UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Johnny Frederic Heurung,            Case No. 23-cv-3749 (PAM/LIB)       

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                               REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION              

Jared Rardin,                                                           

              Respondent.                                               


   Pursuant to a general referral made in accordance with 

 and Local Rule 
72.1, this matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Petitioner 
Johnny Frederic Heurung’s Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Docket No. 6]. 
Finding no hearing necessary, the Court issues the present Report and Recommendation.1  
   Petitioner is currently imprisoned at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota 
(“FMC Rochester”). He has brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 

 
claiming the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) denied him his right to due process by failing to 
hold a proper hearing when the BOP determined that he violated the conditions of his home 
confinement and transferred him back to a more traditional prison setting. (See Amended Petition 
[Docket No. 6]). Petitioner asks the Court to force the BOP to return him to home confinement or, 
alternatively, require the BOP to conduct a hearing to determine if he violated the conditions of 
his home confinement. Petitioner also claims that the BOP wrongfully sanctioned him with the 
loss of forty-one days of good-time credits without proper due process.   

1 Upon review of the present record, the Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary in this action because a hearing on 
the present Petition would not aid the Court in its consideration of the present Petition. See Wallace v. Lockhart, 

 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing that dismissal of a “habeas petition without a hearing is proper . . . where the 
allegations, even if true, fail to state a cognizable constitutional claim, where the relevant facts are not in dispute, or 
where the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the record”).           
   For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends that Heurung’s Amended Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Docket No. 6], be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED with 
prejudice. With respect to the first claim regarding Petitioner’s transfer from home confinement 
back to a more traditional prison setting, habeas corpus is not the proper method to address 

Petitioner’s claims for relief. With respect to Petitioner’s second claim regarding good-time 
credits, Petitioner has not established that the BOP violated his due process rights. Accordingly, 
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on either claim.                     
I.   Background                                                           
   Petitioner has been serving a prison sentence since 2013, when the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced him to 216 months of imprisonment to be 
followed by three years of supervised release for Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud and Wire 
Fraud in violation of 

 and 1343. (Public Information Inmate Data as of 04-24-
2024 [Docket No. 15-1] at 2]). Petitioner has a long history of medical issues that have required 
dozens of hospital trips during his incarceration, and he has recently suffered a stroke which he 

indicates will likely leave him permanently in need of heightened level of medical care. (See 
Inmate History [Docket No. 15-2]; Medical Summary [Docket No. 17-1]). The BOP considered 
him for alternative custody arrangements under the CARES Act and, in 2023, transferred him to 
home confinement to live in his own apartment under several conditions, including that his sister 
would help him get to all required check-ins and appointments. (See Exhibit A [Docket No. 6-1]). 
   During his home confinement, Petitioner failed to appear for a number of his scheduled 
check-in, including an in-person check-in and urinalysis on August 14, 2023. (James Decl. [Docket 
No. 15] ¶ 21). This, in turn, caused the BOP to charge Petitioner with multiple violations of his 
custody conditions. (Incident Reports [Docket No. 15-9] at 2). Petitioner does not refute that he 
failed to appear at required check-ins, but he alleges that he failed to appear at said check-ins 
because his sister was not always available to transport him, and he was without the means to 
provide for his own transportation to required appointments due to delays in receiving social 
security payments. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6]).                 

   As a result of his failure to appear for the in-person check-in and the urinalysis, Petitioner 
was transferred from home confinement to a residential reentry center (“RRC”). (James Decl. 
[Docket No. 15] ¶ 27). Petitioner remained at the RRC from August 23, 2023, until October 19, 
2023, when it was determined that the RRC was unable to meet his medical needs. (Id. ¶¶ 27–29). 
The BOP determined that the best course of action was to transfer Petitioner to FMC Rochester. 
(Id. ¶¶ 28–29).                                                           
   Petitioner’s removal from home confinement was not the only consequence of his failure 
to make scheduled appointments while on home confinement. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 
6]). On August 22, 2023, the BOP held a hearing on the last violation Petitioner received while in 
home confinement. (James Decl. [Docket No. 15] ¶¶ 19–27).2 At the hearing, Petitioner declined 

staff representation, declined to call any witnesses, and declined to present any documentation 
evidence in support of his defense. (Id.; Center Discipline Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]). 
The Discipline Hearing Officer determined that the greater weight of the evidence demonstrated 
that Petitioner had committed the alleged violation, and Petitioner was sanctioned with the loss of 
forty-one days of good-time credits. (James Decl. [Docket No. 15] ¶¶ 25–26; Center Discipline 
Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]).                                     




2 Inmates on home confinement remain subject to the disciplinary rules established by the BOP, and violation of those 
rules can result in sanctions, including loss of good-time credits. See 

(g). 
II.  Analysis                                                             
   In his present Amended Petition, Heurung presents two separate challenges arising out of 
the same underlying incident. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6]). Petitioner first challenges 
the BOP decision to transfer him out of home confinement. Petitioner also argues that the BOP 

violated his due process rights in sanctioning him with the loss of forty-one days of good-time 
credits.                                                                  
   A.   Transfer From Home Confinement                                  

   In challenging the BOP’s decision to transfer him out of home confinement, Petitioner 
conflates home confinement and supervised release. Petitioner throughout his pleadings has 
mischaracterized his placement in home confinement as being a form of early supervised release. 
From the vantage point of the person serving home confinement, the confusion is understandable, 
if ultimately inaccurate. Both home confinement and supervised release, obviously, entail no 
longer being in typical prison setting. Moreover, the person serving either under home confinement 
or supervised release will be subject to various conditions, and a violation of those conditions can 
result in the person being returned to prison.                            
   As a matter of law, however, home confinement and supervised release are materially 
distinct. Transfer to home confinement is, based on the decision of the BOP, which usually may 
place a prisoner in home confinement “for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of imprisonment 
of that prisoner or 6 months.” 

(c)(2); see also 

(b) (investing the 
BOP with discretion over placement decisions). The BOP establishes the conditions of that home 
confinement, and the BOP determines whether placement on home confinement is no longer 
appropriate, just as the BOP determines whether placement at a specific prison is no longer 
appropriate for a particular prisoner.                                    
   Supervised release, by contrast, is not a form of BOP custody. Supervised release is what 
follows after a term of imprisonment. 

(a). Unlike home confinement, supervised 
release is not simply a matter of the BOP relocating a prisoner from one facility to another. By the 
time that a prisoner has been placed on supervised release, his term of imprisonment has been 

completed. The conditions imposed on a person while on supervised release are imposed by the 
Court at the time of sentencing. See 

(d). The same sentencing Court determines 
whether a person has violated the terms of supervised release and what the consequences of that 
violation will be. See 

                                                
   Notwithstanding Petitioner’s confusion, Petitioner was plainly on home confinement, not 
supervised  release,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  disciplinary  violation.  The  documentation 
establishing Petitioner’s transfer to home confinement indicates that he was being considered for 
home confinement under the Cares Act and that he was not eligible for supervised release until 
May 11, 2028. (Exhibit A [Docket No. 6-1]). Indeed, the BOP could not have decided to transfer 
Petitioner to supervised release sooner—the end-date of prisoner’s custodial term was determined 

by the sentencing judge and cannot be altered by the BOP. What the BOP can do—and what the 
BOP did do—is transfer Petitioner between facilities, including by using Petitioner’s home as a 
custodial facility. The BOP has full discretion to transfer Petitioner in such a manner between 
places of incarceration. See 

(b).                         
   “Home confinement is not release from custody . . . it is simply one of several forms of 
BOP custody.” Johnson v. Birkholz, No. 21-cv-2017 (PJS/LIB), 

, at *1 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 5, 2022). Thus, Petitioner’s claim that he was wrongfully transferred from home 
confinement to a more traditional prison institution  is a challenge to the conditions of his 
confinement, not a challenge to the length or duration of his confinement. See 

 This is fatal to 
Petitioner’s habeas claim here.                                           
   If a prisoner, like Petitioner here, “is not challenging the validity of his conviction or the 
length of his detention, such as a loss of good time, then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper 

remedy.” Kruger v. Erikson, 

 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), see also Spencer v. 
Haynes, 

, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014). Thus, a prisoner, like Petitioner, claiming that he 
should be detained at home or in a different facility ultimately is challenging only the conditions 
of  his confinement. See, e.g., Johnson, 

, at *1. Habeas  corpus is not an 
appropriate procedural vehicle for such a claim. See Spencer, 774 F.3d at 469–70. 
   In short, Petitioner’s challenge to the conditions of his confinement is not a cognizable 
habeas claim. Therefore, to the extent Heurung’s Amended Petition challenges his transfer out of 
home confinement, the undersigned recommends that Heurung’s Amended Petition, [Docket No. 
6], be DENIED.                                                            
   B.   Good-time credit                                                

   As observed above, Petitioner also challenges his loss of forty-one days of good-time 
credits arguing that the BOP violated his due process rights in sanctioning him with the loss of 
said good-time credit. In support of this challenge, Petitioner appears to argue that although the 
BOP charged a violation against him, the BOP failed to hold a hearing on the charged violation as 
required by 

. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 3–4).3  


3 Petitioner’s challenge here is somewhat contradictory. He appears to argue that the BOP failed to adjudicate the 
discipline violation charges against him, (see Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 4), but he also acknowledges that 
the loss of good-time credits was a result of his “CDC [Center Discipline Committee] hearing.” (Reply [Docket No. 
17] at 6). This contradiction may be attributable to Petitioner’s incorrect belief that he was on supervised release. If 
he was on supervised release and he violated the terms of his supervised release, then he would have had proceedings 
before the sentencing Court. As already explained, however, Petitioner was not on supervised release, and he was 
therefore not entitled to any such hearing before the sentencing Court.   
   The BOP has statutory authority to penalize inmates, including those inmates placed on 
home confinement, who violate the conditions of their prerelease custody. 

(g)(5). 
But prisoners have a protected liberty interest in good-time credits, which may not be revoked 
without the prisoner receiving due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 

, 556–557 

(1974).                                                                   
   In the present case, Petitioner’s claim is properly raised through a habeas petition because 
the revocation of his good-time credits results in a lengthier duration of his custody and not merely 
change in the conditions of his custody. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

, 478 (1973). But 
Petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated fails on the merits.  
   “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply 
of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 

. In essence, 
the Due Process Clause guarantees inmates minimum procedures prior to revocation of good-time 
credits. 

 This is because a prisoner’s strong interest in avoiding arbitrary loss of good-time 
credits must be balanced against the legitimate institutional need of prisons to enforce discipline 

and maintain safety without having to satisfy overly burdensome administrative requirements. 
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 

, 454–455 
(1985).                                                                   
   Regarding the due process the prisoner must receive at a BOP disciplinary hearing, the 
Supreme Court summarized the requirement as follows:                      
        (1)  advance  written  notice  of  the  disciplinary  charges;  (2)  an 
        opportunity,  when  consistent  with  institutional  safety  and 
        correctional  goals,  to  call  witnesses  and  present  documentary 
        evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder 
        of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. 
Hill, 

. Those very requirements are codified in 28 C.F.R. § 541—the same 
regulation that Petitioner erroneously claims the BOP failed to follow. (See Amended Petition 
[Docket No. 6] at 3)                                                      
   When the BOP follows these procedures, the standard for judicial review of the substantive 

decision rendered by the BOP is highly differential—the BOP’s decision must be supported by 
“some evidence on the record.” Hill, 

. Thus, the Court need not examine the entire 
record, assess the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence, but solely look whether “any 
evidence in the record . . . support[s] the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” 

 at 455–
456.                                                                      
   Here, Petitioner was initially transferred to home confinement on June 8, 2023. (Inmate 
History [Docket No. 15-2] at 1). Before he was transferred to home confinement, Petitioner agreed 
to abide by certain conditions, including the requirement that he accept all calls from supervising 
staff, submit to urinalysis upon request, and appear at regular check-in appointments. (Condition 
of Home Confinement [Docket No. 15-5]; Community Based Program Agreement [Docket No. 

15-6]).                                                                   
   Petitioner incurred violations soon after being transferred to home confinement. (Inmate 
History [Docket No. 15-2] at 1). By July 6, 2023, Petitioner had already twice failed to show up 
to required check-in appointments. (Individualized Program Plan [Docket No. 15-7] at 3). By July 
27, 2023, he had also failed to answer calls, failed to show up to appointments, and had even been 
considered an escapee for under 4 hours. 

                              
   Petitioner does not dispute that he failed to appear as required for his urinalysis and his 
regular check-in appointments. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 2–3; Reply [Docket No. 
17] at 1–5). Petitioner readily admits that he violated the conditions of his home confinement by 
missing multiple appointments. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 2–3; Reply [Docket No. 
17] at 1–5).4                                                             
   At 11:00 a.m. on August 21, 2023, the BOP provided Petitioner with a copy of Incident 
Report No. 3816068, describing his failure to show up to provide a urine sample for urinalysis on 

August 14, 2023. (Incident Report [Docket No. 15-9] at 1). At 12:42 p.m. on August 22, 2023, the 
BOP held a disciplinary hearing regarding Incident Report No. 3816068. (Id. at 2). Petitioner did 
not request a staff representative or call any witnesses, despite the BOP officer informing him of 
his right to do so. (Center Disciple Committee Report [Docket No. 15-2] at 1). At the disciplinary 
hearing, Petitioner was also advised of his right to present document and evidence. (See Id.). On 
August 23, 2024, a BOP Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) reviewed the hearing’s findings 
against Petitioner and certified compliance with the disciplinary process. (See Id.).  
   On August 23, 2023, the DHO issued a report which concluded that the greater weight of 
the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner had committed the violation and sanctioned Petitioner 
to the loss of forty-one days of good-time credits. (Id.). The DHO’s report included specific 

findings of fact and detailed the specific evidence upon which they relied in reaching their 
conclusions. (Id.).5 The DHO’s report was delivered to Petitioner on August 24, 2023. (Id.).  
   The record now before the Court demonstrates that the BOP provided Petitioner with all 
the due process required by the Due Process Clause as it relates to Incident Report No. 3816068 
and the loss of forty-one days of his good-time credits. On August 21, 2023, the BOP provided 


4 Petitioner asserts that his violations were not by choice—he simply lacked the means to pay for transportation when 
his sister was not available. (Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 2–3]; Reply [Docket No. 17] at 2–6). The BOP staff 
did not seem to have disputed this during the disciplinary proceedings. Nor has Responded disputed Petitioner’s 
explanation in this habeas proceeding. If Petitioner’s explanation is indeed accurate, then Petitioner’s case is a 
sympathetic one. Nevertheless, for all the reasons discussed herein, there is more than “some evidence” supporting 
the decision that Petitioner failed to make mandatory appointments.       
5 The DHO’s report also advised Petitioner of his right to appeal the disciplinary finding, but Petitioner did not avail 
himself of that right. (Id.).                                             
Petitioner with the required advanced written notice of the disciplinary charges more than twenty-
four hours in advance of the disciplinary hearing. See Wolff, 

 (requiring advance 
notice of “no less than 24 hours”). The BOP also provided Petitioner with the opportunity to call 
witnesses and present evidence, although Petitioner did not avail himself of these opportunities. 

(See Center Discipline Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]). The BOP also provided Petitioner 
with a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. (See 
Id.).                                                                     
   The record now before the Court also demonstrates that at least “some evidence on the 
record” supports the disciplinary board’s decision that the greater weight of the evidence supported 
the conclusion that Petitioner failed to appear at a scheduled appointment to provide a urinalysis 
sample. (See Center Discipline Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]). As the DHO’s report 
noted, Petitioner—during the disciplinary hearing—admitted that he failed to appear at the 
urinalysis appointment. (Id. at 1). Petitioner admitted his failure to present for the urinalysis 
appointment when he was explaining the reasons why he failed to present for said appointment. 

(Id.). The DHO’s report also noted that the RRC staff had reported that Petitioner failed to appear 
for his in-person urinalysis on August 14, 2023, and August 15, 2023. (Id. at 3). This represents at 
least “some evidence on the record” which supports the disciplinary board’s decision.     
   In short, the BOP provided Petitioner with all the due process required by the Due Process 
Clause.6 Petitioner was provided with sufficiently advanced notice of the disciplinary proceeding; 



6 Notably, Petitioner does not argue that the BOP failed to provide any of the required due process. (See Amended 
Petition [Docket No. 6]; Reply [Docket No. 17]). Instead, Petitioner seems to argue that he is entitled to more due 
process than is required based on his belief that he was on supervised release rather than having been transferred to 
home confinement. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6]; Reply [Docket No. 17]). As already discussed, however, 
Petitioner was not on supervised release.                                 
an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in support of his defense; and a written 
statement by fact finder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.        
III.  Conclusion                                                          
   In summation, Petitioner’s challenge to his transfer from home confinement to a more 

traditional prison setting is not cognizable in this habeas proceeding, and his challenge to the loss 
of good-time credits fails on the merits. Accordingly, the habeas petition should be denied, and 
this matter should be dismissed with prejudice.                           
   Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records and proceedings herein, 
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                            
   1.  The Amended Petition for a writ of habeas corpus of petitioner Johnny Frederic 
     Heurung, [Docket No. 6], be DENIED; and                            
   2.  This matter be DISMISSED with prejudice.                         


Dated: October 17, 2024         s/Leo I. Brisbois                       
                                Hon. Leo I. Brisbois                    
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

                           NOTICE                                       

Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District 
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate 
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the 
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being 
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must 
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).      

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                               

Johnny Frederic Heurung,            Case No. 23-cv-3749 (PAM/LIB)       

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                               REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION              

Jared Rardin,                                                           

              Respondent.                                               


   Pursuant to a general referral made in accordance with 

 and Local Rule 
72.1, this matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Petitioner 
Johnny Frederic Heurung’s Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Docket No. 6]. 
Finding no hearing necessary, the Court issues the present Report and Recommendation.1  
   Petitioner is currently imprisoned at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota 
(“FMC Rochester”). He has brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 

 
claiming the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) denied him his right to due process by failing to 
hold a proper hearing when the BOP determined that he violated the conditions of his home 
confinement and transferred him back to a more traditional prison setting. (See Amended Petition 
[Docket No. 6]). Petitioner asks the Court to force the BOP to return him to home confinement or, 
alternatively, require the BOP to conduct a hearing to determine if he violated the conditions of 
his home confinement. Petitioner also claims that the BOP wrongfully sanctioned him with the 
loss of forty-one days of good-time credits without proper due process.   

1 Upon review of the present record, the Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary in this action because a hearing on 
the present Petition would not aid the Court in its consideration of the present Petition. See Wallace v. Lockhart, 

 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing that dismissal of a “habeas petition without a hearing is proper . . . where the 
allegations, even if true, fail to state a cognizable constitutional claim, where the relevant facts are not in dispute, or 
where the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the record”).           
   For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends that Heurung’s Amended Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [Docket No. 6], be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED with 
prejudice. With respect to the first claim regarding Petitioner’s transfer from home confinement 
back to a more traditional prison setting, habeas corpus is not the proper method to address 

Petitioner’s claims for relief. With respect to Petitioner’s second claim regarding good-time 
credits, Petitioner has not established that the BOP violated his due process rights. Accordingly, 
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on either claim.                     
I.   Background                                                           
   Petitioner has been serving a prison sentence since 2013, when the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced him to 216 months of imprisonment to be 
followed by three years of supervised release for Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud and Wire 
Fraud in violation of 

 and 1343. (Public Information Inmate Data as of 04-24-
2024 [Docket No. 15-1] at 2]). Petitioner has a long history of medical issues that have required 
dozens of hospital trips during his incarceration, and he has recently suffered a stroke which he 

indicates will likely leave him permanently in need of heightened level of medical care. (See 
Inmate History [Docket No. 15-2]; Medical Summary [Docket No. 17-1]). The BOP considered 
him for alternative custody arrangements under the CARES Act and, in 2023, transferred him to 
home confinement to live in his own apartment under several conditions, including that his sister 
would help him get to all required check-ins and appointments. (See Exhibit A [Docket No. 6-1]). 
   During his home confinement, Petitioner failed to appear for a number of his scheduled 
check-in, including an in-person check-in and urinalysis on August 14, 2023. (James Decl. [Docket 
No. 15] ¶ 21). This, in turn, caused the BOP to charge Petitioner with multiple violations of his 
custody conditions. (Incident Reports [Docket No. 15-9] at 2). Petitioner does not refute that he 
failed to appear at required check-ins, but he alleges that he failed to appear at said check-ins 
because his sister was not always available to transport him, and he was without the means to 
provide for his own transportation to required appointments due to delays in receiving social 
security payments. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6]).                 

   As a result of his failure to appear for the in-person check-in and the urinalysis, Petitioner 
was transferred from home confinement to a residential reentry center (“RRC”). (James Decl. 
[Docket No. 15] ¶ 27). Petitioner remained at the RRC from August 23, 2023, until October 19, 
2023, when it was determined that the RRC was unable to meet his medical needs. (Id. ¶¶ 27–29). 
The BOP determined that the best course of action was to transfer Petitioner to FMC Rochester. 
(Id. ¶¶ 28–29).                                                           
   Petitioner’s removal from home confinement was not the only consequence of his failure 
to make scheduled appointments while on home confinement. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 
6]). On August 22, 2023, the BOP held a hearing on the last violation Petitioner received while in 
home confinement. (James Decl. [Docket No. 15] ¶¶ 19–27).2 At the hearing, Petitioner declined 

staff representation, declined to call any witnesses, and declined to present any documentation 
evidence in support of his defense. (Id.; Center Discipline Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]). 
The Discipline Hearing Officer determined that the greater weight of the evidence demonstrated 
that Petitioner had committed the alleged violation, and Petitioner was sanctioned with the loss of 
forty-one days of good-time credits. (James Decl. [Docket No. 15] ¶¶ 25–26; Center Discipline 
Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]).                                     




2 Inmates on home confinement remain subject to the disciplinary rules established by the BOP, and violation of those 
rules can result in sanctions, including loss of good-time credits. See 

(g). 
II.  Analysis                                                             
   In his present Amended Petition, Heurung presents two separate challenges arising out of 
the same underlying incident. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6]). Petitioner first challenges 
the BOP decision to transfer him out of home confinement. Petitioner also argues that the BOP 

violated his due process rights in sanctioning him with the loss of forty-one days of good-time 
credits.                                                                  
   A.   Transfer From Home Confinement                                  

   In challenging the BOP’s decision to transfer him out of home confinement, Petitioner 
conflates home confinement and supervised release. Petitioner throughout his pleadings has 
mischaracterized his placement in home confinement as being a form of early supervised release. 
From the vantage point of the person serving home confinement, the confusion is understandable, 
if ultimately inaccurate. Both home confinement and supervised release, obviously, entail no 
longer being in typical prison setting. Moreover, the person serving either under home confinement 
or supervised release will be subject to various conditions, and a violation of those conditions can 
result in the person being returned to prison.                            
   As a matter of law, however, home confinement and supervised release are materially 
distinct. Transfer to home confinement is, based on the decision of the BOP, which usually may 
place a prisoner in home confinement “for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of imprisonment 
of that prisoner or 6 months.” 

(c)(2); see also 

(b) (investing the 
BOP with discretion over placement decisions). The BOP establishes the conditions of that home 
confinement, and the BOP determines whether placement on home confinement is no longer 
appropriate, just as the BOP determines whether placement at a specific prison is no longer 
appropriate for a particular prisoner.                                    
   Supervised release, by contrast, is not a form of BOP custody. Supervised release is what 
follows after a term of imprisonment. 

(a). Unlike home confinement, supervised 
release is not simply a matter of the BOP relocating a prisoner from one facility to another. By the 
time that a prisoner has been placed on supervised release, his term of imprisonment has been 

completed. The conditions imposed on a person while on supervised release are imposed by the 
Court at the time of sentencing. See 

(d). The same sentencing Court determines 
whether a person has violated the terms of supervised release and what the consequences of that 
violation will be. See 

                                                
   Notwithstanding Petitioner’s confusion, Petitioner was plainly on home confinement, not 
supervised  release,  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  disciplinary  violation.  The  documentation 
establishing Petitioner’s transfer to home confinement indicates that he was being considered for 
home confinement under the Cares Act and that he was not eligible for supervised release until 
May 11, 2028. (Exhibit A [Docket No. 6-1]). Indeed, the BOP could not have decided to transfer 
Petitioner to supervised release sooner—the end-date of prisoner’s custodial term was determined 

by the sentencing judge and cannot be altered by the BOP. What the BOP can do—and what the 
BOP did do—is transfer Petitioner between facilities, including by using Petitioner’s home as a 
custodial facility. The BOP has full discretion to transfer Petitioner in such a manner between 
places of incarceration. See 

(b).                         
   “Home confinement is not release from custody . . . it is simply one of several forms of 
BOP custody.” Johnson v. Birkholz, No. 21-cv-2017 (PJS/LIB), 

, at *1 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 5, 2022). Thus, Petitioner’s claim that he was wrongfully transferred from home 
confinement to a more traditional prison institution  is a challenge to the conditions of his 
confinement, not a challenge to the length or duration of his confinement. See 

 This is fatal to 
Petitioner’s habeas claim here.                                           
   If a prisoner, like Petitioner here, “is not challenging the validity of his conviction or the 
length of his detention, such as a loss of good time, then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper 

remedy.” Kruger v. Erikson, 

 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), see also Spencer v. 
Haynes, 

, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014). Thus, a prisoner, like Petitioner, claiming that he 
should be detained at home or in a different facility ultimately is challenging only the conditions 
of  his confinement. See, e.g., Johnson, 

, at *1. Habeas  corpus is not an 
appropriate procedural vehicle for such a claim. See Spencer, 774 F.3d at 469–70. 
   In short, Petitioner’s challenge to the conditions of his confinement is not a cognizable 
habeas claim. Therefore, to the extent Heurung’s Amended Petition challenges his transfer out of 
home confinement, the undersigned recommends that Heurung’s Amended Petition, [Docket No. 
6], be DENIED.                                                            
   B.   Good-time credit                                                

   As observed above, Petitioner also challenges his loss of forty-one days of good-time 
credits arguing that the BOP violated his due process rights in sanctioning him with the loss of 
said good-time credit. In support of this challenge, Petitioner appears to argue that although the 
BOP charged a violation against him, the BOP failed to hold a hearing on the charged violation as 
required by 

. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 3–4).3  


3 Petitioner’s challenge here is somewhat contradictory. He appears to argue that the BOP failed to adjudicate the 
discipline violation charges against him, (see Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 4), but he also acknowledges that 
the loss of good-time credits was a result of his “CDC [Center Discipline Committee] hearing.” (Reply [Docket No. 
17] at 6). This contradiction may be attributable to Petitioner’s incorrect belief that he was on supervised release. If 
he was on supervised release and he violated the terms of his supervised release, then he would have had proceedings 
before the sentencing Court. As already explained, however, Petitioner was not on supervised release, and he was 
therefore not entitled to any such hearing before the sentencing Court.   
   The BOP has statutory authority to penalize inmates, including those inmates placed on 
home confinement, who violate the conditions of their prerelease custody. 

(g)(5). 
But prisoners have a protected liberty interest in good-time credits, which may not be revoked 
without the prisoner receiving due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 

, 556–557 

(1974).                                                                   
   In the present case, Petitioner’s claim is properly raised through a habeas petition because 
the revocation of his good-time credits results in a lengthier duration of his custody and not merely 
change in the conditions of his custody. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

, 478 (1973). But 
Petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated fails on the merits.  
   “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply 
of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 

. In essence, 
the Due Process Clause guarantees inmates minimum procedures prior to revocation of good-time 
credits. 

 This is because a prisoner’s strong interest in avoiding arbitrary loss of good-time 
credits must be balanced against the legitimate institutional need of prisons to enforce discipline 

and maintain safety without having to satisfy overly burdensome administrative requirements. 
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 

, 454–455 
(1985).                                                                   
   Regarding the due process the prisoner must receive at a BOP disciplinary hearing, the 
Supreme Court summarized the requirement as follows:                      
        (1)  advance  written  notice  of  the  disciplinary  charges;  (2)  an 
        opportunity,  when  consistent  with  institutional  safety  and 
        correctional  goals,  to  call  witnesses  and  present  documentary 
        evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder 
        of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. 
Hill, 

. Those very requirements are codified in 28 C.F.R. § 541—the same 
regulation that Petitioner erroneously claims the BOP failed to follow. (See Amended Petition 
[Docket No. 6] at 3)                                                      
   When the BOP follows these procedures, the standard for judicial review of the substantive 

decision rendered by the BOP is highly differential—the BOP’s decision must be supported by 
“some evidence on the record.” Hill, 

. Thus, the Court need not examine the entire 
record, assess the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence, but solely look whether “any 
evidence in the record . . . support[s] the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” 

 at 455–
456.                                                                      
   Here, Petitioner was initially transferred to home confinement on June 8, 2023. (Inmate 
History [Docket No. 15-2] at 1). Before he was transferred to home confinement, Petitioner agreed 
to abide by certain conditions, including the requirement that he accept all calls from supervising 
staff, submit to urinalysis upon request, and appear at regular check-in appointments. (Condition 
of Home Confinement [Docket No. 15-5]; Community Based Program Agreement [Docket No. 

15-6]).                                                                   
   Petitioner incurred violations soon after being transferred to home confinement. (Inmate 
History [Docket No. 15-2] at 1). By July 6, 2023, Petitioner had already twice failed to show up 
to required check-in appointments. (Individualized Program Plan [Docket No. 15-7] at 3). By July 
27, 2023, he had also failed to answer calls, failed to show up to appointments, and had even been 
considered an escapee for under 4 hours. 

                              
   Petitioner does not dispute that he failed to appear as required for his urinalysis and his 
regular check-in appointments. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 2–3; Reply [Docket No. 
17] at 1–5). Petitioner readily admits that he violated the conditions of his home confinement by 
missing multiple appointments. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 2–3; Reply [Docket No. 
17] at 1–5).4                                                             
   At 11:00 a.m. on August 21, 2023, the BOP provided Petitioner with a copy of Incident 
Report No. 3816068, describing his failure to show up to provide a urine sample for urinalysis on 

August 14, 2023. (Incident Report [Docket No. 15-9] at 1). At 12:42 p.m. on August 22, 2023, the 
BOP held a disciplinary hearing regarding Incident Report No. 3816068. (Id. at 2). Petitioner did 
not request a staff representative or call any witnesses, despite the BOP officer informing him of 
his right to do so. (Center Disciple Committee Report [Docket No. 15-2] at 1). At the disciplinary 
hearing, Petitioner was also advised of his right to present document and evidence. (See Id.). On 
August 23, 2024, a BOP Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) reviewed the hearing’s findings 
against Petitioner and certified compliance with the disciplinary process. (See Id.).  
   On August 23, 2023, the DHO issued a report which concluded that the greater weight of 
the evidence demonstrated that Petitioner had committed the violation and sanctioned Petitioner 
to the loss of forty-one days of good-time credits. (Id.). The DHO’s report included specific 

findings of fact and detailed the specific evidence upon which they relied in reaching their 
conclusions. (Id.).5 The DHO’s report was delivered to Petitioner on August 24, 2023. (Id.).  
   The record now before the Court demonstrates that the BOP provided Petitioner with all 
the due process required by the Due Process Clause as it relates to Incident Report No. 3816068 
and the loss of forty-one days of his good-time credits. On August 21, 2023, the BOP provided 


4 Petitioner asserts that his violations were not by choice—he simply lacked the means to pay for transportation when 
his sister was not available. (Amended Petition [Docket No. 6] at 2–3]; Reply [Docket No. 17] at 2–6). The BOP staff 
did not seem to have disputed this during the disciplinary proceedings. Nor has Responded disputed Petitioner’s 
explanation in this habeas proceeding. If Petitioner’s explanation is indeed accurate, then Petitioner’s case is a 
sympathetic one. Nevertheless, for all the reasons discussed herein, there is more than “some evidence” supporting 
the decision that Petitioner failed to make mandatory appointments.       
5 The DHO’s report also advised Petitioner of his right to appeal the disciplinary finding, but Petitioner did not avail 
himself of that right. (Id.).                                             
Petitioner with the required advanced written notice of the disciplinary charges more than twenty-
four hours in advance of the disciplinary hearing. See Wolff, 

 (requiring advance 
notice of “no less than 24 hours”). The BOP also provided Petitioner with the opportunity to call 
witnesses and present evidence, although Petitioner did not avail himself of these opportunities. 

(See Center Discipline Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]). The BOP also provided Petitioner 
with a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. (See 
Id.).                                                                     
   The record now before the Court also demonstrates that at least “some evidence on the 
record” supports the disciplinary board’s decision that the greater weight of the evidence supported 
the conclusion that Petitioner failed to appear at a scheduled appointment to provide a urinalysis 
sample. (See Center Discipline Committee Report [Docket No. 15-12]). As the DHO’s report 
noted, Petitioner—during the disciplinary hearing—admitted that he failed to appear at the 
urinalysis appointment. (Id. at 1). Petitioner admitted his failure to present for the urinalysis 
appointment when he was explaining the reasons why he failed to present for said appointment. 

(Id.). The DHO’s report also noted that the RRC staff had reported that Petitioner failed to appear 
for his in-person urinalysis on August 14, 2023, and August 15, 2023. (Id. at 3). This represents at 
least “some evidence on the record” which supports the disciplinary board’s decision.     
   In short, the BOP provided Petitioner with all the due process required by the Due Process 
Clause.6 Petitioner was provided with sufficiently advanced notice of the disciplinary proceeding; 



6 Notably, Petitioner does not argue that the BOP failed to provide any of the required due process. (See Amended 
Petition [Docket No. 6]; Reply [Docket No. 17]). Instead, Petitioner seems to argue that he is entitled to more due 
process than is required based on his belief that he was on supervised release rather than having been transferred to 
home confinement. (See Amended Petition [Docket No. 6]; Reply [Docket No. 17]). As already discussed, however, 
Petitioner was not on supervised release.                                 
an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in support of his defense; and a written 
statement by fact finder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.        
III.  Conclusion                                                          
   In summation, Petitioner’s challenge to his transfer from home confinement to a more 

traditional prison setting is not cognizable in this habeas proceeding, and his challenge to the loss 
of good-time credits fails on the merits. Accordingly, the habeas petition should be denied, and 
this matter should be dismissed with prejudice.                           
   Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records and proceedings herein, 
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:                                            
   1.  The Amended Petition for a writ of habeas corpus of petitioner Johnny Frederic 
     Heurung, [Docket No. 6], be DENIED; and                            
   2.  This matter be DISMISSED with prejudice.                         


Dated: October 17, 2024         s/Leo I. Brisbois                       
                                Hon. Leo I. Brisbois                    
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

                           NOTICE                                       

Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District 
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate 
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the 
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being 
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must 
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).