Kalombo v. Skillet

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Kalombo v. Skillet

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Pierre Kalombo,                     Case No. 24-CV-1977 (NEB/DJF)       

              Plaintiff,                                                

v.                               REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION              

Skillet,                                                                

              Defendant.                                                

   This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Pierre Kalombo’s Amended Complaint (ECF 
No. 7) and Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 3) 
(“IFP Application”).  While Mr. Kalombo’s IFP application indicates he likely qualifies financially 
for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status, the federal statute governing IFP proceedings mandates that 
“[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 
dismiss [a case proceeding IFP] at any time if the court determines that … the action … fails to 
state a claim on which relief may be granted ….”  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2).  The Court thus considers 
whether this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.  For the reasons below, the 
Court recommends dismissing this action and denying the IFP Application as moot. 
I.   Allegations                                                          
   Mr. Kalombo is an immigration detainee at the Kandiyohi County Jail (“KCJ”).  His 
allegations are brief.  He alleges jail officials are serving him cereal without milk, a granola bar, 
and eight ounces of juice for breakfast.  (ECF No. 7.)  Because of the absence of milk with his 
cereal, he considers this meal to be inadequate.  (Id.)  For this omission, Mr. Kalombo seeks $6 
million in damages.  (Id.)                                                
II.  Legal Standards                                                      
   To determine whether a complaint states a claim for which a court may grant relief, a court 
must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  See, e.g., Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 
764 F.3d 833, 836
 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 
742 F.3d 845, 854
 (8th Cir. 2014)).  A 
complaint’s factual allegations need not be detailed, but they must “raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555
 (2007) (citing authorities).  A 
complaint must “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570
).  A court’s consideration of whether a 
pleading states a plausible claim is “context-specific”; the court must “draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”  
Id. at 679
; accord Zink v. Lombardi, 
783 F.3d 1089, 1098
 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc).                                                     
   The Amended Complaint does not specify the legal wrong suffered, but since Mr. Kalombo 
is a pro se litigant and seeks relief under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983
, the Court liberally construes his 

pleading as alleging his conditions of confinement violate the United States Constitution.  See Holt 
v.  Caspari,  
961 F.2d 1370, 1372
  (8th  Cir.  1992)  (“Pro  se  complaints  must  be  liberally 
construed….”).  Although the Amended Complaint is construed liberally, it still must allege 
enough facts to support the claims advanced.  See, e.g., Sandknop v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 
932 F.3d 739
, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 
364 F.3d 912, 914
 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
   As an immigration detainee, Mr. Kalombo has constitutional protections similar to those 
of pretrial detainees.  See Ukofia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 09-CV-0017 (PJS/JJG), 
2010 WL 597059
, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2010) (“The status of an immigration detainee is similar to the 
status of a pretrial detainee.”); see also, e.g., Zongo v. Carver Cnty., No. 21-CV-1521 (NEB/BRT), 
2022 WL 2496084
, at *7 (D. Minn. May 23, 2022) (citing Ukofia), report and recommendation 
adopted, 
2022 WL 2467785
 (D. Minn. July 6, 2022); Angelica C. v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 
20-CV-0913 (NEB/ECW), 
2020 WL 3441461
, at *14 (D. Minn. June 5, 2020), report and 
recommendation adopted, 
2020 WL 3429945
 (D. Minn. June 23, 2020).  When pretrial detainees 

challenge their confinement conditions, the constitutional issue is whether the conditions constitute 
punishment.  Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520
, 536 n.16 (1979); see also, e.g., Karsjens v. Lourey, 
988 F.3d 1047, 1052
 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Bell).1  “Not every disability imposed during pretrial 
detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.”  Bell, 
441 U.S. at 537
.  To 
constitute punishment, the challenged action or condition must: (1) be motivated by an express 
intent to punish; (2) have no rational relation to a legitimate governmental objective; or (3) be 
excessive in relation to a legitimate governmental objective.  Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
576 U.S. 389, 397-98
 (2015); see also Stearns v. Inmate Servs.  Corp., 
957 F.3d 902, 907
 (8th Cir. 2020) 
(restating the Bell standard).                                            
III.  Analysis                                                            

   Applying these standards, the Court finds Mr. Kalombo has failed to sufficiently allege 
that Defendants have subjected him to “punishment.”  The Amended Complaint does not claim 

   1 Mr. Kalombo’s status as a federal immigration detainee in a county jail makes it unclear 
whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims.  See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United 
States, 
534 U.S. 161, 167
 (2002) (noting distinction).  Eighth Circuit caselaw does not definitively 
address this.  Cf. Chavero-Linares v. Smith, 
782 F.3d 1038, 1041
 (8th Cir. 2015) (referring to 
immigration detainee’s failure-to-protect claim in county jail as a Fourteenth Amendment claim 
without further analysis).  But the legal standards for inappropriate punishment—the constitutional 
issue in this case—appear to be consistent under both amendments.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 746
 (1987) (addressing Fifth Amendment due process claim); Martinez v. 
Turner, 
977 F.2d 421
, 423 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
576 U.S. 389, 398
 (2015) (addressing Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (citing Bell, 
441 U.S. 520 at 538, 561
 (1979)); Hall v. Higgins, 
77 F.4th 1171, 1179
 (8th Cir. 2023) (addressing Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claim and citing Bell)).  The Court therefore need not decide which 
amendment applies here.                                                   
Defendants had an express intent to punish him or suggest the KCJ’s dietary choices lack any 
reasonable relation to legitimate governmental objectives.  The Amended Complaint states that the 
KCJ’s breakfast options do not “make the cut for a sufficient meal.”  (ECF No. 7.)  But this alone 
does not establish that overall meal provisions at the KCJ are “nutritionally inadequate.”  And 

though it is traditional in American culture to serve cereal with milk, the absence of milk does not 
suggest  Mr.  Kalombo’s  breakfasts  are  so  excessively  deficient  that  they  are  “nutritionally 
inadequate or prepared in a manner presenting an immediate danger to his health, or that his health 
suffered as a result of the food.”  Wishon v. Gammon, 
978 F.2d 446, 449
 (8th Cir. 1992); cf. 
Ingrassia v. Schafer, 
825 F.3d 891, 897
 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding evidence of inadequate nutrition 
because plaintiff claimed he was fed 1200 calories when he required 2000, and that he had lost 
fourteen pounds during the alleged period of malnutrition).  While Mr. Kalombo may dislike his 
breakfast options, the Amended Complaint does not support the conclusion that his conditions of 
confinement at the KCJ are constitutionally problematic.                  
   The Court therefore recommends dismissing the Amended Complaint without prejudice 

for failure to state a claim.  Given this recommendation, the Court also recommends denying his 
IFP Application as moot.                                                  
                      RECOMMENDATION                                    
   Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                                  
   1.   This  action  be  DISMISSED  WITHOUT  PREJUDICE  under  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2) for failure to state a claim; and                  
   2.   Plaintiff  Pierre  Kalombo’s  Application  to  Proceed  in  District  Court  Without 
        Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 3) be DENIED as moot.          
Dated: September 16, 2024       s/ Dulce J. Foster                      
                                Dulce J. Foster                         
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections:  This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District 
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate 
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the 
Report and Recommendation.  A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being 
served a copy of the objections.  See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2).  All objections and responses must 
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).      

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Pierre Kalombo,                     Case No. 24-CV-1977 (NEB/DJF)       

              Plaintiff,                                                

v.                               REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION              

Skillet,                                                                

              Defendant.                                                

   This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Pierre Kalombo’s Amended Complaint (ECF 
No. 7) and Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 3) 
(“IFP Application”).  While Mr. Kalombo’s IFP application indicates he likely qualifies financially 
for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status, the federal statute governing IFP proceedings mandates that 
“[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 
dismiss [a case proceeding IFP] at any time if the court determines that … the action … fails to 
state a claim on which relief may be granted ….”  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2).  The Court thus considers 
whether this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.  For the reasons below, the 
Court recommends dismissing this action and denying the IFP Application as moot. 
I.   Allegations                                                          
   Mr. Kalombo is an immigration detainee at the Kandiyohi County Jail (“KCJ”).  His 
allegations are brief.  He alleges jail officials are serving him cereal without milk, a granola bar, 
and eight ounces of juice for breakfast.  (ECF No. 7.)  Because of the absence of milk with his 
cereal, he considers this meal to be inadequate.  (Id.)  For this omission, Mr. Kalombo seeks $6 
million in damages.  (Id.)                                                
II.  Legal Standards                                                      
   To determine whether a complaint states a claim for which a court may grant relief, a court 
must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  See, e.g., Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 
764 F.3d 833, 836
 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 
742 F.3d 845, 854
 (8th Cir. 2014)).  A 
complaint’s factual allegations need not be detailed, but they must “raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555
 (2007) (citing authorities).  A 
complaint must “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570
).  A court’s consideration of whether a 
pleading states a plausible claim is “context-specific”; the court must “draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”  
Id. at 679
; accord Zink v. Lombardi, 
783 F.3d 1089, 1098
 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc).                                                     
   The Amended Complaint does not specify the legal wrong suffered, but since Mr. Kalombo 
is a pro se litigant and seeks relief under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983
, the Court liberally construes his 

pleading as alleging his conditions of confinement violate the United States Constitution.  See Holt 
v.  Caspari,  
961 F.2d 1370, 1372
  (8th  Cir.  1992)  (“Pro  se  complaints  must  be  liberally 
construed….”).  Although the Amended Complaint is construed liberally, it still must allege 
enough facts to support the claims advanced.  See, e.g., Sandknop v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 
932 F.3d 739
, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 
364 F.3d 912, 914
 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
   As an immigration detainee, Mr. Kalombo has constitutional protections similar to those 
of pretrial detainees.  See Ukofia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 09-CV-0017 (PJS/JJG), 
2010 WL 597059
, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2010) (“The status of an immigration detainee is similar to the 
status of a pretrial detainee.”); see also, e.g., Zongo v. Carver Cnty., No. 21-CV-1521 (NEB/BRT), 
2022 WL 2496084
, at *7 (D. Minn. May 23, 2022) (citing Ukofia), report and recommendation 
adopted, 
2022 WL 2467785
 (D. Minn. July 6, 2022); Angelica C. v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 
20-CV-0913 (NEB/ECW), 
2020 WL 3441461
, at *14 (D. Minn. June 5, 2020), report and 
recommendation adopted, 
2020 WL 3429945
 (D. Minn. June 23, 2020).  When pretrial detainees 

challenge their confinement conditions, the constitutional issue is whether the conditions constitute 
punishment.  Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520
, 536 n.16 (1979); see also, e.g., Karsjens v. Lourey, 
988 F.3d 1047, 1052
 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Bell).1  “Not every disability imposed during pretrial 
detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.”  Bell, 
441 U.S. at 537
.  To 
constitute punishment, the challenged action or condition must: (1) be motivated by an express 
intent to punish; (2) have no rational relation to a legitimate governmental objective; or (3) be 
excessive in relation to a legitimate governmental objective.  Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
576 U.S. 389, 397-98
 (2015); see also Stearns v. Inmate Servs.  Corp., 
957 F.3d 902, 907
 (8th Cir. 2020) 
(restating the Bell standard).                                            
III.  Analysis                                                            

   Applying these standards, the Court finds Mr. Kalombo has failed to sufficiently allege 
that Defendants have subjected him to “punishment.”  The Amended Complaint does not claim 

   1 Mr. Kalombo’s status as a federal immigration detainee in a county jail makes it unclear 
whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims.  See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United 
States, 
534 U.S. 161, 167
 (2002) (noting distinction).  Eighth Circuit caselaw does not definitively 
address this.  Cf. Chavero-Linares v. Smith, 
782 F.3d 1038, 1041
 (8th Cir. 2015) (referring to 
immigration detainee’s failure-to-protect claim in county jail as a Fourteenth Amendment claim 
without further analysis).  But the legal standards for inappropriate punishment—the constitutional 
issue in this case—appear to be consistent under both amendments.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 746
 (1987) (addressing Fifth Amendment due process claim); Martinez v. 
Turner, 
977 F.2d 421
, 423 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
576 U.S. 389, 398
 (2015) (addressing Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (citing Bell, 
441 U.S. 520 at 538, 561
 (1979)); Hall v. Higgins, 
77 F.4th 1171, 1179
 (8th Cir. 2023) (addressing Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claim and citing Bell)).  The Court therefore need not decide which 
amendment applies here.                                                   
Defendants had an express intent to punish him or suggest the KCJ’s dietary choices lack any 
reasonable relation to legitimate governmental objectives.  The Amended Complaint states that the 
KCJ’s breakfast options do not “make the cut for a sufficient meal.”  (ECF No. 7.)  But this alone 
does not establish that overall meal provisions at the KCJ are “nutritionally inadequate.”  And 

though it is traditional in American culture to serve cereal with milk, the absence of milk does not 
suggest  Mr.  Kalombo’s  breakfasts  are  so  excessively  deficient  that  they  are  “nutritionally 
inadequate or prepared in a manner presenting an immediate danger to his health, or that his health 
suffered as a result of the food.”  Wishon v. Gammon, 
978 F.2d 446, 449
 (8th Cir. 1992); cf. 
Ingrassia v. Schafer, 
825 F.3d 891, 897
 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding evidence of inadequate nutrition 
because plaintiff claimed he was fed 1200 calories when he required 2000, and that he had lost 
fourteen pounds during the alleged period of malnutrition).  While Mr. Kalombo may dislike his 
breakfast options, the Amended Complaint does not support the conclusion that his conditions of 
confinement at the KCJ are constitutionally problematic.                  
   The Court therefore recommends dismissing the Amended Complaint without prejudice 

for failure to state a claim.  Given this recommendation, the Court also recommends denying his 
IFP Application as moot.                                                  
                      RECOMMENDATION                                    
   Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                                  
   1.   This  action  be  DISMISSED  WITHOUT  PREJUDICE  under  
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2) for failure to state a claim; and                  
   2.   Plaintiff  Pierre  Kalombo’s  Application  to  Proceed  in  District  Court  Without 
        Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 3) be DENIED as moot.          
Dated: September 16, 2024       s/ Dulce J. Foster                      
                                Dulce J. Foster                         
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections:  This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District 
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate 
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the 
Report and Recommendation.  A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being 
served a copy of the objections.  See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2).  All objections and responses must 
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).      

Reference

Status
Unknown