UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Michael Delgado Martinez,                 No. 24-CV-637 (KMM/DJF)        

               Petitioner,                                               

v.                                          ORDER                        

Eischen, FPC Duluth Warden                                               

               Respondent.                                               


    This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of 
Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster dated March 20, 2024. ECF 13. The R&R recommends 
that Petitioner Michael Delgado Martinez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 

 (ECF 1 (“Petition”)) be denied. Mr. Martinez filed objections 
(“Objections”) to the R&R on September 19, 2023. ECF 14. Based on a thorough review 
of the record, the Court accepts the R&R in full and Mr. Martinez’s Petition is dismissed. 
 I.   Background                                                         
    The Court finds that the R&R’s discussion of Mr. Martinez’s conviction, 
incarceration, and the basis for his petition (see ECF 13 at 1–2) is a thorough and 
accurate representation of the record. That discussion is incorporated here by reference, 
and the Court will only briefly restate certain facts before proceeding to its de novo 
analysis.                                                                 
    Mr. Martinez is an inmate at Federal Prison Camp Duluth (“FPC Duluth”). ECF 7 
at 3; Petition at 1. On February 9, 2022, Mr. Martinez was convicted in the Federal 

District Court for the Southern District of Texas of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm and ammunition under 

(g) and conspiracy to possess with intent 
to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine under 

 and 841(a)(1). 

 at 
1–2. He was subsequently sentenced to a 60-month term of imprisonment. 

 
Mr. Martinez spent time in several state and federal detention facilities, before arriving at 
FPC Duluth, his “designated” detention facility, on September 7, 2022. ECF 11 at 2.  

    Mr. Martinez has been accruing time credits pursuant to the First Step Act 
(hereafter “First Step Act time credits” or “FTCs”). See ECF 7 at 3. Federal prisoners 
may earn FTCs during their incarceration for each month they participate in certain 
approved programming and other activities related to decreasing recidivism. See 

(d)(4). FTCs allow a prisoner to shorten their term of incarceration. 

 The 

record indicates that Mr. Martinez has been participating in approved programming and 
accruing FTCs since arriving at FPC Duluth, and that as of March 1, 2024, the BOP 
calculated that Mr. Martinez had accrued 225 FTCs. ECF 7-1 at 2. As a result, 
Mr. Martinez now has a projected release date of June 18, 2024. 

       
    Mr. Martinez’s Petition asserts that he is entitled to additional FTCs for time spent 

in custody after his sentencing and before arriving at FPC Duluth. ECF 1 at 7–8 (“The 
BOP is not awarding me FSA Time Credits for the time between my sentencing . . . and 
my arrival at [FPC Duluth].”). The government opposes. See ECF 6 (Government’s 
Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus).                          
 II.  Standard of Review                                                 
    The Court reviews de novo any portion of the R&R to which specific objections 

are made. 

(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). In the absence of objections, 
the Court reviews the R&R for clear error. Nur v. Olmsted Cnty., 

, 
949 (D. Minn. 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and Grinder v. Gammon, 

 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). Here, the Court interprets Mr. Martinez’s objections as 
general objections to the R&R as a whole. Accordingly, the Court will review de novo 
the R&R’s recommendations.                                                

 III.  Analysis                                                          
    Judge Foster recommended that Mr. Martinez’s Petition be denied because it does 
not allege or provide any evidence that Mr. Martinez participated in FTC programming 
before his arrival at FPC Duluth. ECF 13 at 2. The Court agrees. There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that Mr. Martinez participated in any kind of program or activity that 

would have entitled him to accrue FTCs until Mr. Martinez reached FPC Duluth.  
    In his Objections, Mr. Martinez suggests that this focus—on whether he was in 
programming before arriving at FPC Duluth—is a “red herring” that avoids the true 
question raised in his Petition: whether the BOP’s policy regarding a prisoner’s eligibility 
to begin FTC accruals comports with the requirements of the First Step Act. See 

Objections at 2 (“[T]he FSA requires the BOP to make programming available to ALL 
prisoners. The better or more appropriate question is ‘what programs were available to 
Petitioner [before his arrival at FPC Duluth]?’”). Indeed, from the record available to the 
Court, it appears that under federal regulation and BOP rulemaking, a prisoner may only 
begin to accrue FTCs once they reach their designated facility of imprisonment. See ECF 
7-5 at 13–14 (U.S. Department of Justice Program Statement) (“An eligible inmate 

begins earning FSA Time Credits after the inmate’s term of imprisonment commences 
(the date the inmate arrives or voluntarily surrenders at the designated Bureau facility 
where the sentence will be served).”) (quoting 

(a)). In his Petition, 
Mr. Martinez did not explicitly raise the reasonableness of this BOP policy, instead 
alleging that he simply “did not receive” FTCs he was entitled to. See, e.g., Petition at 2.  
However, the Objections make clearer that Mr. Martinez’s focus is on a policy that 

prevented him from beginning FTC programming in the months before he arrived at FPC 
Duluth. See, e.g., Objections at 3 (discussing the “injustice borne out of the BOP’s 
insistence that Petitioner’s ability to earn credits be subject to their whim and beholden to 
the time they feel like getting him to his designated facility.”).        
    The Court acknowledges Mr. Martinez’s frustration. However, the reasonableness 

of the broad BOP policy concerning the commencement of FTC accruals cannot be 
adjudicated on this record. Mr. Martinez’s Petition is not a request for this Court to order 
the BOP to allow him to begin FTC programming before arrival at his designated facility, 
nor is it a request to receive FTCs for programming he completed prior to arriving in 
Duluth. It is instead a Petition asking this Court to unilaterally grant him FTCs he 

believes he would have earned, had he been able to begin qualified programming sooner. 
Such relief is plainly barred by the statute because the First Step Act is explicitly clear 
that FTCs are only granted when a prisoner “successfully completes”1 approved 
programming or activities. 

(d)(4)(A). The record before the Court 

indicates that Mr. Martinez has earned FTCs continuously since arriving at FPC Duluth, 
but there is no evidence of the successful completion of any FTC-qualifying programing 
or activities before his arrival at FPC Duluth. Therefore, the validity of the BOP’s policy 
is not even plainly before the Court. As such, the R&R is accepted and the Petition is 
dismissed.                                                                

 IV.  Order                                                              
    Based on the discussion above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT             
    1.  The Report and Recommendation (ECF 13) is ACCEPTED.              
    2.  Petitioner Michael Delgado Martinez’s Objections (ECF 14) are    
      OVERRULED.                                                         
    3.  Petitioner Michael Delgado Martinez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

      under 

 (ECF 1) is DENIED.                          
    4.  This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.                         
    Let judgment be entered accordingly.                                 

Date: April 12, 2024                                                      
                                    s/Katherine Menendez                 
                                  Katherine Menendez                     
                                  United States District Judge           

    1 The rate at which a prisoner earns FTCs for successfully completing approved 
programming and activities is also spelled clearly out in the statute and accelerates over 
the duration of the prisoner’s incarceration. 

(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). As such, 
there is no ambiguity as to whether Mr. Martinez’s FTC accruals have been properly 
calculated.                                                               

                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                    DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Michael Delgado Martinez,                 No. 24-CV-637 (KMM/DJF)        

               Petitioner,                                               

v.                                          ORDER                        

Eischen, FPC Duluth Warden                                               

               Respondent.                                               


    This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of 
Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster dated March 20, 2024. ECF 13. The R&R recommends 
that Petitioner Michael Delgado Martinez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 

 (ECF 1 (“Petition”)) be denied. Mr. Martinez filed objections 
(“Objections”) to the R&R on September 19, 2023. ECF 14. Based on a thorough review 
of the record, the Court accepts the R&R in full and Mr. Martinez’s Petition is dismissed. 
 I.   Background                                                         
    The Court finds that the R&R’s discussion of Mr. Martinez’s conviction, 
incarceration, and the basis for his petition (see ECF 13 at 1–2) is a thorough and 
accurate representation of the record. That discussion is incorporated here by reference, 
and the Court will only briefly restate certain facts before proceeding to its de novo 
analysis.                                                                 
    Mr. Martinez is an inmate at Federal Prison Camp Duluth (“FPC Duluth”). ECF 7 
at 3; Petition at 1. On February 9, 2022, Mr. Martinez was convicted in the Federal 

District Court for the Southern District of Texas of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm and ammunition under 

(g) and conspiracy to possess with intent 
to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine under 

 and 841(a)(1). 

 at 
1–2. He was subsequently sentenced to a 60-month term of imprisonment. 

 
Mr. Martinez spent time in several state and federal detention facilities, before arriving at 
FPC Duluth, his “designated” detention facility, on September 7, 2022. ECF 11 at 2.  

    Mr. Martinez has been accruing time credits pursuant to the First Step Act 
(hereafter “First Step Act time credits” or “FTCs”). See ECF 7 at 3. Federal prisoners 
may earn FTCs during their incarceration for each month they participate in certain 
approved programming and other activities related to decreasing recidivism. See 

(d)(4). FTCs allow a prisoner to shorten their term of incarceration. 

 The 

record indicates that Mr. Martinez has been participating in approved programming and 
accruing FTCs since arriving at FPC Duluth, and that as of March 1, 2024, the BOP 
calculated that Mr. Martinez had accrued 225 FTCs. ECF 7-1 at 2. As a result, 
Mr. Martinez now has a projected release date of June 18, 2024. 

       
    Mr. Martinez’s Petition asserts that he is entitled to additional FTCs for time spent 

in custody after his sentencing and before arriving at FPC Duluth. ECF 1 at 7–8 (“The 
BOP is not awarding me FSA Time Credits for the time between my sentencing . . . and 
my arrival at [FPC Duluth].”). The government opposes. See ECF 6 (Government’s 
Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus).                          
 II.  Standard of Review                                                 
    The Court reviews de novo any portion of the R&R to which specific objections 

are made. 

(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). In the absence of objections, 
the Court reviews the R&R for clear error. Nur v. Olmsted Cnty., 

, 
949 (D. Minn. 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and Grinder v. Gammon, 

 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). Here, the Court interprets Mr. Martinez’s objections as 
general objections to the R&R as a whole. Accordingly, the Court will review de novo 
the R&R’s recommendations.                                                

 III.  Analysis                                                          
    Judge Foster recommended that Mr. Martinez’s Petition be denied because it does 
not allege or provide any evidence that Mr. Martinez participated in FTC programming 
before his arrival at FPC Duluth. ECF 13 at 2. The Court agrees. There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that Mr. Martinez participated in any kind of program or activity that 

would have entitled him to accrue FTCs until Mr. Martinez reached FPC Duluth.  
    In his Objections, Mr. Martinez suggests that this focus—on whether he was in 
programming before arriving at FPC Duluth—is a “red herring” that avoids the true 
question raised in his Petition: whether the BOP’s policy regarding a prisoner’s eligibility 
to begin FTC accruals comports with the requirements of the First Step Act. See 

Objections at 2 (“[T]he FSA requires the BOP to make programming available to ALL 
prisoners. The better or more appropriate question is ‘what programs were available to 
Petitioner [before his arrival at FPC Duluth]?’”). Indeed, from the record available to the 
Court, it appears that under federal regulation and BOP rulemaking, a prisoner may only 
begin to accrue FTCs once they reach their designated facility of imprisonment. See ECF 
7-5 at 13–14 (U.S. Department of Justice Program Statement) (“An eligible inmate 

begins earning FSA Time Credits after the inmate’s term of imprisonment commences 
(the date the inmate arrives or voluntarily surrenders at the designated Bureau facility 
where the sentence will be served).”) (quoting 

(a)). In his Petition, 
Mr. Martinez did not explicitly raise the reasonableness of this BOP policy, instead 
alleging that he simply “did not receive” FTCs he was entitled to. See, e.g., Petition at 2.  
However, the Objections make clearer that Mr. Martinez’s focus is on a policy that 

prevented him from beginning FTC programming in the months before he arrived at FPC 
Duluth. See, e.g., Objections at 3 (discussing the “injustice borne out of the BOP’s 
insistence that Petitioner’s ability to earn credits be subject to their whim and beholden to 
the time they feel like getting him to his designated facility.”).        
    The Court acknowledges Mr. Martinez’s frustration. However, the reasonableness 

of the broad BOP policy concerning the commencement of FTC accruals cannot be 
adjudicated on this record. Mr. Martinez’s Petition is not a request for this Court to order 
the BOP to allow him to begin FTC programming before arrival at his designated facility, 
nor is it a request to receive FTCs for programming he completed prior to arriving in 
Duluth. It is instead a Petition asking this Court to unilaterally grant him FTCs he 

believes he would have earned, had he been able to begin qualified programming sooner. 
Such relief is plainly barred by the statute because the First Step Act is explicitly clear 
that FTCs are only granted when a prisoner “successfully completes”1 approved 
programming or activities. 

(d)(4)(A). The record before the Court 

indicates that Mr. Martinez has earned FTCs continuously since arriving at FPC Duluth, 
but there is no evidence of the successful completion of any FTC-qualifying programing 
or activities before his arrival at FPC Duluth. Therefore, the validity of the BOP’s policy 
is not even plainly before the Court. As such, the R&R is accepted and the Petition is 
dismissed.                                                                

 IV.  Order                                                              
    Based on the discussion above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT             
    1.  The Report and Recommendation (ECF 13) is ACCEPTED.              
    2.  Petitioner Michael Delgado Martinez’s Objections (ECF 14) are    
      OVERRULED.                                                         
    3.  Petitioner Michael Delgado Martinez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

      under 

 (ECF 1) is DENIED.                          
    4.  This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.                         
    Let judgment be entered accordingly.                                 

Date: April 12, 2024                                                      
                                    s/Katherine Menendez                 
                                  Katherine Menendez                     
                                  United States District Judge           

    1 The rate at which a prisoner earns FTCs for successfully completing approved 
programming and activities is also spelled clearly out in the statute and accelerates over 
the duration of the prisoner’s incarceration. 

(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). As such, 
there is no ambiguity as to whether Mr. Martinez’s FTC accruals have been properly 
calculated.