Jackson v. Hennepin Healthcare Systems, Inc.

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota February 28, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

LaTonya Jackson, Civ. No. 23-2296 (PAM/DTS)

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Hennepin Healthcare Systems, Inc., and
Duang See, individually and as a
representative of Hennepin Healthcare
Systems, Inc.,

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. For the
following reasons, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff LaTonya Jackson worked in the radiology department at Defendant
Hennepin Healthcare Systems, Inc., for more than 20 years, from 2001 to 2022. (Compl.
¶ 14.) Hennepin Healthcare is a subsidiary of Hennepin County. (Id. ¶ 2.) In her
Complaint, Jackson alleges that her supervisor, Defendant Duang See, and other
unspecified individuals at Hennepin Healthcare harassed her, treated her differently, and
retaliated against her when she complained about the differential treatment. (See id. ¶ 19.)
According to Jackson, these actions were taken because of her race, her emotional
disability, and her age. (See id. ¶ 31.) The retaliation eventually led to Jackson’s
termination. (Id. ¶ 12.)
Jackson’s Complaint raises four claims: Count I claims discrimination on the basis
of age, race, and disability in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; Count II

claims a violation of Jackson’s equal-protection rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

; Count III 
claims a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),

29 U.S.C. §§ 621

  et  seq.;  and  Count  IV  claims  that  Defendants  violated  the  Americans  with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101

 et seq., when they terminated Jackson’s 
employment a few days after she notified Hennepin Healthcare of her intention to take 
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to deal with a “health issue.”  

(Compl. ¶¶ 51-52.)  In her opposition memorandum, Jackson abandons her § 1983 claim, 
asking that it be dismissed without prejudice.  (Docket No. 15 at 2 n.1.)  This is the only 
claim brought against Defendant See and thus Defendant See will likewise be dismissed. 
DISCUSSION                                                                
    In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, this 

Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all 
reasonable inferences in Jackson’s favor.  Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.,

511 F.3d 818, 820

 
(8th Cir. 2008).  Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, 
they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555

 (2007).  The complaint must “state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.”

Id. at 570

.  In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the 
Court  may  disregard  legal  conclusions  that  are  couched  as  factual  allegations.    See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 679

(2009).
A. Statute of Limitations
Title VII imposes a 90-day statute of limitations: “[i]f a charge filed with the

[EEOC] is dismissed . . . , the [EEOC] shall so notify the person aggrieved and within
ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge.”1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). Jackson does not dispute
that she was notified of the EEOC’s dismissal of her charge on May 5, 2023, giving her
until August 3, 2023, to file her lawsuit.
According to Jackson, she timely filed her lawsuit on August 3, 2023. Jackson

points to the date at the top of the docket sheet on the Court’s electronic case filing (“ECF”)
system, which shows a “Date Filed” of 08/03/2023. (Ward Decl. (Docket No. 16) Ex. 1.)
But the notice of electronic filing associated with the Complaint shows that the Complaint
itself was not filed until after midnight—12:08 am, to be precise—on August 4, 2023.
Defendants thus argue that the Complaint is untimely and should be dismissed on that basis.

The Rules provide that a party “commence[s]” a “civil action . . . by filing a
complaint with the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. Thus, the filing of the Complaint, not the
opening of a civil action on the Court’s ECF system, is the date the lawsuit commences for
purposes of the statute of limitations.
To commence a civil case on the District of Minnesota’s ECF system, a putative

plaintiff must perform several steps. See generally “Filing a New Civil Case,” D. Minn.

1 This section provides another impediment to Jackson’s claims, because her EEOC charge
listed only Hennepin Healthcare as a respondent, but her lawsuit names both Hennepin
Healthcare and Duang See. (Docket No. 13-1 at 2.) Given Jackson’s abandonment of her
only claim against See, however, this discrepancy is immaterial.
Electronic Case Filing Procedures Guide – CIVIL CASES (“ECF Civil Guide”) (available
at https://www.mnd.uscourts.gov/sites/mnd/files/Civil-ECF-Users-Manual.pdf) (archived

at https://perma.cc/SUW5-UEDS). The ECF Civil Guide makes clear that “opening [a civil
case] is a two part process: 1) enter the case data and 2) file the initiating documents.” Id.
at 10.
The first step to commencing a civil case involves filling out a Case Data Screen
with pertinent information regarding the parties, the nature of the lawsuit, whether the party
demands a jury trial, and the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 10-11. After the filing

party has entered all relevant information into the Case Data Screen, the party must click
the “Create Case” button. Id. at 15. The system then offers a final opportunity to review
the information entered. Id. If the information is correct, the party clicks “Yes” and “[t]he
case data is now entered in CM/ECF and a case number has been assigned.” Id.
But to commence the case, the party must complete the second step of the process,

namely, the filing of a complaint or other case-initiating document. Id. Filing a case-
initiating document itself requires confirming that the case number is correct, choosing the
type of document being filed, confirming the name of the filing party, and confirming the
identity of those against whom the claim(s) are filed. Id. at 16. The party must also pay
the filing fee. Id. at 15. Only after proceeding through those steps may the document

itself—here, the Complaint—be uploaded to the ECF system. Id. at 16. And only after
these documents are filed does the system generate a notice of electronic filing (NEF)
indicating that a case has been opened and a district judge and magistrate judge assigned—
as the ECF Civil Guide makes clear, no judges are assigned to the case until after the case-
initiating documents are filed.
Jackson’s attorney apparently began the case-opening process on August 3, 2023,

and likely completed step one of that process, as evidenced by the docket sheet’s “Date
Filed” of August 3, 2023. But the NEF for the Complaint shows that the second step of
the process—the filing of the Complaint—was not completed until August 4, 2023.
Counsel offered a single explanation for this discrepancy, contending that he
mistakenly filed a blank civil cover sheet in conjunction with the Complaint. The Clerk’s
Office contacted him about this misfiling, and he re-filed the civil cover sheet. (Docket

No. 4.) But the Civil Cover Sheet did not reset the filing time in the NEF for the Complaint.
Indeed, the NEF for the correctly filed Civil Cover Sheet shows that it was filed at 11:11
am on August 7, 2023, not on August 4. It is therefore beyond dispute that Jackson’s
Complaint was not filed, and the case was not “commenced” for purposes of Rule 3, until
August 4, 2023, one day past the 90-day deadline.

To avoid dismissal for failure to file within the 90-day limitations period, Jackson
must demonstrate that the deadline should be equitably tolled. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs,

498 U.S. 89, 95

 (1990).  But equitable tolling requires that some impediment 
beyond Jackson’s control prevented timely filing.  See Heideman v. PFL, Inc.,

904 F.2d 1262, 1266

 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Equitable tolling is appropriate only when the circumstances 

that cause a plaintiff to miss a filing deadline are out of his hands.”).  Jackson’s only 
argument that equitable tolling is appropriate is that the case was initiated before midnight 
on August 3, or that the misfiled Civil Cover Sheet somehow caused the system to 
mistakenly date her Complaint as filed on August 4.  The clear evidence, however, is that 
the Complaint was not filed until August 4.  Equitable tolling is not appropriate. 
    Cases are legion that missing Title VII’s 90-day deadline by even a single day 

warrants dismissal.  See, e.g.,  Begay v. St. Joseph’s Indian Sch.,

922 F. Supp. 270

 (D.S.D. 
1996) (claim filed on 91st day dismissed as untimely); see also Taylor v. Books A Million,

296 F.3d 376, 380

 (5th Cir. 2002) (claim filed one day after 90-day period dismissed as 
untimely); Paniconi v. Abington Hospital-Jefferson Health,

604 F. Supp. 3d 290

, 293 (E.D. 
Pa. 2022) (same).  And another Judge in this District dismissed as untimely a Title VII 
complaint filed incorrectly on the 90th day and not correctly refiled until four days later.  

Brinkman v. Nasseff Mech. Contr’rs, Inc.,

251 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1273

(D. Minn. 2017)
(Kyle, J.). Jackson offers no contrary authority and dismissal for failure to comply with
the applicable statute of limitations is appropriate.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Even if Jackson’s Complaint were timely filed, however, it would be subject to

dismissal for failure to sufficiently plead Jackson’s claims. The pleading alleges that
Defendant See made “inappropriate comments” about Jackson’s African hairstyle, and
threatened to call Jackson’s bank to interfere with Jackson’s relationship with her bank.
(Compl. ¶ 19.) The pleading offers no details such as when these alleged comments and
threats occurred. Jackson also contends that See “improperly discussed Ms. Jackson’s

confidential personnel business with others and humiliating [sic] her.” (Id.) But that is the
extent of the allegation; the pleading does not indicate with whom See allegedly discussed
Jackson’s business, or what that business was, or how See supposedly humiliated Jackson.
As another example, Jackson alleges that “HHS white employees used racially derogatory
comments but HHC forced the African American employees to go to racial sensitivity
training.” (Id.) The Complaint does not allege that any employee made racially derogatory

comments to Jackson herself, when or where any of these comments happened, or whether
Jackson was required to attend racial sensitivity training. Defendant’s alleged “legacy of
discrimination” against its African-American employees (id. ¶ 10), is simply insufficient
to plausibly plead any illegal discrimination against Jackson herself.
Other examples of the Complaint’s fatally sparse pleading abound. For instance,
the Complaint asserts that Jackson was discriminated against because of an alleged

disability in violation of the ADA. Nowhere in the Complaint does Jackson explain what
that disability is, other than two oblique references to an “emotional” or “perceived mental
disability.” (Id. ¶¶ 31, 54.) Jackson likewise offers no specific allegation regarding the
alleged disability discrimination that would, if true, establish the required causation for a
claim under the ADA. See Denson v. Steak ’n Shake, Inc.,

910 F.3d 368, 370

 (8th Cir. 

2018) (an ADA plaintiff must plead that she “(1) has a disability within the meaning of the 
ADA, (2) is a qualified individual under the ADA, and (3) suffered an adverse employment 
action as a result of the disability”) (quotations omitted).              
      Jackson also claims to have been discriminated against on the basis of her age, but 
does not plead how old she is,2 or indeed any other facts to support the causation element 

of an age-discrimination claim.  See Aulick v. Skybridge Americas, Inc.,

860 F.3d 613

, 

2 At the hearing, the Court questioned counsel about the Complaint’s failure to include 
relevant details, and mistakenly stated that Jackson did not plead her race for purposes of 
her race-discrimination claims.  Jackson sufficiently alleged her race, but as noted, did not 
plead essential elements of her other discrimination claims.              
621 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting that the elements of age-discrimination claim are that the 
plaintiff “(1) was at least 40 years old; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an 

adverse employment action; and (4) was rejected for someone sufficiently younger to 
permit the inference of age discrimination”).  These failures mean that Jackson’s Complaint 
does not plausibly state a claim on which relief can be granted.  If timely, her Complaint 
would be dismissed on that basis.                                         
C.   Exhaustion                                                           
    Finally, even if timely and sufficiently pled, Jackson’s claims that arise out of her 

termination  must  be  dismissed.    Jackson’s  EEOC  charge  provides  that  the  alleged 
discrimination took place from May 1, 2020, to May 5, 2021.  (Munic Decl. Ex. A (Docket 
No. 13-1).)  Jackson was not terminated until after 2021.  (See Compl. ¶ 12 (stating that 
the alleged discrimination “culminat[ed] in [Jackson’s] improper termination in [DATE] 
[sic], 2023”); ¶ 14 (stating that Jackson worked at HCMC “until her wrongful termination 

in  October  of  2022”).)    An  employment-discrimination  plaintiff  must  exhaust  her 
administrative remedies with respect to her claims before bringing a lawsuit.  See Shannon 
v.  Ford  Motor  Co.,

72 F.3d 678, 684

  (8th  Cir.  1996)  (“The  proper  exhaustion  of 
administrative  remedies  gives  the  plaintiff  a  green  light  to  bring  her  employment-
discrimination claim, along with allegations that are ‘like or reasonably related’ to that 

claim, in federal court.”).  Jackson did not bring another EEOC charge—or amend her 
pending charge—after her termination to include allegations related to that termination, 
thus did not properly exhaust her remedies with respect to her termination. 

    Jackson argues that her termination is part of a “continuing violation,” making her 
EEOC claim timely as to all adverse actions Defendant took against her, including her 
termination.  Jackson did not check the “continuing action” box on the EEOC form, but 
even if she had, termination is a discrete event.  See Hutson v. Wells Dairy, Inc.,

578 F.3d 823, 826

 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A termination is a discrete act.”).  Jackson’s failure to include 
in her charge the time period encompassing her termination means that any claim that her 

termination was discriminatory or retaliatory is barred.  Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-
Wilmington Corp,

894 F.3d 911, 920

 (8th Cir. 2018) (Because plaintiff “never filed a new 
[EEOC] charge for the termination . . . . all federal claims related to the termination are 
beyond the scope of the [EEOC] charge” and were properly dismissed.).     
    Jackson has brought a claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, 

which would allow her to proceed on a continuing-violation theory.  See Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 122

 (2002) (noting that “[a] charge alleging a 
hostile work environment claim . . . will not be time barred so long as all acts which 
constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one act 
falls within the time period”).  But any discrete act that she claims was discriminatory or 

retaliatory must fall within the time she outlined in her EEOC charge, or it is both time-
barred and unexhausted.  See

id.

 (noting that claims arising out of “discrete discriminatory 
or retaliatory acts” must be filed within the statutory time period).  Jackson’s claims related 
to her termination are therefore subject to dismissal on this basis as well. 

CONCLUSION                                                                
    Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                              
    1.   Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 9) is GRANTED;        
    2.   The Complaint is DISMISSED.                                     
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      


Dated:      February 28, 2024           s/Paul A. Magnuson                
                                  Paul A. Magnuson                       
                                  United States District Court Judge