Webb v. City of Minneapolis

U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota April 17, 2024

Trial Court Opinion

            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                             
                DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA                                


Robert Webb,                               No. 23-cv-1836 (KMM/TNL)       

     Plaintiff,                                                      

v.

ORDER

City of Minneapolis, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Robert Webb filed his Complaint on June 19, 2023. Defendant City of
Minneapolis filed an Answer on July 17, 2023, and an Amended Answer on August 7,
2023. United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung held a Rule 16 conference and
issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order on September 12, 2023. Defendants Tser Cheng and
Christopher Lange filed Answers on January 4, 2024. On January 12, 2024, all three
Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c).1
By Local Rule, Plaintiff’s response to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
was due on February 2, 2024. Because Plaintiff failed to file a timely response, on
February 28, 2024, the Court canceled the upcoming hearing on the motion and

1 Other named Defendants in this case include Minneapolis Police Officers Robert
Calhoun and Luke Bakken. In their Rule 12(c) motion, Defendants explain that there is no
officer with the Minneapolis Police Department named Robert Calhoun and that Luke Bakken is
deceased. Understandably, neither of these Defendants has been served with the summons and
complaint.
instructed the parties to file letters addressing whether an extension of the deadline was
appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The parties complied with that instruction.
Under Rule 6(b), “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the

court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired
if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The
“excusable neglect” determination is equitable and involves consideration of all relevant
circumstances involved in the party’s failure to comply with a deadline. Hawks v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank,

591 F.3d 1043, 1048

 (8th Cir. 2010). Courts generally consider four 

factors, including “prejudice to the non-moving party, the length of delay, the movant’s 
good faith, and the reason for the delay.” Albright ex rel. Doe v. Mountain Home Sch. 
Dist.,

926 F.3d 942, 951

 (8th Cir. 2019). “The reason for the delay is a key factor in the 
analysis.”

Id.

                                                            
Three of these factors are essentially uncontested and each weighs in favor of 

granting  Plaintiff’s  request.  Defendants  do  not  argue  that  allowing  such  a  response 
would, in any way, result in unfair prejudice. Nor is there any suggestion that the delay 
caused by allowing Plaintiff an additional two weeks from the date of this Order would 
so prolong these proceedings that it would interfere with a relatively prompt, just, and 
inexpensive  resolution  of  this  litigation.  Further,  there  has  been  no  showing  that 

Plaintiff’s Counsel or Plaintiff acted in bad faith in failing to comply with the deadlines. 
Only the adequacy of the reason for the delay is in dispute. Plaintiff’s Counsel 
argued  that  his failure to file a timely response was the result of excusable  neglect 
because the intern in his office who was responsible for calendaring motions left the 
position as of January 1, 2024. In addition, Plaintiff’s Counsel states that he contracted 
COVID-19 in the first week of 2024 and had symptoms lasting over two weeks. As a 
result, Plaintiff’s Counsel candidly admits that he failed to calendar the motions and 

missed the deadline.                                                      
Defendants  argue  that  the  reasons  provided  by  Plaintiff’s  Counsel  do  not 
constitute excusable neglect. Defendants explain that on January 11th, the day before 
they filed the motion, they emailed Plaintiff’s Counsel to discuss Plaintiff’s willingness 
to voluntarily dismissal of some of the claims asserted in the complaint. Then, in the 

early afternoon of January 12th, Plaintiff’s Counsel responded to that email declining to 
dismiss. A few minutes later, counsel for the parties spoke on the phone  to discuss 
whether  any  settlement  negotiations  would  take  place  prior  to  a  decision  on  the 
Rule 12(c) motion. During the call, Defendants represent that Plaintiff’s Counsel was 
advised that the Defendants would be filing their motion later that day with a March 4th 

hearing  date.  Within  a  few  hours,  Defendants  filed  their  motion  and  supporting 
documents, which generated several emails to all counsel notifying them of the electronic 
filings. Under these circumstances, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s failure 
to calendar the motion does not constitute excusable neglect because he was able, despite 
his illness and the absence of his intern, to engage in email and phone communications at 

the time the motion was filed and reasonably should have placed the filing deadline on 
his calendar, asked for an extension due to his illness, or taken some other appropriate 
steps.                                                                    
Although Defendants raise valid concerns and the Court finds that these facts 
weigh slightly against a finding of excusable neglect, the Court will nevertheless grant 
Plaintiff’s  request.  Defendants  are  correct  that  the  circumstances  here  indicate  that 

Plaintiff’s  Counsel  had  notice  of  the  filing  of  the  motion  and  opportunities  to  act 
diligently. However, the essence of all excusable neglect is that it involves, to some 
degree  or another, negligent conduct by a party or  that party’s representative. What 
Defendants have pointed out is that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s failure to calendar the motion 
was negligent, and Plaintiff’s Counsel has not denied that. Nevertheless, neither the fact 

that Plaintiff’s Counsel communicated with Defendants around the time the motion was 
filed,  nor  the  substance  of  those  communications  demonstrate  that  the  symptoms 
Plaintiff’s Counsel experienced played no role in Plaintiff’s Counsel’s failure to act as 
diligently as he should. It is also not lost on the Court that Plaintiff’s Counsel operates a 
small practice without significant support staff. While this means that he must take steps 

to ensure that he meets deadlines in the future and the law does not create exceptions to 
procedural rules for solo practitioners, the realities of such a practice must be taken into 
account when making an equitable determination such as this.              
Considering all the relevant factors together, including the absence of prejudice to 
Defendants, the relatively brief delay, the absence of bad faith, and the Court’s preference 

for resolution of disputes on their merits, with input from both sides on the legal issues 
presented,  the Court  will grant Plaintiff’s request for permission to file an untimely 
response to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.             
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:                              
1.  Plaintiff  shall  file  a  response  to  Defendants’  Motion  for  Judgment  on  the 
  Pleadings within 14 days of the date of this Order.                

2.  Defendants shall file a reply in support of their Motion for Judgment on the 
  Pleadings within 14 days after Plaintiffs’ response is filed.      
3.  Upon receipt of the briefing permitted by this Order, the Court will determine 
  whether to set a hearing on the motion or to take the matter under advisement 
  based on the written submissions.                                  


Date: April 17, 2024             s/Katherine Menendez                     
                            Katherine Menendez                       
                            United States District Judge