Woodward v. Credit Service International Corporation

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota February 14, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Lisa Woodward and Peter Woodward,         No. 23-cv-632 (KMM/ECW)        

          Plaintiffs,                                                    

v.

ORDER

Credit Service International Corporation                                 
and Richard Muske,                                                       

          Defendants.                                                    


    This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s (“Counsel”) letter requesting 
permission to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Order granting in part 
Counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. Letter (Dkt. 36); Order (Dkt. 35). For the reasons that 
follow, the request is denied.                                            
    Local Rule 7.1(j) requires a party seeking reconsideration of an order to obtain 
permission to file a motion for reconsideration. D. Minn. LR 7.1(j). A party is only granted 
permission to file such a motion when it has shown “compelling circumstances.” Id. 
Motions for reconsideration serve the limited purpose of “correct[ing] manifest errors of 
law or fact or . . . present[ing] newly discovered evidence.” Hagerman v. Yukon Energy 
Corp.,

839 F.2d 407, 414

 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co.,

827 F.2d 246, 251

 (7th Cir. 1987)). “[G]ranting permission to file a motion to reconsider 
is appropriate when necessary to afford a party ‘an opportunity for relief in extraordinary 
circumstances.’”  United  States  v.  Mustafa,  No.  14-cr-261(5)  (JRT/BRT),

2021 WL 925561

, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2021) (quoting Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, No. 10-cv-
404 (JRT/JJK),

2011 WL 2880726

, at *1 (D. Minn. July 18, 2011)).
Counsel’s letter does not explicitly address the standard for obtaining permission to

file a motion for reconsideration. The Court has closely reviewed Counsel’s letter,
including the portions of the record to which it cites,1 and concludes that it identifies no
manifest errors of law or fact justifying granting permission to file a motion for
reconsideration. Overall, the Court finds that Counsel’s letter seeks to reargue matters the
Court has already considered and presents primarily a disagreement with the Court’s ruling.

However, one aspect of Counsel’s letter deserves additional comment. Counsel
argues that the Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs failed to offer a specific opinion
“regarding the prevailing market rates in the Twin Cities legal community for comparable
cases.” Letter ¶ 1 (citing Order at 9). Of note, Counsel’s second declaration states that the
fees “sought in this Motion are in line with the median prevailing rate in the Twin City

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
reputation.” Second Giebel Decl. ¶ 27 (Dkt. 31). The Court agrees that Counsel’s second
declaration did identify an opinion regarding prevailing market rates. But the Court

1 Giebel Decl. ¶¶ 11, 49, 50 (Dkt. 20); Second Giebel Decl. ¶¶ 25, 27 (Dkt. 31); Pls.’ Mem.
at 21–22 (Dkt. 22); Pls.’ Reply at 16–17 (Dkt. 30). As it did when it issued the Order, the Court
has also taken into consideration Counsel’s arguments concerning defense counsel’s rates as
indicated in Ricketson v. Advantage Collection Professionals, LLC, No. 21-cv-2541
(WMW/ECW),

2023 WL 2136544

, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2023), and the court’s discussion of 
prevailing market rates in Berscheid v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 22-cv-086 (JRT/LIB),

2023 WL 3750182

 (D. Minn. June 1, 2023). The Court has also noted Counsel’s disagreement 
with footnote 1 on page 5 of the Court’s Order, including Counsel’s suggestion that it be redacted 
because it is “misleading” or “materially incomplete.” (Letter ¶ 3.) The Court finds that this issue 
provides no basis for reconsideration of the Order.                       
nonetheless finds reconsideration of the Order on the motion for fees is unwarranted 
because the highlighted opinion does not change the calculus that led the Court to conclude 
that $350 per hour represents an appropriate rate for this case. The Court reached that 

conclusion primarily because this case involved an early resolution through an accepted 
offer of judgment and no litigation over the merits. It may be that in a case involving 
contested litigation comparable to what took place in Berscheid, or in other consumer 
litigation cited by Counsel, the full $450 hourly rate that Counsel requested in this matter 
would be appropriate. But the evidence that Counsel points to in his letter does nothing to 

alter the fact that this was a simple dispute with no litigation over uncomplicated merits 
that resolved quickly and without significant court involvement. And none of the evidence 
or argument in Counsel’s letter convinces the Court that compelling circumstances exist to 
reconsider the Court’s conclusion that $12,075.00 represents a reasonable attorney’s fee 
for this matter.                                                          


Date: February 14, 2024         s/Katherine Menendez                     
                                Katherine Menendez                       
                                United States District Judge