UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Paris Da’Jon Allen,                Case No. 24-CV-3213 (JRT/ECW)        

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                              REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION               

State of Minnesota,                                                     

              Respondent.                                               


   Petitioner Paris Da’Jon Allen pleaded guilty in 2002 to one count of third-degree 
criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota state court.  See State v. Allen, No. 27-CR-02-
20493 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).  Now, 22 years later, Allen has filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus challenging the legality of that conviction and subsequent 36-month term 
of imprisonment.  The habeas petition is before the Court pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.  As a result of that 
review, this Court concludes that the petition should be summarily denied and this action 
dismissed.                                                                
   The federal habeas corpus statute, 

, permits a federal court to 
issue writs of habeas corpus only where the person seeking habeas relief is “in custody.”  
See 

(c)(3).  This is because “[a] habeas petition is a request for freedom 
from custody,” Filiatrault v. United States, No. 24-CV-0396 (JMB/DLM), 

, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2024), and thus the granting of habeas corpus is 
meaningless in the absence of a custodial relationship broken by the writ.  If the 
petitioner is not in custody, then the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the habeas 
petition.  See Maleng v. Cook, 

 (1989) (per curiam).     

   “In custody” does not necessarily mean “in prison,” and custodial relationships 
falling short of incarceration can sometimes be sufficient grounds upon which to seek 
habeas corpus relief; thus, prisoners on parole or supervised release subject to continuing 
conditions remain “in custody” despite no longer being behind bars.  

 at 491 (citing 
Jones v. Cunningham, 

 (1963)).  But not every consequence arising from a 
conviction is sufficient to constitute a custodial relationship.  For example, under many 

sentencing schemes, persons convicted of one offense are subject to greater penalties 
should they later be convicted of another offense.  But the threat of greater punishment in 
the future resulting from an old conviction does not amount to custody for purposes of 
§ 2241(c).  See id. at 492.                                               
   Allen is no longer in custody as a result of the conviction that he seeks to 

challenge here.  He received a 36-month term of imprisonment; that term long ago 
expired.  Part of that term likely would have been served on conditional release, but that, 
too, would have ended a long time ago.  The traditional hallmarks of custody simply are 
not present in this case.                                                 
   In his petition and accompanying memorandum, however, Allen points to two 

ongoing impairments that, in his view, constitute adequate justification to continue 
seeking habeas relief.  The first is that Allen is required by the State of Minnesota to 
register as a predatory offender due to his conviction.  Although the Eighth Circuit has 
never answered directly whether post-conviction registration constitutes being “in 
custody” for purposes of § 2241(c), many other courts have answered that question—and 
so far as this Court can tell, those courts have answered unanimously that post-conviction 

registration requirements do not constitute a custodial relationship.  See Calhoun v. 
Attorney General of Colorado, 

 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Therefore, we 
join the circuits uniformly holding that the requirement to register under state sex-
offender registration statutes does not satisfy § 2254’s condition that the petitioner be ‘in 
custody’ at the time he files a habeas petition.”); Wilson v. Flaherty, 

 
(4th Cir. 2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 

 (7th Cir. 2008) (collecting 

cases); Williamson v. Gregoire, 

 (9th Cir. 1998).  The courts of 
this District have long been included among that chorus.  See, e.g., Burks v. Minnesota, 
No. 17-CV-0539 (SRN/SER), 

, at *1-2 (D. Minn. May 15, 2017); 
Defoe v. Swanson, No. 09-CV-2016 (ADM/AJB), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. 
Dec. 3, 2009).  That Allen needs to register as a predatory offender because of his 2002 

conviction does not mean that he is “in custody” as a result of that conviction. 
   Second, Allen alleges that the sentencing court “imposed various conditions . . . 
including no contact with the victim.”  See Pet. Mem. at 2 [Dkt. No. 2].  It is not entirely 
obvious from the petition that Allen remains subject to any no-contact condition imposed 
as part of the criminal proceedings.  Even if he were, however, the courts have again been 

clear: a no-contact order does “not place a ‘severe’ and ‘immediate’ restraint” upon the 
person subject to the order and therefore does not constitute a custodial relationship 
challengeable through a habeas petition.  See Holmes v. Satterberg, 

 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 

 
(1973)).                                                                  

   There are almost certainly other problems with Allen’s habeas petition, see, e.g., 

(d) (setting a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions governed 
by § 2254), but the absence of a custodial relationship between Allen and the respondent 
is a jurisdictional defect—the Court lacks the authority to continue any further.  
Accordingly, it is recommended that the petition be denied and this matter dismissed 
without prejudice.  Allen’s motion for an evidentiary hearing [Dkt. No. 5] may be denied 

as moot should his habeas petition be denied on jurisdictional grounds.  Finally, this 
Court does not believe that the procedural basis upon which dismissal is being 
recommended is fairly debatable, and it is therefore recommended that no certificate of 
appealability issue in this matter.  See 

(c).             
                      RECOMMENDATION                                    

   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                               
   1.   The petition for a writ of habeas corpus of petitioner Paris Da’Jon Allen 
        [Dkt. No. 1] be DENIED.                                         
   2.   This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of          

        jurisdiction.                                                   
   3.   Allen’s motion for an evidentiary hearing [Dkt. No. 5] be DENIED. 
   4.   No certificate of appealability be issued.                      
Dated: September 13, 2024       s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright                
                                ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT                  
                                United States Magistrate Judge          


                           NOTICE                                       

Filing Objections:  This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the 
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.                                                                  

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a 
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being 
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.  A party may respond to those 
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections.  See Local 
Rule 72.2(b)(2).  All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits 
set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).                                          

               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Paris Da’Jon Allen,                Case No. 24-CV-3213 (JRT/ECW)        

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                              REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION               

State of Minnesota,                                                     

              Respondent.                                               


   Petitioner Paris Da’Jon Allen pleaded guilty in 2002 to one count of third-degree 
criminal sexual conduct in Minnesota state court.  See State v. Allen, No. 27-CR-02-
20493 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).  Now, 22 years later, Allen has filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus challenging the legality of that conviction and subsequent 36-month term 
of imprisonment.  The habeas petition is before the Court pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.  As a result of that 
review, this Court concludes that the petition should be summarily denied and this action 
dismissed.                                                                
   The federal habeas corpus statute, 

, permits a federal court to 
issue writs of habeas corpus only where the person seeking habeas relief is “in custody.”  
See 

(c)(3).  This is because “[a] habeas petition is a request for freedom 
from custody,” Filiatrault v. United States, No. 24-CV-0396 (JMB/DLM), 

, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2024), and thus the granting of habeas corpus is 
meaningless in the absence of a custodial relationship broken by the writ.  If the 
petitioner is not in custody, then the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the habeas 
petition.  See Maleng v. Cook, 

 (1989) (per curiam).     

   “In custody” does not necessarily mean “in prison,” and custodial relationships 
falling short of incarceration can sometimes be sufficient grounds upon which to seek 
habeas corpus relief; thus, prisoners on parole or supervised release subject to continuing 
conditions remain “in custody” despite no longer being behind bars.  

 at 491 (citing 
Jones v. Cunningham, 

 (1963)).  But not every consequence arising from a 
conviction is sufficient to constitute a custodial relationship.  For example, under many 

sentencing schemes, persons convicted of one offense are subject to greater penalties 
should they later be convicted of another offense.  But the threat of greater punishment in 
the future resulting from an old conviction does not amount to custody for purposes of 
§ 2241(c).  See id. at 492.                                               
   Allen is no longer in custody as a result of the conviction that he seeks to 

challenge here.  He received a 36-month term of imprisonment; that term long ago 
expired.  Part of that term likely would have been served on conditional release, but that, 
too, would have ended a long time ago.  The traditional hallmarks of custody simply are 
not present in this case.                                                 
   In his petition and accompanying memorandum, however, Allen points to two 

ongoing impairments that, in his view, constitute adequate justification to continue 
seeking habeas relief.  The first is that Allen is required by the State of Minnesota to 
register as a predatory offender due to his conviction.  Although the Eighth Circuit has 
never answered directly whether post-conviction registration constitutes being “in 
custody” for purposes of § 2241(c), many other courts have answered that question—and 
so far as this Court can tell, those courts have answered unanimously that post-conviction 

registration requirements do not constitute a custodial relationship.  See Calhoun v. 
Attorney General of Colorado, 

 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Therefore, we 
join the circuits uniformly holding that the requirement to register under state sex-
offender registration statutes does not satisfy § 2254’s condition that the petitioner be ‘in 
custody’ at the time he files a habeas petition.”); Wilson v. Flaherty, 

 
(4th Cir. 2012); Virsnieks v. Smith, 

 (7th Cir. 2008) (collecting 

cases); Williamson v. Gregoire, 

 (9th Cir. 1998).  The courts of 
this District have long been included among that chorus.  See, e.g., Burks v. Minnesota, 
No. 17-CV-0539 (SRN/SER), 

, at *1-2 (D. Minn. May 15, 2017); 
Defoe v. Swanson, No. 09-CV-2016 (ADM/AJB), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. 
Dec. 3, 2009).  That Allen needs to register as a predatory offender because of his 2002 

conviction does not mean that he is “in custody” as a result of that conviction. 
   Second, Allen alleges that the sentencing court “imposed various conditions . . . 
including no contact with the victim.”  See Pet. Mem. at 2 [Dkt. No. 2].  It is not entirely 
obvious from the petition that Allen remains subject to any no-contact condition imposed 
as part of the criminal proceedings.  Even if he were, however, the courts have again been 

clear: a no-contact order does “not place a ‘severe’ and ‘immediate’ restraint” upon the 
person subject to the order and therefore does not constitute a custodial relationship 
challengeable through a habeas petition.  See Holmes v. Satterberg, 

 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 

 
(1973)).                                                                  

   There are almost certainly other problems with Allen’s habeas petition, see, e.g., 

(d) (setting a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions governed 
by § 2254), but the absence of a custodial relationship between Allen and the respondent 
is a jurisdictional defect—the Court lacks the authority to continue any further.  
Accordingly, it is recommended that the petition be denied and this matter dismissed 
without prejudice.  Allen’s motion for an evidentiary hearing [Dkt. No. 5] may be denied 

as moot should his habeas petition be denied on jurisdictional grounds.  Finally, this 
Court does not believe that the procedural basis upon which dismissal is being 
recommended is fairly debatable, and it is therefore recommended that no certificate of 
appealability issue in this matter.  See 

(c).             
                      RECOMMENDATION                                    

   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                               
   1.   The petition for a writ of habeas corpus of petitioner Paris Da’Jon Allen 
        [Dkt. No. 1] be DENIED.                                         
   2.   This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of          

        jurisdiction.                                                   
   3.   Allen’s motion for an evidentiary hearing [Dkt. No. 5] be DENIED. 
   4.   No certificate of appealability be issued.                      
Dated: September 13, 2024       s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright                
                                ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT                  
                                United States Magistrate Judge          


                           NOTICE                                       

Filing Objections:  This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the 
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.                                                                  

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a 
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being 
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.  A party may respond to those 
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections.  See Local 
Rule 72.2(b)(2).  All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits 
set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).