Major v. Halliday Watkins & Mann, P.C.

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Nicholas R. Major,                    File No. 24-cv-01897 (ECT/DJF)      

         Plaintiff,                                                      

v.                                       OPINION AND ORDER                

Halliday Watkins & Mann, P.C.,                                            

         Defendant.                                                      
_______________________________________________________________________   
Carl E. Christensen, Christopher Wilcox, and Ryan Supple, Christensen Sampsel PLLC, 
Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff Nicholas R. Major.                         

Jared M. Goerlitz, Goerlitz Law, PLLC, St. Paul, MN, for Defendant Halliday Watkins & 
Mann, P.C.                                                                


    Plaintiff Nicholas Major brought this FDCPA case in May 2024.  He sued two 
defendants—Connexus  Credit  Union  and  Halliday  Watkins  &  Mann—alleging  both 
engaged in unlawful debt-collection practices.  The case didn’t last the summer.  On 
July 30, Mr. Major voluntarily dismissed his claims against Connexus and accepted a 
$3,000 offer of judgment from Halliday Watkins.                           
    Now, pursuant to the FDCPA’s fee-shifting provision, Mr. Major seeks to recover 
the full amount of his claimed attorneys’ fees—$46,163.50—from just Halliday Watkins.  
For several reasons that will be discussed, this request is unreasonable.  Though there is 
room to fairly debate the best outcome, my answer is to award Mr. Major attorneys’ fees 
in the substantially reduced amount of $11,566.63.                        
    Plaintiff’s  factual allegations.    Mr.  Major’s  father,  Dennis,  owned  a  home  in 
Howard Lake, Minnesota.  Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 3 ¶ 12; id. at 5 ¶ 18.1  Dennis took out 
two loans against the home, one in 2004 and the other in 2007, both secured by mortgages.  

Id. at 5 ¶¶ 18, 21.  After Dennis allegedly fell behind on the 2007 loan, the mortgage’s 
assignee, Connexus Credit Union, served Dennis with a complaint in 2011.  Id. at 11 ¶¶ 56, 
58.  Connexus, however, never filed the complaint in a Minnesota state district court.  Id. 
at 11 ¶ 57.  By operation of a Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure, Connexus’s failure to 
file the complaint meant that the action was “deemed dismissed with prejudice.”  Minn. R. 

Civ. P. 5.04(a); Compl. at 13 ¶ 68.2  Dennis died in 2020, and Mr. Major inherited the 
home.  Compl. at 7 ¶ 31; id. at 7–8 ¶ 35.  According to Mr. Major, nothing remains owed 
on either the 2004 or 2007 loan.  This is because Mr. Major paid what he thought was the 
remaining balance on the 2004 loan in June 2022.  Id. at 8 ¶ 38; id. at 9 ¶¶ 44, 47.3  And, 
in Mr. Major’s understanding of the law, Connexus’s failure to timely file the 2011 


1    The Complaint numbers its paragraphs inconsistently.  It goes from 1 to 128, and 
then restarts the count at 65.  See Compl. at 23.  To avoid confusion, all citations to the 
Complaint will mark the page number followed by the paragraph number.     

2    In Minnesota state courts, a civil action is commenced by service, not filing.  Minn. 
R. Civ. P. 3.01.  The “deemed dismissed” aspect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a) took effect 
July 1, 2013, after Connexus served Dennis with the complaint.  See Gams v. Houghton, 

 (Minn. 2016).  For actions pending when the deemed-dismissed rule 
was  adopted,  the  Minnesota  Supreme  Court  “provided  a  1-year  grace  period.”    

  
Connexus never filed the complaint, meaning it did not meet this extended deadline.  
Compl. at 13 ¶ 69.                                                        
3    The Complaint’s allegations regarding the 2004 loan are not consistent.  Though the 
Complaint alleges that Mr. Major paid the 2004 loan’s remaining balance, Compl. at 8 ¶ 38; 

 at 9 ¶¶ 44, 47, it also alleges “[o]n information and belief” that Dennis may have used 
the 2007 loan proceeds to pay the remaining balance on the 2004 loan, 

 at 6 ¶ 24.   
complaint with a court means he owes nothing on the 2007 loan.  

 at 13 ¶ 69.  Connexus 
and Halliday Watkins nonetheless sent Mr. Major letters between May and November 2023 
attempting to collect on the 2007 loan.  

 at 9–10 ¶¶ 50–52; 

 at 13–14 ¶¶  73–76; 

 at 

15 ¶ 83; 

 Exs. 2, 3, 4, 5.  These letters and related communications prompted Mr. Major 
to retain counsel and then to file this case.  See Major Decl. [ECF No. 36] ¶¶ 33–35.  
    Plaintiff’s claims and requested relief.  Mr. Major filed this case in May 2024.  See 
Compl. at 30.  He asserted FDCPA claims against Connexus and Halliday Watkins.  

 at 
23–29 ¶¶ 65–104.4  Mr. Major alleged the letters and perhaps other communications he 

received from Connexus and Halliday Watkins falsely represented the amount or legal 
status of a debt, 

 at 24 ¶¶ 71–72; 

 at 27–28 ¶ 94, that Connexus and Halliday Watkins 
falsely represented that nonpayment of the 2007 loan would result in the seizure or sale of 
property, 

 at 25 ¶ 76; 

 at 28 ¶ 95, that Connexus and Halliday Watkins’s letters were 
deceptive and threatened unlawful action, 

 at 25 ¶ 78; 

 at 28 ¶ 96, that “the natural 

consequence of” Connexus and Halliday Watkins’s actions “was to harass, oppress, or 
abuse [Mr.] Major in connection with the collection of” a debt that was not owed, 

 at 25 
¶ 79; 

 at 28 ¶ 97, and that Connexus and Halliday Watkins’s actions amounted to “unfair 
or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” 

 at 26 ¶ 82; 

 at 28–


4    Mr.  Major  alleged  that  Halliday  Watkins’s  letters  violated  federal  regulations 
implementing the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639f(a).  Compl. at 24–25 ¶¶ 73–75.  
In Mr. Major’s understanding, the Truth in Lending Act forbade Halliday Watkins from 
demanding late fees and interest because the lender failed to provide him with periodic 
statements of amounts owed on the 2007 loan.  See id.  The alleged Truth in Lending Act 
violations serve as a basis for the FDCPA claims.  Mr. Major asserts no independent claim 
under the Truth in Lending Act.                                           
29 ¶ 100.  As a result, Mr. Major claimed to have “incurred time, costs, and attorneys’ fees” 
and suffered emotional distress.  Id. at 26 ¶¶ 84–85; id. at 29 ¶¶ 102–03.  For relief, Mr. 
Major sought actual and statutory damages, “an award of costs of litigation and reasonable 

attorney’s fees,” and “such other and further relief as to [sic] the Court deems just and 
equitable.”  Id. at 29–30 (following “WHEREFORE” clause).                 
    Procedural history.  As far as the court’s docket shows, not much happened in this 
case.  After obtaining Mr. Major’s assent to extend its responsive-pleading deadline, 
Connexus filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on July 11, 2024.  ECF Nos. 11, 14, 19.  Before his 

deadline  to  respond  to  the  motion,  Mr.  Major  filed  a  notice  voluntarily  dismissing 
Connexus without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).  ECF No. 28.  
Halliday Watkins charted a different course.  It answered the Complaint on July 11, ECF 
No. 18, and that same day served a $3,000 offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, ECF 
No. 29-2.  The offer excluded “any amount of money Plaintiff may be entitled as an award 

of costs of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), 
which would be determined by the Court.”  Id.  Mr. Major accepted the offer on July 30.  
ECF No. 29.  The parties filed no report under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), and there was no 
scheduling conference under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.  See ECF No. 31.          
    Settlement history between Mr. Major and Halliday Watkins.  Mr. Major and 

Halliday Watkins discussed settlement during July 2024, and these discussions are relevant 
to Mr. Major’s attorneys’ fees motion.  On July 8, Mr. Major offered to release all claims 
against  Halliday  Watkins  for  $65,000;  this  amount  included  an  unspecified  sum  for 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  Goerlitz Decl. Ex. 1 [ECF No. 41-1] at 10.  Halliday Watkins 
rejected the demand, countering with its $3,000 offer of judgment.  After Mr. Major 
accepted the $3,000 offer, the two parties tried to resolve the attorneys’ fees and costs issue.  
Mr. Major’s first fees-and-costs demand was for $30,000.  Id. at 8.  As part of this demand, 

Mr. Major’s lawyers represented that their total fees and costs were $30,378.06, meaning 
the demand represented a negligible compromise.  Id.  Halliday Watkins rejected this 
demand;  it  served  a  second,  fees-and-costs-specific  offer  of  judgment  for  $5,000.  
Corrected Christensen Decl. [ECF No. 40] ¶ 83.  Mr. Major did not accept the offer.  That 
brings us to this motion.                                                 

    Law governing the fee-entitlement question and the fee award’s amount.  Under the 
FDCPA, a “successful” plaintiff may recover from a non-compliant debt collector, among 
other amounts, “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as 
determined by the court.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).  The party seeking fees has the burden 
of establishing that the fees sought are reasonable and should submit evidence supporting 

the rates claimed and hours worked.  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

, 433–34, 437 
(1983).  “To calculate attorney’s fees, courts typically begin by using the lodestar method, 
which multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended by reasonable hourly rates.  
When determining reasonable hourly rates, district courts may rely on their own experience 
and knowledge of prevailing market rates.”  Bryant v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 

 

(8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see In re RFC, 

, 846 (D. Minn. 2019) 
(“Generally, to determine whether an hourly rate is reasonable, courts look at the rates 
‘prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 
skill, experience and reputation.’” (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 

, 895 n.11 
(1984)).  Trial-court judges need not “become green-eyeshade accountants.  The essential 
goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing 
perfection.  So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use 

estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.”  Fox v. Vice, 

 
(2011).                                                                   
    Analysis  of  claimed  hourly  rates  –  attorneys.    Mr.  Major  is  represented  by 
Christensen Sampsel PLLC.  Seven professionals from the firm worked on this case.  See 
Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶¶ 4–70.  These included three attorneys, three law clerks, and 

a paralegal.  

  Begin with the attorneys, Carl E. Christensen, Christopher J. Wilcox, and 
Ryan J. Supple.  Each attorney claims to have charged three hourly rates from 2023 (when 
their representation of Mr. Major began) to 2024 (when this motion was filed).  Id. ¶¶ 24, 
35, 47.  These include a 2023 contingent-fee rate, a 2024 contingent-fee rate, and a client-
paid hourly rate.  Id.  The claimed 2023 contingent-fee rates are $500 for Mr. Christensen, 

$325 for Mr. Wilcox, and $350 for Mr. Supple.  Id.5  Judged against each attorney’s 
qualifications, a recent case from this District awarding fees to Christensen Sampsel, and 
my own experience and knowledge of the market, the claimed 2023 contingent-fee rates 
are reasonable.  See id. ¶¶ 4–21 (describing Mr. Christensen’s credentials), ¶¶ 27–34 (Mr. 


5    Mr. Christensen and Mr. Supple’s 2023 contingent-fee rates match their client-paid 
hourly rates.  Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶¶ 24, 47.  Mr. Wilcox’s 2023 contingent-fee 
rate and his client-paid hourly rate are different and the subject of some confusion.  Id. 
¶ 35.  Mr. Wilcox’s billing records show that he never billed at his $375 client-paid hourly 
rate.  See id. ¶ 71(b).  In his supporting declaration, Mr. Christensen represented that Mr. 
Wilcox’s 2023 contingent-fee hourly rate was $375 but acknowledged that Mr. Wilcox 
billed his 2023 contingent time at $325 per hour.  Id. ¶ 35.  The hourly rate at which Mr. 
Wilcox actually billed, or $325, is applied here.                         
Wilcox), ¶¶ 37–46 (Mr. Supple); see also Knapp v. Compass Minn., LLC, No. 24-cv-100 
(SRN/DTS), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2024).  However, Mr. Major has 
not carried his burden to show that the claimed 2024 contingent-fee hourly rates are 

reasonable.    These  rates  increased  substantially  from  2023.    Mr.  Christensen’s  rate 
increased ten percent to $550.  Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶ 24.  Mr. Wilcox’s billed rate 
increased about thirty percent, from $325 to $425.  Id. ¶ 35.  And Mr. Supple’s rate 
increased about fourteen percent to $400.  Id. ¶ 47.  No justification whatsoever is provided 
to explain or defend these increases.  Without at least some basic explanation, I cannot say 

that either these increases or the increased rates are reasonable.        
     Analysis of claimed hourly rates – law clerks.  The law clerks are Sydney Maglio, 
Darby Hanson, and Donna Whipple.  Id. ¶¶ 49–62.  The claimed hourly rate for each law 
clerk is $145.  Id. ¶ 56 (Ms. Maglio), ¶ 59 (Mr. Hanson), ¶ 62 (Ms. Whipple).  This rate is 
not supported.  (1) It is difficult to understand how it might be appropriate to assign the 

same relatively high hourly rate to all three law clerks.  Though each is unquestionably 
qualified to serve in the role, the three do not share identical qualifications.  For example, 
one is a law school graduate, id. ¶ 50, one is a third-year law student, id. ¶ 61, and one is a 
second-year law student, id. ¶ 58.  Ms. Maglio is described as possessing significant 
consumer-law experience and training.  Id. ¶¶ 51–55.  The other two are not described as 

possessing comparable experience.  See id. ¶¶ 58, 61.  To be reasonable, the requested 
hourly rates would account for these differences.  (2) Ms. Maglio is the most experienced 
of the three law clerks.  But in Knapp, the firm requested an $85 hourly rate for her, and 
the court determined this rate was reasonable.  

, at *4.  Mr. Major 
nowhere addresses the discrepancy between the firm’s $85-per-hour ask in Knapp and its 
$145-per-hour ask here.  Even accounting for the contingent-fee nature of this case, it is 
difficult to understand how $145 might represent a reasonable increase from the $85 hourly 

rate awarded in Knapp.  (3) No authority is cited to justify the $145 hourly rate.  Mr. Major 
asserts the rate “is similarly consistent with the prevailing market rates,” but he cites no 
evidence or authority showing what the prevailing market rates might be.  Corrected Mem. 
in Supp. [ECF No. 39] at 19.  With no support for the requested rate, it seems most 
reasonable  to  revert  to  Knapp.  There,  the  highest  law-clerk  hourly  rate  Christensen 

Sampsel requested, and the court approved, was $95.  

, at *4.  That rate 
will be awarded here.                                                     
    Analysis of claimed hourly rate – paralegal.  The claimed hourly rate for the 
paralegal ranges from $140 to $190, depending on when the paralegal worked on the case.  
Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶¶ 67–68.  Perhaps owing to the comparatively small fee 

amount Mr. Major seeks to recover for the paralegal’s work—$533.50—Halliday Watkins 
does not challenge the paralegal’s claimed hourly rates.  For that reason, and because the 
claimed hourly rates are comparable to, or at least not unreasonably greater than, paralegal 
rates approved in this District, see Berscheid v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 22-cv-86 
(JRT/LIB), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. June 1, 2023), the paralegal’s claimed 

hourly rates will not be reduced.                                         
    Analysis of the claimed hours.  Mr. Major claims his attorneys reasonably expended 
100.2, 101.3, or 114.6 hours on this case.  Which number you get depends on what parts 
of the supporting declaration you read.  If you add the subtotals provided beneath each 
professional’s time descriptions, you get 101.3 hours.  See Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶ 
71(a)–(g).  If you exclude from that number the small amount of time the firm wrote off on 
its bills to Mr. Major, you get 100.2 hours.  See id. ¶¶ 71(c) (showing write-offs to Mr. 

Supple’s time on May 22 and July 8, 2024), 71(g) (showing write-offs to the paralegal’s 
time on November 2, 2023).  And if you add the hours Mr. Christensen represents each 
professional spent on the case, you get 114.6 hours.  See id. ¶¶ 26, 36, 48, 56, 59, 62, 68.  
Regardless, Mr. Major seeks to recover fees billed for all time expended on the case from 
Halliday Watkins.  For several basic reasons, no matter which of the three numbers is 

considered, the claimed hours are unreasonably excessive:                 
    (1) Mr. Major’s supporting documentation contains discrepancies that raise doubts 
about its trustworthiness.  There is the disparity in claimed hours just discussed.  There is 
also a seemingly obvious, important math error in the firm’s supporting declaration.  In a 
table intended to show the total claimed fees and expenses, Mr. Christensen claims the firm 

billed $8,881.50 to Mr. Major on a non-contingent, hourly-fee basis.  Id. ¶ 76.  The table 
indicates that three professionals’ fees of $200, $4,445, and $28 (billed at client-paid hourly 
rates), were added to arrive at $8,881.50.  Id.  Obviously, these three numbers do not total 
$8,881.50; they sum to $4,673.                                            
    (2) Mr. Major cannot reasonably expect to recover all his fees from just one 

defendant when he sued two.  Mr. Major did not sue just Halliday Watkins.  He also sued 
Connexus.  There is no reason to think the claims against Halliday Watkins were more 
complicated or more important to Mr. Major than the claims against Connexus.  The 
Complaint treats both defendants comparably, and the firm’s time records do not usually 
indicate that work was specific to one defendant or the other.  And the Complaint alleges 
that Connexus and Halliday Watkins caused Mr. Major to suffer identical injuries.  See 
Compl. at 26 ¶¶ 83–86 (alleging injuries caused by Halliday Watkins), 29 ¶¶ 101–04 

(alleging injuries caused by Connexus).  The natural inference is that the firm’s work 
generally served the case’s prosecution in equal parts against both defendants and that the 
firm spent roughly equal time on the claims against each defendant.6      
    (3)  The  time  records  and  other  fee-supporting  submissions  reflect  significant 
inefficiencies in the case’s prosecution.  Accept the idea that this case required more 

fact-investigation time than most FDCPA cases.  Once the facts were known, the basis for 
the FDCPA claims was straightforward: Connexus and Halliday Watkins attempted to 
collect debts that (Mr. Major says) were not owed, meaning the collection efforts plausibly 
violated several FDCPA provisions.  There is no obvious justification for spreading the 
case’s work across seven professionals.  At the very least, this resulted in duplicative billing 

and a need for an unreasonable volume of internal firm communications.  See Goerlitz 
Decl. Ex. 6 [ECF No. 41-6].  For example, on July 9, 2024, the three attorneys each billed 
time for debriefing a meeting with opposing counsel.  See Corrected Christensen Decl. 


6    I have carefully reviewed the firm’s time records.  If this motion is excluded, they 
do not show which defendant required more of the firm’s time.  There is one reason to 
guess Connexus may have consumed more time.  It moved to dismiss.  ECF No. 19.  
Halliday Watkins, by contrast, answered the Complaint.  ECF No. 18.  The billing records 
seem to show that more hours were billed to the motion than the Answer.  See, e.g., 
Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶ 71(b) (showing Wilcox conducting meet and confers with 
Connexus, reviewing the motion to dismiss brief, researching additional claims against 
Connexus, calendaring filing deadlines, but with respect to the Answer, only “skim[ming]” 
it).                                                                      
¶ 71(a)–(c).  As another example, on July 12, 2024, Mr. Supple billed time to “Confer with 
attorney  Wilcox,”  and  Mr.  Wilcox  billed  to  “accept  calendar  invites  from  Attorney 
Supple.”  Id. ¶ 71(b)–(c).  Inefficiencies, if they can be called that, also are evident in the 

Complaint’s drafting.  The firm billed 10.3 hours to drafting the Complaint after it was 
filed.  Recall the Complaint was filed on May 21, 2024.  The firm’s time records reflect 
that Mr. Christensen billed a total of 2.4 hours to drafting the Complaint on May 23, that 
Mr. Wilcox billed a total of 2.4 hours to drafting the Complaint on May 23 and June 14, 
and that Mr. Supple billed a total of 5.5 hours to drafting the Complaint on May 23 and 

May 24.  See id. ¶ 71(a)–(c).  Nothing explains why the firm would have continued to bill 
for drafting or revising a pleading that already had been filed.  No amended complaint was 
ever filed.  If an amended complaint were merely contemplated, it is difficult to understand 
why Halliday Watkins should pay for that possibility.  In addition to these issues, the 
attorneys’ fees motion reflects inefficiencies.  The initial brief and principal supporting 

declaration contained errors that required the filing of corrected versions.  See ECF Nos. 
34–35, 39–40.  As noted, the materials that were filed contained inconsistencies that 
required considerable court time to sort out.  And it seems fair to say that the thirty-six-
page  brief  and  supporting  materials  Mr.  Majors  filed  resulted  in  “major  litigation,” 
certainly as compared with what little else transpired in this case.  Hensley, 

 

(“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”).  
    (4) The case involved negligible in-court work.  Mr. Major’s voluntary dismissal of 
Connexus meant he did not have to respond to Connexus’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  There 
was no other motion practice.  Mr. Major’s acceptance of Halliday Watkins’s offer of 
judgment prompted cancellation of the Rule 26(f) report deadline and the Rule 16 pretrial 
conference.  There was no discovery.  In other words, the tasks that ordinarily trigger the 
highest attorneys’ fees were unnecessary and did not occur in this case.   

    (5) By any measure, Mr. Major’s $3,000 recovery was insubstantial.  The amount 
appears modest in comparison to the Complaint’s description of Mr. Major’s injuries.  See 
Compl. at 26 ¶¶ 83–86 (alleging injuries caused by Halliday Watkins).  The amount also is 
quite modest in comparison to Mr. Major’s last settlement demand.  Recall that Mr. Major’s 
final settlement demand from Halliday Watkins was presented on July 8 in the amount of 

$65,000.  Goerlitz Decl. Ex. 1 at 10.  Though this amount included an unspecified sum for 
attorneys’ fees and costs, Mr. Major’s counsel would represent on July 24 that the firm’s 
total fees and costs as of that date were $30,378.06.  Id. at 8.  In other words, Mr. Major’s 
July 8 damages demand exceeded $34,000.  He recovered less than ten percent of that.  Mr. 
Major does not suggest that the case achieved some important non-monetary or other goal. 

    Determination of an appropriate fee award.  Applying the hourly rates that I 
determined  were  reasonable  to  each  corresponding  professional’s  time  reduces  the 
$46,163.50  requested  fees  to  $33,047.50.7    From  there,  accounting  for  the 



7    This math deserves explanation.  I started from paragraph 71 in the Corrected 
Christensen Declaration.  That paragraph lists each billing entry and totals the hours for 
each  attorney,  law  clerk,  and  paralegal.   Where  the  billing  totals  differ  from  earlier 
statements in the Declaration, I took the later statements as accurate because they were 
tethered directly to the billing entries.  I removed hours billed at $0, reaching a total of 
100.2 hours billed in the matter.  Table 1 shows the calculations.  All citations are to the 
Corrected Christensen Declaration.                                        
unreasonableness  of  Mr.  Major’s  attorneys’-fees  request  escapes  mathematical 
calculations or precise time cuts.  Our Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “ordered or 
approved flat percentage reductions in appropriate cases,” Beckler v. Rent Recovery Sols., 

LLC, 

 (8th Cir. 2023), and this seems like an appropriate case for that 
approach.  As a starting point, a fifty percent reduction is appropriate to account for the 
fact that Mr. Major sued two defendants, attributed roughly equal responsibility to both, 
but only seeks attorneys’ fees from one.  Importantly, Mr. Major did not attempt to show 


                      Table 1: Corrected Hours                           
Attorney /  Hours Billed  Hours Billed in  Hours Billed Above $0/hr      
Law Clerk  in Declaration  Declaration                                   
/ Paralegal  Body  Table                                                 
Christensen  25.4 hrs.  ¶ 26.  25.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(a).  25.0 hrs.            
Wilcox  13.4 hrs.  ¶ 36.  13.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(b).  13.4 hrs.                 
Supple  53.0 hrs.  ¶ 48.  40.3 hrs.  ¶ 71(c).  39.5 hrs.  5/22/24 & 7/8/24 entries removed.  ¶ 71(c). 
Maglio  16.2 hrs.  ¶ 56.  16.2 hrs.  ¶ 71(d).  16.2 hrs.                 
Hanson  3.0 hrs.  ¶ 59.  3.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(e).  3.0 hrs.                    
Whipple  0.4 hrs.  ¶ 62.    0.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(f).  0.4 hrs.                 
Robertson  3.2 hrs.  ¶ 68.  3.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(g).  2.7 hrs.  11/2/23 entry removed.  ¶ 71(g). 
TOTAL   114.6 hrs.   101.3 hrs.  100.2 hrs.                              

I then multiplied the hours billed for each professional by the corresponding reasonable 
rate.  Having multiplied the corrected hours by the corrected rates, I added all the products 
and reached the sum of $33,047.50.  Table 2 shows the calculations.  Again, all citations 
are to the Corrected Christensen Declaration.                             

           Table 2: Corrected Hours Multiplied by Corrected Rate         
Attorney / Law Clerk  Hours  Billed  Above  Corrected Rate  Total        
/ Paralegal    $0/hr                                                     
Christensen    25.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(a).  $500/hr.  ¶ 24.  $12,500.00          
Wilcox         13.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(b).  $325/hr.  ¶ 35.  $4,355.00           
Supple         39.5 hrs.  ¶ 71(c).   $350/hr.  ¶ 47.  $13,825.00         
Maglio         16.2 hrs.  ¶ 71(d).  $95/hr.      $1,539.00               
Hanson         3.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(e).  $95/hr.       $285.00                 
Whipple        0.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(f).  $95/hr.       $38.00                  
Robertson      0.5 hrs.  ¶ 71(g).  $175/hr.  ¶ 67.  $505.50              
               and             and                                       
               2.2 hrs.  ¶ 71(g).  $190/hr.  ¶ 67.                       
TOTAL          100.2 hrs.      --                $33,047.50              
that he would have incurred the same fees had he sued only Halliday Watkins.  Nor has he 
shown that the claims against Halliday Watkins were more important or time-intensive 
than the claims against Connexus.  In these circumstances, Halliday Watkins cannot 

reasonably be required to pay the fees Mr. Major incurred pursuing Connexus, and my best 
estimation is that the firm spent roughly equal time on claims against each defendant.8  I 
conclude that an additional fifteen percent reduction is appropriate to account for the 
remaining issues underlying the requested fees’ excessiveness.  As discussed, this case was 
short-lived and not legally complicated, assigning seven professionals to the case created 

inefficiencies reflected in the billing records, and Mr. Major’s recovery from Halliday 
Watkins  was  insubstantial.    Of  course,  the  precise  reduction  warranted  by  these 
considerations is debatable.  My best estimation is that a fifteen-percent reduction is 
sufficient and achieves non-arbitrary “rough justice.”  Fox, 

.  Together, 
these percentage reductions add to sixty-five percent, and reduce the requested attorneys’ 

fees from $33,047.50 to $11,566.63.                                       






8    There is another reason not to award Mr. Major fees incurred pursuing claims 
against Connexus.  He did not prevail on these claims in any sense.  He dismissed the 
claims voluntarily.  See Sequa Corp. v. Cooper, 

, 1037–38 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(“[A] voluntary dismissal without prejudice means that neither party can be said to have 
prevailed.”).                                                             

    Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings 
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:                                               
    1.   Plaintiff Nicholas R. Major’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [ECF 

No. 32] is GRANTED IN PART.                                               
    2.   Plaintiff Nicholas R. Major is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of 
$11,566.63 and costs in the amount of $873.06.                            
           LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                          

Dated:  December 27, 2024          s/ Eric C. Tostrud                     
                                  Eric C. Tostrud                        
                                  United States District Court           

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Nicholas R. Major,                    File No. 24-cv-01897 (ECT/DJF)      

         Plaintiff,                                                      

v.                                       OPINION AND ORDER                

Halliday Watkins & Mann, P.C.,                                            

         Defendant.                                                      
_______________________________________________________________________   
Carl E. Christensen, Christopher Wilcox, and Ryan Supple, Christensen Sampsel PLLC, 
Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff Nicholas R. Major.                         

Jared M. Goerlitz, Goerlitz Law, PLLC, St. Paul, MN, for Defendant Halliday Watkins & 
Mann, P.C.                                                                


    Plaintiff Nicholas Major brought this FDCPA case in May 2024.  He sued two 
defendants—Connexus  Credit  Union  and  Halliday  Watkins  &  Mann—alleging  both 
engaged in unlawful debt-collection practices.  The case didn’t last the summer.  On 
July 30, Mr. Major voluntarily dismissed his claims against Connexus and accepted a 
$3,000 offer of judgment from Halliday Watkins.                           
    Now, pursuant to the FDCPA’s fee-shifting provision, Mr. Major seeks to recover 
the full amount of his claimed attorneys’ fees—$46,163.50—from just Halliday Watkins.  
For several reasons that will be discussed, this request is unreasonable.  Though there is 
room to fairly debate the best outcome, my answer is to award Mr. Major attorneys’ fees 
in the substantially reduced amount of $11,566.63.                        
    Plaintiff’s  factual allegations.    Mr.  Major’s  father,  Dennis,  owned  a  home  in 
Howard Lake, Minnesota.  Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 3 ¶ 12; id. at 5 ¶ 18.1  Dennis took out 
two loans against the home, one in 2004 and the other in 2007, both secured by mortgages.  

Id. at 5 ¶¶ 18, 21.  After Dennis allegedly fell behind on the 2007 loan, the mortgage’s 
assignee, Connexus Credit Union, served Dennis with a complaint in 2011.  Id. at 11 ¶¶ 56, 
58.  Connexus, however, never filed the complaint in a Minnesota state district court.  Id. 
at 11 ¶ 57.  By operation of a Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure, Connexus’s failure to 
file the complaint meant that the action was “deemed dismissed with prejudice.”  Minn. R. 

Civ. P. 5.04(a); Compl. at 13 ¶ 68.2  Dennis died in 2020, and Mr. Major inherited the 
home.  Compl. at 7 ¶ 31; id. at 7–8 ¶ 35.  According to Mr. Major, nothing remains owed 
on either the 2004 or 2007 loan.  This is because Mr. Major paid what he thought was the 
remaining balance on the 2004 loan in June 2022.  Id. at 8 ¶ 38; id. at 9 ¶¶ 44, 47.3  And, 
in Mr. Major’s understanding of the law, Connexus’s failure to timely file the 2011 


1    The Complaint numbers its paragraphs inconsistently.  It goes from 1 to 128, and 
then restarts the count at 65.  See Compl. at 23.  To avoid confusion, all citations to the 
Complaint will mark the page number followed by the paragraph number.     

2    In Minnesota state courts, a civil action is commenced by service, not filing.  Minn. 
R. Civ. P. 3.01.  The “deemed dismissed” aspect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a) took effect 
July 1, 2013, after Connexus served Dennis with the complaint.  See Gams v. Houghton, 

 (Minn. 2016).  For actions pending when the deemed-dismissed rule 
was  adopted,  the  Minnesota  Supreme  Court  “provided  a  1-year  grace  period.”    

  
Connexus never filed the complaint, meaning it did not meet this extended deadline.  
Compl. at 13 ¶ 69.                                                        
3    The Complaint’s allegations regarding the 2004 loan are not consistent.  Though the 
Complaint alleges that Mr. Major paid the 2004 loan’s remaining balance, Compl. at 8 ¶ 38; 

 at 9 ¶¶ 44, 47, it also alleges “[o]n information and belief” that Dennis may have used 
the 2007 loan proceeds to pay the remaining balance on the 2004 loan, 

 at 6 ¶ 24.   
complaint with a court means he owes nothing on the 2007 loan.  

 at 13 ¶ 69.  Connexus 
and Halliday Watkins nonetheless sent Mr. Major letters between May and November 2023 
attempting to collect on the 2007 loan.  

 at 9–10 ¶¶ 50–52; 

 at 13–14 ¶¶  73–76; 

 at 

15 ¶ 83; 

 Exs. 2, 3, 4, 5.  These letters and related communications prompted Mr. Major 
to retain counsel and then to file this case.  See Major Decl. [ECF No. 36] ¶¶ 33–35.  
    Plaintiff’s claims and requested relief.  Mr. Major filed this case in May 2024.  See 
Compl. at 30.  He asserted FDCPA claims against Connexus and Halliday Watkins.  

 at 
23–29 ¶¶ 65–104.4  Mr. Major alleged the letters and perhaps other communications he 

received from Connexus and Halliday Watkins falsely represented the amount or legal 
status of a debt, 

 at 24 ¶¶ 71–72; 

 at 27–28 ¶ 94, that Connexus and Halliday Watkins 
falsely represented that nonpayment of the 2007 loan would result in the seizure or sale of 
property, 

 at 25 ¶ 76; 

 at 28 ¶ 95, that Connexus and Halliday Watkins’s letters were 
deceptive and threatened unlawful action, 

 at 25 ¶ 78; 

 at 28 ¶ 96, that “the natural 

consequence of” Connexus and Halliday Watkins’s actions “was to harass, oppress, or 
abuse [Mr.] Major in connection with the collection of” a debt that was not owed, 

 at 25 
¶ 79; 

 at 28 ¶ 97, and that Connexus and Halliday Watkins’s actions amounted to “unfair 
or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” 

 at 26 ¶ 82; 

 at 28–


4    Mr.  Major  alleged  that  Halliday  Watkins’s  letters  violated  federal  regulations 
implementing the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639f(a).  Compl. at 24–25 ¶¶ 73–75.  
In Mr. Major’s understanding, the Truth in Lending Act forbade Halliday Watkins from 
demanding late fees and interest because the lender failed to provide him with periodic 
statements of amounts owed on the 2007 loan.  See id.  The alleged Truth in Lending Act 
violations serve as a basis for the FDCPA claims.  Mr. Major asserts no independent claim 
under the Truth in Lending Act.                                           
29 ¶ 100.  As a result, Mr. Major claimed to have “incurred time, costs, and attorneys’ fees” 
and suffered emotional distress.  Id. at 26 ¶¶ 84–85; id. at 29 ¶¶ 102–03.  For relief, Mr. 
Major sought actual and statutory damages, “an award of costs of litigation and reasonable 

attorney’s fees,” and “such other and further relief as to [sic] the Court deems just and 
equitable.”  Id. at 29–30 (following “WHEREFORE” clause).                 
    Procedural history.  As far as the court’s docket shows, not much happened in this 
case.  After obtaining Mr. Major’s assent to extend its responsive-pleading deadline, 
Connexus filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on July 11, 2024.  ECF Nos. 11, 14, 19.  Before his 

deadline  to  respond  to  the  motion,  Mr.  Major  filed  a  notice  voluntarily  dismissing 
Connexus without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).  ECF No. 28.  
Halliday Watkins charted a different course.  It answered the Complaint on July 11, ECF 
No. 18, and that same day served a $3,000 offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, ECF 
No. 29-2.  The offer excluded “any amount of money Plaintiff may be entitled as an award 

of costs of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), 
which would be determined by the Court.”  Id.  Mr. Major accepted the offer on July 30.  
ECF No. 29.  The parties filed no report under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), and there was no 
scheduling conference under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.  See ECF No. 31.          
    Settlement history between Mr. Major and Halliday Watkins.  Mr. Major and 

Halliday Watkins discussed settlement during July 2024, and these discussions are relevant 
to Mr. Major’s attorneys’ fees motion.  On July 8, Mr. Major offered to release all claims 
against  Halliday  Watkins  for  $65,000;  this  amount  included  an  unspecified  sum  for 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  Goerlitz Decl. Ex. 1 [ECF No. 41-1] at 10.  Halliday Watkins 
rejected the demand, countering with its $3,000 offer of judgment.  After Mr. Major 
accepted the $3,000 offer, the two parties tried to resolve the attorneys’ fees and costs issue.  
Mr. Major’s first fees-and-costs demand was for $30,000.  Id. at 8.  As part of this demand, 

Mr. Major’s lawyers represented that their total fees and costs were $30,378.06, meaning 
the demand represented a negligible compromise.  Id.  Halliday Watkins rejected this 
demand;  it  served  a  second,  fees-and-costs-specific  offer  of  judgment  for  $5,000.  
Corrected Christensen Decl. [ECF No. 40] ¶ 83.  Mr. Major did not accept the offer.  That 
brings us to this motion.                                                 

    Law governing the fee-entitlement question and the fee award’s amount.  Under the 
FDCPA, a “successful” plaintiff may recover from a non-compliant debt collector, among 
other amounts, “the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as 
determined by the court.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).  The party seeking fees has the burden 
of establishing that the fees sought are reasonable and should submit evidence supporting 

the rates claimed and hours worked.  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

, 433–34, 437 
(1983).  “To calculate attorney’s fees, courts typically begin by using the lodestar method, 
which multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended by reasonable hourly rates.  
When determining reasonable hourly rates, district courts may rely on their own experience 
and knowledge of prevailing market rates.”  Bryant v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 

 

(8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see In re RFC, 

, 846 (D. Minn. 2019) 
(“Generally, to determine whether an hourly rate is reasonable, courts look at the rates 
‘prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 
skill, experience and reputation.’” (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 

, 895 n.11 
(1984)).  Trial-court judges need not “become green-eyeshade accountants.  The essential 
goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing 
perfection.  So trial courts may take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use 

estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.”  Fox v. Vice, 

 
(2011).                                                                   
    Analysis  of  claimed  hourly  rates  –  attorneys.    Mr.  Major  is  represented  by 
Christensen Sampsel PLLC.  Seven professionals from the firm worked on this case.  See 
Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶¶ 4–70.  These included three attorneys, three law clerks, and 

a paralegal.  

  Begin with the attorneys, Carl E. Christensen, Christopher J. Wilcox, and 
Ryan J. Supple.  Each attorney claims to have charged three hourly rates from 2023 (when 
their representation of Mr. Major began) to 2024 (when this motion was filed).  Id. ¶¶ 24, 
35, 47.  These include a 2023 contingent-fee rate, a 2024 contingent-fee rate, and a client-
paid hourly rate.  Id.  The claimed 2023 contingent-fee rates are $500 for Mr. Christensen, 

$325 for Mr. Wilcox, and $350 for Mr. Supple.  Id.5  Judged against each attorney’s 
qualifications, a recent case from this District awarding fees to Christensen Sampsel, and 
my own experience and knowledge of the market, the claimed 2023 contingent-fee rates 
are reasonable.  See id. ¶¶ 4–21 (describing Mr. Christensen’s credentials), ¶¶ 27–34 (Mr. 


5    Mr. Christensen and Mr. Supple’s 2023 contingent-fee rates match their client-paid 
hourly rates.  Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶¶ 24, 47.  Mr. Wilcox’s 2023 contingent-fee 
rate and his client-paid hourly rate are different and the subject of some confusion.  Id. 
¶ 35.  Mr. Wilcox’s billing records show that he never billed at his $375 client-paid hourly 
rate.  See id. ¶ 71(b).  In his supporting declaration, Mr. Christensen represented that Mr. 
Wilcox’s 2023 contingent-fee hourly rate was $375 but acknowledged that Mr. Wilcox 
billed his 2023 contingent time at $325 per hour.  Id. ¶ 35.  The hourly rate at which Mr. 
Wilcox actually billed, or $325, is applied here.                         
Wilcox), ¶¶ 37–46 (Mr. Supple); see also Knapp v. Compass Minn., LLC, No. 24-cv-100 
(SRN/DTS), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2024).  However, Mr. Major has 
not carried his burden to show that the claimed 2024 contingent-fee hourly rates are 

reasonable.    These  rates  increased  substantially  from  2023.    Mr.  Christensen’s  rate 
increased ten percent to $550.  Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶ 24.  Mr. Wilcox’s billed rate 
increased about thirty percent, from $325 to $425.  Id. ¶ 35.  And Mr. Supple’s rate 
increased about fourteen percent to $400.  Id. ¶ 47.  No justification whatsoever is provided 
to explain or defend these increases.  Without at least some basic explanation, I cannot say 

that either these increases or the increased rates are reasonable.        
     Analysis of claimed hourly rates – law clerks.  The law clerks are Sydney Maglio, 
Darby Hanson, and Donna Whipple.  Id. ¶¶ 49–62.  The claimed hourly rate for each law 
clerk is $145.  Id. ¶ 56 (Ms. Maglio), ¶ 59 (Mr. Hanson), ¶ 62 (Ms. Whipple).  This rate is 
not supported.  (1) It is difficult to understand how it might be appropriate to assign the 

same relatively high hourly rate to all three law clerks.  Though each is unquestionably 
qualified to serve in the role, the three do not share identical qualifications.  For example, 
one is a law school graduate, id. ¶ 50, one is a third-year law student, id. ¶ 61, and one is a 
second-year law student, id. ¶ 58.  Ms. Maglio is described as possessing significant 
consumer-law experience and training.  Id. ¶¶ 51–55.  The other two are not described as 

possessing comparable experience.  See id. ¶¶ 58, 61.  To be reasonable, the requested 
hourly rates would account for these differences.  (2) Ms. Maglio is the most experienced 
of the three law clerks.  But in Knapp, the firm requested an $85 hourly rate for her, and 
the court determined this rate was reasonable.  

, at *4.  Mr. Major 
nowhere addresses the discrepancy between the firm’s $85-per-hour ask in Knapp and its 
$145-per-hour ask here.  Even accounting for the contingent-fee nature of this case, it is 
difficult to understand how $145 might represent a reasonable increase from the $85 hourly 

rate awarded in Knapp.  (3) No authority is cited to justify the $145 hourly rate.  Mr. Major 
asserts the rate “is similarly consistent with the prevailing market rates,” but he cites no 
evidence or authority showing what the prevailing market rates might be.  Corrected Mem. 
in Supp. [ECF No. 39] at 19.  With no support for the requested rate, it seems most 
reasonable  to  revert  to  Knapp.  There,  the  highest  law-clerk  hourly  rate  Christensen 

Sampsel requested, and the court approved, was $95.  

, at *4.  That rate 
will be awarded here.                                                     
    Analysis of claimed hourly rate – paralegal.  The claimed hourly rate for the 
paralegal ranges from $140 to $190, depending on when the paralegal worked on the case.  
Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶¶ 67–68.  Perhaps owing to the comparatively small fee 

amount Mr. Major seeks to recover for the paralegal’s work—$533.50—Halliday Watkins 
does not challenge the paralegal’s claimed hourly rates.  For that reason, and because the 
claimed hourly rates are comparable to, or at least not unreasonably greater than, paralegal 
rates approved in this District, see Berscheid v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 22-cv-86 
(JRT/LIB), 

, at *3 (D. Minn. June 1, 2023), the paralegal’s claimed 

hourly rates will not be reduced.                                         
    Analysis of the claimed hours.  Mr. Major claims his attorneys reasonably expended 
100.2, 101.3, or 114.6 hours on this case.  Which number you get depends on what parts 
of the supporting declaration you read.  If you add the subtotals provided beneath each 
professional’s time descriptions, you get 101.3 hours.  See Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶ 
71(a)–(g).  If you exclude from that number the small amount of time the firm wrote off on 
its bills to Mr. Major, you get 100.2 hours.  See id. ¶¶ 71(c) (showing write-offs to Mr. 

Supple’s time on May 22 and July 8, 2024), 71(g) (showing write-offs to the paralegal’s 
time on November 2, 2023).  And if you add the hours Mr. Christensen represents each 
professional spent on the case, you get 114.6 hours.  See id. ¶¶ 26, 36, 48, 56, 59, 62, 68.  
Regardless, Mr. Major seeks to recover fees billed for all time expended on the case from 
Halliday Watkins.  For several basic reasons, no matter which of the three numbers is 

considered, the claimed hours are unreasonably excessive:                 
    (1) Mr. Major’s supporting documentation contains discrepancies that raise doubts 
about its trustworthiness.  There is the disparity in claimed hours just discussed.  There is 
also a seemingly obvious, important math error in the firm’s supporting declaration.  In a 
table intended to show the total claimed fees and expenses, Mr. Christensen claims the firm 

billed $8,881.50 to Mr. Major on a non-contingent, hourly-fee basis.  Id. ¶ 76.  The table 
indicates that three professionals’ fees of $200, $4,445, and $28 (billed at client-paid hourly 
rates), were added to arrive at $8,881.50.  Id.  Obviously, these three numbers do not total 
$8,881.50; they sum to $4,673.                                            
    (2) Mr. Major cannot reasonably expect to recover all his fees from just one 

defendant when he sued two.  Mr. Major did not sue just Halliday Watkins.  He also sued 
Connexus.  There is no reason to think the claims against Halliday Watkins were more 
complicated or more important to Mr. Major than the claims against Connexus.  The 
Complaint treats both defendants comparably, and the firm’s time records do not usually 
indicate that work was specific to one defendant or the other.  And the Complaint alleges 
that Connexus and Halliday Watkins caused Mr. Major to suffer identical injuries.  See 
Compl. at 26 ¶¶ 83–86 (alleging injuries caused by Halliday Watkins), 29 ¶¶ 101–04 

(alleging injuries caused by Connexus).  The natural inference is that the firm’s work 
generally served the case’s prosecution in equal parts against both defendants and that the 
firm spent roughly equal time on the claims against each defendant.6      
    (3)  The  time  records  and  other  fee-supporting  submissions  reflect  significant 
inefficiencies in the case’s prosecution.  Accept the idea that this case required more 

fact-investigation time than most FDCPA cases.  Once the facts were known, the basis for 
the FDCPA claims was straightforward: Connexus and Halliday Watkins attempted to 
collect debts that (Mr. Major says) were not owed, meaning the collection efforts plausibly 
violated several FDCPA provisions.  There is no obvious justification for spreading the 
case’s work across seven professionals.  At the very least, this resulted in duplicative billing 

and a need for an unreasonable volume of internal firm communications.  See Goerlitz 
Decl. Ex. 6 [ECF No. 41-6].  For example, on July 9, 2024, the three attorneys each billed 
time for debriefing a meeting with opposing counsel.  See Corrected Christensen Decl. 


6    I have carefully reviewed the firm’s time records.  If this motion is excluded, they 
do not show which defendant required more of the firm’s time.  There is one reason to 
guess Connexus may have consumed more time.  It moved to dismiss.  ECF No. 19.  
Halliday Watkins, by contrast, answered the Complaint.  ECF No. 18.  The billing records 
seem to show that more hours were billed to the motion than the Answer.  See, e.g., 
Corrected Christensen Decl. ¶ 71(b) (showing Wilcox conducting meet and confers with 
Connexus, reviewing the motion to dismiss brief, researching additional claims against 
Connexus, calendaring filing deadlines, but with respect to the Answer, only “skim[ming]” 
it).                                                                      
¶ 71(a)–(c).  As another example, on July 12, 2024, Mr. Supple billed time to “Confer with 
attorney  Wilcox,”  and  Mr.  Wilcox  billed  to  “accept  calendar  invites  from  Attorney 
Supple.”  Id. ¶ 71(b)–(c).  Inefficiencies, if they can be called that, also are evident in the 

Complaint’s drafting.  The firm billed 10.3 hours to drafting the Complaint after it was 
filed.  Recall the Complaint was filed on May 21, 2024.  The firm’s time records reflect 
that Mr. Christensen billed a total of 2.4 hours to drafting the Complaint on May 23, that 
Mr. Wilcox billed a total of 2.4 hours to drafting the Complaint on May 23 and June 14, 
and that Mr. Supple billed a total of 5.5 hours to drafting the Complaint on May 23 and 

May 24.  See id. ¶ 71(a)–(c).  Nothing explains why the firm would have continued to bill 
for drafting or revising a pleading that already had been filed.  No amended complaint was 
ever filed.  If an amended complaint were merely contemplated, it is difficult to understand 
why Halliday Watkins should pay for that possibility.  In addition to these issues, the 
attorneys’ fees motion reflects inefficiencies.  The initial brief and principal supporting 

declaration contained errors that required the filing of corrected versions.  See ECF Nos. 
34–35, 39–40.  As noted, the materials that were filed contained inconsistencies that 
required considerable court time to sort out.  And it seems fair to say that the thirty-six-
page  brief  and  supporting  materials  Mr.  Majors  filed  resulted  in  “major  litigation,” 
certainly as compared with what little else transpired in this case.  Hensley, 

 

(“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”).  
    (4) The case involved negligible in-court work.  Mr. Major’s voluntary dismissal of 
Connexus meant he did not have to respond to Connexus’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  There 
was no other motion practice.  Mr. Major’s acceptance of Halliday Watkins’s offer of 
judgment prompted cancellation of the Rule 26(f) report deadline and the Rule 16 pretrial 
conference.  There was no discovery.  In other words, the tasks that ordinarily trigger the 
highest attorneys’ fees were unnecessary and did not occur in this case.   

    (5) By any measure, Mr. Major’s $3,000 recovery was insubstantial.  The amount 
appears modest in comparison to the Complaint’s description of Mr. Major’s injuries.  See 
Compl. at 26 ¶¶ 83–86 (alleging injuries caused by Halliday Watkins).  The amount also is 
quite modest in comparison to Mr. Major’s last settlement demand.  Recall that Mr. Major’s 
final settlement demand from Halliday Watkins was presented on July 8 in the amount of 

$65,000.  Goerlitz Decl. Ex. 1 at 10.  Though this amount included an unspecified sum for 
attorneys’ fees and costs, Mr. Major’s counsel would represent on July 24 that the firm’s 
total fees and costs as of that date were $30,378.06.  Id. at 8.  In other words, Mr. Major’s 
July 8 damages demand exceeded $34,000.  He recovered less than ten percent of that.  Mr. 
Major does not suggest that the case achieved some important non-monetary or other goal. 

    Determination of an appropriate fee award.  Applying the hourly rates that I 
determined  were  reasonable  to  each  corresponding  professional’s  time  reduces  the 
$46,163.50  requested  fees  to  $33,047.50.7    From  there,  accounting  for  the 



7    This math deserves explanation.  I started from paragraph 71 in the Corrected 
Christensen Declaration.  That paragraph lists each billing entry and totals the hours for 
each  attorney,  law  clerk,  and  paralegal.   Where  the  billing  totals  differ  from  earlier 
statements in the Declaration, I took the later statements as accurate because they were 
tethered directly to the billing entries.  I removed hours billed at $0, reaching a total of 
100.2 hours billed in the matter.  Table 1 shows the calculations.  All citations are to the 
Corrected Christensen Declaration.                                        
unreasonableness  of  Mr.  Major’s  attorneys’-fees  request  escapes  mathematical 
calculations or precise time cuts.  Our Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “ordered or 
approved flat percentage reductions in appropriate cases,” Beckler v. Rent Recovery Sols., 

LLC, 

 (8th Cir. 2023), and this seems like an appropriate case for that 
approach.  As a starting point, a fifty percent reduction is appropriate to account for the 
fact that Mr. Major sued two defendants, attributed roughly equal responsibility to both, 
but only seeks attorneys’ fees from one.  Importantly, Mr. Major did not attempt to show 


                      Table 1: Corrected Hours                           
Attorney /  Hours Billed  Hours Billed in  Hours Billed Above $0/hr      
Law Clerk  in Declaration  Declaration                                   
/ Paralegal  Body  Table                                                 
Christensen  25.4 hrs.  ¶ 26.  25.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(a).  25.0 hrs.            
Wilcox  13.4 hrs.  ¶ 36.  13.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(b).  13.4 hrs.                 
Supple  53.0 hrs.  ¶ 48.  40.3 hrs.  ¶ 71(c).  39.5 hrs.  5/22/24 & 7/8/24 entries removed.  ¶ 71(c). 
Maglio  16.2 hrs.  ¶ 56.  16.2 hrs.  ¶ 71(d).  16.2 hrs.                 
Hanson  3.0 hrs.  ¶ 59.  3.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(e).  3.0 hrs.                    
Whipple  0.4 hrs.  ¶ 62.    0.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(f).  0.4 hrs.                 
Robertson  3.2 hrs.  ¶ 68.  3.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(g).  2.7 hrs.  11/2/23 entry removed.  ¶ 71(g). 
TOTAL   114.6 hrs.   101.3 hrs.  100.2 hrs.                              

I then multiplied the hours billed for each professional by the corresponding reasonable 
rate.  Having multiplied the corrected hours by the corrected rates, I added all the products 
and reached the sum of $33,047.50.  Table 2 shows the calculations.  Again, all citations 
are to the Corrected Christensen Declaration.                             

           Table 2: Corrected Hours Multiplied by Corrected Rate         
Attorney / Law Clerk  Hours  Billed  Above  Corrected Rate  Total        
/ Paralegal    $0/hr                                                     
Christensen    25.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(a).  $500/hr.  ¶ 24.  $12,500.00          
Wilcox         13.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(b).  $325/hr.  ¶ 35.  $4,355.00           
Supple         39.5 hrs.  ¶ 71(c).   $350/hr.  ¶ 47.  $13,825.00         
Maglio         16.2 hrs.  ¶ 71(d).  $95/hr.      $1,539.00               
Hanson         3.0 hrs.  ¶ 71(e).  $95/hr.       $285.00                 
Whipple        0.4 hrs.  ¶ 71(f).  $95/hr.       $38.00                  
Robertson      0.5 hrs.  ¶ 71(g).  $175/hr.  ¶ 67.  $505.50              
               and             and                                       
               2.2 hrs.  ¶ 71(g).  $190/hr.  ¶ 67.                       
TOTAL          100.2 hrs.      --                $33,047.50              
that he would have incurred the same fees had he sued only Halliday Watkins.  Nor has he 
shown that the claims against Halliday Watkins were more important or time-intensive 
than the claims against Connexus.  In these circumstances, Halliday Watkins cannot 

reasonably be required to pay the fees Mr. Major incurred pursuing Connexus, and my best 
estimation is that the firm spent roughly equal time on claims against each defendant.8  I 
conclude that an additional fifteen percent reduction is appropriate to account for the 
remaining issues underlying the requested fees’ excessiveness.  As discussed, this case was 
short-lived and not legally complicated, assigning seven professionals to the case created 

inefficiencies reflected in the billing records, and Mr. Major’s recovery from Halliday 
Watkins  was  insubstantial.    Of  course,  the  precise  reduction  warranted  by  these 
considerations is debatable.  My best estimation is that a fifteen-percent reduction is 
sufficient and achieves non-arbitrary “rough justice.”  Fox, 

.  Together, 
these percentage reductions add to sixty-five percent, and reduce the requested attorneys’ 

fees from $33,047.50 to $11,566.63.                                       






8    There is another reason not to award Mr. Major fees incurred pursuing claims 
against Connexus.  He did not prevail on these claims in any sense.  He dismissed the 
claims voluntarily.  See Sequa Corp. v. Cooper, 

, 1037–38 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(“[A] voluntary dismissal without prejudice means that neither party can be said to have 
prevailed.”).                                                             

    Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings 
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:                                               
    1.   Plaintiff Nicholas R. Major’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [ECF 

No. 32] is GRANTED IN PART.                                               
    2.   Plaintiff Nicholas R. Major is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of 
$11,566.63 and costs in the amount of $873.06.                            
           LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                          

Dated:  December 27, 2024          s/ Eric C. Tostrud                     
                                  Eric C. Tostrud                        
                                  United States District Court