Woodward v. Credit Service International Corporation

               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Lisa Woodward and Peter Woodward,          No. 23-cv-632 (KMM/ECW)        

   Plaintiffs,                                                          

v.                                    ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’                
                                   MOTION FOR ATTORNEY                  
Credit Service International Corporation  FEES AND COSTS                  
and Richard Muske,                                                        

   Defendants.                                                          


   Plaintiffs Lisa and Peter Woodward brought this lawsuit asserting that Defendants 
Credit Service International Corporation (“CSIC”) and attorney Richard Muske violated 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices  Act and Minnesota’s statutes governing efforts to 
garnish a debtor’s wages. After the Defendants removed the case to federal court and 
answered, they made an Offer of Judgment to the Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 68 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Woodwards accepted the offer of judgment in the 
total amount of $2,002.00 to resolve all claims against CSIC and Mr. Muske. They also 
agreed that their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs would be added to the judgment, 
and the parties would either agree to the amount of those fees and costs, “or if they are 
unable  to  agree,  as  determined  by  the  Court  upon  motion. . . .”  [Rule  68  Offer  ¶ 2, 
Dkt. 9.] The parties failed to resolve the issue of fees and costs on their own, and the 
matter is now before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
[Dkt. 19.] For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part.    
                        BACKGROUND                                      
   Plaintiffs Lisa Woodward and Peter Woodward allege that in May 2016, they 
obtained dental care for one of their children at Southhill Dental Group in Stillwater, 

Minnesota. They incurred an approximately $2,400 debt, and in May 2017, the Dental 
Group  retained  CSIC  to  collect  it.  Before  they  incurred  the  Dental  Group  debt,  the 
Plaintiffs lived in a Stillwater home located on Pine Street West. But at the time they 
obtained dental care for their child from the Dental Group, the Plaintiffs were living at an 
address on Swenson Street in Stillwater. That is the address Ms. Woodward gave to the 

Dental Group in connection with the service obtained in May 2016.         
   When the Defendants attempted to collect the debt, they used the Pine Street 
Address in several court filings. In February 2022, CSIC filed a statement of claim in 
Washington County conciliation court against the Woodwards. To establish jurisdiction 
for that action, CSIC alleged that the Woodwards lived at the Pine Street Address, and 

Defendants allegedly used the Pine Street Address in other court filings in the collection 
case. The Woodwards allege that Defendants knew or should have known those were 
false statements when they were filed because documents available to them showed that 
the Plaintiffs did not, in fact, live at the Pine Street Address. Further, the Plaintiffs allege 
that Defendants attempted to serve the conciliation court summons and complaint by U.S. 

Mail  at  the  Pine  Street  Address,  so  they  never  received  service  of  the  complaint. 
According to the Plaintiffs, the regular mail envelopes attempting service were returned 
to the Defendants as undelivered. And CSIC allegedly violated the FDCPA by seeking a 
judgment for $589.41 more than the debt reported to CSIC by the Dental Group.  
   Despite  knowing  that  they  had  used  the  wrong  address  and  had  not  properly 
served their papers, the Defendants allegedly moved forward with having the Pine Street 
Address entered in the conciliation court record so that the matter was scheduled for a 

hearing and a judgment could be obtained. The Plaintiffs alleged that throughout the 
conciliation court proceeding, the Defendants had information available to them showing 
that the Woodwards were living at the Swenson Street Address, but they ignored that 
information and pursued the action anyway.                                
   Ultimately, the Defendants obtained a judgment in the conciliation court matter, 

and  afterward,  they  attempted  to  collect  the  judgment  through  garnishment  of  the 
Plaintiffs’ wages. In late August 2022, Mr. Muske, acting as a debt collector and counsel 
for CSIC, sent the Woodwards two notices of intent to garnish their wages. Because the 
Plaintiffs had not received service of the conciliation court filings at the Swenson Street 
Address, this was allegedly the first time they were ever made aware of the conciliation 

court action and the judgment. Concerned about the garnishment notices, the Woodwards 
sought legal representation and hired Plaintiffs’ counsel, Kevin Giebel.  
   On September 21, 2022, around a month after he mailed the notice of intent to 
garnish,  and  not  having  heard  from  the  Plaintiffs  or  Mr. Giebel,  Mr. Muske  sent  a 
garnishment  summons  to  Lisa  Woodward’s  employer.  In  doing  so,  the  Defendants 

allegedly  provided  her  employer  with  an  inaccurate  total  ($2,920.81)  as  the  unpaid 
amount that was subject to garnishment. Thereafter, Mr. Giebel contacted Mr. Muske. As 
a result of their conversations, Mr. Muske agreed to withdraw the garnishment summons 
and  stipulated  to  having  the  conciliation  court  void  the  conciliation  court  judgment 
against the Woodwards and having it declared void ab initio, as though the judgment had 
never been entered.                                                       
   In  February  2023,  the  Plaintiffs  initiated  their  state  court  proceeding  alleging 

violations of the FDCPA and Minnesota’s garnishment statutes. Defendants eventually 
removed the case to the District of Minnesota on March 15, 2023, and filed their answers 
shortly thereafter. On April 12th, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright issued an 
Order for a Rule 16 conference to be held on May 23rd. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Giebel 
asked defense counsel for dates when they could conduct a Rule 26(f) planning meeting, 

but he did not receive a response. Before any Rule 26 meeting took place, Defendants 
served the Plaintiffs with their Rule 68 offer of judgment, and Plaintiffs accepted. 
   On May 4, 2023, with the permission of Mr. Giebel, defense counsel filed a Notice 
of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment, and the Rule 16 conference was canceled. As a 
result, the Clerk of Court entered a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of 

$2,002.00. [Dkt. 11.] With respect to the issue of attorney’s fees, The Offer of Judgment 
provided the following:                                                   
        2.  In  addition,  Plaintiffs  Lisa  and  Peter  Woodward’s     
        reasonable  attorneys’  fees  and  costs  in  connection  with  
        Plaintiffs  Lisa  and  Peter  Woodward’s  claims  against       
        Defendants  Credit  Service  International  Corporation  and    
        Richard Muske in the above-referenced suit are to be added to   
        said judgment; said attorneys’ fees and costs as are agreed to  
        between  the  parties,  or  if  they  are  unable  to  agree,  as 
        determined  by  the  Court  upon  motion  and  any  responses   
        thereto[.]                                                      

[Rule 68 Offer ¶ 2.]                                                      
                         DISCUSSION                                     
   Mr. Giebel and defense counsel discussed the issue of fees on several occasions 
but were unable to resolve their disagreements. The motion now before the Court was 

filed on May 25, 2023,1 the Defendants responded on June 8th, the Plaintiffs obtained 
permission to file a reply, and the matter was fully briefed on June 23, 2023. [Dkt. 19–
31.]2 The Plaintiffs seek $164.00 in costs, which Defendants do not dispute, and the 
Court will award. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (costs of the action may be awarded in an 
FDCPA case). However, the parties do not agree on the amount of reasonable attorney’s 

fees that should be awarded.3 The Plaintiffs request an award of $29,139.00 in attorney’s 
fees. [Dkt. 31 ¶ 31.] The Defendants contend that this request is unreasonably inflated 
because it is based on (1) an hourly rate that is higher than reasonable for this type of 
case, and (2) a total number of hours that is unreasonably excessive for a variety of 
reasons.  Having  considered  the  parties’  arguments  and  the  entire  record  in  this 



   1 A motion for fees, meet-and-confer statement, proposed order, and a “bill of 
costs” were filed on several days between May 13 and May 19, 2023. However, the 
request  for  attorney’s  fees  was  not  supported  by  any  factual  submissions,  and  no 
memorandum of law was filed, so the Court denied the motion without prejudice and 
instructed the Plaintiffs to refile the motion. [Dkt. 12–16, 18.]         
   2 On July 23, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed a “Satisfaction of Judgment” indicating that 
the  Defendants  paid  the  $2,002.00  judgment  to  the  Woodwards  on  June  23,  2023. 
[Dkt. 32.]                                                                
   3  Similarly,  the  Defendants  do  not  argue  that  fees  cannot  be  recovered  in 
connection with this suit, nor dispute that the Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of some 
attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the Court will not address these issues in detail. See Wiley v. 
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 

, 1135 (D. Minn. 2022) (noting 
that costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are recoverable in an FDCPA case). 
proceeding, the Court concludes that an award of $12,239.00 in attorney’s fees and costs 
is reasonable under these circumstances.                                  
I.   Legal Standards                                                    

   District courts have “broad discretion” in awarding attorney’s fees. Hanig v. Lee, 

 (8th Cir. 2005). Courts typically begin their analysis of determining a 
reasonable fee award by using the “lodestar” approach—the number of hours reasonably 
expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ 
Council for Clean Air, 

 (1986), supplemented, 

 (1987); 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

 (1983); Paris Sch. Dist. v. Harter, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018). A dispute over fees generally “should not result in a second major 
litigation,” and district courts “need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade 
accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 

 (2011). When awarding fees, a court should 
aim to “do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection,” and may resort to “estimates 

in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.” 

                    
   “A reasonable hourly rate is usually the ordinary rate for similar work in the 
community where the case has been litigated.” Emery v. Hunt, 

, 1048 (8th 
Cir. 2001). In determining a reasonable hourly rate, district courts are permitted “to rely 
on their own experience and knowledge of prevailing market rates.” Hanig, 

.  The  party  seeking  fees  has  the  burden  to  produce  “satisfactory  evidence—in 
addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those 
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 
skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 

, 895 n.11 (1984); see 
also Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 

 (8th Cir. 2002).            
   In addition to having the burden of showing the reasonableness of the requested 

rate, the party applying for an award of attorney’s fees has the burden of “documenting 
the appropriate hours expended. . . .” Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 

, 851 
(8th Cir. 2002). Just as courts assess the reasonableness of the claimed hourly rate, they 
must also “determine whether the hours claimed were reasonably expended.” Harter, 

  (quotations  omitted).  Courts  may  rely  on  their  own  knowledge  and 

experience in reaching that determination. 

                            
II.  Analysis                                                           
   Reasonable Hourly Rate                                               
   First, the parties dispute the reasonableness of the claimed hourly rate. Plaintiffs 
ask the Court to apply an hourly rate of $450 for Mr. Giebel’s work on this matter. 

Mr. Giebel provided a declaration indicating that he has over 37 years of experience as a 
lawyer, having graduated from law school and gaining admission to the bar in 1984. Over 
that time, Mr. Giebel has been involved in a wide variety of practice areas, including 
general  corporate  representation, real estate, mergers and acquisitions, and litigation. 
[Dkt. 20  ¶¶ 4–6.]  His  practice  includes  “approximately  seven  years  supervising  and 

operating [his] firm’s collection law firm practice,” and in FDCPA and related state law 
cases on both the consumer and collections side. [Dkt. 20 ¶ 3.] Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that such a rate is reasonable for a case like this. 
Mr. Giebel attests that in two cases in this district, he has submitted fee applications 
where he was awarded a rate of $575 per hour, and in other instances he has billed as 
much  as  $625  per  hour.  [Dkt. 20  ¶¶ 7,  11.]  He  also  notes  that  his  written  retainer 
agreement with the Woodwards established a preliminary hourly rate of $450 per hour 

and states that he “believes that $450.00 per hour is a reasonable attorney rate in this 
Hennepin  County  locale,  and  for  application  in  this  Action.”  [Dkt. 20  ¶ 8.]  Finally, 
Mr. Giebel states that a recent decision provided to him by defense counsel indicates that 
defense counsel began practicing in 2013, several years after Mr. Giebel, and that he 
typically charges an hourly rate between $400 and $425 in similar FDCPA matters. 

[Dkt. 20 ¶ 49.]                                                           
   The Defendants assert that this case does not justify an hourly rate of $450 and 
that the Plaintiffs’ evidence in support of that rate is insufficient to establish that it is 
appropriate.  The  Defendants  argue  that  a  $350  hourly  rate  is  reasonable  under  the 
circumstances because: (1) this case was neither complex, nor was it ever really litigated; 

(2) Mr. Giebel  offered  nothing  other  than  his  own  affidavit  and  opinions  as  to  the 
reasonableness of the $450 rate; (3) Mr. Giebel’s experience as an attorney in FDCPA 
litigation  is more limited  than  his declaration implies; and  (4) in other cases with  a 
similar  lack  of  complexity,  courts  have  found  hourly  rates  lower  than  $450  to  be 
reasonable. [Dkt. 25 at 19–24.]                                           

   In light of the evidence in the record relevant to this issue, the parties’ arguments, 
and the Court’s own experience in resolving similar fee disputes, the Court finds a $350 
hourly rate for Mr. Giebel’s time performing legal work on this case is reasonable. The 
Plaintiffs’  evidence  submitted  in  support  of  the  requested  $450  rate  falls  short  of 
satisfying their burden. While the Court does not doubt the veracity of Mr. Giebel’s 
assertions in his declaration, his own declaration does not offer any specific opinion 
regarding the prevailing market rates in the Twin Cities legal community for comparable 

cases. Nor do Plaintiffs point to any affidavit from another local practitioner offering any 
opinion regarding the reasonableness of the requested rate in the Twin Cities for a case 
like this one. See Harris v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 13-cv-1719 (SRN/SER), 

, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2018) (“Frequently, when moving for or 
opposing a fee petition, parties submit affidavits from local practitioners who opine on 

the reasonableness of attorneys’ hourly rates, billing for legal services, and attorneys’ 
standing and reputation in the local legal community.”).                  
   Further, the rates allegedly charged by defense counsel in similar FDCPA cases 
are not particularly persuasive in this case for two reasons. First, although an opposing 
counsel’s fees may occasionally be relevant to determining the reasonableness of the fees 

sought by an applicant, that is not an ironclad principle. See Harris, 

, at 
*7 n.5 (finding that the court need not consider defense counsel’s fees in assessing the 
reasonableness of plaintiffs’ claimed hourly rates and citing Burks v. Siemens Energy & 
Automation, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2000) which noted that the comparison of 
an opponent’s fees  can be an “apples-to-oranges comparison” and require  additional 

analysis  of  the  reasonableness  of  defense  counsel’s  billing).  Second,  and  more 
importantly, the record here shows that in the case referenced in Mr. Giebel’s declaration, 
although defense counsel Patrick Newman’s typical hourly rate was between $400 and 
$425, he and co-defense counsel charged a discounted rate of $295. [Newman Decl., 
Ex. L at 9, Dkt. 27.] The Defendants represent that, as was the situation in that matter, 
this matter similarly involves an insurance carrier paying a discounted rate. [Dkt. 25 at 23 
n.8.]                                                                     

   The Court also finds Mr. Giebel’s reliance on the $575 hourly rate he was awarded 
in other cases does not establish that a $450 hourly rate is reasonable here. In particular, 
the fact that Mr. Giebel was awarded a $575 rate in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 
collective action that was heavily litigated —Harris v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 

, at *8 (table of approved rates)—says very little about why such a rate would 

be reasonable in this relatively simple FDCPA and supplemental state law garnishment 
case. Although perhaps less complicated in terms of the number of plaintiffs involved, 
the  other  case  relied  on  by  the  Plaintiffs  for  establishing  the  reasonableness  of 
Mr. Giebel’s claimed $450 hourly rate was also a fairly heavily litigated individual FLSA 
case. See Woodards v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-4181 (SRN/SER), 

 (D. Minn. May 28, 2015), which the court handled in tandem with the 
Harris matter. 

, at *1 n.1. Plaintiffs offer no reasoned argument why the 
comparison of these cases is relevant to determining the reasonable hourly rate for a case 
involving a different area of law and fundamentally different circumstances. 
   Ultimately, the Court determines that a $350 hourly rate is reasonable in this 

matter. Mr. Giebel is, indeed, a seasoned attorney with a breadth of expertise, and he has 
shown  that  his  career  has  involved  several  years  of  experience  on  both  sides  of 
collections-related matters. Based on the Court’s experience  and familiarity with fee 
disputes in FDCPA cases, rates of $400 per hour and higher have typically been found 
appropriate in cases that involve “substantially more litigation than the case at hand.” See 
Meidal v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., No. 18-cv-985 (PAM/BRT), 

, at 
*2–3 (D.  Minn. Sept. 19, 2018) (finding a $300 hourly rate reasonable in a simple 

FDCPA dispute); see also Wiley, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 1147 (approving a $400 hourly rate 
for work performed in three related cases and $450 for work performed in a fourth). 
   The Plaintiffs’ argument that this case was complex enough to justify a higher 
hourly rate because it involved “two separate Plaintiffs and two separate Defendants, and 
multiple claims” is unpersuasive. [Dkt. 22 at 20.] To the contrary, this case involved a 

bare minimum of litigation and was not particularly complex. In fact, it was a run-of-the-
mill dispute that was resolved quickly, and likely could have been resolved even sooner. 
While there are two parties on each side, the merits of the dispute here were relatively 
straightforward, and the interests of both defendants and both plaintiffs aligned. Plaintiffs 
are correct that their complaint was not mere boilerplate or a template pleading, but it was 

refreshingly simple in comparison to other federal litigation. And the litigation in this 
Court was minimal: after the Plaintiffs served their complaint, the case was resolved in a 
few months, there was no commencement of discovery, no litigation over the merits, no 
depositions, no motion practice,  and  no court involvement aside from Judge Cowan 
Wright’s  notice  setting  a  Rule  16  conference.  Therefore,  with  due  consideration  of 

Mr. Giebel’s  experience,  his  long  career  as  a  practicing  attorney,  and  the  specific 
evidence concerning his experience in collections litigation, the Court finds that a $350 
per hour rate is reasonable under the circumstances.                      
   Reasonableness of Hours Expended                                     
   Next, the parties dispute the reasonableness of the hours expended. The Plaintiffs 
argue that they should recover attorneys’ fees incurred for essentially all work performed 

by Mr. Giebel relating to this dispute dating back to his earliest involvement in August 
2022.  Specifically,  they  argue  that  “all  of  the  time  incurred  prior  to  service  of  the 
Complaint in this Action was an absolutely critical part of the Action and necessary to its 
ultimate success, and indeed crucial to this Action.” [Dkt. 22 at 16–17.] Plaintiffs seek an 
award of fees for hours Mr. Giebel expended in investigating the underlying conciliation 

court case and negotiating a resolution of that proceeding, arguing that those efforts were 
instrumental in obtaining excellent results for his clients that are intertwined with this 
lawsuit. They also argue that Mr. Giebel’s billing records establish the reasonableness of 
the claimed hours in connection with both Mr. Giebel’s pre-suit representation and in 
investigating, preparing, and litigating this case.                       

   Defendants disagree. They take the position that the motion seeks compensation 
beyond what is reasonable in this case. They argue that recovery of fees claimed in 
connection  with  Mr. Giebel’s  work  on  the  state  court  conciliation  case  and  the 
garnishment summons is improper because: (1) Mr. Giebel could have acted sooner to 
prevent the garnishment summons from ever going out;4 (2) any fees incurred in the 


   4 The Court declines to engage in any extended discussion of the Defendants’ 
characterizations of Mr. Giebel’s actions as “lying in wait” or constituting a “set up.” 
[E.g.,  Dkt. 25  at  5–7.]  Rather  than  fan  the  flames  of  what  appears  to  be  a  rather 
contentious relationship between opposing counsel in this case, the Court will cabin its 
consideration to whether hours were reasonably expended or otherwise compensable as 
attorney time.                                                            
underlying action would constitute actual damages belonging to the Plaintiffs that are 
foreclosed by the Rule 68 offer of judgment; and (3) an award of those fees would be 
contrary to the plain language of the Rule 68 offer, accepted by the Plaintiffs, which 

limited  available  fees  and  costs  to  those  incurred  “in  the  above-referenced  suit.”  In 
addition, the Defendants argue that, in various ways, Mr. Giebel’s billing records show 
he expended more hours than were reasonably necessary in handling this matter, billed 
for clerical or administrative tasks, and inflated the hours claimed by failing to engage in 
reasonable negotiation over the fee dispute both before and after the Rule 68 offer. [See 

generally Dkt. 25.]                                                       
   As noted, the Plaintiffs seek an award of $29,139.00 in attorney’s fees. [Dkt. 31 
¶ 31.] Plaintiffs calculate this amount by multiplying 64.3 hours of attorney time by the 
$450 requested hourly rate and applying a 10% discount to that total figure ($26,041.00). 
The additional $3,098.00 the Plaintiffs request is in connection with 8.1 hours incurred 

after  the original  motion was filed, multiplied by an hourly rate of $450. The total 
number of hours reflected in Mr. Giebel’s time records is 72.4, which would result in a 
lodestar figure of $32,580 with no discounts applied. Mr. Giebel asserts that the 10% and 
15% reductions he has voluntarily applied sufficiently account for the issues raised by the 
Defendants. Here, the Court finds that amount to be excessive and, for the reasons stated 

below,  concludes  that  several  categories  of  hours  unreasonably  expended  should  be 
excluded from the award of fees.                                          
   -  Fees Incurred in Underlying Proceeding                            
   First, the Court concludes that a reduction in the hours claimed is appropriate 
given  the  substantial  number  of  hours  sought  in  connection  with  Mr. Giebel’s 

representation of the Woodwards in response to the Defendants’ underlying garnishment 
efforts and the state court conciliation case. The Plaintiffs cite no authority that such 
work is recoverable as attorney’s fees in a case like this. And the case law indicates that 
such  fees  incurred  in  connection  with  underlying  collections  actions  are  more 
appropriately categorized as a plaintiff’s “actual damages.” Wiley, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 

1137–40 (collecting cases and rejecting several arguments that such fees in underlying 
collections actions do not constitute “actual damages”). The Rule 68 Offer in this case 
provided that the judgment in the total amount of $2,002.00 would “resolve all claims 
asserted by” the Plaintiffs “as well as any claims that could have been raised against 
Defendants [CSIC] and Richard Muske in this action.” [Rule 68 Offer ¶ 1.] Accordingly, 

allowing recovery of those “actual damages” through the fee petition would deny the 
Defendants the benefit of the bargain they struck in agreeing to the entry of judgment for 
$2,002.00.                                                                
   Moreover, the Court is persuaded that it would not be reasonable to allow recovery 
of significant fees incurred in connection with the garnishment summons. The record 

shows  that  Mr. Giebel  was  retained  weeks  before  Mr. Muske  sent  that  summons  to 
Ms. Woodward’s employer. In fact, he was retained when the Woodwards first received a 
notice of intent to garnish their wages from Mr. Muske. Mr. Giebel could have reached 
out to Mr. Muske then to explain why any garnishment would be inappropriate. But he 
did not contact Mr. Muske until after Muske, having heard nothing from the Plaintiffs or 
Mr. Giebel, moved forward with service of the garnishment summons. When Mr. Giebel 
did  contact  Mr. Muske,  they  were  quickly  able  to  resolve  the  garnishment  issue: 

Mr. Muske withdrew the summons and agreed to having the underlying conciliation court 
judgment voided. This suggests that had Mr. Giebel immediately contacted Mr. Muske, 
substantial fees incurred by the Plaintiffs in connection with the underlying action would 
have been unnecessary.                                                    
   The Court is also persuaded that the language of the Rule 68 Offer in this case 

contemplates that any award of fees would be cabined to those incurred in connection 
with this case, not those incurred for all of Mr. Giebel’s work that is in any way related to 
the underlying collections efforts of the Defendants. Indeed, the Rule 68 Offer plainly 
states that the Woodwards’ attorney’s fees that are to be added to the $2,002.00 judgment 
are the fees incurred “in connection with [Plaintiffs’] claims . . . in the above referenced 

suit.”  [Rule  68  Offer  ¶ 2  (emphasis  added).]  The  “above  referenced  suit”  that  is 
referenced in the Rule 68 Offer is this action.                           
   Having reviewed Mr. Giebel’s billing records, the Court finds that the claimed 
hours expended should be reduced by 24.2 hours. In particular, the Court has considered 
the nature of the entries from August 30, 2022, through November 5, 2022, after which 

the focus of Mr. Giebel’s billable work shifted from issues related to the underlying 
conciliation court matter and the garnishment notices and summons to the investigation 
and preparation of the complaint in this action. [Giebel Decl., Ex. 2 at 9–13, Dkt. 20-1.] 
The Court’s finding has taken into account the fact that Mr. Giebel’s billing records all 
contain  a  heading  listing  both  the  underlying  cases  in  Washington  County  and  the 
“FDCPA matter,” and the individual entries do not always plainly delineate whether the 
tasks being logged relate to the state court and garnishment issues or this action. 

   -  Block Billing and Administrative Tasks                            
   Defendants  argue  that  additional  reductions  are  warranted  because 
(1) Mr. Giebel’s time entries constitute “block billing,” making it a challenge to assess 
the  precise  division  between  compensable  and  non-compensable  attorney  time;  and 
(2) the time records reflect that Mr. Giebel is billing for administrative tasks that are not 

compensable as attorney billable time. The Court has carefully reviewed the records. 
While the Court agrees that block billing can make it difficult to review the submission, 
the Court declines to reduce the ordered fees for either of these reasons. 
   -  Drafting Discovery                                                
   The Defendants also asked the Court to deduct 3.5 hours from Mr. Giebel’s billing 

records for the entry on April 1, 2023, because Mr. Giebel spent time drafting written 
discovery before a discovery conference had ever been scheduled. They argue that it was 
premature for Mr. Giebel to have begun such preparation under the circumstances here. 
The Court finds that no such reduction is warranted under the circumstances. 
   The  April  1st  billing  entry  predates  the  April  12th  Order/Notice  of  a  pretrial 

conference issued by Judge Cowan Wright. However, it is also true that the Defendants 
did not serve their Rule 68 Offer on the Plaintiffs until April 11th, so it was by no means 
clear  that  discovery  would  be  unnecessary.  Indeed,  in  the  communications  between 
counsel leading up to the service of the complaint, the Defendants had, in fact, argued 
that the Woodwards’ claims lacked merit. [E.g., Dkt. 27-1 at 12–13 (1/13/23 letter); id. at 
31 (2/1/23 email).] At the time Mr. Giebel drafted the discovery, the Defendants had just 
served answers to the complaint denying liability, Mr. Giebel sought dates for a Rule 

26(f) conference, and although not much time passed after he made the initial request, he 
had not yet heard back from the Defendants. [Id. at 44 (3/31/23 letter); Dkt. 6 (Muske 
Answer); Dkt. 7 (CSIC Answer).]                                           
   Mr. Giebel’s  decision  to  immediately  turn  to  drafting  discovery  raises  some 
questions about the necessity of his actions, and it is debatable whether clients required to 

pay their attorney’s hourly fees out of pocket would agree to compensate a lawyer for 
such  discovery  work.  However,  because  the  Defendants  cite  no  binding  precedent 
requiring the deduction of these hours under such circumstances,5 and because it was by 
no means clear at the time Mr. Giebel drafted these initial discovery requests that this 
litigation  would  be  resolved  without  any  discovery,  the  Court  finds  that  it  was  not 

unreasonable for Mr. Giebel to have expended these hours. Therefore, the Court will not 
deduct the time entered by Mr. Giebel on April 1, 2023.                   
   -  Settlement Negotiations                                           
   Finally,  the  Defendants  argue  that  the  hours  claimed  should  be  substantially 
reduced because Mr. Giebel engaged in unreasonable settlement negotiations both before 

   5 The circumstances here distinguish this case from the non-binding precedent 
cited by the Defendants. Maher v. Barton, No. 4:13-cv-2260 (CEJ), 

, 
at  *3  (E.D.  Mo.  Apr.  2,  2014)  (deducting  two  hours  for  premature  discovery  when 
defendants had filed no answer and no case management order had been issued); Ferrari 
v. U.S. Equities Corp., 661 Fed. App’x 47, 49 (2nd Cir. 2016) (affirming decision not to 
award fees for preparation of summary judgment motion where motion or judgment on 
the pleadings had not yet been decided).                                  
and  after  the  Defendants  served  their  Rule  68  Offer.  They  further  contend  that 
Mr. Giebel’s settlement strategy was not pursued in good faith, justifying denying an 
award of fees for any hours he billed after the Plaintiffs accepted the Rule 68 Offer and 

that his approach to negotiations “virtually guaranteed this motion would be necessary.” 
They argue that a reduction by 15.6 hours billed after the Rule 68 Offer was accepted is, 
therefore,  appropriate.  [Dkt. 25  at  29–30.]  The  Plaintiffs  argue  that  Mr. Giebel’s 
approach to settling this matter both before and after the acceptance of the offer of 
judgment were conducted in good faith and were reasonable. [Dkt. 30 at 7–9.] 

   Having carefully reviewed the entire record, the Court concludes that it does not 
support the exclusion of every hour billed by Mr. Giebel after the Plaintiffs accepted the 
Rule 68 Offer as the Defendants request. Defendants have not demonstrated that every 
hour  Mr.  Giebel  spent  after  his  clients’  acceptance  of  the  offer  of  judgment  was 
unreasonable  or  could  not  be  compensated.  For  one  thing,  under  the  FDCPA,  fees 

incurred after a Rule 68 offer is accepted may be recovered, “including those associated 
with preparing a fee petition and resulting litigation.” Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & 
Assocs., Inc., 

 (D. Minn. 2012). And although the Defendants 
suggest that this case is akin to Ricketson v. Advantage Collection Professionals, LLC, 
that case involved more egregious conduct than what is at issue here. No. 21-cv-2541 

(WMW/ECW), 

, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2022). In Ricketson, the 
plaintiff’s  counsel  “repeatedly  and  obstinately”  refused  to  provide  information 
concerning fees incurred to defense counsel, misrepresented the nature of the fee dispute 
to  the  magistrate  judge  at  an  initial  pretrial  conference,  and  engaged  in  such  other 
vexatious  litigation  conduct  that  the  district  court  found  it  appropriate  to  grant  the 
defendant’s motion for sanctions pursuant to 

. 

 While it is true that 
Mr. Giebel  initially  declined  to  provide  information  to  the  Defendants  regarding  his 

billed time, he did not repeatedly and obstinately refuse to share the information with 
defense counsel. Indeed, he provided it within a few days of the Defendants’ request, 
albeit after some back-and-forth between counsel and after the Defendants provided him 
with authority supporting their request. While the Court agrees that some of the post-Rule 
68-acceptance hours claimed by Mr. Giebel were not reasonably expended, that finding is 

not a determination that Mr. Giebel acted in bad faith.                   
   Nonetheless, the Court finds that awarding all of the claimed post-Rule 68 time 
would be unreasonable under the circumstances. The full extent of the hours claimed are 
excessive and do not reflect attorney time that was reasonably and efficiently spent. For 
example,  on  April  13th,  two  days  after  the  Defendants  sent  their  Rule  68  Offer  to 

Mr. Giebel, he communicated a demand for $20,000. Of course, that figure included at 
least 23 hours of Mr. Giebel’s claimed time that the Court has already found was not 
reasonably expended in connection with this action because it related to the underlying 
Washington County matters, not this litigation. Seeking compensation for those hours as 
part of the fee dispute in this case was not a reasonable approach and was a major 

contributor  to  Mr. Giebel’s  opening  salvo  being  a  non-starter  for  any  reasonable 
compromise of the fee dispute. When the Defendants eventually countered with a $6,000 
offer on May 4th, later that day, Mr. Giebel increased the demand, stating that “Plaintiffs 
are now willing to accept from [Defendants] the sum of $21,915.00 in attorney fees 
(calculated at the correct $450.00 per hour)” rate, and advising defense counsel that “we 
expect another approximate $5,000.00 - $7,000.00 will be incurred in . . . April and 
May. . . .” [Dkt. 27-1 at 84–94.] The parties met and conferred about the fee issue over 

the  telephone  on  May  8th,  but  were  unable  to  resolve  the  dispute.  Their  follow-up 
communications  over  the  next  few  days  did  not  result  in  the  parties  coming  closer 
together.  [Dkt. 27  ¶ 8;  Dkt. 27-1  at  103–09.]  Mr. Giebel’s  motion  for  fees  and  costs 
followed,  including  a  request  for  nearly  $29,000  in  attorney’s  fees,  a  request  that 
increased again after Mr. Giebel submitted his reply memorandum.          

   All told, the billing records show that Mr. Giebel expended 15.6 hours of time 
between  the  acceptance  of  the  Rule  68  Offer  and  May  22,  2023,  on  such  tasks  as 
communicating with opposing counsel regarding the fee dispute and other issues and on 
researching,  drafting,  assembling,  and  preparing  the  motion  and  related  filings. 
Subsequent billing records from June 2023 identify another 8.1 hours in connection with 

drafting letters to the Court, reviewing Court orders, conducting research for the reply, 
drafting  the  reply,  and  assembling  the  papers  for  filing.  [Dkt. 30-1  at  21.]  Having 
reviewed these portions of the billing records, the Court finds that a total of 10 of the 23.7 
hours that are claimed were reasonably expended. This deduction excludes substantial 
time negotiating the fee dispute while unreasonably including significant fees that are not 

connected with this suit. In addition, the deduction excludes excessive hours spent on 
legal research and drafting of the memorandum and reply and in preparation of the 
submissions for filing. In particular, the Court notes that Mr. Giebel’s opening brief and 
accompanying declaration spends several pages unnecessarily addressing the merits of 
the underlying dispute. Similarly, his reply brief and second declaration address ancillary 
matters that are not relevant to the fee dispute, such as the timing of the defendants’ 
payment of the $2,002.00 judgment to the Plaintiffs. The 10 hours that the Court has 

found reasonably compensable represents sufficient time for the parties to have attempted 
to reasonably negotiate the disagreement over fees and for Mr. Giebel to have prepared a 
properly focused memorandum and reply.                                    
   Conclusion                                                           
   All  told,  Mr. Giebel’s  billing  records  reflect  72.4  hours  of  claimed  time. 

Combined, the Court has found that 37.9 of those hours should be deducted to reflect 
hours unreasonably included that were  connected  to the underlying garnishment and 
collections matters in state court (24.2 hours), and excessive time spent billing after the 
Plaintiffs’ acceptance of the Rule 68 Offer (13.7 hours). Accordingly, the Court finds that 
a reasonable fee in this case is represented by the following lodestar calculation: 34.5 

hours multiplied by $350 per hour, for a total of $12,075.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees. 
   Overall, the Court finds the deductions discussed above in the reasonable hourly 
rate and the hours reasonably expended are appropriate in light of the nature of the suit 
and the effort required to bring it to a favorable conclusion for the Plaintiffs. Significant 
to this conclusion is the fact that this case does not present a situation in which the 

Defendants heavily litigated the merits of the FDCPA claims or the unlawful garnishment 
claims, thereby causing the Plaintiffs to incur fees at an amount close to what was sought 
in the fee petition. Consequently, this case differs from others involving substantial fee 
awards where defendants, after heavily litigating the case, later oppose the plaintiff’s fee 
petition by complaining that the plaintiff’s counsel spent too much time responding to 
their vigorous defense. See Wiley, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 1148–49 (noting that although the 
defendant  was  free  to  “fiercely  contest  Plaintiffs’  claims,”  its  conduct  caused  the 

plaintiffs to incur increased fees). Rather, in this case, within a relatively short period 
after the complaint was served and Defendants filed their answers, CSIC and Muskie 
assessed the issues in the litigation, considered their potential exposure, and weighed the 
risks of a more substantial judgment in attorney’s fees should they continue to litigate the 
merits. Having done so, they made a prompt offer of judgment, which the Plaintiffs 

accepted. Therefore, the Defendants’ strategy here did not cause substantial litigation. To 
the contrary, their approach wrapped the  case up swiftly  and economically, and  the 
record does not support the nearly $30,000 in fees sought by the Plaintiffs’ counsel. 

   For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’ 

Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs [Dkt. 19] is granted in part. The Defendants shall 
pay a total of $12,239.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees ($12,075.00) and costs ($164.00). 

Date: January 22, 2024           s/Katherine Menendez                     
                               Katherine Menendez                       
                               United States District Judge             

               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                   DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Lisa Woodward and Peter Woodward,          No. 23-cv-632 (KMM/ECW)        

   Plaintiffs,                                                          

v.                                    ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’                
                                   MOTION FOR ATTORNEY                  
Credit Service International Corporation  FEES AND COSTS                  
and Richard Muske,                                                        

   Defendants.                                                          


   Plaintiffs Lisa and Peter Woodward brought this lawsuit asserting that Defendants 
Credit Service International Corporation (“CSIC”) and attorney Richard Muske violated 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices  Act and Minnesota’s statutes governing efforts to 
garnish a debtor’s wages. After the Defendants removed the case to federal court and 
answered, they made an Offer of Judgment to the Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 68 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Woodwards accepted the offer of judgment in the 
total amount of $2,002.00 to resolve all claims against CSIC and Mr. Muske. They also 
agreed that their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs would be added to the judgment, 
and the parties would either agree to the amount of those fees and costs, “or if they are 
unable  to  agree,  as  determined  by  the  Court  upon  motion. . . .”  [Rule  68  Offer  ¶ 2, 
Dkt. 9.] The parties failed to resolve the issue of fees and costs on their own, and the 
matter is now before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
[Dkt. 19.] For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part.    
                        BACKGROUND                                      
   Plaintiffs Lisa Woodward and Peter Woodward allege that in May 2016, they 
obtained dental care for one of their children at Southhill Dental Group in Stillwater, 

Minnesota. They incurred an approximately $2,400 debt, and in May 2017, the Dental 
Group  retained  CSIC  to  collect  it.  Before  they  incurred  the  Dental  Group  debt,  the 
Plaintiffs lived in a Stillwater home located on Pine Street West. But at the time they 
obtained dental care for their child from the Dental Group, the Plaintiffs were living at an 
address on Swenson Street in Stillwater. That is the address Ms. Woodward gave to the 

Dental Group in connection with the service obtained in May 2016.         
   When the Defendants attempted to collect the debt, they used the Pine Street 
Address in several court filings. In February 2022, CSIC filed a statement of claim in 
Washington County conciliation court against the Woodwards. To establish jurisdiction 
for that action, CSIC alleged that the Woodwards lived at the Pine Street Address, and 

Defendants allegedly used the Pine Street Address in other court filings in the collection 
case. The Woodwards allege that Defendants knew or should have known those were 
false statements when they were filed because documents available to them showed that 
the Plaintiffs did not, in fact, live at the Pine Street Address. Further, the Plaintiffs allege 
that Defendants attempted to serve the conciliation court summons and complaint by U.S. 

Mail  at  the  Pine  Street  Address,  so  they  never  received  service  of  the  complaint. 
According to the Plaintiffs, the regular mail envelopes attempting service were returned 
to the Defendants as undelivered. And CSIC allegedly violated the FDCPA by seeking a 
judgment for $589.41 more than the debt reported to CSIC by the Dental Group.  
   Despite  knowing  that  they  had  used  the  wrong  address  and  had  not  properly 
served their papers, the Defendants allegedly moved forward with having the Pine Street 
Address entered in the conciliation court record so that the matter was scheduled for a 

hearing and a judgment could be obtained. The Plaintiffs alleged that throughout the 
conciliation court proceeding, the Defendants had information available to them showing 
that the Woodwards were living at the Swenson Street Address, but they ignored that 
information and pursued the action anyway.                                
   Ultimately, the Defendants obtained a judgment in the conciliation court matter, 

and  afterward,  they  attempted  to  collect  the  judgment  through  garnishment  of  the 
Plaintiffs’ wages. In late August 2022, Mr. Muske, acting as a debt collector and counsel 
for CSIC, sent the Woodwards two notices of intent to garnish their wages. Because the 
Plaintiffs had not received service of the conciliation court filings at the Swenson Street 
Address, this was allegedly the first time they were ever made aware of the conciliation 

court action and the judgment. Concerned about the garnishment notices, the Woodwards 
sought legal representation and hired Plaintiffs’ counsel, Kevin Giebel.  
   On September 21, 2022, around a month after he mailed the notice of intent to 
garnish,  and  not  having  heard  from  the  Plaintiffs  or  Mr. Giebel,  Mr. Muske  sent  a 
garnishment  summons  to  Lisa  Woodward’s  employer.  In  doing  so,  the  Defendants 

allegedly  provided  her  employer  with  an  inaccurate  total  ($2,920.81)  as  the  unpaid 
amount that was subject to garnishment. Thereafter, Mr. Giebel contacted Mr. Muske. As 
a result of their conversations, Mr. Muske agreed to withdraw the garnishment summons 
and  stipulated  to  having  the  conciliation  court  void  the  conciliation  court  judgment 
against the Woodwards and having it declared void ab initio, as though the judgment had 
never been entered.                                                       
   In  February  2023,  the  Plaintiffs  initiated  their  state  court  proceeding  alleging 

violations of the FDCPA and Minnesota’s garnishment statutes. Defendants eventually 
removed the case to the District of Minnesota on March 15, 2023, and filed their answers 
shortly thereafter. On April 12th, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright issued an 
Order for a Rule 16 conference to be held on May 23rd. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Giebel 
asked defense counsel for dates when they could conduct a Rule 26(f) planning meeting, 

but he did not receive a response. Before any Rule 26 meeting took place, Defendants 
served the Plaintiffs with their Rule 68 offer of judgment, and Plaintiffs accepted. 
   On May 4, 2023, with the permission of Mr. Giebel, defense counsel filed a Notice 
of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment, and the Rule 16 conference was canceled. As a 
result, the Clerk of Court entered a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs in the amount of 

$2,002.00. [Dkt. 11.] With respect to the issue of attorney’s fees, The Offer of Judgment 
provided the following:                                                   
        2.  In  addition,  Plaintiffs  Lisa  and  Peter  Woodward’s     
        reasonable  attorneys’  fees  and  costs  in  connection  with  
        Plaintiffs  Lisa  and  Peter  Woodward’s  claims  against       
        Defendants  Credit  Service  International  Corporation  and    
        Richard Muske in the above-referenced suit are to be added to   
        said judgment; said attorneys’ fees and costs as are agreed to  
        between  the  parties,  or  if  they  are  unable  to  agree,  as 
        determined  by  the  Court  upon  motion  and  any  responses   
        thereto[.]                                                      

[Rule 68 Offer ¶ 2.]                                                      
                         DISCUSSION                                     
   Mr. Giebel and defense counsel discussed the issue of fees on several occasions 
but were unable to resolve their disagreements. The motion now before the Court was 

filed on May 25, 2023,1 the Defendants responded on June 8th, the Plaintiffs obtained 
permission to file a reply, and the matter was fully briefed on June 23, 2023. [Dkt. 19–
31.]2 The Plaintiffs seek $164.00 in costs, which Defendants do not dispute, and the 
Court will award. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (costs of the action may be awarded in an 
FDCPA case). However, the parties do not agree on the amount of reasonable attorney’s 

fees that should be awarded.3 The Plaintiffs request an award of $29,139.00 in attorney’s 
fees. [Dkt. 31 ¶ 31.] The Defendants contend that this request is unreasonably inflated 
because it is based on (1) an hourly rate that is higher than reasonable for this type of 
case, and (2) a total number of hours that is unreasonably excessive for a variety of 
reasons.  Having  considered  the  parties’  arguments  and  the  entire  record  in  this 



   1 A motion for fees, meet-and-confer statement, proposed order, and a “bill of 
costs” were filed on several days between May 13 and May 19, 2023. However, the 
request  for  attorney’s  fees  was  not  supported  by  any  factual  submissions,  and  no 
memorandum of law was filed, so the Court denied the motion without prejudice and 
instructed the Plaintiffs to refile the motion. [Dkt. 12–16, 18.]         
   2 On July 23, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed a “Satisfaction of Judgment” indicating that 
the  Defendants  paid  the  $2,002.00  judgment  to  the  Woodwards  on  June  23,  2023. 
[Dkt. 32.]                                                                
   3  Similarly,  the  Defendants  do  not  argue  that  fees  cannot  be  recovered  in 
connection with this suit, nor dispute that the Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of some 
attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the Court will not address these issues in detail. See Wiley v. 
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 

, 1135 (D. Minn. 2022) (noting 
that costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are recoverable in an FDCPA case). 
proceeding, the Court concludes that an award of $12,239.00 in attorney’s fees and costs 
is reasonable under these circumstances.                                  
I.   Legal Standards                                                    

   District courts have “broad discretion” in awarding attorney’s fees. Hanig v. Lee, 

 (8th Cir. 2005). Courts typically begin their analysis of determining a 
reasonable fee award by using the “lodestar” approach—the number of hours reasonably 
expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ 
Council for Clean Air, 

 (1986), supplemented, 

 (1987); 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

 (1983); Paris Sch. Dist. v. Harter, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018). A dispute over fees generally “should not result in a second major 
litigation,” and district courts “need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade 
accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 

 (2011). When awarding fees, a court should 
aim to “do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection,” and may resort to “estimates 

in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.” 

                    
   “A reasonable hourly rate is usually the ordinary rate for similar work in the 
community where the case has been litigated.” Emery v. Hunt, 

, 1048 (8th 
Cir. 2001). In determining a reasonable hourly rate, district courts are permitted “to rely 
on their own experience and knowledge of prevailing market rates.” Hanig, 

.  The  party  seeking  fees  has  the  burden  to  produce  “satisfactory  evidence—in 
addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those 
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable 
skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 

, 895 n.11 (1984); see 
also Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 

 (8th Cir. 2002).            
   In addition to having the burden of showing the reasonableness of the requested 

rate, the party applying for an award of attorney’s fees has the burden of “documenting 
the appropriate hours expended. . . .” Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 

, 851 
(8th Cir. 2002). Just as courts assess the reasonableness of the claimed hourly rate, they 
must also “determine whether the hours claimed were reasonably expended.” Harter, 

  (quotations  omitted).  Courts  may  rely  on  their  own  knowledge  and 

experience in reaching that determination. 

                            
II.  Analysis                                                           
   Reasonable Hourly Rate                                               
   First, the parties dispute the reasonableness of the claimed hourly rate. Plaintiffs 
ask the Court to apply an hourly rate of $450 for Mr. Giebel’s work on this matter. 

Mr. Giebel provided a declaration indicating that he has over 37 years of experience as a 
lawyer, having graduated from law school and gaining admission to the bar in 1984. Over 
that time, Mr. Giebel has been involved in a wide variety of practice areas, including 
general  corporate  representation, real estate, mergers and acquisitions, and litigation. 
[Dkt. 20  ¶¶ 4–6.]  His  practice  includes  “approximately  seven  years  supervising  and 

operating [his] firm’s collection law firm practice,” and in FDCPA and related state law 
cases on both the consumer and collections side. [Dkt. 20 ¶ 3.] Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that such a rate is reasonable for a case like this. 
Mr. Giebel attests that in two cases in this district, he has submitted fee applications 
where he was awarded a rate of $575 per hour, and in other instances he has billed as 
much  as  $625  per  hour.  [Dkt. 20  ¶¶ 7,  11.]  He  also  notes  that  his  written  retainer 
agreement with the Woodwards established a preliminary hourly rate of $450 per hour 

and states that he “believes that $450.00 per hour is a reasonable attorney rate in this 
Hennepin  County  locale,  and  for  application  in  this  Action.”  [Dkt. 20  ¶ 8.]  Finally, 
Mr. Giebel states that a recent decision provided to him by defense counsel indicates that 
defense counsel began practicing in 2013, several years after Mr. Giebel, and that he 
typically charges an hourly rate between $400 and $425 in similar FDCPA matters. 

[Dkt. 20 ¶ 49.]                                                           
   The Defendants assert that this case does not justify an hourly rate of $450 and 
that the Plaintiffs’ evidence in support of that rate is insufficient to establish that it is 
appropriate.  The  Defendants  argue  that  a  $350  hourly  rate  is  reasonable  under  the 
circumstances because: (1) this case was neither complex, nor was it ever really litigated; 

(2) Mr. Giebel  offered  nothing  other  than  his  own  affidavit  and  opinions  as  to  the 
reasonableness of the $450 rate; (3) Mr. Giebel’s experience as an attorney in FDCPA 
litigation  is more limited  than  his declaration implies; and  (4) in other cases with  a 
similar  lack  of  complexity,  courts  have  found  hourly  rates  lower  than  $450  to  be 
reasonable. [Dkt. 25 at 19–24.]                                           

   In light of the evidence in the record relevant to this issue, the parties’ arguments, 
and the Court’s own experience in resolving similar fee disputes, the Court finds a $350 
hourly rate for Mr. Giebel’s time performing legal work on this case is reasonable. The 
Plaintiffs’  evidence  submitted  in  support  of  the  requested  $450  rate  falls  short  of 
satisfying their burden. While the Court does not doubt the veracity of Mr. Giebel’s 
assertions in his declaration, his own declaration does not offer any specific opinion 
regarding the prevailing market rates in the Twin Cities legal community for comparable 

cases. Nor do Plaintiffs point to any affidavit from another local practitioner offering any 
opinion regarding the reasonableness of the requested rate in the Twin Cities for a case 
like this one. See Harris v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 13-cv-1719 (SRN/SER), 

, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2018) (“Frequently, when moving for or 
opposing a fee petition, parties submit affidavits from local practitioners who opine on 

the reasonableness of attorneys’ hourly rates, billing for legal services, and attorneys’ 
standing and reputation in the local legal community.”).                  
   Further, the rates allegedly charged by defense counsel in similar FDCPA cases 
are not particularly persuasive in this case for two reasons. First, although an opposing 
counsel’s fees may occasionally be relevant to determining the reasonableness of the fees 

sought by an applicant, that is not an ironclad principle. See Harris, 

, at 
*7 n.5 (finding that the court need not consider defense counsel’s fees in assessing the 
reasonableness of plaintiffs’ claimed hourly rates and citing Burks v. Siemens Energy & 
Automation, Inc., 

 (8th Cir. 2000) which noted that the comparison of 
an opponent’s fees  can be an “apples-to-oranges comparison” and require  additional 

analysis  of  the  reasonableness  of  defense  counsel’s  billing).  Second,  and  more 
importantly, the record here shows that in the case referenced in Mr. Giebel’s declaration, 
although defense counsel Patrick Newman’s typical hourly rate was between $400 and 
$425, he and co-defense counsel charged a discounted rate of $295. [Newman Decl., 
Ex. L at 9, Dkt. 27.] The Defendants represent that, as was the situation in that matter, 
this matter similarly involves an insurance carrier paying a discounted rate. [Dkt. 25 at 23 
n.8.]                                                                     

   The Court also finds Mr. Giebel’s reliance on the $575 hourly rate he was awarded 
in other cases does not establish that a $450 hourly rate is reasonable here. In particular, 
the fact that Mr. Giebel was awarded a $575 rate in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 
collective action that was heavily litigated —Harris v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 

, at *8 (table of approved rates)—says very little about why such a rate would 

be reasonable in this relatively simple FDCPA and supplemental state law garnishment 
case. Although perhaps less complicated in terms of the number of plaintiffs involved, 
the  other  case  relied  on  by  the  Plaintiffs  for  establishing  the  reasonableness  of 
Mr. Giebel’s claimed $450 hourly rate was also a fairly heavily litigated individual FLSA 
case. See Woodards v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No. 14-cv-4181 (SRN/SER), 

 (D. Minn. May 28, 2015), which the court handled in tandem with the 
Harris matter. 

, at *1 n.1. Plaintiffs offer no reasoned argument why the 
comparison of these cases is relevant to determining the reasonable hourly rate for a case 
involving a different area of law and fundamentally different circumstances. 
   Ultimately, the Court determines that a $350 hourly rate is reasonable in this 

matter. Mr. Giebel is, indeed, a seasoned attorney with a breadth of expertise, and he has 
shown  that  his  career  has  involved  several  years  of  experience  on  both  sides  of 
collections-related matters. Based on the Court’s experience  and familiarity with fee 
disputes in FDCPA cases, rates of $400 per hour and higher have typically been found 
appropriate in cases that involve “substantially more litigation than the case at hand.” See 
Meidal v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., No. 18-cv-985 (PAM/BRT), 

, at 
*2–3 (D.  Minn. Sept. 19, 2018) (finding a $300 hourly rate reasonable in a simple 

FDCPA dispute); see also Wiley, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 1147 (approving a $400 hourly rate 
for work performed in three related cases and $450 for work performed in a fourth). 
   The Plaintiffs’ argument that this case was complex enough to justify a higher 
hourly rate because it involved “two separate Plaintiffs and two separate Defendants, and 
multiple claims” is unpersuasive. [Dkt. 22 at 20.] To the contrary, this case involved a 

bare minimum of litigation and was not particularly complex. In fact, it was a run-of-the-
mill dispute that was resolved quickly, and likely could have been resolved even sooner. 
While there are two parties on each side, the merits of the dispute here were relatively 
straightforward, and the interests of both defendants and both plaintiffs aligned. Plaintiffs 
are correct that their complaint was not mere boilerplate or a template pleading, but it was 

refreshingly simple in comparison to other federal litigation. And the litigation in this 
Court was minimal: after the Plaintiffs served their complaint, the case was resolved in a 
few months, there was no commencement of discovery, no litigation over the merits, no 
depositions, no motion practice,  and  no court involvement aside from Judge Cowan 
Wright’s  notice  setting  a  Rule  16  conference.  Therefore,  with  due  consideration  of 

Mr. Giebel’s  experience,  his  long  career  as  a  practicing  attorney,  and  the  specific 
evidence concerning his experience in collections litigation, the Court finds that a $350 
per hour rate is reasonable under the circumstances.                      
   Reasonableness of Hours Expended                                     
   Next, the parties dispute the reasonableness of the hours expended. The Plaintiffs 
argue that they should recover attorneys’ fees incurred for essentially all work performed 

by Mr. Giebel relating to this dispute dating back to his earliest involvement in August 
2022.  Specifically,  they  argue  that  “all  of  the  time  incurred  prior  to  service  of  the 
Complaint in this Action was an absolutely critical part of the Action and necessary to its 
ultimate success, and indeed crucial to this Action.” [Dkt. 22 at 16–17.] Plaintiffs seek an 
award of fees for hours Mr. Giebel expended in investigating the underlying conciliation 

court case and negotiating a resolution of that proceeding, arguing that those efforts were 
instrumental in obtaining excellent results for his clients that are intertwined with this 
lawsuit. They also argue that Mr. Giebel’s billing records establish the reasonableness of 
the claimed hours in connection with both Mr. Giebel’s pre-suit representation and in 
investigating, preparing, and litigating this case.                       

   Defendants disagree. They take the position that the motion seeks compensation 
beyond what is reasonable in this case. They argue that recovery of fees claimed in 
connection  with  Mr. Giebel’s  work  on  the  state  court  conciliation  case  and  the 
garnishment summons is improper because: (1) Mr. Giebel could have acted sooner to 
prevent the garnishment summons from ever going out;4 (2) any fees incurred in the 


   4 The Court declines to engage in any extended discussion of the Defendants’ 
characterizations of Mr. Giebel’s actions as “lying in wait” or constituting a “set up.” 
[E.g.,  Dkt. 25  at  5–7.]  Rather  than  fan  the  flames  of  what  appears  to  be  a  rather 
contentious relationship between opposing counsel in this case, the Court will cabin its 
consideration to whether hours were reasonably expended or otherwise compensable as 
attorney time.                                                            
underlying action would constitute actual damages belonging to the Plaintiffs that are 
foreclosed by the Rule 68 offer of judgment; and (3) an award of those fees would be 
contrary to the plain language of the Rule 68 offer, accepted by the Plaintiffs, which 

limited  available  fees  and  costs  to  those  incurred  “in  the  above-referenced  suit.”  In 
addition, the Defendants argue that, in various ways, Mr. Giebel’s billing records show 
he expended more hours than were reasonably necessary in handling this matter, billed 
for clerical or administrative tasks, and inflated the hours claimed by failing to engage in 
reasonable negotiation over the fee dispute both before and after the Rule 68 offer. [See 

generally Dkt. 25.]                                                       
   As noted, the Plaintiffs seek an award of $29,139.00 in attorney’s fees. [Dkt. 31 
¶ 31.] Plaintiffs calculate this amount by multiplying 64.3 hours of attorney time by the 
$450 requested hourly rate and applying a 10% discount to that total figure ($26,041.00). 
The additional $3,098.00 the Plaintiffs request is in connection with 8.1 hours incurred 

after  the original  motion was filed, multiplied by an hourly rate of $450. The total 
number of hours reflected in Mr. Giebel’s time records is 72.4, which would result in a 
lodestar figure of $32,580 with no discounts applied. Mr. Giebel asserts that the 10% and 
15% reductions he has voluntarily applied sufficiently account for the issues raised by the 
Defendants. Here, the Court finds that amount to be excessive and, for the reasons stated 

below,  concludes  that  several  categories  of  hours  unreasonably  expended  should  be 
excluded from the award of fees.                                          
   -  Fees Incurred in Underlying Proceeding                            
   First, the Court concludes that a reduction in the hours claimed is appropriate 
given  the  substantial  number  of  hours  sought  in  connection  with  Mr. Giebel’s 

representation of the Woodwards in response to the Defendants’ underlying garnishment 
efforts and the state court conciliation case. The Plaintiffs cite no authority that such 
work is recoverable as attorney’s fees in a case like this. And the case law indicates that 
such  fees  incurred  in  connection  with  underlying  collections  actions  are  more 
appropriately categorized as a plaintiff’s “actual damages.” Wiley, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 

1137–40 (collecting cases and rejecting several arguments that such fees in underlying 
collections actions do not constitute “actual damages”). The Rule 68 Offer in this case 
provided that the judgment in the total amount of $2,002.00 would “resolve all claims 
asserted by” the Plaintiffs “as well as any claims that could have been raised against 
Defendants [CSIC] and Richard Muske in this action.” [Rule 68 Offer ¶ 1.] Accordingly, 

allowing recovery of those “actual damages” through the fee petition would deny the 
Defendants the benefit of the bargain they struck in agreeing to the entry of judgment for 
$2,002.00.                                                                
   Moreover, the Court is persuaded that it would not be reasonable to allow recovery 
of significant fees incurred in connection with the garnishment summons. The record 

shows  that  Mr. Giebel  was  retained  weeks  before  Mr. Muske  sent  that  summons  to 
Ms. Woodward’s employer. In fact, he was retained when the Woodwards first received a 
notice of intent to garnish their wages from Mr. Muske. Mr. Giebel could have reached 
out to Mr. Muske then to explain why any garnishment would be inappropriate. But he 
did not contact Mr. Muske until after Muske, having heard nothing from the Plaintiffs or 
Mr. Giebel, moved forward with service of the garnishment summons. When Mr. Giebel 
did  contact  Mr. Muske,  they  were  quickly  able  to  resolve  the  garnishment  issue: 

Mr. Muske withdrew the summons and agreed to having the underlying conciliation court 
judgment voided. This suggests that had Mr. Giebel immediately contacted Mr. Muske, 
substantial fees incurred by the Plaintiffs in connection with the underlying action would 
have been unnecessary.                                                    
   The Court is also persuaded that the language of the Rule 68 Offer in this case 

contemplates that any award of fees would be cabined to those incurred in connection 
with this case, not those incurred for all of Mr. Giebel’s work that is in any way related to 
the underlying collections efforts of the Defendants. Indeed, the Rule 68 Offer plainly 
states that the Woodwards’ attorney’s fees that are to be added to the $2,002.00 judgment 
are the fees incurred “in connection with [Plaintiffs’] claims . . . in the above referenced 

suit.”  [Rule  68  Offer  ¶ 2  (emphasis  added).]  The  “above  referenced  suit”  that  is 
referenced in the Rule 68 Offer is this action.                           
   Having reviewed Mr. Giebel’s billing records, the Court finds that the claimed 
hours expended should be reduced by 24.2 hours. In particular, the Court has considered 
the nature of the entries from August 30, 2022, through November 5, 2022, after which 

the focus of Mr. Giebel’s billable work shifted from issues related to the underlying 
conciliation court matter and the garnishment notices and summons to the investigation 
and preparation of the complaint in this action. [Giebel Decl., Ex. 2 at 9–13, Dkt. 20-1.] 
The Court’s finding has taken into account the fact that Mr. Giebel’s billing records all 
contain  a  heading  listing  both  the  underlying  cases  in  Washington  County  and  the 
“FDCPA matter,” and the individual entries do not always plainly delineate whether the 
tasks being logged relate to the state court and garnishment issues or this action. 

   -  Block Billing and Administrative Tasks                            
   Defendants  argue  that  additional  reductions  are  warranted  because 
(1) Mr. Giebel’s time entries constitute “block billing,” making it a challenge to assess 
the  precise  division  between  compensable  and  non-compensable  attorney  time;  and 
(2) the time records reflect that Mr. Giebel is billing for administrative tasks that are not 

compensable as attorney billable time. The Court has carefully reviewed the records. 
While the Court agrees that block billing can make it difficult to review the submission, 
the Court declines to reduce the ordered fees for either of these reasons. 
   -  Drafting Discovery                                                
   The Defendants also asked the Court to deduct 3.5 hours from Mr. Giebel’s billing 

records for the entry on April 1, 2023, because Mr. Giebel spent time drafting written 
discovery before a discovery conference had ever been scheduled. They argue that it was 
premature for Mr. Giebel to have begun such preparation under the circumstances here. 
The Court finds that no such reduction is warranted under the circumstances. 
   The  April  1st  billing  entry  predates  the  April  12th  Order/Notice  of  a  pretrial 

conference issued by Judge Cowan Wright. However, it is also true that the Defendants 
did not serve their Rule 68 Offer on the Plaintiffs until April 11th, so it was by no means 
clear  that  discovery  would  be  unnecessary.  Indeed,  in  the  communications  between 
counsel leading up to the service of the complaint, the Defendants had, in fact, argued 
that the Woodwards’ claims lacked merit. [E.g., Dkt. 27-1 at 12–13 (1/13/23 letter); id. at 
31 (2/1/23 email).] At the time Mr. Giebel drafted the discovery, the Defendants had just 
served answers to the complaint denying liability, Mr. Giebel sought dates for a Rule 

26(f) conference, and although not much time passed after he made the initial request, he 
had not yet heard back from the Defendants. [Id. at 44 (3/31/23 letter); Dkt. 6 (Muske 
Answer); Dkt. 7 (CSIC Answer).]                                           
   Mr. Giebel’s  decision  to  immediately  turn  to  drafting  discovery  raises  some 
questions about the necessity of his actions, and it is debatable whether clients required to 

pay their attorney’s hourly fees out of pocket would agree to compensate a lawyer for 
such  discovery  work.  However,  because  the  Defendants  cite  no  binding  precedent 
requiring the deduction of these hours under such circumstances,5 and because it was by 
no means clear at the time Mr. Giebel drafted these initial discovery requests that this 
litigation  would  be  resolved  without  any  discovery,  the  Court  finds  that  it  was  not 

unreasonable for Mr. Giebel to have expended these hours. Therefore, the Court will not 
deduct the time entered by Mr. Giebel on April 1, 2023.                   
   -  Settlement Negotiations                                           
   Finally,  the  Defendants  argue  that  the  hours  claimed  should  be  substantially 
reduced because Mr. Giebel engaged in unreasonable settlement negotiations both before 

   5 The circumstances here distinguish this case from the non-binding precedent 
cited by the Defendants. Maher v. Barton, No. 4:13-cv-2260 (CEJ), 

, 
at  *3  (E.D.  Mo.  Apr.  2,  2014)  (deducting  two  hours  for  premature  discovery  when 
defendants had filed no answer and no case management order had been issued); Ferrari 
v. U.S. Equities Corp., 661 Fed. App’x 47, 49 (2nd Cir. 2016) (affirming decision not to 
award fees for preparation of summary judgment motion where motion or judgment on 
the pleadings had not yet been decided).                                  
and  after  the  Defendants  served  their  Rule  68  Offer.  They  further  contend  that 
Mr. Giebel’s settlement strategy was not pursued in good faith, justifying denying an 
award of fees for any hours he billed after the Plaintiffs accepted the Rule 68 Offer and 

that his approach to negotiations “virtually guaranteed this motion would be necessary.” 
They argue that a reduction by 15.6 hours billed after the Rule 68 Offer was accepted is, 
therefore,  appropriate.  [Dkt. 25  at  29–30.]  The  Plaintiffs  argue  that  Mr. Giebel’s 
approach to settling this matter both before and after the acceptance of the offer of 
judgment were conducted in good faith and were reasonable. [Dkt. 30 at 7–9.] 

   Having carefully reviewed the entire record, the Court concludes that it does not 
support the exclusion of every hour billed by Mr. Giebel after the Plaintiffs accepted the 
Rule 68 Offer as the Defendants request. Defendants have not demonstrated that every 
hour  Mr.  Giebel  spent  after  his  clients’  acceptance  of  the  offer  of  judgment  was 
unreasonable  or  could  not  be  compensated.  For  one  thing,  under  the  FDCPA,  fees 

incurred after a Rule 68 offer is accepted may be recovered, “including those associated 
with preparing a fee petition and resulting litigation.” Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & 
Assocs., Inc., 

 (D. Minn. 2012). And although the Defendants 
suggest that this case is akin to Ricketson v. Advantage Collection Professionals, LLC, 
that case involved more egregious conduct than what is at issue here. No. 21-cv-2541 

(WMW/ECW), 

, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2022). In Ricketson, the 
plaintiff’s  counsel  “repeatedly  and  obstinately”  refused  to  provide  information 
concerning fees incurred to defense counsel, misrepresented the nature of the fee dispute 
to  the  magistrate  judge  at  an  initial  pretrial  conference,  and  engaged  in  such  other 
vexatious  litigation  conduct  that  the  district  court  found  it  appropriate  to  grant  the 
defendant’s motion for sanctions pursuant to 

. 

 While it is true that 
Mr. Giebel  initially  declined  to  provide  information  to  the  Defendants  regarding  his 

billed time, he did not repeatedly and obstinately refuse to share the information with 
defense counsel. Indeed, he provided it within a few days of the Defendants’ request, 
albeit after some back-and-forth between counsel and after the Defendants provided him 
with authority supporting their request. While the Court agrees that some of the post-Rule 
68-acceptance hours claimed by Mr. Giebel were not reasonably expended, that finding is 

not a determination that Mr. Giebel acted in bad faith.                   
   Nonetheless, the Court finds that awarding all of the claimed post-Rule 68 time 
would be unreasonable under the circumstances. The full extent of the hours claimed are 
excessive and do not reflect attorney time that was reasonably and efficiently spent. For 
example,  on  April  13th,  two  days  after  the  Defendants  sent  their  Rule  68  Offer  to 

Mr. Giebel, he communicated a demand for $20,000. Of course, that figure included at 
least 23 hours of Mr. Giebel’s claimed time that the Court has already found was not 
reasonably expended in connection with this action because it related to the underlying 
Washington County matters, not this litigation. Seeking compensation for those hours as 
part of the fee dispute in this case was not a reasonable approach and was a major 

contributor  to  Mr. Giebel’s  opening  salvo  being  a  non-starter  for  any  reasonable 
compromise of the fee dispute. When the Defendants eventually countered with a $6,000 
offer on May 4th, later that day, Mr. Giebel increased the demand, stating that “Plaintiffs 
are now willing to accept from [Defendants] the sum of $21,915.00 in attorney fees 
(calculated at the correct $450.00 per hour)” rate, and advising defense counsel that “we 
expect another approximate $5,000.00 - $7,000.00 will be incurred in . . . April and 
May. . . .” [Dkt. 27-1 at 84–94.] The parties met and conferred about the fee issue over 

the  telephone  on  May  8th,  but  were  unable  to  resolve  the  dispute.  Their  follow-up 
communications  over  the  next  few  days  did  not  result  in  the  parties  coming  closer 
together.  [Dkt. 27  ¶ 8;  Dkt. 27-1  at  103–09.]  Mr. Giebel’s  motion  for  fees  and  costs 
followed,  including  a  request  for  nearly  $29,000  in  attorney’s  fees,  a  request  that 
increased again after Mr. Giebel submitted his reply memorandum.          

   All told, the billing records show that Mr. Giebel expended 15.6 hours of time 
between  the  acceptance  of  the  Rule  68  Offer  and  May  22,  2023,  on  such  tasks  as 
communicating with opposing counsel regarding the fee dispute and other issues and on 
researching,  drafting,  assembling,  and  preparing  the  motion  and  related  filings. 
Subsequent billing records from June 2023 identify another 8.1 hours in connection with 

drafting letters to the Court, reviewing Court orders, conducting research for the reply, 
drafting  the  reply,  and  assembling  the  papers  for  filing.  [Dkt. 30-1  at  21.]  Having 
reviewed these portions of the billing records, the Court finds that a total of 10 of the 23.7 
hours that are claimed were reasonably expended. This deduction excludes substantial 
time negotiating the fee dispute while unreasonably including significant fees that are not 

connected with this suit. In addition, the deduction excludes excessive hours spent on 
legal research and drafting of the memorandum and reply and in preparation of the 
submissions for filing. In particular, the Court notes that Mr. Giebel’s opening brief and 
accompanying declaration spends several pages unnecessarily addressing the merits of 
the underlying dispute. Similarly, his reply brief and second declaration address ancillary 
matters that are not relevant to the fee dispute, such as the timing of the defendants’ 
payment of the $2,002.00 judgment to the Plaintiffs. The 10 hours that the Court has 

found reasonably compensable represents sufficient time for the parties to have attempted 
to reasonably negotiate the disagreement over fees and for Mr. Giebel to have prepared a 
properly focused memorandum and reply.                                    
   Conclusion                                                           
   All  told,  Mr. Giebel’s  billing  records  reflect  72.4  hours  of  claimed  time. 

Combined, the Court has found that 37.9 of those hours should be deducted to reflect 
hours unreasonably included that were  connected  to the underlying garnishment and 
collections matters in state court (24.2 hours), and excessive time spent billing after the 
Plaintiffs’ acceptance of the Rule 68 Offer (13.7 hours). Accordingly, the Court finds that 
a reasonable fee in this case is represented by the following lodestar calculation: 34.5 

hours multiplied by $350 per hour, for a total of $12,075.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees. 
   Overall, the Court finds the deductions discussed above in the reasonable hourly 
rate and the hours reasonably expended are appropriate in light of the nature of the suit 
and the effort required to bring it to a favorable conclusion for the Plaintiffs. Significant 
to this conclusion is the fact that this case does not present a situation in which the 

Defendants heavily litigated the merits of the FDCPA claims or the unlawful garnishment 
claims, thereby causing the Plaintiffs to incur fees at an amount close to what was sought 
in the fee petition. Consequently, this case differs from others involving substantial fee 
awards where defendants, after heavily litigating the case, later oppose the plaintiff’s fee 
petition by complaining that the plaintiff’s counsel spent too much time responding to 
their vigorous defense. See Wiley, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 1148–49 (noting that although the 
defendant  was  free  to  “fiercely  contest  Plaintiffs’  claims,”  its  conduct  caused  the 

plaintiffs to incur increased fees). Rather, in this case, within a relatively short period 
after the complaint was served and Defendants filed their answers, CSIC and Muskie 
assessed the issues in the litigation, considered their potential exposure, and weighed the 
risks of a more substantial judgment in attorney’s fees should they continue to litigate the 
merits. Having done so, they made a prompt offer of judgment, which the Plaintiffs 

accepted. Therefore, the Defendants’ strategy here did not cause substantial litigation. To 
the contrary, their approach wrapped the  case up swiftly  and economically, and  the 
record does not support the nearly $30,000 in fees sought by the Plaintiffs’ counsel. 

   For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’ 

Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs [Dkt. 19] is granted in part. The Defendants shall 
pay a total of $12,239.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees ($12,075.00) and costs ($164.00). 

Date: January 22, 2024           s/Katherine Menendez                     
                               Katherine Menendez                       
                               United States District Judge