Huizenga v. Independent School District No. 11
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota
Huizenga v. Independent School District No. 11
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Don Huizenga, Nancy Powell, and Jim Civ. No. 20-2445 (JWB/ECW)
Bendtsen,
Plaintiffs,
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER GRANTING
Independent School District No. 11, and DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
Anoka-Hennepin Education Minnesota SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(American Federation of Teachers Local
7007),
Defendants.
Douglas P. Seaton, Esq., and James V.F. Dickey, Esq., Upper Midwest Law Center,
counsel for Plaintiffs.
Kristin C. Nierengarten, Esq., and Michael J. Waldspurger, Esq., Rupp, Anderson,
Squires & Waldspurger, counsel for Defendant Independent School District No. 11.
David Aron, Esq., Eva Wood, Esq., and Margaret A. Luger-Nikolai, Education
Minnesota; and Faaris Akremi, Esq., and Leon Dayan, Esq., Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC,
counsel for Defendant Anoka-Hennepin Education Minnesota.
This is a Section 1983 lawsuit brought by certain municipal taxpayers against their
school district and local teachers union. Plaintiffs Don Huizenga, Nancy Powell, and Jim
Bendtsen challenge a provision in Defendant Independent School District 11’s (“ISD
11”) collective bargaining agreement with Defendant Anoka-Hennepin Education
Minnesota (“AHEM”). AHEM is the local affiliate of a trade union representing
educators in Minnesota. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the 3,000 teachers
working for ISD 11 are collectively permitted to use up to 100 days per school year to
conduct AHEM business. AHEM must reimburse the school district for the cost of
substitute teachers for union leave time (“union leave” policy). Plaintiffs allege that the
teachers engage in political advocacy during the union leave which violates Plaintiffs’
free speech rights under both federal and state constitutions and violates the state Public
Employer Labor Relations Act. Not all background facts will be recited here and can be
found in other reported decisions. See Huizenga v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 544 F. Supp.
3d 862(D. Minn., June 18, 2021), rev’d,44 F.4th 806
(8th Cir. 2022).
The district court at first dismissed this action for lack of standing, a ruling that
was appealed and that the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id. The Eighth Circuit restricted its
analysis to the face of the pleadings, finding that Plaintiffs’ Complaint adequately alleged
municipal taxpayer standing in ISD 11 sufficient to satisfy a threshold inquiry on a
motion to dismiss. Huizenga, 44 F.4th at 811–12.
After remand from the Eighth Circuit, the parties conducted discovery and have
cross-moved for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 91, 101.) Based on a fully developed
record, Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed for lack of Article III standing.
Plaintiffs clearly enough identify the school district activity they challenge and
most of the Plaintiffs appear to be municipal taxpayers in ISD 11. But what Plaintiffs
have not done sufficiently is to establish that municipal taxpayer revenues, as opposed to
other revenue sources, were in fact spent on the ISD 11 contested activity. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs lack standing and Defendant AHEM’s motion for summary judgment is
granted. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied as moot.
ANALYSIS
Article III standing is a prerequisite to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Bernbeck v. Gale,829 F.3d 643, 646
(8th Cir. 2016) (citing Lujan,504 U.S. at 561
). A plaintiff must generally show: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct of the defendant; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable ruling will redress the alleged injury. Young Am. Corp. v. Affiliated Comput. Servs. (ACS), Inc.,424 F.3d 840
, 843 (8th Cir. 2005). Article III requires “an injury [to] be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,561 U.S. 139, 149
(2010) (emphasis added). “An alleged injury cannot be too speculative for Article III purposes.” Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,747 F.3d 1025, 1030
(8th Cir. 2014).
The general rule is that plaintiffs cannot maintain a lawsuit based solely on their
taxpayer status, but municipal taxpayer standing is the exception to that rule. See
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487(1923). Typically, citizens’ financial interest in how a government spends their tax dollars is an issue of public concern best resolved in the political arena and not in the courts. The exception for municipal taxpayers is based on the “peculiar,” more direct relationship between a taxpayer and their municipality, establishing a “direct and immediate interest” in municipal expenditures that might violate the law.Id.
at 486–87.
Even so, some appellate courts question this municipal taxpayer right as a kind of
vestigial relic, given consistent Supreme Court rulings restricting generalized taxpayer
standing at all other levels of government—county, state, and federal. Protect Our Parks,
Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,141 S. Ct. 2583
(2021); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,641 F.3d 197
, 221–23 (6th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring).
For municipal taxpayer standing, Plaintiffs must show “a good-faith pocketbook
action,” such that each plaintiff has a direct and immediate financial interest in
challenging the municipality’s supposedly illegal conduct. Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849,
852(8th Cir. 2002) (citing Doremus v. Bd. Of Educ.,342 U.S. 429, 434
(1952)). A good- faith pocketbook action consists of “a measurable appropriation or disbursement” of municipal taxpayer funds “occasioned solely by the activities complained of.” Doremus,342 U.S. at 434
(citing Everson v. Bd. Of Educ.,330 U.S. 1
(1987)). So Plaintiffs “must actually be [] taxpayer[s] of the municipality” and “must establish that the municipality has spent [municipal] tax revenues on the allegedly illegal action” in a measurable manner. Huizenga,44 F.4th at 811
(quoting Protect Our Parks, Inc., 971 F.3d at 734)
(quotations omitted) (brackets added).
At the motion to dismiss stage, where “general allegations of injury, causation,
and redressability” were sufficient, the Eighth Circuit determined that Plaintiffs had
adequately pled Article III standing as municipal taxpayers. Id. at 811 (quotations
omitted). Plaintiffs’ standing rested on their contention that ISD 11 “spend[s] tax
revenues on the allegedly illegal action”—political advocacy during union leave—
“because the collective-bargaining agreement requires it to provide up to 100 days of
paid leave, and the union does not fully reimburse that expense.” Id. at 812 (quotations
omitted).
With discovery complete, Plaintiffs can no longer rest merely on the sufficiency of
general allegations. Plaintiffs must now establish standing “with the manner and degree
of evidence” required at summary judgment. Bernbeck, 829 F.3d at 646(quoting Lujan,504 U.S. at 561
). This means that Plaintiffs must set forth—either by affidavit or other evidence admissible at summary judgment—specific facts to satisfy each element of standing. Lujan,504 U.S. at 561
.
Under Eighth Circuit guidance, Plaintiffs must establish that they are municipal
taxpayers in the school district and “that the school district spend[s] tax revenues on the
allegedly illegal action because the collective-bargaining agreement requires it to provide
up to 100 days of paid leave, and the union does not fully reimburse that expense.” See
Huizenga, 44 F.4th at 811. They must provide evidence that goes beyond “mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy” for their claims to survive. Clay v. Credit Bureau Enters.,754 F.3d 535, 539
(8th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiffs do not meet their burden. The record does not show that the municipality
in the end spends any money on the union leave policy, let alone municipal tax revenues
specifically. Without evidence of a clear “dollars-and-cents” expense traceable to their
municipal tax payments, Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of establishing standing.
I. Municipal Taxpayer Status
Plaintiff Nancy Powell’s status bears separate attention as a municipal taxpayer.
She claims standing through property taxes paid by her husband, Dean Powell, on
property he owned before their marriage. The Powells have submitted property tax
statements from Anoka County as support for their claim. Those statements name only
Dean Powell as a county taxpayer. The Powells also each submitted personal declarations
claiming Nancy Powell’s interest in the property. (Doc. Nos. 24, 104, 105.) Personal
declarations are not enough to establish a legal interest. Submitting nothing further,
Nancy Powell has not established that she pays municipal taxes relevant to ISD 11. She
lacks standing for this reason as well as for the other reasons below applicable to her co-
plaintiffs.
II. No Expenditures Occasioned by the Union Leave Policy
Plaintiffs have not identified a measurable ISD 11 expenditure occasioned by the
allegedly illegal union leave policy. The record shows generally the ISD 11 funding for
teacher salaries and benefits but does not delineate which revenue sources support
individual ISD 11 initiatives. Furthermore, there is a lack of detailed allocation within the
funding that would enable tracing it back to specific sources of funding. So critically, in
terms of Article III standing, it is not possible to link this funding directly to Plaintiffs’
municipal tax contributions.
Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence fares no better. Plaintiffs contend that the specific
cost triggered by the union leave policy is the expense ISD 11 incurred in paying
substitute teachers to cover for teacher absences under the union leave policy. Two things
are undisputed: first, ISD 11 unilaterally set the substitute teacher rate per the collective
bargaining agreement; and second, AHEM fully reimbursed ISD 11 at that substitute
teacher rate for all absentee time under the union leave policy. (Doc. No. 96, Ex. 3 at 8;
Ex. 7 at 9:17–10:6.) The record reveals that AHEM paid the substitute teacher rate even
on the days no substitute teacher was necessary, such as days when teachers had no
student contact. (Id.)
ISD 11’s substitute teacher rate did not exist merely to serve the interests of the
union leave policy but was more broadly used across ISD 11. ISD 11 used the substitute
teacher rate in two overarching scenarios. Teachers could pay the substitute rate if they
wished to take extra personal days abutting scheduled school breaks. And teachers had
the option of selling back their excess sick days at the value of the substitute teacher rate.
(See id., Ex. 1, art. XIV, § 2, subd. 3; Ex. 1, art. XIV, § 1, subd. 7.) Setting aside attorney
arguments, the record contains no internal documents or testimony indicating that ISD 11
at any time incurred a financial deficit because of the union leave policy or that its
accounting was flawed in that regard. Furthermore, no expert evidence is offered on the
matter.
Plaintiffs’ contention that expenses related to the union leave policy exceeded
reimbursements relies on a table, attorney-created, that suggests a financial shortfall.
(Doc. No. 103 at 5–6.) The table itself relies on unclear data and unfounded assumptions,
and lists no actual expenses.1 For instance, Plaintiffs seek to compare ISD 11’s annual
1 Plaintiffs’ calculations are rhetorically characterized as “subsidies” to AHEM, and
not as specific costs incurred by ISD 11. In their analysis, Plaintiffs calculate what is
referred to as an “actual subsidy” allegedly provided to AHEM. They determine this by
establishing a “per diem [salary] range” for teachers who utilized leave, which is then
multiplied by the number of leave days taken. From this total, they subtract the substitute
teacher rate that AHEM reimburses. (Doc. No. 103 at 5–6.) This calculation is based on a
spreadsheet crafted by counsel, which records these “actual per diem salaries.” But the
salaries and benefits for union-member teachers to “per diem salaries,” in arguing that the
district’s reimbursement rate for substitute teachers is insufficient and leads to a financial
loss. Yet it is established that ISD 11 pays its teachers an annual salary, disbursed every
two weeks, which is not affected by individual days taken off for whatever the reason.
Plaintiffs have not directly challenged the rate ISD 11 independently sets for substitute
teacher reimbursement—a rate determined to cover various scenarios of teacher absences
and attendance. Plaintiffs’ table provides no calculation of AHEM reimbursements for
when there is no substitute teacher expense, as on days when there is no student contact.
No assessment is presented on how those sums affect Plaintiffs’ claimed loss calculus.
Finally, as with teacher pay, benefits for teachers are determined on an annual basis and
are not calculated or prorated daily, as Plaintiffs have suggested. The table and its
reliance on unsupported data and assumptions does not establish standing.
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d 722, cited favorably by the Eighth Circuit in its previous ruling, provides a useful comparison. See Huizenga,44 F.4th at 811, 812
. An advocacy group sought to prevent construction and
operation of a center on city park ground, alleging violations of the public trust doctrine.
But a separate foundation—not the city itself—was to pay for construction and operation
costs. The Seventh Circuit held that although municipal money would be spent on
support projects such as road management and utilities work, the plaintiffs did not allege
record lacks clear explanation of how they translated annual teacher salaries into daily
rates. This detail is crucial, considering the obvious varying work schedules of teachers.
that those expenditures violated public trust, so those payments could not be the basis for
municipal taxpayer standing. Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 735. Those expenses would
not have been “occasioned by” the allegedly illegal act. See id. (“If the allegedly illegal
conduct is the construction and operation of the Center, and taxpayer dollars aren’t being
spent on that conduct, then that alone is enough to defeat the plaintiffs’ municipal
taxpayer standing.”).
Similarly, the record here reflects one expense “occasioned by” the allegedly
illegal act—the union leave policy—which is payment of the substitute rate on days when
regular teachers take union leave. It is undisputed that AHEM reimburses ISD 11 for that
payment entirely. Plaintiffs have not shown that this policy results in the kind of actual
and non-speculative injury necessary for establishing municipal taxpayer standing. There
is no record of an actual unreimbursed expenses, or anything labeled a “subsidy” to
AHEM due to the union leave policy, as Plaintiffs contend.
Plaintiffs’ claim, at its core, is that ISD 11 should have received more
reimbursement for union leave, and they contend that the amount ISD 11 did receive
constitutes a financial shortfall that justifies municipal taxpayer standing. This claim does
not present a concrete, direct, immediate, or measurable financial loss. Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that ISD 11 received less in substitute teacher reimbursements than was
agreed upon, there is no allegation that the union unduly influenced the reimbursement
rates set by ISD 11, nor is there a claim of any agreement between the union and ISD 11
for the school district to subsidize the cost of union leave.
Plaintiffs’ argument here is of the same kind made in households every day—that
wages should be higher and expenses lower or that government spending should be more,
less, or allocated differently. Without more, merely disagreeing with how the government
determines rates or prices for its goods or services, including reimbursements, does not
grant standing under Article III. It does not establish a loss or injury necessary for
municipal taxpayer standing, even if supplemented by taxpayers' subjective assessments.
Plaintiffs have not established municipal taxpayer standing under Article III.
III. No Traceable Use of Municipal Tax Dollars
Even accepting, for the sake of argument, the assertions that ISD 11 was under-
reimbursed for union leave and that not receiving full reimbursement amounts to a
financial loss, Plaintiffs’ claim fails to establish municipal taxpayer standing for another
reason. There is no proof that Plaintiffs' municipal tax payments directly financed the
union leave policy, irrespective of the alleged financial shortfall.
Municipal taxpayer standing rests on the principle that taxpayers have a “direct
and immediate interest” in how their municipal taxes are spent. Huizenga, 44 F.4th at
810; see also Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 735 (“It is not enough to simply allege that [the municipality] is spending money; the existence of municipal taxpayer standing depends on where the money comes from.”); ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,490 U.S. 605, 613
(1989) (emphasizing that the interest must be “direct and immediate” to exempt municipal taxpayers from restrictions on generalized suits based on taxpayer status). In the absence of a clear linkage between Plaintiffs’ taxes and the municipal expenditure, standing for Plaintiffs is not established. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000) (“[T]he relevant showing for purposes of
Article III standing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”).
In examining ISD 11’s financial records and sources of funding, there is no clear
connection between municipal tax revenues and ISD 11’s expenditure on the union leave
policy. ISD 11 allocates funds from its General Fund to pay K–12 teachers, while the
Community Services Fund covers the costs of Early Childhood Family Education and
Adult Basic Education instructors. The record shows that during the 2020–2021 school
year, the General Fund totaled $541,941,280. (Doc. No. 96, Ex. 3 at 6). Within the
General Fund, $407,576,523 (75.2%) was provided by the State of Minnesota,
$26,623,484 (4.9%) by the federal government, and $101,208,533 (18.7%) by local tax
levies, with the remainder coming from other non-tax revenues. (Id., Ex. 2 at 28.) The
Community Services Fund totaled $21,935,724, with only 13.0% derived from local tax
levies. (Id. at 52, 53.)2
ISD 11 allocated $180,780,264 (33.4% of the General Fund) toward salaries and
benefits for K–12 teachers and an additional $1,767,815 (0.3%) for substitute teachers.
(Id. at 28, 33.) These details underscore that the primary financial support for ISD 11
came from state and non-local sources rather than municipal taxes. The funds were
pooled into a general, non-segregated fund. Tax dollars are not specifically earmarked for
2 The percentages do not meaningfully vary across the three years for which budget
data has been provided. (See id. (for the General Fund, 17.2% from 2018–2019 and
17.7% from 2019–2020; for the Community Services Fund, 13.0% from 2018–2019 and
12.0% from 2019–2020).) The 2020–2021 school year was the most recent school year
completed before discovery started and is therefore used as a representative sample.
distinct expenditures, making it impossible to attribute any part of the spending directly
to a particular source of income, such as municipal tax revenues. (Id., Ex. 3 at 6.)
Plaintiffs have not established a direct relationship between their municipal tax
dollars and the specific expenditures of ISD 11 on teacher salaries, benefits, or the hiring
of substitute teachers in instances of union leave. They have outlined and applied no
methodology by which such a connection could be assessed. “Municipal taxpayers have
standing to sue only when they have both identified an action on the [municipality]’s part
that is allegedly illegal and adequately shown that [municipal] tax dollars will be spent on
that illegal activity.” Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 736.
The Seventh Circuit, in addressing a similar situation involving a municipal
taxpayer challenge and the presence of multiple sources of revenue, stated that “[i]t
would be far too simplistic to conclude that the City is spending tax money on a project
simply because it is spending some money on a project.” Id. at 735–36 (emphasis in
original). With less than a fifth of ISD 11’s 2020–2021 General Fund coming from
municipal tax dollars, and for other reasons stated, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the
requirements for municipal taxpayer standing under Article III.
Without the necessary standing under Article III, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and does not reach Plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.
ORDER
Based on the above and on all the files, records, and proceedings here, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Anoka-Hennepin Education Minnesota’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 91) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs lack Article III
standing and therefore subject matter jurisdiction is absent; and
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 101) is DENIED as
moot.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: March 29, 2024 s/ Jerry W. Blackwell
JERRY W. BLACKWELL
United States District Judge Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Don Huizenga, Nancy Powell, and Jim Civ. No. 20-2445 (JWB/ECW)
Bendtsen,
Plaintiffs,
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER GRANTING
Independent School District No. 11, and DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
Anoka-Hennepin Education Minnesota SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(American Federation of Teachers Local
7007),
Defendants.
Douglas P. Seaton, Esq., and James V.F. Dickey, Esq., Upper Midwest Law Center,
counsel for Plaintiffs.
Kristin C. Nierengarten, Esq., and Michael J. Waldspurger, Esq., Rupp, Anderson,
Squires & Waldspurger, counsel for Defendant Independent School District No. 11.
David Aron, Esq., Eva Wood, Esq., and Margaret A. Luger-Nikolai, Education
Minnesota; and Faaris Akremi, Esq., and Leon Dayan, Esq., Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC,
counsel for Defendant Anoka-Hennepin Education Minnesota.
This is a Section 1983 lawsuit brought by certain municipal taxpayers against their
school district and local teachers union. Plaintiffs Don Huizenga, Nancy Powell, and Jim
Bendtsen challenge a provision in Defendant Independent School District 11’s (“ISD
11”) collective bargaining agreement with Defendant Anoka-Hennepin Education
Minnesota (“AHEM”). AHEM is the local affiliate of a trade union representing
educators in Minnesota. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the 3,000 teachers
working for ISD 11 are collectively permitted to use up to 100 days per school year to
conduct AHEM business. AHEM must reimburse the school district for the cost of
substitute teachers for union leave time (“union leave” policy). Plaintiffs allege that the
teachers engage in political advocacy during the union leave which violates Plaintiffs’
free speech rights under both federal and state constitutions and violates the state Public
Employer Labor Relations Act. Not all background facts will be recited here and can be
found in other reported decisions. See Huizenga v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 544 F. Supp.
3d 862(D. Minn., June 18, 2021), rev’d,44 F.4th 806
(8th Cir. 2022).
The district court at first dismissed this action for lack of standing, a ruling that
was appealed and that the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id. The Eighth Circuit restricted its
analysis to the face of the pleadings, finding that Plaintiffs’ Complaint adequately alleged
municipal taxpayer standing in ISD 11 sufficient to satisfy a threshold inquiry on a
motion to dismiss. Huizenga, 44 F.4th at 811–12.
After remand from the Eighth Circuit, the parties conducted discovery and have
cross-moved for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 91, 101.) Based on a fully developed
record, Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed for lack of Article III standing.
Plaintiffs clearly enough identify the school district activity they challenge and
most of the Plaintiffs appear to be municipal taxpayers in ISD 11. But what Plaintiffs
have not done sufficiently is to establish that municipal taxpayer revenues, as opposed to
other revenue sources, were in fact spent on the ISD 11 contested activity. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs lack standing and Defendant AHEM’s motion for summary judgment is
granted. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied as moot.
ANALYSIS
Article III standing is a prerequisite to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Bernbeck v. Gale,829 F.3d 643, 646
(8th Cir. 2016) (citing Lujan,504 U.S. at 561
). A plaintiff must generally show: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct of the defendant; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable ruling will redress the alleged injury. Young Am. Corp. v. Affiliated Comput. Servs. (ACS), Inc.,424 F.3d 840
, 843 (8th Cir. 2005). Article III requires “an injury [to] be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,561 U.S. 139, 149
(2010) (emphasis added). “An alleged injury cannot be too speculative for Article III purposes.” Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,747 F.3d 1025, 1030
(8th Cir. 2014).
The general rule is that plaintiffs cannot maintain a lawsuit based solely on their
taxpayer status, but municipal taxpayer standing is the exception to that rule. See
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487(1923). Typically, citizens’ financial interest in how a government spends their tax dollars is an issue of public concern best resolved in the political arena and not in the courts. The exception for municipal taxpayers is based on the “peculiar,” more direct relationship between a taxpayer and their municipality, establishing a “direct and immediate interest” in municipal expenditures that might violate the law.Id.
at 486–87.
Even so, some appellate courts question this municipal taxpayer right as a kind of
vestigial relic, given consistent Supreme Court rulings restricting generalized taxpayer
standing at all other levels of government—county, state, and federal. Protect Our Parks,
Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,141 S. Ct. 2583
(2021); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,641 F.3d 197
, 221–23 (6th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring).
For municipal taxpayer standing, Plaintiffs must show “a good-faith pocketbook
action,” such that each plaintiff has a direct and immediate financial interest in
challenging the municipality’s supposedly illegal conduct. Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849,
852(8th Cir. 2002) (citing Doremus v. Bd. Of Educ.,342 U.S. 429, 434
(1952)). A good- faith pocketbook action consists of “a measurable appropriation or disbursement” of municipal taxpayer funds “occasioned solely by the activities complained of.” Doremus,342 U.S. at 434
(citing Everson v. Bd. Of Educ.,330 U.S. 1
(1987)). So Plaintiffs “must actually be [] taxpayer[s] of the municipality” and “must establish that the municipality has spent [municipal] tax revenues on the allegedly illegal action” in a measurable manner. Huizenga,44 F.4th at 811
(quoting Protect Our Parks, Inc., 971 F.3d at 734)
(quotations omitted) (brackets added).
At the motion to dismiss stage, where “general allegations of injury, causation,
and redressability” were sufficient, the Eighth Circuit determined that Plaintiffs had
adequately pled Article III standing as municipal taxpayers. Id. at 811 (quotations
omitted). Plaintiffs’ standing rested on their contention that ISD 11 “spend[s] tax
revenues on the allegedly illegal action”—political advocacy during union leave—
“because the collective-bargaining agreement requires it to provide up to 100 days of
paid leave, and the union does not fully reimburse that expense.” Id. at 812 (quotations
omitted).
With discovery complete, Plaintiffs can no longer rest merely on the sufficiency of
general allegations. Plaintiffs must now establish standing “with the manner and degree
of evidence” required at summary judgment. Bernbeck, 829 F.3d at 646(quoting Lujan,504 U.S. at 561
). This means that Plaintiffs must set forth—either by affidavit or other evidence admissible at summary judgment—specific facts to satisfy each element of standing. Lujan,504 U.S. at 561
.
Under Eighth Circuit guidance, Plaintiffs must establish that they are municipal
taxpayers in the school district and “that the school district spend[s] tax revenues on the
allegedly illegal action because the collective-bargaining agreement requires it to provide
up to 100 days of paid leave, and the union does not fully reimburse that expense.” See
Huizenga, 44 F.4th at 811. They must provide evidence that goes beyond “mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy” for their claims to survive. Clay v. Credit Bureau Enters.,754 F.3d 535, 539
(8th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiffs do not meet their burden. The record does not show that the municipality
in the end spends any money on the union leave policy, let alone municipal tax revenues
specifically. Without evidence of a clear “dollars-and-cents” expense traceable to their
municipal tax payments, Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of establishing standing.
I. Municipal Taxpayer Status
Plaintiff Nancy Powell’s status bears separate attention as a municipal taxpayer.
She claims standing through property taxes paid by her husband, Dean Powell, on
property he owned before their marriage. The Powells have submitted property tax
statements from Anoka County as support for their claim. Those statements name only
Dean Powell as a county taxpayer. The Powells also each submitted personal declarations
claiming Nancy Powell’s interest in the property. (Doc. Nos. 24, 104, 105.) Personal
declarations are not enough to establish a legal interest. Submitting nothing further,
Nancy Powell has not established that she pays municipal taxes relevant to ISD 11. She
lacks standing for this reason as well as for the other reasons below applicable to her co-
plaintiffs.
II. No Expenditures Occasioned by the Union Leave Policy
Plaintiffs have not identified a measurable ISD 11 expenditure occasioned by the
allegedly illegal union leave policy. The record shows generally the ISD 11 funding for
teacher salaries and benefits but does not delineate which revenue sources support
individual ISD 11 initiatives. Furthermore, there is a lack of detailed allocation within the
funding that would enable tracing it back to specific sources of funding. So critically, in
terms of Article III standing, it is not possible to link this funding directly to Plaintiffs’
municipal tax contributions.
Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence fares no better. Plaintiffs contend that the specific
cost triggered by the union leave policy is the expense ISD 11 incurred in paying
substitute teachers to cover for teacher absences under the union leave policy. Two things
are undisputed: first, ISD 11 unilaterally set the substitute teacher rate per the collective
bargaining agreement; and second, AHEM fully reimbursed ISD 11 at that substitute
teacher rate for all absentee time under the union leave policy. (Doc. No. 96, Ex. 3 at 8;
Ex. 7 at 9:17–10:6.) The record reveals that AHEM paid the substitute teacher rate even
on the days no substitute teacher was necessary, such as days when teachers had no
student contact. (Id.)
ISD 11’s substitute teacher rate did not exist merely to serve the interests of the
union leave policy but was more broadly used across ISD 11. ISD 11 used the substitute
teacher rate in two overarching scenarios. Teachers could pay the substitute rate if they
wished to take extra personal days abutting scheduled school breaks. And teachers had
the option of selling back their excess sick days at the value of the substitute teacher rate.
(See id., Ex. 1, art. XIV, § 2, subd. 3; Ex. 1, art. XIV, § 1, subd. 7.) Setting aside attorney
arguments, the record contains no internal documents or testimony indicating that ISD 11
at any time incurred a financial deficit because of the union leave policy or that its
accounting was flawed in that regard. Furthermore, no expert evidence is offered on the
matter.
Plaintiffs’ contention that expenses related to the union leave policy exceeded
reimbursements relies on a table, attorney-created, that suggests a financial shortfall.
(Doc. No. 103 at 5–6.) The table itself relies on unclear data and unfounded assumptions,
and lists no actual expenses.1 For instance, Plaintiffs seek to compare ISD 11’s annual
1 Plaintiffs’ calculations are rhetorically characterized as “subsidies” to AHEM, and
not as specific costs incurred by ISD 11. In their analysis, Plaintiffs calculate what is
referred to as an “actual subsidy” allegedly provided to AHEM. They determine this by
establishing a “per diem [salary] range” for teachers who utilized leave, which is then
multiplied by the number of leave days taken. From this total, they subtract the substitute
teacher rate that AHEM reimburses. (Doc. No. 103 at 5–6.) This calculation is based on a
spreadsheet crafted by counsel, which records these “actual per diem salaries.” But the
salaries and benefits for union-member teachers to “per diem salaries,” in arguing that the
district’s reimbursement rate for substitute teachers is insufficient and leads to a financial
loss. Yet it is established that ISD 11 pays its teachers an annual salary, disbursed every
two weeks, which is not affected by individual days taken off for whatever the reason.
Plaintiffs have not directly challenged the rate ISD 11 independently sets for substitute
teacher reimbursement—a rate determined to cover various scenarios of teacher absences
and attendance. Plaintiffs’ table provides no calculation of AHEM reimbursements for
when there is no substitute teacher expense, as on days when there is no student contact.
No assessment is presented on how those sums affect Plaintiffs’ claimed loss calculus.
Finally, as with teacher pay, benefits for teachers are determined on an annual basis and
are not calculated or prorated daily, as Plaintiffs have suggested. The table and its
reliance on unsupported data and assumptions does not establish standing.
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d 722, cited favorably by the Eighth Circuit in its previous ruling, provides a useful comparison. See Huizenga,44 F.4th at 811, 812
. An advocacy group sought to prevent construction and
operation of a center on city park ground, alleging violations of the public trust doctrine.
But a separate foundation—not the city itself—was to pay for construction and operation
costs. The Seventh Circuit held that although municipal money would be spent on
support projects such as road management and utilities work, the plaintiffs did not allege
record lacks clear explanation of how they translated annual teacher salaries into daily
rates. This detail is crucial, considering the obvious varying work schedules of teachers.
that those expenditures violated public trust, so those payments could not be the basis for
municipal taxpayer standing. Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 735. Those expenses would
not have been “occasioned by” the allegedly illegal act. See id. (“If the allegedly illegal
conduct is the construction and operation of the Center, and taxpayer dollars aren’t being
spent on that conduct, then that alone is enough to defeat the plaintiffs’ municipal
taxpayer standing.”).
Similarly, the record here reflects one expense “occasioned by” the allegedly
illegal act—the union leave policy—which is payment of the substitute rate on days when
regular teachers take union leave. It is undisputed that AHEM reimburses ISD 11 for that
payment entirely. Plaintiffs have not shown that this policy results in the kind of actual
and non-speculative injury necessary for establishing municipal taxpayer standing. There
is no record of an actual unreimbursed expenses, or anything labeled a “subsidy” to
AHEM due to the union leave policy, as Plaintiffs contend.
Plaintiffs’ claim, at its core, is that ISD 11 should have received more
reimbursement for union leave, and they contend that the amount ISD 11 did receive
constitutes a financial shortfall that justifies municipal taxpayer standing. This claim does
not present a concrete, direct, immediate, or measurable financial loss. Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that ISD 11 received less in substitute teacher reimbursements than was
agreed upon, there is no allegation that the union unduly influenced the reimbursement
rates set by ISD 11, nor is there a claim of any agreement between the union and ISD 11
for the school district to subsidize the cost of union leave.
Plaintiffs’ argument here is of the same kind made in households every day—that
wages should be higher and expenses lower or that government spending should be more,
less, or allocated differently. Without more, merely disagreeing with how the government
determines rates or prices for its goods or services, including reimbursements, does not
grant standing under Article III. It does not establish a loss or injury necessary for
municipal taxpayer standing, even if supplemented by taxpayers' subjective assessments.
Plaintiffs have not established municipal taxpayer standing under Article III.
III. No Traceable Use of Municipal Tax Dollars
Even accepting, for the sake of argument, the assertions that ISD 11 was under-
reimbursed for union leave and that not receiving full reimbursement amounts to a
financial loss, Plaintiffs’ claim fails to establish municipal taxpayer standing for another
reason. There is no proof that Plaintiffs' municipal tax payments directly financed the
union leave policy, irrespective of the alleged financial shortfall.
Municipal taxpayer standing rests on the principle that taxpayers have a “direct
and immediate interest” in how their municipal taxes are spent. Huizenga, 44 F.4th at
810; see also Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 735 (“It is not enough to simply allege that [the municipality] is spending money; the existence of municipal taxpayer standing depends on where the money comes from.”); ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,490 U.S. 605, 613
(1989) (emphasizing that the interest must be “direct and immediate” to exempt municipal taxpayers from restrictions on generalized suits based on taxpayer status). In the absence of a clear linkage between Plaintiffs’ taxes and the municipal expenditure, standing for Plaintiffs is not established. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,528 U.S. 167, 181
(2000) (“[T]he relevant showing for purposes of
Article III standing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”).
In examining ISD 11’s financial records and sources of funding, there is no clear
connection between municipal tax revenues and ISD 11’s expenditure on the union leave
policy. ISD 11 allocates funds from its General Fund to pay K–12 teachers, while the
Community Services Fund covers the costs of Early Childhood Family Education and
Adult Basic Education instructors. The record shows that during the 2020–2021 school
year, the General Fund totaled $541,941,280. (Doc. No. 96, Ex. 3 at 6). Within the
General Fund, $407,576,523 (75.2%) was provided by the State of Minnesota,
$26,623,484 (4.9%) by the federal government, and $101,208,533 (18.7%) by local tax
levies, with the remainder coming from other non-tax revenues. (Id., Ex. 2 at 28.) The
Community Services Fund totaled $21,935,724, with only 13.0% derived from local tax
levies. (Id. at 52, 53.)2
ISD 11 allocated $180,780,264 (33.4% of the General Fund) toward salaries and
benefits for K–12 teachers and an additional $1,767,815 (0.3%) for substitute teachers.
(Id. at 28, 33.) These details underscore that the primary financial support for ISD 11
came from state and non-local sources rather than municipal taxes. The funds were
pooled into a general, non-segregated fund. Tax dollars are not specifically earmarked for
2 The percentages do not meaningfully vary across the three years for which budget
data has been provided. (See id. (for the General Fund, 17.2% from 2018–2019 and
17.7% from 2019–2020; for the Community Services Fund, 13.0% from 2018–2019 and
12.0% from 2019–2020).) The 2020–2021 school year was the most recent school year
completed before discovery started and is therefore used as a representative sample.
distinct expenditures, making it impossible to attribute any part of the spending directly
to a particular source of income, such as municipal tax revenues. (Id., Ex. 3 at 6.)
Plaintiffs have not established a direct relationship between their municipal tax
dollars and the specific expenditures of ISD 11 on teacher salaries, benefits, or the hiring
of substitute teachers in instances of union leave. They have outlined and applied no
methodology by which such a connection could be assessed. “Municipal taxpayers have
standing to sue only when they have both identified an action on the [municipality]’s part
that is allegedly illegal and adequately shown that [municipal] tax dollars will be spent on
that illegal activity.” Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 736.
The Seventh Circuit, in addressing a similar situation involving a municipal
taxpayer challenge and the presence of multiple sources of revenue, stated that “[i]t
would be far too simplistic to conclude that the City is spending tax money on a project
simply because it is spending some money on a project.” Id. at 735–36 (emphasis in
original). With less than a fifth of ISD 11’s 2020–2021 General Fund coming from
municipal tax dollars, and for other reasons stated, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the
requirements for municipal taxpayer standing under Article III.
Without the necessary standing under Article III, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and does not reach Plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.
ORDER
Based on the above and on all the files, records, and proceedings here, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Anoka-Hennepin Education Minnesota’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 91) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs lack Article III
standing and therefore subject matter jurisdiction is absent; and
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 101) is DENIED as
moot.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: March 29, 2024 s/ Jerry W. Blackwell
JERRY W. BLACKWELL
United States District Judge Reference
- Status
- Unknown