Rued v. Hudson
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota
Rued v. Hudson
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Joseph Daryll Rued, W.O.R., Scott Daryll Case No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL)
Rued, and Leah Jean Rued,
Plaintiffs,
v. ORDER AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro, Car-
rie Lennon, Keith Ellison, Alec Sloan,
Beth Barbosa, Charlie Alden, Gilbert
Alden Barbosa PLLC, Catrina M. Rued,
Hennepin County Clerk of Court, Jamie
Pearson, and CornerHouse,
Defendants.
Joseph Daryll Rued, W.O.R., Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued, pro se Plaintiffs.
Joseph D. Weiner, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, 445 Minnesota St., Suite 1100,
St. Paul, MN 55101, for Defendants Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro, Carrie Lennon,
Keith Ellison, and Alec Sloan
Beth Barbosa and Charlie R. Alden, Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, 3800 American Blvd.
West, Suite 1500, Edina, MN 55431, for Defendants Beth Barbosa, Charlie Alden, Gil-
bert Alden Barbosa PLLC, and Catrina M. Rued.
Ashley Marie Ramstad and Susan M. Tindal, Iverson Reuters, 9321 Ensign Ave. S.,
Bloomington, MN 55438, for Defendant Jamie Pearson.
Shannon L. Bjorklund, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 50 S. 6th St., Suite 1500, Minneapolis,
MN 55402, for Defendant CornerHouse.
This matter comes before the Court on the following filings:
1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for a Civil Case [ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”)];
2. the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Seek Filing Re-
strictions filed by Defendants Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro,
Carrie Lennon, Keith Ellison, and Alec Sloan [ECF No. 10];
3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reassignment of Related Cases Pursuant to this
Court’s July 19, 2021 Standing Order to the Judicial Officers Earlier
Assigned [ECF No. 17 (“Reassignment Motion”)];
4. Defendant CornerHouse’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 25];
5. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Motion to Deny Persons That Are Also Min-
nesota State Judicial and Attorney General Officers’ Motion to Dis-
miss [ECF No. 32];
6. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Motion to Deny CornerHouse’s Motion to Dis-
miss [ECF No. 39];
7. the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Catrina M. Rued, Beth Bar-
bosa, Charlie R. Alden, and Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC [ECF No.
46];
8. Plaintiffs’ Amended FRCP 11 Motion for Sanctions Against Dorsey
& Whitney and Order for Such Firm to Immediately Withdraw from
These Cases [ECF No. 51];
9. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Dorsey & Whitney’s Representation
of CornerHouse [ECF No. 53];
10. Defendant Jamie Pearson’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 69];
11. Pearson’s Motion for Sanctions [ECF No. 75];
12. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Motion to Deny Beth Barbosa, Catrina Rued,
Charlie Alden, and Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Relevant Claims [ECF No. 81]; and
13. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate Related Cases [ECF No. 88];
For the following reasons, the Court denies the Reassignment Motion as moot, rec-
ommends dismissing this action without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and recommends
denying most of the remaining motions as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
This is the fourth of five cases that Plaintiff Joseph Rued has filed in this District
based on his strong disagreement with the outcome of state-court custody proceedings in-
volving his son, W.O.R.1 In four of these cases, Scott Daryll Rued and Leah Jean Rued—
Joseph’s parents and W.O.R.’s paternal grandparents—have also served as plaintiffs.2 This
Court recently issued a Report and Recommendation in another of these cases, summariz-
ing key points from the earlier state-court proceedings and the first of the Rueds’ federal
cases. See generally R. & R. 4–9, Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-1763 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.
Nov. 6, 2024) (“R&R in No. 24-CV-1763”). In what follows, the Court assumes familiar-
ity with that discussion.
This action began on August 26, 2024, when the Court received the Complaint. See
Docket. The Complaint names twelve defendants, listed below with brief descriptions of
the relevant allegations against each:
• The Complaint identifies Defendant Natalie Hudson as a “state judi-
cial officer”; the Court takes judicial notice that Hudson is the current
chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Compl. 2.3 Plain-
tiffs allege that Chief Justice Hudson improperly relied on perjury
from prior child protective services (“CPS”) investigations and inter-
fered in certain proceedings involving W.O.R.’s custody. Specifi-
cally, they claim she prevented a fraud action, allegedly relevant to
1 In order: (1) Rued v. Hatcher, No. 23-CV-2685 (NEB/DJF) (D. Minn.) (filed Aug. 31, 2023); (2) Rued v. Jayswal,
No. 24-CV-1763 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.) (filed May 15, 2024); (3) Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-2437 (JRT/TNL) (D.
Minn.) (filed June 24, 2024); (4) Rued v. Hudson, No. 24-CV-3409 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.) (filed Aug. 26, 2024);
and (5) Rued v. Webber, No. 24-CV-3662 (JWB/DWF) (D. Minn.) (filed Sept. 16, 2024).
2 This applies to cases (1)–(4) above. W.O.R. is a named plaintiff in all five cases, though the parties here and in other
actions dispute whether the other Rueds can represent him. See, e.g., ECF No. 28 at 8–10; ECF No. 41 at 20–36.
Since the Court’s recommended resolution relies on a lack of jurisdiction, it need not—so does not—address the issue
of W.O.R.’s representation.
3 The Court may take judicial notice of readily ascertainable facts. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (“The court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s
territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.”).
W.O.R.’s custody, from proceeding in Hennepin County District
Court. See id. at 8–10.
• Plaintiffs identify Defendant Leonardo Castro as a “state judicial of-
ficer,” and the Court takes judicial notice that he is a district-court
judge for Minnesota’s Second Judicial District in Ramsey County. Id.
at 4. Plaintiffs allege that Judge Castro incorrectly applied state pre-
clusion principles, including res judicata, to avoid addressing certain
“unreached federal claims” raised by Plaintiffs in state-court actions.
Id. at 7–10. They also claim that Judge Castro improperly relied on
perjury from prior CPS investigations. See id. at 8.
• Plaintiffs name Carrie Lennon as a third “state judicial officer,” and
the Court takes judicial notice that she is the chief judge of Minne-
sota’s First Judicial District and serves in Scott County. Id. at 2. The
Complaint’s allegations against Judge Lennon largely mirror those
against Judge Castro. See id. at 7–10.
• Plaintiffs also name Keith Ellison, Minnesota’s attorney general, as a
defendant. See id. at 4. They allege that Ellison committed fraud on
various courts by falsely stating in filings that certain of Plaintiffs’
claims had already been addressed and/or should not be considered
due to state-law preclusion principles. See id. at 12. Plaintiffs also
name Alec Sloan, an “[a]ssistant Minnesota Attorney General,” alleg-
ing he engaged in the same practices. Id. at 12, 27.
• Other defendants include Catrina Rued, Joseph Rued’s ex-wife and
W.O.R.’s mother; attorneys Beth Barbosa and Charlie Alden, who
represented Catrina Rued in the state-court divorce and custody pro-
ceedings; and the law firm Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, where Bar-
bosa and Alden are partners. See id. at 27. Plaintiffs allege that each
of these defendants knew of perjury in a “CHIPS petition” affecting
W.O.R.’s custody but continued submitting documents relying on that
perjury to various courts. See id. at 12–15; cf. R&R in No. 24-CV-
1763 at 5–8 (discussing underlying perjury claims).
• Plaintiffs allege that the Hennepin County Clerk of Court improperly
failed to file a memorandum of law that Plaintiffs attempted to submit
in Hennepin County District Court in July 2024. See Compl. 18–19.
• Plaintiffs identify Jamie Pearson as a police officer for the City of
Shakopee. See id. at 28. They allege that Pearson “failed to make
mandatory reports regarding her knowledge . . . of falsified CPS
investigations and other maltreatment and endangerment of W.O.R.”
Id. at 19; see also id. at 25 (presenting similar allegation).
• Finally, Plaintiffs identify CornerHouse as a Minnesota-based “child
welfare agency acting under color of state law with municipal inves-
tigators.” Id. at 29. Plaintiffs allege that CornerHouse participated in
the CPS investigation underlying the “CHIPS petition” mentioned
above and incorrectly concluded—allegedly in contradiction with its
own internal records—that certain reports of abuse or maltreatment of
W.O.R. were false and that W.O.R. may have been coached to make
them. See id. at 20–22.
For relief, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 22–23,
25–26. They also request various forms of declaratory relief, including declarations that
certain individuals’ conduct violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See id. at 23–25.
As suggested in the Introduction above, all but one Defendant have moved to dis-
miss the Complaint.4 Two motions argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the so-
called Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., ECF No. 12 at 8–10; ECF No. 70 at 10–13.5
Plaintiffs have responded to this argument. See, e.g., ECF No. 33 at 3–4, 11, 35, 38–39.6
Additionally, several Defendants have requested sanctions against Plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
4 The exception is the Hennepin County Clerk of Court, who has not appeared in this action. See generally Docket.
On September 12, 2024, Joseph Rued filed a certificate of service indicating that he had caused the Complaint to be
“delivered to . . . the Chief Executive Officer of the Hennepin County District Court Clerk of Court.” ECF No. 6 at
1. This wording suggests that Rued himself handled the delivery, which raises questions about proper service. Cf.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (stating that service must be made by “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party”
(emphasis added)). However, given the jurisdictional resolution suggested in what follows, the Court need not further
address this Defendant’s lack of response.
5 Although some Defendants have not raised Rooker–Feldman concerns, the Court may still apply the doctrine to
claims against those parties. Rooker–Feldman affects a court’s jurisdiction, and courts must address jurisdictional
issues sua sponte. See, e.g., Thigulla v. Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770, 773 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis,587 U.S. 541
, 548 (2019)); InterRad Med., Inc. v. Aquilant Ltd., No. 23-CV-3709 (ECT/DTS),2024 WL 913343
, at
*3 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2024) (citing Fort Bend Cnty.).
6 The Court notes that Plaintiffs addressed Rooker–Feldman arguments in ECF No. 12 through their filing at ECF No.
33 but have not responded to Defendant Pearson’s Rooker–Feldman argument in ECF No. 70. Nevertheless, the Court
will resolve the Rooker–Feldman issue now for two reasons. First, Pearson filed a motion for sanctions alongside her
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs responded to the sanctions motion but not the dismissal motion, leaving their intentions
regarding the latter unclear. Second, the Court is well-versed in Plaintiffs’ objections to applying Rooker–Feldman to
Plaintiffs’ various matters, and is confident that any response to Pearson’s motion would not present new arguments
significant enough to alter the analysis.
ECF No. 12 at 15–20; ECF No. 47 at 10–12; ECF No. 76 at 1–8. Plaintiffs have also
addressed these requests. See, e.g., ECF No. 33 at 34–37; ECF No. 83 at 10; ECF No. 94
at 1–2. The Court thus finds these issues ready for resolution.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Reassignment Motion
When Plaintiffs filed this action, this District’s Clerk of Court assigned it to U.S.
District Judge Eric C. Tostrud and U.S. Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty. See Docket.
On September 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Reassignment Motion, requesting reassignment
to this Court and U.S. District Judge John R. Tunheim, partly due to this Court’s and Judge
Tunheim’s assignment to Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-1763, and Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-
CV-2437. See ECF No. 17 at 1; ECF No. 19 at 1–2.
On September 25, 2024, Judge Tostrud and Judge Tunheim entered an order reas-
signing this case to this Court and Judge Tunheim. See ECF No. 23. The relief sought by
the Reassignment Motion has thus already been granted, so the Court denies the Reassign-
ment Motion as moot.
B. Rooker–Feldman
This Court’s prior order in Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-1763, also addressed
Rooker–Feldman issues, and that discussion fully applies here.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine establishes a jurisdic-
tional rule preventing federal district courts from acting as ap-
pellate reviewers of state-court judgments. The doctrine ap-
plies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of in-
juries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the dis-
trict court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” The doctrine aims
to preserve the U.S. Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate juris-
diction over state-court decisions.
If litigants could bypass Rooker–Feldman by challeng-
ing a state-court judgment under a different label, the doctrine
would be toothless. Thus, “[t]he doctrine precludes district
courts from obtaining jurisdiction both over the rare case styled
as a direct appeal . . . as well as more common claims which
are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court decisions.” Con-
versely, if a plaintiff asserts “independent claims arising from
conduct in underlying state proceedings,” then Rooker–Feld-
man generally does not bar jurisdiction.
The key question, then, is how to differentiate between
claims that are inextricably intertwined with state-court deci-
sions and those that are independent. Claims are “inextricably
intertwined” if they are so closely related to a prior state-court
judgment that a federal ruling would effectively overturn the
state decision. Put differently, a claim is inextricably inter-
twined with a state-court ruling if it “‘can succeed only to the
extent the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’”
Additionally, courts assess the source of a plaintiff’s alleged
injury when applying Rooker–Feldman. As the Supreme Court
highlighted in [Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005)], Rooker–Feldman applies when a plain-
tiff complains of “injuries caused by state-court judgments.”
These standards, and review of the relief the Complaint
seeks, plainly show that Rooker–Feldman strips this Court of
jurisdiction here. To be sure, Plaintiffs do not pose the chal-
lenge here as a direct appeal of any state-court decisions (in the
[state-court divorce action] or otherwise). But there is simply
no plausible way to construe Plaintiffs’ battery of relief re-
quests in this action without seeing them as a full-bore chal-
lenge to (1) the custody-related aspects of the [state-court di-
vorce action] and/or (2) the numerous state- and federal-court
decisions that themselves refuse to revisit or overrule the
[d]ivorce [a]ction’s final result. The Court certainly under-
stands Plaintiffs’ frustration: ultimately, they vehemently dis-
agree with evidentiary rulings . . . that arguably led to a cus-
tody outcome that they find abhorrent. Critically, however,
Plaintiffs were able to challenge those rulings in the [d]ivorce
[a]ction itself and simply failed to prevail. And then, of course,
they have repeatedly tried—but failed—to persuade other
state- and federal-court judges that the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals’s judgment in the [d]ivorce [a]ction does not tie other tri-
bunals’ hands (either because of preclusion principles or juris-
dictional consequences). This action is just another manifesta-
tion of Plaintiffs’ long-running attempt to undercut the
[d]ivorce [a]ction’s determination concerning W.O.R.’s cus-
tody. Its claims are plainly inextricably intertwined with that
proceeding’s ruling.
R&R in No. 24-CV-1763 at 12–15 (citations omitted).
The same logic applies here. The Court cannot grant any of the relief that Plaintiffs
seek here without at least implicitly concluding that Minnesota’s state courts mishandled
the proceedings determining W.O.R.’s custody. Therefore, Rooker–Feldman appears to
strip this Court of jurisdiction over this action.
Plaintiffs argue that Rooker–Feldman does not apply here—indeed, they claim it is
so clearly inapplicable that anyone who disagrees must be acting in bad faith. See, e.g.,
ECF No. 33 at 4, 11. But their arguments here mirror those in No. 24-CV-1763, and this
Court’s prior discussion of those arguments also applies fully here:
Plaintiffs offer several arguments for why Rooker–
Feldman does not apply, but none succeed. First, they argue
that this action presents “independent claims” that bypass the
Rooker–Feldman bar. Specifically, they assert that their “pri-
mary claim, which all of Plaintiffs’ claims fundamentally relate
to, is that [Defendant] Jayswal fraudulently concluded CPS in-
vestigations regarding W.O.R. in an under-oath [CHIPS peti-
tion] utilized to deprive Plaintiffs’ protected rights.” But the
only way this claim can succeed is if Plaintiffs show that the
[d]ivorce [a]ction improperly refused to consider the Jayswal-
related evidence that Joseph Rued wanted to introduce there.
So this “primary claim” is not at all independent of the
[d]ivorce [a]ction.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Rooker–Feldman does
not apply because (1) the doctrine applies only when state-
court proceedings are complete, and (2) they still have custody-
related challenges pending in Minnesota state court. The Su-
preme Court indeed limits Rooker–Feldman to cases where
plaintiffs complain about “state-court judgments rendered be-
fore the district court proceedings commenced.” The problem
with Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is that the Minnesota Court
of Appeals’s entered judgment in the [d]ivorce [a]ction on No-
vember 17, 2022—well before this action began. Therefore,
Plaintiffs are indeed challenging a state-court judgment entered
before this action started.
Plaintiffs’ apparent counterargument is that some of the
collateral actions they have filed in state court remain ongoing.
In other words, they suggest a sort of tolling principle: for
Rooker–Feldman to apply, the district-court proceeding must
arise not just after entry of the judgment being challenged, but
also after courts entertain any related collateral challenges to
the judgment. Plaintiffs cite no authority for this tolling prin-
ciple, and this Court is aware of none. Indeed, this case illus-
trates the obvious practical problem such a rule would create:
under it, one could sidestep Rooker–Feldman simply by filing
repeated new cases, as Plaintiffs have done.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Rooker–Feldman does not
apply because their claims about Defendants’ unconstitutional
conduct are somehow “unreached.” Respectfully, this is incor-
rect. Plaintiffs had an opportunity to persuade Minnesota’s
courts—including its appellate courts—of their bedrock claim
that certain evidence about Jayswal’s alleged conduct should
have been handled differently in the [d]ivorce [a]ction. They
failed to do so. The refusal of other courts to overturn the
[d]ivorce [a]ction’s outcome due to jurisdictional or preclusion
principles does not mean Plaintiffs’ claims went unaddressed;
it means that they were considered and the arguments were
found insufficient.
R&R in No. 24-CV-1763 at 15–17 (citations omitted) (certain brackets in original).
For these reasons, the Court recommends dismissing this action without prejudice
for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Given this, the Court
recommends granting ECF No. 10 and ECF No. 69 to the extent that they argue that
Rooker–Feldman applies, but otherwise denying it as moot (with one qualification noted
below). Due to the jurisdictional conclusion, the Court also recommends denying most of
the other pending motions as moot.
C. Filing Restriction
Two motions to dismiss request that the Court impose a filing restriction on Plain-
tiffs, as does a standalone sanctions motion. See ECF No. 12 at 19 (seeking a restriction
preventing Plaintiffs “from prosecuting any action or claim, in any United States District
Court within the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arising from or related to Joseph Rued’s
family court action or subsequent related litigation, without prior written authorization
from a judicial officer of the District of Minnesota, or unless the pleading is signed by an
attorney admitted to practice in this District”); ECF No. 47 at 2 (making a similar request);
ECF No. 76 at 9 (same).
Federal courts have inherent authority to manage their proceedings, including the
ability to impose sanctions to protect the judicial process from abuse. See, e.g., Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107–08 (2017) (citing cases); Fiorito v. South- wick, No. 22-CV-2128 (PJS/TNL),2023 WL 2918018
, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2023) (same). Additionally, the All Writs Act,28 U.S.C. § 1651
(a), permits courts to issue orders to prevent frustration of their jurisdiction, including enjoining vexatious litigants from fil- ing frivolous lawsuits. See, e.g., Fleming v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 15-CV-2683 (PJS/HB),2015 WL 5158707
, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2015) (citing cases); Westley v. Bryant, No. 14-CV-5002 (PJS/BRT),2015 WL 2242161
, at *10 (D. Minn. May 12, 2015)
(collecting cases).
When deciding whether to impose a filing restriction, courts consider four factors:
“(1) the party’s history of litigation, particularly whether he has
filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether
the party had an objectively good faith basis for pursuing the
litigation; (3) whether the party has caused needless expense to
other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts;
and (4) whether other sanctions would adequately protect the
court and other parties.”
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Mashak, No. 22-CV-3117 (KMM/DJF), 2023 WL 4622507, at *6 (D. Minn. July 19, 2023) (quoting Westley,2015 WL 2242161
, at *10); see also, e.g., Mendez v. Kallis, No. 21-1147 (PJS/BRT),2021 WL 3476681
, at *5 (D. Minn. May 27, 2021) (same), report and recommendation adopted in relevant part,2021 WL 2911171
(D. Minn. July 12, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-2667,2021 WL 6689158
(8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021). There is no doubt that Plaintiffs have an extensive history of filing lawsuits aimed at challenging Minnesota courts’ handling of W.O.R.’s custody. This pattern led a Minne- sota district court to designate Joseph Rued as a frivolous litigant—a finding later upheld by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. See Rued v. Rued, No. A23-1444,2024 WL 1987171
,
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2024), review denied (Aug. 6, 2024).7 And while that
7 It is worth here reciting the Court of Appeals’s related discussion:
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed sanctions against
father, including a security and preconditions, pursuant to its frivolous-litigant
determination. The factors are supported by its conclusions and the record: (1) fa-
ther has pursued endless litigation in this matter and the district court has made
hundreds of findings that demonstrate father’s arguments have no chance of suc-
cess; (2) father repeatedly relitigates issues that are already decided; (3) father acts
in bad faith by using litigation to harass mother; (4) the district court has repeat-
edly awarded mother conduct- and need-based attorney fees, demonstrating the
injury she incurs because of father’s endless litigation; (5) the district court
finding addressed Rued’s conduct in state court, Plaintiffs’ actions in federal court follow
a similar pattern: of the five federal lawsuits related to W.O.R.’s custody, four have been
dismissed (with the fifth being this action).
Plaintiffs may believe they have a good-faith basis for this litigation. But that ad-
dresses only their subjective belief, and the relevant question here is whether their conduct
has an objective good-faith basis. The Court concludes it does not. Plaintiffs have been
repeatedly informed—by both Minnesota and federal judges—that their suits cannot pro-
ceed, yet they continually disregard these warnings. At this stage, Plaintiffs’ conduct is
objectively unreasonable.
The third and fourth factors also support imposing a filing restriction here. A review
of the dockets in Plaintiffs’ various cases reveals the significant burden they have placed
on those who oppose their views about W.O.R.’s custody. The Court is confident that,
without a filing restriction, Plaintiffs will continue generating new federal litigation driven
by their dissatisfaction with W.O.R.’s current custody status.8
identified a dozen instances in which a court has reprimanded or discouraged fa-
ther from continuing to pursue this litigation, and yet he continues; (6) we can
infer that the district court found that sanctions and a security would help filter
some of father’s frivolous litigation and provide some safeguards for mother, in-
cluding some assurance of receiving attorney fees; and (7) given the extensive
findings and record in this case, it does not appear that any less severe options
would provide sufficient protections. Because the district court considered all the
factors before it imposed sanctions upon father pursuant to its frivolous-litigant
determination, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Rued, 2024 WL 1987171, at *2. 8 Some courts have refrained from imposing a filing restriction when the litigant had not yet received a specific warn- ing that further conduct could lead to such a restriction. See, e.g., Jackson v. Schnell, No. 22-CV-0965 (WMW/JFD),2022 WL 17418038
, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,2022 WL 17091170
(D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2022). But a warning is not always required; other courts have determined that, under certain circum- stances, “a warning seems superfluous” and then proceeded with a filing restriction. Glover v. Hochschild, No. 23- CV-0119 (PAM/DLM),2023 WL 4828135
, at *4 (D. Minn. July 27, 2023) (citing Bethune v. Minnesota, No. 21-CV- 2673 (PJS/ECW),2021 WL 5964540
, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2021)). Given Plaintiffs’ litigation history and prior The Court thus recommends imposing a filing restriction on Plaintiffs Joseph Rued, Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued.9 Going forward, the Court suggests that these Plaintiffs10 be restricted from filing any litigation in this District related to Joseph Rued’s divorce or W.O.R.’s custody unless Plaintiffs are represented by counsel or receive per- mission from a judicial officer of this District. This restriction will not prevent these Plain- tiffs from filing other nonfrivolous litigation on unrelated topics, but it will halt (or at least slow) their efforts to challenge W.O.R.’s custody in this District’s courts.11 For these reasons, the Court recommends granting ECF Nos. 10, 46, and 75 insofar as they request the imposition of a filing restriction consistent with the Court’s discussion above. D. Monetary Sanction Finally, certain Defendants request that the Court impose a monetary sanction on Plaintiffs under28 U.S.C. § 1927
. See ECF No. 12 at 20. Under § 1927, “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory warnings from other courts, this Court concludes that no additional warning is needed before imposing a filing re- striction on Plaintiffs. 9 Most of the conduct at issue here may originate with Joseph Rued rather than the other Plaintiffs. (Indeed, the Minnesota Court of Appeals’s discussion appears to focus specifically on Joseph Rued, not his parents.) But Rued’s parents have joined him in much of his federal litigation, and the Court suspects that a filing restriction applying solely to Joseph Rued would likely lead to similar litigation filed by his parents instead. 10 As noted above (see note 2), there is a dispute in this and other cases about whether Joseph Rued or his parents can represent W.O.R. Since the Court recommends dismissing this action under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, it does not address the representation issue here. However, to the extent it matters, the Court clarifies that its proposed filing restriction only applies to Joseph Rued and his parents. W.O.R. is not responsible for the litigation actions of his father or grandparents, and the Court emphasizes that nothing in this Order and Report and Recommendation is in- tended to criticize or condemn W.O.R. in any way. However, if Joseph Rued or his parents try to leverage the carveout here by simply bringing new suits in W.O.R.’s name, the relevant judge will almost certainly take swift action to prevent such tactics. 11 Certain Defendants request a filing restriction extending to all Districts within the Eighth Circuit. See ECF No. 12 at 19; ECF No. 76 at 9. At this stage, the Court does not find such a broad restriction necessary, particularly since any W.O.R.-related action filed by Plaintiffs in other districts would likely be transferred back to this one. If this prediction proves incorrect, however, a future court may choose to expand any filing restriction on Plaintiffs. thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” The Court recommends denying the request for monetary sanctions on Plaintiffs at this time, for two main reasons. First, it is unclear whether § 1927 applies to nonlawyer pro se litigants like Plaintiffs. There is a circuit split on this issue, and the Eighth Circuit has not yet addressed it. See, e.g., Erickson v. Sawyer,650 F. Supp. 3d 758
, 771 (D. Minn. 2023) (citing Roberts v. Next Generation, LLC,853 F. App’x 235
, 245 (10th
Cir. 2021)).12
Second, and more importantly, the Court suspects—“hopes” is perhaps the better
word—that the recommended filing restriction will prevent further repetitive litigation
from Plaintiffs, at least in federal court. This restriction should enable the Court to effi-
ciently address any future cases Plaintiffs file regarding W.O.R.’s custody without burden-
ing named defendants with litigation-related hurdles. If this optimism proves misplaced,
however, the question of imposing a monetary sanction on Joseph Rued and his parents
may arise again.
III. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reassignment of Related Cases
12 Defendant Pearson’s motion for sanctions relies on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not § 1927.
See ECF No. 76 at 1. Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed on pro se litigants. See, e.g., Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d
201, 204(8th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Ghana Com. Bank, Ltd., No. 13-CV-1010 (DWF/JJK),2013 WL 12074959
, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2013), report and recommendation adopted,2013 WL 12074961
(D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2013) (citing
Kurkowski). The Court thus denies Pearson’s request for sanctions for the reasons stated in the next paragraph.
Pursuant to this Court’s July 19, 2021 Standing Order to the Judicial Officers Earlier As-
signed [ECF No. 17] is DENIED as moot.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Seek Filing Re-
strictions filed by Defendants Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro,
Carrie Lennon, Keith Ellison, and Alec Sloan [ECF No. 10 (“State
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”)] and Defendant Jamie Pearson’s
Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 69] be GRANTED to the extent they
seek dismissal of this action based on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
2. The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, along with the motion to
dismiss filed by Defendants Catrina M. Rued, Beth Wiberg Barbosa,
Charlie R. Alden, and Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC [ECF No. 46],
and Defendant Pearson’s Motion for Sanctions [ECF No. 75] be
GRANTED to the extent they seek a filing restriction consistent with
the Court’s recommendation above.
3. This action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
jurisdiction.
4. The motions at ECF Nos. 10, 46, and 69 be otherwise DENIED as
moot.
5. The motions at ECF Nos. 25, 32, 39, 51, 53, 81, and 88 be DENIED
as moot.
6. Plaintiffs Joseph Rued, Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued be
prohibited from filing any new cases in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota concerning Joseph Rued’s divorce or W.O.R.’s
custody unless they obtain prior approval from a judicial officer in
this District or are represented by counsel.
7. The Clerk of Court be ORDERED to place Plaintiffs Joseph Rued,
Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued on this District’s restricted-
filer list.
s/Tony N. Leung
Dated: November 22, 2024
_________________________________
Tony N. Leung
United States Magistrate Judge
Rued v. Hudson
Case No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL)
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objec-
tions within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2).
All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local
Rule 72.2(c). Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Joseph Daryll Rued, W.O.R., Scott Daryll Case No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL)
Rued, and Leah Jean Rued,
Plaintiffs,
v. ORDER AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro, Car-
rie Lennon, Keith Ellison, Alec Sloan,
Beth Barbosa, Charlie Alden, Gilbert
Alden Barbosa PLLC, Catrina M. Rued,
Hennepin County Clerk of Court, Jamie
Pearson, and CornerHouse,
Defendants.
Joseph Daryll Rued, W.O.R., Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued, pro se Plaintiffs.
Joseph D. Weiner, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, 445 Minnesota St., Suite 1100,
St. Paul, MN 55101, for Defendants Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro, Carrie Lennon,
Keith Ellison, and Alec Sloan
Beth Barbosa and Charlie R. Alden, Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, 3800 American Blvd.
West, Suite 1500, Edina, MN 55431, for Defendants Beth Barbosa, Charlie Alden, Gil-
bert Alden Barbosa PLLC, and Catrina M. Rued.
Ashley Marie Ramstad and Susan M. Tindal, Iverson Reuters, 9321 Ensign Ave. S.,
Bloomington, MN 55438, for Defendant Jamie Pearson.
Shannon L. Bjorklund, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 50 S. 6th St., Suite 1500, Minneapolis,
MN 55402, for Defendant CornerHouse.
This matter comes before the Court on the following filings:
1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for a Civil Case [ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”)];
2. the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Seek Filing Re-
strictions filed by Defendants Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro,
Carrie Lennon, Keith Ellison, and Alec Sloan [ECF No. 10];
3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reassignment of Related Cases Pursuant to this
Court’s July 19, 2021 Standing Order to the Judicial Officers Earlier
Assigned [ECF No. 17 (“Reassignment Motion”)];
4. Defendant CornerHouse’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 25];
5. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Motion to Deny Persons That Are Also Min-
nesota State Judicial and Attorney General Officers’ Motion to Dis-
miss [ECF No. 32];
6. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Motion to Deny CornerHouse’s Motion to Dis-
miss [ECF No. 39];
7. the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Catrina M. Rued, Beth Bar-
bosa, Charlie R. Alden, and Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC [ECF No.
46];
8. Plaintiffs’ Amended FRCP 11 Motion for Sanctions Against Dorsey
& Whitney and Order for Such Firm to Immediately Withdraw from
These Cases [ECF No. 51];
9. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Dorsey & Whitney’s Representation
of CornerHouse [ECF No. 53];
10. Defendant Jamie Pearson’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 69];
11. Pearson’s Motion for Sanctions [ECF No. 75];
12. Plaintiffs’ Responsive Motion to Deny Beth Barbosa, Catrina Rued,
Charlie Alden, and Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Relevant Claims [ECF No. 81]; and
13. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate Related Cases [ECF No. 88];
For the following reasons, the Court denies the Reassignment Motion as moot, rec-
ommends dismissing this action without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and recommends
denying most of the remaining motions as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
This is the fourth of five cases that Plaintiff Joseph Rued has filed in this District
based on his strong disagreement with the outcome of state-court custody proceedings in-
volving his son, W.O.R.1 In four of these cases, Scott Daryll Rued and Leah Jean Rued—
Joseph’s parents and W.O.R.’s paternal grandparents—have also served as plaintiffs.2 This
Court recently issued a Report and Recommendation in another of these cases, summariz-
ing key points from the earlier state-court proceedings and the first of the Rueds’ federal
cases. See generally R. & R. 4–9, Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-1763 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.
Nov. 6, 2024) (“R&R in No. 24-CV-1763”). In what follows, the Court assumes familiar-
ity with that discussion.
This action began on August 26, 2024, when the Court received the Complaint. See
Docket. The Complaint names twelve defendants, listed below with brief descriptions of
the relevant allegations against each:
• The Complaint identifies Defendant Natalie Hudson as a “state judi-
cial officer”; the Court takes judicial notice that Hudson is the current
chief justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court. See Compl. 2.3 Plain-
tiffs allege that Chief Justice Hudson improperly relied on perjury
from prior child protective services (“CPS”) investigations and inter-
fered in certain proceedings involving W.O.R.’s custody. Specifi-
cally, they claim she prevented a fraud action, allegedly relevant to
1 In order: (1) Rued v. Hatcher, No. 23-CV-2685 (NEB/DJF) (D. Minn.) (filed Aug. 31, 2023); (2) Rued v. Jayswal,
No. 24-CV-1763 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.) (filed May 15, 2024); (3) Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-2437 (JRT/TNL) (D.
Minn.) (filed June 24, 2024); (4) Rued v. Hudson, No. 24-CV-3409 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.) (filed Aug. 26, 2024);
and (5) Rued v. Webber, No. 24-CV-3662 (JWB/DWF) (D. Minn.) (filed Sept. 16, 2024).
2 This applies to cases (1)–(4) above. W.O.R. is a named plaintiff in all five cases, though the parties here and in other
actions dispute whether the other Rueds can represent him. See, e.g., ECF No. 28 at 8–10; ECF No. 41 at 20–36.
Since the Court’s recommended resolution relies on a lack of jurisdiction, it need not—so does not—address the issue
of W.O.R.’s representation.
3 The Court may take judicial notice of readily ascertainable facts. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (“The court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s
territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.”).
W.O.R.’s custody, from proceeding in Hennepin County District
Court. See id. at 8–10.
• Plaintiffs identify Defendant Leonardo Castro as a “state judicial of-
ficer,” and the Court takes judicial notice that he is a district-court
judge for Minnesota’s Second Judicial District in Ramsey County. Id.
at 4. Plaintiffs allege that Judge Castro incorrectly applied state pre-
clusion principles, including res judicata, to avoid addressing certain
“unreached federal claims” raised by Plaintiffs in state-court actions.
Id. at 7–10. They also claim that Judge Castro improperly relied on
perjury from prior CPS investigations. See id. at 8.
• Plaintiffs name Carrie Lennon as a third “state judicial officer,” and
the Court takes judicial notice that she is the chief judge of Minne-
sota’s First Judicial District and serves in Scott County. Id. at 2. The
Complaint’s allegations against Judge Lennon largely mirror those
against Judge Castro. See id. at 7–10.
• Plaintiffs also name Keith Ellison, Minnesota’s attorney general, as a
defendant. See id. at 4. They allege that Ellison committed fraud on
various courts by falsely stating in filings that certain of Plaintiffs’
claims had already been addressed and/or should not be considered
due to state-law preclusion principles. See id. at 12. Plaintiffs also
name Alec Sloan, an “[a]ssistant Minnesota Attorney General,” alleg-
ing he engaged in the same practices. Id. at 12, 27.
• Other defendants include Catrina Rued, Joseph Rued’s ex-wife and
W.O.R.’s mother; attorneys Beth Barbosa and Charlie Alden, who
represented Catrina Rued in the state-court divorce and custody pro-
ceedings; and the law firm Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, where Bar-
bosa and Alden are partners. See id. at 27. Plaintiffs allege that each
of these defendants knew of perjury in a “CHIPS petition” affecting
W.O.R.’s custody but continued submitting documents relying on that
perjury to various courts. See id. at 12–15; cf. R&R in No. 24-CV-
1763 at 5–8 (discussing underlying perjury claims).
• Plaintiffs allege that the Hennepin County Clerk of Court improperly
failed to file a memorandum of law that Plaintiffs attempted to submit
in Hennepin County District Court in July 2024. See Compl. 18–19.
• Plaintiffs identify Jamie Pearson as a police officer for the City of
Shakopee. See id. at 28. They allege that Pearson “failed to make
mandatory reports regarding her knowledge . . . of falsified CPS
investigations and other maltreatment and endangerment of W.O.R.”
Id. at 19; see also id. at 25 (presenting similar allegation).
• Finally, Plaintiffs identify CornerHouse as a Minnesota-based “child
welfare agency acting under color of state law with municipal inves-
tigators.” Id. at 29. Plaintiffs allege that CornerHouse participated in
the CPS investigation underlying the “CHIPS petition” mentioned
above and incorrectly concluded—allegedly in contradiction with its
own internal records—that certain reports of abuse or maltreatment of
W.O.R. were false and that W.O.R. may have been coached to make
them. See id. at 20–22.
For relief, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 22–23,
25–26. They also request various forms of declaratory relief, including declarations that
certain individuals’ conduct violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See id. at 23–25.
As suggested in the Introduction above, all but one Defendant have moved to dis-
miss the Complaint.4 Two motions argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the so-
called Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., ECF No. 12 at 8–10; ECF No. 70 at 10–13.5
Plaintiffs have responded to this argument. See, e.g., ECF No. 33 at 3–4, 11, 35, 38–39.6
Additionally, several Defendants have requested sanctions against Plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
4 The exception is the Hennepin County Clerk of Court, who has not appeared in this action. See generally Docket.
On September 12, 2024, Joseph Rued filed a certificate of service indicating that he had caused the Complaint to be
“delivered to . . . the Chief Executive Officer of the Hennepin County District Court Clerk of Court.” ECF No. 6 at
1. This wording suggests that Rued himself handled the delivery, which raises questions about proper service. Cf.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (stating that service must be made by “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party”
(emphasis added)). However, given the jurisdictional resolution suggested in what follows, the Court need not further
address this Defendant’s lack of response.
5 Although some Defendants have not raised Rooker–Feldman concerns, the Court may still apply the doctrine to
claims against those parties. Rooker–Feldman affects a court’s jurisdiction, and courts must address jurisdictional
issues sua sponte. See, e.g., Thigulla v. Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770, 773 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis,587 U.S. 541
, 548 (2019)); InterRad Med., Inc. v. Aquilant Ltd., No. 23-CV-3709 (ECT/DTS),2024 WL 913343
, at
*3 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2024) (citing Fort Bend Cnty.).
6 The Court notes that Plaintiffs addressed Rooker–Feldman arguments in ECF No. 12 through their filing at ECF No.
33 but have not responded to Defendant Pearson’s Rooker–Feldman argument in ECF No. 70. Nevertheless, the Court
will resolve the Rooker–Feldman issue now for two reasons. First, Pearson filed a motion for sanctions alongside her
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs responded to the sanctions motion but not the dismissal motion, leaving their intentions
regarding the latter unclear. Second, the Court is well-versed in Plaintiffs’ objections to applying Rooker–Feldman to
Plaintiffs’ various matters, and is confident that any response to Pearson’s motion would not present new arguments
significant enough to alter the analysis.
ECF No. 12 at 15–20; ECF No. 47 at 10–12; ECF No. 76 at 1–8. Plaintiffs have also
addressed these requests. See, e.g., ECF No. 33 at 34–37; ECF No. 83 at 10; ECF No. 94
at 1–2. The Court thus finds these issues ready for resolution.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Reassignment Motion
When Plaintiffs filed this action, this District’s Clerk of Court assigned it to U.S.
District Judge Eric C. Tostrud and U.S. Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty. See Docket.
On September 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Reassignment Motion, requesting reassignment
to this Court and U.S. District Judge John R. Tunheim, partly due to this Court’s and Judge
Tunheim’s assignment to Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-1763, and Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-
CV-2437. See ECF No. 17 at 1; ECF No. 19 at 1–2.
On September 25, 2024, Judge Tostrud and Judge Tunheim entered an order reas-
signing this case to this Court and Judge Tunheim. See ECF No. 23. The relief sought by
the Reassignment Motion has thus already been granted, so the Court denies the Reassign-
ment Motion as moot.
B. Rooker–Feldman
This Court’s prior order in Rued v. Jayswal, No. 24-CV-1763, also addressed
Rooker–Feldman issues, and that discussion fully applies here.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine establishes a jurisdic-
tional rule preventing federal district courts from acting as ap-
pellate reviewers of state-court judgments. The doctrine ap-
plies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of in-
juries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the dis-
trict court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” The doctrine aims
to preserve the U.S. Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate juris-
diction over state-court decisions.
If litigants could bypass Rooker–Feldman by challeng-
ing a state-court judgment under a different label, the doctrine
would be toothless. Thus, “[t]he doctrine precludes district
courts from obtaining jurisdiction both over the rare case styled
as a direct appeal . . . as well as more common claims which
are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court decisions.” Con-
versely, if a plaintiff asserts “independent claims arising from
conduct in underlying state proceedings,” then Rooker–Feld-
man generally does not bar jurisdiction.
The key question, then, is how to differentiate between
claims that are inextricably intertwined with state-court deci-
sions and those that are independent. Claims are “inextricably
intertwined” if they are so closely related to a prior state-court
judgment that a federal ruling would effectively overturn the
state decision. Put differently, a claim is inextricably inter-
twined with a state-court ruling if it “‘can succeed only to the
extent the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’”
Additionally, courts assess the source of a plaintiff’s alleged
injury when applying Rooker–Feldman. As the Supreme Court
highlighted in [Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005)], Rooker–Feldman applies when a plain-
tiff complains of “injuries caused by state-court judgments.”
These standards, and review of the relief the Complaint
seeks, plainly show that Rooker–Feldman strips this Court of
jurisdiction here. To be sure, Plaintiffs do not pose the chal-
lenge here as a direct appeal of any state-court decisions (in the
[state-court divorce action] or otherwise). But there is simply
no plausible way to construe Plaintiffs’ battery of relief re-
quests in this action without seeing them as a full-bore chal-
lenge to (1) the custody-related aspects of the [state-court di-
vorce action] and/or (2) the numerous state- and federal-court
decisions that themselves refuse to revisit or overrule the
[d]ivorce [a]ction’s final result. The Court certainly under-
stands Plaintiffs’ frustration: ultimately, they vehemently dis-
agree with evidentiary rulings . . . that arguably led to a cus-
tody outcome that they find abhorrent. Critically, however,
Plaintiffs were able to challenge those rulings in the [d]ivorce
[a]ction itself and simply failed to prevail. And then, of course,
they have repeatedly tried—but failed—to persuade other
state- and federal-court judges that the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals’s judgment in the [d]ivorce [a]ction does not tie other tri-
bunals’ hands (either because of preclusion principles or juris-
dictional consequences). This action is just another manifesta-
tion of Plaintiffs’ long-running attempt to undercut the
[d]ivorce [a]ction’s determination concerning W.O.R.’s cus-
tody. Its claims are plainly inextricably intertwined with that
proceeding’s ruling.
R&R in No. 24-CV-1763 at 12–15 (citations omitted).
The same logic applies here. The Court cannot grant any of the relief that Plaintiffs
seek here without at least implicitly concluding that Minnesota’s state courts mishandled
the proceedings determining W.O.R.’s custody. Therefore, Rooker–Feldman appears to
strip this Court of jurisdiction over this action.
Plaintiffs argue that Rooker–Feldman does not apply here—indeed, they claim it is
so clearly inapplicable that anyone who disagrees must be acting in bad faith. See, e.g.,
ECF No. 33 at 4, 11. But their arguments here mirror those in No. 24-CV-1763, and this
Court’s prior discussion of those arguments also applies fully here:
Plaintiffs offer several arguments for why Rooker–
Feldman does not apply, but none succeed. First, they argue
that this action presents “independent claims” that bypass the
Rooker–Feldman bar. Specifically, they assert that their “pri-
mary claim, which all of Plaintiffs’ claims fundamentally relate
to, is that [Defendant] Jayswal fraudulently concluded CPS in-
vestigations regarding W.O.R. in an under-oath [CHIPS peti-
tion] utilized to deprive Plaintiffs’ protected rights.” But the
only way this claim can succeed is if Plaintiffs show that the
[d]ivorce [a]ction improperly refused to consider the Jayswal-
related evidence that Joseph Rued wanted to introduce there.
So this “primary claim” is not at all independent of the
[d]ivorce [a]ction.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Rooker–Feldman does
not apply because (1) the doctrine applies only when state-
court proceedings are complete, and (2) they still have custody-
related challenges pending in Minnesota state court. The Su-
preme Court indeed limits Rooker–Feldman to cases where
plaintiffs complain about “state-court judgments rendered be-
fore the district court proceedings commenced.” The problem
with Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is that the Minnesota Court
of Appeals’s entered judgment in the [d]ivorce [a]ction on No-
vember 17, 2022—well before this action began. Therefore,
Plaintiffs are indeed challenging a state-court judgment entered
before this action started.
Plaintiffs’ apparent counterargument is that some of the
collateral actions they have filed in state court remain ongoing.
In other words, they suggest a sort of tolling principle: for
Rooker–Feldman to apply, the district-court proceeding must
arise not just after entry of the judgment being challenged, but
also after courts entertain any related collateral challenges to
the judgment. Plaintiffs cite no authority for this tolling prin-
ciple, and this Court is aware of none. Indeed, this case illus-
trates the obvious practical problem such a rule would create:
under it, one could sidestep Rooker–Feldman simply by filing
repeated new cases, as Plaintiffs have done.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Rooker–Feldman does not
apply because their claims about Defendants’ unconstitutional
conduct are somehow “unreached.” Respectfully, this is incor-
rect. Plaintiffs had an opportunity to persuade Minnesota’s
courts—including its appellate courts—of their bedrock claim
that certain evidence about Jayswal’s alleged conduct should
have been handled differently in the [d]ivorce [a]ction. They
failed to do so. The refusal of other courts to overturn the
[d]ivorce [a]ction’s outcome due to jurisdictional or preclusion
principles does not mean Plaintiffs’ claims went unaddressed;
it means that they were considered and the arguments were
found insufficient.
R&R in No. 24-CV-1763 at 15–17 (citations omitted) (certain brackets in original).
For these reasons, the Court recommends dismissing this action without prejudice
for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Given this, the Court
recommends granting ECF No. 10 and ECF No. 69 to the extent that they argue that
Rooker–Feldman applies, but otherwise denying it as moot (with one qualification noted
below). Due to the jurisdictional conclusion, the Court also recommends denying most of
the other pending motions as moot.
C. Filing Restriction
Two motions to dismiss request that the Court impose a filing restriction on Plain-
tiffs, as does a standalone sanctions motion. See ECF No. 12 at 19 (seeking a restriction
preventing Plaintiffs “from prosecuting any action or claim, in any United States District
Court within the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arising from or related to Joseph Rued’s
family court action or subsequent related litigation, without prior written authorization
from a judicial officer of the District of Minnesota, or unless the pleading is signed by an
attorney admitted to practice in this District”); ECF No. 47 at 2 (making a similar request);
ECF No. 76 at 9 (same).
Federal courts have inherent authority to manage their proceedings, including the
ability to impose sanctions to protect the judicial process from abuse. See, e.g., Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107–08 (2017) (citing cases); Fiorito v. South- wick, No. 22-CV-2128 (PJS/TNL),2023 WL 2918018
, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2023) (same). Additionally, the All Writs Act,28 U.S.C. § 1651
(a), permits courts to issue orders to prevent frustration of their jurisdiction, including enjoining vexatious litigants from fil- ing frivolous lawsuits. See, e.g., Fleming v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 15-CV-2683 (PJS/HB),2015 WL 5158707
, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2015) (citing cases); Westley v. Bryant, No. 14-CV-5002 (PJS/BRT),2015 WL 2242161
, at *10 (D. Minn. May 12, 2015)
(collecting cases).
When deciding whether to impose a filing restriction, courts consider four factors:
“(1) the party’s history of litigation, particularly whether he has
filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether
the party had an objectively good faith basis for pursuing the
litigation; (3) whether the party has caused needless expense to
other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts;
and (4) whether other sanctions would adequately protect the
court and other parties.”
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Mashak, No. 22-CV-3117 (KMM/DJF), 2023 WL 4622507, at *6 (D. Minn. July 19, 2023) (quoting Westley,2015 WL 2242161
, at *10); see also, e.g., Mendez v. Kallis, No. 21-1147 (PJS/BRT),2021 WL 3476681
, at *5 (D. Minn. May 27, 2021) (same), report and recommendation adopted in relevant part,2021 WL 2911171
(D. Minn. July 12, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-2667,2021 WL 6689158
(8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021). There is no doubt that Plaintiffs have an extensive history of filing lawsuits aimed at challenging Minnesota courts’ handling of W.O.R.’s custody. This pattern led a Minne- sota district court to designate Joseph Rued as a frivolous litigant—a finding later upheld by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. See Rued v. Rued, No. A23-1444,2024 WL 1987171
,
at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2024), review denied (Aug. 6, 2024).7 And while that
7 It is worth here reciting the Court of Appeals’s related discussion:
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed sanctions against
father, including a security and preconditions, pursuant to its frivolous-litigant
determination. The factors are supported by its conclusions and the record: (1) fa-
ther has pursued endless litigation in this matter and the district court has made
hundreds of findings that demonstrate father’s arguments have no chance of suc-
cess; (2) father repeatedly relitigates issues that are already decided; (3) father acts
in bad faith by using litigation to harass mother; (4) the district court has repeat-
edly awarded mother conduct- and need-based attorney fees, demonstrating the
injury she incurs because of father’s endless litigation; (5) the district court
finding addressed Rued’s conduct in state court, Plaintiffs’ actions in federal court follow
a similar pattern: of the five federal lawsuits related to W.O.R.’s custody, four have been
dismissed (with the fifth being this action).
Plaintiffs may believe they have a good-faith basis for this litigation. But that ad-
dresses only their subjective belief, and the relevant question here is whether their conduct
has an objective good-faith basis. The Court concludes it does not. Plaintiffs have been
repeatedly informed—by both Minnesota and federal judges—that their suits cannot pro-
ceed, yet they continually disregard these warnings. At this stage, Plaintiffs’ conduct is
objectively unreasonable.
The third and fourth factors also support imposing a filing restriction here. A review
of the dockets in Plaintiffs’ various cases reveals the significant burden they have placed
on those who oppose their views about W.O.R.’s custody. The Court is confident that,
without a filing restriction, Plaintiffs will continue generating new federal litigation driven
by their dissatisfaction with W.O.R.’s current custody status.8
identified a dozen instances in which a court has reprimanded or discouraged fa-
ther from continuing to pursue this litigation, and yet he continues; (6) we can
infer that the district court found that sanctions and a security would help filter
some of father’s frivolous litigation and provide some safeguards for mother, in-
cluding some assurance of receiving attorney fees; and (7) given the extensive
findings and record in this case, it does not appear that any less severe options
would provide sufficient protections. Because the district court considered all the
factors before it imposed sanctions upon father pursuant to its frivolous-litigant
determination, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Rued, 2024 WL 1987171, at *2. 8 Some courts have refrained from imposing a filing restriction when the litigant had not yet received a specific warn- ing that further conduct could lead to such a restriction. See, e.g., Jackson v. Schnell, No. 22-CV-0965 (WMW/JFD),2022 WL 17418038
, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,2022 WL 17091170
(D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2022). But a warning is not always required; other courts have determined that, under certain circum- stances, “a warning seems superfluous” and then proceeded with a filing restriction. Glover v. Hochschild, No. 23- CV-0119 (PAM/DLM),2023 WL 4828135
, at *4 (D. Minn. July 27, 2023) (citing Bethune v. Minnesota, No. 21-CV- 2673 (PJS/ECW),2021 WL 5964540
, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2021)). Given Plaintiffs’ litigation history and prior The Court thus recommends imposing a filing restriction on Plaintiffs Joseph Rued, Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued.9 Going forward, the Court suggests that these Plaintiffs10 be restricted from filing any litigation in this District related to Joseph Rued’s divorce or W.O.R.’s custody unless Plaintiffs are represented by counsel or receive per- mission from a judicial officer of this District. This restriction will not prevent these Plain- tiffs from filing other nonfrivolous litigation on unrelated topics, but it will halt (or at least slow) their efforts to challenge W.O.R.’s custody in this District’s courts.11 For these reasons, the Court recommends granting ECF Nos. 10, 46, and 75 insofar as they request the imposition of a filing restriction consistent with the Court’s discussion above. D. Monetary Sanction Finally, certain Defendants request that the Court impose a monetary sanction on Plaintiffs under28 U.S.C. § 1927
. See ECF No. 12 at 20. Under § 1927, “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory warnings from other courts, this Court concludes that no additional warning is needed before imposing a filing re- striction on Plaintiffs. 9 Most of the conduct at issue here may originate with Joseph Rued rather than the other Plaintiffs. (Indeed, the Minnesota Court of Appeals’s discussion appears to focus specifically on Joseph Rued, not his parents.) But Rued’s parents have joined him in much of his federal litigation, and the Court suspects that a filing restriction applying solely to Joseph Rued would likely lead to similar litigation filed by his parents instead. 10 As noted above (see note 2), there is a dispute in this and other cases about whether Joseph Rued or his parents can represent W.O.R. Since the Court recommends dismissing this action under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, it does not address the representation issue here. However, to the extent it matters, the Court clarifies that its proposed filing restriction only applies to Joseph Rued and his parents. W.O.R. is not responsible for the litigation actions of his father or grandparents, and the Court emphasizes that nothing in this Order and Report and Recommendation is in- tended to criticize or condemn W.O.R. in any way. However, if Joseph Rued or his parents try to leverage the carveout here by simply bringing new suits in W.O.R.’s name, the relevant judge will almost certainly take swift action to prevent such tactics. 11 Certain Defendants request a filing restriction extending to all Districts within the Eighth Circuit. See ECF No. 12 at 19; ECF No. 76 at 9. At this stage, the Court does not find such a broad restriction necessary, particularly since any W.O.R.-related action filed by Plaintiffs in other districts would likely be transferred back to this one. If this prediction proves incorrect, however, a future court may choose to expand any filing restriction on Plaintiffs. thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” The Court recommends denying the request for monetary sanctions on Plaintiffs at this time, for two main reasons. First, it is unclear whether § 1927 applies to nonlawyer pro se litigants like Plaintiffs. There is a circuit split on this issue, and the Eighth Circuit has not yet addressed it. See, e.g., Erickson v. Sawyer,650 F. Supp. 3d 758
, 771 (D. Minn. 2023) (citing Roberts v. Next Generation, LLC,853 F. App’x 235
, 245 (10th
Cir. 2021)).12
Second, and more importantly, the Court suspects—“hopes” is perhaps the better
word—that the recommended filing restriction will prevent further repetitive litigation
from Plaintiffs, at least in federal court. This restriction should enable the Court to effi-
ciently address any future cases Plaintiffs file regarding W.O.R.’s custody without burden-
ing named defendants with litigation-related hurdles. If this optimism proves misplaced,
however, the question of imposing a monetary sanction on Joseph Rued and his parents
may arise again.
III. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reassignment of Related Cases
12 Defendant Pearson’s motion for sanctions relies on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not § 1927.
See ECF No. 76 at 1. Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed on pro se litigants. See, e.g., Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d
201, 204(8th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Ghana Com. Bank, Ltd., No. 13-CV-1010 (DWF/JJK),2013 WL 12074959
, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2013), report and recommendation adopted,2013 WL 12074961
(D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2013) (citing
Kurkowski). The Court thus denies Pearson’s request for sanctions for the reasons stated in the next paragraph.
Pursuant to this Court’s July 19, 2021 Standing Order to the Judicial Officers Earlier As-
signed [ECF No. 17] is DENIED as moot.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Seek Filing Re-
strictions filed by Defendants Natalie E. Hudson, Leonardo Castro,
Carrie Lennon, Keith Ellison, and Alec Sloan [ECF No. 10 (“State
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss”)] and Defendant Jamie Pearson’s
Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 69] be GRANTED to the extent they
seek dismissal of this action based on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
2. The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, along with the motion to
dismiss filed by Defendants Catrina M. Rued, Beth Wiberg Barbosa,
Charlie R. Alden, and Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC [ECF No. 46],
and Defendant Pearson’s Motion for Sanctions [ECF No. 75] be
GRANTED to the extent they seek a filing restriction consistent with
the Court’s recommendation above.
3. This action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
jurisdiction.
4. The motions at ECF Nos. 10, 46, and 69 be otherwise DENIED as
moot.
5. The motions at ECF Nos. 25, 32, 39, 51, 53, 81, and 88 be DENIED
as moot.
6. Plaintiffs Joseph Rued, Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued be
prohibited from filing any new cases in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota concerning Joseph Rued’s divorce or W.O.R.’s
custody unless they obtain prior approval from a judicial officer in
this District or are represented by counsel.
7. The Clerk of Court be ORDERED to place Plaintiffs Joseph Rued,
Scott Daryll Rued, and Leah Jean Rued on this District’s restricted-
filer list.
s/Tony N. Leung
Dated: November 22, 2024
_________________________________
Tony N. Leung
United States Magistrate Judge
Rued v. Hudson
Case No. 24-cv-3409 (JRT/TNL)
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objec-
tions within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2).
All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local
Rule 72.2(c). Reference
- Status
- Unknown