Spottswood v. State of Minneostota
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota
Spottswood v. State of Minneostota
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Shawn Clarke Spottswood, Civ. No. 23-3815 (PAM/DJF)
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
State of Minneostota [sic], and Washington
County 10th Judicial District,
Respondents.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster dated January 2, 2024. (Docket No. 4.)
The R&R recommends that Petitioner Shawn Clarke Spottswood’s Petition for habeas-
corpus relief be summarily denied and no certificate of appealability be granted.
Spottswood filed an objection to the R&R (Docket No. 7), as well as an untitled document
docketed as a “Notice.” (Docket No. 8.)
This Court must review de novo any portion of an R&R to which specific objections
are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b). After conducting the required
review and for the following reasons, the Court adopts the R&R.
The R&R thoroughly recounted the factual and procedural history of this matter,
and that history will not be repeated here. As the R&R notes, Spottswood’s Petition seems
based on a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the effect of a judgment of acquittal
he received in a state court criminal proceeding, No. 82-cr-15-4099. The state court entered
the judgment of acquittal during the pendency of Spottswood’s appeal from his conviction,
and thus the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal as moot and Spottswood
was released from detention. Spottswood apparently believes the judgment of acquittal
acquitted him of a different charge that carried an aggravated sentence, and the Petition
asks the Court to allow him to “skip the state remedies, since the[ State] used misconduct
to acquit me, and appeal my conviction.” (Docket No. 1 at 15.)
Spottswood’s misunderstanding likely stems from the title of the Minnesota Rule
his attorney invoked in seeking the judgment of acquittal. Subdivision 18 of Rule 26.03 is
titled “Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or Insufficient Evidence for an Aggravated
Sentence.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18. But subdivision 18 does not apply only if
the underlying crime is subject to an aggravated sentence, and the title of the Rule is best
read as if there is a comma between “Acquittal” and “or.” The Rule under which
Spottswood’s conviction was vacated is subdivision (3), which allows for a judgment of
acquittal after a guilty verdict in any criminal case, not only cases with aggravated
sentencing factors. See id.R. 26.03, subd. 3(a) (“If the jury returns a verdict of guilty . . . a motion for a judgment of acquittal may be brought within 15 days . . . .”). To be sure, subdivision 3 also allows a defendant to move the court to determine that there is insufficient evidence to sustain aggravating factors,id.
R. 26.03, subd. 3(b), but there is no
indication that Spottswood’s vacated conviction had any aggravated factors associated with
it, and the citation to Rule 26.03, subd. 18(3) does not mean that it did.
The R&R thus correctly determined that Spottswood’s Petition claiming otherwise
must be summarily denied. Because no reasonable minds could differ as to this conclusion,
the R&R likewise correctly determined that no certificate of appealability should issue.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The R&R (Docket No. 4) is ADOPTED;
2. The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DENIED;
3. This matter is DISMISSED; and
4. No Certificate of Appealability will issue.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 12, 2024 s/Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Shawn Clarke Spottswood, Civ. No. 23-3815 (PAM/DJF)
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
State of Minneostota [sic], and Washington
County 10th Judicial District,
Respondents.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster dated January 2, 2024. (Docket No. 4.)
The R&R recommends that Petitioner Shawn Clarke Spottswood’s Petition for habeas-
corpus relief be summarily denied and no certificate of appealability be granted.
Spottswood filed an objection to the R&R (Docket No. 7), as well as an untitled document
docketed as a “Notice.” (Docket No. 8.)
This Court must review de novo any portion of an R&R to which specific objections
are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Minn. L.R. 72.2(b). After conducting the required
review and for the following reasons, the Court adopts the R&R.
The R&R thoroughly recounted the factual and procedural history of this matter,
and that history will not be repeated here. As the R&R notes, Spottswood’s Petition seems
based on a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the effect of a judgment of acquittal
he received in a state court criminal proceeding, No. 82-cr-15-4099. The state court entered
the judgment of acquittal during the pendency of Spottswood’s appeal from his conviction,
and thus the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal as moot and Spottswood
was released from detention. Spottswood apparently believes the judgment of acquittal
acquitted him of a different charge that carried an aggravated sentence, and the Petition
asks the Court to allow him to “skip the state remedies, since the[ State] used misconduct
to acquit me, and appeal my conviction.” (Docket No. 1 at 15.)
Spottswood’s misunderstanding likely stems from the title of the Minnesota Rule
his attorney invoked in seeking the judgment of acquittal. Subdivision 18 of Rule 26.03 is
titled “Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or Insufficient Evidence for an Aggravated
Sentence.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18. But subdivision 18 does not apply only if
the underlying crime is subject to an aggravated sentence, and the title of the Rule is best
read as if there is a comma between “Acquittal” and “or.” The Rule under which
Spottswood’s conviction was vacated is subdivision (3), which allows for a judgment of
acquittal after a guilty verdict in any criminal case, not only cases with aggravated
sentencing factors. See id.R. 26.03, subd. 3(a) (“If the jury returns a verdict of guilty . . . a motion for a judgment of acquittal may be brought within 15 days . . . .”). To be sure, subdivision 3 also allows a defendant to move the court to determine that there is insufficient evidence to sustain aggravating factors,id.
R. 26.03, subd. 3(b), but there is no
indication that Spottswood’s vacated conviction had any aggravated factors associated with
it, and the citation to Rule 26.03, subd. 18(3) does not mean that it did.
The R&R thus correctly determined that Spottswood’s Petition claiming otherwise
must be summarily denied. Because no reasonable minds could differ as to this conclusion,
the R&R likewise correctly determined that no certificate of appealability should issue.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The R&R (Docket No. 4) is ADOPTED;
2. The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DENIED;
3. This matter is DISMISSED; and
4. No Certificate of Appealability will issue.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 12, 2024 s/Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge Reference
- Status
- Unknown