Locke v. County of Hubbard

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota January 22, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Matthew Locke,                     Case No. 23-cv-0571 (WMW/LIB)         

                        Plaintiff,

ORDER

County of Hubbard; Cory Aukes, in his
official and individual capacity; and Scott
Parks, in his official and individual
capacity,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 11.) For
the reasons addressed below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Defendants Cory Aukes and Scott Parks are deputies for the Hubbard County
Sherriff’s Office. In August 2021, the deputies responded to a report that numerous
protestors were trespassing on an Enbridge pipeline easement in Hubbard County,
Minnesota. When the deputies arrived, they observed Plaintiff Matthew Locke and three
other individuals who had attached themselves to two pieces of construction equipment
using three sleeping dragon devices.1 To remove Locke from the construction equipment,

1 A sleeping dragon device is an improvised tool made by protestors to secure themselves
to each other or to equipment, with their arms fed through a pipe or a tube. By locking their
hands together inside the device, the protestors hinder the ability of law enforcement
officers to remove them.
the deputies attempted to use pain compliance techniques to get Locke to release himself
from the equipment. Locke alleges that, as the deputies subjected him to the pain

compliance techniques, the right side of his face no longer moved in a normal manner.
When the deputies failed to remove Locke from the devices, Hubbard County and Cass
County extraction teams arrived and removed Locke and the other individuals from the
devices. Locke was transported to the hospital and subsequently to Hubbard County Jail.
Locke initiated this lawsuit against Defendant County of Hubbard and the two
deputies in their official and individual capacity. Locke alleges that the pain compliance

techniques used on him caused him to suffer facial paralysis, emotional distress and tinnitus.
In Count 1, Locke brings a claim of excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983 and
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Aukes and Parks. In Count 2 and Count 3,
Locke brings claims of assault and battery against Aukes, Parks and the County of Hubbard.
Defendants move to dismiss this action, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity

and official immunity.
ANALYSIS
A complaint must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, the complaint must allege sufficient facts that, when accepted as true, state

a facially plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009).  When 
determining whether the complaint states such a claim, a district court accepts as true all 
factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 
favor.  Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc.,

601 F.3d 852, 853

 (8th Cir. 2010).  The factual 
allegations need not be detailed, but they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 570

 (2007).  To satisfy this pleading requirement, a 
plaintiff must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 
elements  of  a  cause  of  action.”

Id. at 555

.  The  district  court  may  disregard  legal 
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 
I.   Deputies Aukes and Parks in Their Individual Capacity                
    Defendants  argue  that  Aukes  and Parks are  entitled  to  qualified  immunity  on 

Locke’s Section 1983 excessive force claim because Locke has not identified a clearly 
established right that was violated when Aukes and Parks responded to the protest.  Locke 
disagrees.                                                                
    To succeed on a motion to dismiss a 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim on the basis of qualified 
immunity, Defendants must show that they are “entitled to qualified immunity on the face 

of the complaint.”  Stanley v. Finnegan,

899 F.3d 623, 627

 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In other words, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 
unless the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Locke, demonstrate that Locke 
was deprived of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time 
of the deprivation.  Ryno v. City of Waynesville,

58 F.4th 995, 1004

 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation 

omitted).  In conducting its legal analysis, the district court may address the elements of 
the qualified immunity inquiry in any order.  Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 236

 
(2009).  This Court considers whether a right was clearly established at the time of the 
deprivation.                                                              
    Qualified  immunity  “protects  all  but  the  plainly  incompetent  or  those  who 
knowingly violate the law.”  Messerschmidt v. Millender,

565 U.S. 535, 546

 (2012) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).  A “clearly established” right does not require the 
existence of a case involving fundamentally similar facts.  Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 741

 (2002).  Rather, the court must determine whether the state actor had fair warning that 
their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Id.

  This inquiry turns on the “objective legal 
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established 
at the time it was taken.”  Pearson,

555 U.S. at 244

 (quoting Wilson v. Layne,

526 U.S. 603, 614

 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has cautioned against defining a “clearly established right” with an excessive degree 
of generality.  Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765, 778-79

 (2014).  Instead, “clearly 
established law must be particularized to the facts of the case.”  White v. Pauly,

580 U.S. 73, 79

 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).                         

    To prove that the law was clearly established when Aukes and Parks allegedly 
violated Locke’s  Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth  Amendment rights,  Locke  must 
identify Eighth Circuit precedent “that involves sufficiently similar facts to squarely govern 
the individual defendants’ conduct in the specific circumstances at issue” or, if such 
precedent does not exist, “present a robust consensus of persuasive authority constituting 

settled law.”  Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa,

991 F.3d 969, 980

 (8th Cir. 2021); 
see also Berry v. Hennepin Cnty., 20-cv-2189 (WMW/JFD),

2022 WL 3579747

, at *4 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 19, 2022).                                                     
    Locke does not identify any binding authority on this issue.  Instead, Locke points 
to Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, in which nonviolent protestors 
locked themselves into a black bear device.2

276 F.3d 1125

, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002).  While 

the protestors were locked to the black bear devices, the officers sprayed the protestors.  Id.  
And in effort to force the protestors to release themselves from the devices, the officers 
denied the protestors water to cleanse their eyes.  Id.  After the protestors refused to comply, 
the officers forced the protestors’ heads back and applied pepper spray with a Q-tip to the 
corners of the protestors’ closed eyes.  Id.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendants in Headwaters Forest Defense were “not 
entitled to qualified immunity because the use of pepper spray on the protestors’ eyes and 
faces  was  plainly  in  excess  of  the  force  necessary  under  the  circumstances,  and  no 
reasonable officer could have concluded otherwise.”  Id. at 1131.         
    The  officers’  use  of  force  in  Headwaters  Forest  Defense,  however,  is 

distinguishable  from the  pain  compliance  techniques  used  in  this  case.   “[Q]ualified 
immunity operates ‘to ensure that before they are subject to suit, officers are on notice their 
conduct is unlawful.’” Hope,

536 U.S. at 739

 (quoting Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194

, 206 
(2001).  Locke has not provided any case law, nor has the Court’s research revealed any 
law, that forbids the use of pain compliance techniques.  As such, Aukes and Parks were 

not on notice that their conduct was or would be clearly unlawful.        

2 A black bear device is similar a sleeping dragon device. A black bear device is a cylinder 
with a rod or post welded into the center.  Protestors place their arms into the steel cylinders 
of the black bear device and attach steel bracelets worn around their wrists to the center 
rods of the device.                                                       
    There is no requirement that the action in question be previously held unlawful.  
Vaugn v. Ruoff,

253 F.3d 1124

, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001).  Locke, however, fails to allege facts 

to show that the conduct at issue in this case would have been “clear to a reasonable officer 
that [the officer’s] conduct was unlawful in the situation [that the officer] confronted.”  
Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo.,

709 F.3d 1201, 1212

 (8th Cir. 2013); see also 
Forrester  v.  City  of  San  Diego,

25 F.3d 804, 809

  (9th  Cir.  1994)  (affirming  jury 
determination that the officer’s use of pain compliance techniques to remove nonviolent 
protestors in front of an abortion clinic was reasonable).  To the extent that Locke argues 

that the deputies’ force was excessive force because of the resulting injury, this argument 
is unavailing.   A court analyzes whether the force applied was  reasonable  from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the force was used, the analysis 
is not based solely on the resulting injury.  Chambers v. Pennycook,

641 F.3d 898, 906

 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (rejecting an “excessive force” requirement that would be unconstitutional when 

applied to a citizen with a latent weakness and constitutional when applied to a hardier 
person;  “[t]he  governing  rule  should  not  turn  on  such  unpredictable  and  fortuitous 
consequences of an officer’s use of force.”).                             
    For these reasons, Aukes and Parks, in their individual capacities, are entitled to 
qualified immunity.  Defendants’ motion to dismiss Locke’s claim against Aukes and Parks 

in their individual capacities is granted.                                
II.  Deputies Aukes and Parks in Their Official Capacity                  
    The Court next turns to the claim against Aukes and Parks in their official capacities.  
Locke’s Section 1983 claim against Defendants Aukes and Parks in their official capacity 
is “another way of pleadings an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”  
Baker v. Chisom,

501 F.3d 920, 925

 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Social 

Services,

436 U.S. 658

, 690 n.55 (1978)).  Accordingly, Locke’s claim against Aukes and 
Parks in their official capacities is a claim against the County of Hubbard. 
    “Municipal  liability  exists  ‘only  where  the  municipality  itself  causes  the 
constitutional violation.’”  Perkins v. Hastings,

915 F.3d 512, 520-21

 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385

 (1989)).  The County of Hubbard 
“may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations if a ‘violation resulted from (1) 

an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent 
failure to train or supervise.’”  Leftwich ex rel. Leftwich v. Cty. of Dakota,

9 F.4th 966, 972

 
(8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence,

829 F.3d 695, 699

 (8th Cir. 2016). 
    Locke does not allege an official municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a 
deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise that violated his constitutional rights.  

Therefore, Locke fails to establish a Section 1983 claim against Aukes and Parks in their 
official  capacities  and  fails  to  establish  a  claim  against  the  County  of  Hubbard.  
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Locke’s claim against Aukes and Parks in 
their official capacities is granted.                                     
III.  Assault and Battery Claim                                           

    Locke  also asserts  claims of  assault  and  battery  under  Minnesota  law  against 
Defendants.  Defendants contend that they are entitled to official immunity on these claims.  
Locke contends that he has properly alleged claims of assault and battery. 
    Under Minnesota’s official immunity doctrine, “a public official charged by law 
with duties which call for the exercise of his [or her] judgment or discretion is not 

personally liable to an individual for damages unless [the official] is guilty of a willful or 
malicious wrong.”  Birkeland as Tr. for Birkeland v. Jorgensen,

971 F.3d 787, 792

 (8th 
Cir. 2020) (quoting Elwood v. Cty of Rice,

423 N.W.2d 671, 677

 (Minn. 1988)).  An 
officer’s decision to use force “is a discretionary decision for which official immunity 
applies absent a showing of a willful or malicious wrong.”  See

id.

 (evaluating use of deadly 
force) (citing Maras v. City of Brainerd,

502 N.W.2d 69, 77

 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).  

Malice under Minnesota law is defined as an intentional act that a public official “had 
reason to believe is prohibited.”

Id.

 (quoting State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View,

518 N.W.2d 567, 571

 (Minn. 1994).                                         
    As addressed in Section I, Parks and Aukes would not have had reason to believe 
that the use of pain compliance techniques was prohibited.  And Locke does not allege that 

Parks and Aukes would have had reason to know that the use of pain compliance techniques 
was prohibited.  Parks and Aukes, therefore, did not act with malice and are also entitled 
to official immunity.                                                     
    Finally,  because  the  deputies’  discretionary  decisions  are  entitled  to  official 
immunity, the County of Hubbard is not vicariously liable.  Hayek v. City of St. Paul,

488 F.3d 1049, 1056, 1057

 (8th Cir. 2007) (observing that official immunity protects the 
government entities from vicarious liability arising from the state actor’s conduct).

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is dismissed.                          
    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 

Dated: January 22, 2024          s/ Wilhelmina M. Wright                                             
                                Wilhelmina M. Wright                     
                                United States District Judge

Trial Court Opinion

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Matthew Locke,                     Case No. 23-cv-0571 (WMW/LIB)         

                        Plaintiff,

ORDER

County of Hubbard; Cory Aukes, in his
official and individual capacity; and Scott
Parks, in his official and individual
capacity,

Defendants.

a facially plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009).  When 
determining whether the complaint states such a claim, a district court accepts as true all 
factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 
favor.  Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc.,

601 F.3d 852, 853

 (8th Cir. 2010).  The factual 
allegations need not be detailed, but they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 570

 (2007).  To satisfy this pleading requirement, a 
plaintiff must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 
elements  of  a  cause  of  action.”

Id. at 555

.  The  district  court  may  disregard  legal 
conclusions that are couched as factual allegations.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 
I.   Deputies Aukes and Parks in Their Individual Capacity                
    Defendants  argue  that  Aukes  and Parks are  entitled  to  qualified  immunity  on 

Locke’s Section 1983 excessive force claim because Locke has not identified a clearly 
established right that was violated when Aukes and Parks responded to the protest.  Locke 
disagrees.                                                                
    To succeed on a motion to dismiss a 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim on the basis of qualified 
immunity, Defendants must show that they are “entitled to qualified immunity on the face 

of the complaint.”  Stanley v. Finnegan,

899 F.3d 623, 627

 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In other words, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 
unless the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Locke, demonstrate that Locke 
was deprived of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time 
of the deprivation.  Ryno v. City of Waynesville,

58 F.4th 995, 1004

 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation 

omitted).  In conducting its legal analysis, the district court may address the elements of 
the qualified immunity inquiry in any order.  Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 236

 
(2009).  This Court considers whether a right was clearly established at the time of the 
deprivation.                                                              
    Qualified  immunity  “protects  all  but  the  plainly  incompetent  or  those  who 
knowingly violate the law.”  Messerschmidt v. Millender,

565 U.S. 535, 546

 (2012) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).  A “clearly established” right does not require the 
existence of a case involving fundamentally similar facts.  Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 741

 (2002).  Rather, the court must determine whether the state actor had fair warning that 
their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Id.

  This inquiry turns on the “objective legal 
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established 
at the time it was taken.”  Pearson,

555 U.S. at 244

 (quoting Wilson v. Layne,

526 U.S. 603, 614

 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has cautioned against defining a “clearly established right” with an excessive degree 
of generality.  Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765, 778-79

 (2014).  Instead, “clearly 
established law must be particularized to the facts of the case.”  White v. Pauly,

580 U.S. 73, 79

 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).                         

    To prove that the law was clearly established when Aukes and Parks allegedly 
violated Locke’s  Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth  Amendment rights,  Locke  must 
identify Eighth Circuit precedent “that involves sufficiently similar facts to squarely govern 
the individual defendants’ conduct in the specific circumstances at issue” or, if such 
precedent does not exist, “present a robust consensus of persuasive authority constituting 

settled law.”  Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa,

991 F.3d 969, 980

 (8th Cir. 2021); 
see also Berry v. Hennepin Cnty., 20-cv-2189 (WMW/JFD),

2022 WL 3579747

, at *4 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 19, 2022).                                                     
    Locke does not identify any binding authority on this issue.  Instead, Locke points 
to Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, in which nonviolent protestors 
locked themselves into a black bear device.2

276 F.3d 1125

, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002).  While 

the protestors were locked to the black bear devices, the officers sprayed the protestors.  Id.  
And in effort to force the protestors to release themselves from the devices, the officers 
denied the protestors water to cleanse their eyes.  Id.  After the protestors refused to comply, 
the officers forced the protestors’ heads back and applied pepper spray with a Q-tip to the 
corners of the protestors’ closed eyes.  Id.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendants in Headwaters Forest Defense were “not 
entitled to qualified immunity because the use of pepper spray on the protestors’ eyes and 
faces  was  plainly  in  excess  of  the  force  necessary  under  the  circumstances,  and  no 
reasonable officer could have concluded otherwise.”  Id. at 1131.         
    The  officers’  use  of  force  in  Headwaters  Forest  Defense,  however,  is 

distinguishable  from the  pain  compliance  techniques  used  in  this  case.   “[Q]ualified 
immunity operates ‘to ensure that before they are subject to suit, officers are on notice their 
conduct is unlawful.’” Hope,

536 U.S. at 739

 (quoting Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194

, 206 
(2001).  Locke has not provided any case law, nor has the Court’s research revealed any 
law, that forbids the use of pain compliance techniques.  As such, Aukes and Parks were 

not on notice that their conduct was or would be clearly unlawful.        

2 A black bear device is similar a sleeping dragon device. A black bear device is a cylinder 
with a rod or post welded into the center.  Protestors place their arms into the steel cylinders 
of the black bear device and attach steel bracelets worn around their wrists to the center 
rods of the device.                                                       
    There is no requirement that the action in question be previously held unlawful.  
Vaugn v. Ruoff,

253 F.3d 1124

, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001).  Locke, however, fails to allege facts 

to show that the conduct at issue in this case would have been “clear to a reasonable officer 
that [the officer’s] conduct was unlawful in the situation [that the officer] confronted.”  
Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo.,

709 F.3d 1201, 1212

 (8th Cir. 2013); see also 
Forrester  v.  City  of  San  Diego,

25 F.3d 804, 809

  (9th  Cir.  1994)  (affirming  jury 
determination that the officer’s use of pain compliance techniques to remove nonviolent 
protestors in front of an abortion clinic was reasonable).  To the extent that Locke argues 

that the deputies’ force was excessive force because of the resulting injury, this argument 
is unavailing.   A court analyzes whether the force applied was  reasonable  from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the force was used, the analysis 
is not based solely on the resulting injury.  Chambers v. Pennycook,

641 F.3d 898, 906

 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (rejecting an “excessive force” requirement that would be unconstitutional when 

applied to a citizen with a latent weakness and constitutional when applied to a hardier 
person;  “[t]he  governing  rule  should  not  turn  on  such  unpredictable  and  fortuitous 
consequences of an officer’s use of force.”).                             
    For these reasons, Aukes and Parks, in their individual capacities, are entitled to 
qualified immunity.  Defendants’ motion to dismiss Locke’s claim against Aukes and Parks 

in their individual capacities is granted.                                
II.  Deputies Aukes and Parks in Their Official Capacity                  
    The Court next turns to the claim against Aukes and Parks in their official capacities.  
Locke’s Section 1983 claim against Defendants Aukes and Parks in their official capacity 
is “another way of pleadings an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”  
Baker v. Chisom,

501 F.3d 920, 925

 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Social 

Services,

436 U.S. 658

, 690 n.55 (1978)).  Accordingly, Locke’s claim against Aukes and 
Parks in their official capacities is a claim against the County of Hubbard. 
    “Municipal  liability  exists  ‘only  where  the  municipality  itself  causes  the 
constitutional violation.’”  Perkins v. Hastings,

915 F.3d 512, 520-21

 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385

 (1989)).  The County of Hubbard 
“may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations if a ‘violation resulted from (1) 

an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent 
failure to train or supervise.’”  Leftwich ex rel. Leftwich v. Cty. of Dakota,

9 F.4th 966, 972

 
(8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence,

829 F.3d 695, 699

 (8th Cir. 2016). 
    Locke does not allege an official municipal policy, an unofficial custom, or a 
deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise that violated his constitutional rights.  

Therefore, Locke fails to establish a Section 1983 claim against Aukes and Parks in their 
official  capacities  and  fails  to  establish  a  claim  against  the  County  of  Hubbard.  
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Locke’s claim against Aukes and Parks in 
their official capacities is granted.                                     
III.  Assault and Battery Claim                                           

    Locke  also asserts  claims of  assault  and  battery  under  Minnesota  law  against 
Defendants.  Defendants contend that they are entitled to official immunity on these claims.  
Locke contends that he has properly alleged claims of assault and battery. 
    Under Minnesota’s official immunity doctrine, “a public official charged by law 
with duties which call for the exercise of his [or her] judgment or discretion is not 

personally liable to an individual for damages unless [the official] is guilty of a willful or 
malicious wrong.”  Birkeland as Tr. for Birkeland v. Jorgensen,

971 F.3d 787, 792

 (8th 
Cir. 2020) (quoting Elwood v. Cty of Rice,

423 N.W.2d 671, 677

 (Minn. 1988)).  An 
officer’s decision to use force “is a discretionary decision for which official immunity 
applies absent a showing of a willful or malicious wrong.”  See

id.

 (evaluating use of deadly 
force) (citing Maras v. City of Brainerd,

502 N.W.2d 69, 77

 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).  

Malice under Minnesota law is defined as an intentional act that a public official “had 
reason to believe is prohibited.”

Id.

 (quoting State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View,

518 N.W.2d 567, 571

 (Minn. 1994).                                         
    As addressed in Section I, Parks and Aukes would not have had reason to believe 
that the use of pain compliance techniques was prohibited.  And Locke does not allege that 

Parks and Aukes would have had reason to know that the use of pain compliance techniques 
was prohibited.  Parks and Aukes, therefore, did not act with malice and are also entitled 
to official immunity.                                                     
    Finally,  because  the  deputies’  discretionary  decisions  are  entitled  to  official 
immunity, the County of Hubbard is not vicariously liable.  Hayek v. City of St. Paul,

488 F.3d 1049, 1056, 1057

 (8th Cir. 2007) (observing that official immunity protects the 
government entities from vicarious liability arising from the state actor’s conduct).

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT 

IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is dismissed.                          
    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                 

Dated: January 22, 2024          s/ Wilhelmina M. Wright                                             
                                Wilhelmina M. Wright                     
                                United States District Judge

Reference

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