Riley v. Rish

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota

Riley v. Rish

Trial Court Opinion

                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
                      DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                              
ADRIAN DOMINIC RILEY also known as                                       
amiri-abdul: rasheed el,                                                 
                                     Civil No. 23-2804 (JRT/ECW)         

                      Petitioner,                                        

v.                                 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND             
                                 RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE            
LISA STENSETH, Minnesota Correctional        JUDGE                       
Facility — Rush City Warden,                                             

                     Respondent.                                         

    Adrian Dominic Riley, OID #173945, Minnesota Correctional Facility — Rush 
    City, 7600 525th Street, Rush City, MN 55069, pro se Petitioner.     

    Erin  R.  Eldridge,  MINNESOTA  ATTORNEY  GENERAL’S  OFFICE,  445    
    Minnesota Street, Suite 1400, St. Paul, MN 55101, for Respondent.    


    Petitioner Adrian Dominic Riley, also known as amiri-abdul: rasheed el, is currently 
serving three life sentences at Minnesota Correctional Facility — Rush City pursuant to a 
state conviction on three counts of first-degree murder.  Riley seeks relief from his 
imprisonment by a petition for writ of habeas corpus.1  Because Riley’s petition is “second 
or successive” and Riley did not receive authorization from the Eighth Circuit to bring this 


    1 While Riley claims that his motion is brought under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241
, the only federal 
habeas relief available for a petitioner held in custody pursuant to a state court judgment is under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
.  (Obj. to R. & R. at 3, Oct. 2, 2023, Docket No. 5; Pet. for Writ Habeas Corpus 
(“Pet.”) at 4, Sept. 11, 2023, Docket No. 1.); 
28 U.S.C. § 2241
(c).  The Court will accordingly analyze 
Riley’s petition pursuant to the standards set forth in 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
. 
action, his petition must be denied.  Thus, the Court will overrule Riley’s Objection to 
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), adopt 

the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, and dismiss Riley’s petition without prejudice. 
                          BACKGROUND                                     
    A Minnesota jury convicted Petitioner Adrian Dominic Riley, who goes by amiri-
abdul: rasheed el, on three counts of first-degree murder.  State v. Riley, 
568 N.W.2d. 518, 520
 (Minn. 1997).  Riley is serving three consecutive life sentences as a result.  (Pet. for 
Writ Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) at 4, Sept. 11, 2023, Docket No. 1.)  Riley previously filed 
three petitions for postconviction relief in Minnesota state court.  Riley v. State, 
819 N.W.2d 162, 166
 (Minn. 2012); Riley v. Smith, No. 13-674, 
2014 WL 896728
, at *1 (D. 

Minn. Mar. 6, 2014).  He also filed a previous habeas petition under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
 in 
the District of Minnesota, which was denied as untimely.  
Id. at *2
.      
    Riley now files another petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief challenging the 
constitutionality of his 1996 conviction.  (See generally Pet.); Riley v. State, 
792 N.W.2d 831, 832
 (Minn. 2011).  Riley also applies to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this 
habeas proceeding.  (Appl. to Proceed without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Sept. 11, 2023, 
Docket No. 2.)  The Magistrate Judge recommended the Court dismiss this petition for 

habeas corpus without prejudice as a “second or successive” petition barred by 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(b).  (R. & R. at 2, Sept. 22, 2023, Docket No. 4.)  The Magistrate Judge also 
recommended the IFP application be denied and that no certificate of appealability be 
issued.  (Id. at 3.)  Riley objects to the R&R seemingly on the basis that many of the 
statutes cited are not law2 and that additional facts previously unavailable to Riley 
undermine his conviction.  (Obj. to R. & R. at 3, Oct. 2, 2023, Docket No. 5.)  Riley alleges 

no specific previously undiscoverable facts regarding his original conviction.  (See id.)  
                           DISCUSSION                                    
    Within 14 days after a magistrate judge files an R&R, a party may file “specific 
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); accord D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1).  “The objections should specify the portions of the 
magistrate  judge’s  report  and  recommendation  to  which  objections  are  made  and 
provide a basis for those objections.”  Mayer v. Walvatne, No. 07-1958, 
2008 WL 4527774
, 
at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2008).  For dispositive motions, the Court reviews de novo3  

“properly objected to” portions of an R&R.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord D. Minn. LR 
72.2(b)(3).  “Objections which are not specific but merely repeat arguments presented to 
and considered by a magistrate judge are not entitled to de novo review, but rather are 
reviewed for clear error.”  Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC, 
98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017
 (D. Minn. 2015).  The Eighth Circuit has been willing to liberally construe otherwise 




    2 Riley cites the U.S. Constitution to support this statement; however, all the statutes 
noted both by the Court and the Magistrate Judge have been properly promulgated per the 
standards of the U.S. Constitution and are the law the Court follows.     
    3 De novo means that this Court will review the evidence and the law independently.  In 
other words, the Magistrate Judge's prior opinion has no influence on how the Court reviews the 
issues.  In essence, the Court will review the case from the start, as if it is the first court to review 
and weigh in on the issues.                                               
general pro se objections to R&Rs and to require de novo review of all alleged errors.  See 
Belk v. Purkett, 
15 F.3d 803, 815
 (8th Cir. 1994).                        

    Those incarcerated pursuant to a state court judgment may seek a writ of habeas 
corpus from the federal district court if he or she believes they are in “custody in violation 
of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(a).  The 
procedure for state prisoners to file habeas petitions is outlined by 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
.  

Among other limitations, § 2244 bars “second or successive” petitions unless permission 
is  granted  by  the  appropriate  court  of  appeals.    
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(b).    “Second  or 
successive” is a term of art and does not encompass all second in time habeas petitions 

under § 2254.  Magwood v. Patterson, 
561 U.S. 320
, 332–34 (2010).  A first habeas 
petition  dismissed  as  untimely  is  considered  an  adjudication  on  the  merits  making 
additional habeas petitions “second or successive.”  Townsend v. Dingle, No. 07-4348, 
2013 WL 2177937
, at *4 (D. Minn. May 20, 2013) (citing Murray v. Greiner, 
394 F.3d 78, 81
 (2nd Cir. 2005)).                                                      
    Riley filed his first federal habeas petition in 2013.  Riley v. Smith, 
2014 WL 896728
, 
at *1.  That petition was denied because it was filed beyond the one-year statute of 
limitations and equitable tolling did not apply.  
Id. at *2
.  Because Riley’s first petition was 

dismissed with prejudice as untimely, it amounts to an adjudication on the merits making 
the current petition “second or successive.”  As Riley did not get authorization from the 
Eighth Circuit to file a “second or successive” habeas petition as required by 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(b)(3), the Court will deny his current petition.                     

    The Court will also not grant a certificate of appealability.  Riley’s petition is being 
denied on a procedural question. To receive a certificate of appealability the petitioner 
must show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 
correct in its procedural ruling.”  Proctor v. Payne, No. 21-2001, 
2022 WL 274515
, at *2 

(8th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 
529 U.S. 473, 484
 (2000)).  Because the 
Court does not find this procedural ruling to be one that can be reasonably disputed, it 
will not issue a certificate of appealability.                            

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED:                                                           
    1.  Petitioner’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
      [Docket No. 5] is OVERRULED;                                       

    2.  The  Magistrate  Judge’s  Report  and  Recommendation  [Docket  No.  4]  is 
      ADOPTED;                                                           
    3.  Petitioner’s Application to Procced in District Court without Prepaying Fees or 

      Costs [Docket No. 2] is DENIED;                                    
    4.  The Court does NOT grant a Certificate of Appealability;         
    5.  Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] is DENIED; and 
    6.  Petitioner’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice.              
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 

DATED:  January 2, 2024                            Otay      eedatiin 
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.                         JOHN R. TUNHEIM 
                                            United States District Judge 

                                    -6- 

Trial Court Opinion

                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          
                      DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                              
ADRIAN DOMINIC RILEY also known as                                       
amiri-abdul: rasheed el,                                                 
                                     Civil No. 23-2804 (JRT/ECW)         

                      Petitioner,                                        

v.                                 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND             
                                 RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE            
LISA STENSETH, Minnesota Correctional        JUDGE                       
Facility — Rush City Warden,                                             

                     Respondent.                                         

    Adrian Dominic Riley, OID #173945, Minnesota Correctional Facility — Rush 
    City, 7600 525th Street, Rush City, MN 55069, pro se Petitioner.     

    Erin  R.  Eldridge,  MINNESOTA  ATTORNEY  GENERAL’S  OFFICE,  445    
    Minnesota Street, Suite 1400, St. Paul, MN 55101, for Respondent.    


    Petitioner Adrian Dominic Riley, also known as amiri-abdul: rasheed el, is currently 
serving three life sentences at Minnesota Correctional Facility — Rush City pursuant to a 
state conviction on three counts of first-degree murder.  Riley seeks relief from his 
imprisonment by a petition for writ of habeas corpus.1  Because Riley’s petition is “second 
or successive” and Riley did not receive authorization from the Eighth Circuit to bring this 


    1 While Riley claims that his motion is brought under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241
, the only federal 
habeas relief available for a petitioner held in custody pursuant to a state court judgment is under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
.  (Obj. to R. & R. at 3, Oct. 2, 2023, Docket No. 5; Pet. for Writ Habeas Corpus 
(“Pet.”) at 4, Sept. 11, 2023, Docket No. 1.); 
28 U.S.C. § 2241
(c).  The Court will accordingly analyze 
Riley’s petition pursuant to the standards set forth in 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
. 
action, his petition must be denied.  Thus, the Court will overrule Riley’s Objection to 
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), adopt 

the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, and dismiss Riley’s petition without prejudice. 
                          BACKGROUND                                     
    A Minnesota jury convicted Petitioner Adrian Dominic Riley, who goes by amiri-
abdul: rasheed el, on three counts of first-degree murder.  State v. Riley, 
568 N.W.2d. 518, 520
 (Minn. 1997).  Riley is serving three consecutive life sentences as a result.  (Pet. for 
Writ Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) at 4, Sept. 11, 2023, Docket No. 1.)  Riley previously filed 
three petitions for postconviction relief in Minnesota state court.  Riley v. State, 
819 N.W.2d 162, 166
 (Minn. 2012); Riley v. Smith, No. 13-674, 
2014 WL 896728
, at *1 (D. 

Minn. Mar. 6, 2014).  He also filed a previous habeas petition under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254
 in 
the District of Minnesota, which was denied as untimely.  
Id. at *2
.      
    Riley now files another petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief challenging the 
constitutionality of his 1996 conviction.  (See generally Pet.); Riley v. State, 
792 N.W.2d 831, 832
 (Minn. 2011).  Riley also applies to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this 
habeas proceeding.  (Appl. to Proceed without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Sept. 11, 2023, 
Docket No. 2.)  The Magistrate Judge recommended the Court dismiss this petition for 

habeas corpus without prejudice as a “second or successive” petition barred by 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(b).  (R. & R. at 2, Sept. 22, 2023, Docket No. 4.)  The Magistrate Judge also 
recommended the IFP application be denied and that no certificate of appealability be 
issued.  (Id. at 3.)  Riley objects to the R&R seemingly on the basis that many of the 
statutes cited are not law2 and that additional facts previously unavailable to Riley 
undermine his conviction.  (Obj. to R. & R. at 3, Oct. 2, 2023, Docket No. 5.)  Riley alleges 

no specific previously undiscoverable facts regarding his original conviction.  (See id.)  
                           DISCUSSION                                    
    Within 14 days after a magistrate judge files an R&R, a party may file “specific 
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); accord D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1).  “The objections should specify the portions of the 
magistrate  judge’s  report  and  recommendation  to  which  objections  are  made  and 
provide a basis for those objections.”  Mayer v. Walvatne, No. 07-1958, 
2008 WL 4527774
, 
at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2008).  For dispositive motions, the Court reviews de novo3  

“properly objected to” portions of an R&R.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord D. Minn. LR 
72.2(b)(3).  “Objections which are not specific but merely repeat arguments presented to 
and considered by a magistrate judge are not entitled to de novo review, but rather are 
reviewed for clear error.”  Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC, 
98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017
 (D. Minn. 2015).  The Eighth Circuit has been willing to liberally construe otherwise 




    2 Riley cites the U.S. Constitution to support this statement; however, all the statutes 
noted both by the Court and the Magistrate Judge have been properly promulgated per the 
standards of the U.S. Constitution and are the law the Court follows.     
    3 De novo means that this Court will review the evidence and the law independently.  In 
other words, the Magistrate Judge's prior opinion has no influence on how the Court reviews the 
issues.  In essence, the Court will review the case from the start, as if it is the first court to review 
and weigh in on the issues.                                               
general pro se objections to R&Rs and to require de novo review of all alleged errors.  See 
Belk v. Purkett, 
15 F.3d 803, 815
 (8th Cir. 1994).                        

    Those incarcerated pursuant to a state court judgment may seek a writ of habeas 
corpus from the federal district court if he or she believes they are in “custody in violation 
of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254
(a).  The 
procedure for state prisoners to file habeas petitions is outlined by 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
.  

Among other limitations, § 2244 bars “second or successive” petitions unless permission 
is  granted  by  the  appropriate  court  of  appeals.    
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(b).    “Second  or 
successive” is a term of art and does not encompass all second in time habeas petitions 

under § 2254.  Magwood v. Patterson, 
561 U.S. 320
, 332–34 (2010).  A first habeas 
petition  dismissed  as  untimely  is  considered  an  adjudication  on  the  merits  making 
additional habeas petitions “second or successive.”  Townsend v. Dingle, No. 07-4348, 
2013 WL 2177937
, at *4 (D. Minn. May 20, 2013) (citing Murray v. Greiner, 
394 F.3d 78, 81
 (2nd Cir. 2005)).                                                      
    Riley filed his first federal habeas petition in 2013.  Riley v. Smith, 
2014 WL 896728
, 
at *1.  That petition was denied because it was filed beyond the one-year statute of 
limitations and equitable tolling did not apply.  
Id. at *2
.  Because Riley’s first petition was 

dismissed with prejudice as untimely, it amounts to an adjudication on the merits making 
the current petition “second or successive.”  As Riley did not get authorization from the 
Eighth Circuit to file a “second or successive” habeas petition as required by 
28 U.S.C. § 2244
(b)(3), the Court will deny his current petition.                     

    The Court will also not grant a certificate of appealability.  Riley’s petition is being 
denied on a procedural question. To receive a certificate of appealability the petitioner 
must show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 
correct in its procedural ruling.”  Proctor v. Payne, No. 21-2001, 
2022 WL 274515
, at *2 

(8th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 
529 U.S. 473, 484
 (2000)).  Because the 
Court does not find this procedural ruling to be one that can be reasonably disputed, it 
will not issue a certificate of appealability.                            

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED:                                                           
    1.  Petitioner’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation 
      [Docket No. 5] is OVERRULED;                                       

    2.  The  Magistrate  Judge’s  Report  and  Recommendation  [Docket  No.  4]  is 
      ADOPTED;                                                           
    3.  Petitioner’s Application to Procced in District Court without Prepaying Fees or 

      Costs [Docket No. 2] is DENIED;                                    
    4.  The Court does NOT grant a Certificate of Appealability;         
    5.  Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] is DENIED; and 
    6.  Petitioner’s action is DISMISSED without prejudice.              
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 

DATED:  January 2, 2024                            Otay      eedatiin 
at Minneapolis, Minnesota.                         JOHN R. TUNHEIM 
                                            United States District Judge 

                                    -6- 

Reference

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