Sorenson v. State of Minnesota
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota
Sorenson v. State of Minnesota
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Eric M. Sorenson, also known as, Cherrity No. 21-cv-671 (KMM/DJF)
Honesty-Alexis Meranelli,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
State of Minnesota, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster, dated November 20, 2023. [R&R,
Doc. 208.] Judge Foster recommends that the Court grant the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and deny the Plaintiff’s1 motion for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice. Ms. Meranelli filed objections to the R&R and the Defendants’ responded.
[Pl.’s Obj., Doc. 209.] For the reasons that follow, Ms. Meranelli’s objections are
overruled, the Court accepts the R&R, grants the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, and dismisses Ms. Meranelli’s claims with prejudice.
1 The Plaintiff in this case is identified by two names—Eric Sorenson, also known as
Cherrity Honesty-Alexis Meranelli. In the Plaintiff’s most recent filing at docket entry 209, dated
November 29, 2023, Plaintiff signed as both Eric M. Sorenson and Cherrity H. Meranelli. It
remains this Court’s understanding that the Plaintiff uses feminine pronouns and that Cherrity
Meranelli is Plaintiff’s preferred name. Therefore, consistent with the approach taken throughout
this litigation, the Court will refer to the Plaintiff as “Ms. Meranelli” or “Plaintiff” and use
feminine pronouns in this Order.
I. Background2
In February 2001, Ms. Meranelli was diagnosed with numerous gallstones and had
surgery in March 2001 to remove her gallbladder. One side-effect of the surgery, she
alleges, is that she experiences bowel incontinence, causing her to need access to a
restroom more frequently and unpredictably than the average person or even a person
with irritable bowel syndrome.
Since approximately 2010, Ms. Meranelli has been detained under an order of civil
commitment at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program’s facility in Moose Lake,
Minnesota (“MSOP”). As part of her treatment in that facility, she participates in
voluntary group therapy. Participation in group therapy is one of the ways individuals
who are civilly committed at MSOP can advance through the phases of their treatment, a
fundamental goal of MSOP and, presumably, a prerequisite for a person subject to
indefinite commitment eventually qualifying for release back into the community.
MSOP does not have a facility-wide policy concerning bathroom breaks for those
who participate in group therapy. For example, there is no official policy that detainees
who leave group therapy to go to the restroom cannot return to their group sessions. But
the two therapists who facilitate Ms. Meranelli’s “core group” therapy programming
2 Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R focus mainly on the rationale for Judge Foster’s
recommendation that her motion to voluntarily dismiss this case without prejudice be denied.
Plaintiff also objects to the recommendation that the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
be granted, but with one notable exception addressed toward the end of this Order, even when
liberally construed, her Objections do not contest Judge Foster’s proposed findings of fact that
support the summary judgment finding. The Court has reviewed the record and determined that
there is no error in Judge Foster’s factual determinations. Therefore, this Court accepts the
R&R’s recitation of the facts. This background section provides only a brief summary of the
dispute.
asked any group members who chose to leave a session not to return until the next
scheduled session. They instituted this approach because participants coming and going
from group therapy sessions is distracting and counter-productive to the programming
goals. Nevertheless, the facilitators agreed that if a group participant provided
documentation of a reason the participant needs to leave a session, they would allow
them to leave and then return.
In September 2020, because Ms. Meranelli alleged that her gallbladder surgery
from March 2001 caused her to have bowel incontinence, she sought an accommodation
from her group therapy facilitators that would allow her to leave group therapy sessions,
use the restroom, and then return to the same session. After reviewing the paperwork
Ms. Meranelli submitted in support of her request, a Registered Nurse Practitioner denied
it. Ms. Meranelli appealed that decision to the Minnesota Department of Human Services
(“DHS”). The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Coordinator for DHS denied the
appeal. Both the original denial and the rejection of the appeal concluded that there was
insufficient documentation of Plaintiff’s claimed impairments. Specifically, the ADA
Coordinator found that although Ms. Meranelli’s health condition was limiting, it was not
“substantially limiting” within the meaning of the ADA, so she was not a qualified
individual with a disability.
Procedural History
After her appeal was denied, Ms. Meranelli filed this lawsuit on March 8, 2021.
The District Court entered a partial order of dismissal [Doc. 44],3 and following an
amendment of the pleadings, the claims remaining in this action include disability
discrimination claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”); and inadequate medical care and impermissible
punishment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants sought written discovery from Plaintiff in March 2022. Plaintiff
responded and, dissatisfied with the information Plaintiff provided, Defendants filed a
motion to compel. Ms. Meranelli did not file a written response to the motion to compel,
and United States Magistrate Leo I. Brisbois granted that motion on July 5, 2022.4 Judge
Brisbois found that Defendants sought relevant information directly related to the
allegations underlying Ms. Meranelli’s claims, including information about the persons
with whom she had communicated regarding her alleged disability; identification of
communications she had with any employee of DHS or MSOP regarding the subject
matter of the action; the identity of any expert and fact witnesses; and details regarding
the symptoms she experienced. Judge Brisbois ordered Ms. Meranelli to provide
substantive responses to the Defendants’ discovery within 30 days, cautioned that failure
3 This case was originally assigned to United States District Judge Nancy E. Brasel but
was later reassigned to this Court. [Doc. 92]
4 Until September 14, 2022, Judge Brisbois was Magistrate Judge assigned to this case.
The case was reassigned to Judge Foster upon her appointment. [Doc. 144.]
to respond could result in sanctions, and modified the scheduling order to allow
additional time for the Defendants to learn more about the basis for Plaintiff’s claims.
Ms. Meranelli provided supplemental discovery responses in July and August of
2022, but the Defendants believed that those responses were still deficient. As a result,
the Defendants filed a motion for sanctions. Ms. Meranelli did not respond to that
motion, and Judge Foster recommended that Defendants’ motion for sanctions be granted
in part. Specifically, she found that Plaintiff should be precluded from offering any
evidence on a motion or at trial that she withheld from Defendants during discovery.
[Doc. 167.] Plaintiff did not object to that recommendation, and this Court entered an
Order precluding Ms. Meranelli “from offering into evidence any information in support
of her claims that Defendants solicited from her and that she failed to produce in
discovery.” [Doc. 169.]
Ms. Meranelli subsequently sought leave to file an untimely response to the
motion for sanctions and the Defendants’ motion to compel discovery. [Doc. 170.] This
Court denied that motion, finding that Ms. Meranelli had essentially asked the Court to
reconsider and vacate its Order adopting Judge Foster’s Report and Recommendation on
the sanctions motion without providing justification for seeking such relief. The Court
also found that granting Ms. Meranelli’s requested relief would be unfairly prejudicial to
the Defendants. [Doc. 178.] Next, Ms. Meranelli filed untimely objections to
Judge Foster’s Report and Recommendation on the sanctions motion, essentially seeking
the same relief she requested in her untimely responses to the motions for sanctions and
to compel. [Doc. 181.] This Court again denied her requested relief as an unsupported
attempt at obtaining reconsideration of the Court’s prior rulings. [Doc. 199.]
On March 29, 2023, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment.
[Doc. 183.] Ms. Meranelli did not respond to the motion, and several months passed
without any filing from her. On August 3, 2023, she filed a motion asking the Court to
allow her to voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice. She stated that she wished
to dismiss the case to pursue a settlement with Defendants, but maintain the ability to
bring her claims again in a second action if she was unsatisfied with the results of the
anticipated negotiations. Ms. Meranelli argued that she had only recently become aware
of a procedure by which she could obtain bathroom passes that might obviate the need for
her to obtain an ADA accommodation. She also argued that such a dismissal would not
prejudice Defendants, and the fact that Defendants had expended resources on this case
was not a sufficient basis to deny her request. [Docs. 200, 201.] As mentioned above,
Judge Foster found that Ms. Meranelli’s motion for voluntary dismissal should be denied
and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted. Ms. Meranelli objects
to both recommendations.
II. Discussion
When a party raises specific objections to a portion of an R&R, the Court reviews
those portions of the R&R de novo and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). Otherwise, the Court reviews an R&R to which no objections are made, non-specific objections, and objections that simply restate arguments already considered by the magistrate judge for clear error. Grinder v. Gammon,73 F.3d 793, 795
(8th Cir. 1996); Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC,98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017
(D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2015). The Court liberally interprets a pro se party’s objections. Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); Horsey v. Asher,741 F.2d 209
, 211 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984).
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice
Ms. Meranelli filed her motion to voluntarily dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(a)(2). District courts have discretion to grant or deny such a request. Thatcher v.
Hannover Ins. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 1212, 1213(8th Cir. 2011). In exercising that discretion, courts consider a variety of factors, including: the explanation for the moving party’s request to dismiss; whether allowing dismissal would waste judicial time and effort; whether dismissal would prejudice the defendants; the stage of the litigation; and the time and effort the parties have expended. Id.; Donner v. Alcoa, Inc.,709 F.3d 694, 697
(8th Cir. 2013); Witzman v. Gross,148 F.3d 988, 992
(8th Cir. 1998); Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp.,738 F.2d 968, 972
(8th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff is not allowed to dismiss a
case merely to avoid an unfavorable decision. Thatcher, 659 F.3d at 1214–15 (reversing
district court decision granting plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss and remanding
with instructions to consider whether the plaintiff’s motion was an improper effort at
avoiding an unfavorable federal forum).
Judge Foster found that the relevant factors weighed against granting Plaintiff’s
request because (1) the parties, especially Defendants, had already expended considerable
resources and should not be required to do so again; (2) Defendants’ factual and legal
positions in a subsequent suit would be disadvantaged because they would be denied the
benefit of the discovery sanctions they obtained in this action, or be forced to go through
the same discovery fights again if the case were refiled; (3) allowing a future suit over the
same claims would waste the Court’s resources and likely result in extensive motion
practice; and (4) Plaintiff’s asserted reasons for dismissal are unpersuasive.
Ms. Meranelli has objected to these conclusions.
First, Ms. Meranelli objects to Judge Foster’s finding that allowing a possible
future lawsuit in this case would be prejudicial to Defendants and specifically argues that
the R&R incorrectly concludes that the “threat of a future lawsuit based upon a voluntary
dismissal” is not the kind of prejudice that justifies denying her motion. [Pl.’s Obj. at 3–
4.] In support of this argument, Ms. Meranelli cites Mullen v. Heinkel Filtering Sys., 770
F.3d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 2014). This Objection is overruled. For starters, Judge Foster did
not conclude that the threat of a future lawsuit alone was sufficiently prejudicial to deny
Ms. Meranelli’s request. Such a suggestion misconstrues Judge Foster’s analysis and
provides no basis for rejecting the R&R.
Moreover, Mullen does not support Ms. Meranelli’s argument. In Mullen, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order granting a motion allowing a plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss a case without prejudice. Id.at 727–29. But the court reached that conclusion because “the case had not progressed very far,” there had only been two hearings on discovery disputes, and even though the magistrate judge had denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to extend the expert deadline, the reason for the dismissal was to allow the plaintiffs to pursue their “legally viable claim” against a corporation over which the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Id.
The circumstances of this
case are not remotely comparable. Unlike the proceeding in Mullen, this case has
progressed to the point where a decision on the merits is at hand. In addition, the
expenditure of resources by the parties and the Court has been considerable, and the basis
for which Ms. Meranelli seeks a dismissal is, by her own admission, to attempt to extract
a settlement from the Defendants from a stronger tactical position than if the threat of a
second suit regarding the same claims were not on the table. [R&R at 10 (citing
Plaintiff’s reply in support of the motion to dismiss, which discusses the motivation to
avoid a decision on the summary judgment motion while “holding the feet of the
Defendants to the flame. . . .”).]
Second, Ms. Meranelli argues that Judge Foster erred by considering how granting
the motion to dismiss would potentially allow Plaintiff to gain a tactical advantage by
circumventing the effects of the sanctions order and by forcing Defendants to undergo
significant fights over discovery in a future lawsuit. Again, relying on Mullen,
Ms. Meranelli argues that Defendants’ loss of a tactical advantage is insufficient
prejudice to justify denial of her motion. [Pl. Obj. at 4.] This Objection is overruled. In
Mullen, the plaintiffs were allowed to voluntarily dismiss their action after the magistrate
judge had denied their motion to extend the expert deadline. On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit found that the loss of such a “tactical advantage” did not constitute legal prejudice
that would justify denying the plaintiffs’ request. 770 F.3d at 728(citing Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc.,596 F.2d 822, 823
(8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). But the consequences here are qualitatively different than a mere tactical procedural advantage that is generally insufficient to show legal prejudice. E.g., Hoffman,596 F.2d at 823
(finding that after the
district court had denied the plaintiff’s request for a jury trial as untimely, the possibility
the plaintiff could assert a timely demand for a jury trial in a subsequent suit was a
“tactical advantage” that alone was not enough to justify denial of voluntary dismissal).
Granting Plaintiff’s motion under the circumstances of this case would allow her to
escape the consequences of her own litigation conduct, subject the Defendants to the
threat of a future suit which could impose far more than the ordinary burdens associated
with discovery and typical litigation costs, and do so primarily so that Plaintiff could
avoid the possibility of an adverse ruling on the Defendants’ pending summary judgment
motion.
Ms. Meranelli’s next two Objections argue that Judge Foster improperly found
that voluntary dismissal was unwarranted because she considered the costs and expenses
Defendants had incurred in discovery and the judicial resources expended during this
litigation. [Pl.’s Obj. at 5.] Because these factors are relevant to the determination and
Judge Foster thoroughly and accurately assessed how they weighed into the analysis,
these Objections are likewise overruled.5 Plaintiff’s suggestion that these are not proper
considerations is not supported by the case law.
Finally, Ms. Meranelli objects to the R&R’s assessment of the asserted reason for
seeking voluntary dismissal. She argues that her stated reason for wanting to dismiss is to
5 In the context of considering the waste of judicial resources, Judge Foster observed that
“Plaintiff continues to demonstrate an unwillingness to respect the Court’s orders.” [R&R at 9–10.]
Although Ms. Meranelli disagrees with this assessment in her Objections [Pl.’s Obj. at 6–7], the
Court agrees with Judge Foster’s observation that any subsequent suit by Ms. Meranelli concerning
these matters would likely involve similarly extensive and litigious motion practice. [R&R at 10.]
engage in good-faith efforts to resolve the dispute without the need for judicial
intervention, which should be supported by the Court because it would save judicial
resources. [Pl.’s Obj. at 6.] This Objection is overruled. Judge Foster found
Ms. Meranelli’s stated reasons for dismissal unpersuasive, noting that Plaintiff had
admitted she wished to avoid a decision on the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, keep open the possibility of refiling the same claims, and negotiate from a
stronger tactical position. [R&R at 10 (citing Doc. 205 at 3).] The record supports Judge
Foster’s conclusion, and the caselaw provides that voluntary dismissal without prejudice
should be denied where it appears to be undertaken for the purpose of avoiding an
unfavorable decision. Thatcher, 659 F.3d at 1214–15; Graham v. Mentor Worldwide
LLC, 998 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “prior cases have repeatedly
noted the importance of inquiring into whether a party has a proper explanation for its
desire to dismiss” and that courts must consider “whether the plaintiff south dismissal to
avoid adverse judgment”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For these reasons, the Court agrees with Judge Foster’s recommendation and the
Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice is denied.
B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
In the R&R, Judge Foster recognized that summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). [R&R at 11.] The R&R accurately sets forth the
familiar law governing summary judgment procedure, Ms. Meranelli raises no issue with
that discussion in her Objections, and the Court will not further repeat that standard here.
[R&R at 11–12.]
As noted, the remaining substantive claims in this case include § 1983 claims of
inadequate medical care and impermissible punishment. Judge Foster recommended that
Defendants’ motion be granted as to these claims. With respect to the punishment claim,
she explained that the record showed group therapy is an important tool offered at
MSOP, that individuals arriving late or leaving early from group sessions can be
disruptive, and that is why facilitators of group therapy (like the therapists leading
Ms. Meranelli’s core group) prohibit participants from leaving during the middle of a
session unless they have a documented reason for doing so. Judge Foster found the goal
of making treatment most effective is rationally related to MSOP’s legitimate interests in
rehabilitation of its civilly committed detainees, and Plaintiff provided no evidence
creating a genuine issue of fact suggesting the policy at issue was punitive. Judge Foster
further found that the § 1983 claim regarding inadequate medical care was essentially
predicated on the same alleged violations of the ADA and RA that form the basis of those
statutory claims. Consequently, Judge Foster applied Eighth Circuit law and concluded
that the overlapping § 1983 claims should be dismissed. [R&R at 15–17.] Ms. Meranelli
does not object to Judge Foster’s conclusions as to either of these claims. Based on the
Court’s review of the R&R and the record in this matter, the Court finds no clear error.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to
these claims.
Judge Foster also addressed Ms. Meranelli’s disability discrimination claims under
the ADA, the RA, and the MHRA. At the outset, Judge Foster explained that the “crux of
Plaintiff’s claims is that Defendants denied her any reasonable accommodation for a
health condition by refusing to permit necessary restroom breaks during therapeutic
programming.” [R&R at 1.] The R&R addressed these claims together, an approach to
which Ms. Meranelli does not object. Judge Foster explained that Ms. Meranelli had the
burden to show that she (1) is a person with a disability as defined by the ADA; (2) is
otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) was excluded from the benefit due
to discrimination based on her disability. [R&R at 12 (citing Randolph v. Rodgers, 170
F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999)).]
For the first element of the prima facie case, Plaintiff must show that her
conditions are “substantially limiting,” meaning that she is “‘[s]ignificantly restricted as
to the condition, manner or duration under which [she] can perform a major life activity,’
as compared to the average person.” [R&R at 13 (quoting Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac.
Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2010)).] Reviewing the evidence in the record, Judge
Foster found: (1) that there was virtually no evidence in the record establishing that
Plaintiff has a history of substantially limiting bowel incontinence; (2) the only medical
record even mentioning diarrhea symptoms was a March 2002 emergency room note,
made more than 18 years prior to her reasonable modification request and reporting only
12 hours of symptoms as opposed to a chronic issue; (3) follow-up medical records
showed no continued complaints of symptoms; and (4) Plaintiffs visits with medical
professionals at MSOP over many years showed no complaints regarding bowel
incontinence. [R&R at 13–14.] Because Ms. Meranelli failed to point to any evidence
supporting her allegation of chronic bowel incontinence, Judge Foster concluded that
there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ms. Meranelli’s bowel
symptoms constitute a disability, and no reasonable jury could find in her favor. [Id. at
14.]
Ms. Meranelli Objects to Judge Foster’s summary judgment recommendation
regarding the disability discrimination claims. First, she contends that the R&R erred by
relying on three cases—Kirkeberg, 619 F.3d 898; Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprentice Comm.,370 F.3d 764
(8th Cir. 2004); and Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc.,188 F.3d 944
(8th Cir. 1999)—that in turn cite Supreme Court decisions with which Congress disagreed when it passed amendments to the ADA in 2008. See, e.g., Kirkeberg,619 F.3d at 904
n.2 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc.,527 U.S. 471
(1999) and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams,534 U.S. 184
(2002)). This Objection is also overruled. The R&R did not rely directly on either Sutton or Toyota Motor in reaching its conclusions concerning her disability discrimination claims, and the Eighth Circuit cases the R&R did cite remain good law. Indeed, courts within this district continue to rely on those same cases when explaining what a plaintiff must show to establish that a condition is substantially limiting. E.g., Kiel v. Mayo Clinic Sys. Southeast Minn., __ F. Supp. 3d __,2023 WL 5000255
, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2023) (citing Kirkeberg,619 F.3d at 903
); Maximo Lopez v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, Civil No. 23-6 (JRT/DLM),2023 WL 4203087
, at *3 (D. Minn. June 27, 2023) (same). Moreover,
Ms. Meranelli fails to identify any way in which the articulation of the legal standard
governing her disability discrimination claims in either the R&R or the Eighth Circuit
cases conflicts in any way with the 2008 amendments to the ADA.
Finally, Ms. Meranelli objects to the R&R’s conclusion that there is no evidence
suggesting she has a substantially limiting disability because she filed her own affidavit
in this case stating that she has an impairment causing disabling symptoms. [Pl.’s Obj. at
8–9.] Presumably, Ms. Meranelli references the February 18, 2022 Declaration of
Substantial Limitations of Daily Activities that she filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. [Doc. 101.] However, it is worth noting that Ms. Meranelli failed to present this issue to Judge Foster in response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Milner v. Olmstead County Adult Center, No. 21-cv-2454 (SRN/HB),2022 WL 278743
, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 2022) (explaining that the plaintiff could not raise an argument about the sufficiency of his factual allegations in objections to an R&R that were not clearly presented to the magistrate judge and citing Hammann v. 1-800 Ideas.com, Inc.,455 F. Supp. 2d 942
, 947–48 (D. Minn. 2006)).
In any event, the Declaration does not undermine Judge Foster’s conclusion that
no reasonable jury could find for Ms. Meranelli on her disability discrimination claims.
The first seventeen paragraphs of the Declaration present only a discussion of the ADA,
the ADA Amendments Act, and legal argument regarding the same, which says nothing
about whether Ms. Meranelli’s alleged condition is, in fact, substantially limiting.
Ms. Meranelli then restates portions of her medical records from February and March of
2001 that led to her gallbladder surgery and largely repeats statements from her verified
amended complaint regarding her alleged post-surgical bowel incontinence. [Id. ¶¶ 18–
25.] Judge Foster thoroughly evaluated the evidence in the record and correctly noted that
there is no documented history of Ms. Meranelli’s alleged bowel incontinence, and the
only medical attention she sought for such symptoms is nearly two decades in the
rearview mirror. Ms. Meranelli’s Declaration does not identify additional documented
instances where Ms. Meranelli’s alleged bowel incontinence substantially limited one or
more of her major life activities when MSOP rejected her accommodation request.6 The
test on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986); Peterson v. Equifax Info. Servs.,44 F.4th 1124, 1128
(8th Cir. 2022) (“To avoid summary
judgment, a scintilla of evidence will be insufficient[.]”) (cleaned up). Accordingly, this
Objection is overruled.
III. Order
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
1. The Report and Recommendation [Doc. 208] is ACCEPTED.
2. Plaintiff’s Objections [Doc. 209] are OVERRULED.
6 In her Objections, Ms. Meranelli states that “some courts have held that an affidavit
from the disabled person stating that [her condition] is substantially limiting is evidence of the
substantial limitations.” [Pl.’s Obj. at 8.] Certainly, to oppose summary judgment, a party’s own
sworn statements in an affidavit (or those made in a declaration under penalty of perjury
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746) can provide evidence that establishes a genuine issue of fact for
trial. However, Ms. Meranelli does not point to any authority in her Objections that she considers
analogous precedent for the Court to use as a comparison. For example, Ms. Meranelli does not
cite a comparable case in which a court has denied a defendant’s motion for summary judgment
where the record contains no evidence that a claimant has any documented request for treatment
for an allegedly disabling condition for nearly twenty years, but then seeks an accommodation
based on the claimant’s uncorroborated statement, two decades later, that the condition causes
substantially limiting symptoms.
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal [Doc. 200] is DENIED.
4. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 183] is GRANTED.
5. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
Date: March 7, 2024 s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States Magistrate Judge Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Eric M. Sorenson, also known as, Cherrity No. 21-cv-671 (KMM/DJF)
Honesty-Alexis Meranelli,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
State of Minnesota, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster, dated November 20, 2023. [R&R,
Doc. 208.] Judge Foster recommends that the Court grant the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and deny the Plaintiff’s1 motion for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice. Ms. Meranelli filed objections to the R&R and the Defendants’ responded.
[Pl.’s Obj., Doc. 209.] For the reasons that follow, Ms. Meranelli’s objections are
overruled, the Court accepts the R&R, grants the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, and dismisses Ms. Meranelli’s claims with prejudice.
1 The Plaintiff in this case is identified by two names—Eric Sorenson, also known as
Cherrity Honesty-Alexis Meranelli. In the Plaintiff’s most recent filing at docket entry 209, dated
November 29, 2023, Plaintiff signed as both Eric M. Sorenson and Cherrity H. Meranelli. It
remains this Court’s understanding that the Plaintiff uses feminine pronouns and that Cherrity
Meranelli is Plaintiff’s preferred name. Therefore, consistent with the approach taken throughout
this litigation, the Court will refer to the Plaintiff as “Ms. Meranelli” or “Plaintiff” and use
feminine pronouns in this Order.
I. Background2
In February 2001, Ms. Meranelli was diagnosed with numerous gallstones and had
surgery in March 2001 to remove her gallbladder. One side-effect of the surgery, she
alleges, is that she experiences bowel incontinence, causing her to need access to a
restroom more frequently and unpredictably than the average person or even a person
with irritable bowel syndrome.
Since approximately 2010, Ms. Meranelli has been detained under an order of civil
commitment at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program’s facility in Moose Lake,
Minnesota (“MSOP”). As part of her treatment in that facility, she participates in
voluntary group therapy. Participation in group therapy is one of the ways individuals
who are civilly committed at MSOP can advance through the phases of their treatment, a
fundamental goal of MSOP and, presumably, a prerequisite for a person subject to
indefinite commitment eventually qualifying for release back into the community.
MSOP does not have a facility-wide policy concerning bathroom breaks for those
who participate in group therapy. For example, there is no official policy that detainees
who leave group therapy to go to the restroom cannot return to their group sessions. But
the two therapists who facilitate Ms. Meranelli’s “core group” therapy programming
2 Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R focus mainly on the rationale for Judge Foster’s
recommendation that her motion to voluntarily dismiss this case without prejudice be denied.
Plaintiff also objects to the recommendation that the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
be granted, but with one notable exception addressed toward the end of this Order, even when
liberally construed, her Objections do not contest Judge Foster’s proposed findings of fact that
support the summary judgment finding. The Court has reviewed the record and determined that
there is no error in Judge Foster’s factual determinations. Therefore, this Court accepts the
R&R’s recitation of the facts. This background section provides only a brief summary of the
dispute.
asked any group members who chose to leave a session not to return until the next
scheduled session. They instituted this approach because participants coming and going
from group therapy sessions is distracting and counter-productive to the programming
goals. Nevertheless, the facilitators agreed that if a group participant provided
documentation of a reason the participant needs to leave a session, they would allow
them to leave and then return.
In September 2020, because Ms. Meranelli alleged that her gallbladder surgery
from March 2001 caused her to have bowel incontinence, she sought an accommodation
from her group therapy facilitators that would allow her to leave group therapy sessions,
use the restroom, and then return to the same session. After reviewing the paperwork
Ms. Meranelli submitted in support of her request, a Registered Nurse Practitioner denied
it. Ms. Meranelli appealed that decision to the Minnesota Department of Human Services
(“DHS”). The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Coordinator for DHS denied the
appeal. Both the original denial and the rejection of the appeal concluded that there was
insufficient documentation of Plaintiff’s claimed impairments. Specifically, the ADA
Coordinator found that although Ms. Meranelli’s health condition was limiting, it was not
“substantially limiting” within the meaning of the ADA, so she was not a qualified
individual with a disability.
Procedural History
After her appeal was denied, Ms. Meranelli filed this lawsuit on March 8, 2021.
The District Court entered a partial order of dismissal [Doc. 44],3 and following an
amendment of the pleadings, the claims remaining in this action include disability
discrimination claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”); and inadequate medical care and impermissible
punishment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants sought written discovery from Plaintiff in March 2022. Plaintiff
responded and, dissatisfied with the information Plaintiff provided, Defendants filed a
motion to compel. Ms. Meranelli did not file a written response to the motion to compel,
and United States Magistrate Leo I. Brisbois granted that motion on July 5, 2022.4 Judge
Brisbois found that Defendants sought relevant information directly related to the
allegations underlying Ms. Meranelli’s claims, including information about the persons
with whom she had communicated regarding her alleged disability; identification of
communications she had with any employee of DHS or MSOP regarding the subject
matter of the action; the identity of any expert and fact witnesses; and details regarding
the symptoms she experienced. Judge Brisbois ordered Ms. Meranelli to provide
substantive responses to the Defendants’ discovery within 30 days, cautioned that failure
3 This case was originally assigned to United States District Judge Nancy E. Brasel but
was later reassigned to this Court. [Doc. 92]
4 Until September 14, 2022, Judge Brisbois was Magistrate Judge assigned to this case.
The case was reassigned to Judge Foster upon her appointment. [Doc. 144.]
to respond could result in sanctions, and modified the scheduling order to allow
additional time for the Defendants to learn more about the basis for Plaintiff’s claims.
Ms. Meranelli provided supplemental discovery responses in July and August of
2022, but the Defendants believed that those responses were still deficient. As a result,
the Defendants filed a motion for sanctions. Ms. Meranelli did not respond to that
motion, and Judge Foster recommended that Defendants’ motion for sanctions be granted
in part. Specifically, she found that Plaintiff should be precluded from offering any
evidence on a motion or at trial that she withheld from Defendants during discovery.
[Doc. 167.] Plaintiff did not object to that recommendation, and this Court entered an
Order precluding Ms. Meranelli “from offering into evidence any information in support
of her claims that Defendants solicited from her and that she failed to produce in
discovery.” [Doc. 169.]
Ms. Meranelli subsequently sought leave to file an untimely response to the
motion for sanctions and the Defendants’ motion to compel discovery. [Doc. 170.] This
Court denied that motion, finding that Ms. Meranelli had essentially asked the Court to
reconsider and vacate its Order adopting Judge Foster’s Report and Recommendation on
the sanctions motion without providing justification for seeking such relief. The Court
also found that granting Ms. Meranelli’s requested relief would be unfairly prejudicial to
the Defendants. [Doc. 178.] Next, Ms. Meranelli filed untimely objections to
Judge Foster’s Report and Recommendation on the sanctions motion, essentially seeking
the same relief she requested in her untimely responses to the motions for sanctions and
to compel. [Doc. 181.] This Court again denied her requested relief as an unsupported
attempt at obtaining reconsideration of the Court’s prior rulings. [Doc. 199.]
On March 29, 2023, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment.
[Doc. 183.] Ms. Meranelli did not respond to the motion, and several months passed
without any filing from her. On August 3, 2023, she filed a motion asking the Court to
allow her to voluntarily dismiss this action without prejudice. She stated that she wished
to dismiss the case to pursue a settlement with Defendants, but maintain the ability to
bring her claims again in a second action if she was unsatisfied with the results of the
anticipated negotiations. Ms. Meranelli argued that she had only recently become aware
of a procedure by which she could obtain bathroom passes that might obviate the need for
her to obtain an ADA accommodation. She also argued that such a dismissal would not
prejudice Defendants, and the fact that Defendants had expended resources on this case
was not a sufficient basis to deny her request. [Docs. 200, 201.] As mentioned above,
Judge Foster found that Ms. Meranelli’s motion for voluntary dismissal should be denied
and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted. Ms. Meranelli objects
to both recommendations.
II. Discussion
When a party raises specific objections to a portion of an R&R, the Court reviews
those portions of the R&R de novo and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). Otherwise, the Court reviews an R&R to which no objections are made, non-specific objections, and objections that simply restate arguments already considered by the magistrate judge for clear error. Grinder v. Gammon,73 F.3d 793, 795
(8th Cir. 1996); Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC,98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017
(D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2015). The Court liberally interprets a pro se party’s objections. Erickson v. Pardus,551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007); Horsey v. Asher,741 F.2d 209
, 211 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984).
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice
Ms. Meranelli filed her motion to voluntarily dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(a)(2). District courts have discretion to grant or deny such a request. Thatcher v.
Hannover Ins. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 1212, 1213(8th Cir. 2011). In exercising that discretion, courts consider a variety of factors, including: the explanation for the moving party’s request to dismiss; whether allowing dismissal would waste judicial time and effort; whether dismissal would prejudice the defendants; the stage of the litigation; and the time and effort the parties have expended. Id.; Donner v. Alcoa, Inc.,709 F.3d 694, 697
(8th Cir. 2013); Witzman v. Gross,148 F.3d 988, 992
(8th Cir. 1998); Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp.,738 F.2d 968, 972
(8th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff is not allowed to dismiss a
case merely to avoid an unfavorable decision. Thatcher, 659 F.3d at 1214–15 (reversing
district court decision granting plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss and remanding
with instructions to consider whether the plaintiff’s motion was an improper effort at
avoiding an unfavorable federal forum).
Judge Foster found that the relevant factors weighed against granting Plaintiff’s
request because (1) the parties, especially Defendants, had already expended considerable
resources and should not be required to do so again; (2) Defendants’ factual and legal
positions in a subsequent suit would be disadvantaged because they would be denied the
benefit of the discovery sanctions they obtained in this action, or be forced to go through
the same discovery fights again if the case were refiled; (3) allowing a future suit over the
same claims would waste the Court’s resources and likely result in extensive motion
practice; and (4) Plaintiff’s asserted reasons for dismissal are unpersuasive.
Ms. Meranelli has objected to these conclusions.
First, Ms. Meranelli objects to Judge Foster’s finding that allowing a possible
future lawsuit in this case would be prejudicial to Defendants and specifically argues that
the R&R incorrectly concludes that the “threat of a future lawsuit based upon a voluntary
dismissal” is not the kind of prejudice that justifies denying her motion. [Pl.’s Obj. at 3–
4.] In support of this argument, Ms. Meranelli cites Mullen v. Heinkel Filtering Sys., 770
F.3d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 2014). This Objection is overruled. For starters, Judge Foster did
not conclude that the threat of a future lawsuit alone was sufficiently prejudicial to deny
Ms. Meranelli’s request. Such a suggestion misconstrues Judge Foster’s analysis and
provides no basis for rejecting the R&R.
Moreover, Mullen does not support Ms. Meranelli’s argument. In Mullen, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s order granting a motion allowing a plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss a case without prejudice. Id.at 727–29. But the court reached that conclusion because “the case had not progressed very far,” there had only been two hearings on discovery disputes, and even though the magistrate judge had denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to extend the expert deadline, the reason for the dismissal was to allow the plaintiffs to pursue their “legally viable claim” against a corporation over which the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Id.
The circumstances of this
case are not remotely comparable. Unlike the proceeding in Mullen, this case has
progressed to the point where a decision on the merits is at hand. In addition, the
expenditure of resources by the parties and the Court has been considerable, and the basis
for which Ms. Meranelli seeks a dismissal is, by her own admission, to attempt to extract
a settlement from the Defendants from a stronger tactical position than if the threat of a
second suit regarding the same claims were not on the table. [R&R at 10 (citing
Plaintiff’s reply in support of the motion to dismiss, which discusses the motivation to
avoid a decision on the summary judgment motion while “holding the feet of the
Defendants to the flame. . . .”).]
Second, Ms. Meranelli argues that Judge Foster erred by considering how granting
the motion to dismiss would potentially allow Plaintiff to gain a tactical advantage by
circumventing the effects of the sanctions order and by forcing Defendants to undergo
significant fights over discovery in a future lawsuit. Again, relying on Mullen,
Ms. Meranelli argues that Defendants’ loss of a tactical advantage is insufficient
prejudice to justify denial of her motion. [Pl. Obj. at 4.] This Objection is overruled. In
Mullen, the plaintiffs were allowed to voluntarily dismiss their action after the magistrate
judge had denied their motion to extend the expert deadline. On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit found that the loss of such a “tactical advantage” did not constitute legal prejudice
that would justify denying the plaintiffs’ request. 770 F.3d at 728(citing Hoffmann v. Alside, Inc.,596 F.2d 822, 823
(8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)). But the consequences here are qualitatively different than a mere tactical procedural advantage that is generally insufficient to show legal prejudice. E.g., Hoffman,596 F.2d at 823
(finding that after the
district court had denied the plaintiff’s request for a jury trial as untimely, the possibility
the plaintiff could assert a timely demand for a jury trial in a subsequent suit was a
“tactical advantage” that alone was not enough to justify denial of voluntary dismissal).
Granting Plaintiff’s motion under the circumstances of this case would allow her to
escape the consequences of her own litigation conduct, subject the Defendants to the
threat of a future suit which could impose far more than the ordinary burdens associated
with discovery and typical litigation costs, and do so primarily so that Plaintiff could
avoid the possibility of an adverse ruling on the Defendants’ pending summary judgment
motion.
Ms. Meranelli’s next two Objections argue that Judge Foster improperly found
that voluntary dismissal was unwarranted because she considered the costs and expenses
Defendants had incurred in discovery and the judicial resources expended during this
litigation. [Pl.’s Obj. at 5.] Because these factors are relevant to the determination and
Judge Foster thoroughly and accurately assessed how they weighed into the analysis,
these Objections are likewise overruled.5 Plaintiff’s suggestion that these are not proper
considerations is not supported by the case law.
Finally, Ms. Meranelli objects to the R&R’s assessment of the asserted reason for
seeking voluntary dismissal. She argues that her stated reason for wanting to dismiss is to
5 In the context of considering the waste of judicial resources, Judge Foster observed that
“Plaintiff continues to demonstrate an unwillingness to respect the Court’s orders.” [R&R at 9–10.]
Although Ms. Meranelli disagrees with this assessment in her Objections [Pl.’s Obj. at 6–7], the
Court agrees with Judge Foster’s observation that any subsequent suit by Ms. Meranelli concerning
these matters would likely involve similarly extensive and litigious motion practice. [R&R at 10.]
engage in good-faith efforts to resolve the dispute without the need for judicial
intervention, which should be supported by the Court because it would save judicial
resources. [Pl.’s Obj. at 6.] This Objection is overruled. Judge Foster found
Ms. Meranelli’s stated reasons for dismissal unpersuasive, noting that Plaintiff had
admitted she wished to avoid a decision on the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, keep open the possibility of refiling the same claims, and negotiate from a
stronger tactical position. [R&R at 10 (citing Doc. 205 at 3).] The record supports Judge
Foster’s conclusion, and the caselaw provides that voluntary dismissal without prejudice
should be denied where it appears to be undertaken for the purpose of avoiding an
unfavorable decision. Thatcher, 659 F.3d at 1214–15; Graham v. Mentor Worldwide
LLC, 998 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “prior cases have repeatedly
noted the importance of inquiring into whether a party has a proper explanation for its
desire to dismiss” and that courts must consider “whether the plaintiff south dismissal to
avoid adverse judgment”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For these reasons, the Court agrees with Judge Foster’s recommendation and the
Plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice is denied.
B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
In the R&R, Judge Foster recognized that summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). [R&R at 11.] The R&R accurately sets forth the
familiar law governing summary judgment procedure, Ms. Meranelli raises no issue with
that discussion in her Objections, and the Court will not further repeat that standard here.
[R&R at 11–12.]
As noted, the remaining substantive claims in this case include § 1983 claims of
inadequate medical care and impermissible punishment. Judge Foster recommended that
Defendants’ motion be granted as to these claims. With respect to the punishment claim,
she explained that the record showed group therapy is an important tool offered at
MSOP, that individuals arriving late or leaving early from group sessions can be
disruptive, and that is why facilitators of group therapy (like the therapists leading
Ms. Meranelli’s core group) prohibit participants from leaving during the middle of a
session unless they have a documented reason for doing so. Judge Foster found the goal
of making treatment most effective is rationally related to MSOP’s legitimate interests in
rehabilitation of its civilly committed detainees, and Plaintiff provided no evidence
creating a genuine issue of fact suggesting the policy at issue was punitive. Judge Foster
further found that the § 1983 claim regarding inadequate medical care was essentially
predicated on the same alleged violations of the ADA and RA that form the basis of those
statutory claims. Consequently, Judge Foster applied Eighth Circuit law and concluded
that the overlapping § 1983 claims should be dismissed. [R&R at 15–17.] Ms. Meranelli
does not object to Judge Foster’s conclusions as to either of these claims. Based on the
Court’s review of the R&R and the record in this matter, the Court finds no clear error.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to
these claims.
Judge Foster also addressed Ms. Meranelli’s disability discrimination claims under
the ADA, the RA, and the MHRA. At the outset, Judge Foster explained that the “crux of
Plaintiff’s claims is that Defendants denied her any reasonable accommodation for a
health condition by refusing to permit necessary restroom breaks during therapeutic
programming.” [R&R at 1.] The R&R addressed these claims together, an approach to
which Ms. Meranelli does not object. Judge Foster explained that Ms. Meranelli had the
burden to show that she (1) is a person with a disability as defined by the ADA; (2) is
otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) was excluded from the benefit due
to discrimination based on her disability. [R&R at 12 (citing Randolph v. Rodgers, 170
F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999)).]
For the first element of the prima facie case, Plaintiff must show that her
conditions are “substantially limiting,” meaning that she is “‘[s]ignificantly restricted as
to the condition, manner or duration under which [she] can perform a major life activity,’
as compared to the average person.” [R&R at 13 (quoting Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac.
Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2010)).] Reviewing the evidence in the record, Judge
Foster found: (1) that there was virtually no evidence in the record establishing that
Plaintiff has a history of substantially limiting bowel incontinence; (2) the only medical
record even mentioning diarrhea symptoms was a March 2002 emergency room note,
made more than 18 years prior to her reasonable modification request and reporting only
12 hours of symptoms as opposed to a chronic issue; (3) follow-up medical records
showed no continued complaints of symptoms; and (4) Plaintiffs visits with medical
professionals at MSOP over many years showed no complaints regarding bowel
incontinence. [R&R at 13–14.] Because Ms. Meranelli failed to point to any evidence
supporting her allegation of chronic bowel incontinence, Judge Foster concluded that
there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ms. Meranelli’s bowel
symptoms constitute a disability, and no reasonable jury could find in her favor. [Id. at
14.]
Ms. Meranelli Objects to Judge Foster’s summary judgment recommendation
regarding the disability discrimination claims. First, she contends that the R&R erred by
relying on three cases—Kirkeberg, 619 F.3d 898; Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprentice Comm.,370 F.3d 764
(8th Cir. 2004); and Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc.,188 F.3d 944
(8th Cir. 1999)—that in turn cite Supreme Court decisions with which Congress disagreed when it passed amendments to the ADA in 2008. See, e.g., Kirkeberg,619 F.3d at 904
n.2 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc.,527 U.S. 471
(1999) and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams,534 U.S. 184
(2002)). This Objection is also overruled. The R&R did not rely directly on either Sutton or Toyota Motor in reaching its conclusions concerning her disability discrimination claims, and the Eighth Circuit cases the R&R did cite remain good law. Indeed, courts within this district continue to rely on those same cases when explaining what a plaintiff must show to establish that a condition is substantially limiting. E.g., Kiel v. Mayo Clinic Sys. Southeast Minn., __ F. Supp. 3d __,2023 WL 5000255
, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2023) (citing Kirkeberg,619 F.3d at 903
); Maximo Lopez v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, Civil No. 23-6 (JRT/DLM),2023 WL 4203087
, at *3 (D. Minn. June 27, 2023) (same). Moreover,
Ms. Meranelli fails to identify any way in which the articulation of the legal standard
governing her disability discrimination claims in either the R&R or the Eighth Circuit
cases conflicts in any way with the 2008 amendments to the ADA.
Finally, Ms. Meranelli objects to the R&R’s conclusion that there is no evidence
suggesting she has a substantially limiting disability because she filed her own affidavit
in this case stating that she has an impairment causing disabling symptoms. [Pl.’s Obj. at
8–9.] Presumably, Ms. Meranelli references the February 18, 2022 Declaration of
Substantial Limitations of Daily Activities that she filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. [Doc. 101.] However, it is worth noting that Ms. Meranelli failed to present this issue to Judge Foster in response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Milner v. Olmstead County Adult Center, No. 21-cv-2454 (SRN/HB),2022 WL 278743
, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 31, 2022) (explaining that the plaintiff could not raise an argument about the sufficiency of his factual allegations in objections to an R&R that were not clearly presented to the magistrate judge and citing Hammann v. 1-800 Ideas.com, Inc.,455 F. Supp. 2d 942
, 947–48 (D. Minn. 2006)).
In any event, the Declaration does not undermine Judge Foster’s conclusion that
no reasonable jury could find for Ms. Meranelli on her disability discrimination claims.
The first seventeen paragraphs of the Declaration present only a discussion of the ADA,
the ADA Amendments Act, and legal argument regarding the same, which says nothing
about whether Ms. Meranelli’s alleged condition is, in fact, substantially limiting.
Ms. Meranelli then restates portions of her medical records from February and March of
2001 that led to her gallbladder surgery and largely repeats statements from her verified
amended complaint regarding her alleged post-surgical bowel incontinence. [Id. ¶¶ 18–
25.] Judge Foster thoroughly evaluated the evidence in the record and correctly noted that
there is no documented history of Ms. Meranelli’s alleged bowel incontinence, and the
only medical attention she sought for such symptoms is nearly two decades in the
rearview mirror. Ms. Meranelli’s Declaration does not identify additional documented
instances where Ms. Meranelli’s alleged bowel incontinence substantially limited one or
more of her major life activities when MSOP rejected her accommodation request.6 The
test on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986); Peterson v. Equifax Info. Servs.,44 F.4th 1124, 1128
(8th Cir. 2022) (“To avoid summary
judgment, a scintilla of evidence will be insufficient[.]”) (cleaned up). Accordingly, this
Objection is overruled.
III. Order
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
1. The Report and Recommendation [Doc. 208] is ACCEPTED.
2. Plaintiff’s Objections [Doc. 209] are OVERRULED.
6 In her Objections, Ms. Meranelli states that “some courts have held that an affidavit
from the disabled person stating that [her condition] is substantially limiting is evidence of the
substantial limitations.” [Pl.’s Obj. at 8.] Certainly, to oppose summary judgment, a party’s own
sworn statements in an affidavit (or those made in a declaration under penalty of perjury
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746) can provide evidence that establishes a genuine issue of fact for
trial. However, Ms. Meranelli does not point to any authority in her Objections that she considers
analogous precedent for the Court to use as a comparison. For example, Ms. Meranelli does not
cite a comparable case in which a court has denied a defendant’s motion for summary judgment
where the record contains no evidence that a claimant has any documented request for treatment
for an allegedly disabling condition for nearly twenty years, but then seeks an accommodation
based on the claimant’s uncorroborated statement, two decades later, that the condition causes
substantially limiting symptoms.
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal [Doc. 200] is DENIED.
4. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 183] is GRANTED.
5. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Let Judgment be entered accordingly.
Date: March 7, 2024 s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States Magistrate Judge Reference
- Status
- Unknown