Roehrs v. Walstrom

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota January 2, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Steven Roehrs, Case No.: 0:23-cv-01885-SRN-DLM

Plaintiff,
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
v. MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TO STAY
Sandra Walstrom, Ervin Abraham, Janet PROCEEDINGS
Tharp, and Garry Walstrom,

Defendants.

Kristina Kaluza and Mickey L. Stevens, Dykema Gossett PLLC, 4000 Wells Fargo
Center. 90 South 7th St, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Plaintiff

Bartley S. Messick and Bethany J. Rubin. Messick Law, PLLC, 7595 Currell Blvd, Ste
251444, Woodbury, MN 55125, for Defendants Sandra and Garry Walstrom

Charles K Maier, Lathrop GPM LLP, 80 S 8th St, Ste 3100 IDS Center, Minneapolis,
MN 55402, for Defendant Ervin Abraham

J. Robert Keena and Neven Selimovic, Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC, 8050 W 78th St,
Edina, MN 55439, for Defendant Janet Tharp

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, to
Stay Proceedings [Doc. No. 22] filed by Defendants Sandra and Garry Walstrom. Based
on a review of the files, submissions, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons below,
the Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Steven Roehrs1 alleges that pursuant to a certain trust agreement (the “Trust
Agreement”) establishing a trust (the “Trust”) over his father Ronald E. Roehrs’ farmland

after his father’s death, he is the rightful successor trustee, and that due to misconduct by
his stepmother and previous trustee Marvel E. Roehrs (“Marvel” or “Bonnie”), as well as
several of his siblings by birth and marriage (the Defendants), he has been wrongfully
deprived of this role. (See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 44.)
Steven alleges unjust enrichment, violations of Minn. Stat. § 501C.0813 and the

Trust Agreement, breaches of fiduciary duty, conversion, and aiding and abetting others’
torts, and seeks a declaratory judgment that Marvel is unable to serve as trustee of the Trust,
that a beneficiary vote naming Defendant Janet Tharp as successor trustee was invalid, and
that he should be appointed trustee of the Trust. He also seeks disgorgement of certain
funds, access to Trust records and a full accounting, and costs, expenses, and attorney’s

fees in connection with this litigation. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-126.)
In this motion, Defendants seek dismissal of all claims, or in the alternative a stay
of the proceedings, while a parallel litigation in state court between Steven’s brother
Michael Roehrs and the Trust is fully concluded.

1 While the Court typically refers to the parties by their last name, where more than
one party shares the same name, the Court will refer to them by their first name.
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff is one of six beneficiaries of the Trust, as set forth in the Trust Agreement.
(Berens Decl. [Doc. No. 11], Ex. A (Tr. Agmt.)2 The other beneficiaries are Steven’s

siblings: Rhonda Conrath, Michael Roehrs, Daniel Roehrs, Defendant Sandra Walstrom,
and Defendant Janet Tharp. (Compl. at 1; Tr. Agmt. § V.A–B.) Defendant Ervin
Abraham is Plaintiff’s stepbrother, and Defendant Garry Walstrom is Plaintiff’s brother-
in-law and the spouse of Sandra. (Compl. at 1–2.) The primary asset of the Trust is
approximately 120 acres of farmland located in Waseca County, Minnesota. (See Tr.

Agmt., Schedule of Trust Assets.)
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement, after the death of Ronald Roehrs,
Ronald’s widow and Plaintiff’s stepmother, Marvel, became the Trustee. (Tr. Agmt. §
V.A.) In addition, upon Ronald’s death, the Trust Agreement gives Marvel the right to
occupy a residence located on the Trust land “for so long as she wishes to occupy it as her

principal residence,” as well as a life estate in the Farmland owned by the Trust, and all
personal property and effects formerly owned by Ronald. (Id.) Steven contends that

2 “In addressing a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the pleadings
themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and
matters of public record.” Illig v. Union Elec. Co.,

652 F.3d 971, 976

 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(quotation omitted).  “[D]ocuments 'necessarily embraced by the complaint' are not matters 
outside the pleading.”  Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,

380 F.3d 1066, 1069

(8th Cir. 2004). Documents included as exhibits to Plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit in support
of his motion for a temporary restraining order are necessarily embraced by the Complaint,
and as such will be considered by the Court. Similarly, the proceedings of the State Court
Action, discussed infra, are a matter of public record and will be considered by the Court.
Marvel is now incapacitated and unable to fulfill her obligations as Trustee. (Compl. at 1,
23.)

Particularly relevant here are the following provisions of the Trust Agreement:
B. Death or Disability of the Grantor as Trustee. If at any time the Grantor
has a disability (as previously defined)3, or upon the death of the Grantor,
Marvel B. Roehrs, is designated as the successor Trustee. Such designee
shall become the successor Trustee upon acceptance of the terms and
conditions of this Trust. If the successor Trustee is unable or unwilling to
serve, Steven Roehrs is designated as alternate successor Trustee.

C. Resignation of Trustee. The Trustee, or any successor may resign at any
time by giving 10 days written notice to the Grantor. If the Grantor is
deceased, such notice shall be given to all adult beneficiaries, and to a parent
or guardian, if any, of each minor beneficiary.

D. Successor Trustee. The beneficiaries to whom such notice of resignation
is given shall designate a successor Trustee by written notice to the resigning
Trustee within 20 days after receipt of the notice of resignation. If a
successor Trustee is not so designated, the resigning Trustee shall have the
right to secure the appointment of a successor Trustee by a court of
competent jurisdiction, at the expense of the trust.
(Tr. Agmt. § VII.B.)
Steven alleges that four of his siblings and fellow Trust beneficiaries—Janet Tharp,
Sandra Walstrom, Daniel Roehrs, and Rhonda Conrath—unlawfully voted to name Tharp

3 As to disability, the Trust provides that:
“disability” shall mean a legal disability or the inability to provide prompt
and intelligent consideration to financial matters by reasons of illness or
mental or physical disability. The determination of whether the Grantor has
a disability shall be made by the Grantor’s most recent attending physician.
The Trustee shall be entitled to reply on written notice of that determination.
(Tr. Agmt. § IV.B.)
as Successor Trustee if Marvel is no longer Trustee. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff contends that
under the Trust Agreement, he is the rightful Successor Trustee. (Id.) Even prior to the

vote, Plaintiff asserts that Sandra and Defendant Ervin Abraham, Marvel’s biological son,
have unlawfully acted as de facto trustees.4 (Id. at 1–2.) Steven further contends that
Defendant Garry Walstrom and Tharp have acted in furtherance of Sandra and Abraham’s
impermissible conduct by renting the farmland to the Walstroms for less than fair market
rental value. (See id. at 2.)
On June 20, 2023, Marvel gave written notice of her intent to resign as Trustee,

effective 10 days from the date of service of the letter. (Berens Decl., Ex. C (June 21, 2023
Ltr. From Marvel Roehrs to J. Hanks; June 20, 2023 Resignation Notice).) She also gave
notice of her intent to relocate her primary residence within 40 days of the date of the letter.
(Id.) On July 11, 2023, Judge Carol M. Hanks, in a related action in Waseca County
District Court, confirmed Tharp’s appointment as Trustee, and ordered entry of judgment.

(Selimovic Aff. [Doc. No. 19], Ex. A (July 11, 2023 Order).)
B. Procedural History
1. State Court Action
On February 15, 2023, Michael Roehrs, brother of both Plaintiff Steven Roehrs and
Defendant Sandra Walstrom, filed a petition in Minnesota State Court, Waseca County, In
the Matter of the Ronald E. Roehrs Trust dated August 9, 1999, No. 81-CV-23-104

4 In March 2021, Marvel granted Sandra and Abraham powers of attorney on her
behalf. (Compl., Ex. A.)
(Waseca Cnty. 2023, Pet., Doc. No. 2) (the “State Court Action”). Michael was represented
by the Mankato-based Blethen Berens firm. (Waseca Cnty., Notice of Representation &

Parties, Doc. No. 1.) Tharp, Sandra, Conrath, Daniel, and Marvel were represented by
counsel in state court, while Steven appeared pro se. (Id.)
Michael’s state court petition, which is captioned “Petition for Removal of Trustee,
Appointment of Successor Trustee, Accounting, and Other Relief,” concerned the same
Trust at issue in the federal lawsuit. In the Petition, Michael sought: (1) the removal of
Marvel as Trustee due to her incapacity (Selimovic Aff., Ex. E (Waseca Cnty. Am. Pet.),

Count I); (2) the appointment of Steven as Successor Trustee (id., Count II); (3) an
accounting and expenditure of Trust assets (id., Count III); (4) investment of Trust assets
and injunctive relief (id., Count IV); and (5) interpretation of the Trust Agreement language
such that any excess income, after payment of various taxes and maintenance fees, be added
to the principal of the Trust and not distributed to Marvel or any other beneficiary for any

other purpose. (Id., Count V).
As to the requested injunctive relief, Michael sought to enjoin Marvel, in the event
she was not removed as Trustee, from renting the farmland for crop year 2023–24 or future
crop years except under one of the following conditions: (1) at fair market value as
determined by open, competitive bids; (2) in an amount approved by the written consent

of all qualified beneficiaries; or (3) upon an order from the court. (Id., Count IV.) In
addition, Michael sought a detailed audit of the Trust records, as well as attorney’s fees
and costs. (Id. at 13.)
Among the documents filed in the state court docket was a June 5, 2023 Notice of
Lis Pendens filed by Barbara Berens, who until October 2, 2023 appeared as counsel for

Steven in the federal court action. (Selimovic Aff., Ex. F (Waseca Cnty. Notice of Lis
Pendens); Notice of Withdrawal and Substitution of Counsel [Doc. No. 42].) The
document provides constructive notice to any prospective property buyers that the Trust
property is in dispute and is the subject of pending litigation. (Id. at 1.)
In the State Court Action, Michael filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in
which he sought to remove Marvel as Trustee, appoint Steven as Interim Trustee, and to

prohibit Marvel from renting the farmland at below-market rates. (Waseca Cnty., Pl.’s
Mem. Supp. Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, Doc. No. 24; Pl.’s Supp’l Mem. at 1, Doc. No.
49.) Judge Hanks, presiding over the State Court Action, denied the motion. (Selimovic
Aff., Ex. G (Waseca Cnty., June 13, 2023 Order at 1). Although Judge Hanks did not
provide her reasoning in her ruling, at the hearing on the motion, she voiced her agreement

with the interpretation of the Trust Agreement proffered by Mr. John Robert Keena,
counsel for Tharp, Conrath, and Daniel.5 (Waseca Cnty., Apr. 5, 2023 Tr., Doc. No. 58, at

5 Mr. Keena had argued that pursuant to the terms of the Trust Agreement: (1) as
long as the Trustee preserves the Trust, i.e., the farm, and meets various obligations such
as taxes, the Trustee is under no obligation to rent the property at a particular rental rate,
and may invest Trust assets and receive reasonable compensation for their services as
Trustee; and (2) Steven, as Alternate Successor Trustee, could become the Successor
Trustee, if, at the time of his father’s death, Marvel was deceased or unable to serve as
Trustee, which did not occur; and (3) in all other circumstances, when Marvel’s time as
Trustee ends, the beneficiaries may designate a new Trustee by voting. (Waseca Cnty.,
Apr. 5, 2023 Tr. at 6–12, Doc. No. 58.)
12:18-20) (stating, “Mr. Keena, I want to thank you because your reading of this Trust is
exactly how I read it, and I was questioning why we are here.”).

As noted, on June 20, 2023, Marvel gave notice of her intent to resign as Trustee,
effective 10 days from the date of service of the letter. (June 20, 2023 Resignation Notice.)
On July 7, 2023, counsel for Tharp asked the Waseca County District Court for an interim
order confirming Tharp’s appointment as Trustee following Marvel’s resignation.
(Waseca Cnty., July 7, 2023 Letter, Doc. No. 59.) On July 11, 2023, Judge Hanks
confirmed Tharp’s appointment as Trustee, and ordered entry of judgment. (Selimovic

Aff., Ex. A (July 11, 2023 Order).) The Clerk of Court entered judgment on July 19, 2023,
and closed the State Court Action. (Waseca Cnty., J. and Notice of Entry of J., Doc. Nos.
65 & 66.)
On August 22, 2023, Michael Roehrs appealed Judge Hanks’ decision to the
Minnesota Court of Appeals. See In the Matter of the Ronald E. Roehrs Trust dated August

9, 1999, No. A23-1248 (Mn. Ct. App. 2023). Michael’s appeal argues that the Waseca
County District Court Judge erred by issuing a permanent order allegedly without requiring
Tharp to abide by state procedural rules, without providing Michael an opportunity to
oppose the procedural and substantive aspects of the entry of the order, and without
Michael having the opportunity to respond to the order, conduct discovery or otherwise

litigate the merits of his claim. (Id.) The appeal has been fully briefed, and oral argument
is scheduled for February 7, 2024. (Id.)
2. Federal Court Action
On June 21, 2023, Steven filed a complaint seeking a declaration that: (1) Marvel is
unable to continue as Trustee and is therefore removed; (2) the four siblings’ vote naming

Tharp as Successor Trustee is invalid under Minn Stat. § 501C.0704(c) and the express
terms of the Trust Agreement; (3) Tharp is not permitted to usurp Plaintiff’s role as
Successor Trustee; (4) Plaintiff shall be appointed to serve as Successor Trustee; and (5)
the Trust’s farmland may not be sold until the issues raised by Plaintiff’s challenges have
been resolved on the merits. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-64.) Through Plaintiff’s other claims, he seeks

a disgorgement of funds reflecting the difference between fair market rent and actual rent
paid by the Walstroms for use of the Trust’s farmland (id. ¶¶ 65-73), contends that Sandra
and Abraham have breached their fiduciary duties as de facto trustees by permitting the
farmland to be rented at less than fair market value (id., ¶¶ 95-113), claims that all of the
Defendants have aided and abetted the unlawful, impermissible conduct concerning the

Trust, (id., ¶¶ 120-26), and requests that as Successor Trustee, the Court permit him to
conduct a detailed audit of all Trust records. (Id. at 23-24.) Steven also seeks attorney’s
fees and costs.
On July 7, 2023, Steven Roehrs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order,
seeking to prevent the appointment of Janet Tharp as successor Trustee [Doc. No. 8]. This

motion was denied by this Court on July 21, 2023. See Roehrs v. Walstrom, No. 23-cv-
01885 (SRN/DLM),

2023 WL 4677735

 (D. Minn. July 21, 2023).                
    On July 18, 2023, Defendants Sandra and Garry Walstrom filed a motion to dismiss 
the Complaint, or in the alternative to grant a stay [Doc. No. 22].  The Walstroms’ motion 
argues that the Complaint is barred by res judicata due to the State Court Action, but in the 
alternative, this Court should abstain.  On July 21, 2023, Janet Tharp filed her answer to 

the complaint [Doc. No. 34].  On August 2, 2023, Ervin Abraham filed his answer [Doc. 
No. 37].  On September 13, 2023, a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss.  (See 
Hearing Trans. [Doc. No. 46].)  At this hearing, the issue of “claim splitting” and federal 
court abstention was raised, and the Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties.  
(Id. 13:3-20.)  The parties subsequently briefed these issues.            

II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Legal Standard                                                  
    A district court has the power to stay proceedings when facing concurrent state and 
federal litigation as part of its inherent power to control its docket. See Landis v. North 
American Co.,

299 U.S. 248, 254-55

 (1936); see also Cottrell v. Duke,

737 F.3d 1238, 1249

 
(8th Cir. 2013) (citing Lunde v. Helms,

898 F.2d 1343, 1345

 (8th Cir. 1990)).  District courts 
have this inherent authority to temporarily stay cases as part of their power “to control the 

disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 
counsel, and for litigants.”  Landis,

299 U.S. at 254

.  “How this can best be done calls for 
the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even 
balance.”

Id. at 254-55

.                                                 
    Separately, courts may abstain (by dismissing or staying) from a federal suit “due 

to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding[.]” Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800

 (1976).  The court first considers whether the state and 
federal actions are genuinely parallel.  See Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc.,

574 F.3d 527, 535

 (8th Cir. 2009).  If they are, the court looks to six factors in determining 
whether a stay is appropriate:                                            

    (1) whether there is a res over which one court has established jurisdiction, 
    (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) whether maintaining separate 
    actions may result in piecemeal litigation, unless the relevant law would 
    require piecemeal litigation and the federal court issue is easily severed, (4) 
    which case has priority—not necessarily which case was filed first but a 
    greater emphasis on the relative progress made in the cases, (5) whether state 
    or federal law controls, especially favoring the exercise of jurisdiction where 
    federal law controls, and (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the 
    federal plaintiff's rights.                                          
Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Arkansas Elec. Cooperatives, Inc.,

48 F.3d 294, 297

 
(8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA,

21 F.3d 259, 263

 (8th Cir. 1994) and citing the Colorado River factors).  The Court’s inherent 
authority to manage its own docket by granting a stay in a pending litigation is distinct 
from Colorado River abstention.  See Kreditverein Der Bank Austria Creditandstalt Fur 
Niederosterreich Und Bergenland v. Nejezchleba,

477 F.3d 942, 945-46

(8th Cir. 2007)
(noting distinction between stay due to Colorado River abstention and stay under court's
inherent power).
B. Analysis
In their motion and in both their initial and supplemental briefing, the Walstroms
argue that this Court can and should stay this litigation due to the ongoing appeal of Judge
Hanks’ decision in the State Court Action. The Walstroms argue that under the Colorado
River factors, a stay is appropriate, as the federal forum is inconvenient for Defendants,
this action will result in piecemeal litigation, the state court has priority, only state law
questions are at issue, and the state forum can adequately protect Plaintiff’s rights. (Defs’
Br. [Doc. No. 25] at 8; Defs’ Supplemental Br. [Doc. No. 43] at 8-12.)

Plaintiff argues that this action should not be stayed, as it does not meet the
prerequisites for a stay under Eighth Circuit case law. Plaintiff argues that this action and
the State Court Action are not parallel, as the parties in the cases are distinct, several state
claims have not been meaningfully litigated, and there is doubt that the state court litigation
will fully dispose of the claims in this suit. (Pl’s Br. [Doc. No. 39] at 8-24; Pl’s
Supplemental Br. [Doc. No. 47] at 11-14.) Plaintiff also argues that even if the Court

reaches the Colorado River factors, they do not counsel a stay. (Pl’s Br. at 24-28.)
The authority of a district court to grant a stay under its inherent authority to manage
its own docket is limited to temporary stays, as a permanent stay is treated as tantamount
to a dismissal. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,

460 U.S. 1

, 27-
28 (1983).  However, a stay order is only final when “the sole purpose and effect of the 

stay is precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.”

Id.

 at 11 n.11; 
see also Boushel v. Toro Co.,

985 F.2d 406, 408

 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The only time that an 
order granting a stay will be considered a final order is if [the stay] is tantamount to a 
dismissal and [the stay] effectively ends the litigation.”)  Where a stay “merely temporarily 
suspend[s]  the  federal  case”  while  ongoing  state  administrative  and  judicial  review 

proceedings are completed, a district court is well within its inherent authority to issue a 
temporary stay.  Lunde,

898 F.2d at 1345

.  This can be true even where abstention would 
be appropriate as to some but not all claims in a litigation.  See Calleros v. FSI Int'l, Inc.,

892 F. Supp. 2d 1163

, 1171 n.8 (D. Minn. 2012).                           
    When determining whether to grant a temporary stay, the Court determines whether 
“such a stay properly balances the rights of the parties and serves the interests of judicial 

economy.” Cottrell,

737 F.3d at 1249

 (reversing a finding that Colorado River abstention 
applied and remanding to the district court to allow it to, under its inherent docket-
management authority, “impose a more finite and less comprehensive stay” than the initial 
stay granted by the court).  Moreover, when considering whether to stay or dismiss a claim 
due to the existence of duplicative litigations, federal courts tend to grant priority to the 
first-filed case.  Cf. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc.,

765 F.2d 119, 121

 (8th 

Cir. 1985) (dismissing a case under the “first to file” rule).  However, the party seeking a 
stay must demonstrate a “specific hardship or inequity if he or she is required to go 
forward.”  Daywitt  v.  State  of  Minnesota,  No.  14-CV-4526  (WMW/LIB),

2016 WL 3004626

, at *5 (D. Minn. May 24, 2016) (quoting Jones v. Clinton,

72 F.3d 1354

, 1364 
(8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, J., concurring)).                                  

    The Court finds that granting a temporary stay to these proceedings serves the 
interests of both judicial economy and justice.  A judgment has already been entered in the 
State Court Action concerning claims that substantially overlap those raised by the Plaintiff 
in this action.  The State Court Action is now before the Minnesota Court of Appeals, is 
fully briefed, and is scheduled for oral argument in less than 40 days.  A temporary stay 

will allow the Minnesota Court of Appeals to possibly resolve some or all of the substantive 
issues before this Court.                                                 
    Moreover, neither the rights of the Plaintiff nor Defendants are unfairly trammeled 
by such a stay.  While the Plaintiff is correct that it is not mandatory for him to bring cross-
claims in the State Court Action to vindicate his rights, see Denzer v. Frisch,

430 N.W.2d 471

, 474–75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.07); see also Augustin v. 

Mughal,

521 F.2d 1215, 1216

 (8th Cir. 1975), his choice to preserve these claims for a 
separate federal litigation—one begun months after the start of the State Court Action, of 
which he had knowledge, and shortly before a decision was issued in that case—affects the 
balance of equities.  Moreover, the state court has spoken in the State Court Action on 
claims that are entirely based in state law.                              
    In this, the Court’s decision here is distinguishable from its decision in Wiley v. 

Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, Case No. 20-cv-00737 (SRN/KMM),

2020 WL 6136146

 
(D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2020), cited by Plaintiff.  There, the plaintiff asserted federal claims 
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and there had been neither a final ruling on 
any issue of fact nor had the majority of the questions of law been determined in either 
litigation.  While there was no immediate risk of inconsistent rulings there, there is in the 

instant case. Moreover, unlike in Wiley, where the burden of concurrent litigation was 
borne similarly by both parties, here it is borne principally by the party seeking a stay, as 
Steven is not a litigant in the State Court Action while the Defendants here have appeared 
there.  While these burdens did not rise “to the level of hardship or inequity required” for 
a stay in Wiley,

2020 WL 6136146

at *4, here the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and

the identified burden on the Defendants of concurrent litigation in federal court, constitute
a sufficiently specific hardship or inequity for a stay to issue.
As such, the Court finds that the interests of both judicial economy and justice are
best served by allowing the current appeal in the State Court Action to resolve before this
action proceeds further. As such, the Court will grant a temporary stay until the Minnesota
Court of Appeals issues a decision on the appeal before it in In the Matter of the Ronald E.

Roehrs Trust dated August 9, 1999, No. A23-1248 (Mn. Ct. App. 2023). At that time and
considering the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Court will re-evaluate whether to extend
the stay, hear a renewed motion to dismiss by the Walstroms, or otherwise proceed with
this litigation.6
III. ORDER
Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS

HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay
Proceedings [Doc. No. 22] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Dated: January 2, 2024 s/ Susan Richard Nelson .
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge

6 As the Court has granted a temporary stay, it need not reach the question of
whether Colorado River abstention applies in the instant case.

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Steven Roehrs, Case No.: 0:23-cv-01885-SRN-DLM

Plaintiff,
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
v. MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TO STAY
Sandra Walstrom, Ervin Abraham, Janet PROCEEDINGS
Tharp, and Garry Walstrom,

Defendants.

Kristina Kaluza and Mickey L. Stevens, Dykema Gossett PLLC, 4000 Wells Fargo
Center. 90 South 7th St, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Plaintiff

Bartley S. Messick and Bethany J. Rubin. Messick Law, PLLC, 7595 Currell Blvd, Ste
251444, Woodbury, MN 55125, for Defendants Sandra and Garry Walstrom

Charles K Maier, Lathrop GPM LLP, 80 S 8th St, Ste 3100 IDS Center, Minneapolis,
MN 55402, for Defendant Ervin Abraham

J. Robert Keena and Neven Selimovic, Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC, 8050 W 78th St,
Edina, MN 55439, for Defendant Janet Tharp

principal residence,” as well as a life estate in the Farmland owned by the Trust, and all
personal property and effects formerly owned by Ronald. (Id.) Steven contends that

652 F.3d 971, 976

 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(quotation omitted).  “[D]ocuments 'necessarily embraced by the complaint' are not matters 
outside the pleading.”  Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.,

380 F.3d 1066, 1069

with the interpretation of the Trust Agreement proffered by Mr. John Robert Keena,
counsel for Tharp, Conrath, and Daniel.5 (Waseca Cnty., Apr. 5, 2023 Tr., Doc. No. 58, at

motion was denied by this Court on July 21, 2023. See Roehrs v. Walstrom, No. 23-cv-
01885 (SRN/DLM),

2023 WL 4677735

 (D. Minn. July 21, 2023).                
    On July 18, 2023, Defendants Sandra and Garry Walstrom filed a motion to dismiss 
the Complaint, or in the alternative to grant a stay [Doc. No. 22].  The Walstroms’ motion 
argues that the Complaint is barred by res judicata due to the State Court Action, but in the 
alternative, this Court should abstain.  On July 21, 2023, Janet Tharp filed her answer to 

the complaint [Doc. No. 34].  On August 2, 2023, Ervin Abraham filed his answer [Doc. 
No. 37].  On September 13, 2023, a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss.  (See 
Hearing Trans. [Doc. No. 46].)  At this hearing, the issue of “claim splitting” and federal 
court abstention was raised, and the Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties.  
(Id. 13:3-20.)  The parties subsequently briefed these issues.            

II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Legal Standard                                                  
    A district court has the power to stay proceedings when facing concurrent state and 
federal litigation as part of its inherent power to control its docket. See Landis v. North 
American Co.,

299 U.S. 248, 254-55

 (1936); see also Cottrell v. Duke,

737 F.3d 1238, 1249

 
(8th Cir. 2013) (citing Lunde v. Helms,

898 F.2d 1343, 1345

 (8th Cir. 1990)).  District courts 
have this inherent authority to temporarily stay cases as part of their power “to control the 

disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 
counsel, and for litigants.”  Landis,

299 U.S. at 254

.  “How this can best be done calls for 
the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even 
balance.”

Id. at 254-55

.                                                 
    Separately, courts may abstain (by dismissing or staying) from a federal suit “due 

to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding[.]” Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800

 (1976).  The court first considers whether the state and 
federal actions are genuinely parallel.  See Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc.,

574 F.3d 527, 535

 (8th Cir. 2009).  If they are, the court looks to six factors in determining 
whether a stay is appropriate:                                            

    (1) whether there is a res over which one court has established jurisdiction, 
    (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) whether maintaining separate 
    actions may result in piecemeal litigation, unless the relevant law would 
    require piecemeal litigation and the federal court issue is easily severed, (4) 
    which case has priority—not necessarily which case was filed first but a 
    greater emphasis on the relative progress made in the cases, (5) whether state 
    or federal law controls, especially favoring the exercise of jurisdiction where 
    federal law controls, and (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the 
    federal plaintiff's rights.                                          
Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Arkansas Elec. Cooperatives, Inc.,

48 F.3d 294, 297

 
(8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murphy Oil USA,

21 F.3d 259, 263

 (8th Cir. 1994) and citing the Colorado River factors).  The Court’s inherent 
authority to manage its own docket by granting a stay in a pending litigation is distinct 
from Colorado River abstention.  See Kreditverein Der Bank Austria Creditandstalt Fur 
Niederosterreich Und Bergenland v. Nejezchleba,

477 F.3d 942, 945-46

460 U.S. 1

, 27-
28 (1983).  However, a stay order is only final when “the sole purpose and effect of the 

stay is precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.”

Id.

 at 11 n.11; 
see also Boushel v. Toro Co.,

985 F.2d 406, 408

 (8th Cir. 1993) (“The only time that an 
order granting a stay will be considered a final order is if [the stay] is tantamount to a 
dismissal and [the stay] effectively ends the litigation.”)  Where a stay “merely temporarily 
suspend[s]  the  federal  case”  while  ongoing  state  administrative  and  judicial  review 

proceedings are completed, a district court is well within its inherent authority to issue a 
temporary stay.  Lunde,

898 F.2d at 1345

.  This can be true even where abstention would 
be appropriate as to some but not all claims in a litigation.  See Calleros v. FSI Int'l, Inc.,

892 F. Supp. 2d 1163

, 1171 n.8 (D. Minn. 2012).                           
    When determining whether to grant a temporary stay, the Court determines whether 
“such a stay properly balances the rights of the parties and serves the interests of judicial 

economy.” Cottrell,

737 F.3d at 1249

 (reversing a finding that Colorado River abstention 
applied and remanding to the district court to allow it to, under its inherent docket-
management authority, “impose a more finite and less comprehensive stay” than the initial 
stay granted by the court).  Moreover, when considering whether to stay or dismiss a claim 
due to the existence of duplicative litigations, federal courts tend to grant priority to the 
first-filed case.  Cf. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc.,

765 F.2d 119, 121

 (8th 

Cir. 1985) (dismissing a case under the “first to file” rule).  However, the party seeking a 
stay must demonstrate a “specific hardship or inequity if he or she is required to go 
forward.”  Daywitt  v.  State  of  Minnesota,  No.  14-CV-4526  (WMW/LIB),

2016 WL 3004626

, at *5 (D. Minn. May 24, 2016) (quoting Jones v. Clinton,

72 F.3d 1354

, 1364 
(8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, J., concurring)).                                  

    The Court finds that granting a temporary stay to these proceedings serves the 
interests of both judicial economy and justice.  A judgment has already been entered in the 
State Court Action concerning claims that substantially overlap those raised by the Plaintiff 
in this action.  The State Court Action is now before the Minnesota Court of Appeals, is 
fully briefed, and is scheduled for oral argument in less than 40 days.  A temporary stay 

will allow the Minnesota Court of Appeals to possibly resolve some or all of the substantive 
issues before this Court.                                                 
    Moreover, neither the rights of the Plaintiff nor Defendants are unfairly trammeled 
by such a stay.  While the Plaintiff is correct that it is not mandatory for him to bring cross-
claims in the State Court Action to vindicate his rights, see Denzer v. Frisch,

430 N.W.2d 471

, 474–75 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 13.07); see also Augustin v. 

Mughal,

521 F.2d 1215, 1216

 (8th Cir. 1975), his choice to preserve these claims for a 
separate federal litigation—one begun months after the start of the State Court Action, of 
which he had knowledge, and shortly before a decision was issued in that case—affects the 
balance of equities.  Moreover, the state court has spoken in the State Court Action on 
claims that are entirely based in state law.                              
    In this, the Court’s decision here is distinguishable from its decision in Wiley v. 

Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, Case No. 20-cv-00737 (SRN/KMM),

2020 WL 6136146

 
(D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2020), cited by Plaintiff.  There, the plaintiff asserted federal claims 
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and there had been neither a final ruling on 
any issue of fact nor had the majority of the questions of law been determined in either 
litigation.  While there was no immediate risk of inconsistent rulings there, there is in the 

instant case. Moreover, unlike in Wiley, where the burden of concurrent litigation was 
borne similarly by both parties, here it is borne principally by the party seeking a stay, as 
Steven is not a litigant in the State Court Action while the Defendants here have appeared 
there.  While these burdens did not rise “to the level of hardship or inequity required” for 
a stay in Wiley,

2020 WL 6136146

at *4, here the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and

HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Stay
Proceedings [Doc. No. 22] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Dated: January 2, 2024 s/ Susan Richard Nelson .
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge

6 As the Court has granted a temporary stay, it need not reach the question of
whether Colorado River abstention applies in the instant case.

Reference

Status: Unknown