Abdi v. Hennepin County

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota January 25, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Sharmarke Y. Abdi, Case No. 23-cv-1275 (WMW/LIB)

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING
v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS
Hennepin County,

Defendant.

Defendant Hennepin County has moved to dismiss Plaintiff Sharmarke Abdi’s
claims. (Dkt. 6.) For the reasons addressed below, the Court grants Hennepin County’s
motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Abdi is a Senior Social Worker who has worked for Hennepin County for almost
ten years. Between November 2020 and August 2021, Abdi had two simultaneous
workplace interactions that he contends were discriminatory.
In November 2020, Abdi submitted a request for a stand-up desk. The request was
denied in January 2021. In an effort to appeal the denial of his request for a stand-up desk,
Abdi reached out to Hennepin County’s Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)
Coordinator in March 2021. The ADA Coordinator labeled Abdi’s request for a stand-up
desk as a “convenience” and “choice.” (Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 13.) Abdi eventually received the stand-
up desk he requested. After learning that the ADA Coordinator labeled his request as a
“convenience” and “choice,” Abdi reached out to the ADA Coordinator’s direct supervisor
and complained about the Coordinator’s use of such language. The supervisor then filed a
complaint against Abdi at Hennepin County Human Services.

In November 2020, one of Abdi’s white female co-workers accused him of
conducting an onboarding training in Somali. The management team dismissed the
allegation as false. In March 2021, the same co-worker made another accusation against
Abdi. Abdi notified the management team but received no acknowledgement.
Abdi participated in an employee performance review (“EPR”) on March 30, 2021.
In the review, Abdi’s supervisor informed him that his communication needed

improvement. Abdi asked the supervisor if this feedback was related to the ADA
coordinator whom he complained about or if it was related to his co-worker who made two
false accusations against him. The supervisor acknowledged being aware of both of those
interactions.
Hennepin County commenced a disciplinary investigation against Abdi in April

2021. It is unclear from the Complaint whether the investigation was the result of one or
both of the workplace interactions. The disciplinary investigation resulted in an acquittal
and the recommendation of “coaching” Abdi. (Id. ¶ 25.) On August 2, 2021, Abdi filed
an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Charge for Discrimination

under the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Abdi’s EEOC
Charge was denied on February 10, 2023.
Abdi commenced this action on May 5, 2023, alleging that Hennepin County
discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, race and national origin, and
retaliated against him for asserting his rights under the ADA.
ANALYSIS
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted as

true, establish a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 
(2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the district 
court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc.,

601 F.3d 852, 853

 (8th 
Cir. 2010).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient 
to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 570

 (2007).  A plaintiff may not rely on, nor may a district court consider, legal 
conclusions couched as factual allegations.  See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678-79

. 
    I.   Administrative Remedy Exhaustion Requirement                    
    Abdi brings four claims: (1) discrimination under the ADA for failure to provide 
him  reasonable  accommodations;  (2)  discrimination  under  the  ADA  for  retaliation; 

(3) discrimination on the basis of race under Title VII; and (4) discrimination on the basis 
of national origin under Title VII.  Hennepin County argues that because Abdi has not 
exhausted the administrative remedies as to all of his claims, the Court can consider only 
the alleged discrimination that Abdi included in his EEOC Charge.  Abdi maintains that 
the Court can consider all of the discrimination claims in the Complaint because he 

exhausted the administrative remedies by checking the “continuing violation” box on the 
EEOC Charge, indicating that the alleged discrimination was ongoing.      
    Under the ADA and Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies 
before filing a lawsuit in federal court.  Lindeman v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City,

899 F.3d 603, 608

 (8th Cir. 2018); Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works,

21 F.3d 218, 222

 (8th Cir. 1994).  To exhaust administrative remedies, the claimant must file a Charge 

of Discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days from the day the discrimination took 
place.

1 Williams, 21

 F.3d at 222.  Each “alleged discrimination or retaliation . . . is a 
separate and discrete unlawful practice for which Plaintiff must exhaust administrative 
remedies unless the conduct is reasonably related to the charge, and simply checking the 
‘continuing  violation’  box  on  the  EEOC  charge  is  insufficient  to  plausibly  allege  a 
continuing violation.”  Yohannes v. Minnesota IT Servs., No. 21-cv-620 (PJS/ECW),

2022 WL 2788397

, at *8 (D. Minn. July 15, 2022) (citing Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

3 F.4th 1075, 1082

(8th Cir. 2021)).
Abdi filed an EEOC Charge on August 2, 2021. The EEOC Charge asserts that
Abdi’s accommodation request for a stand-up desk was denied and that he was subjected
to different terms and conditions of employment when he was investigated and given a

negative performance evaluation, which prevented him from getting a promotion.
However, Abdi’s Complaint includes several discrimination claims, ranging from October
2021 to February 2023, that were not included in the EEOC Charge. Because Abdi did not
submit a second or amended EEOC Charge that includes the alleged discrimination actions
that occurred after August 2021, he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies for the

claims occurring after August 2021. Therefore, this Court will not address the allegations
in the Complaint that were not included in Abdi’s EEOC Charge filed in August 2021,

1 Time Limits For Filing A Charge, EEOC.gov, https://www.eeoc.gov/time-limits-filing-
charge.
specifically the allegations in Complaint paragraphs 29-34, 36-42, and 44-54. The Court
will also not consider Abdi’s allegation of a Title VII violation on the basis of national

origin because Abdi did not include that allegation in his EEOC Charge. Accordingly, the
Court grants Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss as to the Title VII national origin claim.
II. ADA Reasonable Accommodation Claim
Abdi argues that Hennepin County discriminated against him on the basis of his
disability by failing to provide him the reasonable accommodation of a stand-up desk.
Hennepin County contends that Abdi has failed to plead sufficient facts to support his

claim.
“The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating ‘against a qualified individual
on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Ehlers v. Univ. of Minnesota,

34 F.4th 655, 659

 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 12112

(a)).  The failure to make a reasonable 
accommodation constitutes discrimination.  Mobley v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc.,

53 F.4th 452, 456

 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 12112

(b)(5)(A)).             
    To plead a prima facie case of a reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA, 
plaintiffs must show: (1) they have a disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) they 

are a qualified individual and (3) they suffered an adverse employment action because of 
their disability.  Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

486 F.3d 480, 482

 (8th Cir. 2007).  “An 
adverse employment action is a tangible change in working conditions that produces a 
material employment disadvantage.”  Spears v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr. & Hum. Res.,

210 F.3d 850, 853

 (8th Cir. 2000).  A change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities constitutes 
a material employment disadvantage.  Sallis v. Univ. Minn.,

408 F.3d 470, 476

 (8th Cir. 

2005).  However, “[a] transfer involving only minor changes in working conditions and no 
reduction  in  pay  or  benefits  will  not  constitute  an  adverse  employment  action.”  
Ledergerber v. Stangler,

122 F.3d 1142, 1144

 (8th Cir. 1997).  Additionally, a poor 
performance evaluation does not constitute an adverse employment action unless it has 
some other tangible effect on the individual’s employment.  Spears,

210 F.3d at 854

.  Such 
a tangible effect may be the alteration of the individual’s employment terms or conditions.

Id.

The parties do not dispute that Abdi has a disability within the meaning of the ADA
and that he is a qualified individual. The parties disagree, however, on whether Abdi
suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. Abdi alleges that he
suffered an adverse employment action when Hennepin County commenced a disciplinary

investigation against him and reported that his communication needed improvement in an
employee evaluation. However, mere disciplinary investigations and poor evaluations are
not adverse actions, as they do not necessarily have a tangible effect on an individual’s
employment, such as changing the employee’s working conditions. Abdi does not plead
facts suggesting that the conditions of his employment changed due to the actions taken by

his employer. And the Complaint contradicts Abdi’s claim that he was denied a promotion
because of the poor evaluation, as he received a promotion.
Because Abdi fails to plead a prima facie case of discrimination for seeking a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the Court grants Hennepin County’s motion

as to this claim.
III. ADA Retaliation Claim
Abdi contends that Hennepin County retaliated against him, in violation of the
ADA, for requesting an accommodation and for addressing his co-worker’s accusations.
Hennepin County contends that Abdi has failed to plead sufficient facts to support his
claim.

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating “against an individual because
that individual ‘opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing’ conducted pursuant to the statute.” Amir v. St. Louis
Univ.,

184 F.3d 1017, 1025

 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 12203

(a)).  To plead a 

prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Abdi must show: (1) he engaged in protected 
conduct, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action and (3) the adverse action was 
causally linked to the protected conduct.  Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc.,

169 F.3d 1131, 1136

(8th Cir. 1999).
The parties do not dispute that Abdi engaged in protected conduct. Rather, the

parties dispute whether Abdi suffered an adverse employment action. Abdi alleges that he
suffered an adverse employment action when Hennepin County commenced a disciplinary
investigation against him and reported that his communication needed improvement in an
employee evaluation. As addressed in Section II, these actions do not constitute an adverse
action.

Because Abdi fails to plead a prima facie case of discrimination for retaliation under
the ADA, the Court grants Hennepin County’s motion as to this claim.
IV. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Race Discrimination Claim
Abdi maintains that Hennepin County discriminated against him on the basis of race
by conducting a disciplinary investigation after he “defend[ed] [himself] from a white
female employee” who twice accused him of misconduct. (Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 22.) Hennepin

County contends that Abdi has failed to plead sufficient facts to support this claim.
To plead a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII, Abdi must show:
“(1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he was meeting the employer’s
legitimate job expectations, (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that

similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.” Tolen v.
Ashcroft,

377 F.3d 879

, 882 (8th Cir. 2004).                              
    The parties do not dispute that Abdi is a member of a protected class and that he 
meets his employer’s legitimate job expectations.  However, the parties dispute whether 
Abdi suffered an adverse employment action and whether similarly situated employees 

outside the protected class were treated differently.  Abdi alleges that he suffered an 
adverse  employment  action  when  Hennepin  County  commenced  a  disciplinary 
investigation  against  him  and  reported  in  an  employee  evaluation  that  Abdi’s 
communication needed improvement.  As addressed in Section II, these actions do not 
constitute an adverse action.                                             
    Because Abdi fails to plead a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title 
VII, the Court grants Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss as to this claim.     

                         CONCLUSION                                      
    Abdi has failed to allege a claim for discrimination in violation of the ADA for 
failure to provide him reasonable accommodations, for discrimination in violation of the 
ADA for retaliation, and for discrimination based on race and national origin in violation 
of Title VII.  Therefore, Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss is granted.

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED:                                                        
    1.   Defendant Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 6), is GRANTED.
    2.   This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.                     
    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDIGNLY.                                 


Dated:  January 25, 2024                 _s/_ W__i_lh_e_l_m_i_n_a_ M__._ W__r_ig_h_t_  
                                         Wilhelmina M. Wright            
                                         United States District Judge

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Sharmarke Y. Abdi, Case No. 23-cv-1275 (WMW/LIB)

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING
v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS
Hennepin County,

Defendant.

true, establish a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

 
(2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the district 
court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc.,

601 F.3d 852, 853

 (8th 
Cir. 2010).  Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be sufficient 
to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 570

 (2007).  A plaintiff may not rely on, nor may a district court consider, legal 
conclusions couched as factual allegations.  See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678-79

. 
    I.   Administrative Remedy Exhaustion Requirement                    
    Abdi brings four claims: (1) discrimination under the ADA for failure to provide 
him  reasonable  accommodations;  (2)  discrimination  under  the  ADA  for  retaliation; 

(3) discrimination on the basis of race under Title VII; and (4) discrimination on the basis 
of national origin under Title VII.  Hennepin County argues that because Abdi has not 
exhausted the administrative remedies as to all of his claims, the Court can consider only 
the alleged discrimination that Abdi included in his EEOC Charge.  Abdi maintains that 
the Court can consider all of the discrimination claims in the Complaint because he 

exhausted the administrative remedies by checking the “continuing violation” box on the 
EEOC Charge, indicating that the alleged discrimination was ongoing.      
    Under the ADA and Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies 
before filing a lawsuit in federal court.  Lindeman v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City,

899 F.3d 603, 608

 (8th Cir. 2018); Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works,

21 F.3d 218, 222

 (8th Cir. 1994).  To exhaust administrative remedies, the claimant must file a Charge 

of Discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days from the day the discrimination took 
place.

1 Williams, 21

 F.3d at 222.  Each “alleged discrimination or retaliation . . . is a 
separate and discrete unlawful practice for which Plaintiff must exhaust administrative 
remedies unless the conduct is reasonably related to the charge, and simply checking the 
‘continuing  violation’  box  on  the  EEOC  charge  is  insufficient  to  plausibly  allege  a 
continuing violation.”  Yohannes v. Minnesota IT Servs., No. 21-cv-620 (PJS/ECW),

2022 WL 2788397

, at *8 (D. Minn. July 15, 2022) (citing Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

3 F.4th 1075, 1082

claims occurring after August 2021. Therefore, this Court will not address the allegations
in the Complaint that were not included in Abdi’s EEOC Charge filed in August 2021,

34 F.4th 655, 659

 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 12112

(a)).  The failure to make a reasonable 
accommodation constitutes discrimination.  Mobley v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Inc.,

53 F.4th 452, 456

 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 12112

(b)(5)(A)).             
    To plead a prima facie case of a reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA, 
plaintiffs must show: (1) they have a disability within the meaning of the ADA, (2) they 

are a qualified individual and (3) they suffered an adverse employment action because of 
their disability.  Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

486 F.3d 480, 482

 (8th Cir. 2007).  “An 
adverse employment action is a tangible change in working conditions that produces a 
material employment disadvantage.”  Spears v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr. & Hum. Res.,

210 F.3d 850, 853

 (8th Cir. 2000).  A change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities constitutes 
a material employment disadvantage.  Sallis v. Univ. Minn.,

408 F.3d 470, 476

 (8th Cir. 

2005).  However, “[a] transfer involving only minor changes in working conditions and no 
reduction  in  pay  or  benefits  will  not  constitute  an  adverse  employment  action.”  
Ledergerber v. Stangler,

122 F.3d 1142, 1144

 (8th Cir. 1997).  Additionally, a poor 
performance evaluation does not constitute an adverse employment action unless it has 
some other tangible effect on the individual’s employment.  Spears,

210 F.3d at 854

.  Such 
a tangible effect may be the alteration of the individual’s employment terms or conditions.

Id.

184 F.3d 1017, 1025

 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 12203

(a)).  To plead a 

prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Abdi must show: (1) he engaged in protected 
conduct, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action and (3) the adverse action was 
causally linked to the protected conduct.  Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc.,

169 F.3d 1131, 1136

(8th Cir. 1999).
The parties do not dispute that Abdi engaged in protected conduct. Rather, the

similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.” Tolen v.
Ashcroft,

377 F.3d 879

, 882 (8th Cir. 2004).                              
    The parties do not dispute that Abdi is a member of a protected class and that he 
meets his employer’s legitimate job expectations.  However, the parties dispute whether 
Abdi suffered an adverse employment action and whether similarly situated employees 

outside the protected class were treated differently.  Abdi alleges that he suffered an 
adverse  employment  action  when  Hennepin  County  commenced  a  disciplinary 
investigation  against  him  and  reported  in  an  employee  evaluation  that  Abdi’s 
communication needed improvement.  As addressed in Section II, these actions do not 
constitute an adverse action.                                             
    Because Abdi fails to plead a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title 
VII, the Court grants Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss as to this claim.     

                         CONCLUSION                                      
    Abdi has failed to allege a claim for discrimination in violation of the ADA for 
failure to provide him reasonable accommodations, for discrimination in violation of the 
ADA for retaliation, and for discrimination based on race and national origin in violation 
of Title VII.  Therefore, Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss is granted.

ORDER

    Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED:                                                        
    1.   Defendant Hennepin County’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 6), is GRANTED.
    2.   This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.                     
    LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDIGNLY.                                 


Dated:  January 25, 2024                 _s/_ W__i_lh_e_l_m_i_n_a_ M__._ W__r_ig_h_t_  
                                         Wilhelmina M. Wright            
                                         United States District Judge

Reference

Status: Unknown