McKay v. Hennepin County

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota January 16, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

TYREESE M. MCKAY, Case No. 23-CV-0997 (PJS/DJF)
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
HENNEPIN COUNTY; and JASON
WONG, DANIEL KOSKI, and REED
HENDRICKSON, Sheriff’s Deputies, in
their individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
Paul J. Bosman, for plaintiff.

Sarah C. S. McLaren, HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, for
defendants.
This case arises from a 2021 traffic stop in which plaintiff Tyreese McKay was
pulled over for changing lanes without signaling. Compl. ¶¶ 10–12, ECF No. 1. McKay
alleges that, during the stop, various Hennepin County Sheriff’s deputies threw him to
the ground; jumped on his back, ribs, and leg; and handcuffed him too tightly. Compl.

¶¶ 14–15, 17. As a result, McKay alleges, he suffered a fractured ankle and lacerations
on his wrists and face. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17, 23. After McKay was arrested and placed in
the back of a squad car, deputies searched McKay’s vehicle and discovered a substantial

quantity of marijuana. Compl. ¶ 18. McKay was charged with felony possession of
marijuana and misdemeanor obstructing legal process; both charges were later dropped
by the prosecutor. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21. McKay then sued defendants, bringing several
federal and state causes of action. The matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion

to dismiss.
A. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”

Id.

 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556

).  In ruling on a motion to
dismiss, the Court may consider only the pleadings and “materials necessarily
embraced by the pleadings.”  Ching v. City of Minneapolis,

73 F.4th 617

, 620–21 (8th Cir.

2023) (citing LeMay v. Mays,

18 F.4th 283, 289

 (8th Cir. 2021)).  In support of their motion
to dismiss, defendants have submitted five body-cam videos of the incident, and McKay
does not contest the authenticity of those videos.  McLaren Decl., ECF No. 12.  The

videos may therefore be considered by the Court in ruling on the motion to dismiss. 
Ching,

73 F.4th at 621

 (citing LeMay,

18 F.4th at 289

) (“Videos of an incident are
necessarily embraced by the pleadings . . . .”).                          


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                           B. Analysis                                   
    McKay seeks to recover for several alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment

rights:                                                                   
    First, McKay alleges that Deputy Jason Wong used excessive force when, “as
[McKay] began to return to his vehicle, the Deputy grabbed and shoved him, knocking

him to the ground.”  Compl. ¶ 14.  “To show excessive force, a plaintiff ‘must
demonstrate a seizure occurred and the seizure was unreasonable.’” Cravener v. Shuster,

885 F.3d 1135, 1138

(8th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). The videos make clear that this

specific claim as pleaded is meritless. The videos show that McKay was not taken to the
ground as he “began to return to his vehicle.” Compl. ¶ 14. Rather, he was taken to the
ground after being escorted by Deputy Wong to his squad car, which was roughly
20 feet away from McKay’s car. ECF No. 12-1 at 01:57–02:20; ECF No. 12-2 at

02:03–02:23. The timing matters, as the circumstances changed during the minute or so
between the initial stop of McKay’s car and McKay being taken down near the squad
car. ECF No. 12-1 at 01:21–02:19. In short, the complaint alleges a takedown that did

not occur (a takedown near McKay’s car), and says nothing about the takedown that
did occur (the takedown near the squad car). Moreover, the videos do not shed much
light on the circumstances of the takedown that did occur. Thus, the Court will dismiss
with prejudice the excessive-force claim that was pleaded. McKay may, however, seek

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leave to amend his complaint to bring a claim about the takedown that actually
occurred.

Second, McKay claims that the deputies used excessive force once he was on the
ground by “jumping on his back and ribs and another jumping on his leg.” Compl.
¶¶ 15–16. The complaint says almost nothing else about this alleged use of force; in

particular, the complaint does not plead facts establishing that this alleged use of force
was excessive. The videos do not clearly depict everything that happened while McKay
was on the ground, but they do show McKay defying the deputies’ instructions and
physically resisting their efforts to handcuff him. ECF No. 12-1 at 02:52–03:19. Such

resistance justified the use of some force to effect McKay’s arrest, and none of the force
depicted on the videos appears to be excessive. See Ehlers v. City of Rapid City,

846 F.3d 1002, 1011

 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding no excessive force in the use of a taser where “officers

at the scene reasonably could have interpreted Ehlers’s behavior of continuing to lay on
his hands and refusing to comply with instructions as resistance”).  In short, the
complaint fails to plead a plausible excessive-force claim with respect to the force

applied to McKay after the takedown.  Accordingly, that claim is dismissed without
prejudice.                                                                
    Third, McKay alleges that he “was handcuffed tightly” and cut in the process. 
Compl. ¶ 17.  Again, though, the complaint says almost nothing with respect to this

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claim; in particular, it does not allege facts that plausibly establish that any deputy used
excessive force in handcuffing McKay.  The fact that McKay was cut by the 

handcuffs—particularly in light of the physical resistance shown on the videos—does
not in itself make his excessive-force claim plausible.  Chambers v. Pennycook,

641 F.3d 898, 906

 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The degree of injury should not be dispositive, because the

nature of the force applied cannot be correlated perfectly with the type of injury
inflicted.”).  Moreover, the complaint does not allege, and the video does not show, that
McKay informed the deputies that the handcuffs were too tight.  See Howard v. Kansas

City Police Dept.,

570 F.3d 984, 991

 (8th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases finding excessive force
where officers unreasonably failed to respond to complaints that handcuffs were too
tight).  The complaint thus contains insufficient factual allegations to make plausible
McKay’s claim that the deputies used excessive force in handcuffing him.  That claim is

dismissed without prejudice.                                              
    Fourth, McKay alleges that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by
seizing him “without probable cause or legal justification.”  Compl. ¶ 26.  A traffic stop

constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, but “any traffic violation, no matter
how minor, is sufficient to provide an officer with probable cause” justifying such a
seizure.  United States v. Gonzalez-Carmona,

35 F.4th 636, 640

 (8th Cir. 2022) (citations
omitted).  McKay does not dispute that the deputies witnessed him committing a traffic

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violation.  Therefore, the deputies had probable cause to seize him.  Similarly, the
videos make clear that McKay physically resisted the deputies’ efforts to arrest and

handcuff him, giving them probable cause to arrest him for obstruction.  See United
States v. Castleman,

795 F.3d 904, 913

 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[A] warrantless arrest satisfies the
Constitution so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has

committed or is committing an offense.” (citation omitted)).  In short, the videos make
clear that McKay’s false-arrest claims are meritless, and thus those claims are dismissed
with prejudice.                                                           
    Finally, although McKay’s complaint alleges that the deputies searched his car

after his arrest, Compl. ¶ 18, the complaint does not allege that the search was unlawful. 
McKay made that claim for the first time in his response brief.  ECF No. 21 at 13–14. 
The claim is therefore not properly before the Court.  That said, based on its review of

the videos, the Court suspects that the search may indeed have been unlawful.  It does
not appear to the Court that the search was conducted incident to arrest, see United
States v. Stegall,

850 F.3d 981, 984

 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[O]fficers may search a vehicle

incident to an arrest only if (1) the arrestee is unrestrained and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment when the search begins or (2) it is reasonable to believe
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” (cleaned up)), or that the search
was an inventory search, see United States v. Kennedy,

427 F.3d 1136

, 1143–44 (8th Cir.

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2005) (inventory-search exception requires following a standardized impound and 
inventory-search policy).  If McKay wishes to pursue an unlawful-search claim, he may 
seek leave to amend his complaint. 
     Finally, McKay’s complaint asserts several claims under state law.  Those claims 

are also dismissed without prejudice, as the sparse factual allegations in the complaint 
do not permit the Court to find that those state-law claims are plausible.

ORDER

     Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 9] is 
GRANTED as follows: 
     1.     The takedown and false-arrest claims asserted in Count 1 of the complaint 
           [ECF No. 1] are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. 
     2.     All other claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.  The Court will, 
           however, not enter judgment before February 9, 2024, to allow McKay 
           time to move to amend his complaint.  Should he file such a motion, the 
           Court will not enter judgment until that motion has been decided. 
                                       <7    4         
Dated:  January 16, 2024                    Abe Wl Ghee C 
                                      Patrick J. Schiltz, Chie? Judge 
                                       United States District Court 

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