrast, the Babbitt collective covers “any time on 
or after July 20, 2018.”  (Tomezsko Decl., Dkt. 190-25, ¶ 3.)  Although the current overlap is a 
little less than one year, if this matter is transferred to the District of Minnesota and consolidated 
with the ongoing FLSA collective action there, it would seem that Plaintiffs could seek to expand 
the temporal scope of the collective with respect to the claims in this matter.  In any event, as 
discussed infra, the limited overlap between the two collective actions is  not a dispositive 
consideration with respect to the efficiency and interest-of-justice factor in this case. 
whether Target can show that it acted in “good faith” . . . .  This discovery will be 
identical for the two cases since Target’s classification decision predates either case 
and is relevant and germane to Target’s failure to take remedial measures to address 
the labor law violations that Target was committing, and which Target is alleged to 
continue to commit to this day.                                      

(Pls.’ Reply at 4–5.)                                                     
Defendants also argue that “there is significant discovery germane to Jibowu that is not 
relevant in Babbitt, and vice versa.”  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 21.)  But the Court agrees with Plaintiffs 
that the “interest of justice” analysis only “require[s] that the cases be related, not identical.”  (Pls.’ 
Reply at 2 (quoting Wald v. Bank of Am. Corp., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)) 
(internal citation omitted).).  Where, as here, allowing the two cases to proceed in different courts 
presents the very real risk of inconsistent rulings and judgments on the same issues, this factor 
weighs strongly in favor of transfer.  See Zainfeld v. Vivid Seats, LLC, No. 24-CV-1520 (DEH), 

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2024) (“Having two courts deciding the same issue 
poses an obvious risk of inconsistent judgments, not to mention a waste of judicial resources.  
Judicial economy and the interests of consistency [thus] strongly favor a single judge deciding 
both actions.”).                                                          
                      *          *         *                         
Viewing the totality of circumstances, the interest of fairness and judicial efficiency 
militate strongly in favor of transfer.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance of factors 
substantially outweighs Defendants’ objections and that a discretionary transfer of venue is 
appropriate.                                                              
                      CONCLUSION                                     

For  the  foregoing  reasons,  Plaintiffs’  motion  to  transfer  venue  pursuant  to  

(a) is granted.  This case shall be transferred in its entirety to the District of 
Minnesota.                                                                
                              SO ORDERED.                            
                              /s/ Pamela K. Chen                     
                              Pamela K. Chen                         
                              United States District Judge           
Dated:  November 12, 2024                                                 
       Brooklyn, New York                                            

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                              
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                              
-------------------------------------------------------x                  
PRISCILLA JIBOWU, Individually and on                                     
Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated,                           

            Plaintiff,           MEMORANDUM & ORDER                  
                                  17-CV-3875 (PKC) (MMH)             
     - against -                                                     

TARGET CORPORATION and TARGET                                             
CORPORATION OF MINNESOTA,                                                 

            Defendants.                                              
-------------------------------------------------------x                  
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:                             
Plaintiff Priscilla Jibowu (“Plaintiff Jibowu” or “Jibowu”), individually and on behalf of 
all other persons similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought this collective action under 
the Fair  Labor Standards Act  (“FLSA”) against  Defendants  Target  Corporation and Target 
Corporation of Minnesota (collectively “Defendants”) alleging overtime violations pursuant to the 
FLSA, New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), and Illinois 
Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”).  Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to transfer 
venue to the District of Minnesota due to developments in a related case before that court, 
Babbitt v. Target Corp., No. 20-CV-0490 (DWF) (ECW) (D. Minn.).  For the reasons stated below, 
Plaintiffs’ motion is granted.                                            
                     BACKGROUND1                                     
I.   Factual and Procedural History                                       
Defendant Target Corporation (“Target”) is a national retailer that operates approximately 
1,800 stores nationwide, with stores in each of the 50 states.  (Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129, 

1 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case and only recounts 
those facts that are relevant to the instant motion.  The Court has previously provided a detailed 
at 2.)  Each Target store has two salaried managerial positions: the senior-most Store Team Leader 
(“STL”), and some number of Executive Team Leaders (“ETLs”).  (Id.)  Target classifies ETLs as 
exempt executives/administrators for purposes of the FLSA and state labor laws.  (Id.)  Plaintiff 
Jibowu, who worked as an ETL for Target in their Chicago and Brooklyn stores, (see id. at 4), 
commenced the instant action on June 28, 2017, alleging that Target improperly classified Plaintiff 

Jibowu as an exempt executive under the FLSA, NYLL, IMWL, and IWPCA, (see Compl., 
Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 1–3, 33).  On September 6, 2019, Target moved for summary judgment on these claims, 
arguing that there was no genuine dispute that Plaintiff Jibowu’s ETL roles fell within the bona 
fide executive exemption to overtime pay and that she was properly compensated for the hours she 
worked above 40 per week.  (Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129, at 6.)  On September 30, 2020, 
the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and granted Plaintiff Jibowu and the 
seven other opt-in Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification as a collective action under the 
FLSA, defining the collective as the following:                           
[C]urrent and former Food ETLs, Sales Floor ETLs, Softlines ETLs, Hardlines 
ETLs, Guest Experience ETLs, Replenishment ETLs, and Logistics ETLs in stores 
that do not have Replenishment ETLs, employed by Defendants at the Target store 
locations within California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
and Texas, at which Plaintiff Jibowu or the opt-in Plaintiffs worked, at any time 
from June 28, 2014 to the present.                                   

(Id. at 62.)  By March 2022, the case was well into second-stage discovery, and the class was 
comprised of Plaintiff Jibowu and 34 opt-in Plaintiffs.  (See generally Def. Second Suppl. 
Disclosures, Dkt. 191-2.)  A few months later, in June 2022, Defendants filed a consent motion to 
stay the case.  (Dkt. 181.)  In its motion, Defendants informed the Court that “an action [was] 

description of the procedural history and claims in this case in its Memorandum & Order denying 
Defendants’ summary judgment motion.  (Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129); see also Jibowu v. 
Target Corp., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).                         
currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, [No. 20-CV-0490], in 
which plaintiff asserts the same FLSA claim against Target.”  (Id. at ECF 1.2)  Defendants further 
stated that “the parties agree that the Babbitt conditionally-certified collective will likely overlap 
significantly with the collective conditionally certified in Jibowu, which consists of 35 current and 
former Target ETLs who worked at covered stores in California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, 

Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas, at any time from June 28, 2014 to the present, and who filed 
consent forms to participate in the Jibowu lawsuit.”  (Id. at ECF 2.)  At the same time, Defendants 
noted that “the extent of the overlap in the conditionally certified collectives and discoverable 
material cannot be determined until after the disposition of the Rule 72 Motion in Target’s favor 
or the close of the notice and opt-in period in Babbitt (as applicable).”  (Id.)  On June 2, 2022, the 
Court granted the parties’ motion to stay the case, (see 6/2/2022 Dkt. Order), after which the case 
remained stayed for over two years pending developments in Babbitt.       
Following several joint status reports from the parties, on July 3, 2024, Plaintiffs requested 
that the Court lift the stay and allow the parties to engage in motion practice on the issue of whether 

the case should be transferred to the District of Minnesota.  (Joint Status Report, Dkt. 188.)  The 
Court granted Plaintiffs’ request.  (7/11/2024 Dkt. Order.)  Plaintiffs subsequently filed their 
motion to change venue on August 5, 2024.  (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Transfer Venue, Dkt. 189-1 
(“Pls.’ Mem.”), at 13.)  Defendants filed their opposition on September 11, 2024.  (Defs.’ Opp’n, 
Dkt. 190 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), at 26.)  Plaintiffs filed their reply, and this motion was fully briefed, 
on September 25, 2024.  (Pls.’ Reply, Dkt. 191 (“Pls.’ Reply”), at 10.)   



2 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing 
system and not the document’s internal pagination.                        
II.  The Babbitt Case                                                     
Babbitt is a 2020 collective action brought against Defendant Target in the District Court 
of Minnesota by named plaintiffs Tammy Babbitt and William Carter.3  See Babbitt, No. 20-CV-
0490, Dkt. 1.  Plaintiffs in Babbitt worked as ETLs in Target stores and alleged that Target 
misclassified them as exempt employees under federal and state overtime laws and failed to pay 

them overtime, in violation of the FLSA.  

  On March 28, 2022, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth 
Cowan Wright issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) in Babbitt that recommended 
granting conditional certification of a nationwide collective of ETLs.  (Decl. of Sara B. Tomezsko 
Opp’n Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. 190-25 (“Tomezsko Decl.”), ¶ 2.)  On August 24, 2022, District Judge 
Donovan  W.  Frank  adopted  the  R&R  over  Target’s  objections.    (Id.)    The  Babbitt  court 
conditionally certified the following collective:                         
All current and former Executive Team Leader[s] (ETLs) however variously titled, 
excluding the ETL Human Resources position, the ETL Asset Protection position, 
the ETL Remodel position, and the Logistics ETL position in stores that have 
Replenishment ETLs, who worked for [Target] in the United States at any time on 
or after July 20, 2018.                                              

(Id. ¶ 3.)  In March 2023, a third-party administrator started sending out notices of the conditional 
certification order to the Babbitt collective, with the last opt-in deadline set at December 9, 2023.  
(Id. ¶¶ 5–6.)  The scheduling order adopted in January 2024 stated that “[a]ll non-dispositive 
motions and supporting documents, including those that relate to sample fact discovery, shall be 
filed and served” by June 14, 2024, after which the second discovery phase would commence.  See 
Babbitt, No. 20-CV-0490, Dkt. 363, at 4.                                  

3 The District of Minnesota action was originally brought by Andrew Davis, who later 
withdrew, with Babbitt and Carter substituting in his place.  See Babbitt, No. 20-CV-0490, Dkt. 
46.                                                                       
Though Babbitt was originally brought by different lawyers, Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case 
started representing the Babbitt plaintiffs in late 2020.  (See Pls.’ Reply at 7–8 n.5 (“Babbitt was 
filed entirely independently of this case by other lawyers and the counsel in the two cases only 
later agreed to work together.”)); see also Babbitt, No. 20-CV-0490, Dkts. 29, 31 (Orders granting 
Mots. for Admis. Pro Hac Vice for Att’ys Predovan, Timmel, Rudich, Lesser, and Gershbaum).  

Following the grant of conditional certification in Babbitt, two individuals who joined the Jibowu 
case as opt-in Plaintiffs—Bertram Pryce and Kyla Cushman—also opted into Babbitt.  (Pls.’ Mem. 
at 1–2.)                                                                  
                    LEGAL STANDARD                                   
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to 
any district or division to which all parties have consented.”  

(a).  “Under this 
statute, transfer is appropriate where (1) the plaintiff could have originally brought the case in the 
transferee forum, and (2) the balance of convenience and justice favors transfer.”  Buccafusco v. 
Resorts Casino Hotel Atl. City, No. 20-CV-5687 (PKC) (LB), 

, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 

Jan. 6, 2021) (citing N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 

 (2d 
Cir. 2010)).  Once it is established that a plaintiff could have originally brought the action in the 
transferee court,4 courts typically determine whether the case should be transferred by weighing 
the following nine factors:                                               
(1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus 
of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of 
unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease 
of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s 

4 Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff Jibowu could have originally brought the case in 
the District of Minnesota since Defendant Target is headquartered there.  (See Pls.’ Mem. at 4–5; 
Defs.’ Opp’n at 7.)                                                       
familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded the plaintiff[’]s choice 
of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interest of justice, based on the totality of 
the circumstances.                                                   

Rimler v. Ripple Junction Design Co., No. 19-CV-5953 (PKC) (CLP), 

, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting S & L Birchwood, LLC v. LFC Cap., 
Inc., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)).  The party requesting the transfer bears the 
burden of making a “strong case for transfer.”  N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 

 
(quoting Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 
1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Lastly, “[c]ourts have discretion when balancing these 
factors and no one factor is decisive.”  Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. v. Obbink, No. 21-CV-3113 (RPK) 
(MMH), 

, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2023) (quoting Erickson v. MGM Grand, 
Inc., No. 13-CV-0564 (NRB), 

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2014)).  
                      DISCUSSION                                     
I.   The Existence of Changed Circumstances                               
As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to show a change in 
circumstances warranting transfer, and “that fact, in and of itself, counsels in favor of denying the 
request to transfer the case.”  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2–3.)  While they acknowledge that the existence 
of a related case in a different court could warrant transfer in some circumstances, Defendants 
maintain that, in this instance, “there is nothing that recently occurred in Babbitt that would 
constitute a change of circumstances to justify transfer at this time,” and that “ [t]he mere existence 
of Babbitt is plainly insufficient to constitute a change in circumstances.”  (Id. at 4.)  Defendants 
further accuse Plaintiffs of “[f]orum shopping” and having “filer’s remorse,” given that the Babbitt 
plaintiffs  achieved  a  more  favorable  outcome  than  the  Jibowu  plaintiffs  on  conditional 
certification.  (Id. at 6–7.)  They assert that Plaintiffs should have met and conferred with 
Defendants and notified them of their intention to potentially transfer the case back when the 
parties initially requested the stay of the proceedings.  (Id. at 5–6.)   
As Plaintiffs note, “[t]he Second Circuit has not ruled on, and courts in this Circuit disagree 
on, whether a plaintiff seeking to transfer venue must demonstrate a change in circumstances since 
filing the suit.”  Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 

 at *3; (Pls.’ Reply at 7 n.5; see also 

Defs.’ Opp’n at 3 n.1 (acknowledging that a few courts within the Second Circuit have excused a 
movant-plaintiff from demonstrating changed circumstances).)  For some courts, absent such a 
showing, a “motion to transfer venue is not ordinarily granted at the request of the party who chose 
the forum in the first place.”  Megna v. Biocomp Lab’ys Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (requiring plaintiff to show change in circumstances in motion to transfer venue); see also, 
e.g., Bakken Res., Inc. v. Edington, No. 15-CV-8686 (ALC), 

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 29, 2019) (denying motion for transfer for failure to show, inter alia, sufficiently changed 
circumstances).  For other courts, “even though a bona fide change in circumstances may be a sure 
sign that transfer of venue would be in the interests of justice, it does not augment or displace that 

essential inquiry.”  Nat’l Experiential, LLC v. Nike, Inc., No. 12-CV-3197 (ENV) (SIL), 

, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2021); see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale Univ., 
No. 02-CV-1205 (PCD), 

, at *2–3 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2006) (finding that, where 
transfer is “in the interest of justice,” an action may be transferred even if plaintiff cannot show a 
change in circumstances); Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 

 at *4 (finding “that the 
interests of justice inquiry adequately subsumes consideration of any change in circumstances”); 
Lihuan Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., No. 13-CV-0218 (PKC), 

, 
at  *3  (S.D.N.Y.  Jan.  13,  2014)  (noting  that  a  showing  of  changed  circumstances  is  not 
“mandatory,” as the court has “broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under 
[28 U.S.C.] Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-
case basis”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).            
The Court agrees with those courts that have found no need for a showing of changed 
circumstances where the transfer is in the interest of justice.  But even if such a requirement did 
exist, there is no doubt that such a showing would be satisfied in this case.  In their reply brief, 

Plaintiffs contend that their motion to transfer was submitted at an appropriate point in this case 
because “Babbit . . . has [now] reached the exact same posture as this case was when it was 
stayed.”  (Pls.’ Reply at 3; id. at 7 (“[I]t was precisely when both cases reached the same procedural 
point as to second-stage discovery that Plaintiffs, in June, informed Target that they believed the 
cases should be brought together.”).)  Moreover, Plaintiffs note that “[w]hen this case was stayed, 
Babbitt had just been conditionally certified and involved a few individuals.  Now, it has become 
a 3,500 person collective in which the parties are engaged in the same second-stage discovery 
issues as this case with overlapping work regions, districts, [and] stores.”  (Id. at 7 n.5.)  These are 
certainly “new” developments that have taken place since the filing of this suit in 2017.  See Fisher, 

204 F. Supp. 3d at 623 (“Courts assessing this threshold question in plaintiffs’ motions to transfer 
have required plaintiffs to identify a new development that ‘warrants transferring the action to the 
transferee forum.’ . . . This change must have taken place since the filing of the suit.” (quoting 
Ferrostaal, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))).  Moreover, 
these are not examples of circumstances that existed at the time Plaintiffs chose this forum, nor 
are they developments that are only tangentially related to this case.  See Universal Marine Med. 
Supply, Inc. v. Lovecchio, No. 98-CV-3495 (ILG), 

, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 
1999) (“Examples of changes in circumstances warranting transfer include . . . the pendency of a 
related action filed by a plaintiff in the transferee district.”)  Thus, even if Plaintiffs did have a 
burden to demonstrate a change in circumstances—which this Court believes they do not—that 
standard has been satisfied here.                                         
II.  Balancing Factor Analysis                                            
Defendants only dispute six of the nine factors that courts typically weigh to determine 
whether the balance of convenience and justice favors transfer.5  The Court considers each of these 

six factors in turn.                                                      
1.  The Convenience of Witnesses                                     
Plaintiffs contend that in FLSA collective action cases such as this, where witnesses are 
“geographically disparate,” convenience of witnesses is found “either at the corporate defendant’s 
headquarters, or in no single venue because the relevant witnesses are most likely to be found 
disbursed [sic] and where the opt-ins worked.”  (Pls.’ Mem. at 6.)  Defendants, in opposition, state 
that “the presence of a significant number of plaintiffs and their witnesses in New York weighs 
against transfer,” and that “Plaintiffs offer no specific facts as to the identity of key witnesses and 
the nature of their anticipated testimony.  That itself is a reason to reject the transfer request.”  
(Defs.’ Opp’n at 9.)                                                      
“Courts typically regard the convenience of witnesses as the most important factor in 

considering a § 1404(a) motion to transfer.”  Herbert Ltd. P’ship v. Elec. Arts Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  “In assessing whether to transfer this action, the Court notes the 
convenience of witnesses located outside of either this District or the [District of Minnesota] 
should be afforded little, if any, weight.”  Rindfleisch v. Gentiva Health Sys., Inc., 

, 252 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see, e.g., Elec. Workers Pension Fund, Loc. 103 v. Nuvelo, Inc., 

5 Defendants agree with Plaintiffs that the following factors are neutral: (1) the location of 
documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2) the relative means of the parties, and 
(3) the weight accorded to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum.  (See Defs.’ Opp’n at 17–19.) 
Nos.  07-CV-975  (HB),  07-CV-1229  (HB),  07-CV-1777  (HB),  07-CV-1953  (HB),  

, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007) (“Typically . . . district courts have given little, if 
any, weight to the convenience of witnesses who reside in neither the transferor nor transferee 
forum.”).  Moreover, courts “must do more than merely compare the number of witnesses who 
reside in the current forum to the number located in the proposed transferee forum, but should 

instead assess the materiality, nature and quality of the testimony that the witnesses are likely to 
provide.”  Capitol Recs., LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Here, Plaintiffs have identified several corporate witnesses who could offer material 
testimony as to the duties and titles of Target ETLs—a central issue in the case.6  (Pls.’ Reply at 8–
9 n.6.)  Plaintiffs claim that these individuals were responsible for ensuring that ETLs are properly 
classified under the FLSA, as well as for determining store policy, store operations, and ETL 
training materials.  (Id.)  Where a corporation’s practices and policies constitute the heart of a 
claim, courts have favored transfer to the district where the corporate headquarters are located.  
See Farrior v. George Weston Bakeries Distrib., Inc., No. 08-CV-2705 (JFB) (WDW), 

, at *4–6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2009) (where FLSA collective action raised questions 
about  defendant  company’s  compensation  policies  and  practices,  transfer  to  district  where 
defendant’s headquarters were located was warranted because, inter alia, substantial aspects of 
those policies were developed by individuals at corporate headquarters); Earley v. BJ’s Wholesale 


6  They  include  the  potential  testimony  of:  (1)  Michael  Brewer,  Director-Employee 
Relations, regarding Target’s compliance with state and federal wage-and-hour laws and annual 
ETL self-audits; (2) Tonya Lizakowski, former Director-Employee Relations, regarding Target’s 
compliance with state and federal wage-and-hour laws; (3) Melissa Doll, Lead Business Partner, 
HR Planning & Delivery, regarding Target’s compliance with state and federal wage-and-hour 
laws; (4) Laura Poling (f/k/a Hernandez), Lead Compensation Consultant, regarding Target’s 
payment and calculation of ETL bonuses; and (5) Patti Koch, Senior Director Compensation, 
regarding Target’s compensation of ETLs.  (Pls.’ Reply at 9 n.6.)         
Club, Inc., No. 06-CV-3529 (WHP), 

, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (transfer 
of FLSA action to district where defendant’s headquarters were located was appropriate where key 
issue in case was nature and implementation of company-wide overtime policies); Rindfleisch, 752 
F. Supp. 2d at 256–57 (finding that the more critical and extensive testimony was likely to be 
provided by parties and witnesses residing in the transferee district, where the corporation was 

headquartered and its executives who set  company-wide policies were based).  This factor 
therefore weighs in favor of transfer.                                    
2.  The Convenience of the Parties                                   
Courts  generally  find  that  this  factor  favors  transfer  “when  transfer  would  increase 
convenience to the moving party without generally increasing inconvenience to the non-movant.”  
Dickerson v. Novartis Corp., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Fairbanks Co., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).  “Ordinarily, [this] factor becomes 
neutral when transfer would merely shift the inconvenience from the non-movant to the movant.”  
Penrose v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 22-CV-2184 (JPC), 

, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 
2023).  While it is true that eight of the Plaintiffs in this case live in New York and none live in 

Minnesota, Plaintiffs themselves assert that “[i]t seems almost superfluous to point out that it is 
Plaintiffs who are making this motion and hence are willing to bear any inconvenience.”  (Pls.’ 
Reply at 8–9 (emphasis in original).)  Because litigating in Minnesota would not shift any burden 
onto Defendants7, and would not be inconvenient for Plaintiffs, the Court finds that this factor 
weighs in favor of transfer.                                              



7 For example, as Plaintiffs note, regardless of where the case is litigated, Defendants will 
have to depose Plaintiffs in New York.  (See Pls.’ Reply at 9 n.7.)       
3.  The Locus of Operative Facts                                     
Although “in a nationwide FLSA action . . . it is often difficult to fix a single locus of 
operative facts, . . . courts have concluded that operative facts may be found at the locations where 
employees worked, notwithstanding allegations that a uniform corporate policy caused the FLSA 
violations.”  Scalia v. KDE Equine, LLC, No. 19-CV-3389 (KAM) (SJB), 

, at *6 

(E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2020) (quoting Flood v. Carlson Rests Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015)); see also Bukhari v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, No. 12-CV-4290 (PAE), 

, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (“[T]he locus of operative facts is the location of the alleged 
violations . . . not the corporate headquarters.”).  Here, there is no dispute that no Plaintiff worked 
in Minnesota and that eight Plaintiffs worked at stores in New York.  (Pls.’ Reply at 8.)  This factor 
therefore weighs against transfer.                                        
4.  The Availability of Process to Compel Attendance of Unwilling Witnesses 
Though, as noted previously, Plaintiffs have identified material corporate witnesses, they 
have not provided detailed information regarding any third-party witnesses, e.g., where they 
currently live and whether they are still employed by Defendants.  (Pls.’ Mem. at 9; Pls.’ Reply 
at 9 n.6.)  Plaintiffs, however, note that since “Plaintiffs might wish to call unwilling corporate 

witnesses from Target’s headquarters, the District of Minnesota would be favored.”  (Pls.’ Mem. 
at 9.)  But, as even Defendants acknowledge, “to the extent that Defendants’ witnesses are current 
employees, Defendants presumably can compel their testimony without a subpoena.”  (Defs.’ 
Opp’n at 16–17 (quoting Flood v. Carlson Restaurants Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (cleaned up)).)                                                     
Defendants argue that “if any third-party witnesses are unwilling to testify, they are far 
more likely to be former Target employees who worked with plaintiffs at stores outside of 
Minnesota.  Transferring the case to Minnesota—more than 100 miles from the stores at issue—
would jeopardize a court’s ability to compel their testimony.”  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 17.)  Plaintiffs 
respond that in a collective action such as this, most unwilling third-party witnesses are likely to 
be geographically scattered, rendering the reach of 100-mile radius for witness subpoenas the same 
for either court.  (Pls.’ Reply at 10.)  Plaintiffs also question Target’s ability to summon its former 
employees to testify on a voluntary basis if the case remains in this District, stating that “there is 

no guarantee that [Target] will be able to do so, for example, for the witnesses involved in the 
classification decision twenty or more years ago.”  (Id.)  The Court finds that there is no 
demonstrated or predictable difference in the availability of process between the two districts and 
has no reason to believe that litigating the case in this District would be more or less burdensome 
than in the District of Minnesota with respect to issuing subpoenas.  The Court thus concludes that 
this factor is neutral.                                                   
5.  The Forum’s Familiarity with Governing Law                       
“‘Familiarity with the governing law is generally given little weight in federal courts.’ . . .  
This is particularly true when the governing law is a federal statute like the FLSA, which is equally 
familiar to all federal courts.”  Flood, 

 (quoting AEC One Stop Grp., Inc. v. 

CD Listening Bar, Inc., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  When it comes to the state 
law claims present in this action, it is certainly the case that this Court, as a federal district court 
located in New York, has the most familiarity in applying the NYLL.  In the past, courts have 
weighed this factor against transfer.  See, e.g., Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. v. Tala Bros. Corp., 

 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[W]here there are state law claims, the forum’s familiarity 
with governing law supports retention of the action”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  But the NYLL is not the only state law violation alleged in this case—Plaintiff Jibowu 
also alleges violations of Illinois state law, namely the IMWL and the IWPCA.  Thus, to the extent 
that state law claims from other states may arise in this case, “‘federal courts are deemed capable 
of applying the law of other states’” and “the ‘governing law’ factor is to be accorded little weight 
on a motion to transfer venue.”  Neil Bros. Ltd. v. World Wide Lines, Inc., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Norcom Dev., Inc., No. 97-CV-6308 (DC), 

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1998)) (cleaned up).  The Court thus considers this 
factor neutral.                                                           

6.  Trial Efficiency and the Interest of Justice, Based on the Totality of Circumstances 
When it comes to trial efficiency, “[t]here is a strong policy favoring the litigation of related 
claims in the same tribunal in order that pretrial discovery can be conducted more efficiently, 
duplicitous litigation can be avoided, thereby saving time and expense for both parties and 
witnesses, and inconsistent results can be avoided.”  Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Ass’n of Flight 
Attendants, CWA, 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 

, 619 (2d Cir. 1968)).  Indeed, “courts consistently recognize that the existence of a 
related action in the transferee district is a strong factor to be weighed with regard to judicial 
economy.”    Brown  v.  New  York,  

,  325–26  (E.D.N.Y.  2013)  (quoting 
Williams v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-5342 (RWS), 

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 

2006)) (cleaned up).                                                      
Here, Defendants emphasize that the “mere existence of related litigation,” however, is not 
enough; what matters instead is “the degree of overlap between the [related] actions.”  (Defs.’ 
Opp’n at 20.)  Though Jibowu and Babbitt allege the same FLSA misclassification claims against 
Target, Defendants point to the various ways the conditional collectives in the two cases do not 
overlap.  For example, broadly speaking, the Babbitt collective includes all “current and former 
[ETLs] . . . who worked for Defendants in the United States at any times on or after July 20, 2018,” 
(Tomezsko Decl., Dkt. 190-25, ¶ 3), while the Jibowu collective includes only “current and former 
[ETLs] . . . employed . . . at the Target store locations within California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas . . . at any time from June 28, 2014 to the present,” (see 
Summ. J. Mem. & Order, Dkt. 129, at 62).  Defendants rely on Scalia—a case where the Court 
ultimately denied transfer when two related actions had different liability periods and only five 
overlapping plaintiffs—to argue that the same should happen in this case.  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 20); 

.                                                          

Defendants’ reliance on Scalia is unavailing.  In Scalia, the related case (pending in the 
Western District of Kentucky) was “already at an advanced stage” and concerned “different groups 
of employees who were allegedly underpaid at different times.”  

, at *7.  Here, 
though there currently is limited overlap between the time periods of the two collectives,8 both 
cases are procedurally at the same point and concern employees who have essentially the same 
role within Target stores.  A small amount of overlap between the liability periods of the two cases 
is not sufficient to outweigh the larger efficiencies that may be gained from having both cases 
before the same court.  As Plaintiffs note, there are several other considerations supporting transfer 
of this case for the purposes of trial efficiency:                        

Going forward the cases will proceed down the exact same path[.] [T]here will be 
extensive discovery of Target corporation itself, particularly and critically, as to 
Target’s corporate-wide policies and practices and its corporate state of mind, 
including whether it acted willfully or with a reckless disregard for the FLSA . . . or 

8 The time period for the Jibowu collective extends from June 28, 2014 to June 28, 2019, 
which was “the present” for purposes of the Court’s summary judgment decision.  (Summ. J. Mem. 
& Order, Dkt. 129, at 56 (“However, the Court grants conditional certification of those ETLs in 
the proposed collective who were employed in the particular Target stores . . . even temporarily, 
from June 28, 2014, to June 28, 2019.”).)  In contrast, the Babbitt collective covers “any time on 
or after July 20, 2018.”  (Tomezsko Decl., Dkt. 190-25, ¶ 3.)  Although the current overlap is a 
little less than one year, if this matter is transferred to the District of Minnesota and consolidated 
with the ongoing FLSA collective action there, it would seem that Plaintiffs could seek to expand 
the temporal scope of the collective with respect to the claims in this matter.  In any event, as 
discussed infra, the limited overlap between the two collective actions is  not a dispositive 
consideration with respect to the efficiency and interest-of-justice factor in this case. 
whether Target can show that it acted in “good faith” . . . .  This discovery will be 
identical for the two cases since Target’s classification decision predates either case 
and is relevant and germane to Target’s failure to take remedial measures to address 
the labor law violations that Target was committing, and which Target is alleged to 
continue to commit to this day.                                      

(Pls.’ Reply at 4–5.)                                                     
Defendants also argue that “there is significant discovery germane to Jibowu that is not 
relevant in Babbitt, and vice versa.”  (Defs.’ Opp’n at 21.)  But the Court agrees with Plaintiffs 
that the “interest of justice” analysis only “require[s] that the cases be related, not identical.”  (Pls.’ 
Reply at 2 (quoting Wald v. Bank of Am. Corp., 

 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)) 
(internal citation omitted).).  Where, as here, allowing the two cases to proceed in different courts 
presents the very real risk of inconsistent rulings and judgments on the same issues, this factor 
weighs strongly in favor of transfer.  See Zainfeld v. Vivid Seats, LLC, No. 24-CV-1520 (DEH), 

, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2024) (“Having two courts deciding the same issue 
poses an obvious risk of inconsistent judgments, not to mention a waste of judicial resources.  
Judicial economy and the interests of consistency [thus] strongly favor a single judge deciding 
both actions.”).                                                          
                      *          *         *                         
Viewing the totality of circumstances, the interest of fairness and judicial efficiency 
militate strongly in favor of transfer.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance of factors 
substantially outweighs Defendants’ objections and that a discretionary transfer of venue is 
appropriate.                                                              
                      CONCLUSION                                     

For  the  foregoing  reasons,  Plaintiffs’  motion  to  transfer  venue  pursuant  to  

(a) is granted.  This case shall be transferred in its entirety to the District of 
Minnesota.                                                                
                              SO ORDERED.                            
                              /s/ Pamela K. Chen                     
                              Pamela K. Chen                         
                              United States District Judge           
Dated:  November 12, 2024                                                 
       Brooklyn, New York