Zikar Holdings LLC v. Ruhland

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota December 26, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Zikar Holdings LLC, Jameel Ahmed, and File No. 24-CV-03721 (JMB/SGE)
Faraaz Mohammed,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

Michael Ruhland, Christopher Lyden, and
City of Lino Lakes,

Defendants.

Samuel W. Diehl and Christopher R. Johnson, CrossCastle PLLC, Minneapolis, MN; and
Matthew S. Duffy, Monroe Moxness Berg PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiffs Zikar
Holdings LLC, Jameel Ahmed, and Faraaz Mohammed.
Jason J. Kuboushek and Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, LLC, Bloomington, MN, for
Defendant Michael Ruhland.
James J. Thomson and Michelle E. Weinberg, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis,
MN, for Defendant Christopher Lyden.
John M. Baker and Katherine M. Swenson, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, for
Defendant City of Lino Lakes.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Zikar Holdings LLC’s (Zikar), Jameel
Ahmed’s, and Faraaz Mohammed’s (together, Plaintiffs) motion for a preliminary
injunction. (Doc. No. 10.) In this action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant City of Lino
Lakes (City) and two of its City Council members, Defendants Michael Ruhland and
Christopher Lyden, enacted a one-year moratorium on development in a discrete area of
the City where Plaintiffs had proposed to build a residential development that would
include a masjid (mosque), and that they did so because of their discriminatory animus
toward Islam and Muslims. Plaintiffs assert that, in doing so, Defendants have violated the
Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). In their motion for a preliminary injunction,
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin the City from enforcing the moratorium, among other
things. As discussed below, the Court denies the motion because Plaintiffs have not shown
that they will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction.
BACKGROUND

A. The Robinson and Pulte/Del Webb Properties
Lino Lakes is a suburban city located in Anoka County, Minnesota. At issue in this
lawsuit are several parcels of land in the city’s northwest corner, specifically, property
adjacent to Main Street (which runs east-west) between Sunset Avenue and 4th Avenue
(both of which run north-south). Plaintiffs are primarily concerned with the parcels located

on the south side of Main Street (Robinson Property). (See Doc. No. 9 [hereinafter, “Am.
Compl.”]; Doc. No. 17-1 at 4.) Also relevant to the parties’ dispute are the parcels on the
north side of Main Street (Pulte/Del Webb Property). (See Doc. No. 29-13.) All of these
parcels are currently zoned for agricultural and rural residential use. See 2040
Comprehensive Plan, City of Lino Lakes [hereinafter, “2040 Plan”] at 2-17,

https://linolakes.us/184/2040-Comprehensive-Plan [https://perma.cc/4URQ-UKGF].
The City’s 2040 Comprehensive Plan (2040 Plan) re-envisioned the future of the
city’s northwest corner. See 2040 Plan at Part 3. The 2040 Plan identifies the area around
Main Street (i.e., the street running between the Pulte/Del Webb and Robinson Properties)
as a “gateway” district given its position as an entry point to the City. Id. at 3-24, 3‑25.
As such, the City has additional development aspirations for this area, as follows:

Opportunity exists to redevelop both underutilized property
and outdated land uses. A master planning study should be
prepared of the area to examine existing land use, future land
use compatibility, right-of-way needs, access management,
stormwater management, and other appropriate uses.
Id. at 3-24 (emphasis added). Outside of the immediate “gateway” area, the 2040 Plan also
notes that master planning is needed for the entire corridor “between Sunset Avenue and
4th Avenue.” Id. The completion of master plans for the city’s planning districts is noted
as a “Medium”-level priority. Id. at 12-3.
The 2040 Plan gives the parcels comprising the Robinson Property and Pulte/Del
Webb Property “multiple [future] land use designations,” including low-, medium-, and
high-density housing, as well as planned residential/commercial use, which together
“create[s] somewhat of a checkerboard patterned look.” (Doc. No. 17-1 at 5.) The 2040
Plan advises that master planning will ensure that this patchwork of land-use designations
are developed in a cohesive manner. See 2040 Plan at 3-24.
B. Recent Interest in Developing the Robinson Property
In late 2021, Integrate Properties, LLC (IP), a property developer with no known
religious affiliation, sought to develop the Robinson Property into a residential community
comprising more than 700 housing units. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 1, 17.) IP submitted a Planned

Unit Development (PUD) Concept Plan1 to city planning staff. (See id. at 1.) The City

1 A PUD is “[a]n area to be planned and developed as a single entity containing one or
more residential clusters or planned residential developments and/or one or more public,
considered and reviewed this PUD Concept Plan from January 2022 through October 2022.
(See Doc. Nos. 17-1–17-9.) During this review period, Michael Grochala, the City’s

Community Development Director, sent a staff report to the City Council to recommend
that the City fund a master plan for the gateway locations in the City, especially the gateway
area implicated in IP’s PUD Concept Plan. (Doc. No. 17-6.) Grochala reminded the City
Council that the 2040 Plan had identified the development of design guidelines for gateway
areas as a “short term action (1–5 years),” and that the completion of master plans is “in
the medium priority category.” (Id. at 2.) Ultimately, however, IP never pursued its

development further than the PUD Concept Plan stage, the Robinson Property again
became available for development, and master planning did not occur. (Am. Compl. ¶ 53;
Doc. No. 30 ¶ 8.)
Next, Ahmed and Mohammed took an interest in developing the Robinson Property.
(Doc. No. 30 ¶ 6.) Ahmed and Mohammed are Muslims who worship at a masjid in nearby

Blaine, a suburban city directly adjacent to Lino Lakes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 55.) Ahmed’s and

quasi-public, commercial or industrial areas.” Lino Lakes Code § 1007.001(2). A “PUD
[C]oncept [P]lan provides an opportunity for the applicant to submit an application and
plan to the city showing the basic intent and the general nature of the entire development
before incurring substantial cost.” Id. § 1007.024(9)(b)(1). The City’s Community
Development Department forwards a PUD Concept Plan to the city’s several advisory
boards and full City Council for “their informal review and comment on the project’s
consistency with the City’s Comprehensive Plan and development regulations” at
otherwise regularly scheduled meetings. Id. § 1007.024(9)(b)(3). Eventually, the
applicant will submit a PUD Preliminary Plan to “provide a master plan of the entire
development upon which the Planning and Zoning Board will base its recommendation to
the City Council,” and “serve[] as a complete and permanent public record of the entire
PUD and the manner in which it is to be developed.” Id. § 1007.024(9)(c)(1).
Mohammed’s masjid in Blaine had more worshippers than capacity, and its services were
regularly crowded. (Id. ¶¶ 56–58.) According to certain Islamic hadiths to which Ahmed

and Mohammed subscribe, Muslims receive spiritual blessings if they are able to walk to
their place of worship. (Id. ¶ 59.) Ahmed and Mohammed wished to develop a community
that would permit Muslim community members to walk to their place of worship. (Id.
¶¶ 60–63.) In furtherance of this idea, they formed Zikar Holdings, LLC (Zikar). (Id.
¶ 65.) In late 2023, Plaintiffs identified the Robinson Property as a workable location for
their contemplated residential development, which they would call “Madinah Lakes.” (Id.

¶¶ 62, 65, 67; Doc. No. 30 ¶ 6.)
C. In 2024, the City Council Considers Two Developments in the Main
Street Gateway District
In January 2024, a developer, Pulte Homes, contacted the City’s planning staff about
their interest in developing the Pulte/Del Webb Property. (Doc. No. 30 ¶ 6.) The following
month, Pulte Homes delivered a presentation during a City Council work session, during
which they outlined a potential 637-lot residential project. (Doc. No. 29-16; Doc. No. 29-
13.)

Then, in March, Zikar met with Larsen and Grochala to discuss Zikar’s potential
Madinah Lakes development on the Robinson Property. (Am. Compl. ¶ 76.) Zikar
contemplated a several-hundred-unit residential development. During the meeting, both
Larsen and Grochala provided Zikar with helpful input and raised no concerns about the
project. (Id. ¶ 77.) Around that same time, on March 17, Zikar posted a promotional video

on its website about its desired development. (Id. ¶ 78.) Many Lino Lakes residents
learned about the video and some had concerns about Madinah Lakes, specifically its
affiliation with Islam, and a group formed online in opposition to it. (Id. ¶¶ 79–80.) Within

days, City staff had received calls and messages from numerous constituents who were
concerned about or opposed to Madinah Lakes. (Id. ¶ 81.)
On March 25, City Councilmember Ruhland placed a request to add an item to the
City’s agenda for its April 1 work session regarding “[w]ater capacity with major new
development.” (Doc. No. 9-4 at 2.) In the request, Ruhland expressed concern that, given
then-ongoing litigation with a neighboring suburban city,2 the city’s water infrastructure

would be unable to serve the new residential developments proposed by “several
developers.” (Id. at 2–3.) Ruhland recommended that the City consider “a moratorium on
residential development until we’ve had an opportunity to see what our future capacity of
water is, and what our currently stressed infrastructure can sustain.” (Id. at 3.) That
evening, after a City Council meeting during which members of the public spoke out in

opposition to Madinah Lakes, Mayor Rob Rafferty called Mohammed by phone. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 104–07.) The Mayor informed Mohammed that he and council members were

2 Ruhland was referring to In the Matter of Amendments to Various Water Appropriation
Permits, OAH No. 8-2002-37733, which involved “the appropriateness of amendments
made by the Commissioner of Natural Resources to water appropriation permits held by
municipalities neighboring White Bear Lake.” Id. (May 16, 2024) (order on evidentiary
hearings that occurred in October and December 2023). The ruling issued on May 16,
2024. See id. In it, an Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled that White Bear Lake’s
ban on groundwater use by neighboring cities was “arbitrary and capricious.” See id. This
ruling has been appealed and is currently pending before the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
See In the Matter of Amendments to Various Water Appropriation Permits, Nos. A24-0943
(Minn. App. June 21, 2024) (consolidating appeals A24‑0943, ‑0958, ‑0959, ‑0960, and
‑0976).
buried in phone calls from residents and asked that Zikar take down the video about
Madinah Lakes from their website. (Id. ¶ 106.) Zikar did. (Id. ¶ 107.)

In April, Zikar entered into a written purchase agreement to purchase the Robinson
Property, subject to certain “contingencies.” (Id. ¶ 74; Doc. No. 17 ¶ 2.) Zikar also
submitted its PUD Concept Plan for Madinah Lakes to city planning staff. (Am. Compl.
¶ 114.) Zikar received some preliminary feedback on its PUD Concept Plan in late May.
(Id. ¶ 119.) City planning staff informed Zikar that the full City Council would review and
comment on the PUD Concept Plan by July 1. (Id. ¶ 115.)

Meanwhile, opposition to Madinah Lakes continued to coalesce online. In various
spaces on Facebook, Lino Lakes residents and others posted about their fears of a Muslim
community rooting in Lino Lakes. The flavor of the discourse in the group was negative
toward Muslims. Example posts are as follows: comparing Minnesota’s Muslim
community to the “Waco Branch Davidians, the Rajneeshee compound in Oregon,

Jonestown, [t]he Manson Family, all [of which] had goals take over not assimilate!” (Doc.
No. 17-12 at 4); expressing concern that Muslims should develop elsewhere for an “eas[ier]
connection for all of their culture in Minneapolis that will no doubt come along with this
development” (id. at 16); suggesting that “[e]veryone around that Muslim city should get
pigs” (id. at 8); announcing that “I am NOT AFRAID TO SAY I don’t trust anything or

anyone involved in this Muslim-centric ideology in my backyard. PERIOD.” (Id. at 18.)
Opponents to Madinah Lakes attended and spoke at City Council meetings during which
the Madinah Lakes development was not on the agenda. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120, 121, 122,
127.)
On July 1, the City was supposed to consider the PUD Concept Plan. (Id. ¶ 133.)
However, the City Council resolved to table discussion on it until after a final decision on

Ruhland’s proposed moratorium had been made. (Id. ¶ 135.) Then, on July 8, the
Moratorium came before the full City Council for a vote. (Id. ¶ 137.) The meeting included
a lengthy public comment period, during which opponents and proponents of Madinah
Lakes spoke. (See Doc. No. 9-5 at 1–9.) During discussion on the Moratorium, the Mayor
suggested that, by creating Madinah Lakes, Plaintiffs intended to create a community for
Muslims separate from greater Lino Lakes, and that “Lino Lakes is about establishing

neighborhoods, not communities.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 137(A).) Lyden, who supported the
Moratorium, made negative comments about proponents of Madinah Lakes, many of
whom were not native English speakers: “[O]ur city name is not pronounced Lean-o-Lakes.
It’s Line-o-Lakes and it’s been that way for a long time.” (Id. ¶ 137(B).) Lyden also
directed comments toward the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which had

turned out to support Plaintiffs at City Council meetings:
They’re about talking about improving their image, about
creating mutual understandings, that they want to promote
justice, they talk about religious discrimination, they talk about
hate crimes, talk about religious freedom, but they make no
mention of the October 7th attack on Israel. It’s important that
you take responsibility and accountability in life. If you’re
worried about your image, CAIR maybe needs to take a hard
look in the mirror.
(Id.) Ultimately, the Moratorium passed by a vote of 4-1. (Id. ¶ 139.)
As passed, the Moratorium was to last one year, unless extended by the City. (Doc.
No. 9-6 §§ 3, 4.) The City Council made the following findings in support of the

Moratorium:
(1) Main Street at Sunset Avenue (CR 53) is identified as a
“gateway” in the City’s 2040 Comprehensive Plan.
(2) The City’s 2040 Comprehensive Plan recommends the
preparation of a Master Plan for the Main Street corridor
between 4th Avenue and Sunset Avenue (CR 53). No such
plan presently exists.
(3) The City has been presented with two development
proposals within the [covered] area that total 400 acres with
approximately 900 new lots for residential use.
(4) A moratorium will provide the City with time to study and
work towards preparation of a Master Plan for the [covered]
area that will address land uses, transportation, environmental
resources preservation, parks, surface waters, and utility issues.
A moratorium also presents the possibility of conducting an
Alternative Urban Areawide Review (AUAR) environment
study for the area.
(Id. § 2.) In short, the City Council imposed the Moratorium in order to complete the
master planning contemplated by the 2040 Plan.
Then, approximately one month later, Lyden was copied on an email to the author
of a New York Times article about the tension between the City and its residents and
Plaintiffs, from a person who identified himself as “Sean, USA (college-educated white).”
(Doc. No. 9-8 at 1.) The email can be characterized as a multi-page meandering invective
of Islam and Muslims that concludes by wishing “[g]ood luck halting the Muslim conquest
of Minnesota!” (See Doc. No. 9-8.) Lyden responded as follows: “Might be the best email
I have ever received! Thank you Sir!” (See id. at 2.) The City Council voted to censure
Lyden on grounds that Lyden’s reply email “could be interpreted by some as endorsing the
views and opinions expressed in the email.” (Doc. No. 9-9; Am. Compl. ¶ 161.) Ruhland

was the only councilmember who voted against the censure. (Am. Compl. ¶ 161.)
D. This Action
On October 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their five-count Amended Complaint. (See
Doc. No. 9.) In it, they allege that Defendants enacted the Moratorium to preclude the City
Council’s consideration of Plaintiffs’ proposed development on the Robinson Property.
They assert that this conduct violated the Fair Housing Act’s (FHA) prohibition against

discrimination on the basis of religion, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs now move for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 10.) Specifically,

Plaintiffs ask that the City be enjoined from the following three actions: (1) enforcing the
Moratorium or any similar measure that is intended to prevent Plaintiffs from submitting
further development applications; (2) requiring Plaintiffs to undertake any action that is
not neutral or generally applicable as a condition of further approval; and (3) subjecting
Plaintiffs to any condition or requirement that is discretionary and not clearly enumerated

in the 2040 Plan, Zoning Ordinance, or other city ordinance on March 1, 2024.3 (See Doc.

3 In their moving papers, Plaintiffs also asked the Court to enjoin Ruhland and Lyden from
participating in any City Council deliberations on future development proposals. (Doc.
No. 18 at 4 ¶ 2.) However, at the hearing, Plaintiffs withdrew this request.
No. 18 at 3–4.) Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to establish that the applicable
factors favor granting the motion.

When considering whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court
considers four factors: (1) “the threat of irreparable harm to the movant;” (2) “the
probability that movant will succeed on the merits;” (3) “the state of balance between this
harm [to the movant] and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties
litigant;” and (4) “the public interest.” Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc.,

640 F.2d 109, 114

 (8th Cir. 1981).  Generally, no one factor is determinative, and the Court “should 

flexibly weigh the case’s particular circumstances to determine whether the balance of 
equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene.”  Hubbard Feeds, 
Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc.,

182 F.3d 598, 601

 (8th Cir. 1999) (quotation 
omitted).  The burden of establishing every factor belongs to the movants—here, Plaintiffs.  
E.g., Watkins Inc. v. Lewis,

346 F.3d 841, 844

 (8th Cir. 2003).           

A.   Irreparable Harm                                                
The Court first considers whether Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if an 
injunction does not issue.  Dataphase, 640 F.3d at 114.  For the reasons noted below, the 
Court concludes that this factor strongly favors denial of the motion.    
The individual Plaintiffs and Zikar frame their asserted irreparable harm separately.  

First, Ahmed and Mohammed argue that, if the Moratorium is not enjoined, their right to 
freely  exercise  their  religion  will  continue  to  be  violated,  and  “[t]he  loss  of  First 
Amendment  freedoms,  for  even  minimal  periods  of  time,  unquestionably  constitutes 
irreparable injury.”  (Doc. No. 15 at 31 (quoting Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347, 373

 (1974)).)  
However, as discussed infra Part B.i, the Court disagrees that, on the record before the 
Court on this motion, Mohammed’s and Ahmed’s rights to freely exercise their religion 

have been impinged.  Plaintiffs have thus not shown that Ahmed and Mohammed will be 
irreparably harmed if the Court does not grant their motion.              
Next, Zikar asserts that, “[i]f the Moratorium is not enjoined, Zikar risks losing the 
opportunity  to  purchase  the  Robinson  Property  for  good”  because  “[i]ts  purchase 
agreement expires long before the expiration of the Moratorium.”  (Doc. No. 15 at 32; see 
also  Doc.  No.  17  ¶ 2  (“If  the  Moratorium  is  not  enjoined  Zikar  will  likely  lose  its 

opportunity to purchase the Robinson Property.”).)  According to Plaintiffs, “the loss of a 
particular  piece  of  real  property  constitutes  irreparable  harm,”  which  money  cannot 
adequately compensate.  (Doc. No. 15 at 32 (citing Minn. Vikings Football Stadium, LLC 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,

193 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1016

 (D. Minn. 2016)).) 
The primary problem for Plaintiffs here is one of foundation.  Plaintiffs have told 

the Court—but have not shown—that the purchase agreement between Zikar and the 
Robinson Property’s owners “expires long before the expiration of the Moratorium.”  (Doc. 
No. 15 at 32.)  At most, Plaintiffs’ attorney, Sam Diehl, stated the following about the 
purchase agreement in a supporting declaration:                           
     In April 2024, Zikar executed a purchase agreement to buy the   
     Robinson Property, subject to certain contingencies.  The City  
     of Lino Lakes’ . . . Moratorium pre-vents [sic] Zikar from      
     applying for the approvals it needs in order to close on this   
     purchase.  In addition, Zikar’s purchase agreement, and its     
     right  to  purchase  the  Robinson  Property,  will  expire  long 
     before the conclusion of the Moratorium.                        
(Doc. No. 17 ¶ 2.)  Although Diehl states that the Declaration is “based on [his] personal 
knowledge” (id. ¶ 1), he does not aver that he has ever reviewed or read any relevant 
provision of the purchase agreement.  As a result, the representations he makes about its 

terms lack foundation.  El Deeb v. Univ. of Minn.,

60 F.3d 423

, 428 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“Affidavits asserting personal knowledge must include enough factual support to show
that the affiant possesses that knowledge.”). Further, the Court cannot determine for itself
what the purchase agreement says because it has not been placed in the record, neither in
whole nor in part, by Plaintiffs.4 (See Doc. No. 17.)
Further, the Court observes that Zikar does not frame the threat of irreparable harm

in concrete terms. Instead, it describes the potential irreparable harm as a “likely los[t]”
opportunity or a “risk[ed] los[s].” (Doc. No. 15 at 32; Doc. No. 17 ¶ 2.)
This being the case, Zikar’s irreparable-harm argument is a conclusion based on
counsel’s mere ipse dixit about what a contract says. However, the Court does not grant

4 The Court acknowledges that, in the Verified Complaint, Mohammed mentions the
purchase agreement. Though he presumably has adequate foundation to describe its terms,
he does not. He describes the purchase agreement as follows:
In March 2024, Zikar agreed to buy the Robinson Property
from its owners, contingent on obtaining any necessary City or
other government approvals for Zikar’s proposed development
among other potential contingencies. The parties executed a
written purchase agreement in April 2024 memorializing their
agreed terms.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) No part of the purchase agreement is attached to or otherwise
described in the Complaint. (See Am. Compl.) No other portion of the record contains
any specific explanation of what “other government approvals” or “other potential
contingencies” were contemplated in the purchase agreement, much less any indication
whether or not these other contingencies and conditions have been or can be satisfied.
injunctive relief on the say-so of counsel—instead, “[t]o secure preliminary relief, a
plaintiff must do more than raise, ipse dixit, that possibility [of irreparable harm]; he must

concretely demonstrate it.” Vision-Ease Lens, Inc. v. Essilor Int’l SA,

322 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998

(D. Minn. 2004) (denying injunctive relief where irreparable-harm argument was
supported only by conclusory averments in affidavit that was “larded with qualifiers” such
as “could” and “most likely”). Plaintiffs have simply not provided the Court with any proof
that they would indeed lose an opportunity they otherwise would not absent an injunction.
Moreover, based on the limited description of the purchase agreement provided by

Mohammed (who the Court assumes has requisite foundation to make), the Court can
discern that the purchase agreement was subject to certain conditions precedent. According
to Mohammed, the purchase agreement was “contingent on [Zikar] obtaining any
necessary City or government approvals.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) The Court observes that
Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with any proof that Zikar had satisfied or was surely

poised to satisfy those conditions precedent generally, let alone before any deadline that
may or may not be set forth in the purchase agreement. Indeed, at oral argument on this
motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Zikar was “not seeking automatic approval” of any
application before the City Council. Counsel’s argument, therefore, indicates that Zikar
has not been affected by the Moratorium at this stage of the proposed development.

Plaintiff’s argument amounts to mere speculation concerning theoretical future loss, and
on the record presented, the Court concludes that the irreparable-harm factor weighs
resolutely against granting the requested injunctive relief.
B. Success on the Merits
The next Dataphase factor requires the Court to inquire into the “probability that

movant will succeed on the merits.” Dataphase, 640 F.3d at 114. For the reasons noted
below, this factor is neutral.
Ordinarily, a movant satisfies the success-on-the-merits factor by showing that they
have a “fair chance” at prevailing on their claims, which is “something less than fifty
percent.” Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,

530 F.3d 724, 730

 (8th Cir. 
2008) (en banc).  However, when a motion is for the injunction of a statute or ordinance, a 

“more rigorous threshold showing” is required because legislation is deemed to be the 
result of “reasoned democratic processes,” and, therefore, it is “entitled to a higher degree 
of deference and should not be enjoined lightly.”

Id. at 730, 732

 (quotation omitted); see 
also, e.g., Doe 1 v. City of Apple Valley,

487 F. Supp. 3d 761

, 767 (D. Minn. 2020) 
(applying heightened Rounds standard on motion to enjoin city ordinance). 

The Eighth Circuit advises that, when deciding whether to apply the heightened 
Rounds standard, courts must “evaluate whether the full play of the democratic process 
was involved in the [legislative] actions.”  D.M. by Bao Xiong v. Minn. State High Sch. 
League,

917 F.3d 994, 1000

(8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs do not address the
City’s assertion that a heightened showing is required on the probability-of-success factor.

(See Doc. Nos. 15, 31.) Further, aside from their overarching arguments that the two
defendant council members acted with animus toward Muslims, Plaintiffs make no express
argument why the Court should not presume that the Moratorium was not the result of the
full City Council’s “reasoned democratic process” such that the heightened Rounds
standard should not apply. (See Doc. No. 15 at 21–31.)

Therefore, the Court’s inquiry on the first Dataphase factor is whether Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits of their disparate-treatment claim under the FHA and their
Free Exercise claim5 against the City.6
i. Free Exercise Clause
Plaintiffs argue that they will likely succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise
claim. (Doc. No. 15 at 28–30.) According to Plaintiffs, the City violated their rights to

freely exercise their religion because the Moratorium “is quite literally gerrymandered to
affect only a development proposed by Muslims.” (See id. at 29.)
The U.S. Supreme Court advises that “a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law

5 Upon careful review of Plaintiffs’ arguments in their briefing and at oral argument, the
Court discerns that the merits of only these two claims—Counts I and III—are at issue in
this motion, and not the RLUIPA, Equal Protection Clause, or disparate-impact FHA
claims.
6 It is not clear to the Court whether, by withdrawing their requested relief related to Lyden
and Ruhland, see supra footnote 3, Plaintiffs also withdrew their arguments that they are
likely to succeed on the merits of their claims as against those Defendants. The Court
assumes so. However, to the extent Plaintiffs intended to persist in arguing the likelihood
of success of its claims against Lyden and Ruhland, the Court expresses its concern about
the viability of these claims in light of the long-held doctrine that legislators, when acting
within the scope of their duties, are “absolutely immune from liability” for section 1983
claims. Bogan v. Scott-Harris,

523 U.S. 44, 48

 (1998); Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers 
Union of the U.S., Inc.,

446 U.S. 719

, 732–33 (1980) (providing that legislative immunity 
applies to both claims for monetary damages and injunctive relief).  Plaintiffs offer no 
argument concerning legislative immunity, and absent some convincing argument to the 
contrary, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed in these claims. 
has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”  Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,

508 U.S. 520, 531

 (1993).  Said conversely, a 

government action is reviewed under strict scrutiny only if it “places a substantial burden 
on the practice of a religious belief,” and is not “neutral and generally applicable.”  Church 
v. City of St. Michael,

205 F. Supp. 3d 1014

, 1041 (D. Minn. 2016) (quoting Patel v. U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons,

515 F.3d 807, 813

 (8th Cir. 2008), and Olsen v. Mukasey,

541 F.3d 827, 832

 (8th Cir. 2008)).                                                     
A “substantial burden” is one that “place[s] significant pressure on a plaintiff to 

forego religious precepts or to engage in religious conduct.”  City of St. Michael, 205 F. 
Supp.3d at 1042.  Importantly, “a religious plaintiff’s inability to locate its premises in a 
particular location, without more, does not establish a constitutionally recognizable burden 
on free exercise.”

Id.

 (concluding ordinance that banned “[a]ssembly, religious institution, 
house of worship” in business district did not impose substantial burden on plaintiffs’ 

congregation members’ ability to practice their religion because it “merely prevents the 
[plaintiff] from using a specific property for religious worship”); see also Lighthouse Inst. 
for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch,

510 F.3d 253

, 274 & n.17 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(collecting cases); Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston,

250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986

 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (same); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of 

Hastings,

948 F.2d 464, 472

(8th Cir. 1991) (concluding zoning ordinance that permitted
only commercial and retail uses in central business district did not substantially burden
church plaintiff’s free exercise of their religion because the ordinance “has no impact on
religious belief and should not be construed as directly regulating religious-based
conduct”).

Here, Plaintiffs are likely to show that the Moratorium might have delayed
Plaintiffs’ ability to build a place of worship and potential future residences near it in the
northwest corner of Lino Lakes. The language of the Moratorium, however, places no
permanent restrictions on Plaintiff’s ability to build anything and, perhaps more
importantly, it places no restriction on Plaintiff’s ability to seek development of a mosque
elsewhere in the City or to worship elsewhere in the City. Plaintiffs have therefore not

shown that they are likely to prove the Moratorium was a “substantial burden” on their
ability to practice Islam. Further, although Plaintiffs assert that the Moratorium was
motivated by anti-Muslim animus because the City did not pass the Moratorium when IP
was interested in developing the Robinson Property, Plaintiffs have not shown that they
are likely to prove this assertion at trial. On its face, the Moratorium applies to all

development in the covered area, not just development relating to a religious group and not
just development proposed by Muslim developers. (See Doc. No. 9-6.) Moreover, at the
time the Moratorium passed, two developers had expressed interest7 in developing parcels
in the covered area: one with a religious affiliation (Zikar) and one without (Pulte Homes).

7 Plaintiffs make the point that Zikar was the only developer that had a PUD Concept Plan
before city planning staff at the time of the Moratorium and that Pulte had not taken such
a step. However, the record before the Court on this motion shows that Pulte had land
under contract at the time the Moratorium issued and had not withdrawn its interest in
developing the Pulte/Del Webb Property. (See Doc. No. 29-14.)
The Moratorium—both on its face and as applied—impacts both projects. Therefore,
Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on their Free Exercise claim.

ii. Fair Housing Act
Plaintiffs argue that the City also violated the FHA when it implemented the
Moratorium. The Court denies the motion because, based on the preliminary record
presented to the Court at this time, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that
the City violated the FHA.
The FHA prohibits municipalities from either blocking or impeding the provision

of housing on the basis of religion, among other protected traits.8 Gallagher v. Magner,

619 F.3d 823, 831

 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 3604

(a)–(b)).  The framework that 
courts use to assess the merits of FHA discrimination claims depends on which of the four 
types of FHA violations is being raised: direct-evidence disparate treatment discrimination, 
indirect-evidence disparate treatment discrimination, disparate impact discrimination, or 

failure to accommodate.

Id.

at 831–34 (listing elements of both types of disparate treatment
discrimination claims and of a disparate impact claim). Thus, the Court must first
determine what type of claim or claims are at issue here.
Plaintiffs’ argument is unclear. Spanning only two paragraphs, Plaintiffs’ written
argument concerning the merits of its FHA claim does not explain whether Plaintiffs are

8 The parties appear to agree that the circumstances giving rise to this lawsuit—i.e., city
staff deferring review of Zikar’s PUD Concept Plan—fall into the FHA’s purview. For
that reason, and for the purpose of resolving the parties’ arguments in this motion, the Court
assumes without deciding that the FHA applies to the facts in this case.
proceeding on a claim of direct-evidence or indirect-evidence discrimination and
intermittently mixes concepts and cases applying to these two distinct types of claims. (See

Doc. No. 15 at 30–31.) In addition, the Amended Complaint repeatedly references “the
pretextual moratorium” and “pretextual reasons” (see Compl. ¶¶ 6, 9, 95, 103, 124, 158),
indicating that Plaintiffs raise an indirect-evidence disparate treatment claim, not a direct-
evidence disparate treatment claim. Given the prevalence of the references to pretext in
the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief
based on only a theory of indirect-evidence disparate treatment discrimination.

Likewise, although the Amended Complaint includes a claim of FHA disparate
impact discrimination in Count II, nowhere in the written submissions in support of the
preliminary injunction motion do Plaintiffs argue likelihood of success under a disparate
impact theory. Instead, Plaintiffs’ written submissions focus on proof of discriminatory
intent, which is not necessary under a theory of disparate impact. See, e.g., Gallagher, 619

F.3d at 833–34 (explaining the primary theoretical difference between disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims is proof of discriminatory intent). Given the focus of the
arguments presented by Plaintiffs on discriminatory intent, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs do not request injunctive relief on the basis of their allegations of disparate impact
discrimination under the FHA.

The Court applies the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to
indirect-evidence disparate treatment claims. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 831–32. To succeed
on such a claim, Plaintiffs bear an initial burden to make a prima facie showing that the
City treated IP more favorably than it did Zikar. The City then bears a burden to articulate
a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for their actions. See Jones v. City of Faribault,
No. 18-CV-1643 (JRT/HB),

2021 WL 1192466

, at *15 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2021).  Finally, 

Plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden to establish that the City’s proffered nondiscriminatory 
reason for enacting the Moratorium was a pretext for intentional discrimination against 
Muslims.  See

id.

Assuming without deciding that Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to make a
prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, and that the City is likely to carry
its burden to identify a nondiscriminatory reason for the Moratorium, the Court proceeds

to assess the final step in the burden shifting framework to determine whether Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits of their FHA disparate treatment claim.
On the record before the Court on this motion, a factfinder would be presented with
the following evidence: Ruhland admitted that he did not think of proposing a moratorium
on development in the City’s northwest corner until after Zikar posted its promotional

video about Madinah Lakes (Am. Compl. ¶ 131); Lyden openly criticized the way non-
native-English-speaking proponents of the Madinah Lakes project pronounced “Lino
Lakes” and suggested that, given the events on October 7, 2023 in Israel, Muslims in
general are not community-oriented people (Doc. No. 9-5 at 12–13); Lyden expressed his
enthusiastic approval and endorsement of an email that expressed vituperative and

disparaging views of Islam and all Muslim people (Doc. No. 9-8); Ruhland did not vote in
favor of censuring Lyden for endorsing the email on grounds that Lyden was entitled to his
opinion about the email (Doc. No. 9-9; Am. Compl. ¶ 161); the City Attorney informed the
City Council that the Moratorium was not legally necessary to undertake master planning
(Doc. No. 9-5 at 12); the City Council was aware of strong public opposition to Madinah
Lakes and even received into the record more than eighty-two pages of posts made on

social media by their constituents regarding their negative views of Islam, Muslims, and
immigrants (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 129, 131, 132; Doc. No. 17-12); the Mayor asked Zikar to
remove its promotional video about Madinah Lakes due to the volume of public outcry
against it (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106, 107); the comments of members of the public, the Mayor,
and Lyden at the July 8 City Council meeting (during which the City Council voted on the
Moratorium) often centered on Madinah Lakes, not the merits of conducting master

planning. (Doc. No. 9-5 at 2–9.)
It is true that Plaintiffs may not rely on the motives of just two City council members
to establish discriminatory animus on the part of a larger decision-making body. S. Wine
& Spirits of Am. Inc. v. Div. of Alcohol & Tobacco Control,

731 F.3d 799, 808

 (8th Cir. 
2013) (concluding that one legislator’s motive cannot be attributed to entire legislature and 

highest executive officer).  However, when those two council members comprise 40% of 
the  City  Council,9  and  when  those  council  members’  statements  are  combined  with 
constituent complaints that are both “public and pervasive in nature,” a factfinder could 
make a “reasonable inference that [discriminatory] animus was a widely held motive, or 
that  the  [challenged]  Ordinance  ‘effectuate[d]  the  discriminatory  designs  of  private 


9 The City Council of Lino Lakes comprises “an elected mayor and four city council 
members.  City Council & Boards, City of Lino Lakes, https://linolakes.us/164/City-
Council-Boards [https://perma.cc/P5AE-UBVR].  The Court may take judicial notice of 
government websites.  Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr,

830 F.3d 789, 793

 
(8th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging authority to take judicial notice of government websites). 
individuals.’”  Jones,

2021 WL 1192466

, at *15 (quoting U.S. v. City of Black Jack, Mo.,

508 F.2d 1179

, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974)).

On this evidence, the Court believes a reasonable juror could infer that the
Moratorium was pretextual. However, the evidence presented at this stage, prior to
discovery, is not so strong that it satisfies the heightened Rounds standard. The motives
and beliefs of the council members, as well as the basis for the timing of the Moratorium
decision remain unknown at this stage, and absent additional circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that supporting the

Moratorium reflected the importance of complying with the 2040 Plan and prudent
infrastructure and resource planning. Thus, the Court concludes that this factor is neutral,
weighing neither in favor of nor against granting Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion.
C. Balance of Harms
For the third Dataphase factor, the Court weighs the potential harm not issuing the

requested injunction would cause to Plaintiffs against the potential harm to the City if it
did issue an injunction. Dataphase, 640 F.3d at 114. The Court has already concluded that
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will be harmed if the injunction does not issue.
See supra Part A. That being the case, the only harm on the Court’s scale, if any, is the
City’s. The City argues that an injunction would harm the City and the public because

“[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by
representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” (Doc. No. 28 at 40–
42 (quoting Maryland v. King,

567 U.S. 1301, 1303

 (2012).)  This factor weighs slightly 
against issuing an injunction.                                            
D.   Public Interest                                                 
The last Dataphase factor requires the Court to consider whether the requested relief 

is in the public’s interest.  Dataphase, 640 F.3d at 114.  Plaintiffs argue that this factor tips 
in their favor because “it is always in the public interest to protection [sic] constitutional 
rights.”  (Doc. No. 15 at 33 (quoting Phelps-Roper v. Nixon,

545 F.3d 685, 690

 (8th Cir. 
2008).)  However, as discussed supra Part B.i, Plaintiffs have not identified a constitutional 
violation.  Further, the City does not address this factor.  (See Doc. No. 28.)  This factor is 
neutral.                                                                  

In conclusion, the balance of the Dataphase factors weigh against issuing the 
requested injunction.  Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                

  1.  Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED. 

Dated:  December 26, 2024               /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan              
                                   Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan            
                                   United States District Court

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Zikar Holdings LLC, Jameel Ahmed, and File No. 24-CV-03721 (JMB/SGE)
Faraaz Mohammed,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

Michael Ruhland, Christopher Lyden, and
City of Lino Lakes,

Defendants.

Unit Development (PUD) Concept Plan1 to city planning staff. (See id. at 1.) The City

Blaine, a suburban city directly adjacent to Lino Lakes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 55.) Ahmed’s and

opposition to Madinah Lakes, Mayor Rob Rafferty called Mohammed by phone. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 104–07.) The Mayor informed Mohammed that he and council members were

in the 2040 Plan, Zoning Ordinance, or other city ordinance on March 1, 2024.3 (See Doc.

640 F.2d 109, 114

 (8th Cir. 1981).  Generally, no one factor is determinative, and the Court “should 

flexibly weigh the case’s particular circumstances to determine whether the balance of 
equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene.”  Hubbard Feeds, 
Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc.,

182 F.3d 598, 601

 (8th Cir. 1999) (quotation 
omitted).  The burden of establishing every factor belongs to the movants—here, Plaintiffs.  
E.g., Watkins Inc. v. Lewis,

346 F.3d 841, 844

 (8th Cir. 2003).           

A.   Irreparable Harm                                                
The Court first considers whether Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if an 
injunction does not issue.  Dataphase, 640 F.3d at 114.  For the reasons noted below, the 
Court concludes that this factor strongly favors denial of the motion.    
The individual Plaintiffs and Zikar frame their asserted irreparable harm separately.  

First, Ahmed and Mohammed argue that, if the Moratorium is not enjoined, their right to 
freely  exercise  their  religion  will  continue  to  be  violated,  and  “[t]he  loss  of  First 
Amendment  freedoms,  for  even  minimal  periods  of  time,  unquestionably  constitutes 
irreparable injury.”  (Doc. No. 15 at 31 (quoting Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347, 373

 (1974)).)  
However, as discussed infra Part B.i, the Court disagrees that, on the record before the 
Court on this motion, Mohammed’s and Ahmed’s rights to freely exercise their religion 

have been impinged.  Plaintiffs have thus not shown that Ahmed and Mohammed will be 
irreparably harmed if the Court does not grant their motion.              
Next, Zikar asserts that, “[i]f the Moratorium is not enjoined, Zikar risks losing the 
opportunity  to  purchase  the  Robinson  Property  for  good”  because  “[i]ts  purchase 
agreement expires long before the expiration of the Moratorium.”  (Doc. No. 15 at 32; see 
also  Doc.  No.  17  ¶ 2  (“If  the  Moratorium  is  not  enjoined  Zikar  will  likely  lose  its 

opportunity to purchase the Robinson Property.”).)  According to Plaintiffs, “the loss of a 
particular  piece  of  real  property  constitutes  irreparable  harm,”  which  money  cannot 
adequately compensate.  (Doc. No. 15 at 32 (citing Minn. Vikings Football Stadium, LLC 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,

193 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1016

 (D. Minn. 2016)).) 
The primary problem for Plaintiffs here is one of foundation.  Plaintiffs have told 

the Court—but have not shown—that the purchase agreement between Zikar and the 
Robinson Property’s owners “expires long before the expiration of the Moratorium.”  (Doc. 
No. 15 at 32.)  At most, Plaintiffs’ attorney, Sam Diehl, stated the following about the 
purchase agreement in a supporting declaration:                           
     In April 2024, Zikar executed a purchase agreement to buy the   
     Robinson Property, subject to certain contingencies.  The City  
     of Lino Lakes’ . . . Moratorium pre-vents [sic] Zikar from      
     applying for the approvals it needs in order to close on this   
     purchase.  In addition, Zikar’s purchase agreement, and its     
     right  to  purchase  the  Robinson  Property,  will  expire  long 
     before the conclusion of the Moratorium.                        
(Doc. No. 17 ¶ 2.)  Although Diehl states that the Declaration is “based on [his] personal 
knowledge” (id. ¶ 1), he does not aver that he has ever reviewed or read any relevant 
provision of the purchase agreement.  As a result, the representations he makes about its 

terms lack foundation.  El Deeb v. Univ. of Minn.,

60 F.3d 423

concretely demonstrate it.” Vision-Ease Lens, Inc. v. Essilor Int’l SA,

322 F. Supp. 2d 991, 998

530 F.3d 724, 730

 (8th Cir. 
2008) (en banc).  However, when a motion is for the injunction of a statute or ordinance, a 

“more rigorous threshold showing” is required because legislation is deemed to be the 
result of “reasoned democratic processes,” and, therefore, it is “entitled to a higher degree 
of deference and should not be enjoined lightly.”

Id. at 730, 732

 (quotation omitted); see 
also, e.g., Doe 1 v. City of Apple Valley,

487 F. Supp. 3d 761

, 767 (D. Minn. 2020) 
(applying heightened Rounds standard on motion to enjoin city ordinance). 

The Eighth Circuit advises that, when deciding whether to apply the heightened 
Rounds standard, courts must “evaluate whether the full play of the democratic process 
was involved in the [legislative] actions.”  D.M. by Bao Xiong v. Minn. State High Sch. 
League,

917 F.3d 994, 1000

(8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs do not address the
City’s assertion that a heightened showing is required on the probability-of-success factor.

523 U.S. 44, 48

 (1998); Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers 
Union of the U.S., Inc.,

446 U.S. 719

, 732–33 (1980) (providing that legislative immunity 
applies to both claims for monetary damages and injunctive relief).  Plaintiffs offer no 
argument concerning legislative immunity, and absent some convincing argument to the 
contrary, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed in these claims. 
has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”  Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,

508 U.S. 520, 531

 (1993).  Said conversely, a 

government action is reviewed under strict scrutiny only if it “places a substantial burden 
on the practice of a religious belief,” and is not “neutral and generally applicable.”  Church 
v. City of St. Michael,

205 F. Supp. 3d 1014

, 1041 (D. Minn. 2016) (quoting Patel v. U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons,

515 F.3d 807, 813

 (8th Cir. 2008), and Olsen v. Mukasey,

541 F.3d 827, 832

 (8th Cir. 2008)).                                                     
A “substantial burden” is one that “place[s] significant pressure on a plaintiff to 

forego religious precepts or to engage in religious conduct.”  City of St. Michael, 205 F. 
Supp.3d at 1042.  Importantly, “a religious plaintiff’s inability to locate its premises in a 
particular location, without more, does not establish a constitutionally recognizable burden 
on free exercise.”

Id.

 (concluding ordinance that banned “[a]ssembly, religious institution, 
house of worship” in business district did not impose substantial burden on plaintiffs’ 

congregation members’ ability to practice their religion because it “merely prevents the 
[plaintiff] from using a specific property for religious worship”); see also Lighthouse Inst. 
for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch,

510 F.3d 253

, 274 & n.17 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(collecting cases); Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston,

250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986

 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (same); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of 

Hastings,

948 F.2d 464, 472

of housing on the basis of religion, among other protected traits.8 Gallagher v. Magner,

619 F.3d 823, 831

 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 3604

(a)–(b)).  The framework that 
courts use to assess the merits of FHA discrimination claims depends on which of the four 
types of FHA violations is being raised: direct-evidence disparate treatment discrimination, 
indirect-evidence disparate treatment discrimination, disparate impact discrimination, or 

failure to accommodate.

Id.

2021 WL 1192466

, at *15 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2021).  Finally, 

Plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden to establish that the City’s proffered nondiscriminatory 
reason for enacting the Moratorium was a pretext for intentional discrimination against 
Muslims.  See

id.

731 F.3d 799, 808

 (8th Cir. 
2013) (concluding that one legislator’s motive cannot be attributed to entire legislature and 

highest executive officer).  However, when those two council members comprise 40% of 
the  City  Council,9  and  when  those  council  members’  statements  are  combined  with 
constituent complaints that are both “public and pervasive in nature,” a factfinder could 
make a “reasonable inference that [discriminatory] animus was a widely held motive, or 
that  the  [challenged]  Ordinance  ‘effectuate[d]  the  discriminatory  designs  of  private 


9 The City Council of Lino Lakes comprises “an elected mayor and four city council 
members.  City Council & Boards, City of Lino Lakes, https://linolakes.us/164/City-
Council-Boards [https://perma.cc/P5AE-UBVR].  The Court may take judicial notice of 
government websites.  Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr,

830 F.3d 789, 793

 
(8th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging authority to take judicial notice of government websites). 
individuals.’”  Jones,

2021 WL 1192466

, at *15 (quoting U.S. v. City of Black Jack, Mo.,

508 F.2d 1179

, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974)).

567 U.S. 1301, 1303

 (2012).)  This factor weighs slightly 
against issuing an injunction.                                            
D.   Public Interest                                                 
The last Dataphase factor requires the Court to consider whether the requested relief 

is in the public’s interest.  Dataphase, 640 F.3d at 114.  Plaintiffs argue that this factor tips 
in their favor because “it is always in the public interest to protection [sic] constitutional 
rights.”  (Doc. No. 15 at 33 (quoting Phelps-Roper v. Nixon,

545 F.3d 685, 690

 (8th Cir. 
2008).)  However, as discussed supra Part B.i, Plaintiffs have not identified a constitutional 
violation.  Further, the City does not address this factor.  (See Doc. No. 28.)  This factor is 
neutral.                                                                  

In conclusion, the balance of the Dataphase factors weigh against issuing the 
requested injunction.  Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                                                

  1.  Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED. 

Dated:  December 26, 2024               /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan              
                                   Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan            
                                   United States District Court

Reference

Status: Unknown