Sorcan v. Rock Ridge School District (Independent School District No. 2909)

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Pollyann Sorcan,                      Case No. 23-cv-1174 (WMW/LIB)      
                   Plaintiff,                                            
                                        ORDER GRANTING                   
     v.                               DEFENDANTS’ MOTION                 
                                           TO DISMISS                    
Rock Ridge School District (Independent                                  
School District No. 2909); and Bill Addy                                 
Board Chair, in his official capacity as                                 
Chair, and any successor,                                                
                   Defendants.                                           
    Defendants Rock Ridge School District and Bill Addy (collectively “Defendants”) 
have moved to dismiss Pollyann Sorcan’s claims.  (Dkt. 12.)  For the reasons addressed 
below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.                    
                         BACKGROUND                                      
    Sorcan is a member of the School Board (“School Board”) at Independent School 
District No. 2909, Rock Ridge (“District”).  Addy is the Board Chair.  During her tenure 
as a member of the School Board, Sorcan repeatedly questioned and commented on the 
District’s business, supported and opposed strategies and actions related to the District’s 
business, and advocated for positions such as fiscal discipline.          
    On August 9, 2021, the School Board issued a censure against Sorcan for three 
specified reasons: (1) violating District policy and failing to take direction from the School 
Board Chair, (2) failing to respect data privacy laws under District Policies 205 and 406, 
and  (3)  acting  against  the  mission  of  the  District  and  undermining  School  Board 
committees.  Sorcan alleges that Defendants censured her in retaliation for her political 
advocacy, support of the community, and attempts to be informed on relevant issues.  The 

censure purported to: (1) remove Sorcan from School Board committee assignments until 
a date specified by the School Board and (2) bar Sorcan from attending committee meetings.  
The censure was lifted on February 13, 2023.  During the censure period, Sorcan continued 
to attend committee meetings to which she was not assigned.               
    Sorcan commenced this action on April 26, 2023, alleging that the imposed censure 
and the School Board’s misinterpretation of Minnesota’s Open Meeting Law violated her 

First Amendment right to free speech and expression.  Defendants move the Court to 
dismiss Sorcan’s claims on alternative grounds.  Defendants maintain that Sorcan fails to 
state a claim on which relief can be granted.  Alternatively, Defendants contend that, if 
Sorcan has sufficiently pled a First Amendment violation, Defendants are legislatively 
immune.  Because this Court finds legislative immunity applies, it need not analyze 

whether Sorcan sufficiently pled a First Amendment violation.             
                           ANALYSIS                                      
    To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted as 
true, establish a facially plausible claim for relief.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 
(2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the district 

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 

 (8th 
Cir. 2010).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient 
to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007).  A plaintiff may not rely on, nor may a district court consider, legal 
conclusions couched as factual allegations.  See Iqbal, 

. 

I.   Legislative Immunity                                                 
    Defendants contend that the District and Addy are legislatively immune.  Sorcan 
maintains that neither the District nor Addy can claim the privilege of legislative immunity 
because the District is liable under Monell, and Addy, a local level official being sued in 
his official capacity, is liable under Umbehr.  Defendants disagree, arguing that Sorcan 
fails to allege liability under Monell and that local level officials sued in their official 

capacity, as Addy is here, can claim legislative immunity.                
    A.   Bill Addy’s Immunity                                            
    In Tenney v. Brandhove, the Supreme Court held that state legislators are absolutely 
immune from suit under Section 1983 for actions “in the sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity.”  

 (1951).  The Supreme Court subsequently extended this 

immunity to include regional legislators.  Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. 
Agency, 

 (1979).  In 1998, the Supreme Court recognized that local 
officials also have the privilege of legislative immunity for their legislative activities.  
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 

 (1998).  The Court reasoned that the rationales 
supporting legislative immunity for legislators at federal, state and regional levels “apply 

with equal force to local legislators.”  

.  Specifically, the Court determined that 
“[r]egardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not 
be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability,” “the time 
and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, 
where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace,” and “the threat of liability 
may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards 

may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability.”  

.  The court also observed 
that local level governments have two features that provide deterrents to legislative abuse 
that further warrant extending the privilege of legislative immunity: (1) “Municipalities 
themselves can be held liable for constitutional violations, whereas States and the Federal 
Government are often protected by sovereign immunity,” and (2) the electoral process 
“applies with equal force at the local level, where legislators are often more closely 

responsible to the electorate.”  

.                               
    The preceding cases address officials who were sued in their individual capacity.  
But the question remained as to whether government officials sued in their official capacity 
are legislatively immune for actions taken in their legislative capacity.  The Supreme Court 
addressed this question as it applies to state government officials and held that state 

officials sued in their official capacity are legislatively immune.  Supreme Ct. of Virginia 
v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 

 (1980); see also Church 
v. Missouri, 

, 754 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying Consumers Union and finding 
the state officials sued in their official capacity were legislatively immune from suit).  
However,  neither  the  Supreme  Court  nor the Eighth  Circuit has  explicitly  addressed 

whether legislative immunity extends to local level officials.  Rather, the only guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court is from a footnote in Board of County Commissioners, 
Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr, 

 (1996).                  
    In Umbehr, an independent contractor sued the Board of County Commissioners 
and individual Board members in their individual and official capacities, alleging they had 

violated his First Amendment right to free speech.  

  The Supreme Court addressed 
whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment protects independent contractors.  

.  In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that the district court “held that the claims 
against the Board members in their individual capacities would be barred by qualified 
immunity,” and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling on appeal.  

.  Then in a footnote citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and 

Coordination Unit, 

 (1993), the Supreme Court observed that “[b]ecause 
only claims against the Board members in their official capacities are before us, and 
because immunity from suit under § 1983 extends to public servants only in their individual 
capacities, the legislative immunity claim is moot.”  Umbehr, 

 n.* (internal 
citations ommitted).  In Leatherman, however, the claims against both officials who had 

been sued in their official capacity were dismissed by the district court, and the question 
of their immunity was not at issue on appeal.1  Indeed, the cited portion in Leatherman 



1 The district court in Leatherman dismissed the officials, stating:      
    In Brandon v. Holt, 

 (1985), the Supreme Court made clear that 
    an action  brought  under  § 1983  against  a  police  official  in  his  official 
    capacity is tantamount to an action against the public entity for which the 
    official is alleged to act. Individual liability of the official cannot flow from 
    a suit against him in his official capacity. A judgment against him in that 
    capacity is the same as a judgment against the public entity he represents. 
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 

 
(N.D. Tex. 1991), aff’d, 

 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 

 (1993) (internal citations omitted).                                  
analyzes the municipalities’ immunity, not the immunity of the local level officials sued in 
their official capacity.  Leatherman, 

.                    

    Because neither case directly addresses whether local level officials sued in their 
official capacity are legislatively immune for their legislative acts, this Court must look to 
the principles first articulated by the Supreme Court in extending legislative immunity to 
local officials in their individual capacity.  And as addressed above, in Bogan, the rationales 
supporting legislative immunity for legislators at federal, state and regional levels “apply 
with equal force to local legislators.”  

.  Considering the Supreme Court’s 

reasoning in Bogan, this Court identifies no reason to deprive local legislators of the 
privilege of legislative immunity.  Additionally, Sorcan fails to present any distinguishing 
principle that warrants treating local legislators differently from their state counterparts.  
Therefore, this Court concludes that local officials sued in their official capacity may be 
legislatively immune when acting in their legislative capacity.           

    i.   Acting in a Legislative Capacity                                
    Sorcan argues that even if this Court were to find that legislative immunity applies 
to Addy in his official capacity, the School Board’s issuance of a censure and punishment 
does not constitute a legislative act.  Defendants disagree.              
    Officials may claim legislative immunity for their legislative activities.  See Bogan, 

; Church, 

.  To determine if an act is a legislative activity, 
courts consider the nature of the act, not the motive or intent of the official performing the 
act.  Young v. Mercer County Commission, 

 (8th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
voting on a council resolution is a “quintessentially legislative” act that rests within the 
bounds of legitimate legislative activity).  The Eighth Circuit has found legislative acts to 
be  acts  akin  to  “legislative  function[s]  such  as  enacting  ordinances  or  establishing 

municipal policy,” Brown v. Griesenauer, 

 (8th Cir. 1992), or acts that 
“look[] to the future and change[] existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied 
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.”  

 (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic 
Coast Line Co., 

 (1908)).  Examples of acts found to be “undoubtedly” 
legislative functions include the introduction of a budget and signing into law an ordinance.  
Bogan, 

.                                                    

    Courts have also found a governing council’s discipline of one of its members to be 
a  “core  legislative  act”  that  does  not  pose  a  First  Amendment  concern.    Whitener 
v. McWatters, 

 (4th Cir. 1997); Callaway v. Hafeman, 

 (W.D. Wis. 1986), aff’d, 

 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding board actions 
indirectly terminating plaintiff’s position by “formulation of [a] reorganization plan,” were 

legislative acts); see also Stepien v. Schaubert, No. 08-cv-487A, 

, at *8 
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 08-cv-487, 

 (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010), aff’d, 

 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that 
removal proceedings constituted legislative action); Wilson v. Marshall Indep. Sch. Dist., 
No.  2:09-cv-273,  

,  at  *5  (E.D.  Tex.  Feb.  1,  2011),  report  and 

recommendation adopted sub nom. Wilson v. Marshall Indep. Sch. Dist, No. 2:09-cv-273, 

 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2011) (finding a formal reprimand to be a legislative 
act).                                                                     
    Regarding  Defendants’  argument  that  self-disciplinary  actions  against  board 
members are legislative acts, Whitener is instructive. In Whitener, the county board of 

supervisors disciplined a member for using inappropriate language while in his official role.  

.  The disciplinary measure censured the member and stripped the member 
of his committee assignments for a period of one year.  

  The disciplined member alleged 
that the board violated his First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his speech.  

  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found that, 
regardless of a First Amendment violation, the board was legislatively immune if the 

disciplinary action was legislative in nature.  

.  The Fourth Circuit drew a 
distinction between a legislature disciplining a member of a board versus terminating a 
board member’s employment.  

.  The latter was considered an administrative or 
executive act, and the former to be legislative in nature.  

  Accordingly, the board 
members were found to be immune because the censure was an exercise of their “self-

disciplinary power,” and, therefore, taken in a “legislative capacity.”  

.    
    Board Chair Bill Addy and the School Board disciplined Sorcan, a School Board 
member, for the following reasons: violating District policy and failing to take direction 
from the Board Chair, failing to respect data privacy laws under District Policies 205 and 
406,  and  acting  against  the  mission  of  the  District  and  undermining  School  Board 

committees.  The School Board’s “self-discipline” action censured Sorcan and removed 
her  from  School  Board  committees.    Although  the  School  Board’s  action  is  not 
quintessentially legislative and lacks the characteristics of a legislative act when compared 
to the examples above, such as the introduction of a budget or signing into law an ordinance, 
the censure nonetheless was self-disciplinary and did not result in the termination of 
Sorcan’s employment.  Accordingly, this Court concludes that the act was legislative in 

nature.  Because Addy acted in his legislative capacity, he is immune from suit. 
    B.   The District’s Immunity                                         
    The District may be held liable if Sorcan identifies a specific District policy or 
practice that is responsible for the alleged violation.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 

 (1978).  It is the plaintiff’s burden to identify a “persistent pattern of 
unconstitutional misconduct.”   Furlow v. Belmar, 

 (8th Cir. 2022); see 

also Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (identifying “custom or 
usage” includes proof of “a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional 
misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees”) (quoting Ware v. Jackson Cnty., 

 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Ware, 

 (finding misconduct 
spanning several months was sufficient to show a pattern of unconstitutional conduct). 

    Sorcan fails to identify a persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct.  Sorcan 
alleges that the imposed censure accompanied by a punishment is a custom, practice, or 
policy.  However, a single imposition of a censure and punishment is far from a “persistent 
pattern.”  Additionally, Sorcan broadly alleges that Defendants’ misinterpretation of the 
Minnesota Open Meeting Law created a practice and policy that violated her constitutional 

rights.    However,  the  complaint  fails  to  plead  how  the  misinterpretation  resulted  in 
unconstitutional acts arising to a persistent pattern that constitutes a custom or practice with 
the force of law.  Sorcan has failed to identify a specific unconstitutional policy or practice 
that is responsible for the alleged violation.  For this reason, the District is entitled to 
legislative immunity.                                                     

                         CONCLUSION                                      
    Because Bill Addy and the Independent School District No. 2909, Rock Ridge, are 
legislatively immune, the Court need not determine whether Sorcan sufficiently pled a First 
Amendment claim.  Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.    

    Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED:                                                        
    1.   Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 12), is GRANTED.           
    2.   This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.                        
    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDIGNLY.                                 


Dated:  January 22, 2024                 _s/_ _W_i_l_h_el_m__in_a_ M__._ W__r_ig_h_t_  
                                         Wilhelmina M. Wright            
                                         United States District Judge    

                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                

Pollyann Sorcan,                      Case No. 23-cv-1174 (WMW/LIB)      
                   Plaintiff,                                            
                                        ORDER GRANTING                   
     v.                               DEFENDANTS’ MOTION                 
                                           TO DISMISS                    
Rock Ridge School District (Independent                                  
School District No. 2909); and Bill Addy                                 
Board Chair, in his official capacity as                                 
Chair, and any successor,                                                
                   Defendants.                                           
    Defendants Rock Ridge School District and Bill Addy (collectively “Defendants”) 
have moved to dismiss Pollyann Sorcan’s claims.  (Dkt. 12.)  For the reasons addressed 
below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.                    
                         BACKGROUND                                      
    Sorcan is a member of the School Board (“School Board”) at Independent School 
District No. 2909, Rock Ridge (“District”).  Addy is the Board Chair.  During her tenure 
as a member of the School Board, Sorcan repeatedly questioned and commented on the 
District’s business, supported and opposed strategies and actions related to the District’s 
business, and advocated for positions such as fiscal discipline.          
    On August 9, 2021, the School Board issued a censure against Sorcan for three 
specified reasons: (1) violating District policy and failing to take direction from the School 
Board Chair, (2) failing to respect data privacy laws under District Policies 205 and 406, 
and  (3)  acting  against  the  mission  of  the  District  and  undermining  School  Board 
committees.  Sorcan alleges that Defendants censured her in retaliation for her political 
advocacy, support of the community, and attempts to be informed on relevant issues.  The 

censure purported to: (1) remove Sorcan from School Board committee assignments until 
a date specified by the School Board and (2) bar Sorcan from attending committee meetings.  
The censure was lifted on February 13, 2023.  During the censure period, Sorcan continued 
to attend committee meetings to which she was not assigned.               
    Sorcan commenced this action on April 26, 2023, alleging that the imposed censure 
and the School Board’s misinterpretation of Minnesota’s Open Meeting Law violated her 

First Amendment right to free speech and expression.  Defendants move the Court to 
dismiss Sorcan’s claims on alternative grounds.  Defendants maintain that Sorcan fails to 
state a claim on which relief can be granted.  Alternatively, Defendants contend that, if 
Sorcan has sufficiently pled a First Amendment violation, Defendants are legislatively 
immune.  Because this Court finds legislative immunity applies, it need not analyze 

whether Sorcan sufficiently pled a First Amendment violation.             
                           ANALYSIS                                      
    To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted as 
true, establish a facially plausible claim for relief.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 
(2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the district 

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 

 (8th 
Cir. 2010).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient 
to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

 (2007).  A plaintiff may not rely on, nor may a district court consider, legal 
conclusions couched as factual allegations.  See Iqbal, 

. 

I.   Legislative Immunity                                                 
    Defendants contend that the District and Addy are legislatively immune.  Sorcan 
maintains that neither the District nor Addy can claim the privilege of legislative immunity 
because the District is liable under Monell, and Addy, a local level official being sued in 
his official capacity, is liable under Umbehr.  Defendants disagree, arguing that Sorcan 
fails to allege liability under Monell and that local level officials sued in their official 

capacity, as Addy is here, can claim legislative immunity.                
    A.   Bill Addy’s Immunity                                            
    In Tenney v. Brandhove, the Supreme Court held that state legislators are absolutely 
immune from suit under Section 1983 for actions “in the sphere of legitimate legislative 
activity.”  

 (1951).  The Supreme Court subsequently extended this 

immunity to include regional legislators.  Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. 
Agency, 

 (1979).  In 1998, the Supreme Court recognized that local 
officials also have the privilege of legislative immunity for their legislative activities.  
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 

 (1998).  The Court reasoned that the rationales 
supporting legislative immunity for legislators at federal, state and regional levels “apply 

with equal force to local legislators.”  

.  Specifically, the Court determined that 
“[r]egardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not 
be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability,” “the time 
and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, 
where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace,” and “the threat of liability 
may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards 

may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability.”  

.  The court also observed 
that local level governments have two features that provide deterrents to legislative abuse 
that further warrant extending the privilege of legislative immunity: (1) “Municipalities 
themselves can be held liable for constitutional violations, whereas States and the Federal 
Government are often protected by sovereign immunity,” and (2) the electoral process 
“applies with equal force at the local level, where legislators are often more closely 

responsible to the electorate.”  

.                               
    The preceding cases address officials who were sued in their individual capacity.  
But the question remained as to whether government officials sued in their official capacity 
are legislatively immune for actions taken in their legislative capacity.  The Supreme Court 
addressed this question as it applies to state government officials and held that state 

officials sued in their official capacity are legislatively immune.  Supreme Ct. of Virginia 
v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 

 (1980); see also Church 
v. Missouri, 

, 754 n.3 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying Consumers Union and finding 
the state officials sued in their official capacity were legislatively immune from suit).  
However,  neither  the  Supreme  Court  nor the Eighth  Circuit has  explicitly  addressed 

whether legislative immunity extends to local level officials.  Rather, the only guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court is from a footnote in Board of County Commissioners, 
Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr, 

 (1996).                  
    In Umbehr, an independent contractor sued the Board of County Commissioners 
and individual Board members in their individual and official capacities, alleging they had 

violated his First Amendment right to free speech.  

  The Supreme Court addressed 
whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment protects independent contractors.  

.  In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that the district court “held that the claims 
against the Board members in their individual capacities would be barred by qualified 
immunity,” and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling on appeal.  

.  Then in a footnote citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and 

Coordination Unit, 

 (1993), the Supreme Court observed that “[b]ecause 
only claims against the Board members in their official capacities are before us, and 
because immunity from suit under § 1983 extends to public servants only in their individual 
capacities, the legislative immunity claim is moot.”  Umbehr, 

 n.* (internal 
citations ommitted).  In Leatherman, however, the claims against both officials who had 

been sued in their official capacity were dismissed by the district court, and the question 
of their immunity was not at issue on appeal.1  Indeed, the cited portion in Leatherman 



1 The district court in Leatherman dismissed the officials, stating:      
    In Brandon v. Holt, 

 (1985), the Supreme Court made clear that 
    an action  brought  under  § 1983  against  a  police  official  in  his  official 
    capacity is tantamount to an action against the public entity for which the 
    official is alleged to act. Individual liability of the official cannot flow from 
    a suit against him in his official capacity. A judgment against him in that 
    capacity is the same as a judgment against the public entity he represents. 
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 

 
(N.D. Tex. 1991), aff’d, 

 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 

 (1993) (internal citations omitted).                                  
analyzes the municipalities’ immunity, not the immunity of the local level officials sued in 
their official capacity.  Leatherman, 

.                    

    Because neither case directly addresses whether local level officials sued in their 
official capacity are legislatively immune for their legislative acts, this Court must look to 
the principles first articulated by the Supreme Court in extending legislative immunity to 
local officials in their individual capacity.  And as addressed above, in Bogan, the rationales 
supporting legislative immunity for legislators at federal, state and regional levels “apply 
with equal force to local legislators.”  

.  Considering the Supreme Court’s 

reasoning in Bogan, this Court identifies no reason to deprive local legislators of the 
privilege of legislative immunity.  Additionally, Sorcan fails to present any distinguishing 
principle that warrants treating local legislators differently from their state counterparts.  
Therefore, this Court concludes that local officials sued in their official capacity may be 
legislatively immune when acting in their legislative capacity.           

    i.   Acting in a Legislative Capacity                                
    Sorcan argues that even if this Court were to find that legislative immunity applies 
to Addy in his official capacity, the School Board’s issuance of a censure and punishment 
does not constitute a legislative act.  Defendants disagree.              
    Officials may claim legislative immunity for their legislative activities.  See Bogan, 

; Church, 

.  To determine if an act is a legislative activity, 
courts consider the nature of the act, not the motive or intent of the official performing the 
act.  Young v. Mercer County Commission, 

 (8th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
voting on a council resolution is a “quintessentially legislative” act that rests within the 
bounds of legitimate legislative activity).  The Eighth Circuit has found legislative acts to 
be  acts  akin  to  “legislative  function[s]  such  as  enacting  ordinances  or  establishing 

municipal policy,” Brown v. Griesenauer, 

 (8th Cir. 1992), or acts that 
“look[] to the future and change[] existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied 
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.”  

 (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic 
Coast Line Co., 

 (1908)).  Examples of acts found to be “undoubtedly” 
legislative functions include the introduction of a budget and signing into law an ordinance.  
Bogan, 

.                                                    

    Courts have also found a governing council’s discipline of one of its members to be 
a  “core  legislative  act”  that  does  not  pose  a  First  Amendment  concern.    Whitener 
v. McWatters, 

 (4th Cir. 1997); Callaway v. Hafeman, 

 (W.D. Wis. 1986), aff’d, 

 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding board actions 
indirectly terminating plaintiff’s position by “formulation of [a] reorganization plan,” were 

legislative acts); see also Stepien v. Schaubert, No. 08-cv-487A, 

, at *8 
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 08-cv-487, 

 (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010), aff’d, 

 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that 
removal proceedings constituted legislative action); Wilson v. Marshall Indep. Sch. Dist., 
No.  2:09-cv-273,  

,  at  *5  (E.D.  Tex.  Feb.  1,  2011),  report  and 

recommendation adopted sub nom. Wilson v. Marshall Indep. Sch. Dist, No. 2:09-cv-273, 

 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2011) (finding a formal reprimand to be a legislative 
act).                                                                     
    Regarding  Defendants’  argument  that  self-disciplinary  actions  against  board 
members are legislative acts, Whitener is instructive. In Whitener, the county board of 

supervisors disciplined a member for using inappropriate language while in his official role.  

.  The disciplinary measure censured the member and stripped the member 
of his committee assignments for a period of one year.  

  The disciplined member alleged 
that the board violated his First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his speech.  

  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found that, 
regardless of a First Amendment violation, the board was legislatively immune if the 

disciplinary action was legislative in nature.  

.  The Fourth Circuit drew a 
distinction between a legislature disciplining a member of a board versus terminating a 
board member’s employment.  

.  The latter was considered an administrative or 
executive act, and the former to be legislative in nature.  

  Accordingly, the board 
members were found to be immune because the censure was an exercise of their “self-

disciplinary power,” and, therefore, taken in a “legislative capacity.”  

.    
    Board Chair Bill Addy and the School Board disciplined Sorcan, a School Board 
member, for the following reasons: violating District policy and failing to take direction 
from the Board Chair, failing to respect data privacy laws under District Policies 205 and 
406,  and  acting  against  the  mission  of  the  District  and  undermining  School  Board 

committees.  The School Board’s “self-discipline” action censured Sorcan and removed 
her  from  School  Board  committees.    Although  the  School  Board’s  action  is  not 
quintessentially legislative and lacks the characteristics of a legislative act when compared 
to the examples above, such as the introduction of a budget or signing into law an ordinance, 
the censure nonetheless was self-disciplinary and did not result in the termination of 
Sorcan’s employment.  Accordingly, this Court concludes that the act was legislative in 

nature.  Because Addy acted in his legislative capacity, he is immune from suit. 
    B.   The District’s Immunity                                         
    The District may be held liable if Sorcan identifies a specific District policy or 
practice that is responsible for the alleged violation.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 

 (1978).  It is the plaintiff’s burden to identify a “persistent pattern of 
unconstitutional misconduct.”   Furlow v. Belmar, 

 (8th Cir. 2022); see 

also Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (identifying “custom or 
usage” includes proof of “a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional 
misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees”) (quoting Ware v. Jackson Cnty., 

 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Ware, 

 (finding misconduct 
spanning several months was sufficient to show a pattern of unconstitutional conduct). 

    Sorcan fails to identify a persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct.  Sorcan 
alleges that the imposed censure accompanied by a punishment is a custom, practice, or 
policy.  However, a single imposition of a censure and punishment is far from a “persistent 
pattern.”  Additionally, Sorcan broadly alleges that Defendants’ misinterpretation of the 
Minnesota Open Meeting Law created a practice and policy that violated her constitutional 

rights.    However,  the  complaint  fails  to  plead  how  the  misinterpretation  resulted  in 
unconstitutional acts arising to a persistent pattern that constitutes a custom or practice with 
the force of law.  Sorcan has failed to identify a specific unconstitutional policy or practice 
that is responsible for the alleged violation.  For this reason, the District is entitled to 
legislative immunity.                                                     

                         CONCLUSION                                      
    Because Bill Addy and the Independent School District No. 2909, Rock Ridge, are 
legislatively immune, the Court need not determine whether Sorcan sufficiently pled a First 
Amendment claim.  Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.    

    Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED:                                                        
    1.   Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 12), is GRANTED.           
    2.   This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.                        
    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDIGNLY.                                 


Dated:  January 22, 2024                 _s/_ _W_i_l_h_el_m__in_a_ M__._ W__r_ig_h_t_  
                                         Wilhelmina M. Wright            
                                         United States District Judge