Groce v. O'Malley

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota September 4, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Gavin G., Case No. 24-cv-947 (ECT/DTS)

Plaintiff,
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
v.

Martin O’Malley,
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Claimant Gavin G. seeks judicial review of the denial of his application for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
Dkt. No. 8. His claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. Administrative Record
(Admin. Rec.) at 109-26; Dkt. No. 7. He requested and received review by an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who determined he was not eligible for benefits. Id.
at 27-39. The Appeals Council denied Claimant’s request for review. Id. at 13-18. This
action followed.
Claimant makes two arguments in support of his appeal. He argues that despite
finding the opinions of state agency psychological consultants persuasive, the ALJ failed
to include limitations they recommended for (1) interacting with supervisors, and
(2) absenteeism and time off task, when determining his residual functional capacity
(RFC). Dkt. No. 8 at 9-18. For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural History
On October 20, 2021, Claimant applied for SSI benefits, alleging disability
beginning on April 1, 2021 due to bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress

disorder, pancreatitis, diabetes, and anxiety. Admin. Rec. at 222; Dkt. No. 7. The ALJ
held a hearing on December 16, 2022 and issued a decision on February 27, 2023 finding
Claimant not disabled. Id. at 27-39, 46-84.
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine
whether a claimant is entitled to SSI benefits.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

(a).  The 
Commissioner evaluates “(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the 
claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the impairment is, or approximates, a listed 
impairment;  (4)  whether  the  claimant  can  perform  past  relevant  work;  and  if  not, 
(5) whether the claimant can perform any other kind of work.” Brock v. Astrue,

674 F.3d 1062

, 1064 n.1 (8th Cir. 2012); see also

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

(a)(4).      

At Step 1, the ALJ determined that Claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful 
activity since October 20, 2021. Admin. Rec. at 30; Dkt. No. 7. At Step 2, the ALJ found 
that  Claimant  has  several  severe  impairments,  including  hypertension;  pancreatitis; 
alcohol withdrawal syndrome; and schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.

Id.

 At Step 3, the 
ALJ found that none of these impairments, alone or combined, meets the severity of the 
impairments listed in

20 C.F.R. § 404

Id. at 31

. At Step 4, the ALJ found that Claimant 
has the following RFC:                                                    
    [T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except   
    the claimant can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and    
    10 pounds frequently. He can stand and/or walk 6 hours in an     
    8-hour workday and sit about 6 hours. He can occasionally        
    stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can understand,    
    remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks. He can tolerate   
    brief and superficial interactions with coworkers and general    
    public.  He  can  tolerate  the  stressors  and  pressures  of  a 
    routine, predictable work setting.

Id. at 33

. The ALJ determined that Claimant had no past relevant work.

Id. at 37

. 
At Step 5, the ALJ concluded that Claimant could perform work that existed in the national 
economy and identified three occupations suited to his abilities, representing 653,482 
jobs in the national economy.

Id. at 37-38

. The ALJ accordingly denied Claimant’s 
application.

Id. at 39

. Claimant now appeals that denial to this Court, challenging the 
limitations included in the ALJ’s RFC determination at Step 4. Dkt. No. 8.  
II.  Medical Records                                                      
In determining Claimant’s functional limitations, the ALJ evaluated  Claimant’s 
testimony  at  the  administrative  hearing  and  in  function  reports,  objective  medical 
evidence, and medical opinions from State Agency psychological consultants. 
A.   Testimony                                                       
Claimant testified about his mental limitations at the administrative hearing and in 
function  reports.  Claimant  alleged  he  experiences  hallucinations  every  two  days, 
exacerbated by anxiety and paranoia, and he requires time to calm down. Admin. Rec. 
at 34, 62-63, 67-69; Dkt. No. 7. He claimed his hallucinations are less severe and less 
frequent when he takes medication, however.

Id. at 34, 62-63

. He also testified that he 
has significant difficulties interacting with others and becomes paranoid that others are 
talking about him.

Id. at 34, 59

. As a result, he claims he responds disproportionately to 
conflicts, including with coworkers and supervisors.

Id. at 34, 58-61

. However, in a 
function report, Claimant indicated he got along “well” with authority figures such as 
bosses.

Id. at 244

. The ALJ found Claimant’s symptoms supported by his impairments 
but did not find the alleged intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of these symptoms 
entirely consistent with the record.

Id.

                                  
B.   Objective Medical Evidence                                      

The ALJ also evaluated Claimant’s history of mental health treatment. Claimant 
sought behavioral health treatment in September 2021 for “psychosis and cyclic mood” 
and  was  prescribed  medication.

Id. at 389-90, 401-03

.  He  reported  significant 
improvement within a month, such that he was able to “go for walks, play basketball, keep 
a regular sleep schedule, and care for his young child.”

Id. at 386-87

. Claimant’s mental 
status examinations indicated he had “intact memory, logical thought processes, and fair 
judgment” with no evidence of hallucinations or delusions.

Id. at 386, 395, 402

. Claimant’s 
appointments with a psychiatrist similarly indicated that his “down” mood improved with 
medication.

Id. at 383-85, 389-394, 1217-19

. The psychiatrist also found that Claimant 
had “appropriate engagement” and “pleasant and cooperative” behavior.

Id.

 Between 

October 2021 and June 2022, Claimant denied hallucinations, delusions, and “tactile 
disturbances.”

Id. at 1219, 1227-28, 1261

. His allegations of mood swings, isolation, 
paranoia, and hallucinations returned in November 2022, but he had been unmedicated 
and had not seen his provider in almost a year. 1284-85. Even so, his mental status exam 
showed no evidence of paranoia or hallucinations.

Id. at 1286-87

.         
The ALJ found the objective medical evidence “not completely consistent” with 
Claimant’s alleged symptoms. The ALJ found that objective medical evidence indicated 
Claimant could maintain attention and concentration to simple, routine tasks and respond 
appropriately to work stressors and pressures with proper treatment.

Id. at 36

. The ALJ 
also determined that limiting Claimant to brief and superficial interactions with co-workers 
and the public accounted for his reports of hallucinations with delusions.

Id.

  
C.   Psychological Consultants                                       
Additionally, two state agency psychological consultants evaluated Claimant’s 

medical disability claim. Regarding Claimant’s capacity for social interaction, Dr. Michelle 
Hoy-Watkins  found  Claimant  able  to  “get  along  with  coworkers”  and  “respond 
appropriately to criticism from supervisors” without significant limitation.

Id. at 93

. She 
noted that he was moderately limited in his ability to “interact with others” and “interact 
appropriately with the general public” but found he “can engage in brief and superficial 
interactions.”

Id. at 89, 92-93

. Regarding Claimant’s need for time off task or absenteeism 
limitations, Dr. Hoy-Watkins concluded that Claimant could “understand, remember and 
follow simple instructions with adequate [concentration, persistence, and pace]” without 
significant limitation, but she found him moderately limited in his ability to “perform at a 
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods” or “complete 

a  normal  workday  and  workweek  without  interruptions  from  psychologically  based 
symptoms.”

Id. at 92-93

. Dr. Jeffrey Boyd reconsidered and affirmed Dr. Hoy-Watkins’ 
determination in all material respects; however, he added under “Social Functioning” that 
Claimant “[d]enies difficulty interacting with authority figures.”

Id. at 103-04

. 
The  ALJ  found  the  examiners’  opinions  persuasive,  specifically  regarding 
Claimant’s ability to “understand, remember, and follow simple instructions with adequate 
concentration, persistence and pace,” and “engage in brief and superficial interactions.”

Id. at 37

. He determined their opinions were supported by and consistent with Claimant’s 
medical history and daily activities.

Id. at 37

.                          
Ultimately  the  ALJ  found  that  “claimant  is  capable  of  making  a  successful 
adjustment to other work” and concluded he was not disabled.

Id. at 38

.   
                       ANALYSIS                                      
Claimant challenges two aspects of the ALJ’s RFC determination. Dkt. No. 8. He 

argues that despite finding the opinions of the State Agency psychological consultants 
persuasive,  the  ALJ  failed  to  include  limitations  they  allegedly  recommended  for 
(1) interacting  with  supervisors,  and  (2)  absenteeism  and  time  off  task.  The 
Commissioner counters that the ALJ properly incorporated the psychological consultants’ 
recommended limitations into the RFC, and that the record supports the ALJ’s RFC 
determination. Dkt. No. 12. For the reasons set forth below, this Court recommends the 
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.                                      
I.   Standard of Review                                                   
Disability under the Social Security Act means the “inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected  to  last  for  a  continuous  period  of  not  less  than  12  months.”

42 U.S.C. § 423

(d)(1)(A). Under Social Security regulations, disability means the impairments are 
so severe that the claimant is not only unable to engage in previous work but cannot 
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 
economy.

Id.

 § 423(d)(2)(A). The claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement to 
disability benefits. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1512

(a)(1); Kamann v. Colvin,

721 F.3d 945, 950

 
(8th Cir. 2013).                                                          
Upon  review  of an  ALJ’s  decision,  a  court  has  authority  to  “enter,  upon  the 
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing a 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for 
a  rehearing.”

42 U.S.C. § 405

(g)  (sentence  four).  The  Court  must  uphold  the 

Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole 
and is not based on legal error. Chismarich v. Berryhill,

888 F.3d 978, 979

 (8th Cir. 2018). 
Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance but . . . enough that a reasonable mind 
would find it adequate to support the conclusion.”

Id.

 (quotation omitted). The Court “must 
consider evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ’s decision.” Cuthrell v. Astrue,

702 F.3d 1114, 1116

 (8th Cir. 2013). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is 
possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions 
represents the ALJ's findings, the court must affirm the ALJ's decision.”

Id.

 (quotation 
omitted).                                                                 

II.  RFC Determination                                                    
“A claimant's RFC is ‘the most he can still do despite his limitations.’” Swink v. 
Saul,

931 F.3d 765, 769

 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545

(a)(1)). “[T]he RFC 
determination is a ‘medical question’ that ‘must be supported by some medical evidence 
of [the claimant’s] ability to function in the workplace.’” Noerper v. Saul,

964 F.3d 738, 744

 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Combs v. Berryhill,

878 F.3d 642, 646

 (8th Cir. 2017)). “The 
ALJ determines a claimant's RFC based on all relevant evidence, including medical 
records,  observations  of  treating  physicians  and  others,  and  the  claimant's  own 
descriptions of his or her limitations.” Eichelberger v. Barnhart,

390 F.3d 584, 591

 (8th 
Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s analysis should demonstrate a consideration of all impairments, both 
severe and non-severe, in arriving at the RFC. See Mark E. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2047,

2021 WL 6066260

, at *9 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2021).                           
The ALJ is required to construct a “‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and [her] 
conclusions.” Jacobs v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-431,

2009 WL 943859

, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 6, 

2009) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel,

227 F.3d 863, 872

 (7th Cir. 2000)). The “ALJ [i]s not 
required to adopt the exact limitations set forth in the opinions []he found persuasive.” 
Wyatt v. Kijakazi, No. 23 1559,

2023 WL 6629761

, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023). Instead, 
the inquiry turns on whe‐ther the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. 
Vance v. Berryhill,

860 F.3d 1114, 1118

 (8th Cir. 2017). If an ALJ does find an opinion 
persuasive, he should explain any inconsistencies between that opinion and the RFC 
determination. Christine F. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2048,

2022 WL 3648674

, at *5 n.3 (D. 
Minn. July 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 3647808

 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 24, 2022). “[R]emand is appropriate where the ALJ's factual findings, considered in 
light of the record as a whole, are insufficient to permit this Court to conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision.” Chunn v. Barnhart,

397 F.3d 667, 672

(8th Cir. 2005).
A. Social Limitations
Claimant argues the ALJ erred by omitting a limitation on interaction with
supervisors, as recommended by the State Agency psychologists. Psychologists Hoy-
Watkins and Boyd found Claimant able to “get along with coworkers” and “respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors” without significant limitation, but moderately
limited in his ability to “interact appropriately with the general public.” Admin. Rec. at
93,103-34; Dkt. No. 7. Overall, the psychologists concluded that Claimant had moderate
limitations “interact[ing] with others” but found he “can engage in brief and superficial
interactions.” Id. at 89, 92-93, 103-04. The ALJ found these opinions persuasive and
subsequently limited Claimant to “brief and superficial interactions with coworkers and
general public.” Id. at 33. Claimant argues the ALJ erred by finding these opinions

persuasive yet failing to include or address limitations related to his ability to interact with
supervisors. Moreover, he claims, the psychologists’ opinions regarding social interaction
contain an internal inconsistency the ALJ failed to reconcile, which warrants remand.
Claimant is incorrect. First and foremost, the psychologists’ findings do not
necessitate a limitation on interaction with supervisors. They found Claimant moderately
limited in his ability to “interact with others,” but also determined he was able to “engage
in brief and superficial interactions.” Id. at 89, 92-93. They also specified he could “accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors” without significant
limitation and “[d]enie[d] difficulty interacting with authority figures.” Id. at 93, 99, 103.
These findings alone support omitting a limitation on interaction with supervisors.

Regardless, the ALJ had no obligation to include a specific finding about Claimant's
ability to interact with supervisors. The ALJ is not required to defer to any medical opinion
and thus need not include such a finding simply because the State Agency psychological
consultants did, even after finding their opinions persuasive. Stephanie B. v. Kijakazi,
No. 22-cv-837,

2023 WL 3394802

,  at  *5  (D.  Minn.  Apr.  4,  2023), report  and 
recommendation adopted,

2023 WL 3394594

 (D. Minn. May 11, 2023) (“[T]he ALJ is not 
required to defer to any medical opinion, regardless of who provided it, or how persuasive 
it is.”);

20 C.F.R. § 404

.152c(a). Nor do the regulations require the ALJ to specify a 
claimant's capacity to interact with supervisors. Instead, the ALJ must consider all the 
evidence and establish a logical bridge between the evidence and the RFC. Jacobs v. 
Astrue, No. 08-cv-431,

2009 WL 943859

, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 6, 2009) (quoting Clifford v. 
Apfel,

227 F.3d 863, 872

(7th Cir. 2000)). The ALJ has done so here.
After evaluating the record as a whole, the ALJ concluded that limiting Claimant to

“brief and superficial interactions with coworkers and general public” accounted for his
functional limitations. Admin. Rec. at 33; Dkt. No. 7. To justify this conclusion, the ALJ
acknowledged Claimant’s report that hallucinations impact his ability to interact but found
the allegations “not completely consistent” with the record. Id. at 36. Specifically, the ALJ
referenced Claimant’s denials of hallucinations between October 2021 and June 2022,
his improved symptoms when compliant with medication, and his mental status exams
showing no evidence of hallucinations or delusions. Id. at 35-36. He also supported his
finding with citations to the Adult Function Report, in which Claimant reported he got along
“well” with authority figures such as bosses, id. at 34 (citing 244), and Dr. Boyd’s
psychiatric evaluation, which reported he [d]enie[d] difficulty interacting with authority

figures,” id. at 37 (citing 97-105). The ALJ thus adequately connected the evidence in the
record to his determination. The alleged failure to properly weigh the State Agency
psychologists’ opinions was not an error.
Nor do the psychologists’ opinions necessarily contain an internal inconsistency
the ALJ needed to reconcile. Claimant alleges the psychologists’ conclusion that he was
moderate[ly] limited in his ability to interact with others conflicts with their assessment that
he could get along with coworkers and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors
without significant limitation. Dkt. No. 13 at 4-6. As such, Claimant argues, the ALJ’s
failure to “explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence were
considered or resolved” warrants remand. Id. (quoting Masden v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-
00267,

2021 WL 3172934

, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 27, 2021)).                  
Not  so.  In addressing  alleged  conflict, the Court  avoids  “labeling  findings  as 
inconsistent if they can be harmonized.” Galloway v. Kijakazi,

46 F.4th 686, 690

 (8th Cir. 

2022) (internal citations omitted). Where inconsistencies can be harmonized, there is no 
error. See Chismarich v. Berryhill,

888 F.3d 978, 980

(8th Cir. 2018). The psychologists’
findings can be harmonized because “moderate” and “significant” are not coterminous. If
Claimant was “moderate[ly]” limited in his ability to interact with others, he was not
necessarily “significant[ly]” limited in his ability to get along with coworkers and
supervisors. Claimant’s moderate interaction limitations are not presumptively significant.
Therefore, these statements do not contain a “material inconsistency” the ALJ needed to
address or resolve. In total, the ALJ's determination was supported by substantial
evidence and the Court recommends that ALJ's decision be affirmed on this ground.

B. Time Off Task and Absenteeism
Claimant also argues the ALJ erred by omitting limitations for absenteeism and
time off task as recommended by the State Agency psychologists. Dkt. No. 10 at 17-20.
Both psychologists noted that Claimant was moderately limited in his “ability to complete
a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based
symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and
length of rest periods.” Because the ALJ found these opinions “persuasive,” Claimant
argues, he needed to account for time off task and absenteeism limitations in the RFC.
The ALJ cannot “disregard evidence or ignore potential limitations” but need not
“mechanically list and reject every possible limitation.” McCoy v. Astrue,

648 F.3d 605, 615

 (8th Cir. 2011). “‘[S]ome medical evidence’ must support the determination of the 
claimant's RFC,” and it is the claimant’s burden to prove his or her functional limitations. 
Baldwin v. Barnhart,

349 F.3d 549, 556

 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Apfel,

223 F.3d 865, 867

 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)); see also

42 U.S.C. § 423

(d)(5)(A) (“[T]there must 

be medical signs and findings . . . which show the existence of a medical impairment that 
results  from  anatomical,  physiological,  or  psychological  abnormalities  which  could 
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.”). As mentioned 
earlier, the ALJ is not required to defer to a finding simply because the State Agency 
psychologists did, even if he finds those opinions persuasive. See Stephanie B.

2023 WL 3394802

, at *5 (“[T]he ALJ is not required to defer to any medical opinion, regardless of 
who provided it, or how persuasive it is.”). However, the ALJ must consider all the 
evidence and establish a logical bridge between the evidence and the RFC. The ALJ 
does so here.                                                             
For one, the psychologists’ finding that Claimant was moderately limited in his 

ability  to  “complete  a  normal  workday  and  workweek  without  interruptions  from 
psychologically based symptoms” must be read in context. See Admin. Rec. at 92, 102-
03; Dkt. No. 7. The psychologists based this recommendation on Claimant’s history of 
psychotic  symptoms  and  paranoid  ideation.

Id.

  However,  they  also  noted  that  his 
symptoms are improved by medication and found him able to “understand, remember and 
follow simple instructions with adequate [concentration, persistence, and pace].”

Id.

 The 
ALJ  found  their  opinions  “persuasive”  as  a  whole,  but  specifically  agreed  with  the 
psychologists’  findings  regarding  concentration,  persistence,  and  pace.

Id. at 37

. 
Separately,  the  ALJ  engaged  in  a  lengthy  discussion  about  the  objective  medical 
evidence (or lack thereof) supporting Claimant’s allegations of “psychosis and cyclic 
mood.”

Id. at 35-37

. The ALJ noted that Claimant’s mental status exams showed no 
evidence  of  paranoia  or  hallucinations  and  his  symptoms  significantly  improved  or 
disappeared  when  compliant  with  medication.

Id.

This discussion informs the ALJ’s

evaluation of symptoms caused by Claimant’s psychotic symptoms and paranoid
ideation, which prompted the psychologists’ finding.
The ALJ found persuasive the psychologists’ opinions that Claimant could
understand, remember, and follow simple instructions with adequate concentration,
persistence, and pace, and he found the severity of Claimant’s alleged limitations caused
by psychosis and hallucinations unsupported by the record. These findings support his
decision to omit absenteeism and time off task limitations from the RFC. The Court
recommends that ALJ's decision be affirmed on this ground.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the record, memoranda, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons

stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s request to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Dkt. No. 8] be
DENIED.
2. Defendant’s request to affirm the Commissioner’s decision [Dkt. No. 12] be
GRANTED.

Dated: September 4, 2024 __s/David T. Schultz____
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE

Filings Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Gavin G., Case No. 24-cv-947 (ECT/DTS)

Plaintiff,
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
v.

Martin O’Malley,
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

(a).  The 
Commissioner evaluates “(1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the 
claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the impairment is, or approximates, a listed 
impairment;  (4)  whether  the  claimant  can  perform  past  relevant  work;  and  if  not, 
(5) whether the claimant can perform any other kind of work.” Brock v. Astrue,

674 F.3d 1062

, 1064 n.1 (8th Cir. 2012); see also

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

(a)(4).      

At Step 1, the ALJ determined that Claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful 
activity since October 20, 2021. Admin. Rec. at 30; Dkt. No. 7. At Step 2, the ALJ found 
that  Claimant  has  several  severe  impairments,  including  hypertension;  pancreatitis; 
alcohol withdrawal syndrome; and schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.

Id.

 At Step 3, the 
ALJ found that none of these impairments, alone or combined, meets the severity of the 
impairments listed in

20 C.F.R. § 404

Id. at 31

. At Step 4, the ALJ found that Claimant 
has the following RFC:                                                    
    [T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except   
    the claimant can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and    
    10 pounds frequently. He can stand and/or walk 6 hours in an     
    8-hour workday and sit about 6 hours. He can occasionally        
    stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can understand,    
    remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks. He can tolerate   
    brief and superficial interactions with coworkers and general    
    public.  He  can  tolerate  the  stressors  and  pressures  of  a 
    routine, predictable work setting.

Id. at 33

. The ALJ determined that Claimant had no past relevant work.

Id. at 37

. 
At Step 5, the ALJ concluded that Claimant could perform work that existed in the national 
economy and identified three occupations suited to his abilities, representing 653,482 
jobs in the national economy.

Id. at 37-38

. The ALJ accordingly denied Claimant’s 
application.

Id. at 39

. Claimant now appeals that denial to this Court, challenging the 
limitations included in the ALJ’s RFC determination at Step 4. Dkt. No. 8.  
II.  Medical Records                                                      
In determining Claimant’s functional limitations, the ALJ evaluated  Claimant’s 
testimony  at  the  administrative  hearing  and  in  function  reports,  objective  medical 
evidence, and medical opinions from State Agency psychological consultants. 
A.   Testimony                                                       
Claimant testified about his mental limitations at the administrative hearing and in 
function  reports.  Claimant  alleged  he  experiences  hallucinations  every  two  days, 
exacerbated by anxiety and paranoia, and he requires time to calm down. Admin. Rec. 
at 34, 62-63, 67-69; Dkt. No. 7. He claimed his hallucinations are less severe and less 
frequent when he takes medication, however.

Id. at 34, 62-63

. He also testified that he 
has significant difficulties interacting with others and becomes paranoid that others are 
talking about him.

Id. at 34, 59

. As a result, he claims he responds disproportionately to 
conflicts, including with coworkers and supervisors.

Id. at 34, 58-61

. However, in a 
function report, Claimant indicated he got along “well” with authority figures such as 
bosses.

Id. at 244

. The ALJ found Claimant’s symptoms supported by his impairments 
but did not find the alleged intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of these symptoms 
entirely consistent with the record.

Id.

                                  
B.   Objective Medical Evidence                                      

The ALJ also evaluated Claimant’s history of mental health treatment. Claimant 
sought behavioral health treatment in September 2021 for “psychosis and cyclic mood” 
and  was  prescribed  medication.

Id. at 389-90, 401-03

.  He  reported  significant 
improvement within a month, such that he was able to “go for walks, play basketball, keep 
a regular sleep schedule, and care for his young child.”

Id. at 386-87

. Claimant’s mental 
status examinations indicated he had “intact memory, logical thought processes, and fair 
judgment” with no evidence of hallucinations or delusions.

Id. at 386, 395, 402

. Claimant’s 
appointments with a psychiatrist similarly indicated that his “down” mood improved with 
medication.

Id. at 383-85, 389-394, 1217-19

. The psychiatrist also found that Claimant 
had “appropriate engagement” and “pleasant and cooperative” behavior.

Id.

 Between 

October 2021 and June 2022, Claimant denied hallucinations, delusions, and “tactile 
disturbances.”

Id. at 1219, 1227-28, 1261

. His allegations of mood swings, isolation, 
paranoia, and hallucinations returned in November 2022, but he had been unmedicated 
and had not seen his provider in almost a year. 1284-85. Even so, his mental status exam 
showed no evidence of paranoia or hallucinations.

Id. at 1286-87

.         
The ALJ found the objective medical evidence “not completely consistent” with 
Claimant’s alleged symptoms. The ALJ found that objective medical evidence indicated 
Claimant could maintain attention and concentration to simple, routine tasks and respond 
appropriately to work stressors and pressures with proper treatment.

Id. at 36

. The ALJ 
also determined that limiting Claimant to brief and superficial interactions with co-workers 
and the public accounted for his reports of hallucinations with delusions.

Id.

  
C.   Psychological Consultants                                       
Additionally, two state agency psychological consultants evaluated Claimant’s 

medical disability claim. Regarding Claimant’s capacity for social interaction, Dr. Michelle 
Hoy-Watkins  found  Claimant  able  to  “get  along  with  coworkers”  and  “respond 
appropriately to criticism from supervisors” without significant limitation.

Id. at 93

. She 
noted that he was moderately limited in his ability to “interact with others” and “interact 
appropriately with the general public” but found he “can engage in brief and superficial 
interactions.”

Id. at 89, 92-93

. Regarding Claimant’s need for time off task or absenteeism 
limitations, Dr. Hoy-Watkins concluded that Claimant could “understand, remember and 
follow simple instructions with adequate [concentration, persistence, and pace]” without 
significant limitation, but she found him moderately limited in his ability to “perform at a 
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods” or “complete 

a  normal  workday  and  workweek  without  interruptions  from  psychologically  based 
symptoms.”

Id. at 92-93

. Dr. Jeffrey Boyd reconsidered and affirmed Dr. Hoy-Watkins’ 
determination in all material respects; however, he added under “Social Functioning” that 
Claimant “[d]enies difficulty interacting with authority figures.”

Id. at 103-04

. 
The  ALJ  found  the  examiners’  opinions  persuasive,  specifically  regarding 
Claimant’s ability to “understand, remember, and follow simple instructions with adequate 
concentration, persistence and pace,” and “engage in brief and superficial interactions.”

Id. at 37

. He determined their opinions were supported by and consistent with Claimant’s 
medical history and daily activities.

Id. at 37

.                          
Ultimately  the  ALJ  found  that  “claimant  is  capable  of  making  a  successful 
adjustment to other work” and concluded he was not disabled.

Id. at 38

.   
                       ANALYSIS                                      
Claimant challenges two aspects of the ALJ’s RFC determination. Dkt. No. 8. He 

argues that despite finding the opinions of the State Agency psychological consultants 
persuasive,  the  ALJ  failed  to  include  limitations  they  allegedly  recommended  for 
(1) interacting  with  supervisors,  and  (2)  absenteeism  and  time  off  task.  The 
Commissioner counters that the ALJ properly incorporated the psychological consultants’ 
recommended limitations into the RFC, and that the record supports the ALJ’s RFC 
determination. Dkt. No. 12. For the reasons set forth below, this Court recommends the 
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.                                      
I.   Standard of Review                                                   
Disability under the Social Security Act means the “inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected  to  last  for  a  continuous  period  of  not  less  than  12  months.”

42 U.S.C. § 423

(d)(1)(A). Under Social Security regulations, disability means the impairments are 
so severe that the claimant is not only unable to engage in previous work but cannot 
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national 
economy.

Id.

 § 423(d)(2)(A). The claimant bears the burden of proving entitlement to 
disability benefits. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1512

(a)(1); Kamann v. Colvin,

721 F.3d 945, 950

 
(8th Cir. 2013).                                                          
Upon  review  of an  ALJ’s  decision,  a  court  has  authority  to  “enter,  upon  the 
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing a 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for 
a  rehearing.”

42 U.S.C. § 405

(g)  (sentence  four).  The  Court  must  uphold  the 

Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole 
and is not based on legal error. Chismarich v. Berryhill,

888 F.3d 978, 979

 (8th Cir. 2018). 
Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance but . . . enough that a reasonable mind 
would find it adequate to support the conclusion.”

Id.

 (quotation omitted). The Court “must 
consider evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ’s decision.” Cuthrell v. Astrue,

702 F.3d 1114, 1116

 (8th Cir. 2013). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is 
possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions 
represents the ALJ's findings, the court must affirm the ALJ's decision.”

Id.

 (quotation 
omitted).                                                                 

II.  RFC Determination                                                    
“A claimant's RFC is ‘the most he can still do despite his limitations.’” Swink v. 
Saul,

931 F.3d 765, 769

 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545

(a)(1)). “[T]he RFC 
determination is a ‘medical question’ that ‘must be supported by some medical evidence 
of [the claimant’s] ability to function in the workplace.’” Noerper v. Saul,

964 F.3d 738, 744

 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Combs v. Berryhill,

878 F.3d 642, 646

 (8th Cir. 2017)). “The 
ALJ determines a claimant's RFC based on all relevant evidence, including medical 
records,  observations  of  treating  physicians  and  others,  and  the  claimant's  own 
descriptions of his or her limitations.” Eichelberger v. Barnhart,

390 F.3d 584, 591

 (8th 
Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s analysis should demonstrate a consideration of all impairments, both 
severe and non-severe, in arriving at the RFC. See Mark E. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2047,

2021 WL 6066260

, at *9 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2021).                           
The ALJ is required to construct a “‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and [her] 
conclusions.” Jacobs v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-431,

2009 WL 943859

, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 6, 

2009) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel,

227 F.3d 863, 872

 (7th Cir. 2000)). The “ALJ [i]s not 
required to adopt the exact limitations set forth in the opinions []he found persuasive.” 
Wyatt v. Kijakazi, No. 23 1559,

2023 WL 6629761

, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023). Instead, 
the inquiry turns on whe‐ther the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. 
Vance v. Berryhill,

860 F.3d 1114, 1118

 (8th Cir. 2017). If an ALJ does find an opinion 
persuasive, he should explain any inconsistencies between that opinion and the RFC 
determination. Christine F. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2048,

2022 WL 3648674

, at *5 n.3 (D. 
Minn. July 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 3647808

 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 24, 2022). “[R]emand is appropriate where the ALJ's factual findings, considered in 
light of the record as a whole, are insufficient to permit this Court to conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision.” Chunn v. Barnhart,

397 F.3d 667, 672

2023 WL 3394802

,  at  *5  (D.  Minn.  Apr.  4,  2023), report  and 
recommendation adopted,

2023 WL 3394594

 (D. Minn. May 11, 2023) (“[T]he ALJ is not 
required to defer to any medical opinion, regardless of who provided it, or how persuasive 
it is.”);

20 C.F.R. § 404

.152c(a). Nor do the regulations require the ALJ to specify a 
claimant's capacity to interact with supervisors. Instead, the ALJ must consider all the 
evidence and establish a logical bridge between the evidence and the RFC. Jacobs v. 
Astrue, No. 08-cv-431,

2009 WL 943859

, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 6, 2009) (quoting Clifford v. 
Apfel,

227 F.3d 863, 872

(7th Cir. 2000)). The ALJ has done so here.
After evaluating the record as a whole, the ALJ concluded that limiting Claimant to

2021 WL 3172934

, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 27, 2021)).                  
Not  so.  In addressing  alleged  conflict, the Court  avoids  “labeling  findings  as 
inconsistent if they can be harmonized.” Galloway v. Kijakazi,

46 F.4th 686, 690

 (8th Cir. 

2022) (internal citations omitted). Where inconsistencies can be harmonized, there is no 
error. See Chismarich v. Berryhill,

888 F.3d 978, 980

648 F.3d 605, 615

 (8th Cir. 2011). “‘[S]ome medical evidence’ must support the determination of the 
claimant's RFC,” and it is the claimant’s burden to prove his or her functional limitations. 
Baldwin v. Barnhart,

349 F.3d 549, 556

 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dykes v. Apfel,

223 F.3d 865, 867

 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)); see also

42 U.S.C. § 423

(d)(5)(A) (“[T]there must 

be medical signs and findings . . . which show the existence of a medical impairment that 
results  from  anatomical,  physiological,  or  psychological  abnormalities  which  could 
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.”). As mentioned 
earlier, the ALJ is not required to defer to a finding simply because the State Agency 
psychologists did, even if he finds those opinions persuasive. See Stephanie B.

2023 WL 3394802

, at *5 (“[T]he ALJ is not required to defer to any medical opinion, regardless of 
who provided it, or how persuasive it is.”). However, the ALJ must consider all the 
evidence and establish a logical bridge between the evidence and the RFC. The ALJ 
does so here.                                                             
For one, the psychologists’ finding that Claimant was moderately limited in his 

ability  to  “complete  a  normal  workday  and  workweek  without  interruptions  from 
psychologically based symptoms” must be read in context. See Admin. Rec. at 92, 102-
03; Dkt. No. 7. The psychologists based this recommendation on Claimant’s history of 
psychotic  symptoms  and  paranoid  ideation.

Id.

  However,  they  also  noted  that  his 
symptoms are improved by medication and found him able to “understand, remember and 
follow simple instructions with adequate [concentration, persistence, and pace].”

Id.

 The 
ALJ  found  their  opinions  “persuasive”  as  a  whole,  but  specifically  agreed  with  the 
psychologists’  findings  regarding  concentration,  persistence,  and  pace.

Id. at 37

. 
Separately,  the  ALJ  engaged  in  a  lengthy  discussion  about  the  objective  medical 
evidence (or lack thereof) supporting Claimant’s allegations of “psychosis and cyclic 
mood.”

Id. at 35-37

. The ALJ noted that Claimant’s mental status exams showed no 
evidence  of  paranoia  or  hallucinations  and  his  symptoms  significantly  improved  or 
disappeared  when  compliant  with  medication.

Id.

This discussion informs the ALJ’s

Dated: September 4, 2024 __s/David T. Schultz____
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE

Filings Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

Reference

Status: Unknown