UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Jeremy T. S.,                         Case No. 23-cv-202 (TNL)           

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Martin J. O’Malley1,                                                     
Commissioner of Social Security                                          
Administration,                                                          

          Defendant.                                                     


Christopher Todd Milliman, Olinsky Law Group, 250 South Clinton Street, Suite 210, 
Syracuse,  NY  13202  and  Asha  Sharma,  Disability  Partners,  PLLC,  2579  Hamline 
Avenue North, Suite C, Roseville, MN 55113 (for Plaintiff); and          

Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, 
Minneapolis, MN 55415; James D. Sides, Social Security Administration, Office of the 
General Counsel, Office of Program Litigation, Office 4, 6401 Security Boulevard, 
Baltimore, MD 21235; and Kizuwanda Curtis, Social Security Administration, Office of 
Program Litigation, 6401 Security Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21235 (for Defendant). 


                       I.   INTRODUCTION                                 
    Plaintiff Jeremy T. S. challenges Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s 
denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the 
Social Security Act, 

 et seq., and supplemental security income (“SSI”) 
under Title XVI of the same, 

 et seq. The parties have consented to a final 

1 Martin O’Malley is currently serving as the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25(d), he is automatically substituted as Defendant in this suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 
judgment from the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge in accordance with 

(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c).             

    Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s Supplemental Rules governing 
actions seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, this action “is presented 
for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. SS Rule 5. Rather than filing a 
brief as provided in amended Rule 5, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 
No. 16, which was the procedure prior to the recent amendment to Rule 5. Defendant filed 
a brief requesting for the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed, ECF No. 20.  

    For  the  reasons  set  forth  below,  the  Court  denies  Plaintiff’s  motion,  grants 
Defendant’s request for relief, and affirms the Commissioner’s decision.  
                   II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY                               
    Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI asserting that he has been disabled since October 
26, 2019, due to fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, peripheral neuropathy, back, 

neck, knee, and ankle problems, high blood pressure, plantar fasciitis, and carpal tunnel 
syndrome. Tr. 83-84, 96-97, 349. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and again 
upon reconsideration. Tr. 202-204, 214-215, 217-218.                      
    Plaintiff  appealed  the  reconsideration  of  his  DIB  and  SSI  determinations  and 
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 207-208. The ALJ 

held a hearing in December 2021 and issued an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff. Tr. 18-
30, 47-82. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Tr. 3-8. As a result, 
the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial 
review. See 

(g). Plaintiff now seeks review by this Court.  
                III.  RELEVANT MEDICAL RECORDS                           

 A. 2018                                                                 
     In January 2018 an MRI was ordered by Cathy O’Donovan, MD for Plaintiff’s 
cervical spine in response to his complaints of neck pain and deceased range of motion. Tr. 
418. The imaging showed degenerative and spondylotic changes with facet arthropathy and 
uncinate process spurring. Tr. 419. These changes were noted to cause moderate bilateral 
foraminal stenosis at C4-5 and moderate left sided foraminal stenosis at C5-6. Tr. 419. 
Foraminal stenosis was noted as appearing similar to the prior exam and no central stenosis 

was observed. Tr. 419. The appearance of Plaintiff’s cervical spine overall appeared to be 
stable compared to a prior exam. Tr. 419.                                 
    Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed early degenerative disc changes at L3-
4, L4-5, and L5-S1. Tr. 422. The purpose of this MRI was to address Plaintiff’s complaints 
of back pain and neuropathy. Tr. 421. No focal protrusion and central or foraminal stenosis 

were  noted.  Tr.  422.  Mild  facet  arthropathy  was  present  but  overall  appearance  of 
Plaintiff’s lumbar spine did not appear changed in any significant way compared to a prior 
exam. Tr. 422. Imaging of Plaintiff’s right knee in response to complaints of pain showed 
a small meniscal tear. Tr. 424-425.                                       
    Several months later in July 2018, Plaintiff visited with Dr. Donovan to address his 

complaints of pain in his knee, neck, shoulder and back in addition to neuropathy idiopathic 
peripheral, degenerative disc disease of his lumbar spine, and fibromyalgia. Tr. 460. As a 
result of this visit, Plaintiff was prescribed cyclobenzaprine and other pain medications, 
including gabapentin and oxycodone, were refilled. Tr.460- 466. Plaintiff had a follow up 
visit with Dr. Donovan in October 2018. Tr. 542. At this visit Plaintiff was reminded to 
use his cane and was referred back to pain management to address his reported pain. Tr. 

548. Medications for his pain were also refilled. Tr. 548.                
 B. 2019                                                                 
    In April 2019, Plaintiff visited with Dr. Donovan for his reported neck, back, and 
feet pain. Tr. 436, 438. Plaintiff’s pain medications, including gabapentin and oxycodone, 
were refiled. Tr. 436-445.                                                
    In  July  2019, imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  left  foot  showed  underlying  osteoarthritic 

changes and Achilles enthesopathy. Tr. 500. In this same month, imaging of Plaintiff’s left 
foot also showed diffuse osteoarthritic changes and abnormal findings with the anterior 
aspect of the tibia in keeping with fairly large area of osteochondral defect. Tr. 591. Pain 
medications were continued. Tr. 517-523.                                  
    In August 2019, a CT angiogram of the abdominal aorta with runoff to bilateral 

lower extremities showed no evidence for hemodynamically significant stenosis but did 
show mild bilateral diffuse soft and calcific plaque formation. Tr. 583.  
    Plaintiff had a follow up visit with Dr. Donovan in October 2019 (before the alleged 
disability onset date) for complaints of pain. Tr. 510. Pain medications were continued. Tr. 
510-516. The record also showed Plaintiff’s body mass index of 33.5. Tr. 512. 

 C. 2020                                                                 
    After Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date of October 26, 2019, he established 
care with Jason D. Huikko, MD in January 2020. Tr. 577. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Huikko 
a history of chronic pain, although he reported that his chronic pain issues were stable at 
that  time,  and  he  that  had  treated  his  pain  issues  with  gabapentin,  oxycodone,  and 
ibuprofen. Tr. 577. He also reported a history of back pain, neuropathy, and fibromyalgia. 

Tr. 577. Dr. Huikko did not start Plaintiff on any pain medications following this visit. Tr. 
578.                                                                      
    At a follow up visit with Dr. Huikko in March 2020, Plaintiff reported that he wished 
to switch his pain management to Dr. Huikko’s clinic and that a provider he was seeing 
prescribed him oxycodone for his pain. Tr. 568. He informed Dr. Huikko that his pain 
medications were last filled on November 30, 2019, but he had “been managing fairly well” 

without his pain medications but was “still limited due to the pain.” Tr. 568. Dr. Huikko 
prescribed Plaintiff tramadol as needed for his pain. Tr. 569. Dr. Huikko found that 
Plaintiff’s range of motion in his lower back was limited due to pain and found tender 
palpation in the lower lumbar region. Tr. 569. Normal muscle strength and coordination 
were noted. Tr. 569. The record also reflected Plaintiff’s body mass index of 32.74. Tr. 

569. At another follow up appointment with Dr. Huikko in September 2020, Plaintiff 
reported that his pain had increased since he had run out of tramadol and that with 
gabapentin and tramadol his pain was “reasonably well managed.” Tr. 635.  
    Dr. Donovan completed a physical assessment statement in September 2020. Tr. 
678-679. She noted Plaintiff’s diagnosis of thoracic back pain, lumbar disc degeneration, 

fibromyalgia, and knee pain. Tr. 678. The assessment provided that Plaintiff could sit for 
four hours and stand/walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday, would need five-to-
fifteen-minute breaks during the workday, and would need to be absent from work for more 
than four times a month. Tr. 678-679. The assessment also provided that Plaintiff could 
occasionally lift at most ten pounds, could use his hands and fingers for 20 percent of an 
eight-hour workday, and could use his arms for 10 percent of an eight-hour workday. Tr. 

678-679.                                                                  
    At a follow up visit in November 2020, Dr. Huikko noted that in March 2020 he 
had switched Plaintiff’s pain medication from oxycodone to tramadol. Tr. 632. Plaintiff 
reported his pain was “reasonably well managed” with gabapentin and tramadol. Tr. 632. 
He reported, however, increased pain in his right shoulder. Tr. 632. Dr. Huikko noted that 
Plaintiff’s range of motion of his right shoulder was mildly limited because of pain and 

there was some generalized tenderness to palpation but no swelling or deformity. Tr. 633. 
Muscle strength and coordination were both noted as normal. Tr. 633. Plaintiff received a 
steroid injection to his right shoulder to address his shoulder pain. Tr. 633. 
    Lastly, in late 2020, state agency medical consultants reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 
records and opined that Plaintiff was capable of a range of light work. Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 

113-129, 130-146. They also opined that Plaintiff could stand/walk for about six hours in 
an eight-hour workday, could sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday, lift and 
carry 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and occasionally climb ladders, 
ropes, or scaffolds. Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 113-129, 130-146.                 
 D. 2021                                                                 

    In January 2021, Plaintiff had a remote visit with Dr. Donovan for the purpose of 
having Dr. Donovan issue a letter in support of his disability claim. Tr. 650. At the 
telehealth visit, Plaintiff reported increased shoulder, back, and neck pain as well as 
numbness in his feet and or left leg. Tr. 650. As a result of this telehealth visit, Dr. Donovan 
identified  four  problems  and  made  the  following  impressions.  Tr.  655.  Plaintiff’s 
neuropathy  idiopathic  peripheral  causes  numbness  which  prevents  Plaintiff  from 

keyboarding or using a mouse for more than 30 minutes every three to four hours. Tr. 655. 
Plaintiff’s venous stasis limits his ability to stand and sit. Tr. 655. Plaintiff’s degenerative 
disc disease of the lumbar spine makes it so he cannot sit for more than five to ten minutes, 
and he can only walk for ten to fifteen minutes. Tr. 655. Lastly, Plaintiff’s pain medications, 
gabapentin and tramadol, cause fatigue. Tr. 655.                          
    Dr. Donovan issued her letter on January 13, 2021. Tr. 718. In her letter, Dr. 

Donovan opined that Plaintiff’s medical problems make it impossible for him to work. Tr. 
718. She explained that Plaintiff’s main problem is idiopathic peripheral neuropathy which 
affects his feet, legs, arms, and hands. Tr. 718. The numbness in Plaintiff’s hands, she 
opined, keeps Plaintiff from keyboarding or using a mouse for more than 30 minutes every 
three to four hours. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan further opined that because of his degenerative 

disc disease of the lumbar spine, Plaintiff cannot sit for more than five to ten minutes and 
can only walk for ten to fifteen minutes before needing to sit or lie down. Tr. 718. Dr. 
Donovan  explained  that  gabapentin  and  tramadol  both  cause  fatigue  and  decreased 
concentration in Plaintiff. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan noted that Plaintiff has venous stasis with 
edema which affects Plaintiff’s ability to stand. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan also opined that 

Plaintiff’s neck and back pain, and fibromyalgia also complicates his ability to keep a job. 
Tr. 718. For example, according to Dr. Donovan, Plaintiff needs to be absent from work at 
least once a week, is not able to lift more than ten pounds on an occasional basis, is not 
able to do any repetitive motions, lacks fine motor control of his hands, and is at a 
significant fall risk. Tr. 718.                                           

    Also  in  January  2021,  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  lumbar  spine  showed  early  disc 
degeneration at the L3-L4 level, with no focal disc protrusion or extrusion. Tr. 656-657, 
674. The imaging did not show any signs of a compression fracture and there were no acute 
bone changes. Tr. 674. The imaging also did not show evidence of encroachment on the 
neural  elements,  neural  foraminal  stenosis  or  significant  narrowing,  and  no  discrete 
etiology. Tr. 674.                                                        

    At a follow up appointment with Dr. Huikko in February 2021, Plaintiff reported 
problems with his right shoulder and bilateral hips but reported his back pain as “relatively 
stable.” Tr. 670. Dr. Huikko found Plaintiff’s range of motion of his right shoulder to be 
“mildly limited” because of pain but no swelling or deformity was present. Tr. 671. 
Plaintiff’s  range  of  motion  of  his  bilateral  hips  as  well  as  his  muscle  strength  and 

coordination were noted as normal. Tr. 671. Imaging of Plaintiff’s bilateral hips showed 
mild degenerative changes, but no other significant changes. Tr. 669, 671. Dr. Huikko 
continued Plaintiff on tramadol and gabapentin for his pain and administered another 
steroid injection for Plaintiff’s reported shoulder pain. Tr. 671.        
    In May 2021, Dr. Huikko administered another steroid injection in Plaintiff’s right 

shoulder. Tr. 665, 667. Plaintiff had received “some good relief from the last injection.” 
Tr. 667. Imaging Plaintiff’s shoulder from this visit showed “no acute abnormalities or 
significant osteoarthritis changes.” Tr. 667. Plaintiff’s back pain was noted as “relatively 
stable” and there was no weakness in the lower extremities. Tr. 665. Dr. Huikko again 
continued Plaintiff on tramadol and gabapentin for his chronic pain. Tr. 667. Plaintiff’s 
range of motion of his lower back was noted as limited due to pain; however, range of 

motion of his right shoulder, muscle strength and coordination remained unchanged from 
the February visit. Tr. 666.                                              
    Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine from October 2021 showed disc degeneration 
with associated proliferative changes at the L3-L4 level, and mild diffuse degenerative 
facet arthropathy. Tr. 662, 711. The results showed no other significant findings and no 
evidence of spinal instability. Tr. 662, 711. In November 2021, imaging of Plaintiff’s 

cervical spine showed no focal disc protrusion or extrusion but did show multilevel neural 
foraminal  narrowing,  neural  foraminal  stenosis  at  the  C5-C6  level  bilaterally  with 
impingement on the exiting C6 nerve roots. Tr. 693-694, 703. Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar 
spine showed an unchanged appearance of his lumbar spine and no evidence of focal disc 
protrusion or extrusion. Tr. 695-696. Also, in November, in a correspondence between Dr. 

Donovan and Plaintiff, Dr. Donovan told Plaintiff that he has some abnormalities that put 
pressure on the nerve roots in his cervical spine and noted that she “should send [him] to a 
neurosurgeon about this.” Tr. 716. As of the date of the hearing before the ALJ on 
December 23, 2021, Plaintiff had not seen a neurosurgeon. Tr. 47, 69.     
         IV.  ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING AND ALJ DECISION                    

    At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he has “been in so much pain” 
and experiences numbness in his hands and feet. Tr. 60-63, 67. He also testified that his 
hands and legs are shaky, he lacks dexterity in his hands, and has trouble twisting objects 
and buttoning his clothing. Tr. 60, 63, 70. He stated he experiences pain in his back, neck, 
and feet which is worsened by odd positions, and activities such as crouching, lifting, 
reaching, or grabbing. Tr. 61. He further testified that he is able to lift ten pounds, can carry 

his groceries, and can stand and sit for approximately 20 minutes but is most comfortable 
while laying down. Tr. 62. He stated that gabapentin relieves his pain but causes brain fog 
and makes him lethargic. Tr. 64-65. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued her decision in 
March 2022. Tr. 18-30.                                                    
    The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied the insured status requirements of the Social 
Security Act through December 31, 2022 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the alleged disability onset date of October 26, 2019. Tr. 21. The ALJ further found 
that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 
spine, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, and obesity. Tr. 21. The ALJ also 
identified as non-severe Plaintiff’s physical impairments of a right knee meniscus tear, 
idiopathic peripheral neuropathy, venous status with edema, and fibromyalgia. Tr. 21-22. 

The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s mental impairments to be non-severe. Tr. 22-23. The ALJ 
then concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 
that meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments under 20 C.F.R. 
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 23-24.                               
    With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

can perform less than a full range of light work as defined under 

(b) 
and 416.967(b), including the residual functional capacity to:            
         lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds     
         frequently. He can stand and/or walk about six hours in an      
         eight-hour workday and sit about six hours in an eight-hour     
         workday. He can engage in unlimited push and pull except for    
         the limitations in lifting and carrying. He can frequently climb 
         ramps and stairs and can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or  
         scaffolds. He can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 
         can occasionally crawl. He can have occasional exposure to      
         vibration. He can occasionally reach overhead with the right    
         upper extremity and frequent reaching in all other directions.  

Tr. 24-25. The ALJ, therefore, concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing past 
relevant work as a casino host or as a security guard and that these types of positions do 
not require the performance of work-related activities that are precluded by Plaintiff’s 
residual functional capacity. Tr. 28. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not 
disabled. Tr. 29-30.                                                      
                        V.    ANALYSIS                                   
 A. Legal Standards                                                      
    Disability benefits are available to individuals who are determined to be under a 
disability. 

(a)(1), 1381a; accord 

, 416.901. An 
individual is considered to be disabled if he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period  of  not  less  than  12  months.”  

(d)(1)(A);  accord  42  U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 

(a), 416.905(a). This standard is met 
when a severe physical or mental impairment, or impairments, renders the individual 
unable to do his previous work or “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists 
in  the  national  economy”  when  taking  into  account  his  age,  education,  and  work 
experience. 

(d)(2)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also 

(a), 416.905(a).                                        

    Disability is determined according to a five-step, sequential evaluation process. 

(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).                                  
         To determine disability, the ALJ follows the familiar five-step 
         process, considering whether: (1) the claimant was employed;    
         (2) []he was severely impaired; (3) h[is] impairment was, or    
         was comparable to, a listed impairment; (4) []he could perform  
         past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether []he could perform  
         any other kind of work.                                         

Halverson v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2010). In general, the burden of proving 
the existence of disability lies with the claimant. 

(a), 416.912(a). 
Once the claimant demonstrates that he cannot perform past work due to a disability, “the 
burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to prove, first that the claimant retains the 
residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists 
in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to do.” Nevland v. 
Apfel, 

 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).             
    This Court reviews whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as a whole. Biestek v. Berryhill, 

 (2019). “[T]he 
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” 

 “It means—and means only—
such  relevant  evidence as  a  reasonable  mind might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a 
conclusion.” 

 (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Chismarich v. Berryhill, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018) (defining “substantial evidence as less than a preponderance but enough 
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the conclusion” (quotation 
omitted)).                                                                

    This standard requires the Court to “consider both evidence that detracts from the 
[ALJ’s] decision and evidence that supports it.” Boettcher v. Astrue, 

 
(8th Cir. 2011); see Grindley v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2021). The ALJ’s 
decision “will not [be] reverse[d] simply because some evidence supports a conclusion 
other than that reached by the ALJ.” Boettcher, 

; accord Grindley, 

; Perks v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2012). “The court must affirm the 

[ALJ’s] decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” 
Chaney v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).  Thus, “[i]f, after 
reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from 
the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm 
the ALJ’s decision.” Perks, 

 (quotation omitted); accord Chaney, 

.                                                                   
    Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is not 
supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ mischaracterized the evidence, did not 
adequately develop the record, and failed to evaluate properly the opinions of Dr. Donovan. 
See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 1, ECF No. 17. The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff’s motion. 

See generally Def.’s Brief, ECF No. 20.                                   
 B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity   

    Plaintiff  contends  that  the  ALJ’s  residual  functional  capacity  determination  is 
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record because the ALJ mischaracterized the 
evidence, failed to develop the record, and relied on her own lay interpretation of Plaintiff’s 
medical records. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 11-17. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to 

consider the effects of Plaintiff’s cervical nerve root impingement (that imaging from 
November 2021 revealed) on his ability to perform reaching, handling, fingering, and 
feeling tasks. Id. at 16.                                                 
    A claimant’s “residual functional capacity is the most [he] can still do despite [his] 
limitations.” 

(a)(1); accord 

(a)(1); see McCoy v. 
Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A claimant’s [residual functional capacity] 

represents the most he can do despite the combined effects of all of his credible limitations 
and must be based on all credible evidence.”); see also Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2022).“Because a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] is a medical 
question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the 
claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Perks, 

 (quotation 

omitted); accord Schmitt, 

.                               
    At the same time, the residual-functional-capacity determination “is a decision 
reserved to the agency such that it is neither delegated to medical professionals nor 
determined exclusively based on the contents of medical records.” Noerper v. Saul, 

  (8th  Cir.  2020);  see  Perks,  

;  see  also  

(c),  416.946(c).  “An  ALJ  determines  a  claimant’s  [residual  functional 
capacity] based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations 
of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of [his] limitations.” 
Combs v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted); accord Schmitt, 

; Noerper, 

. As such, there is no requirement that a 
residual-functional-capacity determination “be supported by a specific medical opinion.” 

Schmitt, 

 (quotation omitted). Nor is an ALJ “limited to considering 
medical evidence exclusively.” 

 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, “[e]ven though the 
[residual-functional-capacity] assessment draws from medical sources for support, it is 
ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner.” Perks, 

  (quotation  omitted);  accord  Schmitt,  

;  see  

(c), 416.946(c). Plaintiff bears the burden to establish his residual functional 

capacity. Mabry v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016).             
    The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform 
less than a full range of light work as defined under 

(b) and 
416.967(b), including the residual functional capacity to:                
         lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds     
         frequently. He can stand and/or walk about six hours in an      
         eight-hour workday and sit about six hours in an eight-hour     
         workday. He can engage in unlimited push and pull except for    
         the limitations in lifting and carrying. He can frequently climb 
         ramps and stairs and can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or  
         scaffolds. He can frequently balance, stoop kneel, crouch, and  
         can occasionally crawl. He can have occasional exposure to      
         vibration. He can occasionally reach overhead with the right    
         upper extremity and frequent reaching in all other directions.  

Tr. 24-25. Plaintiff argues that this residual functional capacity determination is based on 
a mischaracterization of the medical evidence record, is not supported by “any competent 
medical opinion, and is nothing more than the lay ALJ’s ‘best guess’ as to Plaintiff’s ability 
to perform reaching and manipulative tasks in a competitive work environment.” Pl.’s 
Mem. in Supp. at 12. Plaintiff’s main issue is with the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s 
“cervical spine findings were the same prior to the alleged onset date through the period at 

issue.” See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 12; Tr. 27. According to Plaintiff, the record shows that 
Plaintiff’s cervical spine worsened. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 12-13. Plaintiff points to 
the  November  2021  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  cervical  spine  which  showed  pressure  on 
Plaintiff’s C6 nerve roots. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 13; Tr. 693, 703. And Dr. Donovan 
indicated she should refer Plaintiff to a neurosurgeon. 

; Tr. 716. Plaintiff asserts 
that the ALJ failed to accurately consider and characterize the November 2021 imaging 

which negatively impacted the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination because 
the ALJ failed to include limitations for reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling. 

.  Plaintiff  further  argues  his  subjective  complaints  support  more  restrictive 
limitations. 

. Lastly, Plaintiff believes no medical opinions support the above 
residual functional capacity determination and that the ALJ should have contacted Dr. 

Donovan for an updated opinion or ordered a consultative examination with respect to the 
November 2021 imaging. 

.                                      
    First and foremost, in determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ 
did  consider  the  November  2021  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  cervical  spine  and  did  not 
mischaracterize the findings from that imaging. The ALJ correctly noted that “imaging of 

the cervical spine show[ed] no focal disc protrusion of extrusion. There was multilevel 
neural foraminal narrowing and neural foraminal stenosis [] present at the C5-C6 level 
bilaterally with impingement upon the exiting C6 nerve roots.” Tr. 27. This is consistent 
with the medical record. Tr. 693, 703. The ALJ acknowledged the imaging “more recently 
shows so [sic] issues with impingement.” Tr. 26. But the ALJ concluded that, “the imaging 
was not too dissimilar from prior imaging in 2018.” Tr. 26. With respect to the 2018 

imaging, the ALJ noted that “degenerative changes of [Plaintiff’s] cervical spine [were] 
found, with degenerative and spondylotic changes with facet arthropathy and uncinate 
process spurring.” Tr. 26. The ALJ also noted that “imaging at this time also showed 
moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis at C4-5 and moderate left sided foraminal stenosis at 
C5-6, foraminal stenosis and no central stenosis seen.” Tr. 26. Because the ALJ found the 
2018 imaging “not too dissimilar from prior imaging in 2018” she went on to conclude that 

“[t]he claimant’s cervical spine findings were the same prior to the alleged onset date 
through  the  period  at  issue.”  Tr.  26-27.  In  short,  the  ALJ  did  not  disregard  or 
mischaracterize the November 2021 imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine. See, e.g., Tr. 26 
(acknowledging  that  more  recent  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  cervical  spine  “was  not  too 
dissimilar from prior imaging in 2018”).                                  

    And, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ was not required to contact Dr. 
Donovan for an updated opinion or order a consultative examination because of the 
November  2021  imaging.  “Well-settled  precedent  confirms  that  the  ALJ  bears  a 
responsibility to develop the record fairly and fully, independent of the claimant’s burden 
to press his case.” Snead v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2004). “Although the 

ALJ has an obligation to develop the record, she need not ‘seek additional clarifying 
statements from a treating physician unless a crucial issue is underdeveloped.’” Dennis B. 
Saul, Case No. 20-CV-515 (NEB/HB), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2021) 
(quoting Stormo v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2004)). The duty to develop the 
record is satisfied when there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Haley 
v. Massanari, 

 (8th Cir. 2001). “[A]n ALJ is permitted to issue a 

decision without obtaining additional medical evidence so long as other evidence in the 
record provides a sufficient basis for the ALJ’s decision.” Naber v. Shalala, 

 (8th Cir. 1994). See also Twyford v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 

 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[The Court] do[es] not require that every aspect of an 
[residual functional capacity] finding be supported by a specific medical opinion, only that 
it be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the 

workplace.” (quotations omitted)). The record as a whole demonstrates that substantial 
evidence supports the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination. The ALJ based 
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, testimony, 
objective medical evidence records, and opinion evidence on the record. See generally Tr. 
18-30.                                                                    

    The ALJ summarized medical records from before Plaintiff’s alleged disability 
onset date to late 2021. For example, she discussed imaging of Plaintiff’s right knee from 
2018 showing a small meniscal tear. Tr. 21, 424-425. The ALJ considered 2019 imaging 
of Plaintiff’s left foot showing underlying osteoarthritic changes and Achilles enthesopathy 
as well as 2021 imaging of Plaintiff’s bilateral hips showing mild degenerative changes but 

no other significant changes. Tr. 21, 500, 669, 671. The ALJ also reviewed and noted the 
minimal  number  of  medical  records  concerning  Plaintiff’s  neuropathy  idiopathic 
peripheral. Tr. 21-22, 421, 650, 655.                                     
    The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s conversative treatment for his reported back and 
neck pain as well as Plaintiff’s decreased pain due to his use of gabapentin and tramadol. 

Tr. 22, 26-28, 568-569, 577, 632, 635, 665, 667, 671. For example, beginning in early 
2020, Plaintiff’s pain was stable even though he had been without pain medications for a 
few months. Tr. 26, 568, 577. Likewise, at a follow up visit with Dr. Huikko in March 
2020, Plaintiff reported that he had still been without regular pain medications and still had 
been “managing fairly well without the pain medication[s] but [was] still limited due to the 
pain.” Tr. 26, 568. Dr. Huikko prescribed tramadol for Plaintiff’s pain. Tr. 569. At follow 

up appointments with Dr. Huikko in September and November of 2020, Plaintiff reported 
that with gabapentin and tramadol his pain was “reasonably well managed.” Tr. 26-27, 632, 
635.                                                                      
    The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s reported pain in his right shoulder and his 
conversative treatment for that issue. Tr. 26. For example, in 2020 and 2021 Dr. Huikko 

administered steroid injections to Plaintiff’s right shoulder to address his shoulder pain. Tr. 
26, 633, 665, 667, 671. Plaintiff reported that he received “some good relief” from the 
injections. Tr. 667. Imaging of Plaintiff’s shoulder showed “no acute abnormalities or 
significant osteoarthritis changes.” Tr. 667. Plaintiff’s range of motion of his right shoulder 
was mildly limited because of pain and some generalized tenderness to palpation was 

present  but no  swelling  or  deformity  was  found.  Tr. 633,  671.  Muscle  strength  and 
coordination were both shown as normal. Tr. 633, 671.                     
    Imaging from 2018 of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine was also discussed by the ALJ. Tr. 
26. Such imaging showed early degenerative disc changes at L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1. Tr. 
26, 422. No focal protrusion and central or foraminal stenosis were noted with respect to 
the 2018 imaging. Tr. 422. Mild facet arthropathy was noted as present but the overall 

appearance of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine did not appear changed in any significant way 
compared to a prior exam. Tr. 422. Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine from 2021 was also 
considered by the ALJ. Tr. 22, 24, 26-27. See, e.g., Tr. 674 (imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar 
spine showed “[n]o focal disc protrusion or extrusion. No compression fracture. No acute 
bone changes. Early disc degeneration at a L3/L4 level . . . no encroachment upon the 
neural elements and no evidence of neural foraminal stenosis or significant narrowing. No 

discrete  etiology  found  in  Plaintiff’s  symptoms.”);  Tr.  695-694  (imaging  showed  an 
unchanged appearance of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine). As discussed more above, the ALJ also 
considered imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine before and after the alleged disability onset 
date. Tr. 26-27, 418-419, 693, 703.                                       
    Medical opinions by Dr. Donovan and Caty Dom, M.D. on Plaintiff’s medical 

records were discussed, both of which were found to be unpersuasive by the ALJ. Tr. 21-
23, 27-28, 718. Opinions from state agency medical consultants were also considered and 
found to be persuasive by the ALJ. Tr. 27, 83-95, 96-108, 113-129, 130-146. The state 
medical consultants opined that Plaintiff was capable of a range of light work, including 
standing, walking, and sitting for about six hours in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff was 

also found to be capable of lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds 
frequently, as well as occasionally climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 
113-129, 130-146. Plaintiff’s functional limitations were also thoroughly discussed by the 
ALJ, including the effects of Plaintiff’s obesity. Tr. 24-27, 512, 569. And lastly, Plaintiff’s 
own  subjective  reports  and  testimony  from  the  hearing  before  the  ALJ  were  also 
considered. Tr. 25, 60-65, 67, 70.                                        

    All  in  all,  the  record  reflects  improvements  from  conversative  treatment  for 
Plaintiff’s pain which included use of pain medications and steroid injections. The record 
also reflects mild decrease in range of motion yet normal muscle strength and coordination, 
and the same and or similar imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar and cervical spine.  
    The Court concludes that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the 
ALJ’s conclusion that the objective medical evidence is consistent with the ALJ’s residual 

functional capacity determination. It is not a basis for reversal if it were possible to reach 
a conclusion other than the one reached by the ALJ based on the objective medical 
evidence. See Igo v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We may not reverse simply 
because we would have reached a different conclusion than the ALJ or because substantial 
evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”); accord Fentress v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2017).                                                     
 C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Dr. Donovan’s Opinions Unpersuasive   
    In January 2021, Dr. Donovan wrote a letter in support of Plaintiff’s disability claim, 
offering the following opinions. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan stated that Plaintiff’s main problem 
is with idiopathic peripheral neuropathy which affects his feet, legs, arms, and hands. Tr. 

718. Dr. Donovan opined that Plaintiff can only use a keyboard or mouse for no more than 
30 minutes every three to four hours due to numbness in his hands. Tr. 718. She further 
opined that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and venous stasis with 
edema affects his ability to sit and stand. Tr. 718. Plaintiff cannot sit for more than five to 
ten minutes and can walk for only ten to fifteen minutes. Tr. 718. With respect to Plaintiff’s 
pain medications, Dr. Donovan opined that his medications cause fatigue and decreased 

concentration. Tr. 718. As for his neck and back pain and fibromyalgia, Dr. Donovan 
opined that Plaintiff would have to miss at least one day a week of work. Tr. 718. And, 
lastly, Dr. Donovan opined that Plaintiff cannot lift more than ten pounds on an occasional 
basis, lacks the ability to do repetitive motions, lacks fine motor control of his hands, and 
is at a significant fall risk. Tr. 718. The ALJ found Dr. Donovan’s opinions unpersuasive 
because those opinions were not consistent with the record and unsupported. Tr. 28. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is unsupported 
by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not properly evaluate Dr. Donovan’s opinions. 
See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 17-22.                                         
    In evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions, an ALJ must consider “(1) 
whether they are supported by objective medical evidence, (2) whether they are consistent 

with other medical sources, (3) the relationship that the source has with the claimant, (4) 
the source’s specialization, and (5) any other relevant factors.” Bowers v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing 

.1520c(c)). “The first two factors—
supportability2 and consistency3—are the most important.” 

 (citing § 404.1520c(a)). But 


2 The regulations define the factor of “supportability” as follows:       

    The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a 
    medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 
    finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will 
    be.                                                                  

.1520c(c)(1).                                              

3 The regulations define the factor of “consistency” as follows:          
“[n]o talismanic language is required for the ALJ to meet the requirements of § 404.1520c, 
only that the ALJ make it clear that they considered the supportability and consistency of 

an opinion.” Mario O. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-2469 (NEB/ECW), 

, at 
*11 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 

 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 9, 2023).                                                      
    The ALJ found Dr. Donovan’s opinions to be unpersuasive because her opinions 
“are inconsistent with the record and unsupported.” Tr. 28. According to the ALJ, Dr. 
Donovan’s opinions in the January 2021 letter “are out of proportion with the medical 

evidence record.” Tr. 28. In coming to this conclusion, the ALJ relied on a number of 
objective medical findings in the record documenting Plaintiff’s conversative treatment, 
improved symptoms, and relatively unchanged imaging. Tr. 26-28. The Court concludes 
that the ALJ did not err in her analysis of Dr. Donovan’s opinions.       
    Plaintiff argues that the November 2021 imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine (which 

was conducted after Dr. Donovan’s January 2021 letter in support of Plaintiff’s disability 
claim) supports Dr. Donovan’s opinions. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 18-19. Dr. Donovan’s 
January 2021 opinions, however, lack any mention of Plaintiff’s cervical spine, besides a 
brief statement that Plaintiff has “chronic neck pain.” Tr. 718. Contrary to Plaintiff’s 
assertions and as discussed more thoroughly above, the ALJ did consider and properly 




    The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the 
    evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the 
    medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be. 

.1520c(c)(2).                                              
characterize the imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine prior to the alleged disability onset 
date through the period at issue. Tr. 26-27.                              

    Next, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Donovan’s treatment notes support Dr. Donovan’s 
opinions. 

. A comparison of Dr. Donovan’s treatment notes demonstrates that 
her January 2021 opinions are not supported by her own treatment notes. See Davidson v. 
Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2009) (“It is permissible for an ALJ to discount an 
opinion of a treating physician that is inconsistent with the physician's clinical treatment 
notes.”).  For  example,  Dr.  Donovan’s  treatment  notes  briefly  mention  Plaintiff’s 

neuropathy, but a significant mention of neuropathy is lacking. Tr. 422, 460-466, 510-516. 
It does not follow, as Dr. Donovan opined in January 2021, that Plaintiff’s “main problem 
is idiopathic peripheral neuropathy which affects not only his feet and legs, but his arms 
and  hands.”  Tr.  28,  718.  Plaintiff’s  medical  records,  including  Dr.  Donovan’s  own 
treatment notes, fail to support this opinion.                            

    Plaintiff also takes issue with the lack of the use of the word “supportability” by the 
ALJ in her analysis. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 20. This argument is not persuasive. “The 
fact  that  the  ALJ  did  not  use  the  words  ‘supportability’  and  ‘consistency’  is  not 
determinative; word choice alone does not warrant reversal.” Atwood v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-
CV-1394 JAR, 

, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2022) (citing Kamann v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2013)).                                       
    Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide an explanation as to the 
consistency factor. Tr. 20-21. The ALJ “may discount or even disregard the opinion of a 
treating  physician  where  other  medical  assessments  are  supported  by  better  or  more 
thorough medical evidence.”  Fentress, 

 (citations omitted). Here, the ALJ 
relied on other, substantial evidence in the record that was inconsistent with Dr. Donovan’s 

opinions, including Plaintiff’s conversative treatment, improved symptoms, and largely 
unchanged  imaging.  See, e.g.,  Tr.  422,  662,  656-657,  674,  695 (noting degenerative 
changes of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine but no significant changes and no focal disc protrusion 
or extrusion); Tr. 693, 703 (noting most recent imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine showed 
issues with impingement but no focal disc protrusion or extrusion); Tr. 665, 670-671 
(noting complaints of shoulder pain were addressed with steroid injections); Tr. 510-516, 

632-633,  635,  (noting  controlled  pain  after  minimal  treatment  with  tramadol  and 
gabapentin); Tr. 568, 577 (noting pain was stable even without pain medications); Tr. 632-
633 (noting normal muscle strength and coordination); Tr. 665-667 (noting mild limits to 
Plaintiff’s range of motion); Tr. 512, 569 (noting Plaintiff’s obesity); Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 
113-129, 130-146 (noting state agency medical consultants opinions that Plaintiff was 

capable of a range of light work where he could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 
ten pounds frequently).                                                   
    Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the above records (which the ALJ replied upon in 
rejecting Dr. Donovan’s opinions, Tr. 24-28) do support the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. 
Donovan’s opinions are not consistent with the record. Tr. 28. For example, Dr. Donovan 

opined significant issues with idiopathic peripheral neuropathy, venous stasis with edema, 
fibromyalgia, and numbness, but, as shown above, other objective medical evidence is 
significantly lacking in that respect. While the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s situation, 
Dr. Donovan’s opinions are certainly “out of proportion with the medical evidence record.” 
Tr. 28.                                                                   

     Because the ALJ supported her findings with substantial evidence in the record, the 
ALJ was not required to adopt Dr. Donovan’s opinions. See Seth K. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-
76 (MJD/LIB), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. July 27, 2022) (“[T]he ALJ is not 
required to believe the opinion of a treating physician when, on balance, the medical 
evidence  convinces  her  otherwise.”),  report  and  recommendation  adopted,  

 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2022).  In sum, the ALJ gave “good reasons,” supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, to explain why Dr. Donovan’s opinions were not 
persuasive. See Anderson v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the 
ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Donovan’s opinions.                      
    Moreover, it is not the role of the Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the 
ALJ. See Schmitt, 

 (“Despite [the claimant’s] dissatisfaction with how the 

ALJ weighed the evidence, it is not this Court’s role to reweigh that evidence.”). “While it 
is not surprising that, in an administrative record which exceeds 1,500 pages, [Plaintiff] 
can point to some evidence which detracts from the Commissioner’s determination, good 
reasons and substantial evidence on the record as a whole support the Commissioner’s 
[residual functional capacity] determination and the decision to discount [Dr. Donovan’s] 

opinion[s].” See Fentress, 

 (citing Igo, 

). The Court will 
not  reverse  the  ALJ’s  decision  “simply  because  [it]  would  have  reached  a  different 
conclusion than the Commissioner or because substantial evidence supports a contrary 
conclusion.” 

 (citations omitted); see also Goff v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent 
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner’s 

findings,  the  court  must  affirm  the  Commissioner’s  decision.”).  Here,  the  ALJ’s 
determination  is  supported  by  good  reasons  and  substantial  evidence,  and  the  Court 
therefore finds that the ALJ did not err in assessing Dr. Donovan’s opinions.  
    In sum, based on the Court’s review of the record as a whole, the Court finds that 
the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. Because there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision, the Court 

may not reverse the decision merely because substantial evidence may exist which would 
have supported a different outcome, or because the Court could have decided the case 
differently.                                                              






                      [Continued on next page.]                          
                        VI.  CONCLUSION                                  
    Based upon the record, memoranda, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons 

states above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                                  
 1.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement, ECF No. 16, is DENIED.    
 2.  Defendant’s request for relief, ECF No. 20, is GRANTED.             
 3.  The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.                            
 4.  This matter is DISMISSED.                                           
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      



Date: March 15, 2024          s/ Tong N. Leung                            
                             Tony N. Leung                               
                             United States Magistrate Judge              
                             District of Minnesota                       

                             Jeremy T. S. v. O’Malley,                   
                             Case No. 23-cv-202 (TNL)                    

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Jeremy T. S.,                         Case No. 23-cv-202 (TNL)           

          Plaintiff,                                                     

v.                                          ORDER                        

Martin J. O’Malley1,                                                     
Commissioner of Social Security                                          
Administration,                                                          

          Defendant.                                                     


Christopher Todd Milliman, Olinsky Law Group, 250 South Clinton Street, Suite 210, 
Syracuse,  NY  13202  and  Asha  Sharma,  Disability  Partners,  PLLC,  2579  Hamline 
Avenue North, Suite C, Roseville, MN 55113 (for Plaintiff); and          

Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, 
Minneapolis, MN 55415; James D. Sides, Social Security Administration, Office of the 
General Counsel, Office of Program Litigation, Office 4, 6401 Security Boulevard, 
Baltimore, MD 21235; and Kizuwanda Curtis, Social Security Administration, Office of 
Program Litigation, 6401 Security Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21235 (for Defendant). 


                       I.   INTRODUCTION                                 
    Plaintiff Jeremy T. S. challenges Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s 
denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the 
Social Security Act, 

 et seq., and supplemental security income (“SSI”) 
under Title XVI of the same, 

 et seq. The parties have consented to a final 

1 Martin O’Malley is currently serving as the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25(d), he is automatically substituted as Defendant in this suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 
judgment from the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge in accordance with 

(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c).             

    Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s Supplemental Rules governing 
actions seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, this action “is presented 
for decision by the parties’ briefs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. SS Rule 5. Rather than filing a 
brief as provided in amended Rule 5, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 
No. 16, which was the procedure prior to the recent amendment to Rule 5. Defendant filed 
a brief requesting for the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed, ECF No. 20.  

    For  the  reasons  set  forth  below,  the  Court  denies  Plaintiff’s  motion,  grants 
Defendant’s request for relief, and affirms the Commissioner’s decision.  
                   II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY                               
    Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI asserting that he has been disabled since October 
26, 2019, due to fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, peripheral neuropathy, back, 

neck, knee, and ankle problems, high blood pressure, plantar fasciitis, and carpal tunnel 
syndrome. Tr. 83-84, 96-97, 349. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and again 
upon reconsideration. Tr. 202-204, 214-215, 217-218.                      
    Plaintiff  appealed  the  reconsideration  of  his  DIB  and  SSI  determinations  and 
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 207-208. The ALJ 

held a hearing in December 2021 and issued an unfavorable decision to Plaintiff. Tr. 18-
30, 47-82. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Tr. 3-8. As a result, 
the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner subject to judicial 
review. See 

(g). Plaintiff now seeks review by this Court.  
                III.  RELEVANT MEDICAL RECORDS                           

 A. 2018                                                                 
     In January 2018 an MRI was ordered by Cathy O’Donovan, MD for Plaintiff’s 
cervical spine in response to his complaints of neck pain and deceased range of motion. Tr. 
418. The imaging showed degenerative and spondylotic changes with facet arthropathy and 
uncinate process spurring. Tr. 419. These changes were noted to cause moderate bilateral 
foraminal stenosis at C4-5 and moderate left sided foraminal stenosis at C5-6. Tr. 419. 
Foraminal stenosis was noted as appearing similar to the prior exam and no central stenosis 

was observed. Tr. 419. The appearance of Plaintiff’s cervical spine overall appeared to be 
stable compared to a prior exam. Tr. 419.                                 
    Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed early degenerative disc changes at L3-
4, L4-5, and L5-S1. Tr. 422. The purpose of this MRI was to address Plaintiff’s complaints 
of back pain and neuropathy. Tr. 421. No focal protrusion and central or foraminal stenosis 

were  noted.  Tr.  422.  Mild  facet  arthropathy  was  present  but  overall  appearance  of 
Plaintiff’s lumbar spine did not appear changed in any significant way compared to a prior 
exam. Tr. 422. Imaging of Plaintiff’s right knee in response to complaints of pain showed 
a small meniscal tear. Tr. 424-425.                                       
    Several months later in July 2018, Plaintiff visited with Dr. Donovan to address his 

complaints of pain in his knee, neck, shoulder and back in addition to neuropathy idiopathic 
peripheral, degenerative disc disease of his lumbar spine, and fibromyalgia. Tr. 460. As a 
result of this visit, Plaintiff was prescribed cyclobenzaprine and other pain medications, 
including gabapentin and oxycodone, were refilled. Tr.460- 466. Plaintiff had a follow up 
visit with Dr. Donovan in October 2018. Tr. 542. At this visit Plaintiff was reminded to 
use his cane and was referred back to pain management to address his reported pain. Tr. 

548. Medications for his pain were also refilled. Tr. 548.                
 B. 2019                                                                 
    In April 2019, Plaintiff visited with Dr. Donovan for his reported neck, back, and 
feet pain. Tr. 436, 438. Plaintiff’s pain medications, including gabapentin and oxycodone, 
were refiled. Tr. 436-445.                                                
    In  July  2019, imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  left  foot  showed  underlying  osteoarthritic 

changes and Achilles enthesopathy. Tr. 500. In this same month, imaging of Plaintiff’s left 
foot also showed diffuse osteoarthritic changes and abnormal findings with the anterior 
aspect of the tibia in keeping with fairly large area of osteochondral defect. Tr. 591. Pain 
medications were continued. Tr. 517-523.                                  
    In August 2019, a CT angiogram of the abdominal aorta with runoff to bilateral 

lower extremities showed no evidence for hemodynamically significant stenosis but did 
show mild bilateral diffuse soft and calcific plaque formation. Tr. 583.  
    Plaintiff had a follow up visit with Dr. Donovan in October 2019 (before the alleged 
disability onset date) for complaints of pain. Tr. 510. Pain medications were continued. Tr. 
510-516. The record also showed Plaintiff’s body mass index of 33.5. Tr. 512. 

 C. 2020                                                                 
    After Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date of October 26, 2019, he established 
care with Jason D. Huikko, MD in January 2020. Tr. 577. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Huikko 
a history of chronic pain, although he reported that his chronic pain issues were stable at 
that  time,  and  he  that  had  treated  his  pain  issues  with  gabapentin,  oxycodone,  and 
ibuprofen. Tr. 577. He also reported a history of back pain, neuropathy, and fibromyalgia. 

Tr. 577. Dr. Huikko did not start Plaintiff on any pain medications following this visit. Tr. 
578.                                                                      
    At a follow up visit with Dr. Huikko in March 2020, Plaintiff reported that he wished 
to switch his pain management to Dr. Huikko’s clinic and that a provider he was seeing 
prescribed him oxycodone for his pain. Tr. 568. He informed Dr. Huikko that his pain 
medications were last filled on November 30, 2019, but he had “been managing fairly well” 

without his pain medications but was “still limited due to the pain.” Tr. 568. Dr. Huikko 
prescribed Plaintiff tramadol as needed for his pain. Tr. 569. Dr. Huikko found that 
Plaintiff’s range of motion in his lower back was limited due to pain and found tender 
palpation in the lower lumbar region. Tr. 569. Normal muscle strength and coordination 
were noted. Tr. 569. The record also reflected Plaintiff’s body mass index of 32.74. Tr. 

569. At another follow up appointment with Dr. Huikko in September 2020, Plaintiff 
reported that his pain had increased since he had run out of tramadol and that with 
gabapentin and tramadol his pain was “reasonably well managed.” Tr. 635.  
    Dr. Donovan completed a physical assessment statement in September 2020. Tr. 
678-679. She noted Plaintiff’s diagnosis of thoracic back pain, lumbar disc degeneration, 

fibromyalgia, and knee pain. Tr. 678. The assessment provided that Plaintiff could sit for 
four hours and stand/walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday, would need five-to-
fifteen-minute breaks during the workday, and would need to be absent from work for more 
than four times a month. Tr. 678-679. The assessment also provided that Plaintiff could 
occasionally lift at most ten pounds, could use his hands and fingers for 20 percent of an 
eight-hour workday, and could use his arms for 10 percent of an eight-hour workday. Tr. 

678-679.                                                                  
    At a follow up visit in November 2020, Dr. Huikko noted that in March 2020 he 
had switched Plaintiff’s pain medication from oxycodone to tramadol. Tr. 632. Plaintiff 
reported his pain was “reasonably well managed” with gabapentin and tramadol. Tr. 632. 
He reported, however, increased pain in his right shoulder. Tr. 632. Dr. Huikko noted that 
Plaintiff’s range of motion of his right shoulder was mildly limited because of pain and 

there was some generalized tenderness to palpation but no swelling or deformity. Tr. 633. 
Muscle strength and coordination were both noted as normal. Tr. 633. Plaintiff received a 
steroid injection to his right shoulder to address his shoulder pain. Tr. 633. 
    Lastly, in late 2020, state agency medical consultants reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 
records and opined that Plaintiff was capable of a range of light work. Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 

113-129, 130-146. They also opined that Plaintiff could stand/walk for about six hours in 
an eight-hour workday, could sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday, lift and 
carry 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and occasionally climb ladders, 
ropes, or scaffolds. Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 113-129, 130-146.                 
 D. 2021                                                                 

    In January 2021, Plaintiff had a remote visit with Dr. Donovan for the purpose of 
having Dr. Donovan issue a letter in support of his disability claim. Tr. 650. At the 
telehealth visit, Plaintiff reported increased shoulder, back, and neck pain as well as 
numbness in his feet and or left leg. Tr. 650. As a result of this telehealth visit, Dr. Donovan 
identified  four  problems  and  made  the  following  impressions.  Tr.  655.  Plaintiff’s 
neuropathy  idiopathic  peripheral  causes  numbness  which  prevents  Plaintiff  from 

keyboarding or using a mouse for more than 30 minutes every three to four hours. Tr. 655. 
Plaintiff’s venous stasis limits his ability to stand and sit. Tr. 655. Plaintiff’s degenerative 
disc disease of the lumbar spine makes it so he cannot sit for more than five to ten minutes, 
and he can only walk for ten to fifteen minutes. Tr. 655. Lastly, Plaintiff’s pain medications, 
gabapentin and tramadol, cause fatigue. Tr. 655.                          
    Dr. Donovan issued her letter on January 13, 2021. Tr. 718. In her letter, Dr. 

Donovan opined that Plaintiff’s medical problems make it impossible for him to work. Tr. 
718. She explained that Plaintiff’s main problem is idiopathic peripheral neuropathy which 
affects his feet, legs, arms, and hands. Tr. 718. The numbness in Plaintiff’s hands, she 
opined, keeps Plaintiff from keyboarding or using a mouse for more than 30 minutes every 
three to four hours. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan further opined that because of his degenerative 

disc disease of the lumbar spine, Plaintiff cannot sit for more than five to ten minutes and 
can only walk for ten to fifteen minutes before needing to sit or lie down. Tr. 718. Dr. 
Donovan  explained  that  gabapentin  and  tramadol  both  cause  fatigue  and  decreased 
concentration in Plaintiff. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan noted that Plaintiff has venous stasis with 
edema which affects Plaintiff’s ability to stand. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan also opined that 

Plaintiff’s neck and back pain, and fibromyalgia also complicates his ability to keep a job. 
Tr. 718. For example, according to Dr. Donovan, Plaintiff needs to be absent from work at 
least once a week, is not able to lift more than ten pounds on an occasional basis, is not 
able to do any repetitive motions, lacks fine motor control of his hands, and is at a 
significant fall risk. Tr. 718.                                           

    Also  in  January  2021,  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  lumbar  spine  showed  early  disc 
degeneration at the L3-L4 level, with no focal disc protrusion or extrusion. Tr. 656-657, 
674. The imaging did not show any signs of a compression fracture and there were no acute 
bone changes. Tr. 674. The imaging also did not show evidence of encroachment on the 
neural  elements,  neural  foraminal  stenosis  or  significant  narrowing,  and  no  discrete 
etiology. Tr. 674.                                                        

    At a follow up appointment with Dr. Huikko in February 2021, Plaintiff reported 
problems with his right shoulder and bilateral hips but reported his back pain as “relatively 
stable.” Tr. 670. Dr. Huikko found Plaintiff’s range of motion of his right shoulder to be 
“mildly limited” because of pain but no swelling or deformity was present. Tr. 671. 
Plaintiff’s  range  of  motion  of  his  bilateral  hips  as  well  as  his  muscle  strength  and 

coordination were noted as normal. Tr. 671. Imaging of Plaintiff’s bilateral hips showed 
mild degenerative changes, but no other significant changes. Tr. 669, 671. Dr. Huikko 
continued Plaintiff on tramadol and gabapentin for his pain and administered another 
steroid injection for Plaintiff’s reported shoulder pain. Tr. 671.        
    In May 2021, Dr. Huikko administered another steroid injection in Plaintiff’s right 

shoulder. Tr. 665, 667. Plaintiff had received “some good relief from the last injection.” 
Tr. 667. Imaging Plaintiff’s shoulder from this visit showed “no acute abnormalities or 
significant osteoarthritis changes.” Tr. 667. Plaintiff’s back pain was noted as “relatively 
stable” and there was no weakness in the lower extremities. Tr. 665. Dr. Huikko again 
continued Plaintiff on tramadol and gabapentin for his chronic pain. Tr. 667. Plaintiff’s 
range of motion of his lower back was noted as limited due to pain; however, range of 

motion of his right shoulder, muscle strength and coordination remained unchanged from 
the February visit. Tr. 666.                                              
    Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine from October 2021 showed disc degeneration 
with associated proliferative changes at the L3-L4 level, and mild diffuse degenerative 
facet arthropathy. Tr. 662, 711. The results showed no other significant findings and no 
evidence of spinal instability. Tr. 662, 711. In November 2021, imaging of Plaintiff’s 

cervical spine showed no focal disc protrusion or extrusion but did show multilevel neural 
foraminal  narrowing,  neural  foraminal  stenosis  at  the  C5-C6  level  bilaterally  with 
impingement on the exiting C6 nerve roots. Tr. 693-694, 703. Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar 
spine showed an unchanged appearance of his lumbar spine and no evidence of focal disc 
protrusion or extrusion. Tr. 695-696. Also, in November, in a correspondence between Dr. 

Donovan and Plaintiff, Dr. Donovan told Plaintiff that he has some abnormalities that put 
pressure on the nerve roots in his cervical spine and noted that she “should send [him] to a 
neurosurgeon about this.” Tr. 716. As of the date of the hearing before the ALJ on 
December 23, 2021, Plaintiff had not seen a neurosurgeon. Tr. 47, 69.     
         IV.  ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING AND ALJ DECISION                    

    At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he has “been in so much pain” 
and experiences numbness in his hands and feet. Tr. 60-63, 67. He also testified that his 
hands and legs are shaky, he lacks dexterity in his hands, and has trouble twisting objects 
and buttoning his clothing. Tr. 60, 63, 70. He stated he experiences pain in his back, neck, 
and feet which is worsened by odd positions, and activities such as crouching, lifting, 
reaching, or grabbing. Tr. 61. He further testified that he is able to lift ten pounds, can carry 

his groceries, and can stand and sit for approximately 20 minutes but is most comfortable 
while laying down. Tr. 62. He stated that gabapentin relieves his pain but causes brain fog 
and makes him lethargic. Tr. 64-65. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued her decision in 
March 2022. Tr. 18-30.                                                    
    The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied the insured status requirements of the Social 
Security Act through December 31, 2022 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the alleged disability onset date of October 26, 2019. Tr. 21. The ALJ further found 
that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 
spine, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, and obesity. Tr. 21. The ALJ also 
identified as non-severe Plaintiff’s physical impairments of a right knee meniscus tear, 
idiopathic peripheral neuropathy, venous status with edema, and fibromyalgia. Tr. 21-22. 

The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s mental impairments to be non-severe. Tr. 22-23. The ALJ 
then concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 
that meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments under 20 C.F.R. 
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 23-24.                               
    With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

can perform less than a full range of light work as defined under 

(b) 
and 416.967(b), including the residual functional capacity to:            
         lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds     
         frequently. He can stand and/or walk about six hours in an      
         eight-hour workday and sit about six hours in an eight-hour     
         workday. He can engage in unlimited push and pull except for    
         the limitations in lifting and carrying. He can frequently climb 
         ramps and stairs and can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or  
         scaffolds. He can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 
         can occasionally crawl. He can have occasional exposure to      
         vibration. He can occasionally reach overhead with the right    
         upper extremity and frequent reaching in all other directions.  

Tr. 24-25. The ALJ, therefore, concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing past 
relevant work as a casino host or as a security guard and that these types of positions do 
not require the performance of work-related activities that are precluded by Plaintiff’s 
residual functional capacity. Tr. 28. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not 
disabled. Tr. 29-30.                                                      
                        V.    ANALYSIS                                   
 A. Legal Standards                                                      
    Disability benefits are available to individuals who are determined to be under a 
disability. 

(a)(1), 1381a; accord 

, 416.901. An 
individual is considered to be disabled if he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period  of  not  less  than  12  months.”  

(d)(1)(A);  accord  42  U.S.C. 
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 

(a), 416.905(a). This standard is met 
when a severe physical or mental impairment, or impairments, renders the individual 
unable to do his previous work or “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists 
in  the  national  economy”  when  taking  into  account  his  age,  education,  and  work 
experience. 

(d)(2)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also 

(a), 416.905(a).                                        

    Disability is determined according to a five-step, sequential evaluation process. 

(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).                                  
         To determine disability, the ALJ follows the familiar five-step 
         process, considering whether: (1) the claimant was employed;    
         (2) []he was severely impaired; (3) h[is] impairment was, or    
         was comparable to, a listed impairment; (4) []he could perform  
         past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether []he could perform  
         any other kind of work.                                         

Halverson v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2010). In general, the burden of proving 
the existence of disability lies with the claimant. 

(a), 416.912(a). 
Once the claimant demonstrates that he cannot perform past work due to a disability, “the 
burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to prove, first that the claimant retains the 
residual functional capacity to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists 
in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to do.” Nevland v. 
Apfel, 

 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).             
    This Court reviews whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as a whole. Biestek v. Berryhill, 

 (2019). “[T]he 
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” 

 “It means—and means only—
such  relevant  evidence as  a  reasonable  mind might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a 
conclusion.” 

 (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Chismarich v. Berryhill, 

 
(8th Cir. 2018) (defining “substantial evidence as less than a preponderance but enough 
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the conclusion” (quotation 
omitted)).                                                                

    This standard requires the Court to “consider both evidence that detracts from the 
[ALJ’s] decision and evidence that supports it.” Boettcher v. Astrue, 

 
(8th Cir. 2011); see Grindley v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2021). The ALJ’s 
decision “will not [be] reverse[d] simply because some evidence supports a conclusion 
other than that reached by the ALJ.” Boettcher, 

; accord Grindley, 

; Perks v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2012). “The court must affirm the 

[ALJ’s] decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” 
Chaney v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).  Thus, “[i]f, after 
reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from 
the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm 
the ALJ’s decision.” Perks, 

 (quotation omitted); accord Chaney, 

.                                                                   
    Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is not 
supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ mischaracterized the evidence, did not 
adequately develop the record, and failed to evaluate properly the opinions of Dr. Donovan. 
See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 1, ECF No. 17. The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff’s motion. 

See generally Def.’s Brief, ECF No. 20.                                   
 B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity   

    Plaintiff  contends  that  the  ALJ’s  residual  functional  capacity  determination  is 
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record because the ALJ mischaracterized the 
evidence, failed to develop the record, and relied on her own lay interpretation of Plaintiff’s 
medical records. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 11-17. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to 

consider the effects of Plaintiff’s cervical nerve root impingement (that imaging from 
November 2021 revealed) on his ability to perform reaching, handling, fingering, and 
feeling tasks. Id. at 16.                                                 
    A claimant’s “residual functional capacity is the most [he] can still do despite [his] 
limitations.” 

(a)(1); accord 

(a)(1); see McCoy v. 
Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A claimant’s [residual functional capacity] 

represents the most he can do despite the combined effects of all of his credible limitations 
and must be based on all credible evidence.”); see also Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2022).“Because a claimant’s [residual functional capacity] is a medical 
question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of the 
claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Perks, 

 (quotation 

omitted); accord Schmitt, 

.                               
    At the same time, the residual-functional-capacity determination “is a decision 
reserved to the agency such that it is neither delegated to medical professionals nor 
determined exclusively based on the contents of medical records.” Noerper v. Saul, 

  (8th  Cir.  2020);  see  Perks,  

;  see  also  

(c),  416.946(c).  “An  ALJ  determines  a  claimant’s  [residual  functional 
capacity] based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations 
of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of [his] limitations.” 
Combs v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted); accord Schmitt, 

; Noerper, 

. As such, there is no requirement that a 
residual-functional-capacity determination “be supported by a specific medical opinion.” 

Schmitt, 

 (quotation omitted). Nor is an ALJ “limited to considering 
medical evidence exclusively.” 

 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, “[e]ven though the 
[residual-functional-capacity] assessment draws from medical sources for support, it is 
ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner.” Perks, 

  (quotation  omitted);  accord  Schmitt,  

;  see  

(c), 416.946(c). Plaintiff bears the burden to establish his residual functional 

capacity. Mabry v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016).             
    The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform 
less than a full range of light work as defined under 

(b) and 
416.967(b), including the residual functional capacity to:                
         lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds     
         frequently. He can stand and/or walk about six hours in an      
         eight-hour workday and sit about six hours in an eight-hour     
         workday. He can engage in unlimited push and pull except for    
         the limitations in lifting and carrying. He can frequently climb 
         ramps and stairs and can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or  
         scaffolds. He can frequently balance, stoop kneel, crouch, and  
         can occasionally crawl. He can have occasional exposure to      
         vibration. He can occasionally reach overhead with the right    
         upper extremity and frequent reaching in all other directions.  

Tr. 24-25. Plaintiff argues that this residual functional capacity determination is based on 
a mischaracterization of the medical evidence record, is not supported by “any competent 
medical opinion, and is nothing more than the lay ALJ’s ‘best guess’ as to Plaintiff’s ability 
to perform reaching and manipulative tasks in a competitive work environment.” Pl.’s 
Mem. in Supp. at 12. Plaintiff’s main issue is with the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s 
“cervical spine findings were the same prior to the alleged onset date through the period at 

issue.” See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 12; Tr. 27. According to Plaintiff, the record shows that 
Plaintiff’s cervical spine worsened. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 12-13. Plaintiff points to 
the  November  2021  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  cervical  spine  which  showed  pressure  on 
Plaintiff’s C6 nerve roots. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 13; Tr. 693, 703. And Dr. Donovan 
indicated she should refer Plaintiff to a neurosurgeon. 

; Tr. 716. Plaintiff asserts 
that the ALJ failed to accurately consider and characterize the November 2021 imaging 

which negatively impacted the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination because 
the ALJ failed to include limitations for reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling. 

.  Plaintiff  further  argues  his  subjective  complaints  support  more  restrictive 
limitations. 

. Lastly, Plaintiff believes no medical opinions support the above 
residual functional capacity determination and that the ALJ should have contacted Dr. 

Donovan for an updated opinion or ordered a consultative examination with respect to the 
November 2021 imaging. 

.                                      
    First and foremost, in determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ 
did  consider  the  November  2021  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  cervical  spine  and  did  not 
mischaracterize the findings from that imaging. The ALJ correctly noted that “imaging of 

the cervical spine show[ed] no focal disc protrusion of extrusion. There was multilevel 
neural foraminal narrowing and neural foraminal stenosis [] present at the C5-C6 level 
bilaterally with impingement upon the exiting C6 nerve roots.” Tr. 27. This is consistent 
with the medical record. Tr. 693, 703. The ALJ acknowledged the imaging “more recently 
shows so [sic] issues with impingement.” Tr. 26. But the ALJ concluded that, “the imaging 
was not too dissimilar from prior imaging in 2018.” Tr. 26. With respect to the 2018 

imaging, the ALJ noted that “degenerative changes of [Plaintiff’s] cervical spine [were] 
found, with degenerative and spondylotic changes with facet arthropathy and uncinate 
process spurring.” Tr. 26. The ALJ also noted that “imaging at this time also showed 
moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis at C4-5 and moderate left sided foraminal stenosis at 
C5-6, foraminal stenosis and no central stenosis seen.” Tr. 26. Because the ALJ found the 
2018 imaging “not too dissimilar from prior imaging in 2018” she went on to conclude that 

“[t]he claimant’s cervical spine findings were the same prior to the alleged onset date 
through  the  period  at  issue.”  Tr.  26-27.  In  short,  the  ALJ  did  not  disregard  or 
mischaracterize the November 2021 imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine. See, e.g., Tr. 26 
(acknowledging  that  more  recent  imaging  of  Plaintiff’s  cervical  spine  “was  not  too 
dissimilar from prior imaging in 2018”).                                  

    And, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ was not required to contact Dr. 
Donovan for an updated opinion or order a consultative examination because of the 
November  2021  imaging.  “Well-settled  precedent  confirms  that  the  ALJ  bears  a 
responsibility to develop the record fairly and fully, independent of the claimant’s burden 
to press his case.” Snead v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2004). “Although the 

ALJ has an obligation to develop the record, she need not ‘seek additional clarifying 
statements from a treating physician unless a crucial issue is underdeveloped.’” Dennis B. 
Saul, Case No. 20-CV-515 (NEB/HB), 

, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2021) 
(quoting Stormo v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 2004)). The duty to develop the 
record is satisfied when there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Haley 
v. Massanari, 

 (8th Cir. 2001). “[A]n ALJ is permitted to issue a 

decision without obtaining additional medical evidence so long as other evidence in the 
record provides a sufficient basis for the ALJ’s decision.” Naber v. Shalala, 

 (8th Cir. 1994). See also Twyford v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 

 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[The Court] do[es] not require that every aspect of an 
[residual functional capacity] finding be supported by a specific medical opinion, only that 
it be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the 

workplace.” (quotations omitted)). The record as a whole demonstrates that substantial 
evidence supports the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination. The ALJ based 
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, testimony, 
objective medical evidence records, and opinion evidence on the record. See generally Tr. 
18-30.                                                                    

    The ALJ summarized medical records from before Plaintiff’s alleged disability 
onset date to late 2021. For example, she discussed imaging of Plaintiff’s right knee from 
2018 showing a small meniscal tear. Tr. 21, 424-425. The ALJ considered 2019 imaging 
of Plaintiff’s left foot showing underlying osteoarthritic changes and Achilles enthesopathy 
as well as 2021 imaging of Plaintiff’s bilateral hips showing mild degenerative changes but 

no other significant changes. Tr. 21, 500, 669, 671. The ALJ also reviewed and noted the 
minimal  number  of  medical  records  concerning  Plaintiff’s  neuropathy  idiopathic 
peripheral. Tr. 21-22, 421, 650, 655.                                     
    The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s conversative treatment for his reported back and 
neck pain as well as Plaintiff’s decreased pain due to his use of gabapentin and tramadol. 

Tr. 22, 26-28, 568-569, 577, 632, 635, 665, 667, 671. For example, beginning in early 
2020, Plaintiff’s pain was stable even though he had been without pain medications for a 
few months. Tr. 26, 568, 577. Likewise, at a follow up visit with Dr. Huikko in March 
2020, Plaintiff reported that he had still been without regular pain medications and still had 
been “managing fairly well without the pain medication[s] but [was] still limited due to the 
pain.” Tr. 26, 568. Dr. Huikko prescribed tramadol for Plaintiff’s pain. Tr. 569. At follow 

up appointments with Dr. Huikko in September and November of 2020, Plaintiff reported 
that with gabapentin and tramadol his pain was “reasonably well managed.” Tr. 26-27, 632, 
635.                                                                      
    The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s reported pain in his right shoulder and his 
conversative treatment for that issue. Tr. 26. For example, in 2020 and 2021 Dr. Huikko 

administered steroid injections to Plaintiff’s right shoulder to address his shoulder pain. Tr. 
26, 633, 665, 667, 671. Plaintiff reported that he received “some good relief” from the 
injections. Tr. 667. Imaging of Plaintiff’s shoulder showed “no acute abnormalities or 
significant osteoarthritis changes.” Tr. 667. Plaintiff’s range of motion of his right shoulder 
was mildly limited because of pain and some generalized tenderness to palpation was 

present  but no  swelling  or  deformity  was  found.  Tr. 633,  671.  Muscle  strength  and 
coordination were both shown as normal. Tr. 633, 671.                     
    Imaging from 2018 of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine was also discussed by the ALJ. Tr. 
26. Such imaging showed early degenerative disc changes at L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1. Tr. 
26, 422. No focal protrusion and central or foraminal stenosis were noted with respect to 
the 2018 imaging. Tr. 422. Mild facet arthropathy was noted as present but the overall 

appearance of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine did not appear changed in any significant way 
compared to a prior exam. Tr. 422. Imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine from 2021 was also 
considered by the ALJ. Tr. 22, 24, 26-27. See, e.g., Tr. 674 (imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar 
spine showed “[n]o focal disc protrusion or extrusion. No compression fracture. No acute 
bone changes. Early disc degeneration at a L3/L4 level . . . no encroachment upon the 
neural elements and no evidence of neural foraminal stenosis or significant narrowing. No 

discrete  etiology  found  in  Plaintiff’s  symptoms.”);  Tr.  695-694  (imaging  showed  an 
unchanged appearance of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine). As discussed more above, the ALJ also 
considered imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine before and after the alleged disability onset 
date. Tr. 26-27, 418-419, 693, 703.                                       
    Medical opinions by Dr. Donovan and Caty Dom, M.D. on Plaintiff’s medical 

records were discussed, both of which were found to be unpersuasive by the ALJ. Tr. 21-
23, 27-28, 718. Opinions from state agency medical consultants were also considered and 
found to be persuasive by the ALJ. Tr. 27, 83-95, 96-108, 113-129, 130-146. The state 
medical consultants opined that Plaintiff was capable of a range of light work, including 
standing, walking, and sitting for about six hours in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff was 

also found to be capable of lifting and carrying 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds 
frequently, as well as occasionally climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 
113-129, 130-146. Plaintiff’s functional limitations were also thoroughly discussed by the 
ALJ, including the effects of Plaintiff’s obesity. Tr. 24-27, 512, 569. And lastly, Plaintiff’s 
own  subjective  reports  and  testimony  from  the  hearing  before  the  ALJ  were  also 
considered. Tr. 25, 60-65, 67, 70.                                        

    All  in  all,  the  record  reflects  improvements  from  conversative  treatment  for 
Plaintiff’s pain which included use of pain medications and steroid injections. The record 
also reflects mild decrease in range of motion yet normal muscle strength and coordination, 
and the same and or similar imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar and cervical spine.  
    The Court concludes that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the 
ALJ’s conclusion that the objective medical evidence is consistent with the ALJ’s residual 

functional capacity determination. It is not a basis for reversal if it were possible to reach 
a conclusion other than the one reached by the ALJ based on the objective medical 
evidence. See Igo v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We may not reverse simply 
because we would have reached a different conclusion than the ALJ or because substantial 
evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”); accord Fentress v. Berryhill, 

 (8th Cir. 2017).                                                     
 C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Finding Dr. Donovan’s Opinions Unpersuasive   
    In January 2021, Dr. Donovan wrote a letter in support of Plaintiff’s disability claim, 
offering the following opinions. Tr. 718. Dr. Donovan stated that Plaintiff’s main problem 
is with idiopathic peripheral neuropathy which affects his feet, legs, arms, and hands. Tr. 

718. Dr. Donovan opined that Plaintiff can only use a keyboard or mouse for no more than 
30 minutes every three to four hours due to numbness in his hands. Tr. 718. She further 
opined that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and venous stasis with 
edema affects his ability to sit and stand. Tr. 718. Plaintiff cannot sit for more than five to 
ten minutes and can walk for only ten to fifteen minutes. Tr. 718. With respect to Plaintiff’s 
pain medications, Dr. Donovan opined that his medications cause fatigue and decreased 

concentration. Tr. 718. As for his neck and back pain and fibromyalgia, Dr. Donovan 
opined that Plaintiff would have to miss at least one day a week of work. Tr. 718. And, 
lastly, Dr. Donovan opined that Plaintiff cannot lift more than ten pounds on an occasional 
basis, lacks the ability to do repetitive motions, lacks fine motor control of his hands, and 
is at a significant fall risk. Tr. 718. The ALJ found Dr. Donovan’s opinions unpersuasive 
because those opinions were not consistent with the record and unsupported. Tr. 28. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is unsupported 
by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not properly evaluate Dr. Donovan’s opinions. 
See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 17-22.                                         
    In evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions, an ALJ must consider “(1) 
whether they are supported by objective medical evidence, (2) whether they are consistent 

with other medical sources, (3) the relationship that the source has with the claimant, (4) 
the source’s specialization, and (5) any other relevant factors.” Bowers v. Kijakazi, 

 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing 

.1520c(c)). “The first two factors—
supportability2 and consistency3—are the most important.” 

 (citing § 404.1520c(a)). But 


2 The regulations define the factor of “supportability” as follows:       

    The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a 
    medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 
    finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will 
    be.                                                                  

.1520c(c)(1).                                              

3 The regulations define the factor of “consistency” as follows:          
“[n]o talismanic language is required for the ALJ to meet the requirements of § 404.1520c, 
only that the ALJ make it clear that they considered the supportability and consistency of 

an opinion.” Mario O. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-2469 (NEB/ECW), 

, at 
*11 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 

 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 9, 2023).                                                      
    The ALJ found Dr. Donovan’s opinions to be unpersuasive because her opinions 
“are inconsistent with the record and unsupported.” Tr. 28. According to the ALJ, Dr. 
Donovan’s opinions in the January 2021 letter “are out of proportion with the medical 

evidence record.” Tr. 28. In coming to this conclusion, the ALJ relied on a number of 
objective medical findings in the record documenting Plaintiff’s conversative treatment, 
improved symptoms, and relatively unchanged imaging. Tr. 26-28. The Court concludes 
that the ALJ did not err in her analysis of Dr. Donovan’s opinions.       
    Plaintiff argues that the November 2021 imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine (which 

was conducted after Dr. Donovan’s January 2021 letter in support of Plaintiff’s disability 
claim) supports Dr. Donovan’s opinions. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 18-19. Dr. Donovan’s 
January 2021 opinions, however, lack any mention of Plaintiff’s cervical spine, besides a 
brief statement that Plaintiff has “chronic neck pain.” Tr. 718. Contrary to Plaintiff’s 
assertions and as discussed more thoroughly above, the ALJ did consider and properly 




    The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the 
    evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the 
    medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be. 

.1520c(c)(2).                                              
characterize the imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine prior to the alleged disability onset 
date through the period at issue. Tr. 26-27.                              

    Next, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Donovan’s treatment notes support Dr. Donovan’s 
opinions. 

. A comparison of Dr. Donovan’s treatment notes demonstrates that 
her January 2021 opinions are not supported by her own treatment notes. See Davidson v. 
Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2009) (“It is permissible for an ALJ to discount an 
opinion of a treating physician that is inconsistent with the physician's clinical treatment 
notes.”).  For  example,  Dr.  Donovan’s  treatment  notes  briefly  mention  Plaintiff’s 

neuropathy, but a significant mention of neuropathy is lacking. Tr. 422, 460-466, 510-516. 
It does not follow, as Dr. Donovan opined in January 2021, that Plaintiff’s “main problem 
is idiopathic peripheral neuropathy which affects not only his feet and legs, but his arms 
and  hands.”  Tr.  28,  718.  Plaintiff’s  medical  records,  including  Dr.  Donovan’s  own 
treatment notes, fail to support this opinion.                            

    Plaintiff also takes issue with the lack of the use of the word “supportability” by the 
ALJ in her analysis. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 20. This argument is not persuasive. “The 
fact  that  the  ALJ  did  not  use  the  words  ‘supportability’  and  ‘consistency’  is  not 
determinative; word choice alone does not warrant reversal.” Atwood v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-
CV-1394 JAR, 

, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2022) (citing Kamann v. Colvin, 

 (8th Cir. 2013)).                                       
    Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide an explanation as to the 
consistency factor. Tr. 20-21. The ALJ “may discount or even disregard the opinion of a 
treating  physician  where  other  medical  assessments  are  supported  by  better  or  more 
thorough medical evidence.”  Fentress, 

 (citations omitted). Here, the ALJ 
relied on other, substantial evidence in the record that was inconsistent with Dr. Donovan’s 

opinions, including Plaintiff’s conversative treatment, improved symptoms, and largely 
unchanged  imaging.  See, e.g.,  Tr.  422,  662,  656-657,  674,  695 (noting degenerative 
changes of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine but no significant changes and no focal disc protrusion 
or extrusion); Tr. 693, 703 (noting most recent imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine showed 
issues with impingement but no focal disc protrusion or extrusion); Tr. 665, 670-671 
(noting complaints of shoulder pain were addressed with steroid injections); Tr. 510-516, 

632-633,  635,  (noting  controlled  pain  after  minimal  treatment  with  tramadol  and 
gabapentin); Tr. 568, 577 (noting pain was stable even without pain medications); Tr. 632-
633 (noting normal muscle strength and coordination); Tr. 665-667 (noting mild limits to 
Plaintiff’s range of motion); Tr. 512, 569 (noting Plaintiff’s obesity); Tr. 83-95, 96-108, 
113-129, 130-146 (noting state agency medical consultants opinions that Plaintiff was 

capable of a range of light work where he could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 
ten pounds frequently).                                                   
    Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the above records (which the ALJ replied upon in 
rejecting Dr. Donovan’s opinions, Tr. 24-28) do support the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. 
Donovan’s opinions are not consistent with the record. Tr. 28. For example, Dr. Donovan 

opined significant issues with idiopathic peripheral neuropathy, venous stasis with edema, 
fibromyalgia, and numbness, but, as shown above, other objective medical evidence is 
significantly lacking in that respect. While the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s situation, 
Dr. Donovan’s opinions are certainly “out of proportion with the medical evidence record.” 
Tr. 28.                                                                   

     Because the ALJ supported her findings with substantial evidence in the record, the 
ALJ was not required to adopt Dr. Donovan’s opinions. See Seth K. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-
76 (MJD/LIB), 

, at *5 (D. Minn. July 27, 2022) (“[T]he ALJ is not 
required to believe the opinion of a treating physician when, on balance, the medical 
evidence  convinces  her  otherwise.”),  report  and  recommendation  adopted,  

 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2022).  In sum, the ALJ gave “good reasons,” supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, to explain why Dr. Donovan’s opinions were not 
persuasive. See Anderson v. Astrue, 

 (8th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the 
ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Donovan’s opinions.                      
    Moreover, it is not the role of the Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the 
ALJ. See Schmitt, 

 (“Despite [the claimant’s] dissatisfaction with how the 

ALJ weighed the evidence, it is not this Court’s role to reweigh that evidence.”). “While it 
is not surprising that, in an administrative record which exceeds 1,500 pages, [Plaintiff] 
can point to some evidence which detracts from the Commissioner’s determination, good 
reasons and substantial evidence on the record as a whole support the Commissioner’s 
[residual functional capacity] determination and the decision to discount [Dr. Donovan’s] 

opinion[s].” See Fentress, 

 (citing Igo, 

). The Court will 
not  reverse  the  ALJ’s  decision  “simply  because  [it]  would  have  reached  a  different 
conclusion than the Commissioner or because substantial evidence supports a contrary 
conclusion.” 

 (citations omitted); see also Goff v. Barnhart, 

 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent 
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner’s 

findings,  the  court  must  affirm  the  Commissioner’s  decision.”).  Here,  the  ALJ’s 
determination  is  supported  by  good  reasons  and  substantial  evidence,  and  the  Court 
therefore finds that the ALJ did not err in assessing Dr. Donovan’s opinions.  
    In sum, based on the Court’s review of the record as a whole, the Court finds that 
the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence in 
the record. Because there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision, the Court 

may not reverse the decision merely because substantial evidence may exist which would 
have supported a different outcome, or because the Court could have decided the case 
differently.                                                              






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                        VI.  CONCLUSION                                  
    Based upon the record, memoranda, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons 

states above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:                                  
 1.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement, ECF No. 16, is DENIED.    
 2.  Defendant’s request for relief, ECF No. 20, is GRANTED.             
 3.  The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.                            
 4.  This matter is DISMISSED.                                           
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.                                      



Date: March 15, 2024          s/ Tong N. Leung                            
                             Tony N. Leung                               
                             United States Magistrate Judge              
                             District of Minnesota                       

                             Jeremy T. S. v. O’Malley,                   
                             Case No. 23-cv-202 (TNL)