UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Sonya Braxton,                      Case No. 24-cv-2455 (JMB/LIB)       

              Plaintiff,                                                

v.                                        ORDER AND                     
                                 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION              
State of Minnesota, et al.,                                             

              Defendants.                                               

   Pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with the provisions of 

, this matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Plaintiff Sonya 
Braxton’s various filings. These filings include Plaintiff’s original Complaint, [Docket No. 1]; 
three motions to “add . . . evidence,” (Evidence Motion [Docket No. 3]; Second Evidence Motion 
[Docket  No.  15];  Third  Evidence  Motion  [Docket  No.  17]);  a  motion  for  “an  emergency 
injunction,” (Injunction Motion [Docket No. 6]); two motions requesting appointed counsel, 
(Counsel Motion [Docket No. 8]; Second Counsel Motion [Docket No. 17]); a motion to keep 
Plaintiff’s identity “out of [the] public record,” (Anonymity Motion [Docket No. 9]); a motion for 
a PACER-fee waiver, (Fee-Waiver Motion [Docket No. 10]); a motion to amend the Complaint 
(Motion to Amend [Docket No. 14]); and a motion for additional time to serve the amended 
complaint on Defendants (Extension Motion [Docket No. 18]). Finding no hearing necessary, the 
Court issues the present Order and Report and Recommendation.             
   For the following reasons, the Court denies the Evidence Motion, Second Evidence 
Motion, Third Evidence Motion, Counsel Motion, Second Counsel Motion, Anonymity Motion, 
and Fee-Waiver Motion. The Court grants the Motion to Amend and the Extension Motion.1  
   Further, the Court recommends denying the Injunction Motion.         

I.   Background                                                           
   This case commenced on June 24, 2024, when the Court received the Complaint. [Docket 
No. 1]. Plaintiff Sonya Braxton, a disabled Medicaid recipient, has experienced problems receiving 
dental care. (See Compl. 1–2).2 The Complaint names three defendants: the State of Minnesota 
and two state agencies—the Department of Health and the Department of Human Services. 
(See, e.g., 

). The Complaint generally alleges that Defendants have failed to provide 
adequate dental care to Medicaid recipients, particularly in rural areas. (See, e.g., Id.). 3 
   On July 8, 2024, the Court received several motions from Plaintiff. (See Mots. [Docket 
Nos. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10.) The Evidence Motion requests that the Court consider a document as 
“evidence” in this matter. (See Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 3] at 1). The Injunction Motion seeks 

an  “emergency  injunction”  compelling  Defendants  to  establish  a  public  dental  clinic  in 
Koochiching County, Minnesota, within the next year. (See, e.g., Inj. Mot. [Docket No. 6] at 3). 
The Counsel Motion requests that the Court appoint Plaintiff counsel. (See Counsel Mot. [Docket 
No. 8] at 1.) The Anonymity Motion asks that Plaintiff’s identity be kept confidential in this 
action’s public records. (See Anonymity Mot. [Docket No. 9] at 1–2.) Lastly, the Fee-Waiver 
Motion seeks a waiver of PACER fees, citing Plaintiff’s financial hardship and her inability to 


1 While not an appointment of civil counsel, the Court will, however, refer Plaintiff to the Federal Bar Association’s 
Pro Se Project (“PSP”) through a separate letter for information and an opportunity to consult with an attorney.  
2 Citations to filed materials reference the pagination provided by the District’s CM/ECF filing system. 
3 As noted above and discussed below, Plaintiff has filed the Motion to Amend, which the Court is granting. 
Accordingly, the Court will discuss pleading allegations in greater detail later in this opinion, when discussing the 
Amended Complaint.                                                        
afford the costs of accessing case documents electronically. (See Fee-Waiver Mot. [Docket No. 
10] at 1–2.)                                                              
   The Court received the Motion to Amend, along with Plaintiff’s proposed Amended 
Complaint on August 1, 2024. (See Amended Compl. [Docket No. 14]). The Amended Complaint 

adds several state officials as Defendants, stating they are being sued in both their individual and 
official capacities. (See 

).4 By way of introduction, the Amended Complaint asserts that 
various Defendants have failed to provide adequate dental care to low-income and disabled 
individuals, particularly in rural areas. (See, e.g., 

 at 2–3, 20). Plaintiff contends that state budget 
cuts and systemic negligence have led to severe dental issues for her, including infections, pain, 
and tooth loss, which have worsened her pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. 
(See 

). She argues that Minnesota has violated both federal and state law by failing 
to ensure timely access to dental care and by not addressing racial and economic disparities in 
health-care provision. (See 

 at 1–2, 17–23, 27–30). She seeks injunctive relief to improve access 
to dental care in her region, as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the harm she has 

endured. (See 

 at 32–34.)                                              
   Since submitting the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has filed four additional motions. The 
Second Evidence Motion asks that the Court consider certain letters as evidence in this action. 
(See Second Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 15] at 1–2). The Second Counsel Motion reiterates 
Plaintiff’s request for appointed counsel. (See Second Counsel Mot. [Docket No. 17] at 1). The 
Extension Motion asks the Court for additional time to serve Defendants with the summons and 


4  The  named  defendants  in the  proposed  Amended  Complaint  are  (1)  Tim  Walz;  (2)  Brooke  Cunningham, 
commissioner of Minnesota’s Department of Health; (3) Jodi Harpstead, commissioner of the Department of Human 
Services; (4) John Connolly, an assistant commissioner in the Department of Human Services; (5) Dr. Prasida Khanal, 
the State’s Oral Health Director within the Department of Health; (6) Linda M. Maytan, the Department of Human 
Services’s Dental Policy Director; and (7) Bridgett Anderson, executive director of Minnesota’s Board of Dentistry.  
(See Amended Compl. [Docket No. 14-1] at 1).                              
operative complaint. (See Extension Mot. [Docket No. 18] at 1–2). The Third Evidence Motion 
asks the Court to consider additional letters received by Plaintiff as evidence. (Third Evidence 
Mot. [Docket No. 3] at 1).                                                
II.  Analysis                                                             

   A.   Evidence Motions                                                
   The Court will first address the Evidence Motions. As noted, all three motions request the 
Court to consider certain additional “evidence” in this action. (See Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 3]; 
Second Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 15]; Third Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 19]). But introducing 
documentary evidence is currently unnecessary. In civil litigation, a court typically evaluates a 
case based solely on the allegations in the pleadings until a defendant formally responds by filing 
an  answer.  Cf.  Ashcroft  v.  Iqbal,  

  (2009)  (discussing  motion-to-dismiss 
standards). For now, the court assumes the truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts and assesses 
whether those allegations, if true, establish a legal claim. Cf. 

 The present phase of litigation 
thus focuses on evaluating the complaint’s sufficiency, rather than considering evidence or 

resolving factual disputes—those steps generally occur later, such as during summary-judgment 
proceedings after the parties gather factual evidence through discovery.  
   For the time being, then, it is premature for Plaintiff to submit evidence to the Court. The 
primary question now is whether this action’s operative pleading states a claim. Accordingly, the 
Court denies both the Evidence Motion, the Second Evidence Motion, and the Third Evidence 
Motion.                                                                   
   B.   Injunction Motion                                               
   The Injunction Motion requests a self-described “emergency injunction” requiring the 
State of Minnesota and its relevant agencies to address the lack of dental-care access for Medicaid 
recipients, particularly in rural areas. (See Injunction Mot. [Docket No. 6] at 1.) Specifically, 
Plaintiff asks the Court to mandate the establishment of “a comprehensive permanent dental clinic” 
in Koochiching County within 12 months and to ensure the clinic’s ongoing funding. (See Id. at 
3).                                                                       

   To the extent that Plaintiff views her request as one the Court should impose before 
resolving  this  action,  the  Court  construes  the  Injunction  Motion  as  seeking  a  preliminary 
injunction. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1), a court may “issue a preliminary 
injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” At this stage, there is no indication that Defendants 
have notice of this action—they have not been served with any pleadings and have not filed 
appearances. The Court therefore recommends denying the Injunction Motion to the extent it seeks 
a preliminary injunction. This denial is without prejudice.5              
   C.   Counsel Motions                                                 
   The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s requests for counsel. There is no constitutional or 
statutory right to appointed counsel in civil litigation. See, e.g., Crozier for A.C. v. Westside Cmty. 

Sch. Dist., 

 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 

 (8th 
Cir. 1996)); Traylor v. Minn. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 24-cv-1275 (JWB/TNL), 

, at 
*1 (D. Minn. July 11, 2024) (citing cases). Whether to appoint counsel in civil proceedings is a 
decision “committed to the discretion of the trial court.” McCall v. Benson, 

 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (citing cases); Meranelli v. Pruette, No. 23-cv-2260 (JWB/DJF), 

, at 
*1 (D. Minn. June 26, 2024) (quoting McCall). In determining whether to appoint counsel, a court 


5 As the case proceeds, if Plaintiff believes a preliminary injunction is warranted, she may file another motion. Any 
such motion must, of course, satisfy the procedural and substantive requirements for such requests. See Burgs v. Sissel, 

 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Although pro se pleading are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not 
excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.”); Stone v. Harry, 

 (8th Cir. 
2004).                                                                    
considers factors such as “(1) the factual complexity of the issues; (2) the ability of the indigent 
person to investigate the facts; (3) the existence of conflicting testimony; (4) the ability [of the] 
indigent person to present the claims; and (5) the complexity of the legal arguments.” Crozier, 

 (citing cases); see, e.g., Meranelli, 

, at *1 (quoting Crozier). 

   In this case, Plaintiff’s filings demonstrate her ability to communicate in written materials, 
and at this stage, the Court does not find that litigating this action is factually or legally complex 
enough to warrant consideration of the appointment of civil counsel by the Court. Additionally, 
given that the action is in prediscovery proceedings, issues of conflicting testimony do not 
currently present any challenges. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Crozier factors weigh in 
favor of denying Plaintiff’s request for counsel.                         
   Although the Court will not appoint counsel for Plaintiff, it will refer her to the Federal Bar 
Association, Minnesota Chapter’s Pro Se Project by separate letter. The PSP has a panel of 
volunteer lawyers who often consult with and may assist pro se litigants. Once the referral occurs, 
the Court encourages Plaintiff to contact the PSP and request assistance in finding a lawyer to 

consult with her about this case. This referral is not an appointment of civil counsel however. 
Plaintiff should be aware that the PSP is not required to find a lawyer for her, and no lawyer is 
obligated to represent her in this action.                                
   D.   Anonymity Motion                                                
   The Anonymity Motion requests that the Court allow Plaintiff to be identified only by her 
initials  in  these  proceedings.  “Federal  courts  disfavor  the  use  of  fictitious  names  in  legal 
proceedings,” and the Court sees no reason why using a litigant’s initials should be treated 
differently. Cajune v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 194, 

 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing cases). 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently recognized that 
“federal  courts  have  allowed  parties  to  proceed  under  pseudonyms  in  certain  limited 
circumstances.” 

 at 1076–77 (citing In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 

 (11th 
Cir. 2020)). Specifically, “a party may proceed under a fictitious name only in those limited 
circumstances where the party’s need for anonymity outweighs countervailing interests in full 

disclosure.” 

                                                          
   The Eighth Circuit has outlined the factors relevant to anonymity decisions as follows: 
        The factors that are relevant to this balancing inquiry will depend on the 
   facts of the case in question. Our sister circuits have identified several factors that 
   may be relevant in weighing the competing interests. . . . [T]he Fifth Circuit [has] 
   identified  three  factors  common  to  those  “exceptional”  cases  in  which  party 
   anonymity  was  held  to  be  justified:  (1)  the  party  seeking  anonymity  was 
   challenging government activity; (2) identification threatened to reveal information 
   of a sensitive and highly personal nature; and (3) a party would be required, absent 
   anonymity, to admit an intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking 
   criminal prosecution. The Seventh Circuit has stated that the danger of retaliation 
   is “often a compelling ground” in favor of anonymity. Factors that weigh against 
   party anonymity include “whether the party’s requested anonymity poses a unique 
   threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant,” whether the public’s interest in 
   the case is furthered by requiring that the litigants disclose their identities, and 
   whether there exist alternative mechanisms that could protect the confidentiality of 
   the litigants. We emphasize that the aforementioned factors are non-exhaustive and 
   that other factors, or a combination thereof, may be relevant.       
Id. at 7 (citations omitted).                                             
   Some of the factors point in different directions in this case. Plaintiff is challenging 
government  activity,  and  public  disclosures  of  her  medical  and  dental  issues  may  involve 
“sensitive” and “highly personal” matters. But there is no indication that proceeding with this case 
would require Plaintiff to admit any intent to engage in illegal conduct, and nothing in the 
Complaint suggests that retaliation is a genuine concern. The other factors seem neutral: Plaintiff’s 
request would not keep her identity anonymous from the government, so there is no risk of 
“fundamental unfairness” associated with complete anonymity, and the potential impact on the 
public interest is unclear. Perhaps most importantly, Plaintiff has already filed this suit on the 
Court’s public electronic-filing system, where it has been accessible for several weeks. As a result, 
the proverbial cat is already out of the bag.                             
   Given these factors, the Court concludes that allowing this suit to proceed with Plaintiff 
referred to only by her initials is not appropriate. Accordingly, the Court denies the Anonymity 

Motion.                                                                   
   E.   Fee-Waiver Motion                                               
   As noted above, the Fee-Waiver Motion requests that the Court waive any PACER fees 
Plaintiff incurs while prosecuting this action. Courts may waive PACER fees if they determine 
that an exemption “is necessary in order to avoid unreasonable burdens and to promote public 
access to information[.]” U.S. Courts, Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, https://www. 
uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/electronic-public-access-fee-schedule  (last  visited  Sept.  16, 
2024) (listing fees and automatic exemptions); see also Id. (“[E]xemptions should be granted as 
the exception, not the rule . . . .”).                                    
   Three points concerning PACER fees are relevant here. First, no fees are charged for 

accessing judicial opinions in a docket. See Id. Second, parties in an action receive one “free 
electronic copy” of any documents electronically filed and served in the case. Id. Finally, “[n]o fee 
is owed for electronic access to court data or audio files via PACER until an account holder accrues 
charges of more than $30.00 in a quarterly billing cycle.” Id. Given these provisions, the Court 
cannot conclude that the current PACER-fee structure imposes an unreasonable burden on Plaintiff 
in this action. The Court thus denies the Fee-Waiver Motion. This denial is without prejudice at 
this time.                                                                
   F.   Motion to Amend                                                 
   The Court now turns to the Motion to Amend. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), 
a party may generally amend its pleading once “as a matter of right” (that is, without consent of 
opposing parties or the permission of the Court) if the party seeks the amendment within 21 days 

after serving the pleading on the defendants—or, if the pleading requires a response, within 21 
days after receiving the response or a motion to dismiss. In this case, the Court concludes that 
when Plaintiff submitted the Motion to Amend, she was entitled to amend as a matter of right. The 
Court therefore grants the Motion to Amend. As of now, the Amended Complaint, [Docket No. 
14-1], is now the operative pleading in this action.                      
   G.   Extension Motion                                                
   The Extension Motion requests that the Court give Plaintiff additional time to serve 
Defendants with the summons and the now operative amended complaint. Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, 
the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without 

prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” But the 
rule also provides that “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the 
time for service for an appropriate period.”                              
   Because the Court has allowed Plaintiff to amend her Complaint, and it is separately 
referring Plaintiff to the PSP, it will grant the Extension Motion. The service deadline will now be 
90 days from the date of this Order and Report and Recommendation.        
   Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records and proceedings herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                
   1.  Plaintiff Sonya Braxton’s three motions to add “evidence” to this action [Docket Nos. 
     3, 15, 19] are DENIED;                                             
   2.  Plaintiff’s two motions requesting court appointed counsel [Docket Nos. 8, 17] are 
     DENIED.                                                            

   3.  Plaintiff’s anonymity motion to have herself identified in this action only by her initials 
     [Docket No. 9] is DENIED;                                          
   4.  Plaintiff’s motion for a PACER-fee waiver [Docket No. 10] is DENIED without 
     prejudice;                                                         
   5.  Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint [Docket No. 14] is GRANTED as discussed 
     above;                                                             
   6.  Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to serve Defendants [Docket No. 18] is 
     GRANTED as discussed above; and                                    
   7.  A letter referring Plaintiff to the Federal Bar Association’s Pro Se Project will be issued 
     separately.                                                        

   Furthermore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings 
herein,  IT  IS  HEREBY  RECOMMENDED  THAT  Plaintiff’s  motion  for  “an  emergency 
injunction” [Doc. No. 6] be DENIED without prejudice to the extent it seeks a preliminary 
injunction in this matter.                                                


Dated: September 30, 2024       s/Leo I. Brisbois                       
                                Hon. Leo I. Brisbois                    
                                United States Magistrate Judge          
                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections: The Report and Recommendation component of this Order and Report and 
Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable 
directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.                          
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate 
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the 
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being 
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must 
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).      

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Sonya Braxton,                      Case No. 24-cv-2455 (JMB/LIB)       

              Plaintiff,                                                

v.                                        ORDER AND                     
                                 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION              
State of Minnesota, et al.,                                             

              Defendants.                                               

   Pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with the provisions of 

, this matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Plaintiff Sonya 
Braxton’s various filings. These filings include Plaintiff’s original Complaint, [Docket No. 1]; 
three motions to “add . . . evidence,” (Evidence Motion [Docket No. 3]; Second Evidence Motion 
[Docket  No.  15];  Third  Evidence  Motion  [Docket  No.  17]);  a  motion  for  “an  emergency 
injunction,” (Injunction Motion [Docket No. 6]); two motions requesting appointed counsel, 
(Counsel Motion [Docket No. 8]; Second Counsel Motion [Docket No. 17]); a motion to keep 
Plaintiff’s identity “out of [the] public record,” (Anonymity Motion [Docket No. 9]); a motion for 
a PACER-fee waiver, (Fee-Waiver Motion [Docket No. 10]); a motion to amend the Complaint 
(Motion to Amend [Docket No. 14]); and a motion for additional time to serve the amended 
complaint on Defendants (Extension Motion [Docket No. 18]). Finding no hearing necessary, the 
Court issues the present Order and Report and Recommendation.             
   For the following reasons, the Court denies the Evidence Motion, Second Evidence 
Motion, Third Evidence Motion, Counsel Motion, Second Counsel Motion, Anonymity Motion, 
and Fee-Waiver Motion. The Court grants the Motion to Amend and the Extension Motion.1  
   Further, the Court recommends denying the Injunction Motion.         

I.   Background                                                           
   This case commenced on June 24, 2024, when the Court received the Complaint. [Docket 
No. 1]. Plaintiff Sonya Braxton, a disabled Medicaid recipient, has experienced problems receiving 
dental care. (See Compl. 1–2).2 The Complaint names three defendants: the State of Minnesota 
and two state agencies—the Department of Health and the Department of Human Services. 
(See, e.g., 

). The Complaint generally alleges that Defendants have failed to provide 
adequate dental care to Medicaid recipients, particularly in rural areas. (See, e.g., Id.). 3 
   On July 8, 2024, the Court received several motions from Plaintiff. (See Mots. [Docket 
Nos. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10.) The Evidence Motion requests that the Court consider a document as 
“evidence” in this matter. (See Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 3] at 1). The Injunction Motion seeks 

an  “emergency  injunction”  compelling  Defendants  to  establish  a  public  dental  clinic  in 
Koochiching County, Minnesota, within the next year. (See, e.g., Inj. Mot. [Docket No. 6] at 3). 
The Counsel Motion requests that the Court appoint Plaintiff counsel. (See Counsel Mot. [Docket 
No. 8] at 1.) The Anonymity Motion asks that Plaintiff’s identity be kept confidential in this 
action’s public records. (See Anonymity Mot. [Docket No. 9] at 1–2.) Lastly, the Fee-Waiver 
Motion seeks a waiver of PACER fees, citing Plaintiff’s financial hardship and her inability to 


1 While not an appointment of civil counsel, the Court will, however, refer Plaintiff to the Federal Bar Association’s 
Pro Se Project (“PSP”) through a separate letter for information and an opportunity to consult with an attorney.  
2 Citations to filed materials reference the pagination provided by the District’s CM/ECF filing system. 
3 As noted above and discussed below, Plaintiff has filed the Motion to Amend, which the Court is granting. 
Accordingly, the Court will discuss pleading allegations in greater detail later in this opinion, when discussing the 
Amended Complaint.                                                        
afford the costs of accessing case documents electronically. (See Fee-Waiver Mot. [Docket No. 
10] at 1–2.)                                                              
   The Court received the Motion to Amend, along with Plaintiff’s proposed Amended 
Complaint on August 1, 2024. (See Amended Compl. [Docket No. 14]). The Amended Complaint 

adds several state officials as Defendants, stating they are being sued in both their individual and 
official capacities. (See 

).4 By way of introduction, the Amended Complaint asserts that 
various Defendants have failed to provide adequate dental care to low-income and disabled 
individuals, particularly in rural areas. (See, e.g., 

 at 2–3, 20). Plaintiff contends that state budget 
cuts and systemic negligence have led to severe dental issues for her, including infections, pain, 
and tooth loss, which have worsened her pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. 
(See 

). She argues that Minnesota has violated both federal and state law by failing 
to ensure timely access to dental care and by not addressing racial and economic disparities in 
health-care provision. (See 

 at 1–2, 17–23, 27–30). She seeks injunctive relief to improve access 
to dental care in her region, as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the harm she has 

endured. (See 

 at 32–34.)                                              
   Since submitting the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has filed four additional motions. The 
Second Evidence Motion asks that the Court consider certain letters as evidence in this action. 
(See Second Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 15] at 1–2). The Second Counsel Motion reiterates 
Plaintiff’s request for appointed counsel. (See Second Counsel Mot. [Docket No. 17] at 1). The 
Extension Motion asks the Court for additional time to serve Defendants with the summons and 


4  The  named  defendants  in the  proposed  Amended  Complaint  are  (1)  Tim  Walz;  (2)  Brooke  Cunningham, 
commissioner of Minnesota’s Department of Health; (3) Jodi Harpstead, commissioner of the Department of Human 
Services; (4) John Connolly, an assistant commissioner in the Department of Human Services; (5) Dr. Prasida Khanal, 
the State’s Oral Health Director within the Department of Health; (6) Linda M. Maytan, the Department of Human 
Services’s Dental Policy Director; and (7) Bridgett Anderson, executive director of Minnesota’s Board of Dentistry.  
(See Amended Compl. [Docket No. 14-1] at 1).                              
operative complaint. (See Extension Mot. [Docket No. 18] at 1–2). The Third Evidence Motion 
asks the Court to consider additional letters received by Plaintiff as evidence. (Third Evidence 
Mot. [Docket No. 3] at 1).                                                
II.  Analysis                                                             

   A.   Evidence Motions                                                
   The Court will first address the Evidence Motions. As noted, all three motions request the 
Court to consider certain additional “evidence” in this action. (See Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 3]; 
Second Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 15]; Third Evidence Mot. [Docket No. 19]). But introducing 
documentary evidence is currently unnecessary. In civil litigation, a court typically evaluates a 
case based solely on the allegations in the pleadings until a defendant formally responds by filing 
an  answer.  Cf.  Ashcroft  v.  Iqbal,  

  (2009)  (discussing  motion-to-dismiss 
standards). For now, the court assumes the truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts and assesses 
whether those allegations, if true, establish a legal claim. Cf. 

 The present phase of litigation 
thus focuses on evaluating the complaint’s sufficiency, rather than considering evidence or 

resolving factual disputes—those steps generally occur later, such as during summary-judgment 
proceedings after the parties gather factual evidence through discovery.  
   For the time being, then, it is premature for Plaintiff to submit evidence to the Court. The 
primary question now is whether this action’s operative pleading states a claim. Accordingly, the 
Court denies both the Evidence Motion, the Second Evidence Motion, and the Third Evidence 
Motion.                                                                   
   B.   Injunction Motion                                               
   The Injunction Motion requests a self-described “emergency injunction” requiring the 
State of Minnesota and its relevant agencies to address the lack of dental-care access for Medicaid 
recipients, particularly in rural areas. (See Injunction Mot. [Docket No. 6] at 1.) Specifically, 
Plaintiff asks the Court to mandate the establishment of “a comprehensive permanent dental clinic” 
in Koochiching County within 12 months and to ensure the clinic’s ongoing funding. (See Id. at 
3).                                                                       

   To the extent that Plaintiff views her request as one the Court should impose before 
resolving  this  action,  the  Court  construes  the  Injunction  Motion  as  seeking  a  preliminary 
injunction. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1), a court may “issue a preliminary 
injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” At this stage, there is no indication that Defendants 
have notice of this action—they have not been served with any pleadings and have not filed 
appearances. The Court therefore recommends denying the Injunction Motion to the extent it seeks 
a preliminary injunction. This denial is without prejudice.5              
   C.   Counsel Motions                                                 
   The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s requests for counsel. There is no constitutional or 
statutory right to appointed counsel in civil litigation. See, e.g., Crozier for A.C. v. Westside Cmty. 

Sch. Dist., 

 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 

 (8th 
Cir. 1996)); Traylor v. Minn. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 24-cv-1275 (JWB/TNL), 

, at 
*1 (D. Minn. July 11, 2024) (citing cases). Whether to appoint counsel in civil proceedings is a 
decision “committed to the discretion of the trial court.” McCall v. Benson, 

 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (citing cases); Meranelli v. Pruette, No. 23-cv-2260 (JWB/DJF), 

, at 
*1 (D. Minn. June 26, 2024) (quoting McCall). In determining whether to appoint counsel, a court 


5 As the case proceeds, if Plaintiff believes a preliminary injunction is warranted, she may file another motion. Any 
such motion must, of course, satisfy the procedural and substantive requirements for such requests. See Burgs v. Sissel, 

 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Although pro se pleading are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not 
excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.”); Stone v. Harry, 

 (8th Cir. 
2004).                                                                    
considers factors such as “(1) the factual complexity of the issues; (2) the ability of the indigent 
person to investigate the facts; (3) the existence of conflicting testimony; (4) the ability [of the] 
indigent person to present the claims; and (5) the complexity of the legal arguments.” Crozier, 

 (citing cases); see, e.g., Meranelli, 

, at *1 (quoting Crozier). 

   In this case, Plaintiff’s filings demonstrate her ability to communicate in written materials, 
and at this stage, the Court does not find that litigating this action is factually or legally complex 
enough to warrant consideration of the appointment of civil counsel by the Court. Additionally, 
given that the action is in prediscovery proceedings, issues of conflicting testimony do not 
currently present any challenges. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Crozier factors weigh in 
favor of denying Plaintiff’s request for counsel.                         
   Although the Court will not appoint counsel for Plaintiff, it will refer her to the Federal Bar 
Association, Minnesota Chapter’s Pro Se Project by separate letter. The PSP has a panel of 
volunteer lawyers who often consult with and may assist pro se litigants. Once the referral occurs, 
the Court encourages Plaintiff to contact the PSP and request assistance in finding a lawyer to 

consult with her about this case. This referral is not an appointment of civil counsel however. 
Plaintiff should be aware that the PSP is not required to find a lawyer for her, and no lawyer is 
obligated to represent her in this action.                                
   D.   Anonymity Motion                                                
   The Anonymity Motion requests that the Court allow Plaintiff to be identified only by her 
initials  in  these  proceedings.  “Federal  courts  disfavor  the  use  of  fictitious  names  in  legal 
proceedings,” and the Court sees no reason why using a litigant’s initials should be treated 
differently. Cajune v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 194, 

 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing cases). 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently recognized that 
“federal  courts  have  allowed  parties  to  proceed  under  pseudonyms  in  certain  limited 
circumstances.” 

 at 1076–77 (citing In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 

 (11th 
Cir. 2020)). Specifically, “a party may proceed under a fictitious name only in those limited 
circumstances where the party’s need for anonymity outweighs countervailing interests in full 

disclosure.” 

                                                          
   The Eighth Circuit has outlined the factors relevant to anonymity decisions as follows: 
        The factors that are relevant to this balancing inquiry will depend on the 
   facts of the case in question. Our sister circuits have identified several factors that 
   may be relevant in weighing the competing interests. . . . [T]he Fifth Circuit [has] 
   identified  three  factors  common  to  those  “exceptional”  cases  in  which  party 
   anonymity  was  held  to  be  justified:  (1)  the  party  seeking  anonymity  was 
   challenging government activity; (2) identification threatened to reveal information 
   of a sensitive and highly personal nature; and (3) a party would be required, absent 
   anonymity, to admit an intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking 
   criminal prosecution. The Seventh Circuit has stated that the danger of retaliation 
   is “often a compelling ground” in favor of anonymity. Factors that weigh against 
   party anonymity include “whether the party’s requested anonymity poses a unique 
   threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant,” whether the public’s interest in 
   the case is furthered by requiring that the litigants disclose their identities, and 
   whether there exist alternative mechanisms that could protect the confidentiality of 
   the litigants. We emphasize that the aforementioned factors are non-exhaustive and 
   that other factors, or a combination thereof, may be relevant.       
Id. at 7 (citations omitted).                                             
   Some of the factors point in different directions in this case. Plaintiff is challenging 
government  activity,  and  public  disclosures  of  her  medical  and  dental  issues  may  involve 
“sensitive” and “highly personal” matters. But there is no indication that proceeding with this case 
would require Plaintiff to admit any intent to engage in illegal conduct, and nothing in the 
Complaint suggests that retaliation is a genuine concern. The other factors seem neutral: Plaintiff’s 
request would not keep her identity anonymous from the government, so there is no risk of 
“fundamental unfairness” associated with complete anonymity, and the potential impact on the 
public interest is unclear. Perhaps most importantly, Plaintiff has already filed this suit on the 
Court’s public electronic-filing system, where it has been accessible for several weeks. As a result, 
the proverbial cat is already out of the bag.                             
   Given these factors, the Court concludes that allowing this suit to proceed with Plaintiff 
referred to only by her initials is not appropriate. Accordingly, the Court denies the Anonymity 

Motion.                                                                   
   E.   Fee-Waiver Motion                                               
   As noted above, the Fee-Waiver Motion requests that the Court waive any PACER fees 
Plaintiff incurs while prosecuting this action. Courts may waive PACER fees if they determine 
that an exemption “is necessary in order to avoid unreasonable burdens and to promote public 
access to information[.]” U.S. Courts, Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, https://www. 
uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/electronic-public-access-fee-schedule  (last  visited  Sept.  16, 
2024) (listing fees and automatic exemptions); see also Id. (“[E]xemptions should be granted as 
the exception, not the rule . . . .”).                                    
   Three points concerning PACER fees are relevant here. First, no fees are charged for 

accessing judicial opinions in a docket. See Id. Second, parties in an action receive one “free 
electronic copy” of any documents electronically filed and served in the case. Id. Finally, “[n]o fee 
is owed for electronic access to court data or audio files via PACER until an account holder accrues 
charges of more than $30.00 in a quarterly billing cycle.” Id. Given these provisions, the Court 
cannot conclude that the current PACER-fee structure imposes an unreasonable burden on Plaintiff 
in this action. The Court thus denies the Fee-Waiver Motion. This denial is without prejudice at 
this time.                                                                
   F.   Motion to Amend                                                 
   The Court now turns to the Motion to Amend. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), 
a party may generally amend its pleading once “as a matter of right” (that is, without consent of 
opposing parties or the permission of the Court) if the party seeks the amendment within 21 days 

after serving the pleading on the defendants—or, if the pleading requires a response, within 21 
days after receiving the response or a motion to dismiss. In this case, the Court concludes that 
when Plaintiff submitted the Motion to Amend, she was entitled to amend as a matter of right. The 
Court therefore grants the Motion to Amend. As of now, the Amended Complaint, [Docket No. 
14-1], is now the operative pleading in this action.                      
   G.   Extension Motion                                                
   The Extension Motion requests that the Court give Plaintiff additional time to serve 
Defendants with the summons and the now operative amended complaint. Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, 
the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without 

prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” But the 
rule also provides that “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the 
time for service for an appropriate period.”                              
   Because the Court has allowed Plaintiff to amend her Complaint, and it is separately 
referring Plaintiff to the PSP, it will grant the Extension Motion. The service deadline will now be 
90 days from the date of this Order and Report and Recommendation.        
   Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records and proceedings herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                
   1.  Plaintiff Sonya Braxton’s three motions to add “evidence” to this action [Docket Nos. 
     3, 15, 19] are DENIED;                                             
   2.  Plaintiff’s two motions requesting court appointed counsel [Docket Nos. 8, 17] are 
     DENIED.                                                            

   3.  Plaintiff’s anonymity motion to have herself identified in this action only by her initials 
     [Docket No. 9] is DENIED;                                          
   4.  Plaintiff’s motion for a PACER-fee waiver [Docket No. 10] is DENIED without 
     prejudice;                                                         
   5.  Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint [Docket No. 14] is GRANTED as discussed 
     above;                                                             
   6.  Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to serve Defendants [Docket No. 18] is 
     GRANTED as discussed above; and                                    
   7.  A letter referring Plaintiff to the Federal Bar Association’s Pro Se Project will be issued 
     separately.                                                        

   Furthermore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings 
herein,  IT  IS  HEREBY  RECOMMENDED  THAT  Plaintiff’s  motion  for  “an  emergency 
injunction” [Doc. No. 6] be DENIED without prejudice to the extent it seeks a preliminary 
injunction in this matter.                                                


Dated: September 30, 2024       s/Leo I. Brisbois                       
                                Hon. Leo I. Brisbois                    
                                United States Magistrate Judge          
                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections: The Report and Recommendation component of this Order and Report and 
Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable 
directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.                          
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate 
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the 
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being 
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must 
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).