Benson v. Jesson

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota March 19, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Brandon Keith Benson, Civ. No. 22-3059 (JWB/DLM)

Plaintiff,
ORDER ACCEPTING
v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Lucinda Jesson, Nancy Johnston, Dennis
Benson, Kevin Moser, Scott Benoit, Terry
Kneisel, Troy Basaraba, Gene Anderson,
Ann Zimmerman, Steve Sayovitz, Juliana
Beavens, Kevin Carlson, Ken Stewart, Rob
Rose, Brian S. Ninneman, Sue Johnson, Sara
Kulas, Jannine Hebert, Peter Puffer, Janel
Lindgren, Yvette Anderson, Thane Murphy,
Allison Collins, Angie Ottum, Laurie
Severson, Kent Johanson, Gemma Watson,
Nicki Marvel, Troy Swartout, Brandon
Tatum, and Darien Menten, in their
individual and official capacities,

Defendants.
________________________________________________________________________
Brandon Keith Benson, pro se Plaintiff.
Leonard J. Schweich, Esq., and Mara Sybesma, Esq., Minnesota Attorney General’s
Office, counsel for Defendants.

United States Magistrate Judge Douglas L. Micko issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) on January 30, 2024. (Doc. No. 54.) Both parties have filed
objections. (Doc. Nos. 55, 56, 57.) A district court reviews the portions of the R&R to
which the parties object de novo and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1); 
D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). When a party fails to file specific objections to an R&R or 
merely repeats its prior arguments, de novo review is not required. See Montgomery v. 

Compass Airlines, LLC,

98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017

 (D. Minn. 2015). The portions of an 
R&R to which no specific objection is made are reviewed for clear error. Grinder v. 
Gammon,

73 F.3d 793, 795

 (8th Cir. 1996). Because Benson is pro se, his objections 
receive liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94

 (2007). 
 I.  Plaintiff’s Objections                                              
    First, Benson’s objection that there has been no final judgment on the merits, only 

on the constitutionality of the relevant commitment statute, ignores subsequent district 
court and Eight Circuit rulings. Benson describes only the first Karsjens appellate 
decision—as of the third Karsjens appellate decision, all claims arising from the district 
court case have been fully litigated and resolved on the merits. Karsjens v. Piper,

845 F.3d 394

 (8th Cir. 2017); Karsjens v. Lourey,

988 F.3d 1047

 (8th Cir. 2021); Karsjens v. 

Harpstead (8th Cir. 2023); see also (Doc. No. 54 at 13–14) (comparing Benson’s claims 
with the Karsjens claims). This objection is overruled.                   
    Second, Benson’s objection that all 31 Defendants are culpable because they 
“either knew about [the underlying allegations] or acted in concert [with each other]” 
misapprehends the pleading standard. (Doc. No. 56 at 2–3.) Benson fails to allege that the 

dismissed Defendants have taken any individual official actions in violation of law. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 663

 (2009). Non-specific and conclusory statements of 
wrongdoing are insufficient, and this objection is overruled.

Id.

         
    Third, while Benson objects that he has stated an equal protection claim for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, he fails to allege facts showing the requisite 
disparate treatment. Fourteenth Amendment class-based equal protection claims require 

that members of an identifiable group be treated differently from otherwise similarly-
situated non-members. Mitchell v. Kirchmeier,

28 F.4th 888, 902

 (8th Cir. 2022). Absent 
allegations that other non-member Moose Lake detainees faced similar circumstances yet 
received different treatment, Benson has failed to state a claim, and this objection is 
overruled.                                                                
    Finally, Benson’s objection to the legal standard used for his claim of deficient 

medical care is unavailing. The legal standard used is correct, and he failed to allege that 
any Defendants knew of a serious medical need—a requirement no matter how the 
standard is phrased. Compare Mead v. Palmer,

794 F.3d 932, 936

 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(requiring that “the defendants actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, [plaintiff’s 
medical] needs”), with Senty-Haugen v. Goodno,

462 F.3d 876, 890

 (8th Cir. 2006) 

(requiring “that officials knew about excessive risks to [plaintiff’s] health but disregarded 
them”). The final objection is overruled.                                 
 II. Defendants’ Objections                                              
    First, Defendants’ assertion that there is no right to privacy in information held by 
third parties is not true as an absolute. See Carpenter v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222

 (2018) (“[A] warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate 
privacy interest in records held by a third party.”). Though any such existing exceptions 
are extremely limited, Benson—construed liberally, with every inference taken in his 
favor—has provided more than a threadbare recitation of the elements of a Fourth 
Amendment violation to survive a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 10, Am. Compl. ¶ 75.) 
This objection is overruled.                                              

    Next, Defendants misconstrue the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 
related to the macing incident. A substantive due process claim requires violation of a 
fundamental right where the official’s conduct “shocks the conscience”—a high bar of 
“inhumane” abuse of power designed to cause harm without legitimate purpose. Mitchell 
v. Dakota Cty. Soc. Servs.,

959 F.3d 887, 898

 (8th Cir. 2020); see also Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833

, 843–44 (1998) (analyzing excessive force claims 

under the Fourteenth Amendment); Karsjens v. Lourey,

988 F.3d 1047, 1052

 (8th Cir. 
2021). The allegation here is not simply deploying mace, but continuing to spray the 
Benson after he was subdued. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81–83.) On the face of the pleadings, 
continuing to deploy an as-yet indeterminate amount of a harmful chemical compound on 
an already-subdued civil detainee may constitute excessive punishment by way of 

excessive force, sufficient to shock the conscience. See Burns v. Eaton,

752 F.3d 1136, 1140

 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing cases where the manner of pepper spray use gave rise to such 
constitutional claims); Larson v. Jesson, No. 11-2247,

2018 WL 3352926

, at *18–19 (D. 
Minn. July 9, 2018) (contrasting the Burns cases with a Moose Lake plaintiff who failed 
to allege more than a limited use of pepper spray). This objection is overruled. 

    By contrast, Defendants are correct that Benson’s related restrictive housing-based 
allegation—that following the macing incident, Benson was kept in a restrictive unit for 
an unduly long time—does not state a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
claim. The R&R dispensed with the claim under procedural due process, but seemingly 
allowed it to proceed on substantive grounds. (See Doc. No. 54 at 24–27.) Moose Lake’s 
use of restrictive housing is not unlawfully punitive per se, Karsjens, 74 F.4th at 567, and 

Benson does not present sufficient facts about the circumstances surrounding his 
restrictions or Defendants’ actions to infer that their conduct shocks the conscience. This 
objection is sustained.                                                   
    Defendants’ objection that individual-capacity Defendants should receive 
qualified immunity is unavailing at this stage. Qualified immunity is not available where 
an official deprived a plaintiff of a constitutional right that was clearly established. 

Brandy v. City of St. Louis,

75 F.4th 908, 913

 (8th Cir. 2023). Taking all inferences in 
favor of Benson and liberally construing his Complaint, Defendants Murphy and Stewart 
are not presently entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged unconstitutional search 
and seizure of Benson’s information through misrepresentations to a third party. See 
Carpenter,

138 S. Ct. at 2222

 (limiting the third-party doctrine). Nor are Defendants 

Swartout, Johanson, Marvel, Tatum, and Menten qualifiedly immune for the alleged use 
of excessive punishment, or failing to stop the punishment. See Burns,

752 F.3d at 1140

. 
As stated in the R&R, further fact development may alter the qualified immunity 
determination, but Defendants are not clearly entitled to qualified immunity based on the 
pleadings.                                                                

    Lastly, Defendants reiterate their Karsjens preclusion argument for each of the 
three surviving claims, but do not provide any new argument and refer directly to their 
original briefing. Upon review, there is no clear error in the R&R—the surviving claims 
are not precluded.

ORDER

    Based on the R&R of the Magistrate Judge, and on all the files, records, and 

proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                            
    1.   The January 30, 2024 Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 54) is 
ACCEPTED as modified;                                                     
    2.   Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 44) is 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:                            
         a.   The following two claims in Plaintiff Brandon Keith Benson’s 

    Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 10), against only Defendants Swartout, Johanson, 
    Marvel, Tatum, Menten, Murphy, and Stewart, survive:                 
             i.    Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action (Count I) for Violation of the 
         Fourteenth Amendment remains only as to the allegations in paragraphs 
         81–83 and 102–103, that Defendants Swartout, Johanson, Marvel, Tatum, 

         and Menten in their individual and official capacities deprived him of 
         substantive Due Process rights during the June 2014 macing incident; and 
            ii.    Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action (Count IX) for Violation 
         of the Fourth Amendment remains only as to the allegations in paragraph 
         75, that Defendants Murphy and Stewart in their individual and official 

         capacities knowingly misrepresented their authority to a third party to 
         obtain Plaintiff’s personal information and data.               
         b.   The following claims asserted throughout the pleadings are 
    DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim:            
        i.    Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action (Count VII): Unreasonable 
    Discrimination in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;        

       ii.    Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Stewart and Murphy  
    searched and seized materials from Mr. Benson’s cell in 2014 (Doc. No. 10 
    ¶ 76);                                                          
       iii.   Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants were deliberately indifferent 
    to his serious medical needs (Id. ¶¶ 86–87); and                
       iv.    Plaintiff’s claim that he was subject to restrictive housing for 

    an excessive duration (Id. ¶¶ 103–04).                          
    c.   The following claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE where    
precluded by the Karsjens litigation:                                
        i.    All other claims in Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action (Count I): 
    Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;  

       ii.    Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action (Count II): Right to be 
    Free from Punishment in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
    United States Constitution;                                     
       iii.   Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action (Count IV): Denial of Right 
    to be Free from Inhumane Treatment in Violation of the Fourteenth 

    Amendment to the United States Constitution;                    
       iv.    Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action (Count VI): Denial of 
    Right to Religion and Religious Freedom in Violation of the First and 
    Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;        
            v.     Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action (Count VIII): Unreasonable 
         Restriction of Free Speech and Free Association in Violation of the First 

         Amendment to the United States Constitution; and                
            vi.    All other claims in Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action 
         (Count IX): Unreasonable Searches and Seizures in Violation of the Fourth 
         Amendment to the United States Constitution.                    

Date: March 19, 2024                s/ Jerry W. Blackwell                 
                                  JERRY W. BLACKWELL                     
                                  United States District Judge