Olsen v. O'Malley

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota January 8, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Jennifer O., No. 22-cv-2273 (KMM/ECW)

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

Martin J. O’Malley, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Jennifer O. brought this action after the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security, former Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi,1 denied her application for disability benefits.
Ms. O asks the Court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision for an award of benefits or
remand for further proceedings. [ECF No. 1.] The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on the administrative record. [ECF Nos. 20, 22.] The Court grants the
Commissioner’s summary-judgment motion and denies Ms. O’s summary-judgment motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jennifer O. filed an application for disability insurance benefits on May 25,
2020, alleging that she had been disabled due to fibromyalgia and spinal, digestive, and mental
conditions since April 17, 2018. [Tr. of Admin. Record (“R”) at 271, 274, 298, ECF No. 15.]
The Social Security Administration denied Ms. O’s application initially and on reconsideration.

1 Martin J. O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Press Release,
Social Security Administration, available at https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/#12-
2023-2 [archived at https://perma.cc/2FF2-GV8T]. Under Rule 25, as the successor to former
Defendant Kijakazi, Mr. O’Malley is “automatically substituted as a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
Ms. O requested a hearing, which was held by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Sarah R.
Smisek on November 2, 2021. [Id. at 19.] Ms. O testified in support of her claim, describing
the limitations she experienced from her impairments.

On July 18, 2022, the ALJ denied Ms. O’s claim in a written decision applying the
required five-step evaluation process. [Id. at 5.] At step one, the ALJ found that Ms. O has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 17, 2018. [Id. at 21.] At step two, the ALJ
found that Ms. O suffers from several severe impairments: degenerative disc disease,
degenerative joint disease, obesity, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. [Id.
at 21.] At step three, the ALJ found that Ms. O’s impairments did not meet or medically equal

any listed impairments. [Id. at 22.] At step four, the ALJ determined that Ms. O retains the
residual function capacity (“RFC”’) to perform “simple, routine tasks . . . in a work
environment free of fast-paced production requirements, and involving only simple, work-
related decisions and routine workplace changes, and only occasional incidental interactions
with the general public.” [Id. at 25.] Further, the ALJ found that Ms. O was not capable of
working alongside others and that she must have the opportunity to change positions every

half hour. [Id.] Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Ms. O can perform jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such as document preparer, table
worker, and inspector. [Id. at 31–32.]
The Social Security Appeals Council declined Ms. O’s request for review. As a result,
the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial review.

42 U.S.C. § 405

(g). Ms. O filed this lawsuit on September 19, 2022, challenging the ALJ’s 

denial of her claim for benefits.                                         
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Legal Standard                                                  
    Review of the Commissioner’s denial of an application for disability benefits is limited 

and deferential, requiring a federal court to affirm if the decision is supported by “substantial 
evidence” on the record as a whole. Nolen v. Kijakazi,

61 F.4th 575, 577

 (8th Cir. 2023); Cline 
v. Colvin,

771 F.3d 1098, 1102

 (8th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance; 
it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person would find adequate to support the ALJ’s 
determination. Nolen,

61 F.4th at 577

; Blackburn v. Colvin,

761 F.3d 853, 858

 (8th Cir. 2014). A 
reviewing court must consider not only the evidence that supports the conclusion, but also 

that which detracts from it. Nolen,

61 F.4th at 577

; Bergmann v. Apfel,

207 F.3d 1065, 1068

 (8th 
Cir. 2000). However, the Court does not reweigh the evidence and should not reverse the 
Commissioner’s decision simply because substantial evidence might also support a different 
conclusion. Bowers v. Kijakazi,

40 F.4th 872, 875

 (8th Cir. 2022); Reece v. Colvin,

834 F.3d 904, 908

 (8th Cir. 2016). So long as the Commissioner’s decision does not fall outside of the 
“available zone of choice,” it should be affirmed. Austin v. Kijakazi,

52 F.4th 723, 728

 (8th Cir. 

2022); Hacker v. Barnhart,

459 F.3d 934, 936

 (8th Cir. 2006). In other words, where the 
Commissioner’s decision is among the reasonable conclusions that can be drawn from the 
evidence in the record as a whole, it will not be disturbed. See Despain v. Berryhill,

926 F.3d 1024, 1027

 (8th Cir. 2019); Nicola v. Astrue,

480 F.3d 885, 886

 (8th Cir. 2007); Buckner v. Astrue,

646 F.3d 549, 556

(8th Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
Ms. O raises two challenges to the ALJ’s opinion in this case. She first argues that the
ALJ mishandled the 2019 opinion of Dr. Lawrence Richmond, who assessed her functional

capacity and prepared a four-page report. Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate
adequate limitations on social interactions into the RFC. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court rejects both arguments.

Ms. O contends that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate Dr. Lawrence
Richmond’s 2019 opinion. Dr. Richmond and occupational therapist Lori Anderson saw

Ms. O on October 16, 2019. Dr. Richmond issued a four-page report on Ms. O’s functional
capacity, in which he concluded that she was capable of sedentary work if she had the
opportunity to alternate between sitting, standing, and walking “as needed to increase
comfort.” [R. at 1243–46.] Dr. Richmond also advised that Ms. O work 15 to 20 hours per
week. [Id. at 33.] Dr. Richmond had not previously seen or treated Ms. O and did not see her
again after issuing the assessment. Ms. O argues that the ALJ failed to assess both the

supportability and consistency of Dr. Richmond’s opinion in the weight she gave it in the
RFC.
Although the language used in the caselaw and the regulations has changed over time,
now an ALJ does not defer or give specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
to any medical opinion.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead of “weight,” the ALJ 
determines an opinion’s “persuasiveness” through consideration of several factors including 

the  professional’s  relationship  with  the  claimant  and  their  specialization.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(a) (referring to “persuasiveness”),  404.1520c(c) (listing factors), 416.920c(a) 
(referring to “persuasiveness”); 416.920c(c) (listing factors); Bowers v. Kijakazi,

40 F.4th 872, 875

 (8th Cir. 2022) (finding that ALJ adequately analyzed the persuasiveness of a medical 

under the new regulations). The most important factors for assessing the persuasiveness of a 
medical  opinion  are  supportability  and  consistency.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(b)(2), 
416.920c(b)(2). Supportability examines the source’s own records and explanations.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency addresses the extent to which the opinion 
aligns with evidence from other sources.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). 
    In evaluating the supportability factor, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical 

evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her 
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical 
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.”

20 C.F.R. § 404

.1520c(c)(1). Here, 
Dr. Richmond only saw Ms. O once and did not provide additional medical evidence or 
opinions in his report, significantly limiting the supportability of his opinion in the first 
instance. The ALJ stated that she considered all of the medical opinions in accordance with

20 C.F.R. § 404

.1520c(c)(1)’s requirements, though admittedly she did not specifically discuss 
the supportability of Dr. Richmond’s opinion. [R at 25.] Even were this lack of detail in her 
opinion writing erroneous, an error is harmless when the claimant fails to “provide some 
indication that the ALJ would have decided differently if the error had not occurred.” Lucus v. 
Saul,

960 F.3d 1066, 1069

 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Byes v. Astrue,

687 F.3d 913, 917

 (8th Cir. 
2012)). Here, Ms. O fails to articulate how the ALJ’s conclusion would have been different 

had she explicitly discussed the supportability of Dr. Richmond’s opinion. Indeed, had the 
ALJ explicitly discussed this factor, she would have presumably discussed how the lack of 
treatment history and the absence of discussion of medical evidence reduced the persuasive 
value of the opinion. Therefore, considering the record as a whole, “[t]his case was not a close 

call, and clarification on the [supportability of Dr. Richmond’s findings] . . .would not have 
significantly swayed the ALJ’s decision.” Grindley v. Kijakazi,

9 F.4th 622, 630

 (8th Cir. 2021). 
    The Court similarly rejects Ms. O’s contention that the ALJ failed to discuss the 
consistency factor as it applies to Dr. Richmond’s opinion. Ms. O raises various arguments 
regarding  this  factor,  but  none  are  persuasive.  The  ALJ  specifically  found  that  his 
determination that Ms. O could only work a 15–20 hours per week was “not consistent with 

the physical therapy records, claimant’s daily activities, and the records as a whole as discussed 
in greater detail below.” [R. at 27.] But Ms. O overlooks that Dr. Richmond also provided 
percentages for time Ms. O could spend sitting and standing in an eight-hour workday, 
indicating that Dr. Richmond did not believe she was incapable of full-time work. [Id. at 1245.] 
    Ms. O raises a further concern with the ALJ’s consistency analysis, asserting that the 
ALJ’s  conclusions  regarding  her  physical  abilities  are  not  preclusive  to  also  adopting 

Dr. Richmond’s findings, such as her ability to walk for 30 minutes. [Pl.’s Br. at 16–18, ECF 
No. 20.] This argument is likewise unavailing. Under the applicable regulations, a medical 
opinion’s  persuasiveness is evaluated  primarily based on how consistent it is “with the 
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” See

20 C.F.R. § 404

.1520c(c)(2). Ms. O’s more recent treatment records from the nearly two years that 
followed her evaluation by Dr. Richmond included, for example, Ms. O’s own reports that 

she had been able to walk a mile and ride the stationary bike and use the treadmill. [R. at 2057, 
1244.] Indeed, it appears that Ms. O followed Dr. Richmond’s recommendation to begin a 
“program of self-paced walking to improve cardio endurance and level of activity.” [Id. at 
1244.] The record as a whole supports the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Ms. O’s physical 

abilities. Ms. O essentially asks the court to reweigh evidence, which the Court will not do. 
Pierce v. Kijakazi,

22 F.4th 769, 771

 (8th Cir. 2022) (“So long as substantial evidence supports 
the ALJ’s decision, we will not reverse even if substantial evidence would have supported a 
contrary decision or even if we would have decided the case differently”). 
    Third, Ms. O argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding was “internally inconsistent” with 
Dr. Richmond’s  recommendation  that  Ms. O  take  breaks,  contending  that  “a  break  by 

definition is time off task to rest.” [Pl.’s Br. at 20–21.] But Ms. O does not point to any medical 
opinion that mandates that she take “time off task.” Ms. O misconstrues Dr. Richmond’s use 
of the word “break,” as he recommended that she take “sitting breaks as needed.” [Id. at 1245.] 
Although, Ms. O emphasizes Dr. Paulson’s opinion that Ms. O should “be allowed to stand 
and stretch, change positions every hour for up to 5 minutes,” the ALJ’s RFC finding provides 
that Ms. O “requires the opportunity to change positions every 30 minutes.” [Id. at 25, 177.] 

Moreover, the ALJ recommended that Ms. O perform sedentary work, which contemplates 
that Ms. O be allowed to take a break every two hours. Titles II & XVI: Determining Capability 
to Do Other Work-Implications of A Residual Functional Capacity for Less Than A Full Range of Sedentary 
Work, SSR 96-9P,

1996 WL 374185

, at *6 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“In order to perform a full 
range of sedentary work, an individual must be able to remain in a seated position for 
approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday, with a morning break, a lunch period, and an 
afternoon break at approximately 2-hour intervals.”). The ALJ did not err in her determination 
regarding Ms. O’s need for breaks.                                        
    In addition, Ms. O fails to acknowledge the extent to which the ALJ’s conclusion that 

a part-time limitation was not necessary was supported by evidence in the record. The ALJ 
described in detail Ms. O’s activities and treatment between November 2019 and July 2021. 
[R. at 27–29.] That discussion and the record itself both support the ALJ’s decision not to 
adopt Dr. Richmond’s suggestion for part-time work.                       
    Ms. O generally asserts that the ALJ erred in “rejecting” Dr. Richmond’s opinion. [R. 
at 19.]  But,  as  discussed,  the  ALJ  did  not  reject  Dr. Richmond’s  opinion;  rather,  she 

incorporated many of Dr. Richmond’s findings into her RFC, declining to adopt only his 
opinion regarding part-time work, which the ALJ found unpersuasive. The ALJ was “free to 
accept some, but not all, of a medical opinion.” Austin v. Kijakazi,

52 F.4th 723, 729

 (8th Cir. 
2022). And it is “the ALJ’s role to resolve conflicts in experts’ opinions.” Clay v. Barnhart,

417 F.3d 922, 930

 (8th Cir. 2005). The ALJ did so by conducting a thorough review of the medical 
record, as required.

20 C.F.R. § 416.945

(a) (providing that the RFC assessment is based on “all 

relevant  evidence  in  [the]  case  record”).  Ms. O’s  challenges  to  the  ALJ’s  evaluation  of 
Dr. Richmond’s opinion fail because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination 
regarding Ms. O’s stamina and capacity for full-time work. See Grindley,

9 F.4th at 630

. 

    Ms. O next contends that the ALJ erred because she did not “properly evaluate 
[Ms. O’s]  limitations  related  to  social  interactions  and  failed  to  accurately  reflect  these 

limitations in the RFC.” [Pl.’s Br. at 22.] The ALJ noted that Ms. O had a “moderate limitation 
in [her] ability to interact with others,” and thus determined that Ms. O could not perform 
teamwork or work in tandem with others, recommending that any interactions with the public 
should be incidental and occasional. [R. at 24, 25.] But Ms. O contends that the ALJ erred in 

failing to adopt more stringent restrictions in the RFC. She specifically argues that the ALJ did 
not “explain why the general public required occasional and incidental contact while co-
workers and supervisors did not. . . . There is no explanation within the four corners of the 
decision as to how the ALJ determined that different degrees of social interaction limitations 
were appropriate for various groups . . . .” [Pl.’s Br. at 24.] For two reasons, the Court finds 
that Ms. O has failed to demonstrate any error in the ALJ’s RFC determination. 

    First, limitations regarding social interactions in the workplace are “commonplace in 
unskilled work that involves ‘dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people,’” 
which is the type of work that the ALJ recommended for Ms. O. Dereschuk v. Colvin, No. 15-
CV-86 (TNL),

2016 WL 9454329

, at *25 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (quoting SSR 85–15,

1985 WL 56857

, at *4), aff’d sub nom. Dereschuk v. Berryhill,

691 F. App’x 292

 (8th Cir. 2017). Ms. O 
is correct that the ALJ noted that Ms. O “reported difficulty getting along with others. She felt 

authority figures were intimidating.” [R. at 24.] But the ALJ further explained that “[s]he was 
never fired or laid off from a job because of problems getting along with others.” [Id.] Ms. O 
fails  to  reference  any  evidence  that  would  support  a  greater  restriction  regarding  her 
interactions with supervisors and coworkers.                              
    Ms. O also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to “build an accurate and logical bridge 
between her conclusions related to limitations in social interactions and the evidence.” [Pl.’s 

Br. at 22.] Although the regulations do not explicitly require an ALJ to provide a “logical 
bridge” in explaining the basis for a decision denying benefits, even if that were a requirement, 
the ALJ’s opinion here would meet it. The ALJ’s decision cogently explains what evidence 
supports her determination about the degree of limitations appropriate for Ms. O’s social 

interactions  in  a  work  setting.  And  the  ALJ’s  conclusion  that  she  could  handle  some 
interaction with others is supported by the record, which demonstrates that Ms. O had never 
been fired for workplace conflicts and reflects that she described her ability to get along with 
authority figures, including “bosses,” as “fine.” [R. at 310–12.]         
    In the discussion of step 3, the ALJ conducted a detailed review of overall mental and 
social functioning, which supported the later-adopted RFC and demonstrated that the ALJ 

had carefully reviewed the relevant record. This included discussion of Ms. O’s ability to 
“attend appointments without difficulty getting along with others.” [R. at 23.] The ALJ relied 
on State Agency psychological consultant opinions as partially persuasive, but found that the 
overall records and Ms. O’s mental health treatment supported moderate limitations in all 
Paragraph B criteria, including the ability to interact with others. [R. at 30.] Moreover, in 
adopting functional limitations in the RFC related to Ms. O’s mental health impairments, the 

ALJ thoroughly discussed the evidence in the record of Ms. O’s mental health treatment, 
mental status exam findings, improvement with counseling, and treatment notes. [Id.] The 
ALJ’s reliance on these records is the very logical bridge Ms. O contends is lacking, and based 
on the Court’s review of these records, they provide substantial evidence for the ALJ’s 
determinations regarding the limitations on interactions ultimately adopted into the RFC. 
III.  ORDER                                                               
    For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                
    1.   Ms. O’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 20] is DENIED; and 

    2.   The  Commissioner’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  [ECF  No. 22]  is 
         GRANTED.                                                        

Let Judgment be Entered Accordingly.                                      
Date: January 8, 2024                                                     
                                         s/Katherine Menendez            
                                       Katherine Menendez                
                                       United States District Judge

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Jennifer O., No. 22-cv-2273 (KMM/ECW)

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

Martin J. O’Malley, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

42 U.S.C. § 405

(g). Ms. O filed this lawsuit on September 19, 2022, challenging the ALJ’s 

denial of her claim for benefits.                                         
II.  DISCUSSION                                                           
    A.   Legal Standard                                                  
    Review of the Commissioner’s denial of an application for disability benefits is limited 

and deferential, requiring a federal court to affirm if the decision is supported by “substantial 
evidence” on the record as a whole. Nolen v. Kijakazi,

61 F.4th 575, 577

 (8th Cir. 2023); Cline 
v. Colvin,

771 F.3d 1098, 1102

 (8th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance; 
it is relevant evidence that a reasonable person would find adequate to support the ALJ’s 
determination. Nolen,

61 F.4th at 577

; Blackburn v. Colvin,

761 F.3d 853, 858

 (8th Cir. 2014). A 
reviewing court must consider not only the evidence that supports the conclusion, but also 

that which detracts from it. Nolen,

61 F.4th at 577

; Bergmann v. Apfel,

207 F.3d 1065, 1068

 (8th 
Cir. 2000). However, the Court does not reweigh the evidence and should not reverse the 
Commissioner’s decision simply because substantial evidence might also support a different 
conclusion. Bowers v. Kijakazi,

40 F.4th 872, 875

 (8th Cir. 2022); Reece v. Colvin,

834 F.3d 904, 908

 (8th Cir. 2016). So long as the Commissioner’s decision does not fall outside of the 
“available zone of choice,” it should be affirmed. Austin v. Kijakazi,

52 F.4th 723, 728

 (8th Cir. 

2022); Hacker v. Barnhart,

459 F.3d 934, 936

 (8th Cir. 2006). In other words, where the 
Commissioner’s decision is among the reasonable conclusions that can be drawn from the 
evidence in the record as a whole, it will not be disturbed. See Despain v. Berryhill,

926 F.3d 1024, 1027

 (8th Cir. 2019); Nicola v. Astrue,

480 F.3d 885, 886

 (8th Cir. 2007); Buckner v. Astrue,

646 F.3d 549, 556

Ms. O contends that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate Dr. Lawrence
Richmond’s 2019 opinion. Dr. Richmond and occupational therapist Lori Anderson saw

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead of “weight,” the ALJ 
determines an opinion’s “persuasiveness” through consideration of several factors including 

the  professional’s  relationship  with  the  claimant  and  their  specialization.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(a) (referring to “persuasiveness”),  404.1520c(c) (listing factors), 416.920c(a) 
(referring to “persuasiveness”); 416.920c(c) (listing factors); Bowers v. Kijakazi,

40 F.4th 872, 875

 (8th Cir. 2022) (finding that ALJ adequately analyzed the persuasiveness of a medical 

under the new regulations). The most important factors for assessing the persuasiveness of a 
medical  opinion  are  supportability  and  consistency.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(b)(2), 
416.920c(b)(2). Supportability examines the source’s own records and explanations.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency addresses the extent to which the opinion 
aligns with evidence from other sources.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404

.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). 
    In evaluating the supportability factor, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical 

evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her 
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical 
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.”

20 C.F.R. § 404

.1520c(c)(1). Here, 
Dr. Richmond only saw Ms. O once and did not provide additional medical evidence or 
opinions in his report, significantly limiting the supportability of his opinion in the first 
instance. The ALJ stated that she considered all of the medical opinions in accordance with

20 C.F.R. § 404

.1520c(c)(1)’s requirements, though admittedly she did not specifically discuss 
the supportability of Dr. Richmond’s opinion. [R at 25.] Even were this lack of detail in her 
opinion writing erroneous, an error is harmless when the claimant fails to “provide some 
indication that the ALJ would have decided differently if the error had not occurred.” Lucus v. 
Saul,

960 F.3d 1066, 1069

 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Byes v. Astrue,

687 F.3d 913, 917

 (8th Cir. 
2012)). Here, Ms. O fails to articulate how the ALJ’s conclusion would have been different 

had she explicitly discussed the supportability of Dr. Richmond’s opinion. Indeed, had the 
ALJ explicitly discussed this factor, she would have presumably discussed how the lack of 
treatment history and the absence of discussion of medical evidence reduced the persuasive 
value of the opinion. Therefore, considering the record as a whole, “[t]his case was not a close 

call, and clarification on the [supportability of Dr. Richmond’s findings] . . .would not have 
significantly swayed the ALJ’s decision.” Grindley v. Kijakazi,

9 F.4th 622, 630

 (8th Cir. 2021). 
    The Court similarly rejects Ms. O’s contention that the ALJ failed to discuss the 
consistency factor as it applies to Dr. Richmond’s opinion. Ms. O raises various arguments 
regarding  this  factor,  but  none  are  persuasive.  The  ALJ  specifically  found  that  his 
determination that Ms. O could only work a 15–20 hours per week was “not consistent with 

the physical therapy records, claimant’s daily activities, and the records as a whole as discussed 
in greater detail below.” [R. at 27.] But Ms. O overlooks that Dr. Richmond also provided 
percentages for time Ms. O could spend sitting and standing in an eight-hour workday, 
indicating that Dr. Richmond did not believe she was incapable of full-time work. [Id. at 1245.] 
    Ms. O raises a further concern with the ALJ’s consistency analysis, asserting that the 
ALJ’s  conclusions  regarding  her  physical  abilities  are  not  preclusive  to  also  adopting 

Dr. Richmond’s findings, such as her ability to walk for 30 minutes. [Pl.’s Br. at 16–18, ECF 
No. 20.] This argument is likewise unavailing. Under the applicable regulations, a medical 
opinion’s  persuasiveness is evaluated  primarily based on how consistent it is “with the 
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” See

20 C.F.R. § 404

.1520c(c)(2). Ms. O’s more recent treatment records from the nearly two years that 
followed her evaluation by Dr. Richmond included, for example, Ms. O’s own reports that 

she had been able to walk a mile and ride the stationary bike and use the treadmill. [R. at 2057, 
1244.] Indeed, it appears that Ms. O followed Dr. Richmond’s recommendation to begin a 
“program of self-paced walking to improve cardio endurance and level of activity.” [Id. at 
1244.] The record as a whole supports the ALJ’s conclusions regarding Ms. O’s physical 

abilities. Ms. O essentially asks the court to reweigh evidence, which the Court will not do. 
Pierce v. Kijakazi,

22 F.4th 769, 771

 (8th Cir. 2022) (“So long as substantial evidence supports 
the ALJ’s decision, we will not reverse even if substantial evidence would have supported a 
contrary decision or even if we would have decided the case differently”). 
    Third, Ms. O argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding was “internally inconsistent” with 
Dr. Richmond’s  recommendation  that  Ms. O  take  breaks,  contending  that  “a  break  by 

definition is time off task to rest.” [Pl.’s Br. at 20–21.] But Ms. O does not point to any medical 
opinion that mandates that she take “time off task.” Ms. O misconstrues Dr. Richmond’s use 
of the word “break,” as he recommended that she take “sitting breaks as needed.” [Id. at 1245.] 
Although, Ms. O emphasizes Dr. Paulson’s opinion that Ms. O should “be allowed to stand 
and stretch, change positions every hour for up to 5 minutes,” the ALJ’s RFC finding provides 
that Ms. O “requires the opportunity to change positions every 30 minutes.” [Id. at 25, 177.] 

Moreover, the ALJ recommended that Ms. O perform sedentary work, which contemplates 
that Ms. O be allowed to take a break every two hours. Titles II & XVI: Determining Capability 
to Do Other Work-Implications of A Residual Functional Capacity for Less Than A Full Range of Sedentary 
Work, SSR 96-9P,

1996 WL 374185

, at *6 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“In order to perform a full 
range of sedentary work, an individual must be able to remain in a seated position for 
approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday, with a morning break, a lunch period, and an 
afternoon break at approximately 2-hour intervals.”). The ALJ did not err in her determination 
regarding Ms. O’s need for breaks.                                        
    In addition, Ms. O fails to acknowledge the extent to which the ALJ’s conclusion that 

a part-time limitation was not necessary was supported by evidence in the record. The ALJ 
described in detail Ms. O’s activities and treatment between November 2019 and July 2021. 
[R. at 27–29.] That discussion and the record itself both support the ALJ’s decision not to 
adopt Dr. Richmond’s suggestion for part-time work.                       
    Ms. O generally asserts that the ALJ erred in “rejecting” Dr. Richmond’s opinion. [R. 
at 19.]  But,  as  discussed,  the  ALJ  did  not  reject  Dr. Richmond’s  opinion;  rather,  she 

incorporated many of Dr. Richmond’s findings into her RFC, declining to adopt only his 
opinion regarding part-time work, which the ALJ found unpersuasive. The ALJ was “free to 
accept some, but not all, of a medical opinion.” Austin v. Kijakazi,

52 F.4th 723, 729

 (8th Cir. 
2022). And it is “the ALJ’s role to resolve conflicts in experts’ opinions.” Clay v. Barnhart,

417 F.3d 922, 930

 (8th Cir. 2005). The ALJ did so by conducting a thorough review of the medical 
record, as required.

20 C.F.R. § 416.945

(a) (providing that the RFC assessment is based on “all 

relevant  evidence  in  [the]  case  record”).  Ms. O’s  challenges  to  the  ALJ’s  evaluation  of 
Dr. Richmond’s opinion fail because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination 
regarding Ms. O’s stamina and capacity for full-time work. See Grindley,

9 F.4th at 630

. 

    Ms. O next contends that the ALJ erred because she did not “properly evaluate 
[Ms. O’s]  limitations  related  to  social  interactions  and  failed  to  accurately  reflect  these 

limitations in the RFC.” [Pl.’s Br. at 22.] The ALJ noted that Ms. O had a “moderate limitation 
in [her] ability to interact with others,” and thus determined that Ms. O could not perform 
teamwork or work in tandem with others, recommending that any interactions with the public 
should be incidental and occasional. [R. at 24, 25.] But Ms. O contends that the ALJ erred in 

failing to adopt more stringent restrictions in the RFC. She specifically argues that the ALJ did 
not “explain why the general public required occasional and incidental contact while co-
workers and supervisors did not. . . . There is no explanation within the four corners of the 
decision as to how the ALJ determined that different degrees of social interaction limitations 
were appropriate for various groups . . . .” [Pl.’s Br. at 24.] For two reasons, the Court finds 
that Ms. O has failed to demonstrate any error in the ALJ’s RFC determination. 

    First, limitations regarding social interactions in the workplace are “commonplace in 
unskilled work that involves ‘dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people,’” 
which is the type of work that the ALJ recommended for Ms. O. Dereschuk v. Colvin, No. 15-
CV-86 (TNL),

2016 WL 9454329

, at *25 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (quoting SSR 85–15,

1985 WL 56857

, at *4), aff’d sub nom. Dereschuk v. Berryhill,

691 F. App’x 292

 (8th Cir. 2017). Ms. O 
is correct that the ALJ noted that Ms. O “reported difficulty getting along with others. She felt 

authority figures were intimidating.” [R. at 24.] But the ALJ further explained that “[s]he was 
never fired or laid off from a job because of problems getting along with others.” [Id.] Ms. O 
fails  to  reference  any  evidence  that  would  support  a  greater  restriction  regarding  her 
interactions with supervisors and coworkers.                              
    Ms. O also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to “build an accurate and logical bridge 
between her conclusions related to limitations in social interactions and the evidence.” [Pl.’s 

Br. at 22.] Although the regulations do not explicitly require an ALJ to provide a “logical 
bridge” in explaining the basis for a decision denying benefits, even if that were a requirement, 
the ALJ’s opinion here would meet it. The ALJ’s decision cogently explains what evidence 
supports her determination about the degree of limitations appropriate for Ms. O’s social 

interactions  in  a  work  setting.  And  the  ALJ’s  conclusion  that  she  could  handle  some 
interaction with others is supported by the record, which demonstrates that Ms. O had never 
been fired for workplace conflicts and reflects that she described her ability to get along with 
authority figures, including “bosses,” as “fine.” [R. at 310–12.]         
    In the discussion of step 3, the ALJ conducted a detailed review of overall mental and 
social functioning, which supported the later-adopted RFC and demonstrated that the ALJ 

had carefully reviewed the relevant record. This included discussion of Ms. O’s ability to 
“attend appointments without difficulty getting along with others.” [R. at 23.] The ALJ relied 
on State Agency psychological consultant opinions as partially persuasive, but found that the 
overall records and Ms. O’s mental health treatment supported moderate limitations in all 
Paragraph B criteria, including the ability to interact with others. [R. at 30.] Moreover, in 
adopting functional limitations in the RFC related to Ms. O’s mental health impairments, the 

ALJ thoroughly discussed the evidence in the record of Ms. O’s mental health treatment, 
mental status exam findings, improvement with counseling, and treatment notes. [Id.] The 
ALJ’s reliance on these records is the very logical bridge Ms. O contends is lacking, and based 
on the Court’s review of these records, they provide substantial evidence for the ALJ’s 
determinations regarding the limitations on interactions ultimately adopted into the RFC. 
III.  ORDER                                                               
    For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                
    1.   Ms. O’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 20] is DENIED; and 

    2.   The  Commissioner’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  [ECF  No. 22]  is 
         GRANTED.                                                        

Let Judgment be Entered Accordingly.                                      
Date: January 8, 2024                                                     
                                         s/Katherine Menendez            
                                       Katherine Menendez                
                                       United States District Judge

Reference

Status: Unknown