Moore v. Hamline University

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota February 27, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Mariama Moore, No. 23-cv-3723 (KMM/TNL)

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

Hamline University, et al.,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Mariama Moore’s Motion for Entry of
Default Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). (Doc. No. 24). For the reasons that
follow, the motion is denied.
In support of her motion for default judgment, Ms. Moore argues that she is
entitled to such relief because the Defendants have failed to plead or otherwise defend,
and the well-pled allegations of her Complaint establish the Defendants’ liability. (Doc.
No. 24 at 2.) Further, she contends that no hearing is necessary on the motion and that she
should receive an award of $300,000,000 in civil damages. (Id. at 2–3 (describing the
categories of damages sought).)
Given the nature of Ms. Moore’s allegations in this case, including allegations that
she is experiencing ongoing stalking and harassment by other students in Hamline
University’s dorms, the Court can understand her desire to obtain a swift and favorable
resolution of the litigation. However, the Court cannot enter default judgment against the
Defendants in this case for several reasons.
First, the applicable procedural hurdles for entry of default judgment have not
been cleared. Default proceedings under Rule 55 move forward in two stages. In the
initial stage, under Rule 55(a), after a defendant fails to file a timely answer or pre-

answer motion in response to a complaint, a plaintiff files an application for entry of
default with the Clerk of Court. If the plaintiff’s application demonstrates that the
defendant has failed to timely respond, then the Clerk enters that defendant’s default on
the record. AGCO Fin., LLC v. Littrell,

320 F.R.D. 45, 47

 (D. Minn. 2017) (explaining 
that “[f]irst, under Rule 55(a), the litigant seeking the default judgment must submit proof 

that the opposing party failed to plead or otherwise defend against the claims and request 
that the clerk of court enter default as to the opposing party”).         
The second stage of the default procedure, which is set forth in Rule 55(b), allows 
a party to apply to the district court “for default judgment to be entered.” See

id.

 A district 
court cannot enter default judgment against any party under Rule 55(b) unless the clerk 

has first entered that party’s default under Rule 55(a). Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co.,

140 F.3d 781, 783

 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “entry of default under Rule 55(a) 
must precede grant of a default judgment under Rule 55(b)”).              
Here, the Clerk of Court has not entered the default of any Defendant against 
whom Ms. Moore seeks default judgment. Ms. Moore’s motion seeks relief at the second 

stage of the default process before the first mandatory step has taken place. As a result, 
the Court must deny her motion for default judgment.                      
The second reason that entry of default judgment against the Defendants would be 
improper in this case is that Defendants have not, in fact, failed to plead or otherwise 
defend. Based on other filings Ms. Moore has submitted in this matter, it appears to this 
Court that she believes they have failed to timely respond, and she has filed several 
documents in support of that assertion. But closer examination of the record reveals that 

Defendants still have time left to plead or otherwise respond to the Complaint. 
Ms. Moore applied to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this action, and that 
application was granted on December 27, 2023. (Doc. No. 6.) That same day, the Clerk 
sent Ms. Moore a copy of the Order and service forms to complete and return so the 
Clerk could seek waiver of service from the Defendants consistent with Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. ¶ 3; Doc. No. 7.) On January 4, 2024, the Clerk 
received completed service forms for all Defendants from Ms. Moore and sent out a 
notice of lawsuit and request for waiver of service to each of the Defendants. (Doc. 
No. 13.)                                                                  
As United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung explained in the Order granting 

Ms. Moore’s IFP application, the Defendants had 30 days from the date the waiver was 
mailed (January 4th) to sign and return the waiver. (Doc. No. 6 ¶ 4.) On January 30, 
2024,  within  that  30-day  window,  all  Defendants  returned  signed  waivers.  (Doc. 
Nos. 26–31.) Because they did so, Defendants are not required to answer or otherwise 
respond to the Complaint until March 4, 2024, which is 60 days from the date the Clerk 

mailed  the  completed  waiver  forms  to  the  Defendants.  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  4(d)(3)  (“A 
defendant who, before being served with process, timely returns a waiver need not serve 
an answer to the complaint until 60 days after the request was sent[.]”). Therefore, none 
of the Defendants has failed to plead or otherwise defend in this case within the meaning 
of Rule 55, and entry of default judgment would be inappropriate for this reason as well. 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Default Judgment (Doc. No. 24) is DENIED.                             

Date: February 27, 2024          s/Katherine Menendez                     
                            United States District Judge             
                            District of Minnesota