UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Adam Westphal,                    Case No. 24-CV-4075 (PAM/ECW)         

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                              REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION               

Jared Rardin,                                                           

              Respondent.                                               

   This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Adam Westphal’s Petition for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus Under 

 (Dkt. 1 (“Petition”)).  For the following 
reasons, the Court recommends denying the Petition and dismissing this action. 
   In May 2019, Westphal pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute a controlled 
substance and possessing unregistered firearms or destructive devices.  (See Superseding 
Indictment 1-2, 4, United States v. Westphal, No. 18-CR-30099 (RAL) (D.S.D. May 8, 
2019); Plea Agreement 2-3, United States v. Westphal, No. 18-CR-30099 (RAL) (D.S.D. 
May 9, 2019).1)  U.S. District Judge Roberto A. Lange later sentenced Westphal to 126 
months’ imprisonment.  (See J. in a Criminal Case 2, United States v. Westphal, No. 18-

1    Westphal’s prosecution records do not appear in this action’s docket, but the Court 
may take judicial notice of public court records.  See, e.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 

, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy, 

 
(8th Cir. 1999)); Smith v. Gordon, No. 24-CV-2714 (JMB/SGE), 

, at 
*1 n.1 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2024) (citing cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. 
Minn. Nov. 22, 2024).                                                     
CR-30099 (RAL) (D.S.D. July 31, 2019).)  Westphal is currently incarcerated at the 
Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota (“FMC-Rochester”).  (See Dkt. 1.) 

   The Petition is somewhat hard to follow.  The Court understands that in April 
2024, an FMC-Rochester “Unit Team” reviewed Westphal’s case and recommended to 
the BOP’s Residential Reentry Management (“RRM”) system that Westphal receive “up 
to” 180 days of “Second Chance Act” time in a residential reentry center (“RRC”).  (Id. 
at 6; see also Dkt. 1-1 at 2.)  The Unit Team suggested that these 180 days be added to 
Westphal’s 430 “Federal Time Credits” under the First Step Act.  (See Dkt. 1-1 at 2.) 

Based on these calculations, the Unit Team recommended that Westphal’s RRC-
placement date be August 29, 2024.  (See id.)  Documents submitted by Westphal suggest 
that the RRM nevertheless set his initial RRC placement date as March 19, 2025.  (See 

.2)  Westphal argues that this reflects the RRM applying only his First Step Act 
credits without granting him any benefits under the Second Chance Act.  (See Dkt. 1 at 

6.)  Claiming that this is inappropriate, Westphal asks the Court for immediate placement 
in an RRC.  (See 

.)                                             
   Westphal’s argument is not cognizable in habeas.  He brings the Petition under 

.  (See 

.)  Under that statute, as relevant here, “[t]he writ of habeas 
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . .”  

(c)(3).  


2    During an administrative-remedies process, the RRM appears to have moved 
Westphal’s RRC placement date to January 8, 2025.  (See Dkt. 1-1 at 9; cf. Dkt. 1 at 7 
(referring to January date).)                                             
Because this provision centers on “custody,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit has held that if a prisoner “‘is not challenging the validity of his conviction or 

length of his detention . . . , then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.’”  
Spencer v. Haynes, 

 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kruger v. Erickson, 

 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the 
legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release 
from illegal custody.”).                                                  

   To be sure, Westphal seeks relief that would shorten his time in prison—he wants 
to leave FMC-Rochester earlier—which might seem like a challenge to the length of his 
detention.  But for § 2241 purposes, transferring a prisoner from a prison to an RRC does 
not remove the prisoner from custody; it merely changes the place of confinement.  As a 
result, a petition seeking transfer from prison to an RRC does not challenge the legality of 

a petitioner’s detention and is not cognizable in habeas.  See, e.g., Allard v. Fed. Bureau 
of Prisons, No. 23-CV-3724 (JMB/ECW), 

, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 
2024) (citing cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2024); 
Johnson v. Birkholz, No. 21-CV-2017 (PJS/LIB), 

, at *1-2 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 5, 2022) (same).                                                     

   Westphal’s claim is essentially a conditions-of-confinement issue.  When a pro se 
petitioner improperly raises such a claim in a habeas petition, the district court may 
dismiss the action without prejudice or seek the petitioner’s consent to recharacterize it as 
standard civil litigation.  See Spencer, 

; Fortner v. Eischen, No. 24-CV-
1496 (JRT/LIB), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 27, 2024) (citing Spencer).  In 
deciding, the court should “consider the potential detriment” of converting the petition 

into a civil action.  See Spencer, 

; Sichting v. Rardin, No. 24-CV-3163 
(SRN/DTF), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2024) (quoting Spencer). 
   In these circumstances, the Court concludes that converting this action into a 
standard civil case would be to Westphal’s detriment.  Beyond imposing the $350 
statutory filing fee for civil actions—a potentially significant expense—the Court doubts 
that Westphal can state a claim for which relief can be granted.  As a threshold point, for 

instance, prisoners have no constitutional right to RRC placement.  See, e.g., Hernandez 
v. Eischen, No. 24-CV-0027 (KMM/DLM), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 
2024) (collecting cases) (citing cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 20, 2024); Winters v. Marques, No. 18-CV-1019 (WMW/HB), 

, 
at *5 (D. Minn. May 25, 2018) (same), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. 

Aug. 13, 2018).  Indeed, courts have “ruled repeatedly and consistently that a prisoner 
has no legal right or entitlement to any period of RRC placement.”  McCarthy v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, No. CIV. 10-745 PJS SRN, 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 
29, 2010) (collecting cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 
2010).                                                                    

   Certain documents filed by Westphal suggest that he thinks he has a statutory right 
to RRC placement.  (See Dkt. 1-1 at 4.)  His argument appears to involve 

(c)(1), under which the BOP’s director “shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that 
a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that 
term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a 
reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the 

community.”  

(c)(1) (emphasis added).  But nothing in the Petition 
indicates a violation of § 3624(c)(1)’s terms—indeed, Westphal is clearly being allowed 
to spend “a portion of the final months of [his] term” in an RRC.3        
   The Court concludes that converting this action into standard civil litigation would 
be inappropriate.  Accordingly, the Court recommends denying the Petition and 
dismissing this action without prejudice.                                 

                     RECOMMENDATION                                     
   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS RECOMMENDED THAT:                                                      
        1.   Petitioner Adam Westphal’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
             Under 

 (Dkt. 1) be DENIED for lack of subject-
             matter jurisdiction.                                       
        2.   This action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.                



3    If Westphal intends to argue that the BOP is improperly exercising its discretion in 
setting an RRC placement date that he disagrees with, that claim also faces a well-
established barrier: federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to review BOP decisions 
regarding the place of a prisoner’s confinement.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Rardin, No. 23-CV-
1653 (PAM/ECW), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2024) (discussing 

, 3624, and 3625, and concluding that they “preclude the Court’s review 
of the BOP’s decision against transferring [petitioner] to home confinement under 
§ 3624(c)”), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. May 15, 2024); Khdeer v. 
Paul, No. 18-CV-2112 (ECT/BRT), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2018) 
(applying same principle to RRC-placement decisions), R. & R. adopted, 

 
(D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2019).                                                  
Dated: December 10, 2024        s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright                
                                ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT                  
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the 
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.                                                                  
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a 
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being 
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those 
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 
72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set 
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).                                              

               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Adam Westphal,                    Case No. 24-CV-4075 (PAM/ECW)         

              Petitioner,                                               

v.                              REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION               

Jared Rardin,                                                           

              Respondent.                                               

   This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Adam Westphal’s Petition for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus Under 

 (Dkt. 1 (“Petition”)).  For the following 
reasons, the Court recommends denying the Petition and dismissing this action. 
   In May 2019, Westphal pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute a controlled 
substance and possessing unregistered firearms or destructive devices.  (See Superseding 
Indictment 1-2, 4, United States v. Westphal, No. 18-CR-30099 (RAL) (D.S.D. May 8, 
2019); Plea Agreement 2-3, United States v. Westphal, No. 18-CR-30099 (RAL) (D.S.D. 
May 9, 2019).1)  U.S. District Judge Roberto A. Lange later sentenced Westphal to 126 
months’ imprisonment.  (See J. in a Criminal Case 2, United States v. Westphal, No. 18-

1    Westphal’s prosecution records do not appear in this action’s docket, but the Court 
may take judicial notice of public court records.  See, e.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 

, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy, 

 
(8th Cir. 1999)); Smith v. Gordon, No. 24-CV-2714 (JMB/SGE), 

, at 
*1 n.1 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2024) (citing cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. 
Minn. Nov. 22, 2024).                                                     
CR-30099 (RAL) (D.S.D. July 31, 2019).)  Westphal is currently incarcerated at the 
Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota (“FMC-Rochester”).  (See Dkt. 1.) 

   The Petition is somewhat hard to follow.  The Court understands that in April 
2024, an FMC-Rochester “Unit Team” reviewed Westphal’s case and recommended to 
the BOP’s Residential Reentry Management (“RRM”) system that Westphal receive “up 
to” 180 days of “Second Chance Act” time in a residential reentry center (“RRC”).  (Id. 
at 6; see also Dkt. 1-1 at 2.)  The Unit Team suggested that these 180 days be added to 
Westphal’s 430 “Federal Time Credits” under the First Step Act.  (See Dkt. 1-1 at 2.) 

Based on these calculations, the Unit Team recommended that Westphal’s RRC-
placement date be August 29, 2024.  (See id.)  Documents submitted by Westphal suggest 
that the RRM nevertheless set his initial RRC placement date as March 19, 2025.  (See 

.2)  Westphal argues that this reflects the RRM applying only his First Step Act 
credits without granting him any benefits under the Second Chance Act.  (See Dkt. 1 at 

6.)  Claiming that this is inappropriate, Westphal asks the Court for immediate placement 
in an RRC.  (See 

.)                                             
   Westphal’s argument is not cognizable in habeas.  He brings the Petition under 

.  (See 

.)  Under that statute, as relevant here, “[t]he writ of habeas 
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . .”  

(c)(3).  


2    During an administrative-remedies process, the RRM appears to have moved 
Westphal’s RRC placement date to January 8, 2025.  (See Dkt. 1-1 at 9; cf. Dkt. 1 at 7 
(referring to January date).)                                             
Because this provision centers on “custody,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit has held that if a prisoner “‘is not challenging the validity of his conviction or 

length of his detention . . . , then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.’”  
Spencer v. Haynes, 

 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kruger v. Erickson, 

 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the 
legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release 
from illegal custody.”).                                                  

   To be sure, Westphal seeks relief that would shorten his time in prison—he wants 
to leave FMC-Rochester earlier—which might seem like a challenge to the length of his 
detention.  But for § 2241 purposes, transferring a prisoner from a prison to an RRC does 
not remove the prisoner from custody; it merely changes the place of confinement.  As a 
result, a petition seeking transfer from prison to an RRC does not challenge the legality of 

a petitioner’s detention and is not cognizable in habeas.  See, e.g., Allard v. Fed. Bureau 
of Prisons, No. 23-CV-3724 (JMB/ECW), 

, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 
2024) (citing cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2024); 
Johnson v. Birkholz, No. 21-CV-2017 (PJS/LIB), 

, at *1-2 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 5, 2022) (same).                                                     

   Westphal’s claim is essentially a conditions-of-confinement issue.  When a pro se 
petitioner improperly raises such a claim in a habeas petition, the district court may 
dismiss the action without prejudice or seek the petitioner’s consent to recharacterize it as 
standard civil litigation.  See Spencer, 

; Fortner v. Eischen, No. 24-CV-
1496 (JRT/LIB), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 27, 2024) (citing Spencer).  In 
deciding, the court should “consider the potential detriment” of converting the petition 

into a civil action.  See Spencer, 

; Sichting v. Rardin, No. 24-CV-3163 
(SRN/DTF), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2024) (quoting Spencer). 
   In these circumstances, the Court concludes that converting this action into a 
standard civil case would be to Westphal’s detriment.  Beyond imposing the $350 
statutory filing fee for civil actions—a potentially significant expense—the Court doubts 
that Westphal can state a claim for which relief can be granted.  As a threshold point, for 

instance, prisoners have no constitutional right to RRC placement.  See, e.g., Hernandez 
v. Eischen, No. 24-CV-0027 (KMM/DLM), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 
2024) (collecting cases) (citing cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 20, 2024); Winters v. Marques, No. 18-CV-1019 (WMW/HB), 

, 
at *5 (D. Minn. May 25, 2018) (same), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. 

Aug. 13, 2018).  Indeed, courts have “ruled repeatedly and consistently that a prisoner 
has no legal right or entitlement to any period of RRC placement.”  McCarthy v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, No. CIV. 10-745 PJS SRN, 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 
29, 2010) (collecting cases), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 
2010).                                                                    

   Certain documents filed by Westphal suggest that he thinks he has a statutory right 
to RRC placement.  (See Dkt. 1-1 at 4.)  His argument appears to involve 

(c)(1), under which the BOP’s director “shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that 
a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that 
term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will afford that prisoner a 
reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the 

community.”  

(c)(1) (emphasis added).  But nothing in the Petition 
indicates a violation of § 3624(c)(1)’s terms—indeed, Westphal is clearly being allowed 
to spend “a portion of the final months of [his] term” in an RRC.3        
   The Court concludes that converting this action into standard civil litigation would 
be inappropriate.  Accordingly, the Court recommends denying the Petition and 
dismissing this action without prejudice.                                 

                     RECOMMENDATION                                     
   Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT 
IS RECOMMENDED THAT:                                                      
        1.   Petitioner Adam Westphal’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
             Under 

 (Dkt. 1) be DENIED for lack of subject-
             matter jurisdiction.                                       
        2.   This action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.                



3    If Westphal intends to argue that the BOP is improperly exercising its discretion in 
setting an RRC placement date that he disagrees with, that claim also faces a well-
established barrier: federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to review BOP decisions 
regarding the place of a prisoner’s confinement.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Rardin, No. 23-CV-
1653 (PAM/ECW), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2024) (discussing 

, 3624, and 3625, and concluding that they “preclude the Court’s review 
of the BOP’s decision against transferring [petitioner] to home confinement under 
§ 3624(c)”), R. & R. adopted, 

 (D. Minn. May 15, 2024); Khdeer v. 
Paul, No. 18-CV-2112 (ECT/BRT), 

, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2018) 
(applying same principle to RRC-placement decisions), R. & R. adopted, 

 
(D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2019).                                                  
Dated: December 10, 2024        s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright                
                                ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT                  
                                United States Magistrate Judge          

                           NOTICE                                       
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the 
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.                                                                  
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a 
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being 
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those 
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 
72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set 
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).