Restoration Builders, Inc. v. Vining

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Restoration Builders, Inc. v. Vining

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITDEISDT SRTIACTTE OSF D MISITNRNIECSTO CTOAU  RT      


Restoration Builders, Inc.,          Case No. 23-cv-3616 (PJS/SGE)       

               Plaintiff,                                                

v.                                                                       

ORDER

Richard Vining, Todd Mulvehill,                                          
Hometown Restoration Minnesota, Inc.,                                    
and Spencer Pankonin,                                                    

               Defendants.                                               


    This matter is before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins, 
on  Plaintiff  Restoration  Builders,  Inc.’s  (“RBI’s”)  Motion  for  Leave  to  Amend  the 
Complaint (Dkt. No. 61). The Court heard oral argument on December 19, 2024. For the 
reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.                           
                         BACKGROUND                                      
    On November 22, 2023, RBI filed suit against Defendants Richard Vining, Rodd 
Mulvehill,  Hometown  Restoration  Minnesota,  Inc.  (“Hometown  Restoration”),  and 
Spencer Pankonin asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, 
tortious interference, and unfair competition. (Dkt. No. 1.) RBI later filed an Amended 
Complaint, and Defendants answered. (Dkt. Nos. 17, 19, 20.)               
    On February 20, 2024, the court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order. (Dkt. No. 23). 
As relevant to the instant motion the Pretrial Scheduling Order provided that “[a]ll motions 
which seek to amend the leadings, including without limitation, a motion for leave to 
amend to add parties must be served on or before June 1, 2024.” (Id. at 3.) 
    The Plaintiff’s sent their first requests for production and interrogatories to the 
Defendants on March 6, 2024. (See Gillette Decl., Dkt. No. 72, Exs. 1, 2). On May 20, 
2024, Plaintiff’s counsel began setting dates for depositions, the earliest of which was 
initially scheduled for August 13, 2024. (See Gillette Decl. Ex. 7, Dkt. No. 72.) RBI 
deposed Defendant Pankonin on August 13, 2024, but left the deposition open so that 

Pankonin could search for more documents. (See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp., Dkt. No. 62, at 3.) 
Hometown Restoration and Vining produced more documents on August 12 and 14, 2024, 
and on August 15, 2024, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the scheduling order 
extending several deadlines. (See Dkt. No. 43.) The court granted the motion on August 
19, 2024 (see Dkt. No. 45), inter alia, extending the deadline for fact discovery to October 
11, 2024. (Id.) The parties did not seek, nor did the court grant, an extension of the time to 

move to amend the complaint to add new parties. (See Dkt. Nos. 43, 45.)   
    On October 2, 2024, a week before the close of fact discovery, the court held a status 
conference. (See Dkt. No. 48.) In the order that followed, the court directed the parties to 
email the court with the date of Plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition no later than 5:00 p.m. 
on October 4, 2024, and made clear that, if counsel wanted to amend the scheduling order 

any further, “they must make a fulsome showing of good cause for any such amendment . 
. . .” (Id.)                                                              
    Unfortunately, the court’s gentle guidance had little effect. On October 3, 2024, 
Plaintiff’s counsel sent Defendants’ counsel notice of 13 more depositions. (See Gilette 
Decl. Ex. 16.) Then, on Tuesday, October 8, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent notice that it 

intended to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Hometown Restoration on Friday, 
October 11, 2024 from 5:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. (Id. Ex. 20.) Counsel for Defendant 
Vining sought guidance from the court, the court accepted another round of letters, and on 
October 10, 2024, the court held yet another telephonic status conference with counsel. 
(See Dkt. No. 49, 52-55.)                                                 
    Following the telephonic status conference, the court extended fact discovery from 

October 11, 2024 to November 15, 2024 “for the sole purpose of permitting the depositions of 
Plaintiff; Vining; and Mulvehill and Hometown Restoration Minnesota.” (Dkt. 56.) No other fact 
discovery was permitted and the court denied the Plaintiff’s request to extend all fact discovery, 
noting that the Plaintiff failed to show “good cause” for such an extension. Id.  Additionally, RBI 
did not ask the Court for permission to amend the complaint to add parties or claims (see 
Dkt. No. 53), and the Court did not do so.                                
    Plaintiff’s counsel filed the instant Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint on 

November 22, 2024, seeking to amend the complaint, add new allegations, and assert 
claims against six new defendants. (Dkt. No. 61.) The Court heard oral argument on 
December 19, 2024.                                                        
                           ANALYSIS                                      
 I.   Legal Standard                                                     

    Rule 16(b)(4) provides that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and 
with the judge’s consent.” “The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence 
in attempting to meet the order’s requirements.” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 
532 F.3d 709, 716
 (8th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). “The good cause standard of Rule 16(b) is an 
exacting one, for it demands a demonstration that the existing schedule cannot reasonably 
be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” IBEW Loc. 98 Pension 
Fund. v. Best buy Co., Inc., 
326 F.R.D. 513
, 522 (D. Minn. 2018) (cleaned up). The 
“exacting” standard of Rule 16(b) requires that the moving party first make the requisite 
showing of good cause. E.E.O.C. v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 
266 F.R.D. 260, 265
 (D. Minn. 
2009). Still, the district court retains discretion to determine whether to grant the motion. 

Bradford v. DANA Corp., 
249 F.3d 807, 809
 (8th Cir. 2001).                
    Scheduling  orders are “a vehicle designed  to streamline the flow of litigation 
through [the Court’s] crowded docket,” and where good cause to modify them is absent, 
the Court “will enforce them.” 
Id.
 “While the prejudice to the nonmovant resulting from 
modification of the scheduling order may also be a relevant factor, generally, we will not 
consider prejudice if the movant has not been diligent in meeting the scheduling order’s 

deadlines.” Sherman, 
532 F.3d at 717
 (citing Bradford, 
249 F.3d at 809
).  
 II.  RBI fails to demonstrate good cause.                               
    RBI seeks leave to amend its Amended Complaint to add allegations and claims 
against six new parties to the case, specifically Josh Pellinger, Shawn Johnson, Donald 
Letsch (former employees of the Plaintiff); and RV Services, Weathersafe, and Wolf River 

Electric (competitors of the Plaintiff). Because its motion comes more than six months after 
the deadline has passed, RBI must demonstrate good cause. Sherman, 
532 F.3d at 716
. 
Litigants can show good cause by pointing to “a change in the law, newly discovered facts, 
or  another  significant  changed  circumstance  that  requires  amendment  of  a  party’s 
pleading.” Ellingsworth v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 
949 F.3d 1097, 1100
 (8th Cir. 2020).  

    RBI argues that good cause exists because its motion “is predicated on information 
that it received well after the June 3, 2024 deadline, specifically evidence received or 
explained during Defendant Vining’s deposition on October 24, 2024.” (Mem. in Supp. at 
9.) But RBI knew of additional possible defendants early on in its case. By its own 
admission, RBI knew about Defendant Pankonin’s relationship with Wolf River when it 
filed the Amended Complaint on January 29, 2024. (Mem. in Supp. at 6 (citing Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 84-87)). And on August 19, 2024, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the Pretrial 
Scheduling Order with no mention of amending the complaint. (Dkt. No. 43). Then, on 
October 11, 2024, RBI filed a separate letter to the Court requesting specific extensions to 
the  Pretrial  Scheduling  Order,  stating  that  it  had  found  evidence  of  “additional 
wrongdoing” by of former RBI employees. (Dkt. No. 53).                    
    The docket shows that RBI was aware of at least some facts that form the basis of 

their proposed amendments long before it filed the instant motion.1 See Aviva Sports, Inc. 
v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., Case no. 09-cv-1091 (JNE/JSM), 
2010 WL 4193076
, at *6 
(D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2010) (“[A] party does not meet the good cause standard under Rule 
16(b) if the relevant information on which it based the amended claim was available to it 
earlier in the litigation.”). Nonetheless, RBI did not use either opportunity to request an 

extension to the deadline to add parties.                                 
    To consider whether there is “good cause” to allow amending the complaint, the 
court must first assess whether RBI was diligent in attempting to meet the scheduling 


1 RBI stated in its October 11, 2024 letter that document discovery led it to believe there may be 
good cause to join additional former RBI employees as parties and was “evaluating whether to 
bring a separate motion to amend or to file a separate lawsuit against the individuals, which could 
result in cross-claims by them against the existing Defendants.” (Dkt. No. 53 at 3.) 
order’s requirements, what RBI did to obtain the information before the deadline to amend 
pleadings, and why it was not possible to have known the information before October of 
2024. Target Corp. v. LCH Pavement Consultants, LLC, 
960 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1007
 (D. 
Minn. 2013). Only after assessing RBI’s diligence may the court assess whether the newly 
learned facts during eleventh hour depositions equate to “good cause.”    

    RBI knew that the deadline to amend pleadings to add new accusations and new 
defendants was June 1, 2024, and it did not raise potentially extending that deadline until 
the instant motion, filed on November 22, 2024. RBI has not demonstrated that the newly 
discovered evidence was not discoverable before the June 1, 2024 deadline. Instead, the 
record shows that depositions were twice delayed and did not occur until October of 2024, 
just before the close of fact discovery. Crucially, RBI did not show that there is evidence 

that it discovered—and could only have discovered—after the June 1, 2024 deadline that 
warrants adding new claims and defendants. See 
id.
                        
    Finally, at the hearing before the court on December 19, 2024, counsel for RBI 
confirmed that they did not review document productions until shortly before the scheduled 
depositions—which left thousands of documents unreviewed for months. The June 1, 2024 

deadline  to  amend  pleadings  was  established  on  February  20,  2024  in  the  Pretrial 
Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 23.) Waiting months to begin reviewing discovery—including 
discovery  potentially  related  to  identified-but-yet-unnamed  individuals  who  could  be 
defendants—does not demonstrate diligence. See Alexander v. 1328 Uptown, Inc., Case 
no. 18-cv-1544 (ECT/ECW), 
2019 WL 9514655
, at *3 (D. Minn. June 20, 2019).  

    RBI has not offered any valid explanation why it did not ensure that it had the 
discovery it needed to determine whether to add new claims or defendants before the June 
1, 2024 deadline lapsed, why it did not prioritize obtaining that discovery before the 
deadline, or why it did not timely request extension of the deadline in light of concerns 
with Defendants’ discovery with the Court until months later. RBI has failed to show 
diligence  in  pursing  the  necessary  discovery  to  meet  the  Pretrial  Scheduling  Order 

deadlines so it could timely move to amend its complaint, and the court cannot find “good 
cause” to allow the amendment absent the Plaintiff’s diligence.           
    Generally,  courts  also  evaluate  whether  the  requested  extension  would  cause 
prejudice to the nonmoving party and whether the proposed amendments to the pleadings 
would be futile. It is unnecessary, however, to consider prejudice to the nonmoving party 
or futility of the proposed claims when the moving party has not been diligent in meeting 

the scheduling order’s deadlines. E.g., Sherman, 
532 F.3d at 717
 (“While the prejudice to 
the nonmovant resulting from modification of the scheduling order may also be a relevant 
factor, generally, we will not consider prejudice if the movant has not been diligent in 
meeting the scheduling order’s deadlines.”); see also Bradford, 
249 F.3d at 809
 (finding 
“no need” to evaluate more than the moving party’s diligence “because the record clearly 

demonstrate[d] that Bradford made only minimal efforts to satisfy the [scheduling order’s] 
requirements”); Freeman v. Busch, 
349 F.3d 582, 589
 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of 
motion to amend because movant gave no reason why the amendment could not have been 
made earlier).                                                            
                         CONCLUSION                                      

    Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings here, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Restoration Builders, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to 
Amend the Complaint (Dkt. No. 61) is DENIED.                              

Date: December 27, 2024            s/ Shannon G. Elkins                   
                                  SHANNON G. ELKINS                      
                                  United States Magistrate Judge         

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITDEISDT SRTIACTTE OSF D MISITNRNIECSTO CTOAU  RT      


Restoration Builders, Inc.,          Case No. 23-cv-3616 (PJS/SGE)       

               Plaintiff,                                                

v.                                                                       

ORDER

Richard Vining, Todd Mulvehill,                                          
Hometown Restoration Minnesota, Inc.,                                    
and Spencer Pankonin,                                                    

               Defendants.                                               


    This matter is before the Court, United States Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins, 
on  Plaintiff  Restoration  Builders,  Inc.’s  (“RBI’s”)  Motion  for  Leave  to  Amend  the 
Complaint (Dkt. No. 61). The Court heard oral argument on December 19, 2024. For the 
reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.                           
                         BACKGROUND                                      
    On November 22, 2023, RBI filed suit against Defendants Richard Vining, Rodd 
Mulvehill,  Hometown  Restoration  Minnesota,  Inc.  (“Hometown  Restoration”),  and 
Spencer Pankonin asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, 
tortious interference, and unfair competition. (Dkt. No. 1.) RBI later filed an Amended 
Complaint, and Defendants answered. (Dkt. Nos. 17, 19, 20.)               
    On February 20, 2024, the court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order. (Dkt. No. 23). 
As relevant to the instant motion the Pretrial Scheduling Order provided that “[a]ll motions 
which seek to amend the leadings, including without limitation, a motion for leave to 
amend to add parties must be served on or before June 1, 2024.” (Id. at 3.) 
    The Plaintiff’s sent their first requests for production and interrogatories to the 
Defendants on March 6, 2024. (See Gillette Decl., Dkt. No. 72, Exs. 1, 2). On May 20, 
2024, Plaintiff’s counsel began setting dates for depositions, the earliest of which was 
initially scheduled for August 13, 2024. (See Gillette Decl. Ex. 7, Dkt. No. 72.) RBI 
deposed Defendant Pankonin on August 13, 2024, but left the deposition open so that 

Pankonin could search for more documents. (See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp., Dkt. No. 62, at 3.) 
Hometown Restoration and Vining produced more documents on August 12 and 14, 2024, 
and on August 15, 2024, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the scheduling order 
extending several deadlines. (See Dkt. No. 43.) The court granted the motion on August 
19, 2024 (see Dkt. No. 45), inter alia, extending the deadline for fact discovery to October 
11, 2024. (Id.) The parties did not seek, nor did the court grant, an extension of the time to 

move to amend the complaint to add new parties. (See Dkt. Nos. 43, 45.)   
    On October 2, 2024, a week before the close of fact discovery, the court held a status 
conference. (See Dkt. No. 48.) In the order that followed, the court directed the parties to 
email the court with the date of Plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition no later than 5:00 p.m. 
on October 4, 2024, and made clear that, if counsel wanted to amend the scheduling order 

any further, “they must make a fulsome showing of good cause for any such amendment . 
. . .” (Id.)                                                              
    Unfortunately, the court’s gentle guidance had little effect. On October 3, 2024, 
Plaintiff’s counsel sent Defendants’ counsel notice of 13 more depositions. (See Gilette 
Decl. Ex. 16.) Then, on Tuesday, October 8, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent notice that it 

intended to conduct a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Hometown Restoration on Friday, 
October 11, 2024 from 5:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. (Id. Ex. 20.) Counsel for Defendant 
Vining sought guidance from the court, the court accepted another round of letters, and on 
October 10, 2024, the court held yet another telephonic status conference with counsel. 
(See Dkt. No. 49, 52-55.)                                                 
    Following the telephonic status conference, the court extended fact discovery from 

October 11, 2024 to November 15, 2024 “for the sole purpose of permitting the depositions of 
Plaintiff; Vining; and Mulvehill and Hometown Restoration Minnesota.” (Dkt. 56.) No other fact 
discovery was permitted and the court denied the Plaintiff’s request to extend all fact discovery, 
noting that the Plaintiff failed to show “good cause” for such an extension. Id.  Additionally, RBI 
did not ask the Court for permission to amend the complaint to add parties or claims (see 
Dkt. No. 53), and the Court did not do so.                                
    Plaintiff’s counsel filed the instant Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint on 

November 22, 2024, seeking to amend the complaint, add new allegations, and assert 
claims against six new defendants. (Dkt. No. 61.) The Court heard oral argument on 
December 19, 2024.                                                        
                           ANALYSIS                                      
 I.   Legal Standard                                                     

    Rule 16(b)(4) provides that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and 
with the judge’s consent.” “The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence 
in attempting to meet the order’s requirements.” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 
532 F.3d 709, 716
 (8th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). “The good cause standard of Rule 16(b) is an 
exacting one, for it demands a demonstration that the existing schedule cannot reasonably 
be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” IBEW Loc. 98 Pension 
Fund. v. Best buy Co., Inc., 
326 F.R.D. 513
, 522 (D. Minn. 2018) (cleaned up). The 
“exacting” standard of Rule 16(b) requires that the moving party first make the requisite 
showing of good cause. E.E.O.C. v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 
266 F.R.D. 260, 265
 (D. Minn. 
2009). Still, the district court retains discretion to determine whether to grant the motion. 

Bradford v. DANA Corp., 
249 F.3d 807, 809
 (8th Cir. 2001).                
    Scheduling  orders are “a vehicle designed  to streamline the flow of litigation 
through [the Court’s] crowded docket,” and where good cause to modify them is absent, 
the Court “will enforce them.” 
Id.
 “While the prejudice to the nonmovant resulting from 
modification of the scheduling order may also be a relevant factor, generally, we will not 
consider prejudice if the movant has not been diligent in meeting the scheduling order’s 

deadlines.” Sherman, 
532 F.3d at 717
 (citing Bradford, 
249 F.3d at 809
).  
 II.  RBI fails to demonstrate good cause.                               
    RBI seeks leave to amend its Amended Complaint to add allegations and claims 
against six new parties to the case, specifically Josh Pellinger, Shawn Johnson, Donald 
Letsch (former employees of the Plaintiff); and RV Services, Weathersafe, and Wolf River 

Electric (competitors of the Plaintiff). Because its motion comes more than six months after 
the deadline has passed, RBI must demonstrate good cause. Sherman, 
532 F.3d at 716
. 
Litigants can show good cause by pointing to “a change in the law, newly discovered facts, 
or  another  significant  changed  circumstance  that  requires  amendment  of  a  party’s 
pleading.” Ellingsworth v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 
949 F.3d 1097, 1100
 (8th Cir. 2020).  

    RBI argues that good cause exists because its motion “is predicated on information 
that it received well after the June 3, 2024 deadline, specifically evidence received or 
explained during Defendant Vining’s deposition on October 24, 2024.” (Mem. in Supp. at 
9.) But RBI knew of additional possible defendants early on in its case. By its own 
admission, RBI knew about Defendant Pankonin’s relationship with Wolf River when it 
filed the Amended Complaint on January 29, 2024. (Mem. in Supp. at 6 (citing Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 84-87)). And on August 19, 2024, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the Pretrial 
Scheduling Order with no mention of amending the complaint. (Dkt. No. 43). Then, on 
October 11, 2024, RBI filed a separate letter to the Court requesting specific extensions to 
the  Pretrial  Scheduling  Order,  stating  that  it  had  found  evidence  of  “additional 
wrongdoing” by of former RBI employees. (Dkt. No. 53).                    
    The docket shows that RBI was aware of at least some facts that form the basis of 

their proposed amendments long before it filed the instant motion.1 See Aviva Sports, Inc. 
v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., Case no. 09-cv-1091 (JNE/JSM), 
2010 WL 4193076
, at *6 
(D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2010) (“[A] party does not meet the good cause standard under Rule 
16(b) if the relevant information on which it based the amended claim was available to it 
earlier in the litigation.”). Nonetheless, RBI did not use either opportunity to request an 

extension to the deadline to add parties.                                 
    To consider whether there is “good cause” to allow amending the complaint, the 
court must first assess whether RBI was diligent in attempting to meet the scheduling 


1 RBI stated in its October 11, 2024 letter that document discovery led it to believe there may be 
good cause to join additional former RBI employees as parties and was “evaluating whether to 
bring a separate motion to amend or to file a separate lawsuit against the individuals, which could 
result in cross-claims by them against the existing Defendants.” (Dkt. No. 53 at 3.) 
order’s requirements, what RBI did to obtain the information before the deadline to amend 
pleadings, and why it was not possible to have known the information before October of 
2024. Target Corp. v. LCH Pavement Consultants, LLC, 
960 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1007
 (D. 
Minn. 2013). Only after assessing RBI’s diligence may the court assess whether the newly 
learned facts during eleventh hour depositions equate to “good cause.”    

    RBI knew that the deadline to amend pleadings to add new accusations and new 
defendants was June 1, 2024, and it did not raise potentially extending that deadline until 
the instant motion, filed on November 22, 2024. RBI has not demonstrated that the newly 
discovered evidence was not discoverable before the June 1, 2024 deadline. Instead, the 
record shows that depositions were twice delayed and did not occur until October of 2024, 
just before the close of fact discovery. Crucially, RBI did not show that there is evidence 

that it discovered—and could only have discovered—after the June 1, 2024 deadline that 
warrants adding new claims and defendants. See 
id.
                        
    Finally, at the hearing before the court on December 19, 2024, counsel for RBI 
confirmed that they did not review document productions until shortly before the scheduled 
depositions—which left thousands of documents unreviewed for months. The June 1, 2024 

deadline  to  amend  pleadings  was  established  on  February  20,  2024  in  the  Pretrial 
Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 23.) Waiting months to begin reviewing discovery—including 
discovery  potentially  related  to  identified-but-yet-unnamed  individuals  who  could  be 
defendants—does not demonstrate diligence. See Alexander v. 1328 Uptown, Inc., Case 
no. 18-cv-1544 (ECT/ECW), 
2019 WL 9514655
, at *3 (D. Minn. June 20, 2019).  

    RBI has not offered any valid explanation why it did not ensure that it had the 
discovery it needed to determine whether to add new claims or defendants before the June 
1, 2024 deadline lapsed, why it did not prioritize obtaining that discovery before the 
deadline, or why it did not timely request extension of the deadline in light of concerns 
with Defendants’ discovery with the Court until months later. RBI has failed to show 
diligence  in  pursing  the  necessary  discovery  to  meet  the  Pretrial  Scheduling  Order 

deadlines so it could timely move to amend its complaint, and the court cannot find “good 
cause” to allow the amendment absent the Plaintiff’s diligence.           
    Generally,  courts  also  evaluate  whether  the  requested  extension  would  cause 
prejudice to the nonmoving party and whether the proposed amendments to the pleadings 
would be futile. It is unnecessary, however, to consider prejudice to the nonmoving party 
or futility of the proposed claims when the moving party has not been diligent in meeting 

the scheduling order’s deadlines. E.g., Sherman, 
532 F.3d at 717
 (“While the prejudice to 
the nonmovant resulting from modification of the scheduling order may also be a relevant 
factor, generally, we will not consider prejudice if the movant has not been diligent in 
meeting the scheduling order’s deadlines.”); see also Bradford, 
249 F.3d at 809
 (finding 
“no need” to evaluate more than the moving party’s diligence “because the record clearly 

demonstrate[d] that Bradford made only minimal efforts to satisfy the [scheduling order’s] 
requirements”); Freeman v. Busch, 
349 F.3d 582, 589
 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of 
motion to amend because movant gave no reason why the amendment could not have been 
made earlier).                                                            
                         CONCLUSION                                      

    Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings here, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Restoration Builders, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to 
Amend the Complaint (Dkt. No. 61) is DENIED.                              

Date: December 27, 2024            s/ Shannon G. Elkins                   
                                  SHANNON G. ELKINS                      
                                  United States Magistrate Judge         

Reference

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